IEEJ：March 2017 © IEEJ2017

Institutional Strength inDepth
Dr. Richard A. Meserve
Executive Adviser
Nuclear Risk Research Center1

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Nuclear Power in Japan• Nuclearl
Power isi off Strategic
Si Significance
Si ifi– Japan has few indigenous energy resources– Replacement fossil fuel is expensive and vulnerable– Japan needs carbon‐free generation– Important for Japan to remain strong• But Japan cannot rely on nuclear power unless itmeets highest standards for safety.
– Japanese people demand no less.
– Safety is primary obligation for all those who
construct and operate nuclear power plants
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IEEJ：March 2017 © IEEJ2017

IAEA Comprehensive Report on Fukushima
Accident• “B“Beforefththe accident,
id t thereth
was a bbasici assumption
ti iinJapan that the design of nuclear power plants and thesafety measures that had been put in place weresufficiently
ffrobust . . . .””• “Because of the basic assumption that nuclear power
plants in Japan were safe
safe, there was a tendency fororganizations and their staff not to challenge the level ofsafety. The . . . basic assumption among the stakeholders . .
. resulted in a situation where safety improvements were
not introduced promptly.”• “A systemic approach to safety needs to consider theinteractions between human, organizational and technicalfactors. This approach needs to be taken through the entire
life cycle
y of nuclear installations.”
3

IEEJ：March 2017 © IEEJ2017

Systemic Approach to Build a Robust Nuclear
Safety System?
• Apply Strength in Depth philosophy to provide
robust framework• Cover all who impact on nuclear safety• Keep simple• Base on strong components & effectiveinteractions (no effective system if nointeractions)• Recognize
Ri strong
tanddddeep foundations
fd ti–Leadership and Culture are critical.
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Elements of a Positive Safety Culture• LLeaders
d demonstrate
dt t commitment
itt tto safety
f t iin bbehaviors
h iand decisions• Issues impacting
pg safetyy are promptly
pp y identified,, analyzed,
y ,and addressed• All individuals take personal responsibility for safety• EngageEini continuousilearningli to improveisafetyf• Personnel are free to raise safety concerns withoutretaliation• Communications focus on safety• Trust and respect each other• Individuals avoid complacency and maintain a questioningattitude
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Properties of Institutional Strength in Depth• MULTIPLE LAYERS• INDEPENDENCE OF LAYERS• LAYERS BUILT USING:– DIVERSITY– REDUNDANCY– SEPARATION OF FUNCTION• NO SINGLE POINT FAILURE OR COMMON CAUSEFAILURE• ROBUST DEEP FOUNDATIONS – CULTURE &LEADERSHIP6

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Elements of Strength in Depth

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IEEJ：March 2017 © IEEJ2017

What does “strong”
strong mean?
Inner strength does not refer to brute strength:• Strong enough to listen and absorb others
others’ ideas• Strong enough to face challenges• Strong enough to welcome new ideas and learn fromothers• Strong enough to tell it as it is• Strong enough to recognise when you have things
wrong, to learn, and to correct errors.
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IEEJ：March 2017 © IEEJ2017

1. Components of a Strong Nuclear Industry Sub‐System*Layer
y 1.1

Layer
y 1.2

Layer
y 1.3

Layer
y 1.4

Licensee/Operator level

Peer Pressure atState/Region
Industry level

Peer pressure/ review
at International
Industry level

Review at
International
Institutional level
IAEA OSART
Missions

Suitably qualified and experienced staff who
effect safety Technical/Design/operational
capability including sub-contractors andTSOs

National/regional
industrial high levelfora/associations.

WANO/INPO/JANSI
Missions andRequirements

Strong management systems with multiple
checks and balances

Other organisations
involved in emergency
preparedness andresponse

Bilateral/Multilateral
Organizations e.g. BWR
and PWR Owners’
GroupsCompany Nuclear Safety Committee withexternal members
Company board that holds the Executive toaccountVibrant safety culture led from the top withall encouraged to point out potential
deficiencies or concerns
Independent Nuclear Safety Assessment
Review and Inspection (assurance function
internal to the company independent of theexecutive chain of command)

Nuclear Leadership/Culture/Values* The licensee is the lead for this level of the Industry Sub‐System. The licensee has the prime and enduring legal responsibility forthe safety of the facility. This sub‐system can be split further to include designer, vendor, constructor, etc.
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2. Components of a Strong Regulatory Sub System
Layer
y 2.1

Layer
y 2.2

Layer
y 2.3

Layer
y 2.4

Regulatory Authority

Special Outside TechnicalAdvice

International PeerPressureInternational
Peer Reviews

World class technical/regulatory
capability and competencies, including
assessment, licensing, inspection,enforcement and influencing.
The inherent technical capabilities aresometimes augmented by TSOs.

Standing Panel of experts(may be national orinternational)

NEA CNRA & CSNI
committees andworking groups.

Special Expert Topic Groups
on such topics as• Natural hazards (includingseismic hazards)• Aircraft Crash• PRA• Human Interventions• Digital I&C

IAEA Convention on
Nuclear Safety

Organizational Structure with internal
standards, assurance, OEF, policy,strategy, decision review arrangements,etc.

WENRA – reference
levels, reviews, groups,
stress tests

Regulatory safety culture with openness
and transparency as core values

INRA – top
regulators

Formal accountability to internal
governing body – Board, Commission,etc.

IAEA Safety Standard
meetings.

IAEA IRRS
missions

Nuclear Leadership/Culture/Values
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3 C3.
Components
t off ththe StStrong St
Stakeholder
k h ld Sub-System
S bS tLayer 3.1

Layer 3.2

Layer 3.3

Layer 3.4

Layer 3.5

Layer 3.6

Layer 3.7

PublicNational
Government//
GParliament

Local
Government
G

Neighbors,
Including
Local
Committees
and theInternational
Community

Media

NGOs,
SpecialS
Interest
GroupsShareholders

Industry and Regulatory Routine Supply of Information
Accountability to Public through ParliamentSpecial Reports on Matters of Interest
R
Responsivenessi
tto R
Requests
t ffor IInformation
fti
Routine and Special Meetings

Openness & Transparency, Accountability, Assurance– Industry/Regulator Leadership, Culture and Capability
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Aspects of Strength in Depth• EEachh subsystemb tisi independenti dd t off theth others,thbutb t eachh should
h ld
be open and transparent to the other subsystems. There
should be effective communications within and between thevariousisubsystems
b t• For the system to work optimally, all the subsystems and ally and components
pof layers
y have to be strongg andlayers
operate effectively.
• The establishment of a vibrant safety culture is a primeresponsibility of the leaders in both industry and theregulator.
• Both industry and the regulator must have openness,ttransparency
andd accountabilityt bilit tto stakeholders
t k h ld as d
deep‐rooted value. In this way, trust and confidence by thestakeholders can be earned.
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IEEJ：March 2017 © IEEJ2017

Summary• Just addressing the technical lessons from Fukushima is not
sufficient• Fundamental Lesson of Fukushima – There is a need for a systemic
approach to safety.
• An effective systemic approach should be built on Strength in Depthprinciples• Institutional Strength in Depth has 3 main Independent layers:
Strong Industry, Strong Regulator, Strong Stakeholders• Industry Sub
Sub‐SystemSystem is multi
multi‐layered,layered but prime responsibility rests
with licensee/operator• The Interfaces are crucial.
• Foundation stone is strong nuclear leadership and a robust safety
culture13

Contact :report@tky.ieej.or.jp