Russo-Japanese Relations in the
New Strategic Environment
YOKOTE Shinji

In the initial years of the twenty-first century, especially just after the
September 11 attacks in 2001, Russian foreign policy was expected totake a middle course between the US and China. In those days, Russia
seemed intent on establishing friendly relations with the US and every
state adjacent to its borders in order to concentrate its attention onpressing domestic issues; Vladimir Putin appeared to realize this priority
quite well when he made his personal commitment to support the US
decision to start the military operation in Afghanistan. 1 However, as
Putin’s experience accumulated and as he became increasingly convincedthat the US would pursue its self-proclaimed goals of “democratization”
everywhere in the world from the Middle East to Central Asia to thedetriment of Russia’s interests, he gradually changed his position anddistanced Russia from the US and the US-led European states, while
steering his country closer to China.
The large-scaled Sino-Russian joint military maneuver carried out inAugust 2005, the invitation of the Hamas leaders for talks in Moscow inMarch 2006, and the recent exchange of harsh remarks between US vicepresident Dick Cheney and Putin over Russian policy towards Ukraine
seemed to correspond with this shift in po1icy stance.
1See, for example, Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy,
Chatham House Papers (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003), 117–118.
It should be noted that this is a study clearly focused on the resilience of Russia’s great
power mentality.

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These recent developments raise several intertwined questions forJapanese-Moscow watchers:
First, are these newly unfolded hard-line policies mere tactical steps
designed for putting pressure on the US to restrain its hegemonic behavior
in the international scene or are they signs suggesting the end of thepartnership they have managed to sustain in any event since the end of theCold War?
Second, will China be a reliable long-term Russian partner against
the US regardless of the close economic interdependency that exist
between the US and China? To what extent will the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) be an effective instrument in creating a new strategic
environment either globally or regionally? Further, is Putin reallyconfident that the present Sino-Russian rapprochement will pave the way
to the “multipolar world” that the Russian leader has repeatedly upheld?
Last but not least, what is and will be the impact of the new
East-West strained relations on the North-East Asian context, especiallyon Russo-Japanese relations?
To consider these questions, we should begin with a brief
examination of the problem of Russia’s current status in the world order. It
is no secret that since the collapse of the USSR, both Russia and Western
nations have wondered how to define the new position of Russia in theworld configuration. No doubt, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Russia was a major power, but in the light of its domestic chaotic
conditions it could not be regarded as a power equal to the US or even toother major European powers. Yet with time, both sides came to theconclusion that there were only two alternatives for them to adopt: either
Russia should be seen as one of the leading Western powers equallyranked with such powers as France or Germany or as anindependence-oriented, non-Western power like China or India that would
be expected to strike its own path, showing an inclination to turn a criticaleye toward the US and European behavior in world affairs.
Worried about this situation, in the mid-1990s, European nations
decided to take the initiative to incorporate Russia into the summit of theGroup of Seven as a regular guest power. They were full of expectations
that the granting of membership would encourage the Russian leadershipto overcome its domestic disorder and move Russia towards a liberal
democratic model. The calculation in the same vein produced thePartnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European- 236 -

