DISASTER MANAGEMENTSYSTEM OF HYOGOPREFECTURE
Rustam Safaraliyev
Deputy Head of Crises Management Center of the Ministryof Emergency Situations of Azerbaijan Republic
ADRC Visiting Researcher 2014B

Disclaimer
This report was compiled by an ADRC visiting researcher (VR) from ADRC
member countries.
The views expressed in the report do not necessarily reflect the views of
the ADRC. The boundaries and names shown and the designations usedon the maps in the report also do not imply official endorsement or
acceptance by the ADRC.

2

ACKNOWLEDMENTFirst of all I would like to express my deepest gratitude and appreciations to all ADRC
Staff for providing with the opportunity to attend in Visiting Researcher Program 2014 andessential assistance during the program due to which I managed to enrich my knowledge andimprove my skills on disaster management system and had a great opportunity to familiarize
myself with Japan, its tradition, history and culture The program was both educational andcultural therefore quite memorable. This would have not been possible without your priceless help
and support.
I am sincerely grateful to the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Republic of Azerbaijan
for making possible my participation in this program and in particular, to the Crisis Management
Center for their constant support and guidance throughout the program. This has been very helpful
and contributing factor for successful completion of my research. I truly hope in the future relations
between the MES and ADRC will keep on prospering.
Special thanks go to Ms. Shiomi Yumi who during the entire period of the program has been
Providing her help and assistance and accompanying us in most friendly and kind manner.
It must be particularly noted that she has made her support available in a number of ways by being
sensitive and responsive not only to every single issue related to our program, but also to our culturaland entertainment activities. It is her great merit that I have benefited the program in the mosteffective way and enjoyed my staying in Japan. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to
all ADRC staff for rendering invaluable assistance and providing me exceptional opportunity toparticipate at The Third UN World Conference on Risk Reduction which were held in Sendai andattend in numerous numbers of related forums during the Conference. I’m convinced that theknowledge I had received during the conference will enrich my comprehension of risk reduction.
I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my great thanks to all professors andorganization representatives who conducted for us presentations and lectures within the frameworkof ADRC arranged activities.
Knowledge attained through these sessions was the key to our understanding of many
aspects of the research area and the lecture and presentation materials served as the main
information source while writing it.

3

BACKGROUND
What is disaster management?
The United Nations defines a disaster as a serious disruption of the functioning of acommunity or a society. Disasters involve widespread human, material, economic or
environmental impacts, which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to copeusing its own resources.
The Red Cross and Red Crescent societies define disaster management as theorganization and management of resources and responsibilities for dealing with all humanitarian
aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness, response and recovery in order to lessen
the impact of disasters.
Any disaster can interrupt essential services, such as health care, electricity, water,
sewage/garbage removal, transportation and communications. The interruption can seriously
affect the health, social and economic networks of local communities and countries. Disasters
have a major and long-lasting impact on people long after the immediate effect has been
mitigated. Poorly planned relief activities can have a significant negative impact not only on thedisaster victims but also on donors and relief agencies..
Local, regional, national and international organizations are all involved in mounting ahumanitarian response to disasters. Each will have a prepared disaster management plan.
These plans cover prevention, preparedness, relief and recovery.
Disaster prevention
These are activities designed to provide permanent protection from disasters. Not alldisasters, particularly natural disasters, can be prevented, but the risk of loss of life and injury
can be mitigated with good evacuation plans, environmental planning and design standards. In
January 2005, 168 Governments adopted a 10-year global plan for natural disaster risk
reduction called the Hyogo Framework. It offers guiding principles, priorities for action, andpractical means for achieving disaster resilience for vulnerable communities.
Disaster preparedness and mitigation
These activities are designed to minimize loss of life and damage – for example byremoving people and property from a threatened location and by facilitating timely and effective
rescue, relief and rehabilitation. Preparedness and mitigation are the main ways of reducing theimpact of disasters. Community-based preparedness and management should be a high priority
in physical therapy practice management.

4
Disaster relief
This is a coordinated multi-agency response to reduce the impact of a disaster and its
long-term results. Relief activities include rescue, relocation, providing food and water,
preventing disease and disability, repairing vital services such as telecommunications andtransport, providing temporary shelter and emergency health care.
Disaster recovery
Once emergency needs have been met and the initial crisis is over, the people affected
and the communities that support them are still vulnerable. Recovery activities include rebuilding
infrastructure, health care and rehabilitation. These should blend with development activities,
such as building human resources for health and developing policies and practices to avoid
similar situations in future.
Disaster management is linked with sustainable development, particularly in relation tovulnerable people such as those with disabilities, elderly people, children and other marginalizedgroups.
Depending on its national hazard profile, geographical conditions and administrative
organization every various countries and regions has established tailored emergency
management system. Once system is in place, functional mechanism of emergency response coordination of response activities and communication system are definitive factors.
So relative similarity of both Azerbaijan’s and Japan’s landscapes especiallybetween Absheron peninsula and Hyogo prefecture as well as physiogeographic location
particularly situation at the interface of tectonic plates makes both countries not only
alike in natures but exposed to the similar natural disasters such as earthquakes andfloods.
The purpose of the research is thoroughly explore elaborated through years thedisaster management system and especially disaster response system of Japan andparticularly disaster management system of Hyogo prefecture as one of the most disasterprone and vulnerable areas in terms of earthquake would be efficient example of holistic
and tailored disaster management systems and implementation of the most advanced
features of this system into indigenous disaster management system would be pretty
beneficial.

5
DISA
ASTER PROOFILE OF AZERBAIJAAAN REPUBL
LIC AND JA
APAN

Humid subttropical clim
mate that fe
eatures by hot,h usually humid sum
mmers and mild to coo
olwinters is peculiar for both coountries. Alsso both cou
untries are locatedlon the seismicc split of theetectonicc plates thatt in its turn stipulatesshigher seismmic activity bothbin Azerrbaijan and in Japan.
Hazard pro
ofile of Azeerbaijan Re
epublic
A
Azerbaijan
is vulnera
able to disa
asters due to both natural hazaards, includ
ding floodss,
earthquakes, landsslides, avalanches, droought, debrris flows an
nd mud flow
ws; In the ye
ear 2000, a
severe drought ca
aused an economicelo
oss of $100 million. As
A per GSHAP (GSH
HAP, 1998),
occurrences of lan
ndslides durring heavy rains cause significannt damage to human settlementsss,industryy, farms and roads (Pusch, 20044). However, the only reported disaster eve
ent due to alandslide was in April 2000. A total of 11 people we
ere killed an
nd economiic loss amo
ounted to $4
4million. Azerbaijan also sufferred from seeveral technnological dissasters. The
ere were reeportedly 11
1major trransport acccidents alo
ong with on
ne major inndustrial ac
ccident betw
ween 1988
8 and 2007.
These accidentsakilled 700 peeople and affecteda357
7 others. Hoowever, no economic loss figuress
are avaailable. The country also faces a possible n
nuclear radiiation hazard originatin
ng from theenuclear plant at Me
etsamor, in Armenia. ThisT
plant is consideredd dangerouss by the IAE
EA becauseeof its loccation in an earthquake
e zone and its reactor type (Anagnosti, 2008)A
LANDS
SLIDESFLOODS AND
A
Azerbaijan
is suscepttible to hea
avy
floodingg because oof its topography and thetwater-reelated flucttuations in the Caspian
Sea.Terrritory of Azerbaijan Republic is
includedd in the list of areas, where flooods
and inundations arre observedd mostly alo
ong
the worrld. Appearrance of flo
oods in Gre
eat
and Liittle Cauca
asus mountain rang
geswhich covercalmo
ost half off countrywide
territoryy, occurs more inten
nsively. Most
floods andainundations happe
en in uplan
ndsof Soutth slope oof Great CaucasusCaandNakhichhevan AR. The expe
ected clima
ate
Flood map
m of Azerb
baijan Republlic6changes can cause serious difficulties in the future by increasing recurrence of floods andoverflows.

Heavy showers on the territory of Azerbaijan Republic often lead to floods withdamages and human casualties. Moreover, hail fall is observed on the territory during warm
periods. They cause damage to agriculture. Hail diameters sometimes are about 30–50
millimetres, which results in total destruction. A substantial part of central Azerbaijan could be
flooded in case of damage to the Mingechevir water reservoir in the west. Landslides caused byheavy rains and underground water are also common case for Azerbaijan.
Analysis of the disaster data show that floods have affected a large number of people
and caused significant economic losses in the past 20 years. For example, the April 2003 floodin the Ismayilli Gobustan region alone affected 31,500 people and caused an economic loss of$55 million. Earlier, in June 1997, a flood in the Tovuz-Khanlar region affected 75,000 people
and caused an economic loss of $25 million.
Besides,

another

reasonoflandslides in rural regions of Azerbaijan
is semi-nomadic animal husbandryThe

number

of

areas

in

Azerbaijan which are prone to landslides
has increased by four times in the past
24 years and comprises 400 that cover
the areas of approximately 6,000 square
kilometers
People are behind 80 percent of thelandslides by their agricultural activity
which increases the risk of landslides.

Landslide map of Azerbaijan Republic

Landslides in Azerbaijan are frequently occurring in Shamakhi-Ismayilli, Guba-Khachmaz
regions and Absheron peninsula.
In Baku, landslides occur in Bail, Patamdart, Masazir, Ahmadli, Buzovna settlements, on
the road to Novkhani, and recently intensified in the Garachukhur settlement.
Currently, Agsu Pass can also pose a threat in terms of landslides because of thepassage of trucks on this road which negatively effects on this process.
Landslides are usually reported in spring and autumn in Azerbaijan
However, landslide zones have became more active in Azerbaijan since October, because of adrought in the summer months, and emergence of new cracks in the earth's surface and heavy
rainfall In November, prolonged rains have triggered several landslides in the southern region of
the country.

7
T prolongTheged drought is often ob
bserved in Azerbaijan,A
which in itss term causse mudflowss
in the mountainousms areas. Thee drought created a groound for furrther mudsliides.

S
SEISMICITTY
A a part oAsof the Alpin
ne folded systemsAzeerbaijan territory charaacterized ass very highhseismic activity. Strong and ca
atastrophic earthquake
es which haappened several times in this areaafrom anncient times till now cau
used large numbernof hhuman losees and destrructions .Th
he strongest
earthquakes mainly have be
een registerred in Shamakhi and Ganja reg
gions. The earthquakeehappened in Shammakhi in 166
68 (M ≈ 7.0
0; İ0 = 9-10
0 points) 2 can be con
nsidered ass one of theestrongest earthquaakes happen
ned in the CaucasusC
up to now.
A
Accordingto historical informationn thisearthquake resulte
ed with land
dslides and morethan 800000 people
e died. In Shamakhi
S
re
egion
registerred seismic shocks witth intensity up to
8 according MSK-6
64 in 1828, 1859, 1869
9 and
1872 yeears. In thiss area the lastlcatastro
ophic
earthquake (M = 6.9; İ0 = 9 points) happ
pened
in

190
02.Other

area

whe
ere

destruuctiveearthquake happen
ned is Ganjja region. In
n thisarea haappened strrong earthquakes in 42
27 (M≈ 6.7; İ0
0 = 9 points), in 1139 (M ≈ 6.8; İ0 = 9
points), in 1235 (MM ≈ 5.7; İ0 = 8 points).. After
earthquake happe
ened in 11
139 because oflandslide created Goy-gol Lake.
LIn annotherregions of republic also we
ere registered anumberr of strong
g earthquakkes. Intenssity ofthese earthquakess was not moremthan İ0
0= 6-7
points, but in many cases ressulted with many
Seismicc Zonation Mappdestructtions.
A
Azerbaijanlies in a reegion with moderatemtoo very high seismic haazard. A maagnitude 6.3
3earthquake in the Baku regio
on in Novem
mber 2000 killed 31 people,paffected 3,294 others anddincurredd a reportedd economicc loss of $1
10 million. A
An earthqua
ake in July 1998 repo
ortedly killeddone perrson, affecte
ed a large numbernof peoplepand damageddhundreds of houses

8
S
Since
2003
3 in the Azerrbaijan territory installe
ed 30
telemetry seismic stations prroduction ofo “Kinemettrics”.
Up to now in reepublican teerritory woorking analo
ogue
seismic stations also. Durring installa
ation of thesetstationss it was ta
aking into account th
he level off theseismicity of selectted territoryy
Recent yeears seismmic stations with higher

Active TTectonic Faultss in the territory ofsensitivity seismog
graphs has been added
d to the Re
epublican Se
eismic Stations Netwo
ork and after
this it becomebposssible to reg
gister even lower intensity (magnnitude) eartthquakes inn republicannterritoryy.

MUD VOLLCANOS
Mud volcan
noes are peervasive withhin the Rep
public of Azerbaijan. Th
here are ovver 220 muddvolcanooes in Azerbaijan (Abbsheron Pe
eninsula, G
Gobustan, southeasts
S
Shirvan pla
ain, SamurDavachi plain terraane, both AbsheronAannd Baku Arcchipelago. Most
Mof them have a conecshape.
Their heeight variess in the rang
ge from 20 to 400m, whereaswbasse diameterr may vary from 100 too
4500m.
Besides onshore mud volcanoes there are buried volcanoes and offshore mudd volcanoess.
There area over 140 offshore mud volcan
noes within the Caspia
an Sea. Eig
ght Islands within Bakuuarchippelago weree generated
d
by

mud

eruptiions

volcanoess(Khara-Zira(,

Zanbiil, Garasu, Gil, SangiMughhan, Chigmil etc).
Mud volcanoes are one ofthe vvisible signs of theepreseence of oiil and gass
reservves underr the landdand sea in th
he Caspiannregionn. Gas seeeps are a
relateedphhenomenon.

These
e occur whe
en a pocket
Mud voolcanoes in Aze
erbaijanof ga
as under thetgrounddfinds a passage to the surface
e. One gas seep burnss continually on a hillsiide near Ba
aku, ignoreddby the sheeps
but soometimes visitedv
by cu
urious tourissts.

9
The origins of the volcanoes are disputed. Mud volcanoes are often formed in areas of
weakness in the Earth's crust, along fault lines, and are associated with geologically young
sedimentary deposits, the presence of organic gas from hydrocarbon deposits, and overlying
pressure which forces this gas to the surface.

Drought Areas of Azerbaijan Republic

Physical map of Azerbaijan Republic

Drought is a natural climatic feature of the region and occurs time by time in specificperiods. Azerbaijan has been severely affected by the drought that has stricken many countries
in Central Asia, the Near East and parts of Europe during the spring 2000. An FAO assessment
mission carried out early January 2001 reported significant losses of harvests, particularly of
potatoes and vegetables. The most affected farmers were those cultivating plots located at the
tail end of irrigation canals. The fisheries sector has also been severely affected by the low waterlevels in the rivers and reservoirs due to the drought. Several generations of fish have been lost
due to a disruption in breeding patterns.
In Azerbaijan 3 mln. ha are exposed to desertinisation out of which anthropogenic
desertisation amounts 12 thousand km². Repeated alkalization of the soils occuring due todemolition of incorrect irrigation system is understood as anthropogenic desertisation.

10
Disaster Statistics of Azerbaijan Republic

DisasterFlood
Earthquake
Flood
Flood
Flood
Earthquake
Flood
Flood
Earthquake
Flood

Date
1995
1998
1997
2010
2003
1999
1995
2009
2000
1995

Affected
1,650,000
700,000
75,00070,00031,500
9,170
6000
5000
3294
2800

Statistic of Affected and Killed People

Killed
0
1
11
3
0
1
0
0
31
5

11
Disaster Related Economic Losses of Azerbaijan Republic

12

Vulnerability profile of Japan

Natural condition of Japan

Historically,

destructive

naturaldisasters have posed greatest challenge
forJapanese

geographical,

society.

Unfavorable

topographicalandmeteorological conditions of the country
have made it one of the most disasterprone countries in the world. Although its
territory accounts merely for the 0,25 % of
the planet’s land area, Japan is subject toabout 20,5 % earthquakes with themagnitude 6 or more and 7 % the world’s
active volcanoes is located on its territory.

Seismic hazard map of JapanThe most frequent natural hazards inJapan are earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, volcano eruptions, floods and landslides.

13
onal torrenttial rains annd heavy snowssare aanother cha
allenge for the countryy. The highhOccasio
numberr of earthquuakes, tsun
namis and active volccanoes are the conditioned by th
he fact that
territoryy of Japan forms the part Circum-Pacific SeismicSBe
elt which is sometimes called ass
Pacific RingR
of Firee.
Japan located at the junctio
on of 4 teectonic plattes- Eurasia
an Plate, EurasianE
P
Plate,
North
hAmericaan Plate, P
Pacific Platee and Philipppine Sea ––which is th
he cause oof high seismicity of itss
territtory. Tsunamis are triggered by stronggearth
hquakes at ocean botttom or hugee landslidessin the vicinity off the coast.
Earthhquakes and tsunamis are the majo
or causes ofodisassters. Althoough remarkable succ
cesses hassbeen
n achieved in increasinng prepareddness of theecounntry –crucial role of the JMA, MLIT
T and BRI iss
mustt be emphassized in disa
aster preparredness – tooearth
hquakes annd tsunamis, recent bigbdisasterJapan at thee junction of 4 tectonictplatesscaussed by themm –Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquakeeand Greeat East Ja
apan Earthq
quakes demonstrated th
hat they still remain ass biggest challengecfordisasterr manageme
ent system ofo the countrry.
Typhoonns and rainn front are the main causes of sttorm and flo
ood disaste
ers in Japann. About 10
0
typhoonns hit Japan causing sto
orm, tidal wa
ave and hig
gh tides mainly during th
he period between Mayyand Octtober with A
August and September.1
S
1959 year iss considered
d to be turning point in fighting withhtyphoonns – in that afteraIsewan typhoon whhich caused to the death of more thhan 5000. Since then ass
a resultt of set of measures taken and application new technnological addvancementts by Japann
Meteoroological Ageency (JMA) numbernof deaddor misssing people
es in the ressult of typhooons sharplyy
decreassed.

Ise-wan typhoon tracking map

14Fire vulnerability and risk in Japan is high. This is mainly due to large forest areas which
cover about 70% of its total area, highly developed chemical and high-technology industries andclose proximity of buildings in densely populated areas. Wildfires in Japan occur usually in dry
seasons, mainly in summer. Moreover, tsunamis and earthquakes are also likely to entail large-scale
fires in its immediate aftermath. About 7000 fire cases occurred in immediate aftermath of the Great
Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in 1995.
Rivers in Japan are short and steep and flow rapidly and violently. Moreover, ratio between
normal volume of flow and that during a storm is extremely great. A great amount of rain falls on theJapanese archipelago during the rainy season (heavy rains of June and July) and typhoon seasons;and during periods of intensive rainfall, even a small stream that usually runs low may become araging torrent. Moreover, combination of such factors as steep mountains, fast-flowing rivers,
unstable and soft ground, rainy climate and frequent earthquakes often lead to such sedimentdisasters as debris flows, landslides and slope failures. Charts and maps below explain situation in
Japan with regard floods and sediment disasters.

15

Disaster Statistic of Japan

16

Disaster Statistic of Japan17
Following are indicated the certain figures of disaster statistic of Japan and Hyogo
prefecture:With the territory of 8,396 km2 Hyogo prefecture has the population of 5,595,052 (forthe March 2011). The very peculiar for this region hazards types are followings: Earthquake,
Flood, Land Slide, Storm Surge, and Tsunami

Hazard and vulnerability profile of Hyogo prefecture
Major disasters that have occurred in the past:

Among disasters occurred in Hyogo, the following are the ones with the largest amounts of humansuffering.
Disaster
Death
InjuredSouthern Hyogo Earthquake
6,402
40,092（January 1995）
Heavy rain caused by the
731
1,463
seasonal rain front (July 1938)
Typhoon Muroto (September
281
1,523
1934)
Prevailing hazards and vulnerable conditions
Examining previous disaster occurrences, major disasters expected to occur in Hyogo are as follows:

Flooding incurred by heavy rain due tothe seasonal rain front and typhoons

Earthquake originating from the Yamaki
Fault and the Nankai TroughLandslide disasters in mountainous areas
including Mt. Rokko

Legal Framework for Disaster Management regulations in Japan
In Japan, the disaster management system has been developed and strengthened
following the bitter experiences of large-scale disasters and accidents.
The

laws

coveringallphasesofdisastermanagement–

preparedness,aprevention/mitigation, response and recovery/rehabilitation phase has laid down the legal
framework for the disaster management system of Japan. According to the latest brochure ofDisaster Management System in Japan, 3 laws has been enacted to regulate disaster response
activities at national level: 1) Disaster Relief Act - 1947 year 2) Fire Services Act -1948 year 3)
Flood Control Act – 1949 year - the numbers of the laws regulating other phases of disastermanagement are following: 7 Basic Acts; 18 with regard to Disaster Prevention andPreparedness; 23 Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction and Financial Measures [5; 6-7 p.]

18Adopted in 1961 the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (DCBA) is considered to be
the turning point in the history of modern disaster management system of Japan, two years after
the Ise-wan Typhoon which caused tremendous destructions and loss of more 5000 people, theDCBA defined protection of national land as well as citizens’ lives, livelihoods, and property fromnatural disasters as a national priority. The DCBA lays down the national level framework for thedisaster management. The Law consists of X Chapters, 117 Articles, 11 Sections and governs

Basic outline of Disaster Management in Japan by DCBA

the following matters: Definition of responsibilities of disaster management, Disaster
Management Organizations, Disaster Management Planning System, Disaster Prevention andPreparedness, Disaster Emergency Response, Disaster Recovery and Rehabilitation, Financial
Measures, State of Disaster Emergency. [5; 8p] and Penal Provisions.

