Russia and Contemporary
East Asia: Also on the Interactionof Sino-Russian-Japanese
Trilateral Relationsin the Early Twenty-first Century
FENG Shaolei

As President Vladimir Putin has been vigorously boosting an east-oriented
diplomatic strategy over the last several years, contemporary relations
between Russia and East Asia have become the focus for discussion
among international academics and decision-makers. Yet the focal pointof relations between Russia and East Asia is in the trend of
Sino-Russian-Japanese trilateral relations. Will the trilateral relationshipbecome a new start of multilateral cooperation in the new century, or will
it become a dangerous axis triggering turmoil throughout Northeast Asia,
toppling the existing global order?
Reflections on this question involve not only judgments on theinternal development of the three countries as well as development of
their foreign policies, but also a lucid understanding and interpretation of
the mutual relations and the complicated interaction arising out of it. Even
more imperative is the linkage within the Northeast Asian region in which
the three countries are located, and the entire international scenario needs
to be further probed so that a more comprehensive and objective
understanding of the above-mentioned important objective can beachieved.

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Major Contextual Factors Influencing Current Russian-East
Asian Relations
James F. Hoge Jr., editor of the Foreign Affairs journal, pointed out in his
article “A Global Power Shift in the Making” in the July/August 2004
issue of that journal that “The transfer of power from West to East isgathering pace and soon will dramatically change the context for dealing
with international challenges—as well as the challenges themselves.
Many in the West are already aware of Asia’s growing strength. Thisawareness, however, has not yet been translated into preparedness.” 1
Almost at the same time, on July 9, 2004, the Washington Post publishedan op-ed piece by Henry Kissinger under the title “A Global Order in
Flux,” in which Kissinger commented that with the worsening anddeepening chasm coming into shape with the War on Iraq, the focus ofinternational affairs is shifting to the Pacific region. Almost all the major
players on the world stage are adjusting their roles. Such changes are at
the level of fundamental concepts, instead of being mere tacticalconsiderations.2
The author of this article does not completely agree with the above
two writers. Despite indications that the focus of international affairs has
shifted in certain areas, this does not mean the shift is complete. However,it remains an indisputable fact that East Asia has had unprecedentedly
significant influence in global affairs.
If there is truth in the observations made by these two scholars, we
can conclude that the most important region in the new focus ofinternational affairs, namely the Asia-Pacific region, is Northeast Asia.
The Northeast Asia region is a confluence of tremendous forces ofmajor powers, namely the United States, China, Japan, Russia and even
Europe, which have been actively engaged in exercising influence overthis region. According to statistics of the World Bank, economic
development in the world since the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s has been infavor of East Asia, with annual growth rates of 6.67 percent, 7.87 percent
and 7.29 percent, more than three percent higher than the average growth
1

James F. Hoge Jr., “A Global Power Shift in the Making,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 4(July–August, 2004): 2–7.
2
Henry Kissinger, “A Global Order in Flux,” Washington Post, July 9, 2004.

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rate of the world economy. Apparently, China and Japan in Northeast
Asia have been respectively making significant contributions.
With East Asia’s economic growth gaining obvious speed over the
rest of the world, the gross volume of China’s export and import ranked
fourth in the world trade, namely $851.2 billion in 2003, 40.3 times higher
than that in 1978, which amounted to $20.6 billion. Different from thesituation during the economic take-off of Japan, China’s trade growth hasprovided neighboring countries with tremendous market opportunities. In
2003, China’s export volume reached $412.84 billion, 36.9 times higher
than it was in 1978, which amounted to $10.89 billion, becoming thethird-largest import country in the world after the US and Germany. Even
when international commodity imports dropped by one percent in 2001
and increased by 1.6 percent in 2002, China’s import volume still gained
8.2 percent and 21.2 percent. When world trade had a recovery growthrate of 4.5 percent in 2004, China’s import volume showed a 39.9-percent
rise, in which imports from Asian countries grew by 42.4 percent, higher
than imports from the US (24.3 percent) and the EU (37.77 percent).
Academics around the world almost unanimously agree that China’s
domestic demand has provided the world, especially Asian countries, withgood opportunities.
While the Northeast Asian region is demonstrating a strong impetus
to sustain development, the region has not yet solved its old problems.
Firstly, the integration of Northeast Asia or the whole East Asian region
has greatly lagged behind that of Europe and North America. Secondly,
although the Cold War confrontation became less serious as early as theearly 1970s in the Northeast Asian region, the formal end of the Cold War
atmosphere came much later in this region than in Europe, as this region
has witnessed the split-up of two countries since the end of World War II,
namely China and the Korean Peninsula. In fact, an unprecedented
situation has emerged in Northeast Asia: for more than 2000 years, China
was a considerably strong power with Japan having retreated to thefringes. However, in the past 150 years or so, Japan became increasingly
stronger while China declined to a very weak position. Yet since theinception of the new century, China and Japan, the two countries that havenever simultaneously been in possession of great strength, have become
two major players in the international arena at the same time. Thissituation is bound to bring great possibilities of change to regional
development.

