Minerals for Climate Action:
The Mineral Intensity of the
Clean Energy Transition
CLIMATE-SMART MINING FACILITY
Kirsten Hund, Daniele La Porta, Thao P. Fabregas, Tim Laing, John Drexhage

© 2020 International Bank for
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Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Table of Contents
Foreword

7

Acknowledgments

8

Abbreviations

9

Executive Summary

11

Methodology - Estimating Mineral Demand

19

Overall Methodology

19

Recycling, Reuse

25

Global Warming Potential

26

Model Uncertainty

28

The Role of Minerals in the Clean Energy Transition

31

Renewable Energy and Storage Forecast

32

Mineral Intensity of Clean Energy Technologies

37

Solar Photovoltaic

38

Wind

45

Geothermal

51

Concentrated Solar Power

55

Energy Storage

59

Emerging Energy Technologies

65

Overall Mineral Demand up to 2050

71

Mineral Recycling, Reuse

80

Global Warming Potential of Energy Technologies, Minerals

87

GWP of Energy Technologies

87

GWP of Minerals

88

Conclusion

93

Rising Overall Demand for Minerals

93

Mineral Demand Vulnerability and Risks

93

Role of Recycling and Reuse

95

Emissions Mitigation and Reduction Opportunities

95

Risks Beyond the Model

97

Next Steps and Actions

99

Annex A: About Climate-Smart Mining

101

Annex B: Methodology

102

Annex C: Uncertainties

107

References

108

3

4

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

FiguresFigure ES.1

11

Figure 3.11

Cumulative Demand for Neodymium from Wind
49
Technologies Under Present Technology and Material 		Use Reduction Under 2DS Through 2050

Figure ES.2 Total Molybdenum Demand by Energy Technology
Through 2050 Under 2DS

12

Figure 3.12

Share of Mineral Demand from Geothermal Under 2DS
Through 2050

51

Figure ES.3 Cumulative Demand for Indium from Solar PV
Subtechnologies Compared to Base Share Under 2DS
Through 2050

13

Figure 3.13

Cumulative Demand for Minerals Needed for
Geothermal Through 2050

52

Figure 3.14
14

Total Titanium Demand by Energy Technology
Through 2050 (2DS, Base Scenario)

52

Figure ES.4 Aluminum Recycling Projections Relative to Annual
Aluminum Demand Under 2DS Through 2050

Figure 3.15
15

Share of Mineral Demand from Concentrated Solar
Power Under IEA 2DS Through 2050

55

Figure ES.5 Cumulative Global Warming Potential from Extraction
and Processing of Minerals, Not Including Operations,
Using Cradle-to-Gate Through 2050 Under 2DS

Figure 3.16

Cumulative Demand for Minerals Needed forConcentrated Solar Power Through 2050

56

Figure 1.1

Technology Coverage in the Model

22

Figure 3.17

Methodology for Estimating Demand of Minerals
for 2050 Energy Technology Scenarios

23

Total Silver Demand by Technology Through2050 (2DS, Base Scenario)

56

Figure 1.2

Figure 3.18

Li-ion Battery

60

Figure 1.3

Schematic of Global Warming Potential
Component of Model

28

Figure 3.19

Share of Mineral Demand from Energy Storage Under
IEA 2DS Through 2050

61

Figure 2.1

Estimated Installed Capacity in 2050 Acrossthe Technology-Based Mitigation Scenarios

33

Figure 2.2

Expected Growth in Energy Storage Through 2050

35

Figure 3.1

Share of Mineral Demand from Solar Photovoltaic
Under the IEA 2DS Through 2050

40

Figure 3.2

Cumulative Demand for Minerals Needed forSolar Photovoltaic Through 2050

40

Figure 3.22 Cumulative Demand for Lithium from Energy Storage 64
Under Present Technology and Material Use Reduction 		
Through 2050 Under 2DS, B2DS

Figure 3.3

Total Aluminum Demand by Energy
Technology Through 2050 (2DS, Base Scenario)

41

Figure 3.23 Carbon Capture Storage

65

Figure 3.24 Solid-State Battery

66

Figure 3.4

Total Indium Demand by Energy Technology
Through 2050 (2DS, Base Scenario)

41

Figure 3.25 Floating Offshore Wind

68

Figure 3.5

Cumulative Demand for Indium from Solar PV
Subtechnologies Compared to Base Share Under 2DS
Through 2050

42

Figure 3.26 Hydrogen Fuel Cell

69

Figure 3.6

Evolution of the Wind Turbine

45

Figure 3.7

Share of Mineral Demand from Wind Under IEA 2DS
Through 2050

46

Figure 3.8

Cumulative Demand for Minerals Needed for Wind
Through 2050

47

Figure 3.9

Total Zinc Demand by Energy Technology
Through 2050 (2DS, Base Scenario)

47

Figure 3.10

Cumulative Demand for Neodymium from Wind
48
Subtechnologies Compared to Base Share Under 2DS		
Through 2050

Projected Annual Average Demand of Minerals
up to 2050 Under the IEA Energy Technology
Perspective Scenarios

Figure 3.20 Cumulative Demand for Minerals Needed for Energy
Storage Through 2050

62

Figure 3.21

63

Cumulative Demand for Minerals from Li-ion Battery
Scenarios Under 2DS Through 2050

Figure 4.1

Cumulative Demand for Minerals for Energy
71Technologies (Without Storage) Through 2050 		
Only Under 4DS, B2DS, and REmap

Figure 4.2

Relative Change in Demand for Minerals from Energy
72
Technologies (Without Storage) Through 2050 		
Under RTS, Ref, B2DS, and REmap, Comparedto Base Scenario

Figure 4.3

Projected Annual Mineral Demand Under 2DS Only73
from Energy Technologies in 2050, Compared to 2018 		
Production Levels

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

5

TablesFigure 4.4

Total Copper Demand by Energy Technology
Through 2050 Under 2DS

75

Figure 4.5

Total Molybdenum Demand by Energy
Technology Through 2050 Under 2DS

75

Figure 4.6

Cumulative Copper and Molybdenum Demand
Through 2050 (2DS, Base Scenario)

76

Figure 4.7

Demand Risk Matrix Under 2DS

78

Figure 4.8

Impact of Recycling on Cumulative Demand for
Aluminum and Copper Under 2DS Through 2050

81

Figure 4.9

Impact of Recycling on Cumulative Demand for Nickel
Under 2DS Through 2050

82

Figure 4.10

Impact of Recycling on Cumulative Demand for Cobalt 82
and Lithium Under 2DS Through 2050

Figure 4.11

Impact of Reuse on Cumulative Demand for Lithium
Under 2DS Through 2050

Figure 5.1

Cumulative GWP Through 2050 from "Cradle to Gate" 87
Mineral Extraction and Processing, Operations of 		
Renewable Electricity Generation, and Energy Storage		Technologies Compared to Fossil Fuel Technologies 		
Through 2050

Figure 5.2

83

Total Cumulative Emissions from Cradle to Gate
for Energy Technologies Through 2050 Under 2DS
Compared to the Demand Index (MtCO2e)

89

Cumulative GWP from Extraction and Processingof Minerals, Not Including Operations, Using
Cradle-to-Gate by Technology Through 2050
Under 2DS

91

Figure A.1

Climate-Smart Mining Building Blocks

101

Figure B.1

Lithium Prices, 2010–2019

106

Figure 5.3

Table 1.1

Energy Technologies Included in This Study

20

Table 1.2

Minerals Identified in the Literature Review for
Inclusion in the Scenario Study

20

Table 1.3

Technology-Based Mitigation Scenarios

21

Table 1.4

Assumed Subtechnology Shares in 2050

24

Table 1.5

Assumed Lifetime of Technologies

24

Table 1.6

End-of-Life Recycling Rates and Recycled
Content Rates

25

Table 2.1

Shortened Technology-Based Mitigation Scenarios
from IEA and IRENA

32

Table 3.1

Mapping Minerals with Relevant Low-Carbon
Technologies

37

Table 3.2

Share of Subtechnology Penetration in Solar PV Market 42
Compared with Base Share Under 2DS

Table 3.3

Share of Subtechnology Penetration in Wind Market
Compared with Base Share48

Table 3.4

Batteries and Their Subtechnologies Covered in theRef, 2DS, and B2DS

61

Table B.1

Implication of Clean Energy Transition on Mineral
Demand Challenges

103

Table B.2

2018 Mineral Production and 2050 Projected Annual
Demand from Energy Technologies

103

Reducing Emissions from Aluminum Production
Demand from Energy Technologies

90

Box
Box 5.1

6

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

7

Foreword
The data presented in this report speak for themselves: Ambitious

The mineral intensity of low-carbon technologies should not be

climate action will bring significant demand for minerals.

overlooked. We know that to date, the mining industry consumes

Limiting global warming to at or below 1.5°C–2°C, to realize aup to 11 percent of the global energy use, while 70 percent of mining

low-carbon future, requires a large-scale transition to clean

projects from the six largest mining companies operate in water-energy. Manufacturing solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries

stressed regions. Increasing demand for minerals and metals would

will shape the supply and demand for critical minerals for the

only push these figures higher unless we adopt a radically different,

foreseeable future. Doing so will have significant implications

climate-smart approach. Understanding these new, climate-related

for a wide variety of industries and for mineral-rich developing

risks will be critical for all stakeholders involved in renewable energy

countries. These countries stand to benefit from the rise in

and battery technology supply chains—from extraction to the end

demand for minerals but also need to manage the material anduse of any given mineral or metal.

climate footprints associated with increased mining activities.

While the mineral intensity of renewable energy has its challenges,

This report’s findings make it clear that all stakeholders along

our research shows that, even if low-carbon technologies are more

the mineral and renewable energy supply chains have a vital rolemineral intensive, they only account for a fraction (6 percent) of

to play in the transition to a cleaner energy system to achieve

emissions generated by fossil fuel technologies. This means that

Sustainable Development Goal 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy

the deployment of renewable energy is essential in helping us meetfor All), while ensuring that it does not come at the cost of thethe Paris Agreement, even if it means that more minerals will be

climate, the environment, and people, particularly communities

needed to get there.

directly affected by mining activities.

To address these challenges, the World Bank launched the

In 2017, the World Bank published The Growing Role of Minerals andClimate-Smart Mining Initiative to ensure that minerals for the

Metals for a Low Carbon Future, concluding that a low-carbon futureclean energy transition are produced and supplied sustainably

will not be possible without minerals. This report makes thatand responsibly, while enabling developing countries to benefit

case even stronger, but with a new emphasis on how technology

from this seismic shift. The goal is to ensure that mineral-rich

improvements and recycling could impact mineral demand up to

developing countries are well prepared to meet this growing

2050. For the first time, the global warming potential of different

demand with the smallest possible carbon footprint, while

low-carbon technologies were analyzed in comparison with fossil-

safeguarding the environment and people.

fuel-based energy systems. We also present a new framework to
capture the risks associated with the demand for specific criticalminerals.

I am confident that, with the adoption of climate-smart mining, we
can make the clean energy transition possible without endangering
the climate and the environment. By working together to reduce

This report intends to provide policy makers, mineral producers,

the carbon and material footprints of minerals, we can support the

renewable energy developers, climate negotiators, and civil

large-scale deployment of renewable energy and battery storage

society organizations with a data-driven understanding oftechnologies required to meet ambitious climate targets andhow the shift to a cleaner energy system could impact mineralachieve a low-carbon future that benefits everyone.

demand. It also provides a forward-looking outlook on the actions
each stakeholder can take to minimize the carbon and material
footprints of such a significant shift.
Riccardo Puliti,
Global Director, Energy and Extractive Industries
World Bank

8

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Acknowledgments
This report was developed by the Climate-Smart Mining Team of theWorld Bank’s Energy and Extractive Global Practice. The team was
led by Daniele La Porta and Kirsten Hund. The primary authors andresearch team consisted of Thao P. Fabregas (formerly Nguyen),
Dr. Tim Laing (University of Brighton), and John Drexhage.
Emmanouela Markoglou and Clare Murphy-Mcgreevy provided
communications support. Aisha I. Agily and Helen Ba Thanh Nguyen
provided organizational support.
The team is grateful for the input and contributions received
from the following individuals: Ivan Jacques, Michael McCormick,
Marcelo Mena-Carrasco, Peter Mockel, Remi Pelon, Sven Ulrich
Renner, Benjamin Sprecher (Leiden University), Ester van der Voet
(Leiden University), and Sean Whittaker.
We would like to thank the experts who provided feedback during
the modeling phase: Matthew Eckelman (Northeastern University),
Jagabanta Ningthoujam (Rocky Mountain Institute), Phillip Nuss
(German Environment Agency), and Kohji Tokimatsu (Tokyo Instituteof Technology).
The report's model was built from the original publication

The Growing Role of Minerals and Metals for a Low Carbon Futureand benefited from insight, feedback and data from a number ofother esteemed colleagues. Our sincerest thanks go to all of them.
Lastly, the team greatly appreciates the input and guidance fromChristopher Sheldon and Riccardo Puliti.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Abbreviations
2DS

2-degree scenario (IEA)

4DS

4-degree scenario (IEA)

B2DS

beyond 2-degree scenario (IEA)

CCS

carbon capture and storage

CdTe

cadmium telluride

CIGS

copper indium gallium selenide

CSP

concentrated solar power

CO2

carbon dioxideCO2ecarbon dioxide equivalent

EOL

end of life

GHG

greenhouse gas

Gt

gigatons

GW

gigawatts

GWh

gigawatt-hours

GWP

global warming potential

ICMM

International Council on Mining and Metals

IEA

International Energy Agency

IRENAInternational Renewable Energy Agency

LCOE

levelized cost of energy

Li-ionlithium-ion

Mtmillion tons

MW

megawatts

NDC

Nationally Determined Contribution

NMC

nickel manganese cobalt oxide

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PVphotovoltaic

RC

recycled content

Ref

reference scenario (IRENA)

REmap

renewable energy roadmap scenario (IRENA)

RTS

reference technology scenario (IEA)

SDG

Sustainable Development Goal

All dollars are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated.

9

10

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Executive Summary
1. A low-carbon future will be very mineralintensive because clean energy technologies
need more materials than fossil-fuel-based
electricity generation technologies. Greater
ambition on climate change goals (1.50C–20C
or below), as outlined by the Paris Agreement,
requires installing more of these technologies andwill therefore lead to a larger material footprint.1

American football fields (Mathis and Eckhouse 2020). Undera 2-degree scenario (2DS),2 production of graphite, lithium,and cobalt will need to be significantly ramped up by morethan 450 percent by 2050—from 2018 levels—to meet demand
from energy storage technologies.3 Though demand for somebase minerals, like aluminum and copper, appears to be smaller
in percentage terms, their absolute production figures are
significant, at 103 million tons and 29 million tons by 2050,
respectively. These projections do not include the associatedinfrastructure needed to support the deployment of thesetechnologies (for example, transmission lines) or the physicalLow-carbon technologies, particularly solar photovoltaic (PV),parts (like the chassis4 of newly built electric vehicles).5

wind, and geothermal, are more mineral intensive relative to

Because of the material intensity of low-carbon technologies,

fossil fuel technologies. For example, about 3,000 solar panels

any potential shortages in mineral supply could impact theare needed for 1 megawatt (MW) of capacity of solar PV; thisspeed and scale at which certain technologies may bemeans that a 200 MW solar PV project could be as big as 550

deployed globally.

Figure ES.1 Projected Annual Average Demand of Minerals up to 2050 Under the IEA Energy Technology Perspective Scenarios

RTS

2DS

B2DS

200

B2DS
3.5 billion tons

180
160

2DS
3.1 billion tons

140
Tons (millions)

Total demand through2050 by scenario

120
RTS
1.8 billion tons

100
80
60
40
20
0
2020 - 2024

2025 - 2029

2030 - 2034

2035 - 2039

2040 - 2044

2045 - 2050

Note: “Minerals” refers to the 17 minerals included in this analysis plus steel, but excluding concrete. Steel has been included because of the size of demand for the alloy from energy technologies. Averageannual demand is the mean demand for minerals across the time periods given. The higher mineral demand under the 2DS than the B2DS before 2030 can be explained by the higher overall generation
capacity projected by the IEA to be needed in the 2DS compared with the B2DS. This is especially true of solar photovoltaic in the 2DS in these time periods. Subsequently, the plateau in mineral demandin the 2DS is caused by a relatively slower penetration of renewable generation, followed by a rapid increase in storage capacity from 2035 onward. 2DS = 2-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree
scenario, IEA = International Energy Agency, RTS = reference technology scenario.
1
2
3
4
5

This report does not intend to forecast what will happen, but instead provide a range of scenarios to explore the future global energy system and how different policy choices and technology improvements could
affect overall mineral demand up to 2050.
2DS—along with B2DS (beyond 2-degree scenario) and RTS (reference technology scenario)—refers to one of the scenarios developed in the International Energy Agency (IEA) Energy Technology Perspectives 2017.
Please refer to chapter 1 for additional information.
These projections may be conservative and will most likely be larger in a 1.50C-degree scenario, which demands solutions to be implemented faster, and at a larger scale.
“Chassis” refers to the frame of car and associated components.
Steel figures have not been included in this analysis because of potential double counting issues.

11

12

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

2. Each mineral carries a different demandrisk depending on whether it is cross-cutting(needed across a range of low-carbon
technologies) or concentrated (needed in
one specific technology). Absolute production
numbers and relative increases in demandfor each mineral may also play a role in theirability to meet supply as well as have climate
and environmental implications.

Beyond cross-cutting versus concentrated, some minerals face

Cross-cutting minerals, such as copper, chromium, andenergy technologies. To facilitate the understanding of themolybdenum, are used across a wide variety of clean energy

relationship between cross-cutting and concentrated minerals, as

generation and storage technologies and have stable demand

well as the different levels of demand, this report has developed a

conditions. This is because these minerals do not depend on

demand risk matrix (figure 4.7) that can be used by stakeholders

the deployment of any one specific technology within the clean

and policy makers, allowing minerals to be categorized based onenergy transition. Molybdenum and copper, for instance, aretheir demand risk profile.

higher levels of changes in demand from the shift to a low-carbon
future. Graphite and lithium demand are so high that current
production would need to ramp up by nearly 500 percent by
2050 under a 2DS just to meet demand. Demand for aluminumfor energy technologies in 2050, on the other hand, makes up
only 9 percent of current production levels, but aluminum is used
across a broad range of technologies, making it less susceptible tochanges in technology deployment, and it has the highest absolutelevels of demand from any of the minerals in this analysis.
Understanding these different demand risks is crucial for mining
and energy industries that must be adaptive to rapidly evolving

used in more than eight clean energy generation and storage
technologies; thus, even if technological improvements, costs
reductions, and deployment of new emerging technologies were to

Figure ES.2 Total Molybdenum Demand by Energy Technology Through2050 Under 2DS

take place, these changes would have little impact on the overall
demand for them. For copper, the greatest share of demand comesfrom solar PV and wind, but demand may be underestimatedas it does not include the transmission infrastructure needed toconnect these new technologies to electricity grids.
Concentrated minerals, such as lithium, graphite, and cobalt,
are needed only for one or two technologies and therefore
possess higher demand uncertainty as technological disruption
and deployment could significantly impact their demand. Theseminerals are primarily used in energy storage and have the highest

Nuclear

4.8%

Wind

47.3%
Geothermal

41.7%

Solar PV

3.2%

Hydro

2DS

1.8%
Gas (inc. CCS)

1.0%

Coal (inc. CCS)

0.3%

demand figures relative to 2018 production levels. With energy
storage having the highest level of uncertainty post-2030 given
the number of energy storage subtechnologies currently at the
research and development (R&D) and pilot stages, as well as
different policy choices and market forces, concentrated minerals
have the highest level of demand risk, particularly for producers ofthese minerals.

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, CCS = carbon capture and storage, CSP = concentrated solar power,
PV = photovoltaic.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

3. Technology and subtechnology choice,material substitution, and technologicalimprovements will shift the demand forindividual minerals under different low-carbon
scenarios. Still, any lower-carbon pathway
will increase the overall demand of minerals.

Figure ES.3 Cumulative Demand for Indium from Solar PV
Subtechnologies Compared to Base Share Under 2DS Through 2050

+172%
70

60

demand from energy technologies (87 percent), while wind andgeothermal will account for most zinc and titanium demand,

50

demand in this analysis. Each energy technology has different
mineral compositions, leading to demand features that can varyTons (thousands)

at 98 percent and 64 percent, respectively. Solar PV andwhile battery storage accounts for all graphite and lithium

Indiumdemand80

Under a 2DS, solar PV will account for the majority of aluminum

wind, combined, account for 74.2 percent of all copper demand,

13

IndiumdemandIndiumdemand40+23%

Indiumdemand

+8%

-61%
30

significantly from one technology to another.
Substitution effects, such as efficiency improvements, could

20

have strong impacts on the demand for individual minerals, likeindium, based on which subtechnology within a technology ends

10

up being most widely deployed up to 2050. Factors that could
drive substitution effects include market dynamics, availability ofminerals, technological improvements, and costs. The technology
pathway that will emerge to decarbonize electricity production

0

Base
share

High
crystal si

High
CdTe

High
High
CIGS amorphous si

will shape the minerals that will experience the largest increases
in demand. It is possible that new technologies such as floating
offshore wind, green hydrogen, or solid-state batteries maychange the shape of the future energy system. These technologies
require different minerals and carry different mineral demand
implications, but given that they are generally more material
intensive than their fossil-fuel-based counterparts, overall
demand for minerals will still increase.

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, amorphous Si = amorphous silicon, CdTe = cadmium telluride, CIGS =copper indium gallium selenide, crystal Si = crystalline silicon, PV = photovoltaic.

14

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

4. While the recycling and reuse of minerals
can play a key role in reducing emissions,mining will still be required to supply thecritical minerals needed to produce these
low-carbon technologies, even with large
future increases in recycling rates.

of the low-carbon transition, but policy measures will need to

Recycling and reuse will have a role in meeting future mineral

the mineral recycling sector can be overcome, there is still a needdemand, but primary mineral demand from mining will still be

to meet remaining primary demand in the most effective andneeded. Recycling rates vary greatly for all minerals due to costs

environmentally and socially responsible manner. It will be crucial

and technical issues. The challenge with meeting most of thefor importers of these critical minerals with ambitious climate

demand from recycling is partly due to lack of existing material

targets, particularly in developed countries, to work closely withto recycle and reuse, along with costs and technological barriers

mineral producers in developing countries to decarbonize and(for example, some technologies may not be easily recyclable due

reduce the material impacts associated with increased

to design). Facilitating recycling and reuse is a vital part

extractive activities.

incentivize action in this area while promoting awareness of theeconomic and environmental challenges associated with theprocesses of recycling. Future increases in recycling rates canplay an important role in mitigating increases in demand for
raw materials, as can reuse of components for energy storage
technologies, such as lithium-ion batteries, and refurbishmentof equipment, such as wind turbines. Even if these challenges in

Figure ES.4 Aluminum Recycling Projections Relative to Annual Aluminum Demand Under 2DS Through 2050

Total Demand

Supply from scrap scale up to 100% EOL RR by 2050

Supply from scrap current rates

6

Primary
aluminum
demandafter
100% EOL
recyclingrates

5Tons (millions)

4

Secondaryaluminum
will meet 61%
of demandin 2050
under
100% EOL
recycling
rates

3

2

1

0
2020 - 2024

2025 - 2029

2030 - 2034

2035 - 2039

2040 - 2044

2045 - 2050

Note: EOL recycling rates are assumed to increase annually to meet 100 percent EOL by 2050. This means that secondary aluminum meets an increasing amount of aluminum demand over time. 2DS =2-degree scenario, EOL = end of life, RR = recycling rates.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition15

5. Despite the higher mineral intensity of
renewable energy technologies, the scaleof associated greenhouse gas emissions isa fraction of that of fossil fuel technologies.
However, the carbon and material footprints
cannot be overlooked.

a 2DS. They account, however, for about 16 gigatons of carbon

While increasing the share of renewable energy is one of the mostKingdom combined.6 Greening the power sector and battery

effective ways of decarbonizing the electricity sector, the countries

production requires that upstream and downstream emissions-who have committed to the Paris Agreement need to address therelated challenges from clean energy technologies be meaningfully

mineral intensity of clean energy technologies. Emissions fromaddressed through policy and innovation while integrating these

the production and operation of renewable energy and storage

emissions reductions into countries’ Nationally Determined

technologies are just 6 percent of coal and gas generation underContributions under the Paris Agreement.

dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) emissions up to 2050—similar to the2018 emissions of the United States and China—without factoringin the emissions from transporting minerals between processing
and manufacturing facilities. Together, aluminum, graphite, andnickel production for energy technologies account for a cumulative
1.4 GtCO2e up to 2050, nearly equivalent to the total 2018
carbon dioxide emissions from France, Germany, and the UnitedFigure ES.5 Cumulative Global Warming Potential from Extraction and Processing of Minerals, Not Including Operations, Using Cradle-to-Gate
Through 2050 Under 2DS

800

700

600

MtCO₂e

500

400

300

200

100

0

Aluminum
Energy Storage

Graphite
Geothermal

NickelSolar PVWind

CobaltHydro

Coal (inc. CSS)

CopperGas (inc. CSS)

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, CCS = carbon capture and storage, CSP = concentrated solar power, MtCO2e = million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.
6

Data retrieved from the 2019 Global Carbon Atlas: http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-emissions.