The Disaster

Countermeasures Basic Act and related laws complement each other as generallegislation and detailed legislation, the latter consisting of specific laws established in
response to various specific needs. In the event of a disaster, specific laws are first
applied depending on the nature of the disaster, and the Disaster Countermeasures
Basic Law is only invoked where there are no provisions in these laws. The DCBA which
covers all phases of disaster management and stipulates establishment of disastermanagement councils at three levels: national – Central Disaster Management Council;
Prefectural – Local Disaster Management Council and Municipal Disaster Management
Councils as well as defines organization and duties of these councils and defines
conditions for establishment of headquarters for disaster control in case of emergency.
Disaster Relief Act – The purpose of the law is to provide essential emergency relief inthe event of a disaster through the cooperation of local governments, non-governmental

19
organizations, such as the Japanese Red Cross Society, and the general public, so as to protect
the disaster victims and maintain social order. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of the DRA set theframework for the government policy with regard to costs management and reimbursement andpenal provisions related with disaster relief activities. In the case of emergency relief, theDisaster Relief Law is referred to for matters such as rescue operations and the state
contribution to relief expenses, for which the law has specific provisions. Under the law, relief isprovided only in the event of, for example, the destruction of a certain number of houses relative
to the population of the municipality or municipalities concerned due to a disaster. (Example: At
least 30 households have their dwellings destroyed through total structural collapse in a
municipality with a population of less than 5,000). The extent, methods and duration of relief areto be specified by the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW). The MHLW plays key rolein implementation of DRA during disaster times as a central supervisory and coordinating body.
As stipulated by the law, relief is provided by a prefectural governor with the assistanceof his municipal mayors. Where necessary, the prefectural governor may delegate part of his
authority to municipal mayors. The Act defines the responsibility of the prefectural governor as
follows;
The prefectural governor shall constantly endeavor to formulate required plans, establish
powerful relief organizations, and provide for labor, facilities, equipment, supplies and funding toensure fully effective.
The following types of relief activities are defined by the Disaster Relief Act: setting up ofplaces of refuge and emergency temporary housing; supply of food and water; supply of clothing,bedding, etc; rescue of disaster victims; emergency repair of houses. Provision of schoolsupplies Burial arrangements; search for deceased victims and body treatment; removal ofdebris and other obstacles in and around dwellings.
Disaster countermeasures are taken based on the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act
and various disaster management related laws.
〔Basic Acts〕
1. Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (1961) 2. Act on Prevention of Marine Pollution andMaritime Disaster (1970) 3. Act on Disaster Prevention in Petroleum Industrial Complexes andother Petroleum Facilities (1975) 4. Act on Special Measures for Large-scale Earthquakes(1978) 5. Act on Special Measures for Nuclear Disasters (1999) 6. Act on Special Measures for
Promotion of Tonankai and Nankai Earthquake Disaster Management (2002) 7. Act on Special
Measures for Promotion of Disaster Management for Trench-type Earthquakes in the Vicinity of
the Japan and Chishima Trenches (2004)

20〔Disaster Prevention and Preparedness〕
1. Erosion Control Act (1897) 2. Building Standard Law (1950) 3. Forest Act (1951)
4. Act on Temporary Measures for Disaster Prevention and Development of Special Land Areas(1952) 5. Meteorological Services Act (1952) 6. Seashore Act (1956)
7. Landslide Prevention Act (1958) 8. Act on Special Measures for Disaster Prevention in
Typhoon-prone Areas (1958) 9. Act on Special Measures for Heavy Snowfall Areas (1962) 10.
River Act (1964) 11. Act on Prevention of Steep Slope Collapse Disaster (1969) 12. Act on
Special Measures for Active Volcanoes (1973) 13. Act on Special Financial Measures for Urgent
Earthquake Countermeasure Improvement Projects in Areas for Intensified Measures (1980)14.
Act on Special Measures for Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures (1995) 15. Act on
Promotion of the Earthquake-proof Retrofit of Buildings (1995) 16. Act on Promotion of Disaster
Resilience Improvement in Densely Inhabited Areas (1997) 17. Act on Promotion of Sediment
Disaster Countermeasures for Sediment Disaster Prone Areas (2000) 18. Specified Urban River
Inundation Countermeasures Act (2003)〔Disaster Emergency Response〕
1. Disaster Relief Act (1947) 2. Fire and Disaster Management Organization Act (1947）
3.Japan Coast Guard Act （ 1948 ） 4.Fire Services Act (1948) 5.Flood Control Act (1949)
6.Police Act（1954） 7.Self-Defense Forces Act（1954）〔Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction〕
1．Forest National Insurance Act (1937) 2．Act on Temporary Treatment of Rental Land andHousing in Cities (1946) 3．Agriculture Disaster Compensation Act (1947)
4．Act on Interim Measures for Subsidizing Recovery Projects for Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries Facilities Damaged Due to Disasters (1950) 5 ． Small-Medium Business Credit
Insurance Act (1950) 6．Act on National Treasury Share of Expenses for Recovery Projects for
Public Civil Engineering Facilities Damaged Due to Disasters (1951) 7．Public Housing Act(1951) 8．Fishing Boat Damage Compensation Act (1952) 9．Railway Improvement Act (1953)
10.Act on National Treasury Share of Expenses for Recovery of Public School Facilities
Damaged Due to Disasters (1953)

21
11.Act on Interim Measures for Financing Farmers, Woodsmen and Fishermen Suffering fromNatural Disasters (1955) 12.Airport Act (1956) 13.Small-scale Business Equipment Installation
Financial Support Act (1956) 14.Act on Special Financial Support to Deal with Extremely Severe
Disasters (1962) 15.Fisheries Disaster Compensation Act (1964)
16.Act on Earthquake Insurance (1966) 17.Act on Special Financial Measures for Group
Relocation Promotion Projects for Disaster Mitigation (1972) 18.Act on Payment of Solatia for
Disasters (1973) 19.Act on Special Measures for Reconstruction of Disaster-stricken Urban
Areas (1995) 20.Act on Special Measures for Reconstruction of Jointly Owned Buildings in
Disaster-stricken Areas (1995) 21.Act on Special Measures for Preservation of Rights andProfits of the Victims of Specified Disasters (1996) 22. Act on Support for Livelihood Recovery ofDisaster Victims (1998) 23.The Japan Finance Corporation Act (2007)
River and Flood Management in Japan is regulated based on the River Act andFlood Control Act respectively. The River Act, besides setting the basic rules for riveradministration defines major flood prevention measures whereas the purpose of the FloodControl Act, aka, Flood Fighting Law is to watch for and guard against water-related disasters
caused by floods or storm surges and mitigate damage in order to maintain public safety.
According to the River Act, the rivers in Japan are classified into 2 groups: Class A and Class B.
And also there are independent rivers which are managed either by municipalities or cities.

Classification of Japanese rivers

The river administrator may use or expropriate necessary land, earth materials, bamboos,
wood or other materials and use vehicles or other transportation equipment or devices, ordispose of structures or other obstacles or have people who live near or are present at the flood
hazard site perform the flood protection activities. In the event that a disaster has occurred or is
likely to occur because of a flood, storm surge, etc. and it is deemed necessary in order toprevent or mitigate such disaster, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
may direct the prefectural governor who performs part of the management of a Class A river in adesignated section or the management of a Class B river to take necessary measures.
Flood fighting and preparedness are regulated under the Flood Fighting Act andSpecified Urban River Inundation Prevention Act.

22
According to Flood Control Act the municipalities assumes the primary and full
responsibility for flood fighting activities within their respective territories. The following flood
mitigation measures are conducted based on the Flood Control Act: Patrol of river, Mobilizationof flood-fighting and fire-fighting organizations, Ordering residents to evacuate, Reporting andpublishing water levels, Reporting levee breaches.
The Act plays an important role in the reduction of flood damage. It has provisions
governing the following matters.
1. Flood forecast to guide evacuation, etc. (jointly issued by a river administrator and theJapan Meteorological Agency).
2. Flood fighting warning to guide flood fighting activities (issued by a river administrator).
3. Public announcement by a river administrator of flood prone areas along each major river andpreparation of a hazard map by each municipality based on the assumed flood prone are

According to law some of some of Class A andClass B rivers are monitored by Hyogo Prefecture
Land Management Bureau Public WorksClass C rivers are monitored andmeasured by Municipalities

Class A rivers are measured and monitoredby Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism

EVENT
1940
1950
1960

1970

45-Typhoon Makurazaki
46-Nankai Earthquake
47-Typhoon Catharine
48-Fukui Earthquake
59-Typhoon Ise-wan

61-Heavy snowfalls
64-Niaagata
earthquake

73-Mt. Sakurajima
Eruption
Mt. Asama Eruption
76-seismological Societyof japan’s of possibilityof Tokai Earthquake
78-Miyagi-ken-oki
Earthquake

1980

1990

95-Great
Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake
99- Torrential Rains in
Hiroshima

JCO Nuclear Accident

2000
00-Torrential Rains in the
Tokai region

201004-Niigata-Fukushima
Torrential Rains
04-Niigata-ken-Chuetsu
Earthquake
11-GreatEastJapanearthquake

Disaster Management Acts

Disaster Management Plans
and Systems

47-Disaster Relief Act 23
49- Flood Control Act

50-Building standard Law
60-Soil Conservation and FloodControl
Urgent Measures Act,
61- Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act
62- Act on Special Financial Support to
Deal with Extremely Severe Disasters
62-Act on Special Measures for Heavy
Snowfall Areas
66-Act on Earthquake Insurance
73-Act on Special Measures for Active
Volcanos
78-Act on Special Measures for Large-Scale
Earthquakes

61-designation of Disaster ReductionDay
62 - Establishment of Central
Disaster Management Council
63- Basic disaster management plan

80-Acts on Special Financial measures for
UrgentEarthquake
Countermeasure
Improvement Projects in Areas for
Intensified Measures
81-Amendment of Building Standard Law
95- Act on Special measures for Disaster
Countermeasures
Act on Promotion of the Earthquake – proof
Retrofit of buildings
Amendment of act on special Measures forlarge-Scale Earthquakes
96-Act on special measures preservation ofrights and profits of the victims of specified
disasters
97- Act on Promotion of disasters
Resilience Improvement in densely
inhabited areas
98- Act on Support for Livelyhood recovery
of Disaster Victims
99- Act on Special Measures for Nuclear
disasters
00-Act on Promotion of sediment Disaster
Countermeasures for sediment Disaster
Prone Areas
01-Amendment of Flood Control Act
02-Act on special measures for promotionof Tohnankai and nankai Earthquakes
Disaster management
03-Specified urban river Inundiation
Countermeasures Act
04 – Act on Special measures for
Promotion of Disaster Management for
Trenchtype Earthquakes in the vicinity of
the Japan and Chishima Trenches
05-Amendment of Flood control Act
Amendment of Act on Promotion of
sediment Disaster
Amendment of Act on Promotion of the
Earthquake –proof Retrofit of Buildings
06- Amendment of Act on theRegulation of
Residential land development

83-Designation of disaster Reduction
Week Campaign

13 -Amendment of Disaster
Countermeasures
Basic Act（June 2013）
13- Act on Reconstruction from LargeScale Disasters（June 2013）14 - Amendment to Basic Disaster
Management Plan

79-Tokai Earthquake
Basic PlanCountermeasures

95-Amendment of basic Disaster
Management Plan Designation ofDisaster Reduction and Volunteer
Day

01-Establishment of Cabinet Office
03-Policy Framework for Tokai Earthquake
PolicyTokai Earthquake Countermeasures Basic
Plan
04-Tonankai and Nankai Earthquake
Countermeasures Basic Plan
05-Tokai Earthquake Disaster reduction
strategy
Tonankai and Nankai Earthquake Disaster
Reduction Strategy
Policy Framework for Tokyo Inland
Earthquakes
06-Policy Framework for Trench-type
Earthquakes in the vicinity of the Japan andChishima Trenches
Tokyo Inland Earthquake Disaster Reduction
Strategy
Basic framework for promoting a Nationwide
Movement for disaster Reduction
08- Disaster Management strategy for trenchtype Earthquakes in the Vicinity of Japan andChishima trenches
09- Chubu and Kinki regions Inland
Earthquake Countermeasures Basic plan

24

Outline of Disaster Management system of Japan and Disaster Management
Planning.
Disaster management in Japan consists of 3-layered system – national, prefectural andmunicipal layers. Disaster management system of Japan has undergone tremendous
advancement throughout the past 5-6 decades while disaster management system ofparticularly Hyogo prefecture incredibly improved after The Great Hanshin–Awaji Earthquake
1995. This disaster is possible to be considered the turning point for advancement of disastermanagement system of Hyogo prefecture.
According to DCBA Disaster Management Councils are established at each level andeach council is responsible for the implementation of all disaster management related issues
under its authority. Disaster Management Councils established at each level and each council is
responsible for the implementation of all disaster management related issues under its authority.

Outline of the disaster management system of Japan(National Level)
Central Disaster Management Council

Formulation and promoting implementation of the
Basic Disaster Management Plan

Designated Government Organizations
Designated Public Corporations

Formulation and promoting implementation of
the Disaster Management Operation Plan

(Prefectural level)

GovernorPrefectural Disaster Management Council
Designated Local Government
Organizations
Designated Local Public Corporations

Formulation and promoting implementation of the
Local Disaster Management Plan

(Municipal level)
Mayors of Cities, Towns and Villages
Municipal Disaster Management Council

Formulation and promoting implementation of
the Local Disaster Management Plan

Designated Government Organizations
23 ministries and agencies
Designated Public Corporations
63 organizations including independent administrative
agencies, Bank of Japan, Japanese Red Cross Society, NHK,
electric and gas companies and NTT

25

Central Disaster Management Council consists of the prime minister, who isthe chairperson, Minister of State for Disaster Management , all ministers, heads ofmajor public institutions and experts. The council promotes comprehensive disastercountermeasures including deliberating important issues on disaster reduction according torequests from the Prime Minister or Minister of State for Disaster Management. The Council’sfunctions include the following:* Create and promote the implementation of the Basic Disaster Management Plan
* Create and promote the implementation of plans for emergency measures in the event of adisaster* Deliberate important matters related to disaster preparedness in response to inquiries from thePrime Minister or Minister of State for Disaster Management (basic policies on disastermanagement, overall coordination of disaster management measures, proclaiming emergency
situation and others), etc.
* Provide full report on important items concerning disaster management to the Prime Minister
and Minister of State for Disaster Management
Mission of Cabinet Office - Along with a series of reforms of the central government
system in 2001, the post of Minister of State for Disaster Management was newly established tointegrate and coordinate disaster reduction policies and measures of ministries and agencies. In
the Cabinet Office, which is responsible for securing cooperation and collaboration among
related government organizations in wide-ranging issues, the Director-General for Disaster
Management is mandated to undertake basic disaster management policies and response tolarge-scale disasters, as well as conduct overall coordination.
Additionally, taking into account lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake, the Cabinet Secretariat System was strengthened, including the appointment of the
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management and the establishment of the Cabinet
Information Collection Center, to strengthen risk management functions to address emergencies
such as large-scale disasters and serious accidents. Thereby, the Cabinet Office has a role insupporting the Cabinet Secretariat regarding disaster management matters.

26

Disaster management planning in Japan is implemented at three levels:
1. Basic Disaster Management Plan is prepared by the Central Disaster Management Council
and basis plan for disaster management activities. The plan must be based on Disaster
Countermeasure Basic Act. The structure of it is as shown in the figure below:
2. Disaster Management Operation Plan is made by each designated government organizationand designated public corporation based on the Basic Disaster Management Plan and should
provide measures to be undertaken for disaster prevention pertaining to the business of adesignated administrative organ
3. Local Disaster Management Plan (prefectural, city, town or village) is made by prefectural andmunicipal disaster management councils, subject to local circumstances and based on Basic
Disaster Management Plan.

27

Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act outlines the main actors of disaster management
system of the country
Designated administrative organs which mean administrative organs of the Statedefined under the National Government Organization Act (Act No. 120, 1948) and which to be
designated by the Prime Minister.
Designated local administrative organs means branch offices of designatedadministrative organs in the prefectures and other local administrative organs of the State
designated by the Prime Minister.
Designated public corporations means public corporations such as Nippon Telegraphand Telephone (NTT), the Bank of Japan, the Japanese Red Cross Society, Nippon Hoso
Kyokai (NHK) and other corporations engaged in power, gas, transportation, communication andother public utility work, all designated by the Prime Minister.
Designated local public corporations means administrators of other public
corporations operating in the area of a prefecture and engaged in power, gas, transportation,communication and other public utility work, all designated by the governor of the prefecture
concerned.

28

CURRENTCT OUTLINE OF DESIGNNATED NATIONA
AL AND LOCALL
ADMIN
NISTRATIVVE ORGA
ANS, PUBLIC COORPORATTIONS ANND VOLUUNTARILYY
ORGANISATIONNSRESPONSIBLE FOR DISSASTER MANAGEMENT IN
N JAPAN.
THEIR TASKS ANDARESPPONSIBILITTIES DUR
RING DISA
ASTER
T
THE
MINIS
STRY OF LAND, INF
FRASTRU
UCTURE, TRANSPOTORT AND TOURISM
T
The MLIT
M
conducts disasster mana
agement policypatnationaal as well asa prefectural level in relation to floodand seediment dissasters as
s well as townt
deve
elopment
with regard to sa
afety for bo
oth natural and technnological
ers. Alongsside with otherophasses of em
mergency
disastemanagement thee ministryy also acctively invo
olved insaster Pre
evention
response phase and to thiis end Dis
ablished. Disaster Prevention
P
n CenterCenterr was esta
establisshed in thee MLIT perrforms the following functions:
f
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Mobilizing leaders, staffsmembers and relatedddepartmen
nt memberrs
O
Observingand distrib
buting metteorologica
al information,s images, etc.
site
CCollecting
ng information (integrrating
and sharinddamageinnformation))
Exchangin
ng informattion with ministers'mofffices, otheerministries and agenccies, local departmendnts, etc.
Providing informationin to the pu
ublicRegional assistancea, assistancce to local governments
In case of the large-sscale disassters MLIT
T rendersaassistancee to local governmentts

D
Disaster Prevenntion Center

29

Disaster response by MLIT
In order to minimize victims to the lesspossible extent and achieve the "zerovictim" goal in the face of increasingly
intense floods and localized heavy rainscausedbyclimatechange,flood

forecast centers (provisional name)have been established in regional
development bureaus to improve risk
management measures in, for example,
monitoring floods and providing information

Implementation of flood forecast centers

to municipal governments, the mass media, etc. Flood forecast centers are to perform suchtasks as climate change monitoring, flood risk evaluation and the development of an advanced
flood prediction system. To the end following activities are implemented:•

Collection of point data (e.g. rainfall amounts, water levels and water quality)

Rain observation by ground gauges and telemetry system – the data obtained by telemeters areconsolidated in one site, such as a regional bureau and a prefectural office, through the linking
station. Then, they are sent to each office to update the real-time flood prediction calculations.
•Collection of area data (rainfall amounts)

Radar rain gauges have been installed at 26 locations throughout the country. The informationof 1-km mesh resolution is updated every half an hour and available on the Internet. The radar
data are calibrated using the ground data.
•

Collection of image data.

30
CCTV Network - Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Regional Development
Bureaus and River Offices have real-time access to 3,900 CCTV images available on IP(Internet protocol) network. CCTV images are used for developing disaster control plans.
Fiber-optic network - River Bureau and Road Bureau have jointly laid fiber optics network lines
with the total length of 12046 km (as of 2006).
River information systems developed by individual regional development bureaus have been
integrated into a national river information system. Regional development bureaus cancustomize the system according to their requirements.
Case study: MLIT-managed Maruyama River
On October 20, 2004, Typhoon No. 23 caused serious damage in Hyogo Prefecture and thenorthern part of Kyoto Prefecture. River levees were breached at several locations. For the
MLIT-managed Maruyama River, where flood damage was particularly severe, temporary
restoration works were carried out with the assistance of nearby regional development bureaus
in order to guard against future flooding. Temporary restoration works at two sites werecompleted in five days.
Temporary restoration of the MLIT-managed river sections (two levee breach sites) were

MLIT response to Maruyama River floodcompleted in five days with the assistance of nearby regional development bureaus.
The levee breaches in the sections managed by Hyogo Prefecture (four sites) were smaller thanthe breach sites in the MLIT-managed sections, but the temporary restoration of the four
breached sections took 17 days.

31JAPAN METEOROLOCICAL AGENCY

JMA is semi-autonomous agency of the MLIT.
Besides, function as central weather service agencyof Japan, the agency has established comprehensive
surveillance and awareness providing mechanismwith regard to earthquake, typhoon and volcano
hazards. Regarding flood forecast Director-Generalof Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) In the eventof the imminence of a flood or storm surge, the Director-General of JMA informs the Minister ofLand, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism and the prefectural governors concerned of thepresent

state.

Organizational structure of JMA

Observation Network of JMA
JMA operates an array of networks involving surface based observation and the use of
meteorological satellites to monitor the atmosphere around the clock. The results are madeavailable to the public and related users. The data produced are essential in clarifying
atmospheric conditions, and are used for daily weather forecasts, severe weather monitoring,
typhoon analysis and climate change monitoring32•

Upper-air observation•

Upper-air observation is performed via radiosonde and wind prolifer observation
networks•

Satellite Observation•

Obtain the clear picture of
typhoons over ocean areas
and other global atmosphericconditions
Radar observation•

20 Doppler weather radars are
used

to

observe

rainfall/snowfall

intensity

nationwide

altogether

withproviding the information onthemovementofthunderclouds•

Surface weather Observation•

A total of 160 JMA weather

OBSERVATION NETWORK OF JMA

stations, including Local Meteorological Offices , across the country routinely collect dataon variables
sunshinesuch as surface pressure, temperature, humidity, wind, precipitation,

duration,

snow

depth

visibility

andcurrent

weather

conditions

Observation Network
Weather Analysis and Prediction
JMA monitors weather conditions 24 hours a day andissues Emergency Warnings, Warnings and Advisories tomitigate the effects of possible natural disasters and allow
preparations for other disasters they may trigger. The
Agencyalso

issuesweather

forecasts

based

on

observation and numerical weather prediction (NMP)•

Numerical Weather Prediction

Future weather is predicted by calculating using a numerical weather prediction model on asupercomputer.

33•

Weather maps

Forecasters use various weather maps to determine future weather conditions•

Monitoring

Forecasters monitor changes in weather conditions such as torrential rain, tornadoes andthunderstorms to enable the issuance of appropriate weather information that will help mitigate theeffects of natural disasters
Information for Severe Weather Preparedness
JMA issues messages in order to mitigate possible issues such as damage from storm/flooding,debris flow and slope failure caused by tropical or extra-tropical cyclones and fronts. The messages
issued as:•

Emergency Warnings/Warnings/ Advisories

Bulletins/ Bulletins on Exceptionally Heavy
Downpours•

Bulletins are issued to alert the public toweather conditions before Warning/Advisories
are issued.

Flood

Warnings

andAdvisories

for

designated rivers•

JMA issues Flood warnings and Advisories
for designated rivers with information onwater levels or flow rates in collaboration withnational and prefectural river authorities

Responses advised to protect life (for heavy rain) issued
by JMA

Along with above mentioned messages JMA issues Hazardous Wind Watch, Information on
debris flow, slope failure and other hazards, Radar/ Raingauge-Analyzed Precipitation

and Very-Short Range Forecasts of Precipitation and Nowscasts (Precipitation, Thunder
and Tornado)

34
Monitoring of the Global Environment
JMA carries out observation and monitoring to environmental
issues such as global warming and ozone layer depletion as
well as prediction of global warming, and makes the result
public.
JMA monitors:•

Along with Japan’s Ministry of Defense observe
greenhouse gases in seawater•

Extreme climate events around the world and related
phenomena such as El Nino and La Nina•

Atmospheric environment•

The oceans ( water temperature, salinity, carbon dioxide)
Global environment observation network

Meteorological Information for Aviation and Maritime Safety
JMA provides aviation and maritime operators with specialized information to meet their specificneeds. It includes•

Monitoring at Aerodromes•

Monitoring of Airspace•Issuance of Marine Warnings and Wave Forecast Charts

Monitoring of Earthquakes, Tsunamis and Volcanoes
JMA

monitors

real-time

data

from

around1,500

seismometers and around 4,300 seismic intensity meters,
tsunami observation facilities (around 80 tide gauges and
36 offshore-water-pressure gauges) and instruments suchas seismometers, tiltmeters, GPS and other tools installednear 110 active volcanoes around the clock and issue a

Seismometer and seismic intensity meter network

35
range of disasters mitigation information.

Volcano monitoring system

In order to limit the extent of damage
causedbynaturaldisasters

andsupport the prompt execution of related
activities,

JMA

providesdisaster

mitigation information through various
channelstogovernment

disastermanagement

agencies,

local

governments, the media and the public.
JMA

often

providethedisaster

mitigation information along with othergovernmental body (MLIT).
MLIT informs, jointly with the Director-

Cooperation of JMA with other organizations

General of JMA, for a class A river (excluding designated sections), the prefectural governors
concerned•

water level or discharge if the possibility of flooding is deemed high or•water level or discharge, or the flood hazard area and the flood water depth if flooding
has already occurred.

Prefectural governors communicate the information received as described above to the flood
protection managers and stage gauge managers.