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Accompanying the eastward shift in international focus is the shift in
Russia’s geoeconomic and political focus. In his annual address, President
Putin said, “Today, the Asia-Pacific region is becoming the most dynamic
center of world economic development, and our foreign policy line on
deepening relations with the Asia-Pacific region should be closely tied up
with domestic tasks, with the promotion of potential Russian interests
towards using these ties to further develop the economy of Siberia and theFar East.”3 Sergei Karaganov from the Institute of European Studies,
Russia’s Academy of Sciences, provided annotative remarks to President
Putin’s words: Since the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000, Russia
has attempted to bring Russia’s policies more in line with Europe. This
experiment did not succeed partly because of various external factors, andpartly because of Russia’s unsystematic policies, but more importantly,
because of the exclusiveness of the European Economic Community,
which has become increasingly reluctant to adopt active policies indealing with external matters. Therefore, the existing relationship with
Europe and the general trends in international relations have made Russia
embrace pluralistic policies in terms of geopolitics, including policies thatencourage closer links with Asian countries.4 It seems that the strategies
of NATO to expand simultaneously with the EU have somehow pushed
Russia to maintain a more balanced attitude towards the East and the West.
The so-called “color revolutions,” climaxing in 2004 and 2005, initiatedturbulence in the former Soviet region and moreover, directly drew Russia
closer to the East Asian region.
Indeed, one of the most important international contexts for the studyof mutual relations among China, Russia and Japan is the fact that
Northeast Asia has become the major focus of international economic andpolitical attention. In this regard, domestic political and economic trends
are apparently the internal dynamic for the three countries’ respective
external policies. First, within several years following the start of thetwenty-first century, the domestic political and economic systems in
China, Russia and Japan have been facing deepening reform andadjustment, and second, in varying degrees, economic growth andrecovery have emerged in these three countries. Third, what is more
noteworthy is that the consciousness of national identity in the three
3
4

Vladimir Putin, President Annual Address, Moscow, 2004. www.strana.ru.
Sergei Karaganov, “A President Out of His Time,” The Russia Journal, July 28, 2004.

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countries has been more or less boosted. The emergence of this mentalityof national identity can lead to the rise of nationalism if it is not properly
controlled and managed.
To sum up, current relations between Russia and East Asia are at aphase of unprecedented, profound, overall, regional and even internalchanges in different countries.

Bilateral Relations among China, Russia and Japan since theBeginning of the New Century
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, bilateral relations among
the three countries have their own distinct and unique features, while
possessing several shared characteristics. Each pair of bilateral relations isboth independent and closely mutually related.

Maturing Sino-Russian Relations
In fact, the Sino-Russian (Soviet) relationship has experienced threestages, namely the stage of empire, the stage of revolution and the stage ofreform. The stage of empire refers roughly to the bilateral relationshipbefore Russia’s October Revolution in 1917. The stage of revolution is
between the October Revolution and the end of China’s Cultural
Revolution. The stage of reform started from the end of China’s Cultural
Revolution, through the collapse of the Soviet Union, and has continued
until the present day. Sino-Russian relations in the three stages aredifferent with issues and concerns unique to the particular times. However,
the three stages are linear with links between each stage. Each new stage
would inherit legacies from its historical past.
Talking about the level of present-day Sino-Russian relations is notwithout controversy. Government leaders of both countries tend to use thephrase “the best in history” when describing current bilateral relations.
Given the volume of bilateral trade, the consensus reached by the top of
the governments on a series of important issues, and the steadfast andflexible posture that the bilateral relationship takes when major important
issues occur, “the best in history” is apparently not an exaggeration.
However, on the other hand, calling the bilateral relations “the best in
history” is relative as there are still important challenges to meet in
Sino-Russian relations.