Lithium
Nuclear16

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

6. Limiting the carbon footprint of minerals
needed for the clean energy transition may
offer double wins, helping to boost economic
growth and reduce environmental risks inresource-rich developing countries. It will alsoenable the transition to a 1.50C–20C pathway,
in line with the Paris Agreement, Sustainable
Development Goal (SDG) 7, “access to affordable,
reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all,”and SDG 13, taking “urgent action to combat
climate change and its impacts.”

mineral production while ensuring a continued, stable, andTaking a holistic approach toward increasing climate ambitionlevel of support they have today for climate action. Therefore,

in developed, emerging, and developing countries, as well as in

it is vital that the production and disposal of these technologies

producers and consumers of minerals, involves understanding

do not come at the expense of people and the environment. The

and analyzing the full supply chain of low-carbon technologies,

mining sector has an important role in the clean energy transition,from mineral extraction to the end of life of these technologies.

contributing to SDG 7, and can play a crucial role in the global fightThus, upstream and end-of-life activities of clean energy

against climate change (SDG 13, Paris Agreement). Ensuring thattechnologies must be taken into account to ensure that (1) the

innovation takes a center stage in decarbonizing and encouraging

mining industry can meet increasing demand up to 2050 using

responsible mineral production would equally contribute to SDG 9sustainable and responsible practices; (2) governments and the(Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure) and SDG 12 (Responsible

private sector address the emissions associated with increased

Consumption and Production).

affordable supply of these minerals to support a low-carbon
transition; and (3) innovation across the whole supply chain
is leveraged to ensure low-carbon technologies can be easily
disassembled and safely disposed of, and the mineral contents
recycled to partially meet this new demand.
Limiting greenhouse gas emissions throughout the clean energy
technology supply chain could offer double wins, helping boost
economic growth as well as reducing climate and environmental
risks in resource-rich developing countries that are positioned
to supply these minerals. If, however, the mitigation of emissions
and other potentially harmful environmental and social effects
are not achieved from increased mineral production, there is arisk that clean energy technologies may not maintain the same

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

17

7. The Climate-Smart Mining Initiative
addresses these challenges by working
together with governments, development
partners, industries, and civil society
to minimize the new emissions froma low-carbon transition and work closelywith resource-rich developing countries to
responsibly supply these strategic minerals
for clean energy technologies.
Combining climate-smart mining with an overview of thedifferent demand risks of minerals, via the demand risk
matrix, provides a framework for climate, energy, and mining
stakeholders to understand and mitigate risks associated with
providing a stable supply of minerals while limiting the carbon
and material footprints of increased climate ambition. Eachstakeholder along the supply chain has a role to play:• Climate stakeholders: With minerals playing a vital rolein enabling the clean energy transition, it will be crucial for
members of the climate community to work closely withproducers of those minerals—including resource-richdeveloping countries and the mining industry—to ensure thatthese emissions are mitigated. Mineral-rich countries thatmake it a priority to reduce emissions from mineral production,• Mining stakeholders: The mining community should position

through climate-smart mining practices, could assess options

itself as a contributor to SDG 7 by ensuring that the carbon

to integrate their decarbonization efforts in their Nationallyand material footprints associated with the minerals they

Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement.

supply are minimized. Innovation is necessary to reduce the• Clean energy stakeholders: The energy sector also has

amount of energy, water, and land needed to extract thesean important role to play in ensuring that the low-carbon
technologies they are deploying are being produced sustainably
and responsibly while taking into account the waste
management of these technologies once they reach end of life,in 10, 20, or 30 years from today. The mining sector accounts
for 2–11 percent of the world’s total energy consumption, so
it will be important for the energy sector to work closely withmineral producing countries and miners to ensure that minerals
are produced using clean sources of energy and climate-smart

mining practices.

minerals and reduce the sector’s carbon and environmental
footprints. Without putting into place measures that addressthese challenges, such as adapting climate-smart mining
practices, it will be difficult for the mining sector to position
itself as a champion and enabler of the clean energy transition.

18

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

19

Methodology
Estimating Mineral Demand
The methodology in this report is basedon a spreadsheet-based model that derives
the total global demand of relevant minerals
and metals (together referred to as “minerals”)
from electricity generation and energy storage
up to 2050.7 The electricity generation andenergy storage scenarios (together referred
to as “technology-based mitigation
scenarios”) use data from the International
Energy Agency’s (IEA) Energy Technology
Perspectives 2016 and Energy Technology
Perspectives 2017 and the International
Renewable Energy Agency’s (IRENA) 2019
Global Energy Transformation: A Roadmap
to 2050, to identify the amount of minerals
that would be required under each scenario
to supply clean energy technologies.
While the analysis estimates mineral demand from energy
storage as well as geothermal, solar, wind, and conventionalenergy technologies, it does not take into account the global
supply of minerals available to date to meet demand, nor the
new mineral demand that will come from new global transmission
infrastructure needed to electrify a low-carbon world (for example,
connecting renewable energy projects to existing transmission
infrastructure and creating new charging stations for electricvehicles). It also does not consider the current and future priceof energy technologies, nor the price of minerals required for theenergy transition. In other words, this report exclusively analyzes
the amount of minerals that will be needed to supply a specificsubset of clean energy technologies (listed below) regardless of

Overall Methodology
The methodology was developed using primary and secondary
research to build a robust model to determine potential mineraldemand stemming from the clean energy transition. A literaturescoping study and interviews with clean energy experts wereconducted to review mineral use in electricity generation andenergy storage technologies for clean and conventional energy.
This information was then used to develop the assumptions usedin the model to estimate annual mineral demand. These annual
demands were then aggregated into cumulative demand up to
2050. Key assumptions in the model included technology-based
mitigation scenarios based on IEA and IRENA outlooks; technology
and subtechnologies required to reach those scenarios; assumed
life spans of those technologies; and the minerals required tosupply a megawatt of electricity or a megawatt-hour of energy
storage from each technology included in the model. The model
has static and dynamic elements. The capacity required foreach energy technology and subtechnology varies from year toyear, depending on the relevant technology-based mitigation
scenarios. Other aspects, such as the minerals required to supply
a megawatt or megawatt-hour or electricity or energy storage,
and the life spans of the technologies, remain static in the model,
although the sensitivity of results to altering the first of theseassumptions is tested.

Literature Scoping Study
The approach included identifying the subtechnologies within eachenergy technology necessary to include in the analysis to derivemineral demand (see table 1.1). For example, many variants ofsolar PV panels exist on the market today, and each has slightly
different mineral requirements. Wind turbines can come in a
number of different models, too, and onshore and offshore windturbines require different amounts of minerals. Subtechnologies arethese different types of solar panels, wind turbines, or batteries.

price and whether today’s mineral supply worldwide would be able

The report then identified a list of 17 minerals for inclusion in theto meet this new demand up to 2050.

analysis (see table 1.2).

7This report builds on the World Bank’s previous report, The Growing Role of Minerals and Metals for a Low Carbon Future (June 2017), and adopts a similar methodology. The analysis covers 17 elements and minerals:
Sixteen are produced and used after various amounts of extraction and processing, while one, graphite, is a particular form of carbon.

20

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Table 1.1 Energy Technologies Included in This Study

Subtechnology

Concentrated
solar powern.a.

Battery:
Automotive

Split between Li-ion,lead acid, and otherHydro-electricity

n.a.

Battery:
Decentralized

Split between Li-ion,lead acid, and other

Geothermal

n.a.

Battery:
Grid-scale

Nuclearn.a.

Split between Li-ion,lead acid, redox
flow, and other

Solar PV

Solar PV –CdTeSolar PV –crystal siliconTechnology

Subtechnology

Solar PV –CIGSSolar PV –amorphous silicon
Wind

Technology

Conventional energy (electricity generation)

Technology

Energy storage

Clean energy (electricity generation)

Energy technologies
Subtechnology
Coal-fired electricity
generation

Coal

Coal-fired electricity
generation + CCS
Gas-fired electricity
generation

Gas

Gas-fired electricity
generation + CCS

Offshore
OnshoreNote: The mineral demand for the technologies listed here have been included in the overall mineral demand results for this study. CCS = carbon capture and storage, CdTe = cadmium telluride, CIGS =copper indium gallium selenide, Li-ion = lithium-ion, n.a. = not applicable, PV = photovoltaic.

Data collected from the literature review also included theamount of elements and minerals (henceforth referred to as
minerals) needed (see table 1.2) to build a megawatt of capacity

Table 1.2 Minerals Identified in the Literature Review for Inclusion in the
Scenario Study

1

Aluminum

10

Manganese2

Chromium11

Molybdenum

required to build a 3 MW wind turbine, while another source gives

3

Cobalt12

Neodymiumthe zinc needed for a 5 MW turbine. These numbers have been

4

Copper

13

Nickelof a wind turbine.

5

Graphite14

SilverDifferent estimates were collected, and for each mineral-

6

Indium15

Titanium

subtechnology pairing—such as zinc for offshore wind or lithium

7

Iron

16

Vanadium

8

Lead

17

Zinc

9

Lithiumof a particular subtechnology; this has been typically expressedby the mineral’s weight, in kilograms, of installed megawatt (kg/installed MW). For example, one data source may report the zincstandardized to give the amount of zinc needed to produce 1 MW

for Li-ion batteries—a low, median, and high value were chosen.
These different values were used in the model to produce anestimated range of mineral demand. The midpoint of this range isreported in this analysis.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Technology-Based Mitigation Scenarios
As mentioned above, “technology-based mitigation scenarios”
refers to the electricity generation and energy storage scenarios
up to 2050 that were drawn from the IEA and IRENA. Morespecifically, this report uses six technology-based mitigation
scenarios to estimate mineral demand (table 1.3).

While the 4DS is not used in the models for the IEA’s 2017
ETP scenarios or in IRENA’s 2019 scenarios, it has been retained
here as the base scenario, which is defined as the state of affairs
where there is marginal progress toward a low-carbon transition.
This is done not because a 4DS is likely or normative, but tocompare the relative demand for relevant minerals between 		a future with and without low-carbon technology penetration in

An important distinction to make about the IEA and IRENA
scenarios is that the 2017 IEA scenarios include outlook on bothelectricity generation and energy battery storage penetration,
while the IRENA scenarios and the IEA 4DS exclusively focus onelectricity generation. In other words, the IRENA scenarios and IEA
4DS do not report the penetration of energy storage in the clean
energy transition.

the global energy system.
The IEA and IRENA also hold the view that the state oftechnology capacity is already sufficient to meet even themost ambitious of the global temperature scenarios. That said,
neither agency speculates on the relative availability of thematerials required to actually implement that scale of low-carbon
technology penetration.

Table 1.3 Technology-Based Mitigation Scenarios

Technology-Based Mitigation Scenarios
Scenario acronym

21

SourceScenario description

1

4DS(Base scenario)

4-degree scenario from the IEA ETP(2016) report

Base scenario, where the world carries on a current trajectory,
makes minor improvements in shifting energy system awayfrom fossil fuel sources

2

RTS

Reference technology scenario fromthe IEA ETP (2017) report

Assumes all countries will implement their Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs), as proscribed under theParis Agreement, resulting in an average temperature increaseof 2.7°C by 2100

32DS

2-degree scenario from the IEA ETP(2017) report

Scenario with at least a 50% chance of limiting the average
global temperature increase to 2°C by 2100

4

B2DS
(Most ambitious
scenario in the IEA report)

Beyond 2-degree scenario from the IEA
ETP (2017) report

Scenario with a 50% chance of limiting average futuretemperature increases to 1.75°C by 2100

5

Ref

Reference scenario from IRENA(2019a)Similar to the IEA's RTS, it accounts for actions, commitments
made under current/planned policies, including NDCs. Rise intemperatures would be at least 2.6°C by 2100

6

REmap
(Most ambitious
scenario in IRENA)

Renewable energy roadmap scenario
from IRENA (2019a)

Ambitious scenario that limits the rise in global temperature to“well below” 2°C above preindustrial levels by 2100

Note: IEA = International Energy Agency, IRENA = International Renewable Energy Agency, ETP = Energy Technology Perspectives.

22

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Figure 1.1 Technology Coverage in the Model

Technologies outside the model

IEA ETP 2016

IEA ETP 2017

Technologies included in the model

IRENA - REmap

18
16
14

GW (thousands)

12
10
8
6
4
2
0

ETP - 4DS (2016)

ETP - RTS

ETP - 2DS

ETP - B2DS

IRENA - Ref

IRENA - REmap

Source: IEA 2016, 2017; IRENA 2019a.
Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, 4DS = 4-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy Agency, IRENA = International Renewable Energy Agency, ETP = Energy Technology
Perspectives, GW = gigawatt, Ref = reference scenario, REmap = renewable energy roadmap scenario.

The electricity generation technologies included in the model—

For solar PV specifically, the picture is even more striking, withclean and conventional—account for the vast majority of futuresolar PV in non-OECD countries being 208 percent of that ingenerated electricity in both the IEA and IRENA scenarios (figure

OECD countries.

1.1). A very small share of electricity generation is not included,
mainly electricity generated from oil-based power stations,

Modeling Inputs

biomass power plants, and wave and ocean electricity-generating

The model approach is shown in figure 1.2. The core inputs are

facilities. These technologies were excluded owing to the lack offourfold:

publicly available data on the minerals needed for them.
The majority of clean energy technologies, particularly solar PV
but also wind (onshore and offshore), are expected to be deployed
in developing countries because of large projected increases
in electricity demand and accompanying increasing economic
development, coupled with significant renewable energy resources,
particular solar, in many of these countries. For example, in the
IEA’s 2DS, installed capacity of solar PV and wind is 117 percent• Technology-based mitigation scenarios developed by the IEA
and IRENA• Technology and subtechnology shares required to meetthose scenarios• Assumed life spans on relevant technologies• A range of estimates minerals required to supply a megawattof electricity

higher in non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Figure 1.2 breaks down the steps used in estimating mineral

Development (OECD) countries than in OECD countries by 2050.

demand under a range of climate scenarios based on the IEA data.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Figure 1.2 Methodology for Estimating Demand of Minerals for 2050 Energy Technology Scenarios

Input
Assumptions on subtechnology
shares - from literature

Input

energy scenario data
Generation (IEA, IRENA)

Input
Assumptions on technology
life spans - from literature

Installed capacity data - present to 2050

Storage (IEA, various sources)
Annual GWh required

Model calculation

Annual total capacity
added for generationand storage

Input metalcomposition per MW
Drawn from wide varietyof literature median, low
and high estimates

Annual metal
requirements fortechnology andsubtechnology

Output:Total demand for metals
from electricity generationand storage up to 2050

These four inputs were combined into the model to create twomore comprehensive categories of data:
I. Estimated capacity additions for electricity generation andenergy storage technologies by 2050.

II. Estimated annual mineral requirements in supplying thesetechnologies, which were then summed through 2050 toderive the final calculations of total demand for minerals fromelectricity generation and energy storage.

23

24

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Table 1.4 lays out the penetration of different subtechnologies to

The relative demand for minerals is also driven by the expected

2050 that form the model’s base scenario.

longevity of energy technologies. Table 1.5 breaks down theassumptions behind the expected life span of key zero-carbon

Table 1.4 Assumed Subtechnology Shares in 2050

Technology

Subtechnology

technologies. In particular, the expected and shorter life span of2050 Penetration

10 years for energy storage highlights the critical role it will play indetermining the future minerals market. The life span for many ofEnergy storage(Automotive)

Lithium-ion

Energy storage(Grid scale)

Lead acid

Energy storage(Grid scale)

Lithium-ion

Energy storage(Grid scale)

Redox Flow

Energy storage(Grid scale)

Other aEnergy storage(Decentralized)

Lithium-ion

33%

Energy storage(Decentralized)

Lead Acid

33%

Concentrated solar power

30

Energy storage(Decentralized)

Other a33%

Energy storage(all battery types)

10

Solar PV

Crystalline silicon

50%

Geothermal

30

Solar PV

Cadmium telluride

16.7%

Hydroelectricity

25

Solar PV

Copper indium
gallium selenide

16.7%

Nuclear

50

Solar photovoltaic

30

Amorphous silicon

16.7%

Wind

20

Wind

Direct drive

25%

Coal

40

Wind

Geared75%

Coal + carbon capture and storage

40

Gas

30

Gas + carbon capture and storage

30

Solar PV100%

these technologies is likely to vary between subtechnologies and isalso uncertain given that some of these technologies have not yet

2.5% – 5%(depending on
scenario)

reached full-scale commercial deployment, yet alone the end of

70% - 84%
(depending on
scenario)then less of these technologies will need to be deployed over the

2.8 % - 3.7%
(depending on
scenario)

wind is often designed with a lifetime of 25 years and some turbines

9.8% - 25%

their projected life span. Should the life spans of the technologies
be longer than projected, or be extended through refurbishment,time period of the model—for example, although the analysis
conservatively assumes a life span of 20 years for wind, offshore
have been in operation for more than 40 years. Should life spans belonger than anticipated, mineral demand from these technologies
will be lower than estimated in this report’s projections.
Table 1.5 Assumed Lifetime of Technologies

Note: In the breakdown of battery composition, the refurbishment of car batteries to grid/
decentralized energy has not been accounted for in the estimated mineral demand under thevarious scenarios. It is discussed, however, in the section on reuse in chapter 4.
a. This category represents all other forms of grid-based and decentralized energy storage, such as
pumped storage. As this represents a composite basket of technologies, there are no estimates onmineral requirements of this category.

Technology

Assumed life span(years)Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

25

While the model relied on primary and secondary research,aluminum. In addition, some recycling processes cause losses inmost of the model’s assumptions are primarily based on publicly

the material itself and it may not be technically or economicallyavailable data. The data are thus limited in a number of facets, notfeasible to recover material suitable for recycling from someleast that the data are obtained from a variety of different studies

applications. This is especially the case now with Li-ion batteries

with different methodologies and scopes, and crucially different(Church and Wuennenberg 2019), helping explain the low recycling

ages. Where possible, the data have been drawn from consistent

rates for lithium (table 1.6). RC rates are also an average across all

sources, but this comes at the expense of some of the data being

industries, and with certain minerals, recycled material provides amore recently dated. Additional assumptions made are outlined

suboptimal performance. For example, the cobalt used in batteries

and discussed in annex B.

needs to be extremely pure, limiting the use of recycled material
for that particular use (Bomgardner and Scott 2018), while it is

Recycling, Reuse

extremely difficult to recycle the fiberglass used in wind turbine

To build off the model described above to estimate mineraldemand up to 2050 under the IEA and IRENA scenarios, additional
analysis has been conducted on if and how mineral recycling andreuse could potentially affect estimated mineral demand. In its
current form, the results generated provide estimates for thedemand for end-use minerals in low-carbon energy technologies
without considering whether those minerals come from primaryor secondary minerals. A brief analysis was conducted on fiveminerals—aluminum, cobalt, copper, nickel, and lithium—to
examine the impact of recycling on primary mineral demand, while

blades (Martin 2020). These reasons imply that even if EOL rates
could reach 100 percent (implying that all possible scrap was
captured, recycled, and could be reused), RC rates are unlikely
to reach 100 percent without significant reductions in overall
demand for these minerals.
Table 1.6 End-of-Life Recycling Rates and Recycled Content Rates

MineralEnd-of-life
recycling rates

Recycled
content rates

Aluminum

42%–70%34%–36%the impact of reuse was examined for lithium only.

Cobalt68%

32%

Primary mineral is considered to be newly mined material, while

Copper

43%–53%

20%–37%

Lithium<1%<1%

Nickel

57%–63%

29%–41%secondary mineral is considered to be recycled material. There are
two commonly reported rates for recycling: (1) end of life (EOL),
which gives how much of a mineral is recycled at the end of its
use in a product; and (2) recycled content (RC), which gives thepercentage of secondary material that goes into end-use demand
for a mineral.

Source: UNEP 2011.

To estimate the impact of current and potential future

EOL and RC rates are not equal, and the former is higher than therecycling rates on the demand for primary minerals, a two-steplatter (see table 1.6). The primary reason for this difference is themethodology is adopted. First, it is assumed that current EOL andavailability of scrap. Take the example of aluminum: Between 42

RC recycling rates persist to 2050. Given these levels of recycled

and 70 percent of aluminum is recycled at the end of its life, with

content, the balance between primary and secondary mineral

rates as high as 90 percent in some countries; the industry is

production is estimated using the RC rates and the overall levelalso well developed in recycling the scrap that it obtains. Yet theof demand for the mineral estimated in the model. The implicit

recycled content of new aluminum products has been estimatedassumption here is that the minerals used in energy technologies

at between 34 and 36 percent. This is because the availability

had the same balance between primary and secondary productionof scrap is simply not enough to meet the growing demand foras minerals used across all applications.

88

See “Quality and Value,” (webpage), Aluminum for Future Generation, for more information: http://recycling.world-aluminium.org/review/quality-value/26

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

The impact that increasing future recycling rates have on primary

recycling and reuse would be sufficient to meet the demand for

demand is then examined. Estimates of future recycling rates areminerals of clean energy technologies to achieve a low-carbon

sparse, both for EOL and RC. To understand the scale of a large

future. A key aspect not covered in this analysis is the role offuture increase in recycling efforts, the following assumptions are

refurbishment—for example, where all or component parts ofmade for four of the minerals studied (aluminum, cobalt, copper,

energy technologies, such as wind turbines, are refurbishedand nickel):to extend their life span. The implications of this are, however,• Current recycling rates: Estimates of current EOL and RC rates
are drawn from the literature, taken as the midpoint of therange of values collected.
• New scenario – scaling up EOL recycling rates: EOL recycling

discussed in the section on reuse in chapter 4.

Global Warming Potential
This section focuses on the global warming potential (GWP) ofrates are scaled up to 100 percent by 2050. This is likely to beclean energy technologies compared with fossil fuel technologies,

unrealistic because of some losses remaining in the system, butpartly using a life-cycle analysis. While the data are incomplete,10

it demonstrates an ambitious increase in recycling efforts.

initial results confirm that the additional extraction and• Availability of scrap material: The same ratio of scrap material
availability to overall mineral demand remains the same.
• Impact on RC rates: RC rates therefore follow the same ratio 		to EOL rates, as demonstrated today, and RC rates for 2050
are estimated using the same ratios.
• Determining primary, secondary mineral production: RC rates
are used to estimate the balance between primary andsecondary mineral production in each year.
This process is not possible to do for lithium given the mineral’snegligible current estimated EOL and RC rates. Thus, scenarios of
future lithium recycling rates are drawn from the literature.9

processing of minerals will be appreciably less greenhouse gas(GHG)-intensive than a base scenario with the continued strong
reliance on fossil fuels, with an estimated 615 gigatons of carbon
dioxide (GtCO2) being produced in the base scenario up to 2050,
while moving to a 2DS involves an extra 6 GtCO2 from building andoperating renewable technologies, but it reduces emissions fromfossil fuel generation by over 350 GtCO2.
This GWP analysis does not cover the full life cycle of renewableelectricity generation and energy storage technologies; it is limited
to the operation of each technology. In other words, the GWP does
not take into account the emissions associated with replacing anddisposing energy technologies once they reach their end of life, nor

As for the estimates for mineral reuse, whereby components of thedoes it take into account the transportation of renewable energy

energy system are reused, this has the potential of, again, creating

technologies, such as wind turbines, or the shipping of coal anda difference between end-use and primary mineral demand. For

gas. The intent of the GWP analysis is to produce an estimate ofexample, there is discussion on repurposing Li-ion batteries fromthe GWP of shifting to a new and low-carbon energy system.

electric vehicles for stationary applications, such as the electricity
grid. This impact of reuse is thus examined in the report tounderstand the impact of increasing reuse patterns on the model’sestimated mineral demand from energy technologies.

The basic approach is to examine the GWP in the extraction andprocessing of relevant minerals found in low-carbon technologies
and then compare that with the GWP of the traditional fossil fuelbased electricity generation sources—namely, coal and gas. GWP

Although this additional analysis does not intend to provide arefers to the relative amount of GHG emissions (the vast majority ofcomplete picture of mineral recycling rates, it is an importantwhich is carbon) used in the extraction, production, and processing

area to explore to estimate whether current and future mineralof minerals, as well as the operation of these technologies. Nuclear

910

For example, Ziemann et al. (2018) provides projections for lithium recycling rates that are used in the analysis on recycling in chapter 4.
Calculations on the greenhouse gas (GHG) impact in the manufacturing of clean technologies in this study does not cover, for example, steel or cement; the GHG emissions associated with the production of
infrastructure associated with the fossil fuel industry are also not examined.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

27

28

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transitionenergy has been excluded from this GWP analysis to focus on the

Figure 1.3 Schematic of Global Warming Potential Component of Modelissue of renewable energy versus fossil fuel production.
With respect to the specific minerals and metals covered inthis study, the model draws on data from a paper by Nuss andEckelman (2014). This paper gives consistent estimates of the

GWP per kg of mineralfrom Nuss & Eckelman 2014

GWP per scenario

amount of GWP of minerals in terms of carbon dioxide equivalent(CO2e) from the direct and indirect emissions (for example, theemissions from the extraction and processing and estimatesof the emissions associated with the type of electricity used in

Total demand for metals
from electricity generationand storage up to 2050

those processes). The authors estimate the relative GWP of thesematerials using a “cradle-to-gate” scope, thereby excludingtransportation of the minerals and any emissions associated with
their disposal.
There is little literature on the carbon footprint of energy
technologies, and the data among the available sources vary
vastly because of the different assumptions around extraction,
processing, and operational emissions. For this analysis, theunderlying data come from the period around 2008 and arethus not fully reflective of the situation today, and not for 2050.
What has changed and is likely to further change, impacting the
GWP per kilogram for the minerals in different ways, includes
shifting electricity mix, reducing ore grades, relative prices ofcommodities,11 and changing mining and production techniques.

Note: GWP = global warming potential.

A range for each estimate was produced stemming from the rangeof the GWP per kilogram of mineral and the projected range ofmineral demand. The numbers reported in this analysis are the
midpoint of the range. This is discussed in more detail in annex B.