36

Joint flood warningg by MLIT and JMA

JMA proovides daily
y forecasts
s/one-week
k forecasts (informatioon on weath
her, winds, coastalcocean waves,w
maxximum/minim
mum tempe
eratures andd probabilitie
es of precip
pitation) cov
veringperiods up to two days /up too seven daays ahead. They includde Distributiion Forecassts andThree-H
Hours Foreccasts.
Seasonnal Forecassts (average
e temperatu
ure, precipittation amou
unts, sunshiine duration
ns andsnowfall) totals for the next on
ne to severa
al months are also provvided by JM
MAW
Infformation on
o Extremee Weather
Early Warning
JMA isssues Early WarningW
Infoormation onn Extreme WeatherW
eve
ery Mondayy and Thurs
sday whena high probabilitypoof extreme seven-daysaaveragetemmperatures or very hea
avy snowfalll ispredicteed

2 days aheead forecast issued by JMA

three-hourly forecast

37
It is JMA which designed and apply Earthquake Early Warning System after the Great
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake

38

JMA MainM
Offices

JMA Kobe
e Office

J
JMA
opera
ates the Sa
apporo, Sen
ndai, Tokyoo, Osaka, Fukuoka andaOkinaw
wa RegionaalHeadquuarters to ob
bserve and monitor weeather and eearthquakess and to isssue forecastts, warningss
and buulletins forr these reegions. Th
he Regiona
al Headquarters givee directionn to Locaal
Meteoroological Offfices for thetissuancce and prrovision of information and com
mments onnprefectu
ural and municipal levvels. The AgencyA
ope
erates Aviation Weathher Service Centers at
major airports to su
upport the safesflow of air traffic.
JMA alsso operatess the Meteo
orological Research
RIn
nstitute, thee Meteorolo
ogical Satellite Centerr,
the Aerrological Observatory,O, the Magn
netic Obserrvatory andd the Meteeorological College ass
locationn to research.
FIRE AND DISASTERR MANAGE
EMENT AGE
ENCY
The Firre Defense Organizatio
on Law preescribes tha
at the FDM
MA conductss research,, formulatessplans, etc,
e concernning fire serrvice system
ms in order to strength
hen the fire defense ca
apabilities ofomunicip
palities. To this end itt provides, it providess municipa
alities with advice, guidance anddrecommmendations concerning
g their fire servicesorga
anizations anda activitie
es. It howev
ver does nothave thee power to control succh organizattions and acctivities. Be
elow are thee main affairrs under theejurisdicttion of the F
FDMA:•

Planning an
nd formulatiion of the ovverall fire se
ervice systeem•GGuidancefoor and assisstance in sttrengthening
g fire servicce facilities

39•

Research concerning fire service science and technology•

Training for fire service personnel and officers in the volunteer fire corps•

Advice, guidance and recommendations regarding prefectural and municipal fire services•

Requests for assistance measure during an emergency•

Planning, formulation and coordination in relation to disaster prevention measures taken
by local governments
The FDMA also functions as a contact center between local fire-defense related organizations
and government and coordination body during the large scale disasters and accidents

The role of FDMA during disaster and peace time

Firefighting agencies in Japan comprise of regular fire prevention services such as fire defense
headquarters and fire department, and the non-conventional volunteer fire corps. Both theseorganizations are established under the responsibility of regional municipalities that are mostfamiliar to the public, and are controlled under the jurisdiction of municipality mayors

o
o

40
By expanding the size of municipality fire services, the fire service system can be betterorganized and enhanced. Accordingly, municipal fire services are being spread out to offer local
residents improved services.
Volunteer fire corps operates in every town and city of the country, boasting outstanding
mobilization and response capabilities. Every member of the volunteer fire corps has their own
regular job, but are active days or night protecting their own town by themselves, deeply rooted
in the spirit of their devotion to their hometown. While they are involved in firefighting activities,
they are also there to protect the lives, physical being and properties of local residents fromnatural disasters such as earthquakes, wind and water damage through rescue efforts, warning
patrols and evacuation guidance. Even when there is no disaster present, volunteer fire corps
organizes numerous community-based activities designed to improve fire and disasterprevention capabilities, as well as rejuvenating their local community. Female volunteer fire
corps participates in areas that have been predominantly female-oriented, including home visits
to early people for fire prevention, and holding fire prevention classes at kindergartens andelementary schools.

The FDMA works with local disaster prevention groups such as voluntary disaster prevention
organizations and in-house fire fighting team of companies for the promotion of initiatives that
contribute to the local community. These include improving the quality of personnel serving toprevent disasters in regional areas, rejuvenating voluntary disaster prevention organizations andenhance danger management training, and increasing disaster prevention awareness withincompanies.

41

In the case of large-scale disasters when firefighting organizations cannot cope alone,
elite emergency rescue teams of the FDMA, known as, Emergency Fire Response Teamsassist them.
Leader of the municipal teams supervise municipal teams and manage their activities
whereas the Leader of the Command Support Group deploys teams swiftly to disaster areasusing helicopters and other vehicles in order to gain a better understanding of disasterconditions, contacting and liaising with the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, andproviding instructions and support to local firefighting teams. Since 2004 the Commissioner of
the Fire and Disaster Management Agency has the authority to mobilize and control firefighting
teams in the event of a large-scale disaster or accident. The FDMA controls all aspects ofmanagement, from obtaining real-time information on the disaster to instructing Emergency Fire
Response Teams to mobilize. As of 2004, 2800 Emergency Fire Response Teams has beenregistered across the country covering about 15 % all fire brigades in Japan. Below the structureof Emergency Response Fire Teams is described:
9 Firefighting Teams: Assist in putting out fires to prevent the spread of flames during
large-scale fires.
9 Rescue Teams: Ensure preparation of equipment used for advanced rescue, search forpersons requiring rescuing and assist in rescue efforts.
9 Emergency Teams: Ensure preparation of equipment used for high-level emergencies
and assist in emergency activities
9 Logistical Support Teams: Assist in required transport and resupply using vehicles
equipped with water supply systems to support the activities of each team.
9 Special Disaster Teams: Firefighting teams for responding to special types of disasters,
including poisonous substances and major toxic spills.

42
quipment Teams:
TFireefighting teeams for reesponding to special equipmentt,
9 Special Eq
including thhose requirred by team
ms for resccues in floo
oded areas and carrying water tooremote areeas.
on helicopteers
9 Air Squadrons: Firefighting activitties conduccted using fire protectio
uadrons: Firrefighting activities con
nducted using fireboatss
9 Marine Squ
Emergeency Fire Response
R
T
Teams
was
s founded iin 1995, aftter the Grea
at Hanshin
n-Awaji
Earthquuake and innstitutionalizzed by the FireF Defensse Organiza
ation Law ass amended in 2003.
Rescueactivitie
es

thatt

firefightin
ng organizations areeinvolved with range from fires,,traffic c accidents,aflooding anddnatural disasters,dexxtending toospecial ty
ypes of dissasters thatt
Water Flooding Rescu
ue Effort

include teerrorist attacks. At the

Traffic accident resccue efforts

heart of thesetrescu
ue efforts area Rescue Teams, coomprising ofexperts that have receivedrsp
pecial educa
ation and trraining on liife-saving aand rescue techniques,various types of resscue equipm
ment, and rescuervehiclesFire Statio
ons inHyogo Pre
efecture

43
Case Study – Kobe Fire Department
Overview of the Kobe Fire Department (As of 2015)
1. Outline of Kobe City
(1) Surface area: 553.12 km2(2) Population: 1,536,559 people(3) The number of households: 695,408 households
2. Status of Kobe Fire Department(1) Organization
Fire Department Head Quarters (1), Fire Stations (10), Fire Station Division (1),Fire Station Branches (18), First Aid Station (1), Air Rescue Squad (1), Citizen disasterprevention center (1), Emergency stations (1)(2) Number of employees: 1,396 people (quorum)(3) Number of resources, such as fire engines (total: 93 units)
・ Number of fire engines: 93 units (Pumpers, Pumpers with foam, Aerial ladders,
Rescue tracks, Special disaster response vehicle, etc.)
・ Number of ambulance: 36 units
・ Number of other vehicles: 63 units (vehicles for inspection and public relations,transportation vehicles, etc.)
・ Fireboat: 1 unit
・ Aircraft (Helicopter): 2 units Fire Fighting Water Source Facilities (Total: 33,521 units)(1) Number of hydrants: 29,936 units(2) Number of tank for firefighting: 2,257 units (of the number of earthquake-proof tank: 259)
(3) Number of other water source facilities: 1,328 (pools, ponds, rivers, etc.)
4. Number of reported receiving of “119” call: the number of reports 119 -132,350 (2014), thenumber of reports from cell phone – 55,377
FireEmergency

Other
disasters

77,582
3,123856
5. Status of Fire in 2014

Contactthefirefighting

Training
test

MistakeNo
response

Hospitalinquiry

Inquiry
Advisor

Other

Forward

2,138

5,450

13,725

13,186

8,960

5,526

1,804

・Number of fires: 856
8. Status of Voluntary Disaster Prevention Organizations (BOKOMI)
・ Already formed: 191 districts (all over the city & school districts)
9. Status of Volunteer Fire Corps(1) Organization: headquarters (10), Divisions (15), Sub-divisions (159)(2) Number of members: 4,000 (quorum)

Operation room of the Kobe Fire Department serves as a coordination and emergency hotline
center. Based on a 119 emergency call received in the operation room relevant response teams
are dispatched to accident site. Once a call received automated system identifies and displays
caller’s data and exact location at the digital map. Overall following activities of dispatchedteams take place under supervision and coordination of the Operation Room. In order to ensurethat all incoming calls are received 126 telephones lines are being utilized. In addition, 544
surveillance cameras to ensure safety situation at strategic places are managed by the
Operation Room, meteorological situation in Kobe City area, National Broadcasting Channel –NHK are observed.
For the purpose of coordination of emergency medical service daily information on medical staff
shifts, vacant rooms, etc are received from designated hospitals.
Moreover, the department has taken some measures in order disabled and aging persons to beable to call 119 hot line easily. To this end special fax sheets, landline telephones which enable
one to call 119 hot line with the click of just a button has been elaborated – or ordinary landline
telephones reconfigured to support the same function - and distributed to registered persons.
Once such a call received all the personal and health data are displayed automatically.

Screens using in Command

Automatic Vehicle Monitor

JAPAN COAST GUARD
Alike the JMA, Japan Coast Guard (the JCG) is the external organ of the MLIT. The main
responsibilities of JCG in terms of disaster preparedness and marine search and rescue include:
Search and Rescue: (Rescue from Capsized Vessel, Ice Breaking, Catch by Helicopter
Utilizing the Japanese Ship Reporting System (JASREP))
Prevention of Accident :( Prevention of Marine Leisure Accidents Marine Leisure Events
Information Service Room
Protection of Marine Environment: (Chase of Oil
Discharging Vessel, Fire Fighting Operation for
Blazing Tanker, Derelict Ship Countermeasure, Oil
Pollution Response45
ness and marinemsearcch and rescue – it is the responsib
bility of JCG
G to conducct
Disaster preparedn
e operation once accid
dent such asa boat/vesssel involvedd accidents occur. Theesearch and rescue
orks to raisse awarene
ess and ed
ducate people about the dangerrs of the sea and thee
JCG woprinciple
es of self reescue. It alsso makes evvery effort whenw
accideents do occcur to respond promptlyy
and savve lives. Th
he JCG is increasing its deploymments of mobilemrescu
ue personneel skilled atadescendding from helicopterss and brin
nging peop
ple back up, scuba diving, andd providinggemergeency first aid
d treatment.. It is also workingw
to im
mprove the rescue andd first-aid ca
apabilities of
its diverrs and eme
ergency meedical technnicians. The
e JCG also works toge
ether with otheropubliccand privvate rescue
e organizatio
ons includinng police annd fire depa
artments to ccover the va
ast areas ofsea thaat surround Japan. It is importan
nt that the JCG be no
otified as sooon as posssible whenntrouble occurs in seass
far froom land. Foor that reasson, the JC
CG operate
es a maritim
me accident
reporting service 2
24 hours a day by raddio based ono the Globbal Maritim
me Distress and Safetyy
System (GMDSS). Reports off incidents anda acciden
nts and requests for heelp can alsoo quickly beemade too the JCG w
when the neeed arises byb dialing 11
18 on a mobbile or onbo
oard phone..
om landline
e are receiv
ved by thee respectivve
Calls froregionaal centerss, wherea
as, thecalls frommonboarrd phones are directe
ed to headq
quarters.

To resppond to such maritime disasters as
a large-sca
ale oil spillss, the discha
arge of hazzardous anddnoxiouss substancees, and ship
pboard firess, the JCG has stationed fire-fightting ships anda disastermitigatio
on equipme
ent around the countryy. This provvides the JCG with a system tha
at is alwayss
ready too mobilize aand is also useful for suchstasks as predictin
ng how an ooil spill will spread andddrift in orderoto alloow its effecttive remova
al. The JCG
G also works for maritim
me disasterr prevention
nby condducting exe
ercises withh private-se
ector disasster prevention organiizations in Japan andd46
overseas. The JCG makes every effort to keep its systems in good order and conducts drills sothat when a major natural disaster occurs it is ready to quickly carry out such emergency relief
operations as rescuing disaster victims, providing emergency transportation for personnel andrelief supplies, and conducting surveys of stricken areas. The JCG compiles “coastal area
environmental protection information” so that when oil spills occur their environmental impact
can be promptly assessed and analyzed and their damage minimized. This information is madeavailable over the Internet so that it can be put to use by organizations involved in oil removal aswell as local municipalities and private-sector groups.

Central and Regional
Organization
Of JCG＜

Regional Centers of JCG

Maritime Disaster Prevention Center
Maritime Disaster Prevention Center (MDPC) is the only legitimate organization set forth
by the Law to carry out prevention and elimination operation to response with any Oils (Acceding

47
to the Japanese domestic law, “Oils” were divided into two categories such as “persistent oils”
and “non-persistent oils” Persistent oil ( = specific oil) includes crude oil, heavy oil, lubricating oil
and etc. Non-persistent oil includes gasoline, kerosene, light oil, oil refuse and refined productsetc.) and HNS (Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) includes Non-persistent oil andNoxious liquid substance.) spill incidents, including marine fire fighting, associated withshipboard disasters of HNS tankers along the Japanese coastal line, entrusted by the shipowner of the tanker and instructed by the Japan Coast Guard.

MDPC was established in 1976.
In the event that an HNS spill incident actually occurs or is anticipated, MDPC will
immediately respond to the incident site at the request of the captain or ships owner, and takeinitial pollution prevention and elimination measures including putting out the fire or preventing
the spread of the fire, or any other actions against potential danger. In Japan, the domestic law
relating to the Prevention of Marine Pollution and Maritime Disaster was revised in 2006 due toaccession to the Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-ordination to Pollution Incidents
from Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 2000”(OPRC-HNS Protocol). The following is a partof the provision of this revised law. Since April 1st 2008, when the owner of HNS tankers ofmore than 150GT sails in specified areas (Tokyo-bay, Ise-bay and Seto inland sea) while
carrying HNS, the owner has to keep onboard appropriate accident response materials,
equipment and experts necessary for removal of the said HNS, and be able to reach the sitewith such materials, equipment the location of the said vessel within approximately two hours.
Depending on the characteristic of the HNS, it is necessary to keep the removal materials or
vessel with capability to squirt water, oil boom, oil skimmer etc, and keep the experts.

48
When the owner of the vessel, is sailing in the specified areas when carrying cargoes of HNS,
the owner has to have the certification of accident response materials, equipment and experts.
SELF-DEFENSE FORCES (SDF)
The SDF disaster relief role is defined in Article 83 of

the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954, requiring units to
respond to calls for assistance from prefectural governors to aid
in fire fighting, earthquake disasters, searches for missing
persons, rescues, and reinforcement of embankments andlevees in the event of flooding. The SDF conducts a variety ofdisaster relief operations in collaboration with municipal governments when disasters such as
natural disasters occur in any part of the country, by engaging in the search and rescue ofdisaster victims or missing ships or aircraft, controlling floods, offering medical treatment,
preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods. In particular, over
100,000 SDF personnel were dispatched at a peak time for relief operations for the large-scale
earthquake and nuclear disaster based on the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011.
SDF are deployed only upon the request of prefectural governor. Municipal mayors can
ask prefectural governors to request a disaster relief dispatch by the SDF. In the event thatmayors are unable to makesucharequesttotheprefectural governor, they can
inform the Minister of Defense,or those designated by the
Ministerconditions.

of

the

disaster

After

receivingsuch requests from governors,
the Minister of Defense orother personnel designated by
the Minister can immediately
dispatch units as necessary
accordingtothedisastersituation. Under circumstances of particular urgency when there is no time to wait for a request,
the Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister may authorize an exceptional
dispatch (discretionary dispatch). The Minister of Defense is authorized to dispatch SDF once
earthquake or nuclear threat alarm is issued, based on the request of Chief of the Nuclear
Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters and Chief of the Earthquake Disaster Warning

49
Headquarters (both–the Prime Minister) The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) conducts a variety ofactivities when disaster relief dispatches are required, including search and rescue for accident
victims and ships or aircraft in distress, flood control, medical treatment, epidemic prevention,water supply and transportation of personnel and goods. The SDF make it a principle to dispatch
SDF units upon request from prefectural governors and other officials.
However in the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, it took a lot of time to dispatch
SDF units as governments of Hyogo Prefecture and Kobe City could not collect and analyze
damage information.
From the Kobe Earthquake lessons, The Minister of Defense or those designated by the Ministerof defense may dispatch SDF units without a request in exceptional circumstances when thesituation is particularly urgent and there is no time to wait for a request.

MUNICIPAL LEVEL VOLUNTARY EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAMSVOLUNTARY FIREFIGHTING CORPS - Likewise the fire departments and stations, volunteer
fire corps in Japan also are organized by municipalities. Different from the first two, volunteer firefighters are not professionals and engaged in fire fighting as secondary occupation. The fire
corps are independent from the fire departments and fire stations and there are no top-down
relationships between these two. However, in cases of where the fire corps are called out inemergencies, they must follow the orders of the chief of the fire department or fire station. For
the volunteer fire corps, the basic rule is one corps in one municipality. However, there aremunicipalities that have established more than one corps (most of “designated cities”) and thosethat have not established the corps (Osaka city, and some towns and villages in Aichi
Prefecture).

SUIBO-DAN – VOLUNTARY FLOOD FIGHTINGTEAMS - Voluntary flood fighting teams, known
as “suibo-dan” play important role in floodfighting system of Japan. These teams areusually established within the municipalities inthe vicinity areas of rivers. The members of“suibo-dan” normally engaged in different jobs
but are also involved in patrolling, watching out
and levee protection works in close coordination

SUIBO-DAN is at drill

with river administrators and other related organizations during floods. During periods without
flooding, they still conduct patrols and inspection of levees, provisions for flood fighting

50
warehouses and for communication facilities, drills and other activities in preparation for a flood.
As of 2009 there were about 900 000 voluntary flood fighters nationwide.
Voluntary disaster prevention groups
According to article 7 of DISASTER COUNTERMEASURES BASIC ACT residents of the area
under local government are obligated to contribute toward the cause of disaster prevention bytaking their own measures to prepare for disaster and by participating in voluntary disasterprevention groups
Case study (BOKOMI) - Kobe’s Community –Based
Disaster Prevention Organization
BOKOMI – BOKOMIs are community based - elementary

school district based disaster prevention organizations.
Since 1995, based on the lessons learned from the Great
East Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, all of the districts of Kobecity – 191 districts have established BOKOMIs. To

BOKOMI drill

establish BOKOMI, firstly, it is discussed and decided on
by local government organizations including the local city office and the local fire station,
together with leader of local residents associations, women’s associations, elderly associations,
voluntary fire corps and etc. The equipment and materials needed for the activities are provided
by the local government and storehouses installed in local parks, in preparation for emergencies.
Schools in Japan also serve as evacuation sites during emergencies. In normal times BOKOMI
conducts various emergency drill programs such as on how to use the provided equipment andmaterials (for ex. Water fire extinguishers, powder fire extinguishers), rescue drills, evacuation
drills, information transmission drills, flood control drills and etc and conduct school disasterprevention education.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE BY OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND TEAMSDISASTER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TEAMSDisaster Medical Assistance Teams are specialized and trained medical aid teams which
operate during large-scale disasters. DMAT system was established in 2005 based on thelessons of Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake. The guidelines for the deployment of DMATs are
based on the results of research funded by a Health and Labor Sciences research grant fromthe, the Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare (MHLW). In these guidelines, DMATs are definedas “mobile, trained medical teams that can be rapidly deployed during the acute phase of adisaster (within 48 hours). “DMAT Team Member Training Course” is conducted at the National
Hospital Organization’s Disaster Medical Center (an independent administrative agency) for
certification of DMAT personnel. DMAT member are specialized to render medical assistance51
and treatment during the acute phases of disasters as well as transferring casualties to safe
areas.
The role of each institution affected by these guidelines is:
1. Prefectures: a. Non-emergency times—formulate operational plans, conclude agreementswith medical institutions, and provide training; b. Emergency times—Deploy DMATs and provide
necessary support for relief activities. The prefectures must assume the central role.
2. MHLW: a. Non-emergency times—produce operational guidelines, certify personnel, promote
education and training; and b. Emergency times—collect information; overall coordination.
3. DMAT-designated medical institution: a. Non-emergency times—prepare for deployment, train
personnel; and b. Emergency times—Dispatch DMATs on request.
4. Emergency base hospitals, Japanese Red Cross Society, and the National Hospital
Organization—provide necessary support (collect information, provide contacts, coordination,
personnel, and materials)
Functioning of DMAT are based on the agreements between prefectural governments andmedical establishments and DMATs are deployed only upon the request of government ofdisaster affected prefecture unless the one following conditions is not the case

Outline of DMAT Operations

JAPAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION TEAMS – JMATThe concept of JMAT had been building up since 2009 by a subcommittee of the Japan Medical
Association’s Committee on Emergency and Disaster Medicine. For the first time, JMAT came into
action in March 2011, when the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred. Triage cards were preparedby the Japan Medical Association for JMAT activities in the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake.
Different from triage tags used during the acute phase of a disaster, physicians write their on-thespot judgments down on these cards and give to patients in evacuation shelters and other locations
so that they can be connected later treatment and used by takeover caregivers. Also, the checklists
were prepared for each evacuation shelter to enable the easy sharing of information when presiding

52
at the joint conferences held locally every morning andevening, mainly at the local municipal medical associations.
Over 230 such teams are currently organized.
Purpose‐ To provide medical assistance at hospitals and clinics in thedisaster‐affected areas (and to provide the ongoing medical
treatment that needed to be continued even before thedisaster occurred)‐ To provide medical treatment at evacuation sites andfirst‐aid centers
JMAT Triage tags

Dispatch of JMAT
When a disaster strikes, the JMA moves into action to dispatch physicians with various areas ofexpertise to affected areas along with pharmacists, nurses, other health professionals andadministrative staff. Once dispatched, the main activities of JMAT involve providing medical careand health management at first-aid stations and shelters and offering medical assistance for
local hospitals and clinics in disaster areas to support the continuation of pre-disaster medical
services. JMAT is also responsible for providing public health management at shelters,
responding to patients at home, clarifying medical needs, identifying locations where medical
support is not available and making rounds in such areas, collecting local information andsupporting the efforts to organize coordination meetings for relevant parties in disaster zones.
Passing on duties smoothly to reconstructed medical institutions (including local medical
associations) in affected areas is also an important activity.
Composition of JMATA JMAT typically consists of one physician, two nurses and one coordinate staff member.
However, team composition should be flexible in response to the situations at hand based onstaff availability and local needs, both in terms of professions and staff numbers. In fact, after theGreat East Japan Earthquake, other professionals such as pharmacists also played significant
roles
Dispatching duration of the team: Approximately three to seven days (depending on discussion
with supported sites and supporting associations)
6. Communication method with JMA: Mobile phone

53
Case study – Medical relief activities by Hyogo JMAT in Ishinomaki City
When the disaster 2011 occurred JMAT Hyogo was dispatched to the affected areas of
Ishinomaki, the second-largest city in Miyagi Prefecture with a population of approximately
160,000 as part of the activities of the local government.
Medical activities at the first-aid stations were carried out for about three months, from March 21
until June 19, 2011. The activities of Hyogo JMAT started at the Ishinomaki Junior High Schoolwith 700 evacuees and then three more stations, followed by patient visits. JMAT Hyogo
dispatched 44 teams in total to the disaster area. Each team departed by airplane in the earlymorning of the first day, stayed in the disaster zone carrying out medical activities for three days,
and then left on the last flight on the third day. A total of 140 physicians were dispatched from
Hyogo, with as many as six physicians required in a team. The number of JMAT team members
totaled 312, including nurses, pharmacists, and coordination staff. The teams were organizedwith the cooperation of the secretariats of Hyogo prefectural nurses associations, pharmacists
associations, and medical associations as well as municipal medical associations. First-aid
stations had not been prepared beforehand. The first JMAT Hyogo team set up a first-aid station
at the junior high school in consultation with the school principal. Every time physicians in
specialist fields were dispatched, notices for evacuees were posted at the first-aid center inadvance.
The staff of JMAT not only constructed a device for suspending the drips, but also secured food,water, and gasoline; negotiated with other relief teams; and made arrangements for flights andaccommodation.
JAPANESE RED CROSS SOCIETY
The JRCS has a well-organized disaster response regime, with 488
response teams

throughout the country with 6,844 medical relief

personnel registered as standard. Eachteam consists of six personnel: adoctor, a head nurse, two nurses, and two administrators.