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Commission and Russia in 1994 (which came into force only in 1997).
During these years, the Russian leaders were, by contrast, continuously
divided on future orientations. For example, Evgenii Primakov, appointed
foreign minister in 1996, strongly advocated building Eurasian
partnerships among Russia, China, and India, although there seemed to be
little feasibility of this idea. As was expected, Russian political elite
greeted Primakov’s idea partly with enthusiasm, partly with cynicism.
After the September 11 attacks, the European nations once again took
the initiative, proposing in early 2002 that Russia become the eighth
member of the G8 in return for the moral and political support Putin
offered for “the War against Terrorism.” At least for a year or so, Putin
seemed to be content with the new alignment. Russia was accepted as aprincipal member of the Western club.
Some Russian scholars began to call the newly created world power
structure “the pluralistic unipolarity,” in which not the US alone, but the
US with its closely connected friendly powers in the G7 plays the role ofthe polar actor.2 According to this definition, on the one hand, the non-US
member states of this group, although hardly comparable in power
potential to the US, have a chance to exert influence over US foreign
policy as far as the circumstances permit in a pluralistic framework; on theother hand, in order to be a member state of this group, it is supposed tocope with international threats and conflicts in cooperation with the US
and other member states. More importantly, the non-US member states aresupposed to acquiesce in a superior US role in world affairs; in return forthis cooperation, a fully fledged member can expect that it will be treatedmore favorably in the international politico-economic order than China,
India, or other newly emerged states. In the case of Russia, theestablishment of the NATO-Russia Council was a good example of thisspecial treatment, and the Russian accession to the WTO seemed to ensue
in the near future (at latest during 2002–2003).
However, seemingly, the two incidents taking place one after anothersince 2003 severely tested the above-mentioned special linkage in the
power structure. The first was the war in Iraq: as is well known, Russia,
2
On this concept, see Aleksei D. Bogaturov, “Pliuralisticheskaia odnopoliarnost’ iinteresy Rossii,” Svobodnaia mysl’ 2 (1996): 25–36. See also Bogaturov ed., Sistemnaia
istoriia mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniĭ v chetyrekh tomakh 1918–2003, vol. 3 (Moscow:
Nauchno-obrazovatel’iĭ Forum po Mezhdunarodnym Otnosheniiam, 2003), 583–584.

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aligned with France and Germany, made every effort to prevent the
US–led coalition forces from attacking Iraq, but only to see their
persistent protests had no effect. Contrary to the tacit understanding
implied in “pluralistic unipolarity,” the US with the support of the UK andJapan totally disregarded both the UN Security Council and the oppositionof the three major states. No doubt, Putin must have drawn from this bitter
experience an unforgettable conclusion that although membership of theG8 gave Russia great power status, the military power of the US was sopreeminent that its serious balancing act with the European states was notenough to curb its hegemonic ambition.
The second was the so-called “color revolutions” in the former Soviet
Union. The revolutionary changes began in Georgia in November 2003,
spreading to Ukraine in December 2004, to Kyrgyzstan in February 2005,
and ended with antigovernmental riots in Uzbekistan in May 2005.
Evidently, the chain of events shocked Putin. Up to this time, the former
Soviet space, with the exception of the Baltic area, was regarded by the
Russian leaders as Russia’s sphere of influence. They have long taken it asa matter of course that the leaders in newly independent states would
continue to hold a political system similar to the Russian “managed
democracy,” 3 while providing Russia with a secure environment.
Certainly, it would have been difficult for the Russian leaders to deny theassumption that behind the scenes, the US supported these revolutionarychanges with the purpose of reducing Russia’s traditional sphere and in
the end damaging the Russian great power status. Putin must have drawn
from these incidents another lesson that given the differences between
Russia and the US in terms of their value systems, even strategic
collaboration with the US and the European states would not ensure
Russia great state status in a stable way.
Thus, the brief overview of the recent developments of international
relations of Russia strongly suggests that Russia’s present assertiveness is
not a mere feint, but a reflection of the distrust that, no doubt, is deeply
rooted in its political culture and has been provoked by the recent US
behavior in the minds of the Russian political elite. It should be added,
though, that however nominal the great power status may be, it is too
3

It should be noted here that influential Russian commentators and newspapers denote
politically desirable conditions with this term. Vitalii Tret’iakov, Nuzhen li nam Putin posle
2008 goda? (Moscow: Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 2005), 13–16.