Model Uncertainty
Like many projections, there are uncertainties regarding futuremineral demand from energy technologies, as it relies on a

The direction, and scale, of these changes will differ from mineralvariety of different sources with different methodologies toto mineral. For example, iron will always have a relatively

derive forward-looking projections. These include the mineralhigh GWP so long as it relies on coking ovens. Aluminum’s GWP,

composition of the energy technologies themselves; the share, andon the other hand, is very much predicated on the electricity

scale, of energy technologies that will be deployed in the future;source needed for its production. For example, its GWP is muchwhich subtechnologies will actually be deployed within eachsmaller when the energy source for the aluminum production isenergy technology; and the life span of technologies and futurehydroelectricity rather than electricity from coal power stations.

paths of recycling and reuse.

To produce the estimates, the total demand for minerals from

The model captures uncertainty around two of these elements:

the various energy technologies in the model are combined with

(1) mineral composition and (2) share, and scale, of energy

the estimates of GWP per kilogram of mineral (figure 1.3). This

technology penetration. It produces a range of demand for eachthen provides an estimate of the different GWPs arising from themineral, and all results of this analysis are midpoints of the range

minerals used in the technologies in the IEA 2DS.

of estimated mineral demand. The ranges of some of the minerals

12

11

12

Relative prices are important because of the methodological choice of economic allocation rather than mass allocation for the GWP of production processes that produce two or more final metal products. For
example, some forms of copper refining yield copper, silver, selenium, and tellurium. The question then becomes how to allocate the GWP from the copper refining process between the four minerals. Economic
allocation, adopted by Nuss and Eckelman (2014), allocates the GWP on the basis of the revenue earned from the four minerals. Mass allocation allocates on the mass of the products obtained. Under the economic
allocation methodology, large shifts in relative prices would shift the allocation of the GWP between the end-use metals.
These issues have been explored in depth for seven specific metals in van der Voet et al. (2019). A further discussion of issues relating to the GWP sources can be found in annex B.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition29

are considerable. For example, aluminum is used in solar PV forthemselves that will be needed for the low-carbon transition.

the frames; however, this service could be provided by synthetic

These different demand risks are addressed in the report throughor composite materials—and if or when aluminum is replaced,a demand risk matrix.

demand for that mineral could fall considerably.

The potential implications for mineral demand from a range of

The second aspect of uncertainty relating to the share and scale

emerging new technologies, including some of these new emerging

of energy technology penetration is captured by the use of various

storage technologies, are discussed in the Emerging Energy

scenarios. Different scenarios from the IEA are used to capture theTechnologies section in chapter 3. For additional information on

impact of wider deployment of low-carbon energy technologies.

uncertainty ranges, please refer to annex B.

The four IEA scenarios are used to highlight the impact of greaterclimate ambition, demonstrating a clear trend that higher
ambition leads to higher demand for minerals.
Within this greater ambition, however, are a number of potential
technology pathways to meet the same level of emissions
reductions. More focus could be placed on fossil fuel generation
with carbon capture and storage, or on renewable deployment.
Even within this second choice, there are options for more wind
deployment, or more solar PV, higher rates of geothermal, orconcentrated solar power. These choices do not necessarilymean higher or lower levels of overall demand for minerals, butthey do imply demand for different minerals. This uncertainty ispartially captured by the inclusion of scenarios from two different
sources: the IEA and IRENA. The IEA scenarios see a greater rolefor carbon capture and storage, while the IRENA scenarios see
greater renewable deployment. Comparing the results of thesedifferent groups of scenarios therefore highlights an aspect of thisuncertainty.
The uncertainty over the emergence of new subtechnologies
is also not captured in the model. The uncertainty over thiselement is likely to be much greater post-2030 than in thenext decade, especially in the realm of energy storage, where anumber of new technologies are emerging fast, such as solidstate Li-ion batteries as well as other types of flow batteries (forexample, iron-based), and new developments in thermal electricand mechanical storage. Each of these technologies will havediffering mineral compositions. Predicting which, if any, of thesetechnologies will emerge is impossible, implying that post-2030
both the scale of storage and the mineral composition of energy
storage is highly uncertain. This creates uncertainty over not
only the amount of demand of minerals but the actual minerals

30

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

31

The Role of Minerals
in the Clean Energy Transition
The penetration of renewable energy in theenergy sector will be crucial to achieve a 		low-carbon future. The energy sector today
accounts for 41 percent of carbon emissions
worldwide, or 13.6 GtCO2e (IEA 2019a), and is
expected to rise further as the global population
grows, particularly in developing countries, andenergy consumption rises because of this new
demand.13 With renewable energy costs falling
rapidly from clean energy technologies, suchas solar PV and onshore wind at 0.08/kWh and0.05/kWh in 2018 (IRENA 2019d), respectively,
it is expected that these technologies will playa significant role in decarbonizing electricity
production. However, the rapid deployment ofthese low-carbon technologies needed to reacha 2°C pathway, or below, will also mean that thedemand for minerals needed to produce thesetechnologies will rise.

Adopting climate-smart mining (World Bank 2019) practices

The implications of rising mineral demand can be examinedthrough a holistic approach. This includes estimating potential

through multiple lens. On one hand, increasing extractive andmineral demand under six technology-based mitigation scenarios

processing activities could have serious environmental and socialfrom the IEA and IRENA while taking into account the role that

implications if these activities are not managed responsibly

recycling could have in meeting this new mineral demand. It doesto meet this new demand from the increased deployment of

not intend to forecast what will happen, but instead provide arenewable energy. As of today, the mining sector accounts forrange of scenarios to explore the future global energy systemapproximately 2–11 percent of total global energy consumption

and how different policy choices and technology improvements(Guilbaud 2016; CCSI 2018), while 70 percent of mining operations

could affect overall mineral demand up to 2050. Failing tofrom the six largest mining companies are located in water-

address concerns on materials use intensity and its relationshipstressed countries (IFC and ICCM 2017). On the other hand, new

to increasing environmental and social impacts may cause ademand for these “strategic” minerals could also provide new

backlash that will question the appropriateness of some ofopportunities for resource-rich developing countries and enable

these technologies in comparison to those that are conventionalthem to meaningfully contribute to the clean energy transition.

(Bloomberg 2019; Wade 2016).

13

would enable the mining sector to transform its current
practices—through innovation and new partnerships withdownstream companies and civil society organizations—tofurther reduce the overall sector’s carbon and environmental
footprints. Providing adaptation measures (for example, water
efficiency) and the incorporation of desalination can contribute tooperational independence while improving relationships with thecommunities (Campero and Harris 2019). Integrating renewableenergy into mining operations, for example, as well as employing
energy efficiency measures could reduce at least 40 percent of
total energy use in the crushing and grinding of minerals (Australia2018). Providing demand estimates for a variety of minerals canillustrate the implications of various lower carbon pathways, and
it is a crucial exercise to undertake as it provides a framework toensure that the decarbonization of electricity generation does not
end up shifting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from electricity
production to upstream (extraction and processing) and EOL(disposal of energy technologies) activities.
This analysis estimates the amount of minerals that may
be needed per clean energy technology—including theirsubtechnologies—to provide policy makers, private sector
entities, and civil society organizations with the latest
information available to support the low-carbon transition

Energy sector in this context refers to electricity and heat generation only. This category is further broken down by sector on the IEA website.

32

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Renewable Energy 				and Storage Forecast

Policy choices, technology improvements, and these latest pricing

Renewable energy has been one of the largest growing sources

and storage forecasts a central point in this report’s analysis

of installed electricity generating capacity, growing from 1,058

to estimate mineral demand up to 2050. The IEA and IRENA

GW in 2008 to 2,179 GW in 2018 (IRENA 2018), largely driven

scenarios for electricity generation and battery storage, including

by government policies, regulations, and incentives as a means

the subtechnology shares in those scenarios, also highlight theto decarbonize the energy sector and limit the negative impacts

energy technology coverage in the model and break down key

of a changing climate. Demand-side interventions, as well as

inputs used to better understand the minerals’ role in the clean

economies of scale and technological developments on the supply

energy transition.

side, have enabled renewable energy to become competitive withtrends combined indicate that the growth of renewable energy inthe global electricity mix is here to stay, making renewable energy

fossil-fuel-based technologies. For example, some countries haveTechnology-Based Mitigation Scenarios

already begun transitioning away from support schemes (forAs this report relies heavily on the IEA and IRENA technology-

example, feed-in-tariffs, or FiTs) to support renewable energy

based mitigation scenarios, the six scenarios have been captured

growth, to competitive auctions for long-term power purchaseagain in table 2.1 to provide a reference point for each assumption

agreements (IEA 2019d, 154).

used to derive estimated mineral demand up to 2050.

Table 2.1 Shortened Technology-Based Mitigation Scenarios from IEA and IRENA

Technology-based mitigation scenarios
Scenario

SourceScenario description

1

4DS(Base scenario)

IEA

Base scenario, where the world carries on a current trajectory andmakes little improvement in shifting the energy system away fromfossil fuel sources

2

RTS

IEA

Assumes all countries will implement their NDCs under the Paris
Agreement, resulting in an average temperature increase of
2.7°C by 2100

3

2DS

IEA

Scenario with at least a 50% chance of limiting the average global
temperature increase to 2°C by 2100

4

B2DS

IEA

Scenario with a 50% chance of limiting average future temperature
increases to 1.75°C by 2100

5

Ref

IRENA

Accounts for actions, commitments made under current/planned
policies, including NDCs. Rise in temperatures would be at least
2.6°C by 2100

6

REmap

IRENA

Ambitious scenario that limits the rise in global temperature to“well below” 2°C above preindustrial levels by 2100

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, 4DS = 4-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy Agency, IRENA = International Renewable Energy Agency, NDC = Nationally
Determined Contribution, Ref = reference scenario, REmap = renewable energy roadmap scenario.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

33

Electricity Generation: 		
Installed Electrical Capacity in 2050

about the emergence of other low-carbon technologies such as

The IEA and IRENA use different assumptions about renewable

The type of energy technology penetration in the global energy

energy penetration in their technology-based mitigation scenarios.

mix is relevant for minerals because they are required to supply

For example, IRENA’s REmap projections on renewable electricity

transportation and nontransportation-related energy storage andpenetration up to 2050 are higher than IEA’s 2DS and B2DS, at 64

renewable energy technologies. Figure 2.1 provides an overview

percent and 51 percent, respectively. These differences are due toof the relevant energy technologies expected to play a role ina number of factors, including different global economic growth

the global electricity production in the future; however, threeassumptions—IRENA assumes an annual global GDP growth of 3.2

technologies are excluded from this model—oil, biomass, andpercent; the IEA assumes 2.9 percent—and different assumptions

tidal—owing to the lack of data on their mineral composition.

carbon capture and storage (CCS).

Figure 2.1 Estimated Installed Capacity in 2050 Across the Technology-Based Mitigation Scenarios

Most ambitious scenarios
20
18
16

Base scenario
14

GW (thousands)

12
10
8
6
4
2
0

IEA ETP - 4DS
Geothermal

Solar CSPIEA ETP - RTS
Solar PV

Wind (offshore)

IEA ETP - 2DS
Wind (onshore)

IEA ETP - B2DS
Hydro

Nuclear

IRENA - Ref
Gas + CCSIRENA -REmap
Gas

Coal + CCS

Coal

Source: IEA 2016, 2017; IRENA 2019a.
Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, 4DS = 4-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree scenario, CCS = carbon capture and storage, CSP = concentrated solar power, ETP = Energy Technology Perspectives,
IRENA = International Renewable Energy Agency, PV = photovoltaic, Ref = reference scenario, REmap = renewable energy roadmap scenario.

34

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Under the base scenario (4DS), coal and gas with some CCS
dominate the electricity sector, while the share of conventionalenergy gradually diminishes as the world becomes increasingly
ambitious in its climate targets. Geothermal is seen to playa larger role under the base scenario than other reference
scenarios (RTS and Ref), mainly because it was produced before
the other scenarios. In the intervening period, the costs ofvariable renewable energy, such as solar PV and wind, have fallen
dramatically, as have the costs of integrating these technologies
into the grid, albeit not as dramatically as the latter. This has
meant that in the later RTS and Ref scenarios, other renewables
have become more attractive than geothermal energy.
From the base scenario, a decrease in coal is observed once themodel moves toward the IEA’s 2DS and B2DS, and away from the
RTS and the 4DS. While coal decreases in the 2DS and B2DS, theshare of CCS for gas and coal starts to appear in the electricity
mix, albeit a very small share, whereas in the IRENA scenario,
those technologies are not expected to materialize.
Renewables—particularly solar PV and wind—rise dramaticallyunder those same IEA scenarios, but again, the IRENA models
assume a much higher penetration of those two technologies than
do the IEA models, which also assume increasing contributions
from other nonemitting sources, including hydroelectricity andnuclear energy. The IRENA Ref scenario has higher levels ofwind penetration than the IEA 2DS and B2DS. One of the key
takeaways is the following: the more ambitious the scenario, thehigher the penetration of renewable energy in the electricity mix
for both the IEA and IRENA scenarios.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Energy Storage Projections

35

to energy storage for transportation, is expected to risedramatically by 2050. In the 2DS, for example, demand for

Unlike electricity generation, mineral demand estimatesfor energy storage technology were solely derived from the
IEA,14 as data on energy storage under the IRENA scenarios
were not available. The IEA 4DS (base scenario) also does notinclude the penetration of energy storage in the electricity mix.
Energy storage predictions up to 2050 were extrapolated fromstorage rises from 4,108 gigawatt-hours (GWh) in 2025 to
22,270 GWh in 2050. The demand for energy storage technology
rises exponentially as each scenario increases in climate
ambition, with a difference of 32,792 GWh from the RTS (in lightred) to B2DS (in dark blue) in 2050.

data provided by the IEA on energy storage requirements for

The energy storage market penetration is split between

automotive and nontransportation-related energy storage up totransportation (covering electric and hybrid vehicles) and

2040 and 2060. The average of the storage requirements from

nontransportation (covering storage from electricity generation),

2040 and 2060 was taken to give an estimate of the requiredwith the latter again split between grid scale (for regulation

storage in 2050, and then combined with data from a wide varietyof grid voltage and storage from intermittent electricity

of sources on other key aspects of the storage sector.

generation, such as renewables) and decentralized (storage fromAs seen in figure 2.2, all three IEA scenarios demonstrate thatthe relative demand for energy storage, particularly with respectindividual, small-scale renewable energy installations). Redoxflow batteries are only used in grid-scale applications.

Figure 2.2 Expected Growth in Energy Storage Through 2050

Energy storage(automotive)

Energy storage(grid scale)

Energy storage(decentralized)

Energy storage(RTS - total)

Energy storage(B2DS - total)

Energy storage(2DS - total)

45
40
35

GWh (thousands)

30
25
20
15
10
5
0

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

Source: Based on IEA ETP 2017.
Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree scenario, GWh = gigawatt-hours, RTS = reference technology scenario.
14

IRENA’s scenarios only provide data for electricity generation and not energy storage.

2040

2045

2050

36

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

37

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Mineral Intensityof Clean Energy Technologies
decarbonize the transportation sector (IEA 2019b) are examplesof new energy infrastructure that also have not been captured
in this analysis. Additionally, the materials needed to installthese low-carbon technologies, such as cement to stabilize windturbines’ installation, have not been addressed in this analysis.

model owing to data constraints.
These minerals include, but are not limited to, dysprosium fordirect-drive wind turbines; cadmium, tellurium, selenium, andgallium for various types of solar PV panels; and platinum inother forms of energy storage (such as fuel cells, discussed
in the Emerging Energy Technologies section in chapter 3).
The exclusion of these minerals from this analysis should not,vehicles that are expected to come online in the next 10 years to

9

8

6

Lead
Lithium

Nickelbuild the motors and chassis to electrify 135 million electric

11

Iron

wind turbines; however, no data were available on such use and840 million people without electricity access today as well as

11

IndiumNeodymium

where platinum would play a key role. The need to connect some6Graphitecomponents, such as the use of carbon brushes in the motors ofother clean energy options, such as hydrogen-based vehicles,8

CopperMolybdenum

support a low-carbon transition has not been addressed, nor have2

Cobaltcriticality for individual technologies, or the low-carbon transition.

As mentioned in chapter 1, the new infrastructure required to8

Chromium

Manganesethus they were excluded from the model.

10

Aluminum

however, be interpreted as a commentary on their lack ofSome technologies may also use small amounts of minerals in

Carbon captureand storage

minerals are also needed, but they have not been included in theGasgeneration and energy storage technologies—and a range of otherCoalexhaustive list, as it focuses exclusively on certain electricity

Nuclearthe technology-based mitigation scenarios is by no means an

Energy Storage

mapping of relevant minerals to energy technologies found in

Geothermalthem critical elements for realizing a low-carbon future. The

Hydro

nickel are required for a range of low-carbon technologies, making

Concentrated
solar power

Copper, aluminum, chromium, manganese, molybdenum, andSolar photovoltaic

Table 3.1 Mapping Minerals with Relevant Low-Carbon Technologies

Wind

The clean energy transition is expected to bemuch more mineral intensive than fossil-fuelbased electricity generation. It is important tounderstand the extent to which mineral demand
will grow globally to supply renewable energy
and storage technologies. Table 3.1 provides an
overview of the minerals covered in this analysis
and their relevance to each technology identified
in the technology-based mitigation scenarios.

SilverTitanium
Vanadium
Zinc
Total

38

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Solar Photovoltaic
Solar photovoltaic (PV) has been the most rapidly deployed

Four widely used solar PV subtechnologies are represented inrenewable energy technology globally, with installed capacity

this analysis:reaching 485 GW in 2018 (IRENA 2019b), outpacing all othertechnologies in growth between 2017 and 2018, growing by 24
percent. The high learning rate15 of solar PV (22–40 percent) has
resulted in dramatic cost reductions, with the global-weighted
average levelized cost of energy (LCOE) falling by 77 percent
between 2010 and 2018 (IRENA 2019c), making it one of the most
attractive technologies for renewable energy investors worldwide.
This trend can be reflected with installed capacity of solar PV
expected to reach up to 8,519 GW (IRENA 2019c) by 2050 in

1. Crystalline silicon (crystal Si) cells make up about 85 percentof the current market. They can either be manufactured as
single crystalline, polycrystalline, or amorphous silicon.
2. Copper indium gallium selenide (CIGS) is a “thin film” solar
technology. It can be made into thinner cells than crystal Si,
which may reduce material and manufacturing costs whileallowing for flexible cells.
3. Cadmium telluride (CdTe) is another thin film technology. It
is cost competitive with crystal Si and has good efficiency.

Africa, Asia, and Europe owing to continued cost decreases, where

However, the toxicity of cadmium and the future supply of

the technology is expected to reach price parity with fossil fueltellurium make the future of this technology uncertain.

technologies. Solar PV’s relative growth in Africa, for example,
is likely to be huge, with the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2019
projecting solar PV deployments in the region to grow by morethan 3,000 percent between 2018 and 2040. By 2050, mostsolar PV deployments are expected to take place in non-OECD
countries, especially in China and India.

15

The learning rate is defined as the fractional reduction in cost for each doubling of cumulative production.

4. Amorphous silicon (amorphous Si) solar cells are the final thinfilm technology. They suffer from lower performance thancrystal Si but are able to be printed on flexible materials.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

39

40

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Between the scenarios, IRENA’s REmap scenario is by far the mostmaterially intensive, owing to its higher installed capacity of solar
PV, with 160 million tons of aluminum and 20 million tons of copper
required by 2050 (figure 3.2). Compared with the base scenario, thedemand for both minerals grow by more than 350 percent.
Figure 3.2 Cumulative Demand for Minerals Needed for Solar
Photovoltaic Through 2050

250

Solar PV technologies are primarily made up of aluminum, copper,and silver—with various minerals also playing a role in each of200

the different technologies, some of which are included in thisanalysis, such as indium in CIGS, and some that are not, such as
cadmium for CdTe. Figure 3.1 shows the major mineral demand
more than 85 percent of most solar PV components, being used
for the frames of the panels, and copper following suit at about
11 percent. While silver accounts for a smaller share of mineralcomposition in a 2DS, less than 0.05 percent, it accounted forTons (millions)used to supply solar PV through 2050. Aluminum accounts for150

nearly 7 percent of total silver demand in 2015 owing to the rapid
100

deployment of solar PV worldwide (Sanderson 2016).
Figure 3.1 Share of Mineral Demand from Solar Photovoltaic Under the
IEA 2DS Through 2050

50
IndiumLead
Copper11.2%
Aluminum
88.0%

Other
0.8%

Molybdenum
Nickel0

SilverIRENA IEA
REmap B2DS

IEA
2DS

IRENA
Ref

IEA
RTS

Base
scenario

Zinc

Aluminum

CopperIndiumLead

Molybdenum

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy Agency.

NickelSilverAluminum

CopperIndiumNickelSilverZinc

Lead

Molybdenum

Zinc

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy
Agency, IRENA = International Renewable Energy Agency, Ref = reference scenario, REmap =renewable energy roadmap scenario, RTS = reference technology scenario.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

41

While aluminum is a major contributor to solar PV technologies,

Indium is another critical element that is used almost exclusively

it is also used in most other low-carbon technologies, such as

for solar PV. Figure 3.4 shows the cumulative demand for indium

wind, energy storage, and hydroelectricity. Figure 3.3 shows thatby technology. The vast majority of indium (97 percent) is usedthe vast majority of growth in demand for aluminum is tied toin solar PV, predominantly in CIGS solar cells, with the remaining

solar PV used both in the cells themselves and in the frame and3 percent used in nuclear power. The relative share in a solar PV

attachments. Its greatest use is with crystal-Si cells as theseis small but critical to a key type of solar PV subtechnology: thin

are still assumed to represent the greatest share of the solar

film. The current literature expects this subtechnology to grow,market by 2050. Greater ambition to combat climate change isand in the model, the three thin film subtechnologies—CIGS, CdTe,

associated with greater penetration of solar PV and therefore

and amorphous silicon—are assumed to grow from 20 percent togreater demand for aluminum—cumulative demand for aluminum

50 percent of solar panels.

is 119 percent greater in the 2DS than in the base scenario.
Figure 3.3 Total Aluminum Demand by Energy Technology Through 2050
(2DS, Base Scenario)

Figure 3.4 Total Indium Demand by Energy Technology Through 2050
(2DS, Base Scenario)

a. Indium demand bytechnology

a. Aluminum demand byenergy technology

Hydro

0.7%

Solar PV

87.0%

Coal, Gas

0.6%

2DS

Wind

9.7%

Solar PV

97.4%

Coal + Gas + CCS

2DS

Nuclear

2.6%

0.5%

Energy Storage

1.2%

Nuclear0.3%

b. Cumulative aluminum demand
from solar PV
90

35

80

30

60

+119%

Tons (thousands)

70
Tons (millions)b. Cumulative indium demand
from solar PV

50
40
30
20

25

15
10

10

5

0

0

Base scenario

2DS

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, CCS = carbon capture and storage, PV = photovoltaic.

+117%

20

Base scenario

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, PV = photovoltaic.

2DS

42

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Trade-Offs in Solar PV Subtechnologies

Figure 3.5 Cumulative Demand for Indium from Solar PV Subtechnologies
Compared to Base Share Under 2DS Through 2050

There are trade-offs in mineral demand from solar PV technology,
depending on which subtechnologies end up being deployed mostthrough 2050. Each technology for constructing solar PV cells

Indiumdemand80

has distinct advantages and disadvantages, as well as differing+172%

mineral content.

70

Since indium is the most affected by potential changes in the60

subtechnologies solar PV market share, figure 3.5 presents how
indium demand could increase or decrease, depending on various
subtechnologies relative to the base share to demonstrate how
the demand for indium would change.
In the base share scenario, the share of crystal Si declines

50
Tons (thousands)

outcomes. Table 3.2 breaks down the penetration of different

IndiumdemandIndiumdemand40

Indiumdemand

+23%

+8%

-61%

30

in use with gradual increases in share from the other three
emerging technologies. The high crystal Si scenario keeps the20

subtechnology’s share at 2017 levels, with static shares for theother three subtechnologies. The high CdTe, CIGS, and amorphous

10

Si scenarios have the relevant technologies growing to half themarket by 2050, with crystal Si declining in importance and small

0

Base
share

increases for the other two subtechnologies.

High
crystal si

High
CdTe

High
High
CIGS amorphous si

Indium is the key mineral affected by changes in subtechnology
market share in solar PV; minerals such as silicon, gallium, andtellurium would also be affected, but these are not included in themodel. Demand for indium is greatest in the high CIGS scenario,
and smallest in the high crystal Si scenario, as seen in figure 3.5.
These changes are potentially significant, with indium demand
increasing by more than 170 percent, compared to the base share,
when penetration of CIGS is highest. In contrast, if crystal Si
remains the dominant subtechnology, then indium demand would
be more than 60 percent lower than in the base share scenario.

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, amorphous Si = amorphous silicon, CdTe = cadmium telluride, CIGS =copper indium gallium selenide, crystal Si = crystalline silicon, PV = photovoltaic.