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FENG SHAOLEIThis new era has the following unique features: firstly, the heads ofstate of both governments are personally involved in pushing ahead
development of the relationship, while on the other hand, there has been
an unprecedented concern regarding Sino-Russian relations at a
non-governmental level. Reports on China-Russian affairs have been eye
catching in the Chinese media. Secondly, significant breakthroughs havebeen achieved on a number of issues, while patient negotiations have been
carried out in dealing with major challenges under the principle of mutual
trust. In the areas of politics and security, Sino-Russian relations haveendured changes in leadership in both countries and have moved aheadsmoothly. Heads of state of both countries have based the bilateralrelationship on the principle of “strategic partnership” to reach agreements
on various issues including China-Russia border disputes, anti-terrorism,
anti-separatism, the War on Iraq, Russia’s accession to the WTO, etc. In
economic and trade relations, bilateral trade has gained an annual increaseof 20 percent over the past six years. The volume of trade is expected toreach or even exceed $30 billion in 2006. The bilateral communiqué evenset the target for 2010’s bilateral trade volume at $100 billion. This is wellover the previous general estimate made by scholars in both countries. In
the sensitive area of military and technological cooperation, some scholars
estimate that even after the EU countries reopen the sale of weaponry andhigh technology to China, Russia will still be one of China’s mostimportant partners in military and technological cooperation. And, inparticular, the joint military exercise conducted by China and Russia inthe summer of 2005 has become a major event in the development ofbilateral relations.
What is especially worth noting is that, first, President Putin has beenpushing forward the development of Russia’s far eastern territory, while
China has been engaged in revitalizing the traditional old industrial basein Manchuria. The conjoining strategies for development in both countries
provide a sound basis for cooperation between the two countries. Second,
not only are the two countries starting to cooperate in developing the
remote, less developed regions of each country, but economic cooperation
between the more developed areas is also substantially catching up. For
example, Shanghai and St. Petersburg enjoy a sister-city relationship. In
recent years, big enterprises in Shanghai have been leading cooperation in
major projects, including large-scale investments in St. Petersburg’s
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the “Baltic Pearl” project, have achieved significant progress. Third, theissue of investment and protection of safe trade in China and Russia, anissue of great concern to nationals of both countries, is being tackled
further. It is expected that the Chinese and Russian governments will signan Agreement on Encouragement and Protection of Mutual Investment in
the near future. The Agreement will bring considerable improvement to
the trade and investment environments of both countries.
All in all, the fact that both countries are able to make adjustments
and push forward bilateral relations when major problems and challenges
occur provide ample justification to the conclusion that Sino-Russian
relations are moving ahead toward a more mature level.
The issue of the China-Russia energy pipeline has been the focus ofattention in the international community. Although non-government
opinions as reported in the media are quite heated, with frank negotiationand sincere communication, a breakthrough has been made as a result. (Alater section of this article will discuss this issue further.)
Apart from cooperation in energy issues, immigration control
between China and Russia has been another major focus of media
attention. Since the spring of 2004, senior Russian officials, such as Sergei
Prikhod’ko, foreign affairs aide to the Russian presidency, have written to
indicate that the so-called Chinese emigration to Russia’s Far East
territory “should not be exaggerated as has been done by the media. The
total number of Chinese nationals regularly residing in Russia is no morethan 150,000 to 200,000, while the official census made by Russianauthorities is as low as 35,000.” Untrue reports exaggerating the numberof Chinese immigrants in Russia are thus rebuffed by such senior officials
in foreign affairs as Prikhod’ko.5
Major problems for bilateral relations between China and Russia
include, first, the development in bilateral relations still lagging behind therespective internal development of each country. In other words, mutual
understanding of the profound internal changes of both systems, or thedevelopment strategies rapidly taking place in both China and Russia, stillneeds to be deepened although great improvement has been made in thisregard. Second, both China and Russia should improve their capacity for
effective management in relation to the development of bilateral relations.
5Sergei Prikhod’ko, “Moskva—Pekin: My nuzhny drug drugu,” Rossiia v Global’noi
politike 2, no. 2 (2004): 166–171.

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FENG SHAOLEIFor example, criminal activities in bilateral commerce are yet to be totallycurbed. Third, insufficient cultural exchange between China and Russia is
one of the most acute problems. Generally speaking, exchange between
the two peoples at the humanistic and cultural levels are far fromcompatible with the status of the two great countries, each with a longcultural and historical heritage, or with the status of the two biggest
neighboring developing and transition countries. Only when suchexchanges reach adequate levels can a mutual trust mechanism be soundly
built.