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comfortable for them to relinquish it by quitting membership of the G8 orother Western institutions such as the NATO-Russia Council. Therefore,
Putin is likely to keep Russia in these institutions, without making adecisive departure for the Eurasian partnership. In this sense, Russia’sWestern orientation is still kept alive. This is a starting point for theexamination of the second question: How stable is the Sino-Russian
partnership?
No doubt, China and Russia make good partners both
psychologically and economically. On the psychological level, both are
under strong pressure to democratize their domestic political systems fromthe US and the European states. Naturally, the leaders of both nations
share the same apprehensions about cultural globalization that levels theground for political homogenization. And economically, the sharp rise inenergy prices combined with China’s aggressive economic growth
prompts the Chinese leaders to ensure access to Russia’s rich oil and gas
reserves. Putin is a man intellectually prepared for Russia’s energy-related
strategy. Before coming to power in the late 1990s, he had finished amaster’s thesis arguing that “Russia’s natural resources base will not only
secure the country’s economic development but will serve as the guarantorof the country’s international position.”4
One of the most important targets that the Russians have set in its
long-term energy plan is to diversify its energy markets, which, in turn,requires Russia to open up markets in Asia. In this sense, China is anindisputable partner in this calculation.
Yet, in spite of this “favorable” interdependency and the positive
trends, there are several issues casting a shadow over the future of
Sino-Russian relations.
First, for both China and Russia, the other is a trade partner of minor
importance. While Russian trade with the European states amounts toalmost half of its total, China’s main trading partners are other Asian
countries, followed by the US. This is in part due to the Sino-Russian
trade structure; for Chinese businesses, the Russian market is too far forthem to transport large amounts of low-cost commodities. The Siberian
4Martha Brill Olcott, “Vladimir Putin and the Geopolitics of Oil,” in The Energy
Dimension in Russian Global Strategy, The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy’s
study paper (Houston: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University,2004), 17.

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railway is not yet fit for this purpose; the Russian government and Russian
businesses, on their part, hope to heighten the industrial infrastructureswith the help of sophisticated Japanese, US, and European technologies.
In a word, economically, the US, Europe, and Japan have much more tooffer either China or Russia than trade between the two. Some Russians
go on to say that China needs only Russian energy resources, and that
economic ties with Russia would only serve to make Russia a raw
materials supplier for China.
Second, related with the aforementioned point is the salient contrast
in the demographic trends in China and Russia. According to a Japanesescholar, while the population in the Russian Far East lost roughly one
million from 1991 to 2001, in a neighboring Chinese province(Heilongjiang Province) alone, the population increased by three million
in the same period.5
Given this startling gap in the demographic trends and a sparse
population in the Russian Far East and Siberia, it is no wonder that theRussian residents feel threatened with unmanageable population pressure
from the south. Although both Russian and Chinese governments havetaken serious measures to cope with the illegal immigration problem inthe last decade, the fundamental difficulty seems to remain unsolved oreven compounded by the differences in the economic growth rates. Sooner
or later, the Russian government will have to face a dilemma: either it willlegalize Chinese migration to meet the demands from the regional labormarket at the risk of incurring Chinese economic dominance, or it will beforced to take stricter measures to regulate Asian immigration at the costof economic stagnation in the eastern part of its territory.
Third, there is still a potential territorial dispute between the twoneighbors. No one can deny the significance of the agreement in October
2004 concerning the jurisdictional procedures over the remaining three
disputed islands: Bol’shoi Ussuriiskii, Tarabarov, and Bol’shoi. The
resolution of the territorial dispute was indeed a great achievement for
both governments. Yet, there still remains room for skepticism. Some
Russian scholars are still concerned with references made by the Chinese
5

ITO Shoichi, “Putin jidai no Churo kankei: Roshia toubu chiiki o meguru 2kokukan
kankei o chusin ni” [Sino-Russian relations in the era of Putin], in IWASHITA Akihiro ed.,Roshia Gaikou no Genzai I [Russian Foreign Policy Today I], Making a Discipline of
Slavic Eurasian Studies 2 (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2004), 77–78.