Table 3.2 Share of Subtechnology Penetration in Solar PV Market
Compared with Base Share Under 2DS
2050 share

Crystal Si

CdTe

CIGS

Amorphous Si

Base share
(2DS)

50%

16.7%

16.7%

16.7%

High share:
Crystal Si

80%

6.7%

6.7%

6.7%

High share:
CdTe

16.7%

50%

16.7%

16.7%

High share:
CIGS

16.7%

16.7%

50%

16.7%

High share:
Amorphous Si

16.7%

16.7%

16.7%

50%

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, amorphous Si = amorphous silicon, CdTe = cadmium telluride, CIGS =copper indium gallium selenide, crystal Si = crystalline silicon, PV = photovoltaic.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

43

44

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Wind

Under the IEA and IRENA scenarios, the bulk of onshore wind

Similar to solar PV, wind energy has also been one of the fastest

wind resources and consistent policy support. Offshore wind is

growing renewables, with installed capacity reaching 566 GW in
2018 (IEA 2019c). Increases in wind turbine size, higher efficiency,
lower cost of capital, and economies of scale have lowered windelectricity generation prices to the point where it is competitive
with fossil fuel generation in many areas, and, according to45

growth is expected to take place in emerging markets with strong
expected to expand its current footprint in Europe and China
before moving into emerging markets over the next few years.
A recent study by the World Bank found over 3.1 terawatts ofoffshore wind technical potential in only eight emerging markets.

Citibank, is even “approaching the average wholesale electricity

Simply put, wind turbines convert the kinetic energy of wind into

price in a number of large markets—including Italy, Spain, theelectricity. The largest onshore wind turbines now exceed 6 MW

United Kingdom, and China—and has already attained andof peak generation capacity, enough to power more than 5,000

surpassed parity in Brazil” (Savvantidou et al. 2013). Onshore

homes in the United States. The largest offshore wind turbines arewind costs are frequently below $40 per megawatt-hour intwice that size (12 MW) and have blades as long as 107 metersdeveloped markets. Offshore wind has seen even more dramatic(indeed, they are the largest pieces of rotating machinery thatcost reductions, falling from a range of $150–$200 per

humans have ever invented). The next generation of wind turbines

megawatt-hour in 2015 to under $50 per megawatt-hour inare expected to reach generation capacity up to 15 MW or even 20

the United Kingdom in late 2019 (ESMAP 2019).

MW soon (AIP 2019).

Figure 3.6 Evolution of the Wind Turbine
Future wind turbine
12-15 MW300

Eiffel Tower
276m

250

Washington
Monument
169m

Meters200

London Eye
135m

150

100

Statueof Liberty
93m

6-12 MW

4-8 MW

1-2 MW

50

0
Illustration adapted from various sources (for example, https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Evolution-of-wind-turbine-size-and-output-Liebreich-2017_fig3_331249559; Power Technology, https://www.
power-technology.com/features/haliade-x-look-ges-supersized-new-wind-turbine/attachment/ge-infographic-1-haliade-x/).

46

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Onshore and offshore wind turbines share many commonalities,

onshore and offshore wind has implications in how the modelbut they also have significant differences in design, technology,

derives mineral demand from wind technologies.

and required materials, both in the turbines themselves and in
the balance of plant. Offshore wind turbines encounter harsher
conditions than their onshore counterparts and thus need to be
more resistant to corrosion, higher winds, and extreme weather.

The main components of turbines (towers, castings, nacelle,
shafts, and so on) are primarily made up of steel. The blades are acomposite of fiberglass, resins, balsa wood, and adhesives (someuse carbon fiber, although this increases the cost significantly).

Offshore wind farms also require greater material inputs in theirModern wind turbines can be anywhere from 150 to 250 meters

foundations (mainly steel) and in the cabling required to transmit

in height from base to blade tip, nearly the height of the Eiffel

the electricity onshore (for example, copper). Offshore wind farms

Tower. Steel figures have been excluded from the analysis because

do, however, offer greater capacity factors than their onshoreof potential double counting issues, with minerals included in the

counterparts (ESMAP 2019).

analysis such as chromium being used in the steel needed for windModern utility-scale wind turbines can be divided into two
categories: geared or direct drive.
1. Geared turbines make up roughly 80 percent of global installedcapacity. These “Danish design” machines use a gearbox toconvert the relatively low rotational speed of the turbine rotor(12–18 rpm) to a much higher speed (1,500 rpm) for input to a
generator. The vast majority of these generators are double-fed
induction generators, which use significant amounts of copperand iron. Geared turbines have achieved a very low cost witha high level of reliability, although they generally require more
frequent maintenance because of the higher number of moving
parts relative to their direct-drive counterparts.
2. Direct drive wind turbines feature generators that are fixedturbines. Steel is primarily manufactured using a mix of iron ore,carbon, and other elements. Other elements also could be used
for steel production, including nickel, molybdenum, titanium,
manganese, vanadium, or cobalt, depending on the type andquality of steel required for industrial applications.
Figure 3.7 shows the major minerals used to supply wind
installations through 2050, with iron accounting for 84.6 percent ofdemand and copper 4.4 percent. Note, the iron reported here is thatwhich is used directly in the turbine, in either the generator core, themainframe, or the rotor hubs; it does not include the iron needed
for the steel components. All other minerals combined represent
nearly 11 percent of demand, primarily for the permanent magnets(neodymium), gearboxes (nickel), or cabling (aluminum). Minerals
not included in this analysis include dysprosium, which is used indirectly to the rotor and therefore turn at the same speed.

permanent magnet direct-drive turbines.

Certain models (for example, those produced by Goldwind)

Figure 3.7 Share of Mineral Demand from Wind Under IEA 2DS Through 2050

employ a generator with permanent magnets consisting ofrare earth minerals such as neodymium and dysprosium.

Aluminum

Other models (for example, those produced by Enercon) use
an electrically excited rotor utilizing significant amountsof copper. Direct-drive turbines tend to be initially more
expensive per megawatt, although this can be offset by lower

Iron
84.6%

Chromium

Other
10.9%

Lead

maintenance during the turbine’s operation.

Molybdenum
Manganese
Neodymium
NickelCopper
4.4%

In general terms, geared turbines tend to dominate onshore
installations, where maintenance is relatively straightforward.
Conversely, direct-drive turbines are preferred in offshore windapplications, where maintenance is much more challenging. The
difference in how these subtechnologies are deployed between

Iron

CopperAluminum
Manganese

Chromium

Lead

Neodymium

NickelNote: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy Agency.

Molybdenum

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Figure 3.8 Cumulative Demand for Minerals Needed for Wind 		
Through 2050

47

Figure 3.9 Total Zinc Demand by Energy Technology Through 2050 (2DS,
Base Scenario)a. Zinc demand by technology

500

450
Wind

98.1%
400
Energy storage

1.5%

2DS

350
Solar PV

0.4%

Tons (millions)

300

250

b. Cumulative zinc demand from wind
30

200

25

150

+80%
20
Tons (millions)

100

50

15

10
0

IRENA
REmap

IEA
B2DS

IEA
2DS

IRENA
Ref

IEA
RTS

Base
scenario

5

0
Iron

Zinc

CopperNickel

Molybdenum

Aluminum
Manganese

Lead

Chromium

Base scenario

2DS

Neodymium

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy
Agency, IRENA = International Renewable Energy Agency, Ref = reference scenario, REmap =renewable energy roadmap scenario, RTS = reference technology scenario.

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, PV = photovoltaic.

As seen in figure 3.8, the strongest demand for these minerals

With the exception of zinc, all the minerals used to construct windcome from the IRENA REmap scenario, representing a 78 percent

turbines are also needed to build other clean energy technologies.

increase from the IEA B2DS, as there is a higher installed capacity

As seen in figure 3.9, 98.1 percent of zinc demand from energyof wind in comparison to the IEA scenarios. The slight variations

technologies comes from the wind industry, as the mineral isacross the minerals across the technology-based mitigation

predominantly used for protecting wind turbines from corrosion.

scenarios are due to slightly differing mixes of offshore andonshore wind that have different mineral compositions.

48

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Trade-Offs in Wind Subtechnologies

Table 3.3 Share of Subtechnology Penetration in Wind Market
Compared with Base Share

Similar to solar PV, there are trade-offs in mineral demand forwind depending on which subtechnology—geared or direct drive—ends up being the most widely deployed. Currently, the mostwidely deployed wind technology is geared, as it is often used foronshore wind applications; direct drive is primarily targeted forthe deployment of offshore wind, given its lower maintenancerequirements. While onshore wind makes up the majority of windenergy deployment across all scenarios, the share of offshore
wind is expected to increase with technology improvements andexpected falling costs (LCOE).
Neodymium, which is only used in permanent magnet directdrive turbines, is a key mineral affected by the balance between

2050
share

OnshoreGearedOnshoreDirect drive

Offshore
GrearedOffshore
Direct drive

Base share
(2DS)

75%

25%

25%

75%

High share:
Geared

90%

10%

40%

60%

High share:
Direct drive

60%

40%

10%

90%

Figure 3.10 Cumulative Demand for Neodymium from Wind
Subtechnologies Compared to Base Share Under 2DS Through 2050

these technologies. Two alternative scenarios are constructed tohighlight how shifts in the balance between geared and directdrive turbines may affect the demand for neodymium.

Neodymiumdemand

250+48%

The first scenario has a higher share of direct-drive turbines,

16

rising to 40 percent of onshore turbines and 90 percent of offshore
turbines by 2050, compared with 25 percent and 75 percent in200

the mixed base scenario. The second scenario has higher shares

Neodymiumdemandof geared turbines, accounting for 90 percent of onshore turbines-65%

The greatest demand for neodymium comes in the high sharedirect drive scenario (see figure 3.10), with cumulative demandalmost 50 percent higher than the base share scenario. In
contrast, demand for neodymium in the high share geared

Tons (thousands)

and 40 percent of offshore (table 3.3).
150

100

scenario is 65 percent lower than the base share scenario.

50

0

Base
share

High
direct driveHighgearedNote: 2DS = 2-degree scenario.

16

It should be noted that not all direct-drive turbines use permanent magnets and thus demand neodymium. Data on the neodymium concentration in direct-drive turbines are drawn from a number of sources in theliterature and a central point was used. The substitution between different direct-drive turbines is a scale of resolution beyond the scope of the model.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Material Use Improvements in Wind Turbines
Material improvements in direct-drive onshore and offshore

Figure 3.11 Cumulative Demand for Neodymium from Wind Technologies
Under Present Technology and Material Use Reduction Under 2DS
Through 2050

wind turbines could lead to potential efficiency gains in the useof neodymium in the turbines. Such improvements could include(1) the decreased use of permanent magnets through alternative180

designs (for example, air core axial flux), and/or (2) the increased160

use of hybrid turbines using a medium-speed gearbox and140

To estimate the efficiency gains from the reduction of materials

120

through 2050 under a 2DS, a figure derived from the lowest
figure for neodymium use in direct-drive turbines in theliterature. As noted in figure 3.11, if material improvements were
to take place, cumulative demand of neodymium would fall by
45 percent, compared with the present mineral composition ofcurrent wind technology.

Tons (thousands)

permanent magnet generator.

in wind turbines, a 67 percent mineral reduction is assumed

49

100
80
60
40
20
0

IEA 2DS
Present technology

Material use reduction (67% reduction)

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy Agency.

50

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Geothermal

the technology comes from the use of elements to create various

Geothermal energy currently accounts for less than 1 percent of

avoid double-counting.

global electricity generation capacity (IEA 2019c) and is actively

51

alloys of steel, steel has, again, been excluded from this analysis tobeing used in more than 20 countries;17 the United States is the

Figure 3.12 shows the major minerals required for supplying

world’s largest producer, at about 2.5 GW in 2018.18 Geothermal

geothermal through 2050. In addition to being used in wind,energy can be used for electricity generation, direct or indirect use,

chromium represents a key mineral for geothermal technologies,

or co-generation. There are limitations with the use of geothermal

with 36 percent of its demand from all energy technologies goingenergy since electricity can only be generated in locations withtoward geothermal.

high or medium temperatures, typically close to tectonically active
regions.19 Countries such as Indonesia, Iceland, the Philippines, and
New Zealand—countries in tectonically active regions—actively
use geothermal to meet their electricity needs. Indonesia recently
announced a plan to build 7.2 GW of geothermal by 2025 given
its comparative advantage in this resource to meet its growing
energy demand.20

The highest capacity of geothermal is found in the REmap andB2DS scenarios, with overall mineral demand of relevant minerals
increasing by 78 percent and 71 percent from the Ref and RTS
scenarios, respectively (figure 3.13).
Figure 3.12 Share of Mineral Demand from Geothermal Under 2DS
Through 2050

Geothermal generates electricity from thermal energy locatedbelow the earth’s surface, whether in liquid, trapped steam, orrock. Therefore, geothermal requires a very high level of quality
steel to be able to carry reservoirs of steam and hot water for

Nickel58.4%

electricity generation. Corrosion-resistant alloys, for example,
titanium and molybdenum. The demand for these minerals from

Chromium
31.3%

specific geothermal plants will vary from location to location
based on the number and depth of wells needed to access thethermal energy.21
Geothermal uses relatively more steel than wind, approximately

Manganese

Other
2.9%

are needed in the geothermal plants, requiring minerals such as

Titanium

Molybdenum
Copper

Chromium

CopperManganese

Molybdenum

NickelTitanium

6–10 times as much per megawatt of capacity. Unlike
wind—which also requires a large amount of steel, primarily
manufactured from a mix of nickel and iron ore—geothermal

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario.

requires steel alloys with a large quantity of titanium to copewith the high heat and pressure in geothermal power generation.
Literature on geothermal production is more limited than for windand solar PV, and given that a large share of mineral demand for

17
18
19
20
21

“Geothermal Energy,” National Geographic, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/global-warming/geothermal-energy/.
“Geothermal Energy,” International Renewable Energy Agency, https://www.irena.org/geothermal.
Ibid.
“Indonesia Needs $15 Billion Investment to Meet Geothermal Target by 2025,” Reuters, August 13, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-geothermal/indonesia-needs-15-billion-investment-to-meetgeothermal-target-by-2025-idUSKCN1V30R0.
Data used in the model is an average of three plants—a 50 MW facility with 25 wells at depth of 5 kilometers; a 10 MW facility with 5 wells 1.5 kilometers deep, and 48.4 MW facility with 22 wells 2.5 kilometers
deep—and covers both plant facilities and well pipes (Moss et al. 2013).

52

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Figure 3.13 Cumulative Demand for Minerals Needed for Geothermal
Through 2050

Figure 3.14 Total Titanium Demand by Energy Technology Through 2050
(2DS, Base Scenario)

a. Titanium demand by technology

12

Geothermal

10

Nuclear64.0%

Coal (inc. CCS)

34.5%

8

0.7%

2DS

Hydro

0.2%

Tons (millions)Gas (inc. CCS)

0.7%

6

b. Titanium demand120

4Tons (thousands)

100
2

80

+80%

60
40

0

IRENA IEA
REmap B2DS
NickelChromium

IEA
2DS

IRENA
Ref

CopperMolybdenum

IEA
RTS
ManganeseBasescenario

20
0

Base scenario

Titanium2DS

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy
Agency, IRENA = International Renewable Energy Agency, Ref = reference scenario, REmap=renewable energy roadmap scenario, RTS = reference technology scenario.

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, CCS = carbon capture and storage.

Contrary to solar PV and wind mineral demand trends, figure 3.13

and the IEA now project lower levels of geothermal capacity thanillustrates that the overall demand for geothermal minerals inthe slightly older IEA data from which the base scenario is drawn.

the base scenario is slightly higher than in both the RTS and Ref
scenarios because of different assumptions around geothermal
deployment up to 2050. In the base scenario, a higher shareof geothermal capacity is expected. This reflects changes inassumptions about the projected costs of geothermal energy
over time, relative to other renewable technologies. Because thecosts of solar PV and wind have plummeted in recent years, thesetechnologies are now seen as more attractive over other renewable
technologies. Therefore, the most up-to-date projections from IRENA

Titanium is one of the relevant minerals that are affected by
the assumptions around both geothermal and coal and CCS
deployment. As seen in figure 3.14, under a 2DS, geothermal
accounts for 64 percent of titanium demand, while coal and CCS
account for 34.5 percent. With titanium being heavily used inboth technologies, its demand will grow regardless of whether theworld moves toward a more fossil fuel intensive or lower-carbon
energy pathway.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

53

54

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

55

Concentrated Solar Powerlinear fresnel systems, and central receivers—with each using

Concentrated solar power (CSP) produces electricity by

installed capacity and material composition to model these types

concentrating the sun’s heat using mirrors to heat water and drive
steam turbines. A variety of CSP plant sizes exist, ranging from 1
MW to 400 MW. One of the main advantages of CSP, comparedvarying amounts of silver. There was insufficient data on both
separately, but the model does capture variations in silver demand
from the various types.

with solar PV, is that it can be equipped with molten salts to store

Figure 3.15 shows the balance between copper and silver for which

heat, which can then be released in the evening, making it an ideal

data were available under a 2DS, with copper representing a much

renewable energy source for large-scale applications. Despite its

greater share of modeled demand because of its wider spread use

advantages, CSP only accounted for 5.5 GW of installed capacity

across CSP facilities.

globally in 2018, compared with 480 GW of solar PV, because
22

of its high costs relative to other renewables and geographic
constraints. CSP can only be deployed in locations with excellent

Figure 3.15 Share of Mineral Demand from Concentrated Solar Power
Under IEA 2DS Through 2050

direct normal irradiation, which is typically found in desert
regions, so currently CSP is most found in countries such as Chile,
Spain, and the United States.
Regions such as North Africa and the Middle East are expected
to take the lead in developing their CSP capacity, even though
CSP deployment will remain small relative to solar PV and wind.

Silver0.2%

Copper
99.8%

There is potential for the technology to be further scaled up
given continued falling prices and technological improvements.
Growth rates may still be large; the IEA’s World Energy Outlook

2019 projects growth in Africa-deployed CSP at more than 900
percent by 2040. This growth is most likely to occur in developing

CopperSilvercountries, with the IEA projecting that, under the 2DS, almost 80
percent of all CSP installed capacity will be in non-OECD countries
by 2050. CSP’s storage capacity also makes it an attractive
renewable source for developing countries endowed with highdirect normal irradiation.
Given the niche aspect of the technology, there are considerable
fewer studies on the material inputs required for CSP systems.
Bulk materials such as glass, steel, and aluminum are needed forthe support structures for the mirrors, but no data were available
in the literature for these materials, or the minerals identified wereoutside the model. Data were available, however, for the use of
copper (for wiring, pumps, electric motors, and the generator) andsilver (used for coating the glass for the mirrors). Various typesof CSP plants are emerging—including parabolic trough systems,
22“Solar Energy,” IRENA, https://www.irena.org/solar.

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy Agency.

56

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Figure 3.16 Cumulative Demand for Minerals Needed for Concentrated
Solar Power Through 2050

Figure 3.17 Total Silver Demand by Technology Through 2050
(2DS, Base Scenario)a. Silver demandby technology

4.0

3.5
Solar PV

96.3%

3.0

Solar CSP

2.2%

Tons (millions)

2.5

2DS

Nuclear1.4%

2.0

b. Silver demand

1.5

350
1.0
Tons (thousands)

300

0.5

0

IRENA IEA
REmap B2DS

IEA
2DS

IRENA
Ref

CopperSilver

IEA
RTS

Base
scenario

250
200

+120%

150
100
50
0

Base scenario

2DS

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy
Agency, IRENA = International Renewable Energy Agency, Ref = reference scenario, REmap =renewable energy roadmap scenario, RTS = reference technology scenario.

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, CSP = concentrated solar power, PV = photovoltaic.

Mineral demand is strongest in the B2DS, as seen in figure 3.16,

While the projected figures for both copper and silver appear towhere it is expected that CSP capacity will be the highest. Both ofgrow dramatically in the more ambitious scenarios, they pale in

the IRENA scenarios, Ref and REmap, are bearish on CSP’s sharecomparison to the minerals’ use in solar PV. For example, figurein the global electricity mix through 2050, explaining the lower

3.17 shows the demand for silver by technology through 2050

demand for copper and silver. This reflects different assumptions

under a 2DS. The vast majority of demand for silver, at 96.3

on the projected costs of the technology against other renewable

percent, is linked to solar PV growth, predominantly from solar

technologies, such as solar PV. The base scenario also projects a

PV’s subtechnology, crystal Si, with only 2.2 percent of silver

higher share of CSP than the later RTS one, reflecting changing

demand linked to CSP and 1.4 percent to nuclear. Under a 2DS,

beliefs on the balance between CSP and solar PV, with cost

demand for silver is expected to double, growing from 1.4 thousand

reductions in the latter causing it to be projected as an eventons in 2017 to nearly 3.2 thousand tons in 2050.

greater share of renewable capacity compared with CSP in the
more recent IEA projections.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

57

58

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

59

Energy Storage

Mobile Energy Storage

Energy storage technology stores electricity when it is generated

The energy storage landscape for automobiles (and other wheeledand can then later dispatch it as needed.23 It is a very important
technology for renewable energy, particularly for variable
ones such as solar PV and wind, which are nondispatchable, as
electricity is only generated when the sun is shining or when thewind is blowing. Energy storage can provide a solution and act
as an ancillary service for these specific technologies by storing
electricity in a battery and then releasing it during peak hours,
usually in the evening. Given this high potential, the World Bank
launched the Energy Storage Program to scale up 17.5 GWh of
battery storage by 2025 in developing countries.24
While energy storage can play a major role in stabilizing thegrid from variable renewable energy, its costs are still too highground vehicles, including buses, vans, and trucks) is changing
very rapidly. All vehicles today have some battery energy storage,
almost always a lead-acid battery, to help start the engine and topower vehicle electronics. There are two primary batteries used in
the automotive sector and covered in this analysis:• Lead-acid batteries have dominated the early stages of electricvehicle operation because they are a mature technology and are
inexpensive, but they are limited by their weight and their range.
They are being gradually replaced by Li-ion batteries, initiallydeveloped for use in laptops and other electronics.
• Li-ion batteries offer a much higher energy density than previous
generations of batteries, meaning more energy can be stored

for it to be deployed more widely. Relative to solar PV and wind

for the weight of battery. They also require less maintenancetechnologies that have an average LCOE of 0.05/kWh, battery

and offer a range of flexibility since they can be manufactured

storage has LCOE costs averaging 250/kWh, making it too

with a variety of different minerals, and are tailored for different

expensive for most applications today. Despite the high costs,

functions. They do, however, come at a higher cost, require

the increased use of batteries in electric vehicles has been theprotective circuits, and are a potential fire risk.

primary reason why battery costs have fallen quickly, from
288/kWh in 2016 to 157/kWh today, representing a 46 percent
decrease in price.
Energy storage is crucial for the low-carbon transition for two

The model assumes that initially a mix of lead-acid and Li-ion
batteries are used in electric vehicles, with Li-ion quickly taking
over the entire market.

main reasons: (1) It is used to power electric vehicles, and (2) it is

Stationary Energy Storage

needed to store power from intermittent electricity generation

Stationary energy storage has different desirable features fromfrom solar PV and wind farms, including grid and decentralized

the use of batteries in electric vehicles. Weight, for example, isoperations. Both applications of energy storage are included inless of a concern, and different applications of stationary storage

the model from the IEA’s technology-based mitigation scenarios

have different needs. Some batteries need a lot of power to besince data on energy storage were not available for the IRENA

stored for short durations, whereas others need less power but aand base scenarios. Battery electric vehicles are expected tolonger storage time. Different batteries may therefore play a roleaccount for approximately 90 percent of deployments in thein mineral demand:

IEA scenarios, with stationary and decentralized applications
making up the other 10 percent; the mineral demand follows this
sectorial split.

23
24• Li-ion batteries are the dominant technology at the momentin stationary energy storage, although lead-acid batteries stillplay a small role in some applications.

In this section, energy storage refers to battery technologies specifically, not other forms of energy storage, such as pumped hydroelectricity, nor thermal storage (such as the molten salts used in CSP). Batteries arealso a crucial component of electric vehicles, vital for storing and carrying the electricity needed to run the motors of these vehicles.
For more information, see the World Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program’s “Energy Storage Program” webpage: https://www.esmap.org/energystorage.

60

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition• Redox flow batteries are an emerging technology in stationary
energy storage. They are heavy and large, and thus unsuitablefor vehicles, but they can be built with extremely large
capacities (up to 200 MW, compared with 100 MW for Li-ion)and have a long life span.
In the model, Li-ion batteries provide the largest amount ofstationary storage, with a declining role for lead-acid batteries

Battery Composition
Batteries generally have three main elements: a cathode, ananode, and an electrolyte that sits between the two materials toenable electricity to be collected and discharged at different times.
The minerals used for these elements differs between and withinbattery technologies.

and an emerging role for vanadium-based redox flow batteries.

Redox flow batteries differ in that they operate by pumping a

Battery Technology Post-2030

salts—in vanadium redox flow batteries), through a core consisting

The battery space is emerging rapidly, and many new options

liquid electrolyte (usually sulfuric acid, mixed with vanadiumof a positive and negative electrode, separated by a membrane.26

are under development. This uncertainty is much greater post-

Examples of the different types of batteries covered in the model2030 owing to the huge scale of innovation and experimentation

are given in table 3.4.

occurring in the sector. The assumption that Li-ion batteries
dominate both the mobile and stationary market for the next
decade is conservative. Post-2030, the scale of uncertainty is

As the climate scenarios become more ambitious, 12 of the 17
minerals in this analysis show much larger increases in demandmuch greater, with a wide range of options in both markets.

because of their use in energy storage, particularly those minerals

Within mobile storage, options such as solid-state Li-ion batteries

show smaller increases: They are not used in Li-ion batteries, but

could enter the market. However, the automotive market itself

rather in lead-acid or redox flow batteries, whose deployment do

could pivot, with hydrogen fuel cell vehicles entering the market

not vary as significantly across the 2DS and B2DS.

at scale. Within the stationary space, there will be increasing
demand for longer-duration batteries. Some of this demandused in Li-ion batteries (figure 3.19). Lead, vanadium, and ironFigure 3.18 Li-ion Battery

could be met by vanadium redox flow batteries, but other options

Anode(graphite)

are also emerging rapidly, including iron-based flow batteries,

Separator

thermal-electric options that involve storing energy as heat ina variety of different media from molten salts (also used in CSP

Cathode(different
formations)

Current
collector

to store energy) or rocks. There is even concrete and mechanicalstorage, which stores energy as mechanical energy and discharges
it by dropping weights.25

Electrolyte(lithium salts)

Li+

Predicting which, if any, of these technologies emerges tocommercial scale is impossible, but each could affect the demand
for minerals generally, and especially the minerals used heavily
in the types of stationary storage assumed in the model, such aslithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese, and vanadium. The impacts ofsome of these technologies are discussed in the Emerging Energy
Technologies section later in this chapter.