The Society

has undertaken a number of disaster relief activities at home since 1888,
when

it sent its first medical relief team to assist the victims of the Mt.

Bandai eruption. The JRCS conducted disaster relief operations after the Great Kanto (1923),
Great Hanshin Awaji(1995) and Niigata Chuetsu (2004) earthquakes, the Unzen-Fugen(1991) and Usu (2000) volcanic eruptions, and other natural disasters. The
also involved in rescue
train crashes, andoperations following transportation accidents, such asindustrial disasters, such as gas explosions.

organization isairplane and54
These disaster relief activities are conducted as a mission of the Red Cross under theJapanese Red Cross Law and its statutes. In addition, the JRCS is designated as a
“Designated Public Corporation” by the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act and theDisasterRelief Act, and is required to co-operate with the Government to offer relief assistance in timesof disaster. The contents of such assistance are provided for under anagreement with the

Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare.
The domestic disaster relief activities of the JRCS are as follows:・Medical relief and psychological care・Storage and distribution of relief goods
・Provision of blood products
・Collection and distribution of voluntary donations
Activities by Red Cross volunteers include collection of information, first aid, provision of hot
meals, tracing services, transportation and distribution of relief goods, and caring for those who
evacuate to shelters.
BUILDING RESEARCH INSTITUTE
The BRI is actively involved in response measures taken
in immediate aftermath of earthquakes, as well as in longterm measures. As to immediate measures, the BRI
conducts preliminary damage assessments of buildings
just after an earthquake hit the area thereby defining
which buildings is still can be exploited which are not.
Having completed assessment of each building BRI

BRI disaster response – building assessment

specialist attach an special sticker on what enables one to define vulnerability level of a building. The
measure helps to avoid future human injury and loss as well as identify possible evacuations spots.
As to the long term measures the BRI is main institute who conducts research for building seismic
resistant buildings and seismic retrofitting of buildings.

NHK – JAPAN BROADCASTING COMPANY
As one of the public corporations designated for disastermanagement under the Disaster Countermeasure Basic
Act, NHK plays the key role in disaster broadcasting andemergency warning. To this end, the corporation has
dedicated vast resources to disaster response andTsunami warning broadcasting by NHK

55established effective coordination mechanism with other disaster management relatedorganizations, mainly with the JMA. Small quakes detected the JMA before strong earthquake
occurs, automatically redirected to NHK within a few seconds, (moreover, NHK has installed
seismic intensity meters at 73 locations countrywide) what enables it to issue public alert
promptly and provide necessary information regarding the magnitude and precise location of theearthquake as well as tsunami information nationwide. Emergency Warning System (EWS)
utilized in collaboration the JMA is carried out only in special emergency cases such as largescale tsunami and earthquake warnings or based on the request of governors and mayors. In
striving to alert as many people as possible, the system switches on tv sets and radios – 4 tv
channels and 3 radio channels belong to NHK - automatically. Since 1985 they EWS alert has
been issued 18 times – all of them for tsunami warnings, while the test transmission is conducted
every month and emergency drills held every day by NHK. To ensure quick and live broadcastingfrom disaster hit areas NHK owns 14 helicopters – which are equipped with necessary devices forlive broadcasting – stationed at 12 locations and 460 remote controlled cameras installed
countrywide.
In addition, the official web-page of NHK also provides disaster and weather information and enables
watching two channels – General TV and NHK World TV - online.
Case Study: Osaka Gas Engineering Co., Crisis Management System.
Osaka Gas basically has the below three disaster prevention measures for earthquakes.
Each consists of training and drills with hardware and software.

Outline of the Osaka Gas Engineering Crises Management Measures

56

Emergency measures:
Seismometer
In order to determine whether damage has been caused by earthquakes or not and quickly estimate
the extent of that damage, gas companies in Japan use seismometers that can measure SI as anindicator of gas pipeline and structural damage. The seismometers are tied into an automatic shutoff
system that triggers under high SI capable of causing damage in an earthquake.
Shut-off system
Safety is ensured in areas heavily damaged by earthquakes by stopping city gas supply.

The Osaka Gas Engineering Automatic Shut-Off System

The intelligent gas meters installed at each customer’s location automatically shut off at 200 (gal).
Furthermore, low pressure gas supply is automatically shut off in earthquakes capable of damaging
pipelines and structures by an automatic shut-off system installed at medium pressure governor B.
Moreover, in extreme cases (widespread damage), city gas supply can be shut off remotely from theCentral Control Center and Back-Up Center.
In-house radio network

57
In order to smoothly produce and supply city gas, Osaka Gas remotely monitors and controls city gas

The Osaka Gas Engineering In-house Radio Network

supply 24-hours a day. Because around-the-clock operation is necessary as much in an earthquake
as on a regular basis, Osaka Gas introduced a radio network that works by radio waves and satellite.

Back-Up CenterTo
ensurecustomers
absolute

safetyandconvenience in their use ofcity gas, it is necessary to
remotely monitor and control
city gas supply at all times,
and, in the event of anearthquake, collect damage
information and operate the
The Osaka Gas Engineering Back-Up Centersystemfromremote.

The

Control
Center is capable of this, but should it be damaged, a Back-Up Center built with aseismic
systems and other state-of-the-art technology for 24-hour operation can take over control.

58
INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE
JAPAN DISASTER RELIEF TEAM (JDR)
In the case large-scale disaster in foreign countries JDR join
emergency relief operations upon the request of the government of thedisaster-affected country to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
Dispatch is carried out by JICA based on Disaster Relief Team Law
within the framework of its Disaster Relief Program.
There are four types of JDR teams. One or more types of the teams are dispatched as appropriate
To facilitate the rapid andreliable supply of the largevolume of relief items, reserve
supplies must be procured andappropriately
stockpiledinadvance at locations as close as
possible to disaster areas.
Accordingly,JICA
has
warehouses in four locations
worldwide, namely Germany(Frankfurt),
Singapore,
the
United States (Miami) and South
Africa (Johannesburg). Eightpriority goods are stockpiled at
these
four
locations—tents,
sleeping pads, plastic sheeting(tarpaulins), blankets, portablewater containers (plastic jerrycans), water tanks, water
purifiers and electric generators.
In cases where other types ofJAPAN DISASTER RELIEF TEAMS
supplies are required, JICA takes
emergency action, including procurement in affected or neighboring countries. When requested,
emergency medical supplies are procured from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Supply
Division in Denmark or the International Dispensary Association (IDA) in the Netherlands and are
rapidly shipped to affected countries.
.

59

The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake as a Turning Point of
Improvement of Disaster management system of Japan as awhole and Disaster Management System of Hyogo Prefecture

60
SHORTCOMINGS AND FAILURES DURING DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND DISASTERRESPONSE TO THE GREAT HANSHIN-AWAJI EARTHQUAKEAreas hit by the Great Hanshin -Awaji Earthquake, 17 January, 1995

Among disasters occurred in recent history of Hyogo, the following are the ones with the largest
amounts of human suffering: Typhoon Muroto (September 1934) that led to death toll of 281 andInjured 1,523, Heavy rain caused by the seasonal rain front (July 1938) brought to 731 deathand 1463 injured I would like to highlight so-called The Great Hanshin earthquake (阪神・淡路
大震災 Hanshin Awaji daishinsai?), or Kobe earthquake or Southern Hyogo Earthquake
occurred on Tuesday, January 17, 1995, at 05:46 JST (January 16 at 20:46 UTC) in thesouthern part of Hyōgo Prefecture .
So January 17, 1995 the earthquake occurred that struck one of the world's largest port cities.
Inner city problems such as densely populated urban areas with old wooden houses and very
narrow streets intensified the severity of damage.
The Earthquake had 3 main characteristics that features it
The earthquake focal point was directly under an urban area
This quake was recorded at Level 7, the first observed earthquake at this level
There were big vertical motions in addition to horizontal motions in some areas

To comprehend the intensity of the earthquake below the Japanese scale earthquake is given:

Level Type

Explanation

61

0

Not felt

Nobody can feel, only a seismometer can record

1TremorA person at rest or a careful person can feel2

SlightMost people can feel, sliding doors may move

3

Weak

Houses may tremble, sliding doors make a sound. Hanging things
may wave. Anyone can see that the surface of water will ripple

4

MiddleHouses tremble strongly, something like a flower vase may fall.
Water in a container may overflow. Walking people can feel.

5

StrongA wall of a house may crack, gravestones may fall and a chimney
may be crushed.

6

Stronger

Under 30% of houses may be crushed, landslides may occur andthe ground may fissure. Most people will be unable to stand.

7

Terrible

Over 30% of houses may be crushed, landslides will occur and theground will fissure

More than 500, 000 houses and buildings were partially or completely destroyed. The slow startof the search and rescue
emergency

management

Japanese Earthquake Scale

operations

and

lack

of

increased the human andproperty damage. The redundancy of the water supply systems and quick recovery of electric
power contributed to the stabilization of the regional society in spite of the massive damage. The
rnaximum number of evacuees at shelters was 316,678 on January 23; about 20,000 remainedon June 30, About 60000 temporary housing units were planned and some were cornpleted as
early as the second week after the earthquake. During these first two weeks, the number ofresidents rescued in Kobe City was 1,888 but these surviving only 733. The total number of firesin Kobe was 176, and the area burned about 70 ha. In terms of economic damage, the loss ofproperty was 11.6 trillion ¥, 2.5% of the Japanese GDP {466 trillion ¥ in 1994).
The hypocenter of the earthquake was located about 20km southwest of downtown Kobe
City between the northeast tip of Awaji Island and the mainland was focused about 13.2 km
under the northeast tip of Awaji Island and had a Japan Meteorological Agency magnitude of 7,2.
The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake exposed the wretched fragility of highly advanced urban
infrastructures such as the artificially made Port Island and Rokko Island with modern port
facilities, the network systems of railroads, subways and highways, and other lifelines systems
that extended in a narrow zone along the coast.
Kobe area had historically suffered mostly from typhoons and heavy rainfall. In 1896 , 1903 ,1905 , 1910 , 1932 , 1935 , 1938 , 1945 , 1961 ,and 1967 ,Kobe suffered sediment disaster due

62
to heavy rainfall. The most devastating was that occurred in 1933 during which debris flows that
accompanied flood in killed 616 people. Therefore, for the residents and local governments
sediment flew had posed a main source threat in terms of disaster in this area. The same does
not refer to earthquakes. The organs designated for disaster management in particularly fordisaster preparedness and disaster mitigation don’t even taken into account thepossibility of major earthquake. No emergency management plans had been elaborated
during a major earthquake close to this densely populated urban area.
Among the places that suffered the most from the earthquake was Kobe port. Kobe has a 130year tradition as an international port, and ranks as the sixth largest cargo port in the world, it
handled about 40 million tons of international container (about 2.5 million containers) in 1993,
and has been the country's largest container port (i its share was 30%). Damage to the port
facilities include the severe collapse of 239 berths, of which 35 container berths collapsed due toliquefaction, and the members of the total gantry cranes used to load containers buckled due tointensive ground motion. All the container berths with a depth of 12m on Port Island and thosewith a depth of 14m en Rokko Island were broken due to liquefaction and strong earthquake
motion. The estimated cost of the damage was 1.4 trillion yen. Maritime transport companies
have since switched to such other domestic ports as Osaka and Yokohama and to foreigncontainer ports such as Hong Kong and Pusan. If a new route for cargo distribution isestablished, attracting customers back to the old Kobe route will be difficult, By the end of April
1995, six container berths had been reopened, and one-third of the berths repaired. Before 1997,
the other damaged berths will be usable.
The violent tremor lasted 20 seconds or less, but 101,233 houses were completely destroyed
and about the same number semi-destroyed. The old wooden houses with heavy tiled roofs
collapsed, blocking the streets and obstructing rescue and relief activities. Reinforced concretebuildings built according to the old construction code were also damaged

63

Old wooden buildings collapsed during the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake 1995

but those built according to the revised construction standards of 1981 did not suffer serious
damage.
An extensive and uncontrollable fire broke out after the earthquake in the Nagata ward of Kobe,
which has the highest population density in the city. In this area there are many old wooden
houses and apartments as well as numerous small factories manufacturing rubber shoes. Water
was not available from fire hydrants as the supply had been suspended, and fire-fighting wasconsequently extremely difficult. It took more than 30 hours to extinguish the fire, using seawater. Overall, the fire after the earthquake burned out 7,456 houses in over 530 localities.
Streets, bridges and railways were also seriously damaged.

The earthquake struck an aging society.
Inspection doctors inspected 2,416 bodies and estimated the death time. 92% of victims weredead within fifteen minutes after the quake.
The earthquake struck a region with a rapidly aging population. When old wooden houses
collapsed, many senior citizens died under the ruins of their houses or furniture 86.6% of victims
were dead in their own houses.
In other words, most of the deathsin this earthquake were caused by
the collapse of old Japanesehouses. And half of those people
were over sixty since the elderly
tend to live on the ground floor to
avoid climbing stairs.

64More than half of the dead were over 60 years old, most of whom lived in old wooden
houses in the densely populated areas of the inner city of Kobe. Traditional style Japanesehouses have very heavy tile roofs in order to resist the strong winds that accompany typhoons,
The Kobe area had not experienced a major earthquake for more than one thousand
years, and the local governments and residents in this area had no experience of anearthquake with an epicenter close to Kobe (in this one the distance between theepicenter and city center was only 20km}.

Age~9
Number 242

10s
301

20s
467

30s
258

40s
467

50s
805

60s
1047

70s
998

80s
692

The number and the age of died residents

The Cause of Death%

Pressure or
suffocation

89

Burnt

10

Crushed by a fallen
highway1

Epicenter of the Quake

Approximately 6,434 people lost their lives; about 4,600 of them were from Kobe.
43,792 people injured
3 considered missed

90~
91

65
T
There
were
e many patiients suffering from accute renal fa
ailure and crush
csyndrome that 6
had beeen rescuedd from fallen
n buildings or furniture
e and admitted to hosspital. We hadha largeenumberr of injuries just after the quake, but
b later we
e also had an increasiing numberr of patientss
d circulatory disorders such as pn
with resspiratory andneumonia, hypertensiohon. or heart disorders innthe evaacuation Ce
enters due to crowdedd conditionss and lack of sanitatio
on. Furtherm
more, manyy
people lost their me
edication annd started tot become ill several daays down th
he road.
O the firstt 3 days 96% of a totaOn
al rescued w
were saved (on the firsst day, therre were 486
6survivorrs, on the seecond 129, and on thee third 89).

The numb
ber of resc
cued peop
ple
Data
a
17
18
19
9
20
21
Tota
al 604
452
40
08
238
121
Alive
e 486
129
89
9
14
7
These threetdays area called the "golden seventy-tw
wo hours" for rescue, annd this disa
aster provedd
it correcct. In Kobee, fire deparrtment workkers rescue
ed 1,888 peeople over a period of two weekss,
but onlyy 733 of theem survived
d. Neighbor s’ help andd cooperatio
on are very important justjafter annearthquake. In thiss event, many universitty students living in doormitories and other yooung peopleetook active parts inn rescue operations. The
T
trend throught
thee end of bubble econo
omy of earlyy
1990s wasw the ressiding of thee young fam
milies on th
he outskirts of the big cities, Kobe including,becausee of the ve
ery high land costs inn
big Jappanese citie
es. In the inner city,
older people who have lived
d for morethan twwenty to th
hirty years in cheap
rented houses cannnot move elsewhere
becauseeofexp
pensivecomminnutingcosts.

ho
ouse

and

Therefore

vulnerability to natural disa
asters has
increase
ed year by year.
y
Many buildings and hou
uses wereecrushedd, thereforre it was very difficult

Ne
eighbors carrie
ed out a person
n crushed under the housefor fire fighters andarescuee teams too act at acc
cident sce
enes. Beca
ause fire fig
ghters anddrescue teams usu
ually use destructing tools, such as an en
ngine cutter, a chain saws
and sooon and there weree not enoug
gh, it was veryv
difficu
ult to conduct such ooperations.
Especia
ally at the accident scenessof crushedcbuuildings it was necesssary to uttilize craneetrucks, shovel cars and so on. But coonstructionn companie
es had alsoo damagess and thereewere manymtraffic
c jams, theerefore it tooktmuch
h time for thosettrucks to reacch accidenttsceness.

66
In Kobe City only 291 firefighters out of about 2,000 were on duty, Policemen on night
duty numbered about 300. Therefore, at the time of disaster only about 600 officers wereimmediately available. Despite of the fact that due to the earthquake, many poles bearing
electric and telephone lines were broken and, the buildings and facilities of NTT (Nippo
Telephone and Telegram) were partially damaged the emergency number, 119, received 6,922
calls on January 17th 3,483 on the 18th and 2,306 on 19th at the information control center inKobe whereas the daily average number of emergency calls in l994 was 436 and for fires andaccidents 150. Switchboard capacity also was not sufficient to handle the great increasing calls.
At the time of the earthquake, 122000 telephone circuits were disrupted. The ambulances
carried about 400 injured people daily to hospitals applying the maximum carrying capacity of
the ambulances while the total number of ambulances available at Kobe fire department was 15.
The area devastated by a fire was one million square meters through the total number offires was 176, and the number of houses and buildings burned down was 7,453. Fortunately, onJanuary 17th and 18th, there was no or very little wind as Nagata Ward had many chemical shoecompanies, most of which were small or tiny enterprises occupying narrow areas and some of
their chemical products contributed to enlargement of the fires but could have done much more.
The Hanshin Expressway and JR-West Railway played important roles as fire break zones, fireengines and crews that came from other cities and towns, encountered some problems:
traffic jams in damaged areas delayed early arrival, many of the fire hydrants and thewater supply systems were broken, collapsed houses and buildings covered the roads
and stopped traffic, and ambulances from nearby cities and towns could not come to thedamaged areas due to the lack of working arrangements among local governments.
Consequently the increasing of firefighters was fractal. On January 17th, 800 firemen
arrived and on the 20th (after 4 days) 2,400 were present. Such a gradual increase was
not good for the early attempts at fire fighting.
The reason why so many fires broke out during the early morning is not clear. Osaka
Gas Company supplies city gas (LNG) to this area, and about 70% of the residences were
equipped with gas meters which would automatically stop the gas flow at the time of anearthquake, Less than 10% of the residences, however ,were using gas at the time, therefore,
these devices only partly contributed to reducing the occurrence of fire. Due to electric power
failure at 5:46, on January 17, the streets were very dark without streetlights, and it was difficult
to move or act. In order to rescue victims under the collapsed houses, some neighbors usedmatches and lighters which may have caused fires due to gas leaks at broken pipelines with lowpressure. There was quick restoration of electric power by Kansai Electric Company,

67
which also may have generated fires owing to short circuits or overheated heaters. The
switching on of electric appliances by fallen furniture or collapsed houses also was a main cause.

The general trend in Japan for a long period was the visit of firemen to companies
and private houses and giving guidance for fire prevention. The Kobe City fire
department has tried to decrease the number of fires by the same manner. Fortunately,
the number of fires has gradually decreased but the numbers of fire engines and firemenalso have decreased. At the time of catastrophic disaster, however, the simultaneous
outburst of fires at many places cannot be handled by such a system.

Time
Total
~ 6:00~ 7:00~ 8:00~ 9:00
9:00 ~

Higashinada

Nada

Fukiai

Ikuta

Sui

Hyogo

Kita

NagataSuma

Tarumi

Nishi

17
10
1
2
1
3

17
13
1
1
2

12
5
2
2
3

6
3
1
2

2
1
1
-

17
11
2
1
3

1
1

17
13
1
3

13
4
4
4
1

6
6

1
1
1
-

The number of fires on January 17th 1995 in Kobe

Reasons for this wide range of burnt area are:a) Most of the fire hydrants were useless, because fire hydrants are on the samelines as water supply pipes, which were heavily damaged.
b) Due to many fallen buildings and wooden houses blocking the roads, it was
impossible for fire trucks to get very close to the fire scenes. Since the firefighters and trucks could not gain access and just close off a small area tofight a fire, bigger and bigger areas were needed to be able to gain control of a
fire.
c) It was difficult to create ditches or fire breaks to prevent fires from spreading
Failures in conducting rescue operations (extracting from the rubbles)
Many buildings and houses were crushed, therefore it was very difficult for firefighters and rescue teams to act at accident scenes. Because fire fighters and rescue
teams usually use destructing tools, such as an engine cutter, a chain saw and so on andthere were not enough, it was very difficult to conduct such operations.
Especially at the accident scenes of crushed buildings it was necessary to utilize
crane trucks, shovel cars and so on. But construction companies had also damages andthere were many traffic jams, therefore it took much time for those trucks to reach
accident scenes.

68
Right after the earthquake occurred, many injured people gathered to fire stations.
Fire stations made temporary first-aid stations and ambulance crew members assigned
priorities of care, “triage”. People who needed more intensive care were transferred tohospitals.
But several medical institutions in Kobe were damaged. Most of the hospitals andclinics could not accept patients, because electricity and water service were stopped.
Building Damage
Fully collapsed and half ruined houses in Hyogo Prefecture respectively totaled 92,877
and 99,829 (as of April 24, 1995). After the 1978 Miyagiken-Oki earthquake disaster new,seismic building and structure codes were enacted, Buildings erected in accordance with the
new code suffered little damage, whereas damage to older ones was severe. The downtown
Sannomiya area had many old concrete buildings that included Kobe City Hall, Kobe West Civic
Hospital, the Daimaru and Sogo department stores, and the Hyogo Police Station. Many ofthese public buildings were severely damaged. This is one reason why the official response to
the earthquake was late.

