5.0

5.1

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONSKEY RESULTS

1) It was very clear during the interview process, and from the very first interview, thatMozambican civil society organizations are in close communication and coordination
with respect to dialogue with ProSAVANA. No organization agreed to talk to the Majol
team without first checking in with its sister and partners CSO’s/ NGOs, and receiving ago-ahead from these partners to talk to the Majol team about ProSAVANA.
2) It was also evident that there is both funding for and a focus on compliance andoversight. Many CSO’s and NGO’s occupy this space at present, while in the past more
effort was devoted by the NGO community to service delivery/ implementation
activities. ProSAVANA will have to deal with this new ‘watchdog’ focus of theNGO/CSO community. One positive and proactive reaction might be to actively
include ‘watchdog’ NGO’s in ongoing monitoring and evaluation exercises.
3) There are two main camps, represented by the “No to ProSAVANA” campaign, and the“Campaign Against Land Grabbing” (ASCUTE). The No to ProSAVANA campaign ingeneral is more hardline, though some members are willing to engage in constructive
dialogue on improving ProSAVANA if they are assured of genuine dialogue and fullparticipation (see points three, four, five and six below). Members of the Campaign
Against Land Grabbing are uniformly open to dialogue with ProSAVANA, but insist
that for such engagement to take place, they must also be a genuine dialogue and fullparticipation of NGO’s and CSO’s.	  
4) This means that in strategic terms, CSO’s and NGOs can be treated as a single block,with an essentially identical set of demands. The only difference is that some few
members of the No to ProSAVANA campaign say will not engage in dialogue under any
circumstances. Since these represent only four of the 32 CSO’s and NGOs interviewed,
these can be considered a minority that is small enough to be essentially disregarded interms of negotiations. The ProSAVANA team should instead focus on the nearly unified
demands of the other 32. It is the Majol belief that if genuine and constructive dialogue,
and in particular a roadmap can be agreed upon, these four institutions may well join
the ProSAVANA dialogue process.
5) Among all NGOs, levels of fear and distrust of the ProSAVANA planning process werevery high. All recognized the conflicts of the past, and without exception, attributed
these to poor communication and lack of openness for dialogue on the part of theProSAVANA team and MASA. Interviewees note that there has not been a good
information flow throughout the consultation process, with a lack of transparency andsometimes intimidation. Interviewees in particular mentioned the fact that some MASA
officials have attitudes and behaviours that make dialogue difficult or impossible.	  
6) All felt that the ProSAVANA team needed to engage in a much more participative
process. Specifically, many interviewees noted that commenting on documents was not
sufficiently participative. Many spoke of the need to ‘co-create’ ProSAVANA, meaningthat civil society partners should have as much input into the documents as the trilateral

MAJOLP. 33

agencies involved. Civil society would like to be called for a much more in-depth roundof discussions, rather than simply being asked to comment on documents.	  
7) The negative reactions to commenting on documents were indeed very strong. Several
interviewees mentioned that they were “tired of commenting on documents” andspecifically would refuse to do so in the future. Many specifically said that the release
another version of the ProSAVANA Master Plan, created on the basis of dialogue todate, would be seen as further marginalization of civil society. This opinion may be inconflict with the JICA desire to release Draft One of the ProSAVANA Master Plan, basedon comments received in the first round of consultations, in the near future.	  
8) All felt that the co-creation process was a much more in-depth, detailed, and timeconsuming process than current JICA plans allow for. Civil society in general believes
that the document must be re-created from the very beginning. Majol would like tospecifically call JICA’s attention to this, as an area where civil society demands and JICA
expectations may be in conflict.	  
9) The April timeline was mentioned by several organizations as unrealistic. This point, as
well as point number seven above may not all harmonise well with JICA desires tocomplete the second round of public consultations, based on a revision of the draft 1
Master plan, by April, 2016. JICA should start to think about what its reactions might beand what alternatives might be available	  10) The name ProSAVANA was considered by some organizations to be a clear sign that
ProSAVANA planners did not understand the environmental and social context, and notenough studies and dialogue have been done. This is because the Nacala Corridor infact is largely miombo woodland, not savannah4.	  
11) On the other hand, there is the possibility of a very strong partnership to be developedwith WeEffect. WeEffect even has institutional financing available specifically for thecreation of a positive dialogue for the improvement of the ProSAVANA program.
Development of this partnership should be given the very highest priority.
12) Some of the reasons given to ‘re-create’ the ProSAVANA Master Plan are detailed under
numbers 13-21, below.	  
13) Interviewees were clear about the inadequacy of the development models as outlined inthe ProSAVANA Master Plan Zero Draft. They particularly noted that the agribusinessdevelopment model as laid out in this plan was vague, not clear enough for the reader tounderstand the roles of family farmers, agribusinesses, and financial institutions. Keyquestions like, “how will family scale farmers access markets?”, “How will family sector
products be transported to markets?”, and “How will family sector farmers access thecredit they need?”are not clearly answered.	  
14) That being said, there did not seem to be clear consensus among interviewees on what
agricultural and agribusiness development models should be used. To quote a very
simple example, civil society opinion is divided about the use of fertilizers. Some pointto World Bank studies showing that use of fertilizers can lead to impoverishment of4

http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/w4442e/w4442e05.htm#TopOfPage