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leaders in 1964 and 1989 to “the lost hundred and fifty thousand square
kilometers,” expecting that the Chinese people in general will be informedof past claims involving them in the new territorial dispute in themeantime. Judging from the situation, the final resolution of the
Sino-Russian territorial issue still needs to be published in China andaccepted by the Chinese people.
Fourth, there is a contest over influence in Central and South Asia.
The SCO is a suitable instrument to dispel distrust of each other as well as
to suppress the threat of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Moreover,in July 2005, it succeeded in issuing a joint declaration to limit US
influences in this area by demanding that the US army pull out of
Uzbekistan. Yet, the SCO seems to be indecisive about its future role inregional and world affairs. Although it effectively serves as a forum toexpressing anti-American opinions, the leaders of the member states could
not make a decision regarding which state among the observers would be
admitted as an official member of the organization. If India is permitted tojoin the organization, the SCO would evolve into a powerful architectureon the Eurasian continent. But almost a year has passed since India wasgiven observer status, and as to this point, nothing has happened.
Presumably, this was due to the struggle between Russia and China for theleadership of the organization. Although they repeatedly express the desire
to construct a multipolar world, they are not yet determined to make the
SCO a reliable power center for challenging US hegemony.
Fifth, the Sino-Russian rapprochement will in the long run touchupon the problem of Russian identity. In other words, however useful it
would be as a countermeasure against what the Russian leaders think asrude interference in Russian domestic affairs by the US and European
democratic nations, the one-sided orientation towards China would surely
raise uneasiness in Russian hearts and minds. In spite of the differences in
the historical experiences and religious traditions, the majority of peoplein Russia have considered themselves as belonging to European
Civilization.
To sum up, the arguments in this section suggest that apart from therhetoric about the new stage in the strategic relationship, China could not
be appreciated as a stable partner for Russia against the US and Europe.
For both China and Russia, it is unrealistic to counterbalance the US andEurope, given the present power distribution in the global structure as well
as moral and cultural perceptions in both Russia and China. So far, the- 241 -

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benefits brought about by the cooperative relations between them seem tobe limited to immediate, mainly defensive objectives such as relatively
small-scale economic cooperation, insurance against potential turmoil, oragreement to maintain the present status quo around the two countries.
Nevertheless, even these modest benefits may have different meanings in
the context of Northeast Asia. This last point is related to the theme of thethird section.
The first problem concerning the change of strategic circumstances inNortheast Asia is the following: are bilateral relations between Japan andRussia influenced and determined by US-Russian relations as they were in
the Cold War years? In my view, the answer is no, because there is neither
a functional bipolar system nor a tangible Russian threat to the Japanesepeople. Today, either the Russian or the Japanese government could
formulate its policy towards the other without taking into consideration
the US-Japan alliance.
Certainly, Russo-Japanese relations have been stagnant since Putin
took presidency, due, as a matter of fact, to the diplomatic failure of thepreceding decade; the leaders of both Japan and Russia had exaggerated
and boosted the possibility of a resolution of the territorial dispute with
their imprudent statements, causing a deep sense of disappointment
among the Japanese public. (Boris Yeltsin irresponsibly disclosed his
intention to resolve the dispute by 2000, and the Japanese side
optimistically regarded his remark as a serious promise to make a final
decision in favor of the Japanese side.) In any case, the present blunt
Russo-Japanese relations have hardly any connection with the present
unfriendly atmosphere in US-Russian relations.
Then, what is the impact of the Chinese factor? As we mentioned
above, the Sino-Russian rapprochement has had almost no effect on the
US or Europe, as was demonstrated by the Sino-Russian joint militarymaneuver of last August. While China seemed to make use of the occasion
to threaten the Taiwanese, the US showed no serious concern about thisseemingly provocative gesture.
However, the problem here is whether or not the same conclusion isapplicable in the case of the strategic triangular partnership among
Sino-Russo-Japanese relations. To speak plainly, to what extent is Japan’s
regional isolation in the past few years the result of a Sino-Russian
rapprochement?