Structural type

Collapse or
severe damage

RC(reinforced
concrete)/SRC(steel reinforced
concrete

Steel
Total

Minor or slightdamage
1797

Total

610

Moderate
damage
347

457
1067

348
695

971
2768

1776
4530

2754

Building damage during the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake 1995

Building damage
On the basis of the preliminary reconnaissance report, Table 2 shows damage statistics as aresult of the survey [2] .Damage is defined as follows:
1) Collapse: Failure or overturning of the entire structure or the complete failure of a single story.
2) Severe damage: A large portion of the building frame is damaged. Permanent deformation of
the structure may cause imminent collapse.
3) Moderate damage: Significant structural damage is visible. Permanent deformation between
stories exists, but there is low probability of collapse.
4) Minor damage: Minor structural damage, although the structure may have significant
architectural damage.
5) Slight damage: No structural damage. Architectural damage may be noticeable.

69
The number of building s in the collapsed and severely damaged categories exceeds 1000.
Buildings that suffered at least moderate damage exceeded 1,760.
Expensive land costs have stopped public works projects within the inner city: During the
bubble economy of the late 1980s through early 1990s, land costs increased sharply year
by year. Every bank lent much money to businesses Iand owners, and individual s.
During that time, it was very difficult to buy land for infrastructure construction or theredevelopment of urban area. No redundancy or fail-safe systems were adopted. The
expansion of urban areas was too large. The total balance of urban activity and life havenever discussed macroscopically, The socially weak, such as the old, poor people ,and
the physically handicapped ,were left alone inside the inner city to inhabit told, jerry- built
wooden houses densely distributed and surrounded by narrow streets, many small
factories and residential houses being located together.
Lifeline damages
As is known the Hanshin area is densely urban area located between the Rokko Mountains{highest peak 931m) on the north and the Seto Inland Sea on the south with average width

Damages of Railway Facilities of Kobe City

about 3 km. In this narrow area, there are two national highways (Route 2s and 43}, an elevatedhighway (the Hanshin
Expressway), threerailways (the JR-West,
Hankyu, and Hanshin).
These were disrupted inmany places except for
Route 2. Other forms ofmass transit; two subway
lines ,two monorails serving the Port and Rokko islands and two local railways also were70
disrupted due to collapsed tunnels, piers, and bridges. The
Sanyo Shinkansen railway also was heavily damaged(elevated girders were broken at eight places and inside the
Rokko tunnel the concrete lining was partially stripped off.)
The JR-West reopened on 1 April and the Sanyo
Shinkansen on 10 April. The Hankyu and Hanshin railways
respectively were restored to operation on 12 and 26 June, The repair processes for the area's
lifelines are shown in. Damage to elevated highways was particularly serious, which not only
prevented traffic on the highways themselves but also on the streets beneath them. Some newly
constructed elevated highways were also inactivated, especially those built on reclaimed artificial
land which was floode. Three hundred and eighteen bridges collapsed and roads were severely
damaged in 9,408 place.Railways were damaged in more than 90 places.'
Millions of people were thus deprived of their means of mass transportation. The
elevated Shinkansen (bullet train) railway, which runs at a speed of up to 250300 km/hr, wasalso damaged. If the earthquake had occurred one hour later, several trains would have been
derailed and crashed off the elevated railways, causing thousands more dead and injured.

Damage and recovery of other lifelines wereas follows:
1) Gas: High pressure pipelines suffered no damage and middle pressure lines were repaired by
January 31, whereas low pressure lines were completely destroyed. On January 17, the gas
supply was cut off to 857,000 residences and on February 17 only 295,OOO residences had theuse of gas. By late March, the figure had increased to more than 98%. Slow recovery mainly
was due to having to check each house and the intrusion of water that leaked from highpressure water supply pipelines into the broken gas pipelines. Some 9,700 of engineers were
engaged in gas line repairs.
2) Electric power: In Japan, electric power usually is supplied by wires strung from poles In thecase of collapsed houses and buildings it was not necessary to supply electric power quickly so
the engineers cut many useless electric wires. This is one of reasons for the quick restoration ofelectrical power. Straight after the earthquake about 916,000 residences was blacked out. Afterthe earthquake, 4,700 electrical engineers worked on repairs and the restoration of power.
3) Telephones and means of communications: On January 17, as a result of the earthquake
about 285,000 telephone circuits were out of order. Until January 20, about 4,000 telephonelinemen were engaged in restoration work, after that about 7,000 NTT employees were active inrepair work that eventually led to complete restoration of service by January 31, except for the

71
38,000 residences that had completely collapsed. Under these conditions, communications
capability was critical. The Kobe Fire Department had just installed an advanced computerizeddispatch system with video monitors in December 1994. But on January 17, 1995, it was not yet
operational and was not used during the disaster operations. Telephone lines were out of orderduring the first day in large areas of the region, while others were overloaded. Over 1800
emergency calls made on 118 emergency circuits were recorded on the 119 dispatch logs on
January 17, 1995, at roughly 100 calls per hour or 1.7 calls per minute. These, however, were
only the calls that could get through. The number of calls attempted, but not completed, cannot
be estimated. Fire departments had their own radio systems, but could not communicate withother departments. Communications capability proved very limited in the first critical hours
following the earthquake.
These conditions proved overwhelming for the Kobe Fire Department, which had primary
responsibility for emergency response, with a total of 11 fire stations in the city, 176 engines,
and 305 personnel on duty when the earthquake occurred. Three of the 11 stations weredamaged in the earthquake, and even with emergency call-out procedures, only 663 personnel
were able to report for duty within the first two hours. The actual destruction was beyond any
training scenario for municipal emergency response.
4) Water supply: The water supply was cut off to 1,355,600 cubic meters. The average daily
supply rate was 1,363,000 cubic meters, 13% of the water coming from underground. A total of
2,090 public and private water company engineers cooperated in this restoration work. The
length of pipeline worked on was 7,685 km, of which 3,921km was in Kobe City. In Kobe City,
fail safe systems for the main pipelines were present but brunch pipelines were severely
damaged.
5) Waste-water: Kobe City has 43 water treatment plants, one sludge center, 3,315km of waste
water pipes, and 484 km of rainwater pipes. Due to the earthquake, 1,147 places in the waste
water pipes and 267 places in the rain water pipes were damaged. Typical types of damage
were the rising, sinking, and position gaps of 810 manholes. Immediately after the big shock,the tapped water supply in most of the downtown Kobe area stopped. Sewage channels werebroken down. Walls of the sedimenting pond in the Higashinada sewage plant were toppled andit temporarily used the nearby sea canal as a processing pond. People rushed to shelters suchas schools, health centers, the City Hall or other big buildings because of fear of the aftershockand to escape fire. In some places, more than 3000 people were in very congested dirty areas.
Toilet basins in the shelters were transformed into mounds one day after the disaster. People
could not use the toilet and some refugees became sick because the situation was so desperate.
They ate very little and drank almost nothing and were exhausted. In the night-time, the situation

72
got worse. People tried to manage without going to excrete because they were afraid to disturb
other people's sleep by getting up and finding their way across the very congested floor to thetoilet.

Map of damaged sewage channels (shaded areas)

People made great efforts to provide toilet facilities. Some dug a trough in the ground. Others
tried to clean flush toilets with buckets of water but this did not work long because of the broken
sewage channels. On the basis of this experience, the Kobe city government has now prepareda type of portable toilet that can be placed on the top of a manhole. Eventually many portable
toilets were supplied. Initially the Kobe authorities estimated that 300 of them would be enough,but in fact needed 3000 toilets, one for every 60-100 people. It was erroneous assessment of
the essential humanitarian supplies as a part of insufficient disaster preparedness madeby Hyogo prefecture in general and Kobe city authorities in particular.
In the shelter, where good systematic management or initiative was established, people
tried themselves to clean toilets and collected waste regularly without contaminating the area.
They sprayed disinfectant and killed odor. Many items useful for cleaning and disinfection were
supplied and a number of volunteers cleaned toilets. This worked in those shelters where themanagement system functioned smoothly. However, in shelters, where the management waspoorer or even non-existent, volunteers were not accepted or had a hard time to find a way towork with the homeless resulting in filthy toilets and contamination of the surroundings.
For the collection and disposal of waste, a tank lorry with a vacuum pump was most effective. It
sucks up waste in an air tight condition without spilling a drop. Kobe eventually had 19 tanklorries operational and additional lorries came from other prefectures. Luckily enough there were
not outbreaks of epidemic and infectious diseases. Respiratory infections such as influenza
started to spread to a certain extent but were limited to small-scale epidemics. There are several
possible reasons why there were not severe diarrhea outbreaks. Firstly, the low temperature in
the winter helped to prevent bacterial growth in food. Also food boxes were checked for thehomeless for toxigenic or hemorrhagic E. Coli or other bacteria and suggested that those who

73
prepared the food boxes should heat the food adequately. In addition, many people cleaned thetoilets and sprayed disinfectant around them. Wet disposable towels were distributed to clean
contaminated hands. Waste was collected effectively by the tank lorries with a vacuum pump,without spillage.
For the respiratory diseases, special medic teams monitored the influenza and gave
vaccines. In this situation, the factor that most contributed to stopping the influenza epidemics
was the fact that most of the people in the shelters were relatively old, over 60, and had alreadybeen exposed to the various pathogens in the past and were immune to them.
Each municipal government or public health sector had to prepare and stock clean,easy-to-handle portable toilets with a good disposal system items for emergency use. In
the shelters, a good management system had to be established.

Problems of emergency care providing shelters and faults in coordination andcommunications during the disaster response
Providing shelters
After the earthquake, more than 300,000 people took refuge in schools, city halls, community
centers and other public buildings private tents in parks, school play grounds, and open spaces
along roads. On January 23 and 24, the maximum number of refugees was recorded,
316,678 ,of which 235,443 were in 601 shelters in Kobe City. In mid-April, more than 40,000
people were living in shelters because construction of temporary housing had not gone smoothly.
In most damaged areas, there was little public open space. Space for construction was available
only on inconvenient reclaimed land or in rural areas. People wanted to live in a temporary
housing area with neighbors who lived in the same areas before the disaster whereas housing
selection was independent of this condition. Moreover, older people needed helper sandvolunteers, and at the shelters, such assistance was readily available, The volunteers totaled
more than one million, and they came from all over Japan, the firs t such massive volunteer
action seen in Japan, Many university students gathered in the damaged areas, As theJapanese Red Cross does not systematically organize such volunteers, their training andregistration were became important, even urgent problems.
Lack of coordination and communication
The operations logs of the Kobe Fire Department document actions taken during the first criticalhours following the earthquake. The record reveals the gaps in information that seriously
affect the coordination within and between jurisdictions. For more than four hours,
neither the Hyogo Prefectural Government nor the National Fire Defense Agency in Tokyo
had a clear picture of the degree of destruction and damage in Kobe. Constrained from74
action by the existing law until a request for assistance had been received from the Cityof Kobe, these governmental agencies did not enter the response system until more thanfour hours after the initial shock. In further irony, existing law kept the dogs from the
French Search and Rescue team in quarantine, not allowing them to enter response
operations until the fourth day after the earthquake when they extricated dead bodies,instead of living people. These conditions indicate the perverse effects of law, intended toprotect citizens, in restricting the capacity of public managers to carry out their mission
under dynamic conditions
Especially damaging was the lack of communication between the public agencies and theprivate utility companies. Osaka Gas Company, a private company and owner of the ruptured
gas lines that were fueling the fires, was apparently not in communication with the city
departments. Only after reviewing the data from their own seismic monitoring devices atapproximately 11:00 a.m. on January 17, 1995, did the company's Policy Group decide to close
off five of the fifty-five blocks of their 50,000 km. distribution system. The company began to shut
off the gas in critically damaged areas at 11:30 a.m., and completed the task about 11:50 a.m.,six hours after the main shock occurred. The gap in information and communication regarding
emergency medical services was even more severe. For the first 12 hours following theearthquake on January 17, 1995, the Emergency Medical Division, Ministry of Health in Tokyo
had little to no information regarding the conditions and need for medical services in the disasterarea. On January 23, 1995, six days after the earthquake, an Emergency Operations Center
was established in Kobe with the assistance of the national Ministry of Health.
Participation of both private and nonprofit organizations peaked in the third week of operations,as reported in the Japan Times. Interesting also is the active role of the yamaguchigumi, theJapanese mafia, in the organization and distribution of disaster relief, in apparent cooperation
with local governmental officials.
Problems of emergency care
Overwhelming casualties
As so many houses were destroyed and persons trapped all at the same time, withnumerous fires breaking out, the emergency calls to the local fire departments overwhelmed
their capacity. In spite of the maximum efforts of rescue personnel, paramedics and ambulancecrews, it was impossible to respond to every call. In some places people had to dig out buried
family members or friends almost with their bare hands. On-site triage of the casualties byprofessional

rescueandambulance

workerswasalmostimpossible.

75
Many mildly and severely injured patients and even dead bodies were rushed by family
members or neighbors to hospitals in the disaster area, which were themselves variously
damaged and in a state of general confusion. It was also cold and dark in the hospitals, which
had no electricity, gas or water supply. There was also a shortage of medical resources (sterilematerial) and human resources (physicians, nurses, clerical personnel) in the hospitals,
especially in the first six hours after the disaster.
Damage to medical facilities
Damage to medical facilities was a serious problem.
Out of the 180 hospitals in the disaster area, four werecompletely destroyed and 110 suffered serious structural
damage. The 1,809 clinics in the area were similarly affected.
Most of the sophisticated medical equipment, such as
magnetic

resonance

imaging

apparatuses,

computed

tomography, X-ray angiography apparatuses and chemical
autoanalysers,

wasdamagedandunserviceable.

In Kobe City Central Hospital, which is the core
hospital in Kobe, water tanks on the roof were damaged andwater poured down into the wards. As the water level in thetanks dropped, water was automatically pumped up fromother water tanks in the basement and eventually all the

Number of patients presenting at hospital inth
Nishonomiya on 17 of January (in parentheses
the number of dead bodies brought in).

stored water was lost. The lack of water resulted in the breakdown of the water-cooled home
power plant. The hospital electricity supply thus stopped completely about 30 min after theearthquake. Whatever medical instruments had escaped direct damage could not be operated
anyway.
Apart from structural damage and damage to hospital equipment, the reduced presence of
hospital personnel also decreased hospital functionality. The attendance rate of personnel in
hospitals on the first day of disaster was 58.4% for physicians, 35.0% for dentists, 44.2% fornurses, and 3 1.0% for clerical staff. In the first hours, when the hospitals in the disaster area
were extremely busy, less than 50% of personnel were able to attend their hospitals.
Despite the awareness of Japan to earthquakes the hospitals might have not been
properly Prepared The causes of reduced medical services were as follows; cut of water supply,interrupted telecommunication, cut off gas supply, shortage of medical and assistant staff,
destroyed facilities or equipment, electricity blackout, shortage of drugs and other medical
supplies such as intra-venous solutions or local anesthetic ran out on the first evening.

76
First-aid centers or stations were set up for primary medical care, and were manned
twenty-four hours per day by medical and assistant staff. At one stage there were one hundredand sixty centers in operation. It was possible to observe at the stage many teams dispatchedfrom various organizations to support medical services such other cities or prefectures，theSelf-Defense Force Japan Red Cross Society, Universities and public hospitals, Doctors
Associations, and volunteer groups.
Breakdown of telecommunication systems and lack of the information
As said, telephone lines were damaged or overloaded, with the result that this form ofcommunication between hospitals was difficult in the first two or three days. The hospitals were
not equipped with any form of radio communication system. On the first day, most of the medical
personnel in the disaster area did not know that the hospitals in Osaka, only 20-25 km from thedisaster area, had suffered no damage. TV news programs showed scenes of fires anddestroyed highways, but did not give any information about the chaos in the hospitals or about
undamaged hospitals.
Traffic congestion
The widespread destruction of streets, highways, bridges and railways caused severe traffic
problems. Within an hour of the tremor every practicable road in the disaster area was full ofcars with people leaving the area or on their way to visit family members to ascertain their safety-some even on their way to work. It was not uncommon to take several hours to drive 10 km.
These conditions delayed the mobilization of relief teams from neighboring areas andcomplicated the transportation of casualties.
Disproportionate number of patients in relation to medical facilities available
Although the hospitals in the central disaster area were extremely crowded, very few casualties
were taken to hospitals outside the disaster area which had suffered no damage. For example,
small to medium-sized private hospitals in Nishinomiya (south, west and north), which have 150
to 190 beds, were overwhelmed with more than 1,000 patients each on the first day. On thecontrary, only about 60 patients presented at the Hyogo Medical College Hospital, which has
about 1,000 beds and is located not many kilometers from the severely damaged area . With theinterruption of telecommunication systems and the serious traffic jams, a journey even of only a
few kilometers was regarded as an infinite distance by the general public and ambulance crews.
Delay in transportation of patients between hospitals
Because of the traffic congestion and the lack of appropriate information exchange
between medical facilities, the transport of severely injured patients from damaged hospitals to
unaffected hospitals was somewhat delayed. When the severity of the damage in Kobe wasreported on TV news programs, most of the tertiary emergency centers in Osaka prepared beds

77
to receive large numbers of casualties. But in the first twelve hours only three patients weretransferred to these emergency centers.
Crush syndrome and other pathologies
The earthquake created enormous psychological stress for the mere than 2. 4 million survivors
living in the damaged areas. It was the first instance of extended human ware management inJapan (human ware items related to human activities). Traditionally, Japanese people haveshown much patience against such emotional stress known as "gaman zuyoi". In the damaged
areas, little looting or disorder was reported even under continuing miserable conditions.
Systematic psychological stress care exercised for the earthquake victims was as follows:
1) Information was disseminated about post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in various kinds ofbrochures as well as in the mass media.
2) Outreach counseling was given the earthquake homeless living in shelters. In earthquake
disasters school children experience severe mental stress so that counseling for them is very
important. Professional counselors and trained volunteers have been working with thesesurvivors, and counseling will continue for more than two years.
With respect to characteristic pathologies of the patients injured or killed in the earthquake
they were as follow:•

traumatic asphyxia and direct whole body crush injury, which were the most frequentcauses of death•

fracture of the spine and spinal cord injury, which required hospitalization, although thefate of the paralyzed limb was normally already determined, regardless of emergency
surgery crush syndrome, which needed careful attention on the part of the physicians in
the early phase

According to the extensive survey conducted on the 6,107 patients hospitalized after theearthquake, 372 presented crush syndrome, with a mortality rate about twice that of othertrauma patients.'
Health problems of the displaced persons
At the peak point of the disaster, more than 310,000 persons were evacuated from their homes
to temporary accommodation centers, such as schools, gymnasiums and other public buildings.
There was no electricity, water or gas supply for several days and even weeks in these
temporary shelters. Minimum supplies of food, clothes and blankets were soon provided,
but sanitary conditions in such circumstances were far from perfect. The earthquake
occurred in the coldest season of the year, and many persons caught cold while living inthe shelters. In the early stages most clinics were closed and could not provide primary healthcareservicesforevacuees.

78
Countless numbers of volunteer medical relief teams fortunately came to the area from all overJapan and provided medical services for several weeks and months. Some 90% of private
medical practitioners were however able to reopen their clinics within six weeks, thus restoring
local

medicalservices.

National and local government agencies began to provide temporary dwellings inMarch for those who had lost their homes. As it was difficult to find sufficient vacant land
for all these temporary houses, they tended to be built at some considerable distancefrom the earthquake area. Many displaced persons thus lost touch with the originalcommunity with which they were acquainted.
The disruption for weeks and months of vital public services such as water supply,
electricity, city gas, sewerage, garbage collection, telephone services and public transport madepeople's lives in the urban area intolerable. Disaster response plans defined at the level ofnational and local government did not at first function properly because the coreorganization (city government and prefecture government) failed to respond in the earlyphase. Lack of information and the breakdown of telecommunication systems led todisorganization of the disaster response. Medical services were also disrupted.
Fortunately, social life was not disturbed by any silly rumors or tumults. A promising signfor Japanese society is that a good number of young people joined in the volunteer relief
activities after the disaster in many different fields.
The Governmental response to the great Hanshin -Awaji Earthquake saw a delay inthe dispatch and use of Self Defense Force in disaster areas. That was probably also
the factor of huge casualties and injured of the disaster. This disappointing fact was
attributable to 2 main factors. The first and primary one : according the Article 83 of
the Self-Defense Forces law of 1954, requiring units to respond to calls for assistancefrom prefectural governors to aid in fire fighting, earthquake disasters, searches formissing people persons, rescues, and reinforcement of embankments and levees inthe event of flooding. But SDF are deployed only upon the request of prefectural
governor. Municipal mayors can ask prefectural governor to request a disaster relief
dispatch by the SDF. But due to the fact that the telephone lines were out of orderduring the first day in large areas of the region, while others were overloaded local
officials failed to connect with army official and request the assistance. As a result thetardiness of SDF disaster response was for more than 4 hours that in its turn cost
lives of hundreds trapped under debris
The second one: delay was stipulated then existing relatively strong antimilitary sentiment among the local leaders for deployment of JSDF for relief activities

79. Members of the Yamaguchi gumi, the crime syndicate that has its headquarters in Kobe,
won much popular acclaim by distributing food, blankets and water – often before theofficial rescue teams had arrived on the scene.

Lessons learnt from disaster and Improvement of the whole cycle ofdisaster management
Recovery of lifelines and other urban functions was accomplish relatively quickly( electricity, 6 days; telephones, 14 days; gas, 84 days; water , 90 days; sewers, 93 days) but
reconstruction of industry and housing took longer.
Immediately after the earthquake, some communities were cut off due to damaged roads.
Evacuation of victims was therefore difficult, and delivery of emergency supplies and lifeline
services were delayed.
As a part of disaster recovery the repair of roads used to supply daily necessities
was therefore prioritized in order to quickly reestablish lifelines.
Almost all elevators stop running during earthquake. In almost every case, earthquake
control operation equipment functions and the elevators went to the nearest floor, stopped, andopened their doors. Except for buildings that could not be entered for security reasons, expert
technicians confirmed safety in order to prevent secondary accidents, and service is restored thefollowing day. Emergency stop equipment engaged when door abnormalities were detected.
Elevators should be equipped on the inside with devices for manually opening doors, similar to
the emergency doors on trains, so that people can escape safely. The Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake of 17 January, 1995 caught both the residents and local government of Hyogo
prefecture flatfooted. This mostly has been due to the fact that for about 70 years devastating
earthquakes did not occur in this region. The Disaster Management System of Hyogo Prefecture
mostly focused on prevention and response on sedimental disasters such as flooding, heavy
rains, landslides and so on. However Kansai region is located on earthquake prone area there
were earthquakes but they were not so devastating and did not affected to the great extent.
But anyway after the Earthquake the whole system of disaster management of theprefecture and as the disaster exposed the disaster management system of Japan needdrastically modifying. The changes in the structure, interconnection methodology, synergy in allphases of disaster management between all actors including governmental and nongovernmental structures mostly but not only related to filling the gaps detecting during the
coping with the Kobe Earthquake.