Japan-Russia Relations in Upheaval
While China-Russia relations have been moving ahead more steadily after
the end of the Cold War, Japan-Russia relations have been characterized
by false starts and upheavals.
The end of the 1990s witnessed a peak in Japan-Russia relations.
With Russia’s initiative to push forward its Euro-Asian-based diplomacy,
and Japan’s so-called “three principles of Hashimoto,” Japan and Russia
drew closer. The Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations signed in
1993 pointed out that the two countries should sign a peace treaty andsolve the Northern Territories dispute. According to the Declaration,
Japan would be involved in large-scale cooperative development of theNorthern Territories, and even the whole Kurile Islands. Meanwhile,
Japan would support Russia’s attempt to join APEC, while Russia would
support Japan’s attempt to become a permanent member of the UN
Security Council. However, Boris Yeltsin aborted his visit to Tokyo at thelast minute in the face of strong domestic opposition at the end of 1998.
Senior government officials and analysts believed that it was almost
impossible for the two countries to sign a peace treaty before 2000.
After Putin took presidency in 2000, two Japanese prime minsters,
Mori Yoshiro and Koizumi Junichiro, devoted their energies to promoting
the development of Japan-Russia relations, the result of which was a visit
in January 2003 by Koizumi to Russia. The two governments reached anagreement according to which Russia would continue its support of Japan
to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and Japan
would support Russia’s bid to accede to the WTO. Japan would also
welcome Russia taking part in the ASEM. Koizumi displayed great
enthusiasm in the energy diplomacy with Russia, and even raised thequestion of Russia building an oil pipeline from East Siberia to Nakhodka.

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Since then, Japan has promised Russia to not only invest in the Sakhalin 1
and 2 projects, but also to provide a $7 billion (which was later raised to$13 billion) loan as a guarantee to help Russia build the pipeline from
Angarsk (later changed to Taishet) to Nakhodka. The Japanese
government has started an unprecedented lobbying campaign to Russia for
the Far East oil pipeline. Although negotiations between Japan and Russia
concerning the Far East pipeline are yet to be concluded, various signs
show that Japan-Russia relations may not be developing as speculated bysome critics, i.e., given Japan’s enormous investment, Russia could easily
build the pipeline according to Japan’s blueprint, and soon solve thedispute over the Northern Territories. On September 2, 2004, Koizumi
inspected the four disputed islands, trying to exert pressure on Russia.
This, in fact, indicated that the territorial dispute has been put on theagenda between Japan and Russia. Some Russian scholars estimated thatthe value of the four islands is $2.5 trillion, equivalent to six years’ GNP
of Russia. In this regard, Russia will not easily concede on the Northern
Territories dispute.
During President Putin’s visit to Japan in November, 2005, for the
first time since his coming to power, both sides signed 12 agreements tostrengthen bilateral cooperation, including Japan’s support of Russia’s
accession to the WTO, and confirmed that they would attempt to reach an
agreement on the oil pipeline in the Far East in 2006. But no flexibility
has been seen in the most crucial issue of the Northern Territories.
Japanese scholars have several predictions concerning thedevelopment of Japan-Russia relations in the twenty-first century. First,
Russia has drawn significantly closer to Western countries after thecollapse of the Soviet Union, even sharing ideology with the West. Afterthe 9/11 terrorist attacks, Russia has actively supported America’s
campaign against terrorism, allowing the United States access to and entry
into Central Asia. This policy orientation is in line with that of Japan.
Although Japan is situated in East Asia, it is already a member of theWestern countries. The closer Russia becomes to the West, the better it
would develop its relations with Japan. The Russia-Japan relationshipwould become better, and even serve as a containment of the
China-Russia relationship.
The second opinion is that although Russia is drawing closer to theUnited States and other Western countries, this does not necessarily mean
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FENG SHAOLEI

Putin’s closeness with the West does not originate from shared concepts,
but is a reflection of his pragmatic principles considering Russia’snational interests. Russian scholar Andrei Piontkowski believes that “there
is not much feeling towards each other between America and Russia, nor
are there many shared values. The only affinity lies with similarities inboth countries’ geopolitical interests.” Some Japanese scholars believethat given the context that Putin’s support of the United States’
anti-terrorist campaign has not received support from Russianconservatives, especially as the Russian media believes that Russia hasdone so at a great price, the West has not given Russia the expected
returns but rather, constraints and containments resulting from theeastward expansion of NATO and the EU, and mutual distrust between
Russia and the United States has become resurgent. With this internationaland domestic background, Putin is not likely to give much concession to
Japan.
A third group of academics points out that constructive considerationof Russia-Japan relations should break out of the framework of Russia’s
relations with the West. The Russo-Japanese relationship has uniquefeatures independent of Russia’s relations with the West, and is notnecessarily subordinate to US-Russia relations.6
I think that given the above-mentioned opinions, the following
conclusions can be made. First, the development of Japan-Russia relations
can be traced to domestic developments in Russia and Japan in the recent
decade. Both Japan and Russia have experienced almost ten continuous
years of economic crisis and depression, especially the East Asianfinancial crisis of 1997 and the Moscow financial crisis in 1998. The twocountries have just walked out of the quandary toward recovery andgrowth, but there are enormous problems pending a solution, including
business group interests, systemic issues and different directions ofdevelopment, all of which need to be adjusted, tackled, integrated andcoordinated. Within the context of resurgent nationalism in both countries,
compromise is not likely to be expected on such major issues as theNorthern Territories dispute. Second, given the context of the shift in theinternational political and economic focus and the new trends in the
Northeast Asian geopolitical situation, both Russia and Japan need to seek
6