25
26

ChargeDischarge
Current
collector
Illustration adapted from the World Bank’s Minerals for Climate Action Infographic, https://www.
worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2019/02/26/climate-smart-mining.

One example of mechanical storage includes a technology that uses abandoned mine shafts. Energy is stored by lifting weights to the top of the shaft and discharged by dropping the weights to the bottom of the shaft.
A number of different chemistries are possible, but batteries using vanadium are the most mature and thus are the main type of redox flow battery included in the model.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

61

Table 3.4 Batteries and Their Subtechnologies Covered in the Ref, 2DS, and B2DS

CathodeLithium-ion

Various:

Anode

Electrolyte

Uses

Graphite

Lithium salt

• Electric vehicles, stationary
storage, medical devices, e-bikes• Electric vehicles, stationary
storage, medical devices, e-bikes• Portable electronics• Power tools, medical devices• Electric vehicles, electric buses,
stationary storage• Nickel manganese cobalt (NMC) oxide• Nickel manganese cobalt (NMC) oxide• Nickel cobalt aluminum (NCA) oxide• Lithium cobalt oxide (LCO)• Lithium manganese oxide (LMO)• Lithium iron phosphate (LFP)
Lead-acid

Lead-dioxide

Lead

Sulfuric acid

Vehicles, backup power systems,
stationary storage

Redox flow

n.a.

n.a.

Vanadium-based

Stationary storage

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree scenario, n.a. = not applicable, Ref = reference scenario.

While cobalt and lithium are probably best known for being used inenergy storage, batteries generally use a wide variety of minerals

Figure 3.19 Share of Mineral Demand from Energy Storage Under IEA 2DS
Through 2050

for the cathode, as covered in figure 3.19, including aluminum,
lead, and manganese. Graphite, used for the anode, accounts fornearly 53.8 percent of mineral demand. Nickel, needed for cathodeproduction in NMC (nickel manganese cobalt oxide) and NCA(nickel cobalt aluminum oxide) batteries, accounts for the second

Lead
6.0%

Lithium Manganese
6.0%
4.0%
Aluminum
Nickel18.6%

highest level of demand, at 18.6 percent. Cobalt, another battery
mineral, is expected to account for 6.2 percent of total demand

Chromium
Other
5.0%

up to 2050 under a 2DS. Lithium, accounting for 4 percent of
total demand, is used across all Li-ion batteries, regardless of theGraphite
53.8%

cathode composition.

Iron
Vanadium

Cobalt6.2%

It should be noted that this analysis does not take into accountCopperZinc

the implications of mineral supply to achieve a low-carbon future,
but for demand for energy storage minerals specifically. Supply
has been minimally highlighted owing to the fact that somebattery minerals, namely cobalt and graphite, are primarily

Aluminum

Chromium

CobaltCopperGraphite

Iron

Lead

Lithium

Manganese

NickelVanadiumZinc(more than 50 percent) produced in one country, albeit not thesame one.27

27

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy Agency.

China produces nearly 70 percent of the world’s natural graphite, while the Democratic Republic of Congo produces more than 60 percent of the world’s cobalt (EC 2018)

62

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Trade-Offs in Battery Subtechnologies

Compared to the IEA RTS, mineral demand increases by 107
percent in the B2DS because of the large-scale deployment ofWithin some battery technologies, trade-offs exist between

battery electric vehicles (figure 3.20). The uncertainty regarding

component minerals, and thus the choice of subtechnology orbattery storage deployment is high, particularly as battery

even specific types of subtechnology can have implications for the

storage technologies are expected to be in greatest demand

demand for not just one mineral, but a grouping of minerals. With

post-2030. Still, the storyline remains the same as that forenergy generation technologies: Greater climate ambition leads togreater overall mineral demand. However, as demand levels grow,the types of technology that might meet that demand become
uncertain, as more space is available for new battery technologies,
with different mineral requirements, to enter the market.

battery manufacturers concerned about mineral supply chains,
especially for cobalt, the battery industry has been spearheading
efforts to reduce the amount of cobalt needed in batteries, toreduce supply chain risks, while maintaining the efficiency levelin battery technology. Mainstream media and nongovernmentorganizations reporting on the labor and environmental issues

The only use of both graphite and lithium in energy technologies

surrounding cobalt extraction have put pressure on downstream

included in the model is linked to energy storage in Li-ion batteries

companies to become more responsible in where and how they

for the anode and electrolyte, respectively.28 As these two minerals

source cobalt for battery technologies.

are not used in other energy technologies, their overall demandWith the battery sector changing the most rapidly among all

cannot be compared to other technologies.

technologies, being able to forecast which subtechnology will be
the most used up to 2050 is nearly impossible. The scarcity ofavailable data on, for example, the different shares of the different
battery chemistries in the Li-ion market, both now and in the

Figure 3.20 Cumulative Demand for Minerals Needed for Energy Storage Through 2050

tons (million)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

IEA B2DS

IEA 2DSIEA RTS

Graphite

NickelCobaltManganese

Lead

Lithium

Vanadium

Aluminum

Iron

Chromium

CopperZinc

IndiumIron

Molybdenum

Neodymium

SilverTitanium

Note: Demand in the 4DS scenario is not presented because energy storage is not modeled in that scenario. 2DS = 2-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy Agency,
RTS = reference technology scenario.

28

Graphite has some niche uses in other energy technologies, such as the use of carbon brushes in the motors of wind turbines, but no data were available for these uses and their scale is likely to be very small
compared with the use of graphite in battery technologies.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

future, has been a challenge. In the model, data have been drawn(see figure 3.21). In the first scenario, every Li-ion battery isfrom across the various chemistries, and, using the methodology

assumed to be an NMC811, while in the second one, all batteries

described above, have modeled the “average” Li-ion battery.

are assumed to be an NMC111.29

However, to illustrate how changes in the types of Li-ion battery
that may dominate the future market may impact mineral

Lithium demand varies by almost 20 percent from the baseshare depending on the battery choice. Figure 3.21 showsdemand, two illustrative scenarios have been developed.

that the higher levels of lithium demand with NMC111 are also

In the battery sector, the Li-ion battery compositions areassociated with much greater levels of cobalt and manganesedescribed by their mineral content ratio. In a NMC811 design,

demand, approximately 100 percent more than the base share.

for example, the 8, 1, and 1 represent the nickel (80 percent),

However, with NMC111, nickel demand is much lower, over 35

manganese (10 percent), and cobalt (10 percent), respectively,

percent lower.

used in the cathode, while in the NMC111 design, nickel,
manganese, and cobalt are used in equal proportions. The latterhas been the main chemistry used in NMC batteries to date, butthere is increasing interest in the new NMC811 design, which ispotentially cheaper, lighter, and offers longer range to electric

There a clear trade-off between nickel, cobalt, and manganese(and to a lesser extent lithium), depending on which battery
subtechnology emerges. Shortages (and thus higher prices) 		
of minerals such as cobalt could incentivize shifts to different
Li-ion battery types—either NMC811 or non-cobalt types likevehicles—along with reducing the amount of cobalt required.

lithium-iron phosphate. On the other hand, shortages in lithium

To demonstrate the impact of shifts in demand within the Li-ion

could shift battery types to NMC811, increasing the demand 		battery market, two alternative scenarios are compared to thefor nickel.

“average” Li-ion battery, which is the base in the model
Figure 3.21 Cumulative Demand for Minerals from Li-ion Battery Scenarios Under 2DS Through 2050

Lithium

NickelCobaltManganese

25

Tons (millions)

20

15

10

5

0
Average
NMC111
Li-ion battery

NMC811

Average
NMC111
Li-ion battery

NMC811

Average
NMC111
Li-ion battery

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, Li-ion = lithium-ion.

29

63

These are extreme scenarios, but they demonstrate potential directions and scales of impact on demand for particular minerals.

NMC811

Average
NMC111
Li-ion battery

NMC811

64

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Material Use Improvements in Li-ion Batteries
Many of the technologies needed for a low-carbon future arebeing deployed rapidly while cost-reductions are occurring.30
These cost reductions stem from many sources, including
decreasing concentration of minerals such as cobalt. In 2018,the minerals needed to build cathodes and anodes (battery cell)accounted for approximately 70 percent of the total cost of abattery (Goldie-Scot 2019).
Although not all technologies show a clear pattern of reduction(depending on how subtechnology choice is assumed to occur),there are patterns of change. For example, various sources in
the literature show a reduction in the estimated composition oflithium in Li-ion batteries over recent years.31 In 2016 Teske et al.
estimated a composition of 0.24 tons per megawatt-hour for a
Li-ion (NCA) battery. By 2018, the IEA estimated a compositionof 0.1 tons per megawatt-hour for a similar battery (IEA 2018).
To capture this effect, the model was extended using the

Figure 3.22 Cumulative Demand for Lithium from Energy Storage Under
Present Technology and Material Use Reduction Through 2050 Under
2DS, B2DS

assumption that all Li-ion batteries would keep improving theiruse of lithium, with all batteries moving to the most efficient

10type seen in the literature today. This shift led to a 23 percent

9

reduction in the use of lithium in Li-ion batteries by 2050. Figure
3.22 shows the effect of these material improvements in Li-ion

8batteries on the demand for lithium under a 2DS and B2DS. The

7

between 16 and 17 percent, with the largest absolute difference
seen under a B2DS.
Improvements in the energy density of Li-ion batteries, such as
the amount of energy batteries can store per kilogram, as wellas their cycle life, how many times a battery can be charged anddischarged before its capacity starts to fall below 80 percent

Tons (millions)

impact of this result would reduce the demand for lithium by

6
5
4
3
2

of its original capacity, will also have important implications for1

demand for minerals such as lithium, graphite, and cobalt. Should

0density and cycle life increase sharply, then the demand for newbatteries and the minerals they require will fall.

2DS
Present technology

B2DS
Efficiency improvement (23% reduction)

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree scenario.

30
31See, for example, figure 5.1 of IEA’s 2018 report Global Electric Vehicle Outlook.
See, for example, Teske et al. (2016) and IEA (2018).

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Emerging Energy Technologies

Carbon Capture Storage

This section discusses the various emerging technologies that

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is one of the key technologies

are considered potential game changers in the transformationof the energy system globally. Other than carbon capture andstorage, these specific technologies have not been included in
the model to estimate demand across the 17 minerals analyzed
in the model, but they are included here because their potentialcommercialization in the near term could have implications
on overall mineral demand. This analysis remains technology
agnostic with regard to which energy technology could become65

that is expected to be deployed under the IEA scenarios, albeit
with great uncertainty, and it has been partially captured in themodel. However, it has been included in the Emerging Energy
Technologies section because the technology is still at relatively
early stages of development compared to solar PV, wind,geothermal, CSP, and energy storage.
CCS involves the capture of CO2 from three sources:more prominent to achieve a low-carbon future, but as the• Combustion of coal and gas

emerging technologies are also mineral intensive, they are• Transportation of the CO2 from source site to long-term storage

addressed in the report.

• Long-term storage of the CO2

Figure 3.23 Carbon Capture Storage

Atmosphere(carbon capture)

Industrial facility(carbon capture)

Power plant(carbon capture)

Offshore(carbon storage)

Pipeline(carbon transportation)

Long-term
geo-sequestration
carbon storage

Long-termcarbon storage
in depleted oilor gas fields

Illustration adapted from various sources (for example, Shell Sustainability Report 2016, https://reports.shell.com/sustainability-report/2016/energy-transition/our-work-to-address-climate-change/carbon-capture-and-storage.html; Carbon Capture and Storage Association, http://www.ccsassociation.org/what-is-ccs/).

66

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Widespread commercial-scale CCS has yet to emerge and there
is great uncertainty over how large a role it will play in the future.
CCS’s role in technology-based mitigation scenarios varies widely.
The IEA sees an increasing role for the technology in the 2DS and
B2DS scenarios; it projects that under the 2DS, 350 GW of coalplants with CCS attached will be in operation, representing 74
percent of all coal facilities. IRENA, on the other hand, sees thetechnology differently and does not include CCS in their scenarios.

Batteries: Next Generation
Among many battery experts, the view is that Li-ion batteries
will dominate the battery sector in the next decade,32 similar to
projections made under the model used in this analysis. However,a number of rapidly emerging new battery technologies could
potentially challenge the proposed future dominance of Li-ion
batteries. Great uncertainty exists about when, or if, these newbatteries will reach widespread market deployment. However,Crucial to the scale at which CCS may be deployed are costs,

many of these new technologies offer substantial benefits overincluding the size of a carbon price, which is vital for ensuring that

Li-ion batteries should they become viable; thus, they could play

CCS is commercially viable; regulatory and legal factors relatinga large role in providing energy storage options, both mobile andto the storage of carbon, and any liabilities that may result fromstationary, post-2030. Two groups of these technologies, solid-

this process; and availability of suitable geological formations tostate Li-ion batteries and zinc-air batteries, are examined to give

store the CO2 underground.

understanding on the potential impact of such breakthroughThese factors have limited the widespread adoption of CCS,
resulting in its slow acceptance. In 2018, there were 43 large-

technologies on demand for minerals.
Figure 3.24 Solid-State Battery

scale facilities at various stages of operation, with 20 operating
commercially (GCCSI 2019). The technology itself, however, is

Anodenot entirely new—capturing CO2 and injecting it into oil wells toimprove recovery has been going on for over 45 years. Projects are
emerging that involve capturing CO2 from electricity plants, aswell as from iron and steel facilities.

CathodeThe sparsity of large-scale operating CCS plants makes
projecting the mineral composition of the technology in the futurechallenging. Work in this area has identified chromium, cobalt,
copper, manganese, molybdenum, and nickel as the key minerals
involved in the technology. These minerals are used in a variety
of ways in CCS, either in capturing the CO2 (such as manganeseand nickel) or in the steel alloys needed for the CCS plant,
transportation pipes, and other changes needed for the generation
plant. A critical factor is the length of the pipelines needed to

Solidelectrolyte

transport the CO2 to the storage sites; this will vary between
facilities and would alter the overall scale of demand for minerals
from the technology.

32

See, for example, Tsiropoulos, Tarvydas, and Lebedeva (2018).

Illustration adapted from various sources (for example, Electronics-Lab.com, https://www.
electronics-lab.com/solid-state-li-ion-batteries-high-energy-dense-batteries-closer/).

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

67

Solid-State Batteries

Zinc-Air Batteries

Solid-state batteries differ from their more common liquid

Zinc-air batteries have become more prominent in the emerging

counterparts by replacing the liquid electrolyte in conventional

storage sector because of their high specific energy density

Li-ion batteries with a solid alternative such as a polymer orcompared to other storage options, such as Li-ion batteries.

ceramic. This structure enables engineers to replace the graphite

Zinc-air batteries have emerged as the leading mineral-air

anode with a lithium mineral anode, which greatly increases

battery type because they are safe, environmentally friendly,

the storage potential of the battery. Solid-state batteries,

and potentially cheap and simple. The potential advantages 		theoretically, offer greater storage, faster charging, improvedof the technology can be seen in a comparison of the practicalsafety, and a reduced fire risk because they use nonflammableenergy density of different battery technologies. Lithium-air

ceramic electrodes. This structure also reduces the need forbatteries are possible and have even higher energy densities,

cooling systems, allowing space for larger batteries in applications

but zinc is more attractive for a number of reasons, including

such as electric vehicles. The batteries are, however, hinderedsafety, ease of recyclability, and greater global availability.

by costs, design safety, and production techniques. They haveZinc-air batteries could potentially be used in both electricbeen proposed for use in electric vehicles—especially because ofvehicles—either solely or, potentially more practically, as a range

their fast charging, higher storage, and reduced fire risk—and

extender in combination with a Li-ion battery—and stationary

stationary storage applications. Projections, however, place themstorage (Sherman et al. 2018). For example, New York Urban

5 to 10 years away from market deployment.33

Electric Power is working with a number of public sector partners

Should solid-state batteries play a major role from 2030 onward,
there may be implications for the demand of some minerals used

to deploy a 1 MWh grid-connected zinc-air battery for demand
response and peak shaving.

in energy storage applications. Lithium demand would likely

Should zinc-air batteries reach large-scale deployment in electricremain strong, as the mineral would still be required for the anode.

vehicles, or in stationary storage, they could dampen the demand

Graphite demand could fall as the graphite anode is replaced

for the minerals used in Li-ion batteries (for example, lithium,by lithium.34 The greatest uncertainty lies in the composition

graphite, nickel, manganese, and cobalt). Demand could thenof the solid electrolyte; the wide variety of different options

shift to nickel, manganese, and zinc itself, but also potentially tobeing proposed use a range of additional minerals, including tin,lanthanum or silver as well. Large-scale deployment, however, isaluminum, silver, and boron (Varzi et al. 2016). Therefore, great

only likely to be post-2030, with the timing, the scale, and theuncertainty exists not only on the potential scale of future market

composition of the batteries highly uncertain.

deployment of solid-state batteries, but also on the implicationsof such deployment on demand for minerals.

33
34

See, for example, Meeus (2018).
Lead-acid batteries offer 40 watt-hours (Wh)/kg; Li-ion batteries, 160 Wh/kg; and zinc-air batteries, approximately 350 Wh/kg (Caramia and Bozzini 2014).

68

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Floating Offshore Windin the United Kingdom since 2017. And a number of pilot

Offshore wind has experienced rapid growth in recent years,
especially in the North Sea and China. The vast majority of projects
are installed on fixed foundations (usually monopiles) in waterless than 60 meters deep. For deeper waters (up to 1,000 meters),
floating foundations may be used. Although the floating windtechnology is still at a nascent stage, it offers great future potential
to rapidly increase the scale and the geographic scope of offshore

projects have begun elsewhere, with different models of floating
foundations emerging, such as spar-buoy, spar-submersible, andtension-leg platform. Many of these models draw on existing
applications of floating foundations within the offshore oil
industry. Each model has different advantages and disadvantages
and varying implications for mineral demand. Costs are also falling
rapidly, declining 86 percent since 2009 (ESMAP 2019).

wind. At the same time, it could also increase the mineral demand

Beyond steel, demand for other minerals from floating offshore

for steel because floating platforms tend to be much heavier

wind turbines could be similar or different from other wind options.

than their fixed counterparts. An October 2019 report by ESMAPThe biggest difference in mineral demand relates to the length of

estimated that eight developing countries—Brazil, India, Morocco,transmission cabling required. Where floating offshore turbines

the Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Vietnam—havewill be deployed is not just a function of distance from the shore

the technical potential for more than 3,000 GW of offshore wind,

but also depth to the seabed. In areas where floating turbines are

two-thirds of which would require floating turbines (ESMAP 2019).

deployed a relatively short distance from the shore, then cabling

Floating turbines are just starting to enter commercialization.
A 30 MW demonstration project, Hywind, has been operating

will not necessarily be longer, and demand for copper may not begreater. Should floating offshore turbines be deployed at greater
distances, however, then demand for copper could rise.35

Figure 3.25 Floating Offshore Wind

Barge

Semisubmersible

Spar

Illustration adapted from ESMAP (2019) and various other sources.

35

These factors are discussed in more depth in life-cycle assessments of floating turbines, such as in Tsai et al. (2016) and Chipindula et al. (2018).

Tension-leg platform

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Fuel Cells and Hydrogen69

infrastructure. All these features combined explain why fuel cells

A key potential low-carbon technology not included in this analysis
is the use of fuel cells and hydrogen in the clean energy transition,

have been emerging predominantly in buses, and medium to heavy
freight transportation.

for providing space heating and powering various industrial

Fuel cells have various subtechnologies, including ones that use

processes as well as transportation. The use of fuel cells anda catalyst prominently made out of platinum or ruthenium, buthydrogen to provide a power source for low-carbon transportation

there are two main subtechnologies:

has been explored for some time now because of its potential tolower carbon emissions (assuming green hydrogen is used) andthe potential for hydrogen to be used as an energy carrier. Despite
this promise, hydrogen deployment has been limited by high costs
barriers in providing the fuel cells and the required hydrogenneeded to power those cells, along with infrastructure constraints.
Figure 3.26 Hydrogen Fuel Cell

• Proton exchange membrane fuel cells are the most commonlyused hydrogen subtechnology because of their low weight. These
fuel cells operate at low temperatures and require a catalyst
usually made out of platinum to split the hydrogen and oxygen
molecules. This subtechnology also utilizes chromium steel,composed of 18 percent chromium and 8 percent nickel.36• Solid oxide fuel cells do not require a catalyst. These fuel cells
operate at very high temperatures and are thus not suitable
for transportation; they are predominantly used for stationary

Hydrogen gas
Catalyst (platinum)
Oxidant

power generation. Although the solid oxide fuel cell does notneed platinum as a catalyst, it uses other minerals such as
yttrium, zirconium, lanthanum, and samarium in the anodes,
cathodes, and electrolytes.
The platinum market as a whole showed a surplus in 2018, in part
attributable to a decline in consumption of diesel cars, in which

Unused fuelplatinum is used in the catalytic converter (Johnson Matthey
Water2019). This trend is likely to continue, and whether it will be offset
by sufficient demand from fuel cells depends on their speed andscale of deployment. Platinum may also play further roles infuture energy systems, as it is important component not just of

Illustration adapted from various sources (for example, Setra, https://www.setra.com/blog/whatis-a-hydrogen-fuel-cell-and-how-does-it-work).

Fuel cell transportation has specific features that give it athe fuel cells but also in the electrolysis production of hydrogen.
Should hydrogen grow as an energy carrier for uses beyond fuelcells, such as space heating, platinum demand could rise strongly.

comparative advantage over batteries and other low-carbon

Recycling will also play an important role in platinum demand

technologies. Fuel cells offer a higher energy density per weightfrom hydrogen. Platinum group minerals are highly recyclable,

than batteries, allowing for longer distance travel and improved

with potential recovery rates of 95 percent possible (Hagelüken

performance in vehicles, such as buses and heavy freight. The

2012). The scale at which platinum group minerals could

point-to-point nature of this form of transportation also helps

be recycled from fuel cell applications, especially withinovercome some of the infrastructure constraints associatedtransportation, remains to be seen, but it could have a large

with needing to electrify all electric vehicles with transmission

impact on overall demand for primary platinum.37

36
37

Estimates have highlighted potential future efficiency gains, reducing the share of steel to 0.02 kg/KW by 2025—down from 0.1 kg/KW in 2008 (Moss et al. 2013).
The current use of six platinum group metals as catalysts in fine chemical production demonstrates recycling rates of 80–90 percent. Recycling rates in automotive applications are lower, but still around 50–60
percent. Recycling from electrical applications have proved trickier, with rates below 10 percent.

70

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

5

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

71

Overall Mineral Demand
up to 2050
This chapter illustrates the overall demandacross all 17 minerals from the six technologybased mitigation scenarios to show the impactthat the clean energy transition will have on
minerals in comparison with the base scenario.
Figure 4.1 shows the total cumulative demand
for minerals through 2050 from electricity
generation technologies only under IRENA’s
REmap and the IEA’s base scenario (4DS) andB2DS (again, energy storage figures are notprovided because the data were unavailable
for the base and IRENA scenarios).

The figures demonstrate an overall increase in demand for as
many as 11 minerals used across a variety of energy technologies,
with iron and aluminum showing the highest absolute increase,followed by copper and zinc. These trends indicate a relative
increase in mineral demand with the relative ambitiousness ofeach technology-based mitigation scenario. This confirms one of
the critical conclusions of previous findings: Not only is low-carbon
energy transition materially intensive, but that intensity increases
with the level of decarbonization.
Most minerals show the highest levels of demand under the
IRENA scenario, when compared with their IEA counterparts,
owing to the IRENA scenario’s greater reliance on wind and solar
PV technologies. The key exception is manganese, which showsmuch higher levels of demand under the 4DS and B2DS scenarios
because of its use in CCS, which the IEA considers more likely
than IRENA.

Figure 4.1 Cumulative Demand for Minerals for Energy Technologies (Without Storage) Through 2050 Only Under 4DS, B2DS, and REmap

IEA 4DS

400
350

60

3.0

50

2.5

40

2.0

30

1.5

20

1.0

10

0.5

IEA B2DS

IRENA REmap

300

Tons (millions)

250
200
150
100
50
0

0
Iron

Aluminum0
CopperZinc

Lead

NickelChromium

Manganese Molybdenum Silver Neodymium

Note: Base scenario = 4-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy Agency, IRENA = International Renewable Energy Agency, REmap = renewable energy roadmap scenario.

72

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Figure 4.2 provides another way of looking at the scenarios andAnnual Demand

implications for minerals demand: the percentage of expected

The results presented to date have highlighted the cumulativechange from the base scenario in supplying electricity generation
technologies only. In the REmap scenario, demand for aluminum,
indium, and silver are expected to increase by more than 300

scale of minerals needed to meet the challenge of the low-carbon
transition. However, it is important to note the annual pathwaythat is needed to meet this cumulative scale. It is not simply apercent by 2050 from the base scenario, while the demand for

one-off investment in a stock of minerals that are needed for thecopper, iron, lead, neodymium, and zinc is expected to increase

low-carbon transition. Instead, it is a steadily increasing annual

by more than 200 percent. In comparison, in the most ambitious

requirement that is needed to meet a higher future projectedscenario under the IEA (B2DS), the demand for more than five

demand for electricity. This evolution can be seen in figure ES.1,

minerals is expected to double by 2050, from the base scenario.

which highlights that annual rates of demand are increasing up
to 2050. The rate of increase tails off slowly to 2050, but it still
reveals a picture whereby annual demand in 2050 is much greaterthan that in 2020.