80
We can figuratively specify the amendments and establishments that were implemented
in disaster management system of the country as well as prefecture as changes in disaster
preparedness, changes related to disaster mitigation and changes in disaster recovery.
Changes in Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation
According to Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act prevention of disasters shall be performed forthe purpose of preventing any disaster ahead of time in matters listed below•

keeping in good condition of organizations concerned with disaster prevention•

drills for disaster prevention•

stockpiling, replenishing and inspection of materials and supplies for disaster prevention•

maintenance and inspection of establishments and equipment for disaster prevention

Unfortunately, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake revealed the bitter truth - designatedadministrative organs along with designated public organs altogether with designated central
administrative organs both on prefectural and municipal failed to display efficiency during eachphase of disaster management .So deep structural changes in disaster prevention and disasterrecovery system of Hyogo prefecture were urgently and desperately required
Therefore Hyogo Prefectural Government alongside with Cabinet Office made had
conducted successful reforms in disaster management system nationwide and on prefecturelevel that eventually positively reflected during response for The Great East Japan Earthquake2011 and some others.

a) Conducting of Drills on Emergency Management Joint disastermanagement drills
Practical drills on Disaster management tailored to thecharacteristics of the area are methodically conducted withthe participation of local residents such as voluntarydisaster response organizations with the aim ofenhancing the awareness of citizens regarding disasterprevention, improving voluntary disaster response
capabilities and strengthening cooperation among relatedorganizations to raise the level of preparedness for
typhoons, earthquakes and other disasters.
At local communities, voluntary disaster response organizations play an integral role inemergency drills including information collection and communication, fire extinguishing, rescue
activities,
evacuation,
meal
and
water
provision,etc.
Holding emergency drills at local communities is recommended in the Hyogo Disaster
Management Action 2010-2014, a program advocated by the Hyogo Safety Day Promotion
Committee established by the prefecture with the partnership with Hyogo-based groups from allwalks of the society. Under the plan, such activities are supported by subsidies and sending

81
experts.
b) Emergency drills held at schools
More than once a year, evacuation drills are held withtheassumptionofearthquake

or

fire

disasteroccurrences at all of elementary and junior highschools in the prefecture. At schools, disastermanagement supplementary materials compiled by the
Hyogo Board of Education are used in disaster
preparedness classes as a part of school curriculum.

c ) Drills conducted on administration office level
Emergency drills are also planned and implemented at
the district administration office level, aiming to improvedisasterprefecture.

management
Approx.80

capabilities
officials

throughout
at

the

the

DisasterManagement and Planning Bureau and the Disaster
Response Bureau take part in Disaster Imaging Game
twice a year. Also, approximately 50 regular personnel
residing in the standby accommodation take part in emergency drills four times a yeard)

Oil complex emergency drills

Drills are annually carried out to improve andstrengthen

thedisastermanagement

system’s

capability to respond to a disaster at an oil complex“1.17 memorial” local emergency drills
Local residents such as voluntary disaster responseorganizations, elementary schools and junior highschools are encouraged to participate in emergency

82
drills , especially during Disaster Reduction Month that fall on January around 17 January Hyogo Safety Day Earthquake prediction ( so-called “ 1.17 memorial” local emergency drills)

PartnershipwithcitizengroupsHyogo Prefecture has established the Hyogo Safety Day
Promotion Committee inviting Hyogo-based groups fromall strata of society to join in. The Hyogo disastermanagement special promoter system was set up to
dispatch experts in the field of disaster management tolocal residents’ associations and schools. The committee
is endeavoring to raise people’s awareness towards disaster preparedness.

Case-study: Local Voluntary Disaster Management Organization “Bousai-Fukushi
Community”
When a disaster occurs, it is important for local residents to take the initiative in performing
urgently required activities such as fighting fire, fighting floods, search and rescue. For thisreason, residents aware of the need for solidarity in the community established local voluntarydisaster management organizations named “Bousai-Fukushi Community” in Kobe. These
organizations prepare materials and machinery in the region, and practice disaster management
drills routinely. The Government of Kobe City supports the activities. As of march 2007, 189organizations were established at each elementary school area, which covers about 90% of thecity area.

Learning from the great Hanshin – Awaji Earthquake, Japan has undertaken new
measures and strengthened and improved existing ones in order to mitigate earthquake
damage.
Community-based Specific Disaster Prevention Education and Training of
Teachers in Hyogo Prefecture

83
Applying the lessons of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, disaster prevention
education related not only to earthquakes but to all kinds of natural disasters is promoted in
Hyogo prefecture.
Along with the allocation of ten disaster prevention education specialists (one to each education
office), disaster prevention teachers with specialized knowledge are systematically andcontinuously trained.
Workshops in disaster prevention education are also held for regular teachers. It includes
followings:•

Master plan for disaster prevention education in schools and annual teaching plan•

Efforts to utilize the time set aside for general studies and utilization of disasterprevention education supplementary reader,“1.17 shall never be forgotten ” learning
resources and community resources•

Enhancement of practical evacuation drills tailored to the characteristics of the area•

Improvement of mental health care•

Cooperation among different types of school and cooperation between schools andfamilies, the local community and related organizations

In addition Emergency and Rescue Team by school staff in Hyogo (ＥＡＲＴＨ) - the teamconsists of teachers with specialist knowledge of disaster prevention and practical response
skills was formed in 2000, April 1. The team is comprised of 150 school personnel and othermembers as of FY 2011. Along with providing support for rehabilitation of schools in afflicted
areas and mental health care for children affected by disaster, the team members are often
dispatched to provide drills or give lectures in disaster prevention to communities.
Eighteen EARTH members were sent three times between March and April (60 more between
July through August) in response to a request from Miyagi Prefecture Board of Education in theaftermath

of

the

Great

East

Japan

Earthquake

of

March

11,

2011.

The first group worked on support for schools that have been used as shelters in the town of
Minamisanriku beginning from March 15, the fifth day after the earthquake occurred. During that
period, in cooperation with the Miyagi Prefecture Board of Education, EARTH generated achecklist of necessary tasks to achieve a resumption of school following the earthquake and thechecklist was actively used to make this happen.

The bitter lesson of the Great Hanshin–Awaji Earthquake brought about torevise and make amendments to then existing legislation and disastermanagement plans.

The below mentioned amendments could be referred to

improvement of disaster preparedness and disaster mitigation

84

A
Accordingto the Ba
asic Disastter Manage
ement Plaan (July 20005, Centra
al Disaster
Management Council), “Re
ecovery annd reconstruction of affected aareas has the aim ofsupporrting victim
ms in putting their lives back in order, working ttowards reecovery offacilities with thee focus on the preve
ention of reepeat disa
asters, andd providing
g the basicc
conditioons for loccal develop
pment fromm the persspective off improving
g safety. In addition,
the prromptest and smooothest po
ossible reccovery annd reconsstruction shouldsbee
implemmented in light of redu
uced sociooeconomic activity in the commmunity beca
ause of theedisasteer.”
Based on tthe lessonss of the Grreat Hanshiin-Awaji Eaarthquake, the follow
wingmeasurres are in place.
p(1) Revision ofo laws and plans(i) Ameendment ofo the Disa
aster Counntermeasures Basic Act Revissions enha
ancing anddstrengtthening thee functionss and operrations ofgovernment

disastermannagement

headquuarters by relaxing the condiitions forestablis
shing

the
e

Headquarters

forr

UrgentDisasteer Managem
ment led byy the Primee Ministerandeestablishinng

theOn-siteDisasterManageement Hea
adquarters
s as a leg
gal entity
have beeen implem
mented. Lo
ocal govern
nment disa
aster mana
agement ha
as been strrengtheneddby alloowing mayo
ors to calll upon preefectural governorsgto ask forr the aid ofo the SelffDefense Forces.
e Basic Dis
saster Management PlanP
and the Local Dis
saster Man
nagement(ii) Reviision of thePlan
T earthquTheuake sectio
on of the Basic Disaster Managem
ment Plan, th
he most imp
portant plannin the disaster man
nagement sector, was completelycrevised.
t
In addition,, the comprehensive planspfor loocal areas (the Local Disaster Managemen
MPlan) werew
also revvised in eacch prefecture in light oof the complete revisionn of the Basic Disaster
Manageement Plan. As of Apriil 20 04, 2, 390 municipal governm
ments (76.5
5 percent off the whole)
had com
mpleted their revisions.
(iii) Thee Act Conceerning Sup
pport for Re
econstructting Livelih
hoods of Diisaster Victtims
Natural disa
asters can cause very significant damage too livelihoodss. For victim
ms who faceedifficulties rebuildin
ng their livves and reg
gaining their independ
dence due to econom
mic or otherfactors, prefecturess can use funds
fcontriibuted from a mutual aid
a perspecctive to help
p the victimss

85tindepeendence. The
T
law waas passed and implem
mented in 1998. In 2004, it wass
regain theirrevised to relax thee conditionss for its appllication andd to increasee the maxim
mum payme
ent amount.
Casee study: Ko
obe city Disaster Man
nagement Plan
P
This is a plan ma
ade by Kob
be City Disa
aster mana
agement
Council in which the Mayoor of Kobee takes thee chair
accordinng to loccal circumsstances and the Disaster
D
Counterrmeasures basic Actt. The pla
an was rrevised
entirelyy in 1996 b
based on th
he experie
ences incurrred at
the timme of the Kobe
K
Earthqquake. The
erefore the plan is
one of the most detailed plans in Jap
panese mu
unicipaldisasterr managem
ment plans as the lesssons learn
nt from
Kobe Eaarthquake w
were condeensed in thee planS
Securing
liifelines
Lifelines arre directly reelated not onlyoto recoovery and reconstructirion, but als
so to endinggevacueee conditionss.
S
Securingpeersonnel to work on reecovery andd reconstrucction is impo
ortant but fo
or improveddearthquake resista
ance for facilities and quickqrestorration of funnction after disaster esstablishmentof earthhquake insp
pection techhnology andd retrofitting
g methods forf existing facilities annd researchhand devvelopment oof technolo
ogy for prom
mpt discove
ery of areass damaged in a disastter are alsoonecessaary.
In addition, during reecovery annd reconstrruction che
ecks, wiring
g and pipe
es must beedecentrralized throu
ugh sectioning off, duplicating, or networking( Electriciity
(i)
A
After
the Great Hanshhin - Awaji EarthquakeEe, 44 electriccal fires bro
oke out. Pu
ublic serviceeannouncement su
urging peop
ple to turnn off circu
uit breakerss before eevacuating are beingg
implemeented, but circuit breaakers need to be consstructed such that theey will remaain off evennafter ele
ectricity is reestored until a confirma
ation button
n is pushed.
( Gas
(ii)
For city ga
as, microco
omputer- eq
quipped meeters that shut off when an ea
arthquake iss
sensed have beenn required since the Great Han
nshin – Aw
waji Earthquuake. Theyy functioneddeffective
ely during the Chuetsu
u Earthquakke, preventing seconda
ary damagee. An autom
matic shutofff
system linked to ea
arthquake warningw
bullletins is nee
eded for liquuid propane
e gas as well.
( Water(iii)
Many waterr pipes havee been wea
akened by th
he use of asbestos-cem
ment materrials or haveebeen in place moree than 20 ye
ears, so pip
pe connectio
ons joints do
d not withsstand earthq
quakes well.

86
The Great Hanshin -Awaji Earthquake caused about 900,000 homes, mainly in Kobe, to lose
water service. Currently, waterlines are being made earthquake resistant with ductile cast-ironpipes with earthquake - resistant joints, steel pipes, polyethylene pipes, and so on.
(iv) Sewers
Sewage facilities such as treatment plants, pumping stations, and pipelines constructedsince the Great Hanshin -Awaji Earthquake are generally earthquake resistant. For joints, very
elastic and watertight expanding and flexible joints are used, and monitoring of sewer damage
status through remote-control television cameras is progressing. Sewer services are restored inconjunction with recovery work on waterlines.
Passing the Act for Promotion of the Earthquake Proof Retrofit of Buildings(Earthquake Retrofitting Promotion Act)
Based on the lessons of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, Japan’s Diet passed the
Act for Promotion of the Earthquake Proof Retrofit of Buildings (Earthquake Retrofitting
Promotion Act) in December 1995 to work towards early retrofitting of buildings that don’t meetearthquake-resistant codes. Owners of designated buildings (schools, hospitals, theaters,
department stores, offices, and other buildings of at least three stories and 1,000 m2 where
many people gather) must carry out earthquake - resistance inspections and, if necessary, carryout earthquake retrofitting. Ordinary homes are not included. More than 20,000 designatedbuildings have been retrofitted
In 2004, therefore, parts of the Building Standards Law and the Urban Planning Law
were revised in order to ensure the safety of building and proper urban disaster management.

Partialrevisionofthe

Building

Standards

Law(ensuring building safety)•

Enhancement and strengthening of the reporting andinspection systems for buildings•

Issuing of directives to upgrade dangerous substandard
buildings•

Rationalizationofregulations

regardingexisting

substandard buildings•

Strengthened penalties (corporate tax penalties for not complying with directives toperform upgrades), etc.

•

Countermeasures for earthquakes and major fires in crowded urban areas, etc.

87Partial revision of the Urban Planning Law
In order to strengthen measures for homes and buildings with insufficient earthquake
resistance, designated buildings must undergo earthquake inspection and retrofitting within
specified periods. Buildings with insufficient earthquake resistance are to receive not justguidance and advice, but also will receive instructions, be required to make reports, and submit
to on-site inspection, and buildings that fail to comply will be publicly identified. Revisions to the
Earthquake Retrofitting Promotion Act such as new provisions requiring action to be taken withrespect to general housing are also under consideration.
According to new rules of revised Building Standards Law newly erected
residential houses and construction should meet the requirement of earthquake resistant,seismic isolation and vibration suppression
There are three types of construction that raise the earthquake - resistance of buildings:“earthquake resistant construction,” “seismic isolation construction,” and “vibration suppression
construction”
Earthquake resistant construction utilizes studs, walls, and other structural elements toabsorb seismic forces through elasticity or elastoplasticity.
Seismic isolation construction utilizes equipment such as bearings in foundations,
between stories, and so on to absorb seismic energy and prevent buildings from shaking.
Vibration suppression construction utilizes suppression equipment such as dampers inwall stone absorb seismic energy and control shaking of the entire building.
Earthquake resistant construction proved effective in the Great Kanto Earthquake. During
Japan’s period of rapid economic growth, buildings became taller and in the 1980s
vibration suppression construction increased mainly as a means of improving livability in highwinds. Seismic isolation construction has increased since the Great Hanshin – Awaji Earthquake.
Making homes and buildings earthquake resistant
The cost of earthquake retrofitting for single family homes varies by the size of the houseand the amount of work needed, but it averages ¥2 million per home.
Since the Great Hanshin - Awaji Earthquake, the support system for earthquake inspection andretrofitting has been implemented once in 2 or 3 years to ease the cost burden.

88

Establishm
ment of Glo
obal Asseessment off EarthquaakeCounntermeasu
ures and Reconstru
R
uction Ove
erall Verifiication
and reecommendations
Five years after the GreatG
Hansh
hin-Awaji Earthquake Japaneseand forreign inspecctors madee various proposalspreegarding em
mergency
relief, aid
a for victims, and reconstructir
ons measu
ures. The proposals
were mademin the frameworkk of the Glo
obal Assesssment of Ea
arthquake
Counterrmeasures that was co
onducted in 1999, five years afterr the great
Hanshinn-Awaji Earrthquake. An
A overall ve
erification reesulted in moremthan
460 prooposals on 54 topics inn 6 areas (overall(
verification, heealth welfarre, society andaculture,industryy and emplo
oyment, disa
aster reducction, urban developme
ent and com
mmunity buillding)Establisshment of Scientificc Researchh institutees for elaboration anndimplemmentation of Disaste
er Reducttion PolicyyJJapan’sennvironmenta
al and geo
ological circcumstancess make it hhighly susc
ceptibility toonatural disasters. A
And, as is clear from its history of such disasters, inh
herent in Japan is theeher large-sccale disaste
er capable oof severe damage ove
er a large geographicaalpossibility of anoth
D
R
Reductionand Hum
man Renovvationarea. Disaster
Institution has beeen establisshed in ordeer to transm
mit theexperiennces and lessons off the Grea
at Hanshin--Awaji
Earthquuake to futu
ure generatio
ons so as too contributee bothdomestiically and aabroad to am
meliorating damage infflictedby disasters, and to convey respectr
for the value of life
e importancce of harmo
onious coexxistence to theand therest of thet world.

Peo
ople and Disastter Prevention Future Center
Exxhibition in Disaaster Reduction and Human
Renovvation Institution

It is esssential that the lesson
ns learned fromf
the Great
Hanshinn-Awaji Earrthquake annd other passt natural disasters are
e conveyed to the next generation,that theese lessonss are utilize
ed in disasster counterrmeasures aimed at llessening the damagee
inflicted by disaste
ers, and th
hat each inndividual incorporates these lesssons in theeir concreteeactivities.
Crises Manageme
ent Researc
ch Committtee “Kobee Safety Net Council”
The Koobe earthquuake cause
ed damagee to local privatepcompannies. But manym
priva
ate compa
anies contributed
relief goods,gasssisted fire fighting andarented theirbuilding
gs as eva
acuation siites. Somee stores began
businesss soon afte
er the disastter.
From the leessons, the private com
mpanies, scholars

89
on disaster management and the government of Kobe City established a crises management
research committee named “Kobe Safety net Council” in 2001. As of March 2007, 83 companies
have joined the council.
Budget assigned for disaster risk reduction
The Hyogo prefecture secures a budget both for construction and programs such as
developing rivers and coastal areas, and maintaining the disaster management information
system as well as the disaster-relief system
Improvement of sedimental disasters countermeasures
River development projects are undertaken by Hyogo prefecture with the assumption of aheavy rain level that occurs once every one to five decades. The River Improvement Plan
Review Committee established in conformity with the River Law conducts adequate analysis on
disaster risk management.
In order to counteract floods triggered by an unconventional type of natural disaster in
the area such as a guerilla rain or sudden local downpour, flood control measures for improving
channels such as broadening rivers and elevating embankments, are now underway. At thesame time, flood-controlling reservoirs for temporarily storing precipitation and facilities to enable
rainfall to readily permeate the ground are being built. In addition, efforts are made to perfect its
flood and storm surge control measures by establishing drainage pumping stations where
deemed necessary.
Designation of a special post in Disaster Management System of Hyogo Prefecture andestablishment of new actors in disaster management system of Hyogo prefecture
Hyogo Prefecture created the special post of Japan’s first Superintendent of Emergency
Management.

The

post

was

established on 1 April 1996. Mr.
Akinori Sugimoto, Superintendentfor Disaster Management of Hyogo
Prefecture is the incumbent at the
moment.
Establishment of the Disaster
Management Planning Bureau andthe Disaster Response Bureau. The
organs were set up on 1 April 2005.
The superintendent serves as thechief

officer

who

assiststheComposition of Disaster Management Bureau of Hyogo Prefectural government

90
governor with the prefecture’s crisis management following the 1995 earthquake. The
Superintendent oversees approximately 90 personnel at the Disaster Management & Planning
Bureau and the Disaster Response Bureau engaged in disaster preparedness enhancement,
disaster response, as well as restoration and reconstruction after disasters. The roles of both
DRR(Disaster Risk Reduction) or non DRR departments across the prefecture and how they cancontribute to local communities in the case of natural disasters are clearly stated in the Hyogo
Local Disaster Management Plan, and prefectural personnel are well informed of these details,
meaning the prefectural government can act as one body of the DRR team. The Phoenix
Disaster Management System, a comprehensive disaster prevention information system, canquickly and efficiently respond to various kinds of disasters by using the disaster andmeteorological information collected via terminals at municipalities, police and fire departments,
and the Self Defense Force base in Hyogo. The system is equipped with functions to estimate
damage, demand and supply of relief goods, displaying necessary procedures to follow basedon the collected data and sending out this information to terminals across Hyogo. A 24-hourmonitoring and quick-response system is maintained in anticipation of the occurrence of adisaster or other emergencies, by means of a duty rotation system as well as a standby systemwith both designated and regular personnel residing in standby accommodation. To better
prepare for future natural disasters by sharing the experiences and lessons Local Progress
Report 2013-2014 2/37learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the prefecture
established the Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Institution (DRI) in which earthquake
related resources are collected, preserved, and exhibited. The DRI also fosters DRR specialists
and young experts, promotes pragmatic DRR research, offers on-site assistance in disasteraffected areas, and functions as a hub for exchange and networking with global counterparts.

Chief Officer for Crisis Management an Office for Crisis Management
It is one of the most important lessons of
the Kobe Earthquake for a local
government to respond just after
disasters.
The position of “Chief Officer for crises
management” and the office for crises
management were newly established in
2002. The Chief Officer for Crises
management is in charge responding for
not only natural disasters but also manmade disaster such as large accident
disasters or terrorism disasters. In
absence of the Mayor or in regard to91

matters specified by the Mayor, the Chief Officer for Crises
management can direct all the staff of the government of Kobe City
in place of the mayor.
Improvement of seismic observation network
In the wake of the Great Hanshin – Awaji Earthquake, the legislator- initiated Earthquake
Disaster Management Special Measures Act was passed in July 1995 to promotecomprehensive measures for earthquake disaster management.
The Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion set forth “Basic Earthquakes
Survey and Observation Plan” in August 1997.
For earthquake observation, a system that covers the whole country in order to centralize
and process data to the Japan Meteorological Agency was prepared. This is a highly-sensitive
broadband seismic observation network covers the entire country with a high degree of accuracy
consisting of set up terrestrial high –sensitivity seismographs (seismographs that detect verysmall vibrations that cannot be sensed by human beings) in 1,228 location.
Placement of terrestrial broadband seismographs (seismographs that record surface
vibrations over a wide range of frequencies, from fast vibrations to very slow ones) in 112
locations.
Underground strong - motion seismographs (seismographs that monitor strong vibrations
too great to be recorded by high – sensitivity seismographs) are in place at 975 locations,generally at the same sites as high – sensitivity seismographs. There are also 3,564 in surface
locations, with an additional 2,800 belonging to local governments.
Placement of GPS continuous observation facilities (a system using satellites to monitor
plate and crustal deformation) in 1,456 locations
Replacement of the seafloor seismograph off, placement of cable-type seafloor
seismographs.
Prompt communication of data obtained through seismic observation.
Currently, data from seismic intensity indicators in every prefecture are connected to theJapan Meteorological Agency, which broadcasts a range of information to the public should aseismic event occur. The prefectures begin transmission of seismic intensity data within four
minutes after an earthquake. Transmission from all observatories is to be completed within nine
minutes. When large - scale damage is expected, a headquarters is formed in the Prime
Minister’s Office and an emergency assembly team is convened.

92
Releasing the earthquake and tsunami warning bulletins
The Japan Meteorological Agency began testing earthquake warning bulletins in February 2004.
Currently, bulletins are being provided to about
140 organizations, including national disastermanagement

agencies,

local

governments,

universities, schools, and the private sector.
Damage can be reduced by carrying out thefollowing disaster management action before
the principal shock arrives:

JMA warning and notification system• Automatic control of trains, elevators, etc.
• Avoidance of dangers by transmission to people in buildings, at local governments, etc.
• Practical application of data transmission systems such as mobile phones and satellite
communications• Damage mitigation by turning off electricity, gas, fuel to factory production lines, and otherelements that can cause fires, and backing up important data.
Hazard maps
Hazard maps are intended to keep disaster damage to aminimum. A long with clearly depicting expected damage zones anddegrees of damage on maps, they present evacuation informationsuch as shelters and danger zones in an easy-to-understand format.
Earthquake hazard maps have been prepared for Tokyo andsix cities including Yokohama and Nagoya. Tsunami hazard maps
have been created for only 122 of Japan’s coastal municipalities, Current seismic intensity distribution map
about 12 percent of the total of 991. The Central Disasterof Hyogo prefectureManagement Council raised the issue of the creation of tsunami hazard maps within the next
five years for all municipalities that need to introduce tsunami disaster management measures.
Most hazard maps created and published to date indicate schools, community centers, andother evacuation points, but few show escape routes or designated evacuation routes.
Research and development budgets for science and technology related to disastermanagement and establishment of the Headquarters for earthquake Research Promotion
Japan’s disaster management countermeasures, including those for natural disasters,
are based on the Disaster Countermeasures
Basic Act, which was passed in 1961 in theaftermath of the Typhoon Ise-wan of 1959.