KIMURA Hiroshi, “Iaponskoe napravlenie vneshnei politiki Rossii,” Mirovaia ekonomika
i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2003, no. 3: 84–94.

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a new strategic balance. It is no easy job to maintain and develop the
momentum of cooperation between Japan and Russia while readjusting
the strategic balance.

Sino-Japanese Relations as the Backgroundto Russian-East Asian relations
China and Japan are close neighbors. Even during the Cold War, the two
peoples had very impressive friendly exchanges. However, Sino-Japaneserelations have recently undergone serious difficulties since theestablishment of a formal diplomatic relationship in the early 1970s.
First, with a series of events after Koizumi took power, especially his
five consecutive visits to Yasukuni Shrine, it has been very difficult for
both China and Japan to find the opportunity to hold top-level meetings in
the past several years. Second, different from expectations of “coldpolitical relations with hot economic ties,” there are signs that the growthof Sino-Japanese economic and trade relations has been slowing down.
Generally speaking, the proportion of trade with China in Japan’s volume
of international trade is becoming more and more significant. In 2000, it
was 9.9 percent, but in 2003, it was as high as 15.6 percent, only five
percent less than that with the US, Japan’s biggest trade partner. Thisshows that Japan’s dependence on China in terms of trade is increasing.
On the other hand, the proportion of China-Japan trade is dropping in
China’s international trade, from 20 percent in the early 1990s to 15.7
percent, close to the lowest level experienced in 1992 (15.3 percent).
Since 1993, Japan had been China’s biggest trade partner, but between
January and May, 2004, the trade volume between China and the EU
overtook that between China and Japan, making the EU China’s biggest
trade partner, with Japan retreating to second place. Despite an increase ofsome 12 percent in trade volume between China and Japan in 2005 overthe previous year, this was the 11th consecutive year in which the growthof trade volume between China and Japan was lower than the averageincrease in China’s international trade. Although China has become thebiggest trade partner of Japan, the proportion of China’s export to Japan to
its total export is on the decline. Third, non-governmental concern
regarding Sino-Japanese relations has been on the rise. The incident
during the final game of the Asia Cup soccer match in the summer of
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cities in 2005, indicates that disharmony in Chinese and Japanese public
opinion is considerably significant.
What effects will Sino-Japanese relations have on Russia’s role in
East Asia?
First, with world opinion in favor of China’s economic development,
Japan has had its third year of recovery and growth since 2002. Someeconomists forecast that this growth will maintain. If this forecast is
accurate, this boom will be the longest since the end of Japan’s “bubble
economy.” With more than a decade’s adjustment, Japan’s economic
system has been further perfected. The development of high technology
has demonstrated that there is a solid foundation for Japan’s growth. We
can expect that in Northeast Asia, there will emerge a situation in which
China and Japan will be the two major powers for a comparatively long
period of time. This has confronted Russia with a situation in which it has
options not only with great limitations but also with great opportunities in
the future.
Second, changes in the US-Japan alliance, considered as the pillar ofJapan’s external relations by Japan, is one of the major factors withsignificant impact on Russia. Particularly in the case of Russia faced withgreat pressure from NATO’s eastward expansion, if there emerged
another “quasi-NATO” in East Asia, Russia’s “vulnerable” mentality
would be further strengthened.
Either the expansion of Russia’s influence into East Asia or the
direction and progress of Sino-Japanese relations might possibly hinge on
the emergence of a stable and effective multilateral mechanism inNortheast Asia and East Asia. The formation of such a mechanism willtake some time to mature as it will experience a relatively long period ofcontest and rivalry among countries.
Looking at Sino-Russian, Russian-Japanese and Sino-Japaneserelations, we can see that the China-Russia relationship is relatively stable,
while Sino-Japanese and Russian-Japanese relations will develop
smoothly only after significant adjustments regarding major problems are
made. On the other hand, the three pairs of relationship are also
complicatedly interactive. In other words, even with the smoothdevelopment of China-Russia relations, support from the other two pairsof relations is needed to bring about positive interaction, without whicheven the China-Russia relationship would experience upheaval andfrustration. Therefore, we should not only pay attention to the- 210 -

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development of bilateral relations, but also look more comprehensively atmajor issues on a large scale and at the interaction among the three pairsof relationship. Only by doing so can we achieve a better, more pertinent
understanding of the issues of this region.