Figure 4.2 Relative Change in Demand for Minerals from Energy Technologies (Without Storage) Through 2050 Under RTS, Ref, B2DS, and REmap,
Compared to Base ScenarioBasescenario

350%
31%

242%
4%

119%

-5%

244%
5%

Iron

219%

10%

Indium341%
28%

CopperAluminum

76%

-11%

Lead

Chromium

IEA-RTS

40%-11%

Neodymium
Molybdenum

IRENA-Ref

9%

SilverNickel

IEA B2DS

231%

Zinc
Titanium

IRENA REmap

12%

213%
122%

-5%

322%
28%

Note: Base scenario = 4-degree scenario, B2DS = beyond 2-degree scenario, IEA = International Energy Agency, IRENA = International Renewable Energy Agency, Ref = reference scenario, REmap =renewable energy roadmap scenario; RTS = reference technology scenario.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition73

As all 17 minerals covered in the model are used for different

Graphite demand increases in both absolute and percentage

applications outside the energy sector, this analysis comparesterms since graphite is needed to build the anodes found in thethe mineral demand coming from the 10 energy technologies

most commonly deployed automotive, grid, and decentralized

under the 2DS and compares it with 2018 production figures.

batteries. About 4.5 million tons of graphite is needed to be

Figure 4.3, panel a, provides the percentage increase in mineralproduced annually by 2050, or a cumulative of 68 million tons,

demand based on 2018 production figures, with the majority ofwhile graphite demand increases by nearly 500 percent from 2018

demand coming from battery minerals, namely graphite, lithium,

production figures, demonstrating the critical role graphite plays

and cobalt. These minerals will be needed at scales significantlyin the clean energy transition, being used in Li-ion batteries, thebeyond current production levels, by up to as much as five times.

most widely projected deployed battery technology.

Figure 4.3, panel b, illustrates the annual absolute increase inmineral production up to 2050, with production figures being thehighest for aluminum, graphite, and nickel.

Figure 4.3 Projected Annual Mineral Demand Under 2DS Only from Energy Technologies in 2050, Compared to 2018 Production Levels

a. 2050 annual demand from energy technologies
as percentage of 2018 productionb. Annual demand from energy technologies
in 2050

500%

6

450%
5

400%
350%

4
Tons (millions)

Percent

300%
250%
200%

3

2

150%
100%

1

50%

Titanium

SilverNeodymium

Vanadium

Molybdenum

Lithium

Chromium

CobaltManganese

Zinc

Lead

CopperNickelGraphite

Iron

Titanium

Chromium

Manganese

Zinc

CopperAluminum

Lead

Molybdenum

SilverNeodymium

NickelVanadium

CobaltIndiumLithium

Graphite

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario.

Aluminum

0

0%

74

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Even where future demand from energy technologies does notMarket Dynamics and Mineral Demand
The demand estimates produced in this analysis are thedemand that would occur assuming that supply can fully
adjust to meet that demand and that no substitution or
efficiency improvements occur. Higher levels of demand
would lead to higher prices, causing increases in supply
but also substitution of other minerals, where technicallypossible, as well as innovation in efficiency improvements.
The outlook presented in this section should be seen as

exceed current production, the share of demand from energy
technology in total demand for virtually all these minerals
is likely to rise, which carries implications for their relative
accessibility over the next few decades.38 For example, thepercent share of aluminum appears to be relatively small, but
the mineral’s absolute numbers are much greater than lithium(the highest percentage increase)—at about 5.6 million tons in
2050, compared with 0.4 million tons for lithium that same year.
Absolute demand may be so high that it could bring pressure on
the aluminum industry’s capacity to meet the expected demand in

the first pillar in understanding the full impact that a low-

servicing the low-carbon future.

carbon transition will have on the markets for minerals.

Cross-Cutting Minerals

These results should be combined with further researchon the supply aspects as well as the substitution and

Cross-cutting minerals refer to minerals that are used across atechnical efficiency possibilities.

wide variety of energy generation and storage technologies. Earlier
in this report, the demand for minerals such as lithium, graphite,silver, and aluminum was identified as being concentrated in
one or two specific energy technologies up to 2050. This section
also focuses on the minerals that are used throughout a broader
spectrum of energy technologies, as this has implications forthe overall demand of minerals regardless of which technology
or subtechnology ends up being deployed the most under eachtechnology-based mitigation scenario.
Copper, chromium, and molybdenum are examples of minerals
that are used across eight or more technologies, with copper
being used in all energy generation and storage technologies
covered in the model. It is important to pay attention to crosscutting minerals since these are a subset of minerals that are notdependent on the deployment of one specific energy technology
for the demand to be affected. In other words, changes intechnology or subtechnology deployment will most likely have aminimal impact on the overall demand of cross-cutting minerals.

38

As market dynamics were not considered in this analysis, further information on how market dynamics could potentially impact this report’s mineral projections, which are based on the IEA and IRENA scenarios, canbe found in annex B.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Figure 4.4 Total Copper Demand by Energy Technology Through 2050
Under 2DS

3.4%

Geothermal

Coal (inc. CCS)Wind

Gas (inc. CCS)

41.7%

1.8%

Coal (inc. CCS)

Solar CSP

10.2%

35.3%

Figure 4.5 Total Molybdenum Demand by Energy Technology Through2050 Under 2DS

Gas (inc. CCS)

Solar PV

38.8%

Wind

75

1.0%

2DS

47.3%
Energy storage

3.5%

2DS

Nuclear

4.8%

Hydro

4.4%

1.0%
Hydro

0.3%

Geothermal

1.3%

Solar PV

3.2%

Nuclear2.0%

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, CCS = carbon capture and storage, CSP = concentrated solar power,
PV = photovoltaic.

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, CCS = carbon capture and storage, CSP = concentrated solar power,
PV = photovoltaic.

Figure 4.4 shows the total cumulative demand for copper from

Molybdenum is another critical mineral required for a range of low-electricity generation and energy storage technologies throughcarbon technologies, especially wind and geothermal. The greatest

2050. The greatest share of demand comes from solar PV (39share of demand for molybdenum from electricity generation andpercent) and wind (35 percent), particularly for offshore wind.

energy storage technologies comes from wind (47.3 percent) andTogether, solar PV and wind represent 74 percent of total copper

geothermal (41.7 percent), with all the other generation and energy

demand in a 2DS. This is likely a significant underestimation

storage technologies together accounting for only a small shareof the demand for copper in servicing the clean energy future(11 percent) (figure 4.5). This is despite the fact that molybdenum

since it does not include infrastructure requirements, such as

typically only makes up 0.15 percent of the mineral compositiontransmission systems. The International Copper Associationof a wind turbine. Together, wind and geothermal account for 89

estimates that more than 60 percent of refined copper is used forpercent of molybdenum demand under a 2DS. There is a lack ofsupporting electricity and heating systems.39

clear data allowing for determination of which subtechnology ofwind accounts for the greatest demand.

39

For further information, see “Energy and Renewables,” Applications, Copper Development Association: https://copperalliance.org.uk/about-copper/applications/energy-and-renewables/.

76

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Figure 4.6 Cumulative Copper and Molybdenum Demand Through 2050 (2DS, Base Scenario)a. Copper demandb. Molybdenum demand
800

30
25
Tons (thousands)

Tons (millions)

600
20
15
10

400

200
5
0

0

Base scenario

2DS

Base scenario

2DS

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario.

While copper and molybdenum are both cross-cutting 		As mentioned earlier, the copper figures are most likely vastly

minerals, there is a significant difference between the two:

underestimated, with copper’s demand likely to increase

Copper is a base metal that is used across a wide variety ofsignificantly from new transmission infrastructure needed forindustries,40 while molybdenum is considered to be a niche

new transportation infrastructure and energy systems, as well 		

mineral that is usually recovered as a byproduct or co-productas for a growing global population.

of copper (figure 4.6).41 The difference can also be seen in
production figures. In 2018, 21 million tons of copper was
produced, whereas only 0.3 million tons of molybdenum was
extracted—a 20.7-million-ton difference between the twominerals. In other words, 7,000 percent more copper was
produced in 2018 relative to molybdenum, even though bothminerals are used across a wide variety of energy technologies
and will both contribute to a low-carbon future pathway given
their importance in solar PV, wind, and geothermal technologies.

40
41

In this case, copper is referred to as a base metal since it is commonly used and inexpensive. It is not considered a precious metal such as silver or gold. However, for consistency, all minerals and metals in this report
are referred to as minerals.
“Molybdenum,” Minerals Database, Minerals Education Coalition, accessed 2019, https://mineralseducationcoalition.org/minerals-database/molybdenum/.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Demand Risk Matrix
A key element of this analysis is to understand how overall mineraldemand could be affected by the technology concentration ofeach mineral or the increase in growth from energy technologies

77• 2018-2050 production-demand index (demand index): This
index captures the scale to which production must scale up to
meet demand from energy technologies. The index consists of
two parts:

compared to current production figures. The relative importance• Relative demand is captured by comparing 2050 demand fromof mineral demand is even more important for minerals that areenergy technologies to 2018 total production of the mineral.

cross-cutting, meaning they do not depend on the deployment of

An index between 0 and 1 is then computed, with the mineral

one or two specific technologies to be relevant.

with highest relative demand, graphite, given a score of 1 andA demand risk matrix has been developed under a 2DS to provide
an overview of these trends based on technology concentrationlevels per each mineral relative to 2018 production figures (inabsolute and percentage figures). Two indexes, which make up thematrix, have been created, to ease comparisons between minerals:

each other mineral given a score relative to graphite.
• Absolute demand is captured through the absolute level ofdemand in 2050 from energy technologies for each mineral.
The mineral with the highest level (aluminum) is given a scoreof 1 and every other mineral is given a score between 0 and 1
relative to aluminum.

• Weighted coverage-concentration index (technology
concentration index): This index captures how cross-cutting

The two parts of the index are given an equal weight toor concentrated in a few technologies the minerals are in thecompute an overall production-demand index. The two indexes

model. A value for 1 is given for the most cross-cutting mineral,

are then plotted together to give four categories, or quadrants.

namely copper, with the scores for all other minerals relative

A breakdown of the quadrants and the possible interpretation

to copper. The index is calculated on an equal weighting of two

on mineral demand from energy technologies is below, as seen initems: (1) the number of technologies that require one mineral,figure 4.7 and annex B.

and (2) the share of demand for minerals that comes from asingle technology. The assumptions are described in further
detail in annex B.

78

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Figure 4.7 Demand Risk Matrix Under 2DS

1.0

Graphite
0.9

0.8

2018-2050 Production-Demand Index

0.7

0.6

Lithium
CobaltAluminum

0.5

0.4

Nickel
0.3

IndiumVanadium
0.2

Copper

Zinc
0.1

Lead

SilverManganese

Neodymium
Chromium0

Molybdenum

Titanium
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

Weighted Coverage-Concentration Index

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Quadrant 1
Medium-Impact Minerals:

Quadrant 3
High-Impact, Cross-Cutting Minerals:

Minerals that fall in quadrant 1 are the least impacted

Minerals that fall in quadrant 3 are critical because

minerals from demand. These minerals feature in only

the demand from 2018 production levels increases

a small range of energy technologies and the anticipatedsignificantly, yet their use is also widespread acrossincreases in demand are a small percentage of 2018a variety of technologies.

production levels. It is important to stress that this matrix
only compares minerals demand from energy technologies
only and does not consider supply risks, nor the demand
from other industries outside the energy sector.
• This is not to say that these minerals are not important79• Aluminum is used widely for both energy generationand storage technologies. The demand for aluminumis therefore expected to be critical regardless of which
technology-based mitigation scenario is achieved.
While aluminum’s overall level of demand from energy

to the deployment of particular subtechnologies.

technologies is less than 10 percent of its 2018 production

Neodymium is a rare earth that is critical for thelevels, it has the highest production levels compared to all

deployment of offshore wind.

other 16 minerals, with cumulative production reaching
102 million tons by 2050 to primarily supply solar PV andthen other energy technologies.

Quadrant 2
High-Impact Minerals:

Quadrant 4
Cross-Cutting Minerals:

Minerals that fall in quadrant 2 are important

The minerals in quadrant 4 are important because while

because, although they only feature in a small number

their overall demand from energy technologies relativeof technologies, their level of future demand is muchto production (in percentage) is not as dramatic as that

greater than 2018 production levels. Changes to thefor minerals in quadrants 2 or 3, they are used acrosstechnologies or subtechnologies used may have big

a wide variety of technologies and are not dependent

implications for overall levels of demand. They areon one specific technology. Therefore, the demand for

predominantly (but not exclusively) minerals used inthese minerals will exist no matter which technologies orenergy storage technologies.

subtechnologies are deployed.

• Lithium, which is only used in energy storage under• Copper, for example, represented as an index of 1, is used

this analysis, is projected to need 488 percent ofacross all 10 energy technologies covered in the model and2018 production levels to meet its 2050 demand

therefore is the mineral for which the demand will be theunder a 2DS.42

least impacted by significant changes in the technologybased mitigation scenarios.

42

While this report does not address supply, about 71 percent of all rare earths, including neodymium, are produced in China.

80

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Mineral Recycling, Reuse

more cheaply than recycled material, then very little recycling

Recycling could play an increased role in meeting demand forplay a critical role in how the mineral recycling industry develops

minerals to supply a low-carbon transition. As of today, the mostrecycled minerals are iron and steel (AGI 2017). Minerals mapped
under the demand risk matrix in the previous section could, intheory, shift into different quadrants, depending on whether someof these minerals are partially recycled once energy technologies
reach end of life, reducing the amount of minerals that need to be
extracted. The opportunities for mineral recycling are important to
explore, particularly as mineral demand increases under the mostambitious climate pathways.

will occur. Policy support and technological improvements will
to bring down costs and encourage innovation to meet demand
from low-carbon technologies.

Recycling
Only five minerals have been selected to analyze the potential
impact of recycling on mineral demand, given the limitationsof available data on mineral recycling, as well as to provide
consistency with other sections. Aluminum is specifically highlighted
because it is used across almost all energy generation technologies

Primary minerals refer to minerals that are extracted andand storage and has significant demand implications relative to its

processed into a final mineral product before being used to2018 production levels (quadrant 3 – high-impact, cross-cutting

manufacture products, including energy technologies, while

minerals). Lithium and cobalt are relevant because the demandsecondary minerals refer to minerals that have been recycled

for these minerals increase by 488 percent and 460 percent,from a variety of products. The model’s estimated projections

respectively, relative to 2018 production (quadrant 2 – high-impact

for the potential role of recycling do not consider the economics

minerals). Nickel and copper are showcased because both mineralsof mineral recycling, nor the technical limitations of recycling.

are cross-cutting minerals (quadrant 4 – cross-cutting minerals)

The cost of recycling is a crucial factor in determining how muchand their increase in demand in either absolute or relative numbers

recycling takes place. If the primary mineral is available muchis significant, relative to niche minerals, under a 2DS.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

As discussed in the Recycling, Reuse section of chapter 1, twodemand further. Examples of such changes that could increase

recycling rates are important for the analysis:

scrap availability include changes to the design of products to• End of life (EOL): The percentage of material that is recoveredat the end of a products life and recycled into new material• Recycled content (RC): The percentage of a new product thatis made using secondary (recycled) material
The implications of recycling under a 2DS can be seen in figures
4.8–4.10. In these charts, the end-use demand for the relevant
minerals is illustrated, chiefly the amount of minerals that is
actually required to go into a wind turbine or solar panels. The
figures show the amount of primary mineral that is required if
current RC rates remain the same until 2050,43 along with thesituation if EOL rates increase to 100 percent by 2050 (lithium
rates are estimated differently, as explained in the Recycling,
Reuse section in chapter 1).
Figure 4.8 presents the impacts for aluminum and copper
recycling. Approximately 102.8 million tons of aluminum isenable better mineral recovery, and large falls in demand for themineral from other sectors, outside the energy industry.
For copper specifically, current RC rates are assumed to be
28.5 percent (figure 4.8) and an increase to 100 percent EOL
by 2050 increases RC rates to 59 percent, reducing the overall
cumulative demand for primary copper from energy technologies
by 26 percent. While increasing EOL rates to 100 percent has asimilar impact on both minerals, primary demand for aluminum
still outweighs primary copper demand by more than threetimes, at over 46 million tons for aluminum and over 14 million
tons for copper through 2050. Again, the copper figures may beunderestimated given that transmission figures are not includedin this analysis.
Figure 4.8 Impact of Recycling on Cumulative Demand for Aluminumand Copper Under 2DS Through 2050

required to meet demand from the energy technologies undera. Aluminuma 2DS. Should RC rates remain constant at today’s levels of 35
percent, then 42.3 million tons would be met by secondary orfrom primary production, from bauxite extraction.

The final amount of aluminum needed to supply technologies
doesn’t change, but the amount met by secondary production
rises to 57 million tons, with 24 percent less primary production
required.44 The demand for primary production does not disappear
completely even with a 100 percent EOL rate, as the production of25

80
Tons (millions)

aluminum available is recycled—then RC rates rise to 61 percent.

b. Copper
30

100

recycled production, with the remaining 60.5 million tons coming

If EOL rates increase to 100 percent by 2050—implying that all

20
60
15
40
10
20

5
0

0

Should structural changes to the nature of the economy takeCurrent
Scale up to
recycling 100% EOL RR
rates
by 2050(RC: 61%)

Current
Scale up to
recycling 100% EOL RR
rates
by 2050(RC: 59%)

place, which means that the ratio of scrap availability to overall

Primary aluminum required

Primary copper required

mineral demand changes, then the potential to increase RC rates

Secondary aluminum available

Secondary copper available

secondary aluminum is limited by the supply of scrap available.

81

from 100 percent EOL rates exist, reducing primary mineral
Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario.

43
44

Data on global recycling rates for different minerals are patchy and a review of the literature shows a wide range of estimates.
The change in primary demand is a function of two factors: the time path of end-use aluminum demand and the time path of recycling rates. Although the results seem trite, they are in fact contingent on how fast
recycling rates increase and when the majority of end-use demand occurs. Given that the larger share of end-use demand occurs closer to 2050, should recycling rates scale up more quickly than the linear trend
assumed here, then overall primary demand would decrease. Similarly, a slower transition to higher recycling rates will require higher levels of primary aluminum to be supplied.

82

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Figure 4.9 Impact of Recycling on Cumulative Demand for Nickel Under
2DS Through 2050

Nickel is a crucial metal for the move to a green energy future as itis needed in energy storage, for use in Li-ion batteries, and is also
used in a wide range of generation technologies, often being used35

as a component of the steel required. Rates on the RC of nickel, or

30

scrap nickel, vary, but they center on 35 percent. Should RC rates
stay at this level, then primary demand for nickel through 2050

Tons (millions)25

would stand at just over 20 million tons (figure 4.9). Following

20

similar assumptions for copper and aluminum, as well as assuming

15

that EOL rates increase to 100 percent by 2050, then RC rates

10

increase to 58 percent and primary demand for nickel would fallby 23 percent compared to today’s RC rates.

5

The battery minerals cobalt and lithium have very different0
Current recycling rates

Scale up to EOL RR
100% by 2050 (RC:58%)

Primary nickel required

Secondary nickel required

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, EOL = end of life, RC = recycled content, RR = recycling rate.

Figure 4.10 Impact of Recycling on Cumulative Demand for Cobalt
and Lithium Under 2DS Through 2050

a. Cobalt
8

5

7

5

percent, following a similar trajectory as aluminum and copperwith regard to decreased demand from primary production.
However, the technical challenges of extracting cobalt for use
in batteries may make these assumptions less robust than foraluminum and copper, which are easier to recycle.

area.46 For example, they project medium and high recycling
scenarios of EOL rates of 40 percent and 80 percent, respectively.

10

demand for primary cobalt from energy technologies by 15

highlighted the high future potential for recycling to grow in this2

1increases RC to 47 percent, reducing the overall cumulative

according to a variety of sources.45 However, some sources have3

2

up to 2050 (figure 4.10). An increase to 100 percent EOL by 2050

lithium recycling rates (both EOL and RC) are close to zero

43with primary cobalt accounting for 5.4 million tons of demand

Lithium, on the other hand, is very different because current

4

6
Tons (millions)b. Lithium

recycling trajectories. Cobalt currently has an RC of 32 percent,In this analysis, a midpoint has been selected, with EOL rising to0
Current
Scale up to
recycling 100% EOL RR
rates
by 2050(RC: 47%)

Current
recyclingrate

Scale up to
60% EOL RR
by 2050(RC: 39%)

Primary cobalt available

Primary lithium available

Secondary cobalt available

Secondary lithium available

60 percent by 2050 implying an estimated 39 percent RC rate.47
The impact of such recycling is to reduce cumulative demand forlithium by 26 percent.

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario.

45
46
47

It should be noted that there is a large amount of research and activity investigating the potential to recycle lithium from Li-ion batteries. However, to date little available public data show this is yet happening
commercially at any scale. In fact, where there are recent studies, they have highlighted the low cost of lithium and the relatively high cost of recycling as a key barrier to scaling up lithium recycling. See, for example,
Ziemann et al. (2018) and Church and Wuennenberg (2019).
This is drawn from the analysis in Ziemann et al. (2018).

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Reuse

83

Figure 4.11 Impact of Reuse on Cumulative Demand for Lithium Under
2DS Through 2050

Reuse differs from recycling in that recycling involves the breaking
down of the material and re-forming it for an alternative use. The

6term “reuse” in this context is used to mean the reusing of theoriginal component, such as a battery, for another use beyond

5what was original intended. For example, Li-ion batteries that areof energy storage applications.48 While reuse of batteries could
provide opportunities for stationary storage applications, thispotential solution to reducing overall mineral demand should be
carefully approached from waste and safety perspectives.
This could be the case if, once clean energy technologies reachend of life and can be to some degree repurposed, they do not end

4Tons (millions)used in electric vehicles could potentially be used in other types

32
1
0With no reuse

up being used as an excuse to dispose these technologies under
the guise of a “repurposed” product; this is especially true for

Scaling up to 50%
stationary storage
met by reusedeveloping countries or underserved communities that may end up
becoming recipients of these technologies once they reach end oflife, resulting in an increased amount of waste.

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario

Otherwise, with lithium demand only coming from energy storage

In this context, reuse has also been termed as repurposing.

under the Ref, 2DS, and B2DS, particularly in the automotive

Conservative assumptions have been applied to the rate of reused

sector, the only way to significantly reduce lithium’s demand

Li-ion batteries with the assumption that reused batteries meetwould be by finding ways to reuse Li-ion batteries in the electric

50 percent of the demand for Li-ion batteries in stationary

vehicle sector, as stationary storage applications only account forstorage by 2050. This reduces the total cumulative demand fora small share of energy storage deployments up to 2050. However,lithium by 3 percent (figure 4.11). Should there be a reuse of Li-ion

this trend is unlikely as electric vehicles require batteries with thebatteries in transport, either between cars or between trucks andcapacity to undertake a large amount of cycling (charging andbuses and cars—through remanufacturing processes—then thisdischarging) and to hold a charge and recharge quickly—features

could reduce primary demand for lithium substantially. There is,associated with new batteries.

49

however, little current evidence of these processes occurring at acommercial level, despite much research and interest in the area.

48
49

See the discussion in Ahmadi et al. (2017).
See Strandridge and Hasan (2015) for further details.