Logo of the Headquarters for Earthquake Research
Promotion

93
In recent years, research and development on technology related to disaster management has
proceeded in accordance with the 1993 Basic Plan for Research and Development on Disaster
Prevention (December 1993, decided by the Prime Minister).Following the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake, the Headquarters for earthquake Research Promotion was established as a special
government organ in July 1995. It carries out earthquake - related observation, measurement,
surveys, and research.
The government developed a disaster information system, which consists of an
Early Estimation System and an Emergency Measures Support System
Disaster Information Systems
The Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) and local governments developed seismic
intensity observation points with seismographs. There are about 3,000 observation points
nationwide. Based on the information from those observation points, the government developed
Early Estimation System and Emergency Measure Support System.
The Figure 1 illustrates the Disaster Information System. After the earthquake, thegovernment first estimates the damage such as number of deaths, injured, collapsed houses
and so on.

Disaster Information System and Flow of Earthquake Damage Estimation

Then the government estimates the needs of support in terms of materials, manpower for
rescue and rehabilitation, hospital beds, evacuation camps etc.

94
The estimation system is based on population, building structure information, groundconditions, time of occurrence and survey of persons using transport. Normally persons usingtransport are excluded from the estimation.
Damage caused to buildings is estimated according to seismic intensities for each 1-km
mesh, building conditions and ground conditions. Further distribution of seismic intensity is
obtained based on data from observatories.
The earthquake damage estimation system enables an estimate for damaged building
and casualties to be obtained. Based on this damage estimation, the level of need for support iscalculated by computer.

Adoption of J-Alert System
J-Alert isanationwide

satellite(Superbird–B2

communication satellite) based warning system designed
to quickly inform the public of various threats It launchedin February 2007 and allows authorities to quickly
broadcast alerts to local media and to citizens directly via asystem of loudspeakers. It takes about 1 second to inform
local officials, and between 4 and 20 seconds to dispatch

J-Alert System

the message to citizens. The system was developed in thehope that early warnings would speed up evacuation times and help coordinate emergency
response
All warnings, except for severe weather warnings, are broadcast in five languages:
Japanese, English, Mandarin, Korean and Portuguese (Japan has a small Chinese, Korean andBrazilian population). The severe weather warnings are only broadcast in Japanese. Information
related to earthquake early warning, (hypocenter, magnitude, intensity, precaution to tsunami),tsunami, volcano eruption as well as military threats (ballistic missile launching, air assault,
attack to nuclear plant, large scale of terrorism are able to be transmitted by this system.
Improvement of sedimental disasters countermeasures
River development projects are undertaken by Hyogo prefecture with the assumption of aheavy rain level that occurs once every one to five decades. The River Improvement Plan
Review Committee established in conformity with the River Law conducts adequate analysis on
disasterriskmanagement.

In order to counteract floods triggered by an unconventional type of natural disaster in
the area such as a guerilla rain or sudden local downpour, flood control measures for improving
channels such as broadening rivers and elevating embankments, are now underway. At the95
me, flood-co
ontrolling reeservoirs fo
or temporarily storing precipitation and facilitie
es to enableesame tim
rainfall tot readily permeate thee ground arre being bu
uilt. In additiion, efforts are made too perfect itssflood and storm ssurge contrrol measurres by esta
ablishing drrainage pumping stattions whereedeemedd necessaryy.
Storm

Surge

M
Measuresincorpora
ating

Natu
ural

FeatureesormHyogo prefecture is taking measures against sto
surges by develop
ping coastal areas thatt can withsttand
the

sea

highesthlevels

in

the

pa
ast.

For thee developm
ment of coa
astal areass as well, theHyogo Prefectural governmen
nt not only maximized thedisasterr management functionn that can counteractcsstormSStorm Surge

surge, but
b also too preserve biodiversityy by adopting a
construcction metho
od, which caan bring outt the blessin
ngs of naturre to peoplee.
Flood controlcmea
asures by making use of naturee
Hyogo prefecturepuundertakes flood contrrol measurees by improvving rivers w
with the assumption of
a

heavy

rain

level

that

occcur

once

every

one

tto

five

decades.

The bassic philosop
phy lies on thet foundatiion of river improveme
ent efforts. T
These effortts include toomaking rivers safee and sounnd, maintainning rivers so that peeople can ffeel the abundance ofonature, developing
g rivers that incorporatee characterristics of basins and th
he culture th
hat revolvess
around water, and fully bringin
ng out the attractionsaaand comfortableness off riversides..
The following ste
eps were deesigned too fill gaps aand improv
ve disasterr responsee system ofprefecture in particular and disaster reesponse syystem of th
he country
Establishm
ment of Dis
saster Mediical Centerrs througho
out whole J
Japan andparticularly in Hyo
ogo prefec
cture
T
The
Preffectural
G
Governmennt
had
establisshed the Disaster Med
dical Center named
Hyogo Emergency
Ey Medical Ce
enter at Aug
gust 1 in
2003. Hyogo
H
Emeergency Medical Cen
nter wasdesigna
ated as a DisasterDmeedical centeer (maincore hoospital in Hyyogo Prefeccture) equipped withteaching
g function to train EMS (EEmergent
Medicall Services)) crews, andastock of EMS

96
suppliess (stockpilinng drugs and other med
dical suppliees) for eme
ergency deliivery.
Functions ofo the Hyogoo Emergenccy Medical Center is ass following
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Everyday ddutiesO
Offer
rescue and emerrgency treattment as a rescue andd emergencyy medical center.
cO
Operateaddoctor car service.
s
Receive pa
atients broug
ght by helicopter.
Manage and operate the emergen
ncy informa
ation center..
Implement courses, reesearch, andd training.
Duties durring disasteerO
Operateaddisaster emergency infformation annd instructio
on center.
Receive pa
atients from the disaste
er area.
Dispatch reelief workerss

15 hosppitals are deesignated asa DMC in Hyogo preffecture. Main
Disaster medical C
Center is Hyogo
H
Emergency Med
dical Centeer.
2-3 docctors are nnominated asa Disaster Medical Coordinators
Medicall Coordinato
ors in each DMC.
Training
g seminars of personne
el are held severalstime
es a year.
545 hosspitals werre designated as DMC
Cs strategically locateedcore hoospitals in ea
ach region, retaining anda training medical anndassistannt staff. Pra
actical man
nuals have also been prepared forf
the improvement ofo disaster reelated mediical care.

Locattion of hospitals designated asa
DMC in Hyogo prefecture

Information Control CenterC
A disaster--related me
edical inform
mation netw
work hasbeen esstablished.
W
While
keep
ping the exxisting sys
stem for em
mergency
medicaal treatmen
nt ， a com
mprehensiv
ve networkk systemwill be introduced
d to each ofo various regionalrins
stitutions
to colle
ect and disseminate
e medical informatioon in thesituatioon of disaster.
T Disastter-related Medical In
The
nformation Center isstribute medical
establisshed to disminfo
ormation andato issuueInstructions to me
edical instiitutions and ambulan
nce service
es.
T
This
is a wwide-reaching telecom
mmunicationn network, including high-speed
d dedicateddground or satellite lines, in orrder to increease the response spe
eed in disassters. This canc also beeused ass an emerge
ency medica
al network duringdnorm
mal period.

97
In addition to the previously estab
blished systtems, it is plannedpto u
use formatio
on of a neww
multi-ceentered netw
work with th
he use of co
omputers an
nd multi-display phones in metropolitan areass.
This information and contro
ol system links Hyoggo
Prefectu
ural Govern
nment with medical insstitutes, corre
hospitalls. Regiona
al medical information centers, firre
departm
ments and th
he Disasterr-related Me
edicalInformation

Centerthroughhigh-speeeddedicate
ed digital, satellite, or public lines. Th
heauthorities

have constructe
ed a syste
em which innormal situations can be used for exchanginng
information, in thee situation of a disa
aster ， it will
supportt prompt andd exact eme
ergency delivery

Outlinee of Interactionn of Emergencyy Medical Centeerwitth other disasteer management authorities

A a mainAsn disaster and emerrgency info
ormation ce
enter for H
Hyogo preffecture, theeinformation and insstruction center uses th
he internet to provide emergencyemedical infformation toofire stattions, mediccal agencie
es, and it allso providess informatio
on regardin
ng medical agencies toothe residents of th
he prefectu
ure. During a disasterr, the centeer collects informationn about theestrickenn area and patients recceived by thhe various medical agencies concerned, andd then passs
this info
ormation onn to relatedd organizatiions. Also, together withw
the loccal medical informationncenters and emerg
gency hosp
pitals speciffied for eacch seconda
ary health carecmedicaal area, theecenter works
wwith thet fire fighting organizzations, relaated to med
dical treatm
ment, volunte
eers, etc, toosecure disasterdemmergency medical treattment.
T
There
are ten regiona
al areas inn Hyogo prrefecture.
We alsoo establishe
ed strategiccally located core hosspitals forprovidinng emergenncy medical services tot regional areas in
Hyogo prefecture. There are 15 core hoospitals (4, Kobe,2,
Tajima and Nakahharima,1,resst of each regions). T
They arethe regional basess for treatm
ment of pattients in a disaster,
having earthquakee-proof build
dings, large storage faccilities forkeepingg drugs annd other medicalm
suppplies, largge waterstorage tanks, annd electrica
al power generators.. .These
hospitalls have a duty to retainn and train emergencyy medical
and asssistant staff,, and to disppatch first-a
aid teams too disaster arrea in the situation of disaster.
d98
d disaster exercisess of mediccal(Trraining andprofessions and medical vo
olunteers) Training andexercisees are ve
ery important for health/mediccal
professionals to unnderstand andaenhancce their roles
in disasster situatio
on. Triage techniques and speciificskills too manage common injuries andadiseases
associa
ated with disasters
dsshouldbe required toundersttand and prractice. 2-3
3 doctors are nominateed
as Disaster Medica
al Coordinattors in eachh DMC.
Training seminars of personn
nel are held several tim
mes a year

ns of Anti- Seismic Water
W
Storagge Tanks
Installation
In areas afffected by Ko
obe Earthquuake, fire broke out at the same time in 54 lo
ocations jusst
after thhe earthquuake. But thesituationn far excee
eded the ciity’s
fire-fighting capaciity. There was
w
no

wa
ater

at

ffire

hydra
ants

becausee pipes haad cracked. In
additionn the dista
ance betweeenmountain Rokko andathe seaa isvery narrow. Most of the riverrs in
Kobe are very sho
ort and havve a
rapid annd few strea
ams. Thereffore river wa
ater was inssufficient fo
or firefighting
g at that timme.
From the lessonlof thetearthquuake Kobe Municipal Governme
ent installed
d 250 antiseismic water tanks which sto
ore 100 tonss water in pa
arks, schoo
ols and so on.
oInstalla
ation and utilizationn of Phoen
nix Disaste
er Manage
ement Sys
stem
Phoenix Disaster
D
M
Managemeent System
m is a com
mprehensive
e disaster prevention
nation syste
em that ca
an quicklyy respond to earthq
quakes andd other any kind of
informadisasterr, based on the lessons of thee Great Ha
anshin Awa
aji Earthquaake. This systems
hassfunction
ns including
g the collection and provision oof disaster and meteorological information,
damagee predictionn, and the estimationeo supply anofnd demandd, and it helps an initia
al rapid anddaccuratee emergenccy response to be carrried out. This is a com
mplete systtem built by
y employingginternet technologyy (web techhnologies) acrossathe board.
b
The system sup
pports decisions madee

99by the Emergency Relief Headquarters, providing damage predictions, disaster flash reports, adisplay of disaster situation map, and more, in addition to providing meteorological information.
For the prefectural residents, it provides information related to disaster prevention on a web site.
In order to facilitate the initial and emergency response at the time of a disaster and inorder to share disaster related information, the system have set up terminals for disasterprevention at prefectural agencies, municipalities, fire departments, police headquarters, police
stations, Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Self-Defense Forces, coast guard
headquarters and lifeline operators, as well as other related agencies, and are strengthening
cooperation with relevant organizations. The system becomes actively engaged with systems
related to disaster prevention within the prefecture.
During times of non-emergency communication support features, such as e-mail andelectronic bulletin boards contribute to flexible information sharing between agencies andorganizations involved in disaster prevention.

Phoenix Disaster Management System at the time ofan earthquake1) If there is an earthquake with a seismic intensity of
three or more ( on the Japanese scale) within theprefecture, the system calls for attention bydisplaying blinking pop-ups, together with a sound2) The System collects earthquake intensity informationfrom the seismic intensity meters set up at 96
locations within the prefecture ( Seismic intensity
information network)3) If the System observes an earthquake of a seismic
intensity of four or more (on the Japanese scale), it
estimates the damage per 500x500 m cell, based on
geological and other ground –related information on
the ground and display the results on a map and a list4) When an earthquake occurs, all municipal disasterprevention-related organizations and others report, as
their first notification, the damage situation regarding
the offices and in the vicinity of the offices using asimple YES-NO form.

100

As well ass the state of prefe
ectural mea
asures, thee5) Assystemdis
splays in ge
eneral the following:ftthedamageessituationo each regofgion (fatalitties, housin
ng damagee,aandfires);; the state
e of the establishm
ment of annEmergencyy Relief Headquartters; requuests frommmunicipalitties; and th
he state of prefectural responsesst the disas
to
ster

6) W
Where required, the actualasitua
ation of thee disaster isiaascertaine
d in real tim
me, using ono Heli-Telle images and
a
o
other
sourrces of info
ormation.

g times of non-emerrgency
During1) TheT
Syste
em issuess latest ale
ert and up
pdate alarrmsstatusages2) Issues sattellite ima

C
ou
uts
3) Carry
predictionnmoniitoring

a
and

make
es

e Map of waterwlevel status
4) Issues the

wave

101

w
leve
el graph annd5) Keeps a record of water
amera ima
ages
broadcastts river ca6) TThe urbann situationn is ascerttained using imagessffromhigh-altitude cameras installedd at fireeddepartmen
nts
(Kob
be
City,
Amagassaki
Cityy,Nishinomiy
ya City, Ashiya City, Ak
kashi Cityy,
Kakogawa City, Taka
asago Cityy, Himeji City)C
and ata
S
Shiso
City Hall.

7) T
The system
m delivers disaster prrevention andameteorolog
gical inform
mation as well
w as disa
asterrelated info
ormation too prefecturral residentts.

er Manage
ement Sys
stem dischharges bellowmentio
oned func
ctions:Phoenix Disaste•O
Observatio
on and info
ormation coollection

The sysstem collects and stoores meteo
orological informationn from the Japan
Meteorrological Ag
gency and operatorss transmittinng meteoro
ological infformation, as well assinformaation on rivvers and onn landslide
e warnings, and proviiding the reesults of th
heprocess
sing of thiss informatio
on to the disasterd
preevention teerminals.
•

Earthquakke intensity
y informatioon collectioonystem colle
ects inform
mation fromm the seissmic inten
nsity meters set up within thee
The syprefecture.
•

Damage predictionp102

Based on information from the seismic intensity meters set up within the prefecture andbasic data on buildings, population and other factors based on a grid of 500 m x 500 m
cells, the system produces a earthquake intensity distribution map, makes damage
predictions including the number of destroyed buildings, and the number of causalities
and fatalities, and displays this information on the disaster prevention terminals.
•

Supply and Demand estimation

Using the disaster prevention terminals, the system analyzes how many plans needsupport such as disaster prevention materials and personnel necessary for disasterprevention, based on the damage predictions and other results.
•

Disaster information reporting

The system reports the damage situation from various aspects, such as office damage
reports from disaster prevention-related organizations, disaster flash reports andsummary disaster reports, together with maps and digital camera photographs, anddisplays them on the disaster prevention terminals.
● Image information system
The system displays the disaster information images from Heli-Tele, high-altitude
cameras, river cameras and elsewhere and the content displayed at disaster prevention
terminals is displayed on the big screen in the Emergency Relief Headquarters Control
Room, so supporting various meetings, etc.
● Crisis management notification
The system sends notifications of information such as alerts, alarms; seismic intensity
information and disaster flash reports, by displaying them on the pop-up navigator of eachdisaster prevention terminal, giving warnings to all organizations related to disaster prevention atonce.
● Geographic Information System (GIS)The system manages prefectural maps (1/250-1/1,500,000), and displays a variety of
information, including that related to disaster-affected areas.
● Communication
Utilizing the Internet, the system provides a website for prefectural residents with disaster andmeteorological information (a PC version and a mobile version are available).
Also, at “Hyogo Disaster Net,” the system transmits emergency information (including
earthquake information and meteorological alerts and alarms) extremely rapidly by using mobile
phone e-mail.

103● Securing power supply
Uninterruptible power systems (UPS) and emergency generators have been set up for thesystem, in order to prevent it being affected by power failures.
● VPN (Virtual Private Network) for disaster prevention that covers the whole area of theprefecture

The system connects the prefectural government office, the regional prefecturalorganizations and organizations related to disaster prevention within the prefectureusing dedicated optical fiber lines such as the Hyogo information highway and theprefectural government office WAN; however, to ensure security a disaster prevention
VPN has been built for the system.
● Securing of backup lines
The system employs a structure that makes it possible to establish a connection bytaking another route in cases where damage has been caused to the main line to theprefectural government office (where the server is located). At the same time, thesystem makes it possible to use ISDN lines as a backup line, should all of the glass fiber
dedicated lines become unusable.
● Structures with earthquake-resistant floors
The system employs structures with earthquake-resistant floors for the network control
room, where all the servers and other equipment have been set up, and for otherfacilities.
● Establishment of a backup center
The system has established a structure that makes it possible to use a backup center inthe Hyogo Prefectural Emergency Management and Training Center in Miki which lies
16 kilometers to the Northwest of the prefectural government office, for cases where the
Hyogo Disaster Management Center becomes unusable due to a large-scale disaster.
The below mentioned information accumulates by the Phoenix Disaster
Management System and transmit to Hyogo Disaster Management Center:•

Earthquake information (Hyogo Prefecture seismic intensity information
network)•

Meteorological data( Kobe Marine Observatory) West Japan ADESS (theAutomated Data Editing and Switching System)

104

•

Local Meteorological Information (Operators transmitting meteorologicalinformation)•

Information on rainfall and water level (Hyogo Prefecture River Information
System,•Hyogo Prefecture landslide disaster information provision system)

•

High

altitudecameraimage

information(Fire

Departments

andheadquarters, Kobe City, Amagasaki City, Nishinomiya City, Ashiya City,
Akashi City, Kakogawa City, Takasago City, Himeji City, Shiso City Hall•

Tsunami observation camera (Minami Awaji City (Aman))•Heli-Tele image information (Hyogo Prefecture Heli-Tele System)•

Systems related to disaster prevention (Hyogo Prefecture wide-areadisaster information system on emergency medical care, Hyogo Prefectureroad information, Hyogo Prefecture hazard map, Hyogo Prefecture maritime
disaster prevention information, Hyogo Prefecture notification system forflood danger and other information, etc.

105

Functionality of Phoenix Disaster Management Center

Functionality of Phoenix Disaster Management System
If the scale of disaster increases, many problems occur, such as:•

Increasing of the delays occurring in the transmission of disaster-related information•

Uncertainty in assessment of personnel and the amount of materials needed for support
measures and conducting relief operations•

In case communications fail it becomes impossible or at least extremely complicated toestablish contact with related organizations•

As ensuing from above mentioned quick disaster response for inexperienced staff
becomes impossible
Therefore, confusion arises with regard to decision-making related to matters such as the
securing of personnel for each kind of countermeasures that the prefectural Emergency
Relief Headquarters have to implement.

106
In order to overcome these problems and in order to implement a swift and accurate response, itis necessary to produce a quick approximation of the overall damage caused, regardlesswhether there have been requests for support from municipalities, and to carry out decision
making related to disaster countermeasures to be taken by the prefecture, as well as
implementing concrete measures.
Therefore, in order to support decisions as to how to respond that the staff members involved indisaster response have to make, the system has functionality enabling it to estimate and analyze
matter such as the number of necessary personnel and the amount of materials necessary forsupport measures based on the results of damage prediction, as well as to give guidance on
initial responses based on the damage information acquired.
Supply and demand estimation and analysis function
In addition to estimating the required number of personnel and amount of materials in eachaffected area using the damage prediction system at the time of the earthquake disaster, thesystem also conducts an analysis of supply and demand for resources such as personnel,
equipment, and relief supplies
Guidance function
Concerning the initial response by the Prefectural Emergency
Relief Headquarters, the system displays the flow and proceduresfor each prevention measure item and also record processing
status, together with the progressive management of the initial
response.
Database function
A database necessary to support the guidance function, supply and demand estimation andanalysis function, containing information including that related to disaster equipment, is built.

Through Hyogo information Highway and Internet Hyogo Disaster management
Center inform, notify and if necessary warn the National government, Prefectural
government and prefectural local administrative agencies, Municipalities, Fire
departments, Police, disaster prevention–related agencies lifeline operators andHyogo prefecture residents and other.

107

The method of notifying and information of appropriate authorities through Hyogo Information
Highway and Phoenix Disaster Management System

The network of the Phoenix Disaster Management System

The network of the Phoenix Disaster Management System consists of:•

Hyogo Information Highway (This is a large-scale network of a total length ofapproximately 1,100 km that has been established as fundamental information
infrastructure to promote information technology within the prefecture, and connects key
locations within the prefecture with optical fiber lines. High reliability has been achieved
for the system through the use of a high-speed and high capacity (10 Gbps), a
monitoring and maintenance regime running 365 days a year and 24 hours a day, as well
as by making the Hyogo information highway into a loop network and putting the lines
underground. Also, access points to the network can be connected to by a variety ofaccess lines.

•

Disaster Prevention VPN (This system connects key locations such as the prefecture
general building and the regional agencies of the prefectural government with adedicated digital line in a loop, utilizing the Hyogo Information Highway and the108
prefectural governmen
nt WAN as its
i main tran
nsmission channels.
c
From each accessapoint,
tthemunicip
palities, fire departmen
nt headquarters and otheroorganiizations are
e connecteddby dedicate
ed optic fibe
er lines, thuss covering thet entire prefecture.
pAAlso, in ordeer to ensureessecurity,
trransmission
ns use a dedicated disaster preventionp
VPN (Virttual Privatee
Network) ha
as been cre
eated withinn the networrk.)•

Hyogo preefectural administraaative radioo for dam
mage preve
ention (saatellite anddggroundbaased) (Thiss system connects thetprefecttural goverrnment office with alllmunicipalities, fire dep
partment heeadquarterss, etc. usinng a satellitte communication line.
AAlso,
the prefecturalpgovernmen
nt office is connected
d with the bureau for prefecturaalresidents and civil eng
gineering offfices, etc. by a terresttrial radio liine. This syystem is notoonlyutilize
ed in timess of non-em
mergency ffor uses in
ncluding th
he disaster prevention
nw
wireless
phone, for thee sending off bulk faxess function an
nd image trransmissionn, but is alsooused for th
he receptionn and transsmission off Heli-Tele images annd other infformation atttimes
of dissaster.

Hyogo Informatio
on Highwayy
In orderr to advancce the orien
ntation of in
nformation technologyy in Hyogo Prefecture in terms ofinfrastru
ucture for informationiand comm
munication, the admin
nistration aand civil seector in theerespective field are
e promoting
g compreheensive application for th
he purpose
e of supplyinng the diverservicess in admin
nistration, education,eresearchra
andmedicaal treatmentt, and also
o improvingginformation

gapss.