Mutual Relations among China, Russia and Japan
from a Multilateral Perspective
Mutual relations among China, Russia and Japan from a multilateralperspective involve the construction of the Far East energy pipeline,
nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula, and the planned
integration of East Asia, including contextual mutual relations among
China, Russia and Japan in Central Asia.

The Far East Energy Pipeline
The biggest issue in recent years for the trilateral relations of China,
Russia and Japan is the Far East energy pipeline issue.
From the mid-1990s to the beginning of the twenty-first century, withthe support of the Chinese and Russian governments, the China Petroleum
and Chemical Corporation (CPCC) and Russia’s Yukos and Pipeline
Transportation Corporation signed a series of agreements, stipulating thedirection of the pipelines, volume of oil supply, and the promised ways ofpurchase and sale of crude oil. The agreements especially stipulated the“Angarsk-Daqing” pipeline, which would start from Angarsk in Russia,
through Manchuria in China to Daqing in China. But after many years of
repeated discussions, it was decided only during Putin’s fourth state visit
to China in March 2006 that the pipeline in the Far East would start inTaishet in the first phase and would end in Skovorodino, 60 kilometers
away from the Sino-Russian border area, and is estimated to be completed
by around 2008 with a transport capability of 10 million tons of oil a year.
The direction of the Far East pipeline reflects some importantchanges at three levels in the trilateral relations among China, Russia andJapan. The first problem is the relationship between the domestic
government and companies. The Russian government has had tension
with Yukos over a series of political and economic issues. The auctioningof the core industries of Yukos had made the China-Russia pipeline deal
“nobody’s child.” However, that was several years ago and now this crisis- 211 -

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is no longer. The second change involves the bilateral relations between
China and Russia. Russia has been reiterating its support of thecooperation between the two countries in energy development, and China
has been strongly indicating its belief in Russia’s sincerity in adhering to
its support of the pipeline project. China also expressed its understandingof Russia’s necessity to make certain adjustments out of concern toprotect its national interests. The third change is the trilateral relations
among China, Russia and Japan revolving around the energy issue. China
and Russia have been able to overcome difficulties to push forward
cooperation in new situations.
In fact, with medium- or long-term perspectives, either China, or
Russia, or Japan can find mutual or complementary interest in cooperationin developing the Far East energy pipeline, thus promoting a coordinateddevelopment of trilateral relations. Various opinions offered by scholars
can be summarized as follows.
First, an “East Asia Energy Forum” or “Energy Foundation” can beestablished to push forward the development of new energy and solutions
regarding the direction of the oil supply pipeline. Some scholars havepointed out the possibility of using a considerable part of Japan’s earlier
aid to China for this project.
Second, since 50 percent of the imported crude oil of China, Japanand Korea is from the Middle East, 80 percent of which goes through the
Malacca Strait, various related parties have been seriously considering anddiscussing the possibility of building a land passage in the past several
years. Although opinions vary, the prospect of cooperation still exists.
Third, cooperation development has been explored to develop the oiland LNG in the Sakhalin and Caspian Sea regions. China is willing toparticipate in the development and purchase of Sakhalin oil and LNG.
Japan as the investor and China as the purchaser can expect to interact andcooperate positively.
Four, as suppliers and purchasers, China, Russia and Japan cancooperate in not only exerting influence to control energy prices, but also
cooperate at full scale in the mining, processing, transportation and sale ofenergy, thus making a network of multilateral cooperation in thedevelopment of East Asian energy.