84

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Opportunities and Challenges
While the opportunities for recycling minerals could help address
demand risks associated with the low-carbon transition, somerecyclable minerals may not be suitable for the production ofcertain energy technologies, as some technologies may requirea very high grade of a specific mineral for their application (forexample, steel). Moreover, the energy intensiveness of somerecycling processes could pose the same issues that have been
identified in steel and aluminum production.
Recycling rates vary massively between minerals because of cost
and technical issues. Rates for recycling of steel are especiallyhigh, with over an estimated 85 percent of it being recycled EOL.
Even within minerals, rates vary across products. For example,
95 percent of steel from automobiles is recycled, compared with
70 percent from steel packaging. Recycling rates, however, canbe deceptive. Despite 85 percent of steel being recycled, about
one-third of steel comes from primary production, as the majorityof steel is locked up in long-term, durable structures, limiting theamount of steel that is available for recycling, especially when
demand is increasing.
Recycling brings environmental benefits in a number of areas,

Refurbishment of structures and equipment to prolong theirespecially in GHG emissions, with the carbon footprint from thelife spans has not been covered by this analysis, but it issecondary production of minerals, such as aluminum, being aanother crucial feature phenomenon that could affect thefraction that of primary production. For other minerals, however,demand for primary minerals. Recycling of many components

recycling comes with additional environmental challenges, such asof energy technologies may prove to be technically difficult orenergy use and water footprints, that need to be weighed against

costly. Refurbishing parts of energy technologies can prolong

the environmental benefits.

life spans dramatically, reducing the mineral footprint. For

Overall, recycling could present interesting opportunities forcountries with advanced recycling technology with reliable lowcarbon, electricity production to potentially reduce the pressureof increasing demand for certain minerals, but policy coherence
among countries will be needed so that future international
recycling practices take into account the environmental, safety,
and high costs of mineral recycling.

example, old wind turbines at the end of their life span can be
refurbished by retaining the tower but replacing some or all of
the other components, increasing the capacity of the turbine or
retrofitting it with more efficient components such as gearboxes
or generators. Estimating the scale of such effects is difficult, but
increasing refurbishment would reduce the overall scale of mineraldemand, and may impact minerals used in frames and structures
more than those minerals used in specific components such as
motors or magnets.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

85

86

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

6

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

87

Global Warming Potentialof Energy Technologies, Minerals
GWP of Energy Technologies

Although steel and cement were not included in the analysis, they

The importance in calculating the GWP of energy technologies

to emissions from the construction of both renewable and fossil

is to compare the carbon footprint associated with extracting
and recycling more minerals to supply a low-carbon future. The
aim is to understand the carbon footprint implications of theclean energy transition, particularly as the previous sections of
the analysis have demonstrated that low-carbon technologies,
including generation and storage, are extremely mineralintensive. With the Paris Agreement calling for increasing global
temperature to not exceed a 2°C scenario, the GWP analysis
provides the approximate calculation of the carbon footprint ofclean energy technologies compared with fossil fuel ones under the
IEA 2DS, mirroring the approach taken in the demand risk matrix
to meet mineral demand.

have been included in figure 5.1 because of their high contribution
fuel energy technologies. Steel is currently estimated to accountfor 7–9 percent of total GHG emissions. Cement accounts forapproximately 8 percent (Timperley 2018). Data on the steel andcement needed to build the technologies, and the carbon footprint
for steel and cement, were drawn from the literature, with high,median, and low values used to capture the range of estimates in asimilar manner as other aspects of the model.
Figure 5.1 Cumulative GWP Through 2050 from "Cradle to Gate" 		
Mineral Extraction and Processing, Operations of Renewable
Electricity Generation, and Energy Storage Technologies Comparedto Fossil Fuel Technologies Under 2DS

As seen in figure 5.1, there are emissions associated with minerals

160

required for a low-carbon future up to 2050, but clean energy
technologies provide a substantially smaller overall GHG footprint

140

than either coal or gas—with renewable energy and storage
contributing approximately 16 GtCO2e through 2050 in the 2DS,

120

compared with almost 160 GtCO2e from coal and approximately
more electricity is generated from these latter sources, theemissions from coal and gas are much greater, at more than 470
GtCO2e and 130 GtCO2e, respectively.

100
GtCO₂e96 GtCO2e from gas. In the base scenario, where substantially8060

The primary difference between clean and conventional energy
has to do with the operation of each of those technologies. While40

the GHG footprint in the extraction and processing of minerals
required for the construction of renewable energy technologies

20

is likely to be higher than that for fossil fuel generation, once theemissions that result from extracting coal and gas, and cruciallyin burning it to generate electricity, are taken into account, fossil
fuel generation has a significantly greater footprint. In other0

Renewable
generation+ storage

Coal

Gas

words, the relative GWP of “cradle to gate” of renewable energy

Extraction for fuelExtraction for construction

technologies compared with the GWP of fossil fuel combustion

Operation

Extraction and processing steel and concrete

under a 2DS are considerably smaller.
Note: Extraction for construction includes the crade-to-gate emissions from the 17
minerals included in the analysis. Extraction and processing steel and concrete includes
crade-to-gate emissions for steel and concrete and are included because of the scale ofemissions from these two minerals compared to the 17 minerals included in the analysis.
GtCO2 = gigatons of carbon dioxide, GWP = global warming potential.

88

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

GHG emissions from just the operation of coal and gas facilities
alone are comparable to 2017 GHG emissions50 of more than
60 years of European Union emissions, at an annual basis. Thisfinding is consistent with the wider literature that have examined
the life-cycle footprint of the different energy technologies. It
also falls in line with the IEA’s estimation of coal combustion
contributing to the 0.3°C of the 1°C increase in global averagetemperature above preindustrial levels, representing about 30

GWP of Minerals
Given the material intensity of low-carbon technologies, as wellas the implications associated with their disposal, particularly forbattery technologies, current and future renewable energy policy
should also take into account the emissions associated with thesetechnologies’ increased deployment. It should also be noted that
the GWP analysis does not consider the environmental and social

percent of total GHG emissions globally.51

risks (for example, water, ecosystems, and so on) associated with

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) conducted

cutting minerals (quadrant 4) and high-impact, cross-cutting

an exercise attempting to harmonize the various life-cycle
estimates of different energy technologies. The NREL’s scope
differs from the GWP estimated above, as this analysis focusessolely on the GWP relating to the mineral extraction andprocessing, as well as the operation of energy technologies,
without considering the end of life of these technologies, but theincreased extractive and processing activities, particularly crossminerals (quadrant 3).
The GWP can also be used to look at the carbon intensiveness foreach mineral, relative to the 2DS, to understand which mineral
has the lowest and highest carbon footprint. Figure 5.2 shows
the balance between the emissions impact of these minerals andfindings from their work are similar.52

their demand importance in the transition to a low-carbon energy

The takeaway from this GWP analysis is that, while a more

emissions up to 2050.

ambitious climate scenario leads to a higher demand for numberof minerals, the GWP of clean energy technologies, using acradle-to-gate approach, is significantly smaller than coal andgas; therefore, the clean energy transition is the preferred means
to achieve a 2°C or below pathway that is in line with the Paris
Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals.

system, with circle size representing a mineral’s cumulative

Aluminum has the highest cumulative carbon footprint undera 2DS, at 840 MtCO2e, as solar PV is expected to be the mostwidely deployed renewable energy technology under that scenario,
accounting for 87 percent of total aluminum demand; it is also
used across a range of other energy technologies. Additionally,aluminum demand is expected to grow by 111 percent, from 48.8
million tons under the base scenario to 102.8 million tons in a 2DS.
Aluminum is the highest ranked mineral on the demand index
as it is a high-impact, cross-cutting mineral; it is used across awide range of technologies and has the highest annual productionlevels, reaching 5.6 million tons per year by 2050.

50
51
52

Data sourced from Union of Concerned Scientists, “Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions,” published July 16, 2008, updated October 10, 2019, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-countrys-share-co2emissions.
Data available from the IEA Data and Statistics database: https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics?country=WORLD&fuel=CO2%20emissions&indicator=CO2%20emissions%20by%20energy%20source.
The NREL finds that the mean carbon emissions per kilowatt-hour from solar PV is just 6 percent of the same kilowatt-hour produced by a coal plant, and 12 percent of a kilowatt-hour from a gas plant. Moreinformation on the project is available at “Life Cycle Assessment Harmonization,” NREL: https://www.nrel.gov/analysis/life-cycle-assessment.html.

Steel
3,655.4

Figure 5.2 Total Cumulative Emissions from Cradle to Gate
for Energy Technologies Through 2050 Under 2DS Comparedto the Demand Index (MtCO2e)

Steel is outside the model
but would fall in quadrant 3
if it were included.

Emissions values are MtCO₂e.

Graphite
363.5
1.0

0.9

0.8

2018-2050 Production-Demand Index

0.7

0.6

Lithium

CobaltAluminum

36.4

66.5

842.7

0.5

0.4

Nickel
211.6

0.3

IndiumVanadium

3.4

63.0
Copper
Zinc

0.2

73.7

93.7
Silver0.1

Manganese

60.7

Neodymium

Lead
22.3

10.6

2.9

Chromium

4.7

20.4

Titanium0

Molybdenum

0.7
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

Weighted Coverage-Concentration Index

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

90

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Graphite follows suit as a high-impact mineral, accounting forGermany, and the United Kingdom combined.53 Steel has not been

about 360 MtCO2e up to 2050 because it is exclusively used toincluded in the GWP analysis to avoid double-counting minerals

manufacture anodes used in most battery technologies. Nickel

such as nickel, titanium, iron ore, and chromium, given that thesehas the third highest GWP and falls into the cross-cuttingminerals are needed to produce steel. The emissions from steel

mineral category; it both has high levels of future demand, nearly

would be so high, that its cumulative emissions would stand at 3.7

doubling production from 2018 levels, and is used across a wide

GtCO2e—more than four times higher than the GWP of aluminum.

range of technologies.

Six minerals have been selected from three of the four quadrants

Together, aluminum, graphite, and nickel production for energy

in the demand risk matrix to understand which energy technology

technologies account for a cumulative 1.4 GtCO2e up to 2050,

has the highest GWP per mineral under a 2DS. Similar to trends

nearly equivalent to the total 2018 CO2 emissions from France,

above, aluminum accounts for the largest share of emissions,54 led

Box 5.1 Reducing Emissions from Aluminum Production

Extractionof bauxite

Conversion
to alumina

Aluminato aluminumTransportingand manufacturing

Productuse

End ofproduct life

Store

BauxiteminingAluminarefining

Aluminumsmelting

Primary aluminum production is a multistaged processtransition itself. Increased renewable deployment reduces

that transforms bauxite that is dug out of the ground into

the carbon intensity of electricity and therefore thefirst alumina (aluminum oxide) through crushing, washing,emissions from the electrolysis process. Using data fromtreating, and baking the bauxite (the Bayer process), andthe academic literature, it is estimated that cumulative

then into aluminum via electrolysis (Hall-Héroult process).

emissions of 840 MtCO2e from aluminum from energy

Emissions are produced at each stage, with the greatest
proportion coming from the final stage because of thelarge amounts of electricity involved and the CO2 that
directly arises from the process itself. Emissions per ton ofaluminum could fall dramatically in the future—especiallyfrom this final stage—as a result of the low-carbon

53
54

Recycling (recycling, reuse, and refurbishment)

Data from “CO2 Emissions,” Global Carbon Atlas: http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-emissions.
A full overview of the aluminum production process and its associated emissions can be found in annex B.

technologies only could fall to under 500 MtCO2e asa result of these changes, and increased recycling.
However, as the process of producing aluminum produces
direct CO2 emissions from the process of breaking
down aluminum oxide (alumina) into aluminum, othertechnological advances will be needed to reduce emissions
from the electrolysis process.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

91

Figure 5.3 Cumulative GWP from Extraction and Processing of Minerals, Not Including Operations, Using Cradle-to-Gate Through 2050 Under 2DS

800

700

600

MtCO₂e

500

400

300

200

100

0

Aluminum
Energy Storage

Graphite
Geothermal

NickelSolar PVWind

CobaltHydro

Coal (inc. CSS)

CopperGas (inc. CSS)

Lithium
Nuclear

Note: 2DS = 2-degree scenario, CCS = carbon capture and storage, CSP = concentrated solar power, GWP = global warming potential, MtCO2e = million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.

by solar PV (87 percent) and then wind (10 percent) deployments,

As a cross-cutting mineral, copper is used across all energy

as seen in figure 5.3. Under a B2DS, total emissions for aluminum

technologies, with a total carbon footprint of 74 MtCO2e under aproduction to supply energy technologies increases to 0.9 GtCO2e,

2DS, similar to cobalt and lithium. However, the GWP copper figure

representing an 8 percent increase from the 2DS. GHG emissions

may be vastly underestimated because copper is used in a widefrom cobalt, graphite, lithium, and nickel production primarily

variety of industries and crucial for the clean energy transition,

come from energy storage technologies specifically, althoughfrom transmission infrastructure to connecting electric vehicles

nickel is also used across a range of other energy technologies.

worldwide. Although aluminum’s large carbon footprint primarily

Still, energy storage accounts for a large share of nickel’s carbon

comes from solar PV, aluminum is also considered a cross-cutting

footprint—154 MtCO2e, representing 73 percent of total nickel

mineral because it is used across six energy technologies, including

emissions from energy technologies—while it accounts for 100

electricity generation and storage.

percent of graphite’s carbon footprint equivalent (363 MtCO2e).

92

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

7

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

93

Conclusion
Rising Overall Demandfor Mineralsmarket, or their commercialization could be hindered by costs or

The demand for base and niche minerals to help build clean

and are subject to shifts in policy or technologies. The overarchingenergy technologies are expected to rise substantially up to2050, increasing in both absolute and percentage terms from2018 production levels. Although clean energy technologies
are distinct, they all share a common feature: Higher material
intensity in comparison to fossil-fuel-based electricity generation.
Regardless of which technology-based mitigation scenario isachieved to keep global warming under 2 degrees or beyond, therapid and large-scale deployment of renewable energy will leadto significant increases in mineral demand because of how thesetechnologies produce and store electricity.
Based on the model presented in this report, large relative
increases in demand of up to nearly 500 percent are estimatedfor certain minerals, especially those concentrated in energy
storage technologies, such as lithium, graphite, and cobalt.

policy barriers. The increases in demand for specific minerals fromthe model should be regarded as a possibility that could emerge
conclusion—that mineral demand will increase—is agnostic tothe exact mix of technologies and subtechnologies that may be
deployed up to 2050.
Opportunities and risks are present for both the mining
sector and the governments that have low-carbon minerals,particularly in mineral-rich developing countries. For the mining
industry and resource-rich economies, there are environmental
and social challenges that need to be addressed as a resultof mining activities. The use of scarce water resources, forexample, can create conflict between mining companies and thecommunities around which they operate. For developing countries
specifically, these environmental and social issues are exacerbatedby weak governance. Countries that host these minerals arelikely to see an increased demand, which, if well managed, could

Even those minerals whose relative demand increases are smaller

contribute to economic growth and sustainable development.

(for example, copper) still face large increases in absolute demand.

Understanding how demand patterns for these crucial minerals

Different energy technologies require different types of minerals,

may shift in the face of a new energy system is crucial to long-

either to build their structures or frames, or as components interm planning for countries that produce these minerals andthe technology used to generate electricity, such as the PV cells

deploy renewable energy technologies as part of their nationalin solar PV and magnets or motors in wind turbines. Therefore,climate ambitions.

the technology pathway that emerges from the clean energy

carbon technology pathway is selected, overall mineral demand

Mineral Demand 		Vulnerability and Risks

will still increase.

Meeting the challenge of large-scale deployment of renewabletransition will shape the types of minerals that will experience thelargest increases in demand. That said, regardless of which low-

Technologies involved in the clean energy transition are
emerging, evolving, and improving rapidly through innovationand increased deployment. Thus, the way in which the lowcarbon transition will emerge is very difficult to predict. This
analysis relied on the IEA and IRENA scenarios to model the futureenergy system, but it is highly likely that a very different mix ofelectricity generation, and especially energy storage technologies,
will emerge as a result of policy choices, technological innovation,and market forces. New technologies such as floating offshore
wind or hydrogen fuel cells could emerge and dominate theenergy requires the steady availability of a variety of key
minerals as well as stable prices and minimal market
disruptions. This is particularly true in developing countries thatneed to deliver on SDG 7, “access to affordable, reliable, sustainable

and modern energy for all.” Understanding that each mineral may
carry different demand risks is crucial for the mining industry andgovernments, both of which need to be prepared for changes in
low-carbon technology deployments, potentially causing large andvolatile shifts in mineral demand. Understanding that minerals
can have varying demand risks can also provide insight into
potential recycling opportunities and needs.

94

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

This report has gone beyond estimating mineral demand
under different climate scenarios, specifically by developing a
new framework to understand the demand risks that may be
associated with a group of specific minerals. Some minerals will
face potentially large increases related to only one technology (orsubtechnology), while others will face lower but more broad-based
increases in absolute demand. Understanding which minerals fall
into which demand risk category is crucial for miners, renewableenergy developers, and policy makers to build a comprehensive
plan for the clean energy transition.

II. High-Impact Minerals• The clean energy transition has significant implications forthe production of certain minerals. High-impact mineralssuch as graphite, lithium, and cobalt will, under a 2DS, needto increase their production significantly, up to nearly 500
percent by 2050 from 2018 levels. Most of this demand will
come specifically from energy storage technologies; it could
also carry supply risks, as more than 60 percent of graphite andcobalt production are concentrated in China and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, respectively.

The demand risk matrix provides an overview of how 17 minerals• Demand for high-impact minerals is therefore both potentially

identified as key to the low-carbon transition are impacted byhigh and uncertain, raising opportunities and risks to both thedifferent demand profiles.

renewable energy industry and those involved in the supply

I. Medium-Impact Minerals• Medium-impact minerals, such as titanium and neodymium,chain of these minerals. Relatively small changes in the amountand type of energy storage technologies and subtechnologies
deployed could have large implications for the markets of theseare still affected by demand increases and may still play anminerals. Similarly, any potential challenges in meeting thisimportant role in the clean energy transition. Even thoughdemand could cause changes within the storage sector, causing

medium-impact minerals neither have high levels of relative

industry to change battery chemistry or even battery type.

demand nor are cross-cutting across a range of energy
technologies, the markets for these minerals could still beIII. High-Impact, Cross-Cutting Minerals

affected. Although their relative demand increases are small in• High-impact, cross-cutting minerals, such as aluminum, arethe climate scenarios presented, future changes in technology

critical not only because their demand does not depend on one

deployment could cause significant increases in demand forspecific technology, but also because they are needed in higher

these minerals.

quantities across a wide variety of energy technologies. High-• Medium-impact minerals are not used in a wide range

impact, cross-cutting minerals are less susceptible to fluctuatingof technologies but are crucial components of specificdemand risks because the high level of demand for these minerals

technologies, such as neodymium for offshore wind and titanium

will always exist no matter what type of energy technology orfor geothermal. Issues that threaten the ability of the market

subtechnology is deployed up to 2050. Additionally, the scale-to meet this demand could severely impact the deployment of

up in demand required is significant, implying there is a greater

these specific technologies as well as change the shape of thetrigger from demand to increase supply, compared to minerals

low-carbon transition. In some cases, substitution and efficiency

that are just cross-cutting. This makes this category of minerals

may be possible, as demonstrated in the case of neodymium

a high risk for both producers and consumers alike, but also

for wind energy, but this may be limited in many instances.

a potential opportunity for producers who will supply these

While this analysis, again, does not assess mineral supply risk,

minerals to meet this higher demand.

neodymium is a rare earth, and more than 70 percent of rareearths are currently produced in China.

• Demand for high-impact, cross-cutting minerals is likely to behigh and fairly certain over time. For aluminum specifically, its
future use and production may have significant implications
on the clean energy transition because it is used acrossMinerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition95

most technologies and has absolute demand figures thattechnologies, but extraction of mineral resources will still besignificantly outweigh all 17 minerals except graphite. Solar

needed. Recycling rates, both end of life and recycled content, vary

PV accounts for 87 percent of total aluminum demand since

greatly across minerals. Current recycling rates could reduce theit is expected to be the most widely deployed clean energy

required primary demand for minerals involved in the low-carbon

technology as climate scenarios become more ambitious.

transition. Future increases in recycling rates can play an important

Aluminum is thus vital to the low-carbon energy future. The

role in mitigating increases in demand for primary minerals, as

challenge is to provide a steady supply of high-impact, cross-can reuse of components for energy storage technologies, such as

cutting minerals, like aluminum, at a cost that allows the

Li-ion batteries, although commercial application of such reuse isrenewable energy sector to fulfill its potential.

currently limited. Incentivizing recycling, reuse, and refurbishment

IV. Cross-Cutting Minerals• Even without large increases in relative demand, minerals may
be greatly impacted by the low-carbon transition. For someminerals, such as copper, future demand from clean energy
technologies may not represent a large portion of current
production levels.55 However, the amount of those minerals
needed, in absolute terms, outweighs the production of otherminerals whose relative increases are much greater; theincrease in demand is still large enough to have an impact on theis a vital part of the low-carbon transition. However, more policy
measures are needed to scale up action in this area, all thewhile remaining cognizant of both economic and environmental
challenges associated with the recycling processes.
Even with large increases in recycling—including a scenario
where 100 percent EOL recycling is achieved—there is still likely
to be strong demand for primary minerals. This is especiallythe case for those minerals with the highest growth in demand,
which lack existing material to recycle and reuse. Even if large
increases in the mineral recycling sector can be achieved, there will

overall market and availability of those minerals. Again, thesestill be a need to meet remaining primary demand. Further work

projected demands only account for energy technologies andwill be needed in this area to ensure that recycling processes are

do not include the transmission lines needed to integrate thesecarried out in a responsible way. Policy measures are needed thattechnologies into electricity grids.

encourage energy efficiency, environmentally and socially sound• Cross-cutting minerals are also used across a wide range ofelectricity generation and energy storage technologies, meaning

practices, and innovation to ensure that clean energy technologies
can be safely and efficiently dissembled and recycled.

that future increases in demand are less reliant on the fate of

demand has a high certainty of occurring. Meeting this demand

Emissions Mitigation 			and Reduction Opportunities

is also crucial to the entire fate of the low-carbon transition

While deploying renewable energy is one of the most effective

as these minerals are vital in many energy technologies. Even

ways to decarbonize the electricity sector, the mineral intensity

without large triggers from rapidly increasing relative demand,of clean energy technologies must be addressed. Even if theit will be crucial that supply can meet demand.

emissions from the mineral production and operation of clean

any one technology. For these minerals, where relative demand
may not be high but the absolute demand may be, this projectedenergy technologies are just 6 percent that of coal and gas

Role of Recycling and Reuse

generation, the emissions are not insignificant. Greening the

Recycling, reuse, and refurbishment have important roles inrelated emissions are addressed. Policy and innovation will belimiting and meeting future demand for minerals for clean energy
55

electricity sector will require that upstream- and downstreamneeded to “take urgent action to combat climate change and its

Current production refers to minerals produced in 2018, based on the Mineral Commodity Summaries, U.S. Geological Survey.

96

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

impacts” (SDG 13) while integrating these emissions reductions

and tailoring different policy approaches for reducing the carbon

into countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

footprint of these different minerals are key.

Deploying renewable energy technologies globally without taking

Tailoring strategies to all the different categories of minerals

into account the mineral demand risks and the additional carbon

is critical for both helping meet the challenge of supplying

emissions from upstream and EOL activities may hinder rather

strategic minerals and minimizing emissions from the clean

than accelerate progress on SDG 7 and SDG 13. The emission

energy transition. Aluminum, for example, falls into the high-intensity of each mineral has been captured within the demand

impact, cross-cutting minerals category and happens to have therisk matrix to offer insight on potential avenues to maximize

largest cumulative emissions under a 2DS or beyond. That makes

emissions reduction and mitigation efforts from clean energy

it crucial for more attention to be focused on the entire aluminum

technology production and end use. While providing a steadysupply chain to ensure steady and affordable supply, all the whileand cost-effective supply of minerals is vital to enable the global

decarbonizing primary aluminum production. All stakeholders

deployment of clean electricity generation and storage, thealong these minerals’ supply chains should look for strategies thatvarious demand risk profiles also mean that different mitigation

can help reduce emissions and not exacerbate demand risks. These

strategies need to be employed to decarbonize the various areas

strategies can include government policy support, technologicalof the clean energy mineral supply chain.

innovation by industry, and end users incentivizing suppliers to

Understanding and analyzing the full mineral supply chain for

reduce their GHG emissions for products they are going to buy.

low-carbon technologies are critical to effectively realize climate

Some of the interventions to scale up renewable energy may

ambitions. This means that the clean energy transition must

offer double wins, helping both to boost economic growth intake into account that (1) current and future mineral production,

resource-rich developing countries and to reduce climate andincluding recycling, meets increasing demand up to 2050; (2)environmental risks. One example relates to the emissions

emissions associated with increased mineral production areassociated with the transportation of the minerals, as well as toeffectively mitigated or reduced while ensuring a continued,

facilitating value-added production in countries where extraction

stable, and affordable supply of these minerals to support a low-

takes place and boosting manufacturing capacity for renewablecarbon transition; and (3) innovation is leveraged to ensure thattechnologies in areas where demand is strong—for example, solar

these technologies can be safely disposed, easily dissembled, andPV in Africa, given the region’s massive solar resources. Although

the mineral contents recycled, at economically reasonable levels,

this lies outside the scope of this analysis, these emission reduction

to partially meet this new demand.

and mitigation opportunities may be significant for particular

The scale, intensity, and causes of emissions vary from mineral
to mineral. Mining silver, for example, is emissions intensive,minerals and technologies, depending on where renewables will be
deployed and where these minerals will be produced.

though silver is not demanded on a large scale. Silver production

GHG emissions from steel and cement production are mostwill rise 15 thousand tons annually by 2050, from the demand of

likely significantly higher than emissions generated by thesolar PV and CSP technologies alone, compared to 27 thousand

majority of the 17 minerals identified in this analysis. Steeltons produced overall in 2018 (USGS 2018b). On the other hand,production currently accounts for nearly 7–9 percent of total

5.6 million tons of aluminum, produced from bauxite ore, is needed

GHG emissions worldwide (WSA 2020), while cement accounts

under a 2DS by 2050 to supply just low-carbon technologies,

for nearly 8 percent (Rodgers 2018). Thus, for certain clean

compared to 60 million tons of total aluminum produced for allenergy technologies, estimated GHG emissions associated withuses in 2018 (USGS 2018a). Other minerals, such as copper, havetheir production may be vastly underestimated when thesesmaller GHG footprints per kilogram, but they are needed at aare excluded. For technologies such as wind, geothermal, andlarger scale relative to silver. Understanding these complexitieshydroelectricity, steel and cement are major inputs, but they have

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

97

been unaccounted for in this analysis because of potential double-

the minerals crucial to either the entire low-carbon transition or

counting issues, as a variety of minerals included in the model

key technologies within that transition are supplied to the market

are needed to produce steel. Enhanced international cooperationconsistently. Understanding the supply risk is crucial for developedon reducing the GHG footprint of these two industries will be

and developing countries, which are consumers and producers alike,crucial to effectively decarbonize the production of low-carbon

to meet SDGs 7 and 13. This analysis does not address supply,

technologies, from an upstream perspective.

including the material impacts associated with the increased

Recycling some of these low-carbon technologies once they reachextraction and production of base, precious, and rare minerals.

end of life could help reduce emissions associated with primary

While this report does not consider potential mineral supply risks, it

mineral production, but the emissions associated with the energy

is on the basis that resource-rich developing countries will be major

intensiveness of recycling processes also need to be considered.

contributors to the clean energy future by producing a significant

Recycling alone cannot eliminate all emissions associated withpart of these strategic minerals and supplying them to the global

supplying minerals, but it could have a dramatic effect in reducing

market. Based on the World Bank’s Growing Role of Minerals andsome of these emissions. For example, secondary aluminum (forMetals for a Low Carbon Future (2017), a number of key developing

example, recycled content) could have a carbon footprint thatcountries have been identified as having a potentially consequential

is about 5–10 percent of that coming from primary aluminumrole in producing these strategic minerals.

production (Nuss and Eckelman 2014). Increasing recycling
therefore can greatly assist in the transition to a cleaner energy
system, but challenges relating to the availability of mineral scrap
and the need for purity of materials in some applications mustbe faced, along with reducing the emissions intensity of recycling
processes themselves.