The large sscale of fibeer –optic ne
etwork withh the total extensione
off 1,100 km connectionnthrough the main basses in the prefecture
p
iss
the

top

class

in

the

country.

The installation of 26
6 access points at theemain basees, and att the samee time, theenetwork in
nfrastructure
e with high speed anddlarge capa
acity of 10 G bps with which evennanimation can be communicatcted, will beerealized.
Onn the other hand, a part of theenetwork will be opene
ed to the prrivate sector
for the pro
omotion of ddiffusion of high-speeddNetworrk Constructionn of Hyogo
Information High
hway

Internet

service,ttheimprovvementof

109
information gaps among local areas, and for the promotion of industrial development.
And the use of the circuits of Information High-Way is open with free of charge to Cities,
Towns, Enterprises, and Organizations and so on. This fact helps the improvement ofadministrative services, the removal of inequality of transmission of information by regions, andthe promotion of industries at various place
In order to advance the orientation of information technology in Hyogo Prefecture in terms ofinfrastructure for information and communication, the administration and civil sector in therespective field are promoting comprehensive application for the purpose of supplying the diverservices in administration, education, research and medical treatment, and also improving
information

gaps.

The large scale of fiber –optic network with the total extension of 1,100 km connection through
the

main

bases

in

the

prefecture

is

the

top

class

in

the

country.

The installation of 26 access points at the main bases, and at the same time, the network
infrastructure with high speed and large capacity of 10 G bps with which even animation can becommunicated,

will

be

realized.

On the other hand, a part of the network will be opened to the private sector for the promotion ofdiffusion of high-speed Internet service, the improvement of information gaps among local areas,
and

for

the

promotionofindustrial

development.

And the use of the circuits of Information High-Way is open with free of charge to Cities, Towns,
Enterprises, and Organizations and so on. This fact helps the improvement of administrative
services, the removal of inequality of transmission of information by regions, and the promotionof industries at various places.
Establishment of “Hyogo Disaster Management Center”
Based on the lessons learnt from Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and in order to collectaccurate information immediately after disaster Hyogo prefecture prepared “Hyogo Disaster
Management Center” on 22 of August 2000. It is the firstmunicipally–owned facility dedicated to disaster control,
particularly in Hyogo prefecture area. It serves as central
base for preparedness and information collection. The
Center functions as the base for rescue activities, utilizing
the Phoenix Disaster Management System for disaster
related information collection, damage assessment andemergency measures. The Center also cooperates with the
Hyogo Prefectural Emergency Management and Training
Center.
Disaster Management Center110
es in the building that canc withstannd a 7 level earthquakke on the Ja
apanese scaale. It has 1
It locatefloor beelow groundd, 6 floors aboveagroun
nd. The Ce
enter fully equipped witth facilities for disastermanageement. It is capable to operate thee emergenccy Relief He
eadquarterss system smmoothly anddefficienttly, this center securess exclusive work spacee for relatedd organizatiions including the SelffDefense
e Force, thee police, firee-fighting auuthorities, and lifeline companiescaand media•

A facilitiess necessaryy for the 24All4-hour watcching and promptp
resp
ponse syste
em such ass
night duty rooms are
e provided Near the Center, standby stafff is provided with 76
6aaccommoda
ation units consisting of three buildings forr initial mob
bilization ju
ust after theeof a disastter. To call up standbyy staff, promooccurrence
mptly each unit
u connected with theeccenterthrou
ugh broadca
asting equip
pment.

•

Ready for respondingr
to any type of natural disasterd•

T structuThe
ure of the ceenter is nott only endurrable to sto
orm and floood but also resistant toomeasuringt
thesame earthquakee as the GreatG
Hanshin-Awaji EarthquakeEg 7 on theeJJapanese
S
Scale.
Somee of Hyogo Prefectural building coode requirees one and a half timesssstrength,coomparing too normal building code•

Equipped withw multiple
e functions whenw
lifelinees are damaged•

Backups arre fully provvided, such as power generators for emerge
encies, a sttock of fuel,ddoubletelephone lines
s, and the exclusive weell to secure
e drinking w
water.

•

Disaster innformation system hashbeen improved, including setting up
u multipleeccommunica
ation channeels and new
w installationn of audio visualv
equip
pment.

•

Food and b
blankets for immediate use for threee days aree stored so that Emerg
gency Relie
ef
Headquarte
ers staff cann devote alll their attention to eme
ergency response withoout externaals
supply.

Establishment of Emerge
ency Relie
ef Headquuarters Co
ontrol RoomThe rooom serves asa the centrral base forr disaster managementmt activities. Desks are arranged innhorse shoesshape so that thee Chief of HeadquarteHers,
namely Governor of Hyogo PrefecturePaandthe othher
designa
ated membe
ers can acttively discusss. This rooom
is equippped with Phoenix,
P
w
which
providdes the lateest
information on disa
aster damag
ge. This roo
om is situatted
on the undergrounnd level, co
omparativelly resistantt inorder too make goo
od use of the topogra
aphy of Ko
obewhich has mountains in north..

111

Night duty room
This ceenter utilize
es a 24-hou
ur watchingg and prom
mpt
responsse system tot prepare against dissaster evenn in
day andd night as a disaster .mmay occur anytime. Sttaff
stands byb in the Ce
enter all dayy throughou
ut the year

Broadcasting room
Broadca
asting equiipment is installed inn this roomm toprovide informatioon directly to local reesidents in theprefectu
ure

when

a

disastteroccurss.

Emergeency

broadca
ast is delive
ered throughh an AM raddio station

Network controlcrooomInformationn and commmunicatioon devicess are
installe
ed in this rooom, including the server, Pho
oenix
DisasteerMaanagementtcommu
unication

devicesthat

Systtem,

rradiouttilizesatellite

commu
unication networks.
nTThe
devisees are prottected fromm seismic vibration byb a base-isolated
d floor.

n of Regio
onal Emerg
gency Managementt Bases
Formation
Based on the experriences annd lessons
s learned from the G
Great Han
nshin-Awajji
uake, Hyogo Prefectture established six regional emergencyemanagemment basessEarthquwithin Hyogo, whhich will serve as ce
enters for storing, collecting
caand distributing relief

112

supplies and equipment, and as bases for
assembling and mobilizing emergency relief
workers. Miki Emergency Management Base isequipped with the overall function of being acore facility of these regional emergency
management bases, and covers the entire
prefecture
Function of Regional Emergency Management
Bases

1. Storage
Storage of relief supplies for victims (blankets,
emergency food supplies, etc.) and rescue
equipment (engine cutters, chain saws, etc.)

Hyogo Regional Emergency Management Bases

2. Collection and distribution of
supplies
In the event of a large-scale disaster, the bases become transport centers for collecting
relief supplies sent from all over the country and distributing them to the affected areas.
3. Assembly and mobilization of relief workers
The bases become centers for emergency relief activities, dispatching workers fromother areas to aid rescue activities and restoration work in the afflicted areas.

113

Hyogo Prefectural Miki Emergency Managemen
Mt Baseconsist of the “Leaarning and Training Zone”
Z(52 ha)h and“Disasteer Management Park Zone” (2002 ha). The
e Baseprovidess disaster trraining and education for citizens as welll center. Bu
as functtions as a sportssand recreationar
ut in theevent ofo a major disaster,dit serves as a prefecture-wide
emergeency management basee.

Duringg a disasteer:
In the event off major disaster, Miki
M
EmerrgencyManaggement

B
Base

will

ensureethesmoothMiki Emmergency Mana
agement Base

distribution

off

reliefsuppliesinperation
coop

with

reg
gionaleemergencyygement ba
ases both within thee prefecture and in thet Kansaai region. It will alsoomanag
serve as an ope
eration ba
ase for em
mergency
y relief wo
orkers, an
nd implem
ment quickksaster response me
easuresand efffective dis

At norm
mal times - Learning andaTraininng Zone:• Disaster ed
ducation forr citizens: ProvidesPhaands-on lea
arning andt
training
for citizens to raiser
aware
eness of dissaster risk reeduction.
• Holds the Hyogo
H
Disaaster Manag
gement Lea
ader Trainin
ng Coursew
which
includes lecture
es, exercises and emerrgency drillss, with thea of fosteaimering leaderrs of volunta
ary disasterrs response groups.
• Hyogo Pre
efecture Firrefighting AcademyApprovidestraaining forf
firefightersand volunte
eer fire com
mpany members so tha
at they cannd diverse disastersdrespond to complex an• Improveme
ent of disasster respon
nse abilitiess of relief workers
w:
Provides va
arious typess of emerge
ency drills a
at the rubb
ble rescuettraining
faccility from firefdepartm
ments, the police, self-defensefforces,
Dissaster Medical Assista
ance Teams ( DMATss) and the
J
Japan
Disa
aster Relief TeamT
• 3-D
3 Full-Sccale Earthquuake Testing Facility (EE-Defense)
Using the world’sw
large
est shaking
g table, an aactual size building issshakento thet same deegree as it would be duringda high-intensityeearthquake
e to study the destrucction proce
ess. Experim
ments areperformed byb shaking a real-size 6-story stru
ucture and simulatingt tremorss that occurrred in the Great
the
G
Hansh
hin-Awaji Earthquake.
E114
ed that bes
sides Emergency Ma
anagement Bases
It should be noteestablisshed throug
ghout the wholew
counttry almost eachecity oro townlocated in disasterr prone area
as local Go
overnments prepare sto
ocks incase off disaster w
with capacitty of variou
us amount of local ressidents
Stocks prepared fo
or disaster. It would be to the poinnt to mention
n stockfor disa
aster preparred by The Governme
ent of Kobee City for 10
00 000people. During Ko
obe Earthquake nearly 60 % off evacuation sites
were junnior high scchools and elementaryeschools. From the lesssons of thee Great Han
nshin –Awajji
earthquake half thee stock at ju
unior high scchools and elementaryy schools wwere prepareed.

At norm
mal times – Disaste
er Manage
ement Parkk Zone••Promotion of sports
s/recreational activities - Equuipped withhvarious sports/recreavational faciilities, takinng- Under the stands oSStorage
off relief supplies and equipment
e
of
t
the
athletics stadiumm, there iss a stockp
pile wareho
ouse whichhsstoresrelie
ef supplies
s such as fo
ood, blankkets and tents, as wella relief equipment
asesuch as life-savingg systems(( packageddeequipmentt for self-de
efense forcces) and generators

Nam
me of Facility
Athleetics stadiuumSeco
ond athleticcs
stadium
Baseeball stadiuumBall gamegstadiuum
C parkCar

Main funnctions
At ordinary timest

In the evennt of disaster

A
Athletics
stadiumm, soccerSupp
ply base
Trucck yard

As abovve

Temporaary heliport

baseball

Temporaary heliport

Car parkk

Assembly and accommodationaoofemergency relief workers
Suppply baseGyymnasium
Tennis courtss

Basketba
all,Na
ature forestt

Nature experrience,
environmenta
al study

Tenniss

Supply base, assembly andaccommodatio
on of emergenccy
relief workers
Supply base, assembly andaccommodatio
on of emergenccy
relief workers

Miki Emerggency Managem
ment Base115
Establishment and execution of reconstruction plans
With the aim of accomplishing creative reconstruction after the Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake in January 1995, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Reconstruction Plan (period:
1995 – 2005; budget: 17 trillion yen) was formulated and executed with the collaboration of
public administration and local residents. Initiatives for reconstruction that belonged to the three
categories to support the life quality restoration of disaster victims, that is, housing, infrastructure
and industry, were especially focused on under the Priority Three-Year Plans with the goal ofachieving the pre-quake level.
Reflecting on the disaster victims’ opinions
Although the reconstruction of the affected areas was going on through theReconstruction Plan and other measures, not a few disaster victims had worries, being unable tofind hope for their future reconstruction of livelihoods, even of the next day. Under thisrecognition, the Hyogo Forum for Advocating Individual Recovery (FAIR) started six months after
the Earthquake in order to conduct objective and integrated examination of challenges toovercome in order to restore the means of livelihood of the disaster victims, and to deliver
proposals toward that purpose.
To grasp the victims’ status and challenges necessary for the reconstruction of theirlivelihoods, members of the Forum often visited affected areas and exchanged opinions withdisaster victims and their supporters.
Urban redevelopment support projectIn affected areas, formation of local community groups was encouraged to achieve urban
redevelopment with the commitment of the local residents themselves. Such groups played a
primary role in urban redevelopment. Hyogo Prefecture promoted the Urban Redevelopment
Support Project to dispatch advisors and consultants to such groups and to support urban
redevelopment activities of them.
Earthquake insurance
Because the potential damage from earthquakes is so large, it is difficult for private –sector insurance companies to bear the risk alone. Following the 1964 Niigata Earthquake,therefore, the Act for Earthquake Insurance was passed in 1966 to establish an insurance
system jointly operated by the government and private-sector insurance companies.
When insurance claims for a single earthquake reach a certain level, the government
pays a portion of such claims. Since April 2005, the limit per earthquake has been ¥5 trillion (apossibility in an earthquake on the scale of the Great Kanto Earthquake).
Earthquake insurance is incidental to fire insurance, and is limited to ¥50 million for the
structure and ¥10 million for household goods, 30 -50 percent of fire insurance coverage.

116
Premiums are decided according to date of construction, wood or non-wood construction, andrisk by prefecture (four categories).
As of the end of FY 2003, earthquake insurance was attached to about 35 percent of fire
insurance policies. About 17 percent of households have earthquake insurance. Including Japan
Agriculture Cooperative insurance the enrollment rate is still only about 30 percent. Promoting
the spread of earthquake insurance is a current issue.

117

Conclusion
Being one of the most disaster prone areas in Japan Hyogo prefecture has developed
sophisticated and all-embracing disaster management system. The disaster management system in
Hyogo Prefecture has been heavily influenced by unfavorable geographical position, as well as,
meteorological, and topographical conditions and various large-scale disasters have been driving
force of new changes and enhancements to it. Current disaster management of the prefecture has
been formed during the last 50-60 years but significantly modified for the last 20 years. Rapid
development of the country during this period enabled it to make considerable investments on DMS
and integrate latest technological achievements of the country to it.
As one of the most prominent characteristic features of the system decentralization enables
more government agencies to be involved in disaster management, although to various extent andbearing various responsibilities, fosters development disaster coping capability of each body or
region individually and enhancement overall disaster management system.
Talking about emergency management system in the prefecture in particular, and in Japangenerally it is important to distinguish major, additional, specialized and voluntary response bodies
and forces. By major bodies we assume municipalities and Japan Coast Guard the former holding
the primary responsibility of ensuring and carrying out quick response operations on the land area,
the latter within the territorial waters of Japan. Specialized bodies are trained emergency medical
assistance teams – DMAT and JMAT and specialized teams of several public corporations
designated for disaster management under the DCBA. In turn, additional assistance forces aremanaged by national level government organizations such as FDMA, MLIT, and MHLW which takedisaster response actions once the scale of the disaster is out of response capabilities of a municipal
government. At the same time, MLITT, FDMA, MHLW are central bodies for national levelsupervision and coordination of emergency response activities as well as response assistance during
large-scale disasters.
JMA is the key body in prediction major natural hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis,
typhoons and volcano eruptions while MLIT is for flood and sediment disasters and cooperation withthem is essential for municipalities and other disaster response organizations. It must be noted thatapplication of latest technologies for disaster warning and communication by JMA had greatly
improved disaster response system in Japan. In addition, state lifeline agencies, railway companies,
NHK has established quick information sharing with JMA and other relevant bodies as well as
response mechanism within respective fields of activity. Although playing important role during largescale disaster National Police and Self-Defense Forces are additional response forces as join the
response activities only upon request.
Explored the disaster management system of Hyogo prefecture and its attributes it is necessary
firstly to highlight it’s a) organizational and methodological peculiarities of the system and b) its

118
technically – structural features that distinguishes this system from the one in my country. Having
conducted benchmarking assessment of the both systems I would like to fetch out 2 main
peculiarities that principally distinct the disaster management system of Hyogo prefecture from theone in my country.
1) Decentralized system of disaster management. Decentralization can be stipulated by thesize of the country and in terms of save of the time in disaster management system of theprefecture it plays vital role. Decentralization also empowers local authorities and nongovernmental organizations at the same time impose the local authorities as well as local
communities with to bear high responsibility for the steps they take.
2)

Overwhelming engagement of local residents in disaster management system. In
Azerbaijan Republic however the population is involved in disaster management system but it
doesn’t not widespread. It could be partly steam with the fact that unlike local population of
Hyogo prefecture the area of which is considered the most disaster prone out of Japan the
population of Azerbaijan Republic did not faced devastating disasters in recent years andthus doesn’t feel safe. In this case the good practice of BOKOMI – Kobe Community –based
Disaster Prevention Organization and other voluntarily disaster prevention organizations
would be extremely beneficial. Through The Ministry of Emergency Situations along withother administrative organs systematically conduct disaster management drills unfortunately
the local residents are engaged in these drills in a small extent.

Among technical and structural peculiriaties that would be advantageous to adopt isestablishment and implementation of disaster prevention information system Phoenix Disaster
Management System alike that can quickly response any kind of disaster. This is a complete
system built by employing internet technology (web technologies) across the board has
functions including the collection and provision of disaster and meteorological information,
damage prediction, and the estimation of supply and demand. The system provides damage
predictions, disaster flash reports, a display of disaster situation map, and more, in addition toproviding meteorological information. For the residents, it provides information related to disasterprevention on a web site.
In order to facilitate the initial and emergency response at the time of a disaster and inorder to share disaster related information, the system have set up terminals for disasterprevention at prefectural agencies, municipalities, fire departments, police headquarters, police
stations, Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Self-Defense Forces, coast guard
headquarters and lifeline operators, as well as other related agencies, and are strengthening
cooperation with relevant organizations.
Among others I would like to emphasis establishment of disaster-related medical
Information Control Center. The Center is designed in the case of disaster to collect and119disseminate medical information to each of various regional institutions through acomprehensive network system as well as to distribute medical information and to issue
Instructions to medical institutions and ambulance services. This can also be used as an
emergency medical network during normal period.
In normal situations the Center can be used for exchanging information, in the situationof a disaster ，it will support prompt and exact emergency delivery. During a disaster, the centercollects information about the stricken area and patients received by the various medical
agencies concerned, and then pass this information on to related organizations. Also, together
with the local medical information centers and emergency hospitals specified for each secondary
health care medical area, the center works with the fire fighting organizations, related to medical
treatment, volunteers, etc, to secure disaster emergency medical treatment. The establishment
and utilization of such kind of disaster–related medical information would be also very beneficial
for national disaster management system.
The existing disaster management system of Hyogo Prefecture, although, has been form
during relatively short time period put in place sophisticated mechanism which enables theprefecture to mobilize forces and resources and respond in a comprehensive manner any largescale disasters promptly, considerably decreasing damage and loss. Although, complicated at
first glance, comprehensively elaborated coordination enables to relevant bodies take concerted
actions what increases efficiency of whole system.

120

TABLE OF CONTENT

1)
2)
3)

ACKNOWLEDGEMT……………………………………………………………………………2
BACKGROUND …………………………………………………………………………………3
1) CLIMATE AND DISASTER PROFILE OF AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC AND JAPAN….5
1.1
HAZARD PROFILE OF AZERBAIJA REPUBLIC……………………………….5
1.1.2 FLOODS AND LANDSLIDES…………………………………………………….7
1.1.3 SEISMICITY………………………………………………………………………..7
1.1.4 MUD VOLCANOS…………………………………………………………………8
1.1.5 DROUGH AREAS OF AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC……………………………..9
1.2
DISASTER STATISTICS OF AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC……………………… ….10
1.3
VULNARABILITY PROFILE OF JAPAN……………………………………………..12
1.4
DISASTER STATISTIC OF JAPAN ………………………………………………….15
1.5 DISASTER PROFILE OF HYOGO PREFECTURE ……………………………17
LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND BASIC LAWS …………………………………………………17
FOR DISASTER REGULATIONS IN JAPAN………………………………………………..12
OUTLINE OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF JAPAN AND DISASTER
MANAGEMENT PLANNING ………………………………………………………………….24
CURRENT OUTLINE OF DESIGNATED NATIONAL AND LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVEORGANS, PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AND VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONSRESPONSIBLE FOR DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN. THEIR TASKS ANDRESPONSIBILITIES DURING DISASTER…………………………………………………..28
5.1 THE MINISTRY OF LAND, INFRASTRUCTURE,
TRANSPORT AND TOURISM ........................................................................................28
5.1.1 CASE STUDY: MLIT-MANAGED MARUYAMA RIVER …………………………...30
5.2 JAPAN METEOROLOGICAL AGENCY ……………………………………………….31
5.3 FIRE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT AGENCY…………………………………… 38
5.3.1 CASE STUDY: KOBE FIRE DEPARTMENT……………………………………….. 43
5.4 JAPAN COAST GUARD………………………………………………………………….44
5.5 MARITIME DISASTER PREVENTION CENTER ……………………………………..46
5.6 SELF-DEFENSE FORCES ………………………………………………………………48
5.7 MUNICIPAL LEVEL VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS ……………………………….49
5.7.1 CASE STUDY: (BOKOMI) –KOBE’S COMMUNITY – BASED DISASTER
PREVENTION ORGANIZATION …………………………………………………………….50
5.8 EMERGENCY RESPONSE BY OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND TEAMS…………50
5.8.1 DISASTER MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TEAMS………………………………………..50
5.8.2 JAPAN MEDICAL ASSOSIATION TEAMS – JMAT………………………………….51
5.8.3 CASE STUDY – MEDICAL RELIEF ACTIVITY BY HYOGO JMAT IN ISHINOMAKI
CITY………………………………………………………………………………………………53
5.8.4 JAPANESE RED CROSS SOCIETY…………………………………………………..53
5.9 BUILDING RESEARCH INSTITUTE…………………………………………………..54
5.10 NHK- JAPAN BROADCASTING COMPANY…………………………………………..54
5.11 CASE STUDY- OSAKA GAS ENGINEERING CO. CRISIS MANAGEMENTSYSTEM…………………………………………………………………………………………55
5.12- INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE – JAPAN DISASTER RELIEF
TEAM…………………………………………………………………………………………….57

121
4)

THE GREAT HANSHIN –AWAJI EARTHQUAKE AS A TURNING POINT OF
IMPROVEMENT OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF JAPAN AS A WHOLE
AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF HYOGO PREFECTURE …………..59
6.1 SHORTCOMINGS AND FAILURES DURING DISASTERPREPAREDNESS AND DISASTER RESPONSE TO THE GREAT HANSHINAWAJI EARTHQUAKE ………………………………………………………..59
6.1.1 MAIN CHARASTERISTICS OF THE EARTHQUAKE, CASUALTIES,BUILDING AND LIFELINE DAMAGES………………………………………..62
6.1.2 PROVIDING SHELTERS AND EMERGENCY CARE AND FAULTS IN
COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE DISASTERRESPONSE ………………………………………………………………………72
6.2 LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE GREAT HANSHIN-AWAJI
EARTHQUAKE AND IMPROVEMENT OF DISASTER MANAGEMENTSYSTEM OF JAPAN AND HYOGO PREFECTURE…………………………78
6.2.1 ENHANCEMENT OF DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND DISASTER
MITIGATION SYSTEM………………………………………………………… 79
6.2.2 ENHANCEMENT OF DISASTER RESPONSE SYSTEM…………….94
6.2.3 ENHANCEMENT OF DISASTER RECOVERY SYSTEM ……………114

5)
6)

CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….

116
119

122

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