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Relations among China, Russia and Japan in the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Issue on the Korean Peninsula
The nuclear non-proliferation issue is the most urgent and pressing
problem in present-day Northeast Asia. While competition over the muchneeded energy supplies in the Far East is fierce, the failure to peacefully
resolve the Korean issue could result in the resumption of a nuclear arms
race in the region.
There are many similarities in the positions adopted by China, Russia
and Japan. First, all three countries wish to see the Korean Peninsula
become a stable, nuclear-free region. Second, with different perspectives,
all three countries wish to see North Korea initiate further reforms topromote a market economy and democracy. Third, as neighbors aroundthe Korean Peninsula, the three countries are opposed to extreme
measures to solve the nuclear proliferation problem. Fourth, the three
countries wish to promote the six-party dialogue mechanism out ofconcern for their own interests. Fifth, the three parties are all in support of
improvement of the relationship between the North and South Koreas,
although they all believe such an improvement would take a rather longtime. There are some who believe that China, Russia and Japan do notwish to see a unified, strong Korean Peninsula. But I believe such a
process is natural, independent of whims and wants.
The three countries have different emphases in their standings
regarding the Korean Peninsula. First, the three countries have different
formal relations with North Korea. Technically, China still maintains its
Treaty of Military Friendship Alliance with North Korea; however, inpractice, China is not necessarily in support of the use of force over theissue of the Korean Peninsula. Russia and North Korea have a friendshiptreaty that does not involve military cooperation. Japan, on the hand, has
not established formal diplomatic relations with North Korea. Second, theactual development of the relations of North Korea with the three
countries is quite different. China has sustained steady development with
North Korea, while Putin has drastically adjusted Russia’s relations with
the isolated country. Japan has not yet solved the problem of the
kidnapping issue. Third, the three countries have different attitudes
concerning whether to “freeze” or “eliminate” nuclear weapons, andwhether to put in force a linkage mechanism providing security guarantees
to North Korea. With the United States’ shift in attitude from “freezing”- 213 -

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to “eliminating” North Korea’s nuclear weapons, Japan has kept pace with
the US. However, neither China nor Russia can provide security
guarantees to North Korea. China and Russia still share much common
ground with North Korea, and stress the importance of real parallel
relations between the US and North Korea in implementing“denuclearization” and providing a “security guarantee.”
As for the prospects of the six-party talks regarding the Korean
nuclear problem, I believe, first, that the six-point consensus reached at
the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue in 2005 provided astrong incentive for Russia to continue participating in and promoting thedevelopment of the current situation in the Korean Peninsula in the
direction of denuclearization and stability. Second, since China, Russia
and Japan have shared interests in nuclear non-proliferation, in making thesix-party dialogue into a regional security guarantee mechanism, and in
making use of the economic opportunities arising from North Korea’s
possible economic reform, the three countries can still expect to haveroom for cooperation.

China, Russia and Japan at Play in Central Asia
From a medium- and long-term perspective, Central Asia can be a regionin which changes in the balance of power on the Eurasian continent
become the most fierce and most significant. This is not only because of
the strategic space left after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, butalso because this region has great strategic resources awaiting exploration.
With the increasingly clearer picture drawn by scholars of the resource
potential of this region, the pattern of struggle by the great powers is
becoming more and more distinct.
The existence in Central Asia of China, Russia and Japan can serve
as a complement to the Far East order. If Russia can be perceived asholding an advantageous position with its energy resources in trilateralrelations in Northeast Asia, Russia will likewise recover its traditional
influence in the Central Asian region, thus gaining a balance of power thatwas once lost. Particularly after the “color revolution” and marked by theattempt to form closer ties with Russia by Uzbekistan as well as the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s request that the US put forward atimetable for its withdrawal from Afghanistan, it indicates that Russia is- 214 -

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staging a comeback following its loss of influence after the “color
revolution.”
Compatible with the recovery of Russia’s influence over Central Asia,
Japan has been invigorating its activities in this region. The Astana
Conference held by Japan with the five countries of Central Asia on
August 28, 2004 can be seen as an important landmark. The direct target
of Japan’s Central Asian strategy is energy and the environment. Japanpromises to provide a loan of the value of 16.4 billion Yen to Uzbekistan,
while accepting 1,000 students to study in Japan. Japan is now the biggest
donor country for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. By the end of 2004, Japan
had provided Central Asian countries with $2.5 billion worth of official
development assistance. The meeting of “Japanese-Central Asian foreign
ministers” under the initiative of Japan on June 5, 2006 can be viewed as a
new strategic and significant measure in Japan developing its relations
with the Central Asian countries.
China’s relations with Central Asia have witnessed rapid growth after
the Cold War, but the total volume of trade between China and Central
Asian countries was $3–4 billion in 2003, half of Russia’s trade with thesame region, and 0.5 percent of China’s total external trade volume.
China’s investment in Central Asia is only just above $1 billion, muchless than the large-scale investment by Japan.
Although the secretariat of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is
set up in Beijing, and the first secretary-general was a former Chinese
diplomat, this organization represents more the cooperation andcoordination of the member countries.
Therefore, in view of strategic, economic and political influences,
Russia still leads the power structure in Central Asia. In Central Asia
today, there is no great power that can dominate local affairs, which
provides room for multilateral cooperation in the region. Perhaps some
new tendencies will become factors in promoting such multilateral
cooperation. First, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has insisted on
being an “open” regional cooperative organization; second, significant
adjustments by the US to its Central Asian strategy, which not only sees
Central Asian affairs and South Asian affairs as a whole, but also stresses
advancing economic cooperation in areas such as energy andinfrastructure, have been made. From medium- and long-term
perspectives, the above-mentioned changes might possibly provide
opportunities for Russian-Japanese-Chinese trilateral cooperation.