Risks Beyond the Model
The model presented here provides key insights to potential future
pathways for mineral demand under different levels of ambition
on climate change; however, it provides findings on just one
part of a complex system. Two crucial areas, supply and wider
environmental and social risks, are not covered, but they areimportant in understanding the wider context of the report.

Supply Risks

Wider Environmental and Social Risks
This report will inform policy makers, private sector actors, andcivil society organizations in their quest to help resource-richdeveloping countries sustainably and responsibly produce theminerals needed to deliver on SDGs 7 and 13. Beyond specificclimate-related risks, other environmental and social risks
of increased mineral extraction also need to be consideredthroughout the supply chain. These have not been addressed inthis analysis given the focus on GHG emissions.
From a broader environmental perspective, for example, the water
intensiveness of the mining sector and the impact of deforestationneed to be integrated in how these minerals will need to be
produced to sustainably supply clean energy technologies. Froma social perspective, understanding issues such as the impactof mining upon local communities is vital to ensure that theOverall, demand for minerals is likely to be high, varied, and intransition to a clean energy system is beneficial for all. Given

some cases uncertain. It will fluctuate with changes in technology

how critical minerals are to the low-carbon transition, a failure toand subtechnology deployments, market conditions, and national

address these wider environmental and social risks could facilitate

and international trends. It is critical to ensure that supply cana backlash against renewable electricity generation and energy

meet this demand—and in a manner that minimizes the negative

storage technologies needed to mitigate GHG emissions.56

consequences of primary mineral production while ensuring that
56

Recent reports such as the World Bank’s Forest-Smart Mining: Identifying Factors Associated with the Impacts of Large-Scale Mining on Forests (2019) and Building Resilience: A Green Growth Framework for
Mobilizing Mining Investment (2019), and the IFC and ICMM’s Shared Water, Shared Responsibility, Shared Approach: Water in the Mining Sector (2017) have shed light on some of these challenges and offeredpotential solutions. More research will be needed to understand the wider environmental and social risks from increased mineral production.

98

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Next Steps and Actions
The World Bank Group’s Climate-Smart Mining Initiative
supports the sustainable extraction and processing of minerals
and metals to secure supply for clean energy technologies while
minimizing the climate and material footprints throughout
the value chain of those materials by scaling up technicalassistance and investments in mineral-rich developing countries.
Achieving these objectives would represent a key win-win forclimate: It would allow the wide rollout of renewable and storage
technologies, required under ambitious climate scenarios, while
minimizing the emissions and material footprints associatedwith those technologies. Being able to understand which minerals
are needed for which energy technologies and subtechnologies

 Actively support mineral-rich countries that make it apriority to reduce emissions from mineral production, throughclimate-smart mining practices, while helping them integrate
their decarbonization efforts in their NDCs.
 Support measures that aim to decarbonize the full supply
chain of low-carbon technologies, including emissions fromthe transportation of minerals between mines and processing
facilities, as well as the emissions from manufacturing thesetechnologies.
 Leverage new and existing frameworks, such as the demandrisk matrix, to focus on minerals that require a more targeted
approach for climate mitigation strategies to supply specificclean energy technologies.

is crucial to help renewable energy developers, miners, and• Clean energy stakeholders: The energy sector also has angovernments understand where the major risks lie along theimportant role to play in ensuring that the low-carbon

clean energy supply chain in order to reduce mineral demand,technologies they are developing and deploying are being

environmental and climate-related risks.

produced sustainably and responsibly while taking into

The Climate-Smart Mining Initiative addresses these challenges
by working together with governments, development partners,
industries, and civil society. Combining climate-smart mining
with an understanding of the demand risks can provide actionableinsight for climate, energy, and mining stakeholders to identify
opportunities to reduce the carbon and material footprints ofincreased climate ambition while maintaining a stable supply ofminerals. Each stakeholder along the supply chain has a role to play:• Climate policy makers: With minerals playing a vital rolein enabling the clean energy transition, it will be crucial
for members of the climate community to work closelywith producers of those minerals—including resource-richdeveloping countries and the mining industry—to ensure thatthe associated emissions are effectively mitigated. Mineralrich countries that make it a priority to reduce emissions frommineral production, through climate-smart mining practices,
could integrate their decarbonization efforts in their NDCs under
the Paris Agreement. To address some of these challenges,
climate stakeholders can do the following:account the waste management of these technologies once
they reach end of life. The energy community can play a role inhelping producers of minerals reduce their carbon footprint byengaging with countries and mining companies. With the mining
sector accounting for 2–11 percent of the world’s total energy
consumption, it will be important for the energy sector to work
closely with miners to ensure that minerals are produced using
clean sources of energy and climate-smart mining practices.
Specifically, the energy sector should do the following: Focus on reducing the environmental and carbon footprints ofthe full supply chain of their technologies, from working withminers by helping them adopt climate-smart mining practices
to working on easing decommissioning, reuse, recycling, andrefurbishment to increase the lifetimes of these technologies.
 Connect with stakeholders across the mining sector aswell as those involved in the recycling industry to assist in
approaching these challenges from a holistic perspective.
 Use frameworks, such as the demand risk matrix, tounderstand where the greatest demand challenges may lie
and where innovation may need to be focused to reduce theuse of particular materials.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition• Mining Stakeholders: The mining community should position
itself as a contributor to SDG 7 by ensuring that the climate andmaterial footprints associated with the minerals they supply
are minimized. Innovation is necessary to reduce the amount ofenergy, water, and land needed to mine these minerals. Without
putting into place measures that address these challenges, byadopting climate-smart mining practices, it will be difficult forthe mining sector to position itself as a champion and enabler ofthe clean energy transition. Specific actions recommended forthe sector:
 Mainstream the use of climate-smart mining practices toreduce the carbon and material footprints of supplying thecritical minerals needed for the low-carbon transition.
 Build networks with those involved at all stages of low-carbon
technology supply chains, to help build understanding of theopportunities, challenges, and risks in supplying the materials
needed for the low-carbon transition.
 Encourage and advocate for innovation to develop and sharenew technological developments to green mineral supply
chains. This includes developing new methods to reduce wateruse, increase energy efficiency, deploy clean energy trucks
and processing technology, and explore mineral recycling
opportunities.
• Governments: Policies will have a pivotal role to play in ensuringthat climate-smart mining practices are adopted throughout
the entire supply chain of low-carbon technologies, to secure thesupply of these minerals through sustainable and responsiblemeans, while integrating a circular approach to these minerals.
Most notably, policy makers should consider doing the following: Encourage, incentivize, and remove economic and technicalbarriers to recycling, reuse, and refurbishment of thetechnologies involved in the clean energy transition.
 Work with the mining sector and renewable energy developers
to understand where the greatest demand risks may occur.
 Work with the mining sector and users that produce andconsume these minerals to ensure that climate-smart mining
practices are encouraged and incentivized, and that economic
and technical barriers are removed.

Rio Tinto, Diavik Diamond Mine, Canada

99

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Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

8

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

101

Annex A.
About Climate-Smart Mining
The Climate-Smart Mining Initiative will help
resource-rich developing countries benefit fromthe increasing demand for minerals and metals,
while ensuring the mining sector is managed
in a way that minimizes its environmental andclimate footprints.57

While the growing demand for minerals and metals provides
economic opportunities for resource-rich developing countries andthe industry alike, significant challenges will likely emerge if theclimate-driven clean energy transition is not managed responsibly
and sustainably. Without climate-smart mining practices,
negative impacts from mining activities will increase, affecting
already vulnerable communities in developing countries, as well as
the environment in which they operate.

The initiative supports the responsible extraction and processingof minerals and metals to secure supply for clean energy
technologies by minimizing the social, environmental, and climate
footprints throughout the value chain of those materials byscaling up technical assistance and investments in resource-richdeveloping countries.

The Climate-Smart Mining Initiative has been developed to alignwith the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement
to ensure that the decarbonization of the mining and electricity
industries also benefits the resource-rich countries that hostthese strategic minerals and the communities directly impacted
by their extraction, as well as the developing countries that are
projected to deploy renewable energy technologies to reach theirclimate ambitions.

Figure A.1 Climate-Smart Mining Building Blocks

World Bank, IFC support to decarbonize and reducematerial footprint of mining sector

Strong governance and adequate regulatory framework
Climatemitigation

Climateadaptation

Reducing material
impacts

Creating marketing
opportunities

Integration ofrenewable energy
in the mining sector

Forest-Smart
Mining withlandscapemanagement

Adoption of acircular economy
for low-carbon
mineralsDe-risking
investments
for low-carbon
mineralsInnovationin extractive
practices

Resource
efficiency
in mineralvalue chain

Reuse /
recyclingof low-carbon
minerals

Leveragecarbon financeinstruments

Energyefficiency
in mineralvalue chain

Innovation
waste
solutionsLow-carbon
mineralsupply chain
management

Robustgeological data
management

Gender and multi-stakeholder engagement

57“Climate-Smart Mining: Minerals for Climate Action” (Brief), Extractive Industries, World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/brief/climate-smart-mining-minerals-for-climate-action.

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Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Annex B.
Methodology
A number of assumptions, data, and methods
were utilized in the model. This annex expands onthe methodology discussed in the report.

Weighted Coverage-Concentration Index

Energy Storage Assumptions

comes from a single technology. This index is normalized to 1 forModeling future energy storage pathways is difficult because of
the rapidly emerging nature of the different technologies involved,

The weighted coverage-concentration index is calculated on an
equal weighting of two items: (1) the number of technologies that
require one mineral, and (2) the share of demand for minerals that
copper, with all other minerals rated against that mineral. The twocomponents are calculated in the following way:

and the relative lack of publicly available scenarios to draw on. As• Number of technologies that require one mineral. This is calculatedsuch, a number of assumptions were made on the basis of a broadby counting how many technologies the mineral plays a role in.

reading of the literature and discussions with industry experts.

Any minerals used in energy storage are given a value based on• Automotive energy storage assumptions• By 2030, all automotive energy storage is met by li-ion

the overall demand of minerals from energy storage compared
to energy generation (6 percent). Those minerals also usedin generation technologies are given a score based on thebatteries. Up to 2030, the use of lead-acid batteries declines

share of total installed capacity in 2050 in the 2DS that thelinearly to zero.

technologies the minerals are used in account for, multiplied by• Automotive energy storage assumptions• By 2030, all automotive energy storage is met by Li-ion

the total amount of minerals used in generation (94 percent).
For example, if a mineral was just used in wind, it would receive ascore of 0.22 because wind accounts for 23 percent of installedbatteries. Up to 2030, the use of lead-acid batteries declines

capacity in 2050 and this would be multiplied by 94 percent.

linearly to zero.

The more technologies a mineral is involved in, the higher the• Stationary energy storage assumptions• Energy storage requirements are met by 90 percent
grid-scale energy storage and 10 percent decentralized.
• Decentralized energy storage transitions to an equal mix 		
of lead-acid, Li-ion, and other energy storage technologies 		
by 2050.
• Grid-scale energy storage is met by a majority of Li-ion
batteries (70–84 percent of capacity, depending on scenario)

value.
• Share of demand for the mineral that comes from a single

technology. This is calculated by subtracting from 1 the largest
percentage share of demand from one technology. For example,
if 60 percent of demand from a mineral comes from wind, thenthis would be calculated as 1 – 0.6 = 0.4. The idea behind thisis that the lower the share from any one technology, the morecross-cutting the mineral.

and a small percentage of lead-acid (2.5–5 percent). Other

2018–2050 Production-Demand Index

technologies (mostly pumped-energy storage) decline in

The 2018–2050 production-demand index is calculated on an

importance to between 17 and 25 percent, while vanadium

average of absolute and relative demand, as discussed above. The

redox flow batteries grow at a rate of 5 percent of extra

data used to calculate this index are given in table B.2.

additional capacity per year to account for between 2.8 and3.7 percent of capacity by 2050, depending on the scenario.

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

103

Table B.1 Implication of Clean Energy Transition on Mineral Demand Challenges
Quadrant

Category

Implication

Quadrant 1

Medium-impact
minerals

Quadrant 1 minerals may appear to be less of a priority, but that may not necessarily be the case.
Some of these minerals may be critical to key subtechnologies, and although some substitution may
be possible, they may be strategically important to the clean energy transition. Since these minerals
may not face the high levels of demand faced by quadrant 2 minerals, nor the stable conditions facedby quadrants 3 and 4, less priority may be given to these minerals, but in turn, this may result in
potentially increasing their criticality, if supply constraints exist.

Quadrant 2

High-impact minerals

Demand for minerals in quadrant 2 is much higher, but it is much more concentrated in certain
technologies or subtechnologies. Demand growth could be substantial, but potentially more varied
if shifts in policy, market conditions, or other key factors cause different types of technology orsubtechnology to be deployed at greater, or lesser, levels.

Quadrant 3

High-impact,
cross-cutting minerals

Quadrant 3 minerals encounter the dual challenge of meeting high levels of demand from a broad
range of technologies. They do not face the same challenges of technology choice as quadrant 2
minerals, but they face higher levels of relative demand than quadrant 4 minerals. Demand pressures
are thus likely to be highest and most stable in these minerals.

Quadrant 4

Cross-cutting minerals

Quadrant 4 represents stable and steady levels of demand. Minerals in this area are not so dependenton shifts in energy technology, and greater levels of climate ambition are likely to lead to increases inthese minerals across the board. Demand growth is therefore likely to be predictable and steady.

Table B.2 2018 Mineral Production and 2050 Projected Annual Demand from Energy Technologies

Mineral2018 annual
production(Tons, thousands) a

2050 projected annual
demand from energy
technologies (Tons, thousands)

2050 projected annual demand
from energy technologies as percent
of 2018 annual production

Aluminum

60,0005,583

9%Chromium

36,000366

1%Cobalt

140

644

460%

Copper

21,000

1,378

7%Graphite

930

4,590

494%

Indium

0.75

1.73

231%

Iron

1,200,000

7,584

1%

Lead

4,400

781

18%

Lithium

85

415

488%

Manganese

18,000694

4%

Molybdenum

300

33

11%

Neodymium

23

8.4

37%

Nickel

2,300

2,268

99%

Silver

27

15

56%

Titanium

6,100

3.44

0%

Vanadium

73

138

189%

b

a. Data for 2018 annual production sourced from the U.S. Geological Survey.
b. Data sourced from Deetman et al. (2018).

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Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Global Warming Potential
The estimates for the GWP of the minerals used in the clean
energy transition presented here come with a number of caveats,
and avenues for future research. They are based on GWP perkilogram from historical sources and are static—that is, they do
not take into account changes in the composition of relevant lowcarbon technologies. Nor do they take into account future changes
in electricity mix, declining ore grades, changing technologies,

demanded metal could change substantially. For example, Nussand Eckelman (2014) estimated the GWP of primary aluminumfrom bauxite ore at between 8.7 and 30.5 times the GWP of
secondary aluminum (depending on the source of the scrap
aluminum used). Therefore, significant increases in secondary
aluminum production would reduce the overall GWP of aluminum
used in energy technologies—with the caveat of there being areadily available supply of scrap aluminum.

shifts in relative prices, or increases in recycling activities. They

With respect to ore grades, van der Voet et al. (2019) found little

also do not take into account wider environmental impacts such

evidence for declining ore grades for bauxite, iron, or manganese,as health, water, and ecosystem loss from the extraction of the

but they did find declining long-term trends for copper, zinc,minerals required to build renewable energy technologies.

lead, and nickel, which will work to increase their GWP numbers,

To calculate their data, Nuss and Eckelman (2014) drew on awide variety of data sources, and included various production
techniques for each metal, creating a weighted average of GWP
per metal on the basis of historical shares of each production
technique. The details behind estimate of GWP are vast andbased on a wide variety of data, techniques, and assumptions. For
example, copper production is based on seven different production
techniques, utilizing different ore types.
The estimates of GWP per kilogram are based on a shareof primary and secondary production based on historical
data. Should recycling of key metals increase significantly,
as discussed in the main report, then the GWP of the final

because of higher energy inputs to extract and process thematerials to obtain the same amount of ore. Declining ore
grades brings increase in associated environmental impacts—for
example, an increase on the volume of waste generated produces
larger tailings as well as impacts on local ecosystems. For
production techniques, the authors again find differing impacts,with a clear trend in improved process efficiencies reducing energy
demand in steel production. No such advances have been made forprocessing bauxite ore into alumina and only a slow improvement
in conversion efficiencies of alumina into aluminum.
The conclusion to be drawn is that there are no consistentpatterns of improvement in projected future GWP per kilogram of

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition105

metals—pathways will differ from metal to metal depending on thetherefore its emissions vary greatly depending on the source of thedependence on electricity as an energy source and other factors.58

electricity. The process involves the electrolysis of alumina. The

More research is needed in this area, extending the work conducted

electrolysis process involves carbon anodes, separating the oxygenby van der Voet et al. (2019). The model notes these key futurefrom the alumina (or aluminum oxide) and attaching it to thechanges to the GWP per kilogram but uses the static data fromcarbon in the anode, creating CO2 (and other greenhouse gases)

Nuss and Eckelman (2014) as a starting point to conduct analysis,in the process. Thus, emissions come both from the electricity

noting the limitations and future changes discussed above.

involved and as a direct result of the process.

Shifting Aluminum Emissions

Emissions may potentially shift at all three stages of the

The production of aluminum from bauxite ore is a multistaged
process, creating different amounts and types of greenhouse gas
emissions at the various stages (figure B.1). The carbon intensityof aluminum production is likely to change in the future becauseof changes in the carbon intensity of electricity, the efficiencyof the technologies involved in the process, and the grade of ore
extracted from the ground.
The first stage of the process is the extraction of bauxite from theground. Emissions from this part of the process account for 0.2
percent of emissions per ton (Tan and Khoo 2005), resulting fromthe use of fuels to run the machinery needed to clear earth and dig
mining pits, and to extract and crush the bauxite.

aluminum production process. The scale of these shifts will dependon the penetration of renewables into the electricity grid alongwith technology improvements and changes in the ore extracted.
These shifts may cause the carbon intensity of aluminum to shift
in different directions. Higher penetration of renewables will cause
the carbon intensity to reduce, while declining ore grades are likely
to increase the carbon intensity.
Estimates of the future path of emissions are scarce in theliterature, although van der Voet et al. (2019) do provide estimates
under adapted GEO-4 scenarios. Under the equitability firstscenario—a sustainable development scenario that the authors
link to the WEO 450 scenario—aluminum emissions decline by
43 percent per ton by 2050. Although the scenarios are not

The next stage of the process is the transformation of bauxite tocompletely analogous, the impact of these shifts is illustrated inalumina, or aluminum oxide. This is done by a four-stage “Bayer”

the estimates of the GWP of aluminum up to 2050 under the 2DS.

process, which involves the digestion of the bauxite with caustic

Total aluminum emissions for use in energy technologies declines

soda, the clarification of liquor streams, the precipitation of

from 840 MtCO2e to 550 MtCO2e under the 2DS (reducing to 454

alumina hydrate, and the calcination of alumina. This latter stage

MtCO2e if end-of-life recycling rates increase to 100 percent by

involves heating the alumina in a kiln to temperatures in excess2050). This shift illustrates the scale to which the low-carbonof 1,000°C. Emissions at this stage account for approximately 13

transition itself may help mitigate some of the emissions frompercent of total emissions (Tan and Khoo 2005), resulting from theminerals required—but not all. Mitigation options are available atcombustion of fossil fuels at various stages of the process, such as

various stages of the process, including the use of inert anodes

the heating of the kilns.

in the Hall-Héroult process and innovation focused on reducing

The final stage transforms the alumina to aluminum via the HallHéroult process. This stage is the most carbon-intensive part ofthe process, accounting for 60–90 percent of emissions (Carbon
Trust 2011). It involves the use of large amounts of electricity and58

electricity use in the electrolysis phase (IEA 2019e). However,further action is needed to reduce emissions involved in theextraction and processing of minerals—this is a crucial area ofwork for the Climate-Smart Mining Initiative.

Van der Voet et al. (2019) use the GEO-4 scenarios in their estimation of future metal demand. The differential impacts on the carbon footprint of different metals can be seen by comparing their projections ofemissions per kilogram of metal under the markets first scenario (which represents a scenario dominated by global markets) with that under the equitability first scenario (representing sustainable development).
They project the CO2 equivalent per kilogram for aluminum falling by 11 percent in the markets scenario and by 49 percent in the equitability scenario. In contrast, the same figure for copper rises by 15 percent in themarkets scenario and falls by 24 percent in the equitability scenario, while lead’s emissions per kilogram increases by 23 percent in the markets scenarios and by 9 percent in the equitability scenario.

106

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

Market Dynamics

Even though technology substitution and supply responses may
allow large-scale increases in demand to be met, such rapid

The demand estimates produced in this model represent

scale-ups of demand may cause price spikes and falls, creating

underlying (or latent) demand for minerals. This is the demand

instability and uncertainty for both the mining and renewablethat would occur, all other things being equal, crucially without

energy sectors. An example of this can be seen in recentchanges in supply or induced substitution and efficiency.

movements in the lithium market. Rapid growth in the demand forHigher levels of demand for commodities could lead to higher

Li-ion batteries from a growing electric vehicle market as well as

prices, which induce two major effects: (1) Those involved in

mobile phones, laptops, and tablets has induced large increases

the extraction and production of commodities increase theirin supply over recent years, culminating in a 98 percent increase

supply, and (2) those demanding those minerals are incentivizedin global production between 2017 and 2018. This in turn caused

to reduce their use in their products, either by substituting fora short-term oversupply in the market, causing a drop in lithium

other minerals or by improving the efficiency of how the

prices in 2019.

minerals are used.

This reduces the incentives for substitution and technicalThe demand figures provided in this analysis therefore provide

efficiency in the use of lithium, and also incentives to investa scale of how far supply needs to adjust if no such substitution

in future lithium supply. This may cause future price spikes,

or efficiency improvements are possible. To fully gauge the scale

increasing supply. Understanding these dynamics is critical forat which this demand poses a risk therefore depends on both the

fully understanding the impact that the low-carbon transition

supply aspects and the scale at which substitution and efficiency

will have on mineral markets. Each commodity and technology

can play a role. The questions related to supply lie beyond thehas particular specificities, which means that the market

scope of this report, while questions of technology substitution

dynamics will be unique to each case. Therefore, commodity- andand efficiency vary dramatically from technology to technology,

technology-specific research are needed to understand the fulland mineral to mineral. Some of these aspects are explored for

picture of mineral demand and market dynamics.

lithium, cobalt, nickel, and manganese in Li-ion batteries in the
Energy Storage section in chapter 3 of the main report.
Figure B.1 Lithium Prices, 2010–2019

20,000Price in $ (per ton)

17,50015,00012,50010,000
7,500
5,000
2,500
0

2010
Source: Garside 2020.

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

107

Annex C.
Uncertainties
Uncertainty regarding the future mineraldemand from energy technologies arises froma number of different sources: the mineralcomposition of the energy technologies,
the amount of these technologies that will
be deployed in the future, and which of thetechnologies will actually be deployed.
Uncertainties over the first two are captured in the model by
including a range of metal composition estimates and providing
comparisons across a range of scenarios. The estimates presented
in the report are effectively a central point of a distribution. These
distributions are, in some cases, extremely broad—for example,
the use of aluminum in solar PV could be substituted for composite
or synthetic alternatives. In cases where the use of the mineral isless substitutable and there is less of a range of estimates in theliterature, the distribution is much smaller.
When looking at the GWP of minerals needed for a low-carbon
transition, there is another source of uncertainty that iscompounded with the uncertainty over future mineral demandlevels: the uncertainty in the future GWP per kilogram of metal.

This uncertainty is multiplied by the uncertainty of the use of

A portion of this uncertainty is captured by including the range

aluminum in solar PV, especially in the fittings required for solarof estimates for GWP per kilogram from Nuss and Eckelman

panels. An extremely wide range for this is given in the literature.

(2014). It should be acknowledged, however, that this is likely to

Together, these highlight that although the mean GWP for theunderestimate the uncertainty, given potential future changes in

use of aluminum in solar PV is large, improvements in aluminum

GWP, as discussed in annex B.

production, moves toward greater use of secondary aluminum,

The scale of this potential range can be seen by examining therange of GWP for aluminum. The GWP from the use of aluminumin solar PV varies as a result of uncertainty both in the GWP
per kilogram and in the use of aluminum in solar PV panels. The
uncertainty in the GWP per kilogram of mineral as given in Nussand Eckelman (2014) is the result of the wide variation in GWP
from primary aluminum and recycled aluminum (much of thisis due to difference in the electricity source: because aluminumproduction is so power intensive, the power source—coal versus
gas versus hydro—is a very significant variable).

and efficiency improvements in solar PV design could reduce the
GWP significantly.

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Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition

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