MAJOLP. 34

family sector farmers, while others point to possible environmental side effects. Stillothers think that the use of fertilizers is a necessary step in developing a more vibrantfamily sector farming economy. Most interviewees acknowledged that there was noconsensus, but cited this fact as simply underlining the importance of a broader andmore in-depth discussion of development models, before Master Planning can beundertaken. This position was frequently and succinctly summed up by the phrase, “If
we are going to talk to ProSAVANA, then everything must be on the table”, in otherwords, ProSAVANA must be willing to start negotiations from the very beginning, witha discussion of the development model to be used.	  
15) Both government and CSO stakeholders referred to the need to “Mozambicanise”
ProSAVANA, that is, to create a program that was more adapted to the local situationand more in line with local realities, as well as the ambitions and aspirations of the localpopulation.	  
16) Again, and with specific reference to developmental models, several institutions(including the opinion leader and former No to ProSAVANA campaign financier,WeEffect), noted that the current Zero Draft Master plan is based on an approach andmodel nearly identical to previous projects such as ProAgri and PAMA, neither of which
are judged to have left any lasting benefit with rural communities.	  
17) Nearly everyone interviewed noted that land tenure and environmental safeguards as
outlined in the zero draft are inadequate, and even more significantly, that unless theseare made compulsory and specific, with specific guarantees, opposition to ProSAVANA
will not cease.	  
18) Land rights are particularly problematic given the current level of conflicts withincoming investors; civil society feels that the current legal framework and government
guarantees are insufficient and that ProSAVANA must adopt clearer, compulsory, andmore stringent standards than those existing in Mozambican Law.
19) There are also questions about political will and government capacity to adequately
implement family sector safeguards.
20) The document does not discuss social and environmental risks associated with theproject. Something like an ESIA (Environmental and Social Impact Assessment) isneeded.
21) All had questions about where will NGO’s and CSO’s fit into ProSAVANA? This is notclearly explained. And will there be components for them to implement? The
documents mention the need for their involvement but do not specify any mechanisms.
22) Many interviewees praised the concept of a third-party intermediary, and noted thatongoing dialogue should continue to be mediated by third parties.	  
23) Only two interviewees mentioned the need to plan more adequately for the impacts ofclimate change, not only on agricultural production, but also on transport and marketing
networks. Majol however feels it is important to mention these here, particularly given
current and long-term tendencies towards ever increasing numbers of disaster events
due to climate change. These have increased by a factor of 28 (28 times as many) in thebetween the decade of the 1950s and the decade of the 2000’s. See figure below.	  

MAJOLP. 35

Natural disasters have increased from one per decade in the 1950s to 28 per decade in
the years between 2000 and 2010.
24) Climate change is also an opportunity for ProSAVANA. Farmers are really very
desperate this year with the drought (as they were last year with the floods). Dialogue
with them about new technologies, new crops, new ways of planning and adapting, andthe building of climate-change resilient cropping systems, would be seen by many
farmers and partners as opportune and very necessary.

5.2

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above results, the Majol team believes that it is probably realistic to expect thata dialogue platform can be established, particularly given new civil society openness todialogue. This openness is based at least in part upon the changes introduced to theProSAVANA program by the Zero Draft Master Plan.
However, there do seem to be differences between civil society expectations of a complete
and open dialogue, starting over from the very beginning, and JICA expectations ofconsultations leading fairly quickly to a second round of public consultations, before April,2016. JICA would do well to begin to consider what its position might be should theroadmap proposed by civil society differ substantially from JICA expectations.
CSO’s and NGOs have collectively many years of experience and their input would
probably add value to the quality of the Master Plan. However, process is important as wellas product. CSO’s and NGOs must feel that they are essential elements of the process, andthat their input is valued and considered. Otherwise, opposition to ProSAVANA willcontinue.
Opposition to ProSAVANA was triggered initially about concerns of land tenure for family
sector farmers. ProSAVANA proponents must be prepared to go beyond Mozambican lawMAJOLP. 36

and what is currently written in the draft ProSAVANA master plans, to create broadly
accepted and publicly monitored safeguards for family sector land and resource access.
Otherwise, opposition to ProSAVANA will continue.

6.0

LIST OF APPENDIXES

Appendix 1. Comentários ao Plano Director Versão Draft Zero, Marco de 2015, no Contexto daCampanha Não ao ProSAVANA
Appendix 2. Survey Monkey Questionnaires and Results

MAJOLP. 37