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FENG SHAOLEIChina, Russia and Japan Relations, Regional Cooperationin the Northeast Asian Region and the Planned East Asian Integration
One important topic of heated discussion in recent years in thegovernments, media, and academia of East Asia is the prospect of East
Asia’s integration. What is the relationship between integration and thetrilateral relations as discussed above?
Obviously, the concept of “East Asia” cannot be limited to the east of
Asia, but rather, it should refer to the west of Pacific Asia, which shouldof course include countries like China, Russia and Japan. Particularly
when considering the issue of an energy pipeline in Northeast Asia, thewest of Pacific Asia that includes China, Russia and Japan should betaken as a whole.
At present, there are the following characteristics of theconsiderations regarding East Asia’s integration and its very limited
practices. First, countries in the region tend more to negotiate for a free
trade area on the basis of bilateral relations. Multilateral regional
cooperation has been put aside as their medium- or long-term plan. This
reflects the loose pattern of the geopolitical situation in East Asia. It is stilla long way from achieving East Asian integration in any real sense.
Second while, it is the general expectation that China and Japan shouldplay a more important role in East Asia’s integration, Russia’s push into
the Asia-Pacific region has received recognition and support from somecountries; for example, China supports Russia’s participation in the East
Asian summit. The advantage enjoyed by Russia in terms of its resources
has made it increasingly important in the region. Future East Asian
integration cannot leave Russia out of the picture. Third, East Asian
integration is different from European integration. In other words, it is notlike in Europe where France and Germany led the integration process. In
East Asia, integration started from a sub-regional level. The Shanghai
Cooperation Organization and China’s negotiation with ASEAN for FTA,
the trilateral negotiation for strategic cooperation among China, India andRussia, and the six-party talks over the Korean Peninsula all indicate theformation of a new geopolitical landscape, which is emerging in thesurrounding area of China’s territory. Many countries in this region are
making themselves more market economy and democracy oriented. Thissituation makes China not only unlikely to return to a time in its history
when it was closed to the rest of the world, but take a more open attitude- 216 -

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and shoulder more responsibilities towards regional stability, cooperation,
progress and prosperity. It is very possible that Northeast Asia will
become the start of regional cooperation in the entire East Asian region.
China, Russia and Japan are apparently decisive, indispensable players inthis process.
Although the interaction and contest between China, Russia andJapan in the process of regional integration is just starting, with a better
study of the history of European integration, lessons can be learnt tofacilitate the process: display of forgiveness and tolerance of pastenemies; strengthening sovereignty while experiencing transfer ofsovereignty; and all-round cooperation and integration starting throughpartial, functional cooperation.

Conclusion
All in all, the following conclusions can be made based on our study ofthe multi-level relations among China, Russia and Japan.
First, there is a realistic possibility of a potential crisis occuring in the
Northeast Asian region. There are also issues pending resolution in thecore countries in the region, namely, China, Russia and Japan. However,people’s awareness and the regional management mechanism are still far
from satisfactory in facing the need to solve possible crises.
Second, compared with existing problems in the trilateral relations,
there is still enormous room for complementary cooperation among thethree countries. Intentions and practices are emerging, too.
Third, most imperative is for the three countries to quicken theprocess of dialogue and negotiation starting from functional departments
and the highest levels of government. The six-party talks, and theProliferation Security Initiative under the UN’s Security Council,
including APEC and the East Asia Summit, can be adapted into platforms
for the three countries’ further cooperation, with proper adjustments madeto the function and membership structure.
Last but not the least is the existence of the United States, which
serves as the background to the trilateral relations. Although the UnitedStates does not want to see its influence dwindling because of thecooperation among China, Russia and Japan, neither does it wish to seeitself bogged down in unrestrained competition in the Northeast Asian- 217 -

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region. Therefore, US support is one of the keys to the rational
development of trilateral relations among China, Russia and Japan.

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