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The closer relations between China and Russia seem to havegenerated different strategic meanings towards Japan for the two partners.
In the case of China, closer relations with Russia have already paid
dividends: firstly, they have given the Chinese leaders a better bargaining
position vis-à-vis Japan, and they showed greater confidence inmaintaining a stronger position following Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni
Shrine; secondly, the rapprochement contributed towards creating theperception in the region that China transformed itself into a dominant
power indispensable for coping with regional affairs, thwarting Japan’s
bid for regional leadership; thirdly, China could make use of the improved
relations with Russia for monopolizing the role of hosting the six-party
talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. (Thanks to China’s soft approach,North Korea has made great progress in manufacturing its nuclear
technologies and missiles.) On top of these benefits, the SCO paved theway for China to expand its influence into Central Asia, hindering Japan
from establishing its influence in this area. Thus, China has already reapeda rich harvest from the Russian linkage.
Compared with the Chinese case, the Russian accounts are slightly
different. It is true that Russian leaders have shown an increasingly
assertive position over territorial disputes since the start of the twenty-first
century. In 2005, for example, several high-ranking Russian leaders paid avisit to the so-called Northern Territories, underscoring their allegationthat since the islands belonged to Russia, there was no need to negotiate
over them. German Gref, minister of economic development and trade,went on to announce that the ministry was determined to implement a
fourfold increase in expenditure to improve the social infrastructure of theterritories in the next budget when he visited the islands. As expectedfrom these incidents, Putin’s visit to Tokyo in November 2005 produced
nothing diplomatically.
But interestingly enough, no comment from the Japanese side linked
these approaches with the improved Sino-Russian relations. According toJapanese Foreign Ministry officials, Putin’s uncompromising attitude
during negotiations is due solely to the favorable Russian economic
conditions that resulted from high energy prices. Evidently, the Japaneseside sensed Putin’s approach to regional politics when he decided not to
accept the Chinese offer on the oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing at theend of 2004. Instead, the Russian government announced that it had- 243 -

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decided to adopt the route stretching from Taishet to Nakhodka. 6
Although this did not mean ultimate victory of the Japanese plan, thedecision signaled to the Japanese government that the Russian side was
keen to engage in geopolitical calculations; the more closely Russia
connected its economy to China, the more it would be dependent on thelatter not only economically but also politically in the Northeast Asian
context. And in order to ensure its influential role in the region, Russia
needs to avoid the establishment of an economic structure heavily
weighted towards China. Thus, while Russia’s foreign policy aims tofurther strengthen its relations with China against the US at the global
level, its regional interests in Northeast Asia dictate improved relations
with Japan and South Korea, both closely connected with the US.
The analysis of Russia’s changed stance up to this point strongly
suggests that there is a possibility for Japan and Russia to improve thepresent stagnant relations. Hitherto, Japan has regarded the resolution of
the territorial dispute as the ultimate goal of its relations with Russia. But,in view of the above-mentioned new strategic circumstances in general,and the North Korean nuclear program in particular, it should reconsider
its diplomatic means and ends. If Japan wants to be a global player, as isshown by its bid for a seat on the UN Security Council, it has to approach
Russia as well as China both regionally and globally. At least Japan needs
to elaborate a comprehensive Northeast Asian policy based on its global
stance, instead of a mixture of bilateral relations.

6

Gilbert Rozman, “Sino-Japanese Competition over the Russian Far East: Is the Oil
Pipeline Only a Starting Point?” in IWASHITA Akihiro ed., Siberia and the Russian Far Eastin the Twenty-first Century: Partners in the“Community of Asia”, Slavic Eurasian Studies
6, no. 1 (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2005), 1–20; National Institute for Defense
Studies Japan ed., Higashi Ajia Senryaku-gaikan 2006 [East Asian Strategic Review 2006](Tokyo: Kokuritsu insatsu kyoku, 2007), 169.

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