DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot

V-Dem is a unique approach tomeasuring democracy – historical,
multidimensional, nuanced, anddisaggregated – employing state-ofthe-art methodology.
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)produces the largest global dataset
on democracy with over 31 million
data points for 202 countries from1789 to 2023. Involving over 4,200
scholars and other country experts,
V-Dem measures over 600 different
attributes of democracy.

We gratefully acknowledge our funders’ support over
the years. To learn more about our funders, please visit:https://v-dem.net/about/funders/
The Democracy Report is a signature publication of the
V-Dem Institute and the views and opinions expressedherein do not reflect an official position of the larger
V-Dem Project or the V-Dem Steering Committee.

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

Table of Contents
Produced by the V-Dem Instituteat the University of Gothenburg
V-Dem Institute Team: Fabio Angiolillo (Postdoctoral Researcher),
Cecilia Borella (Data Team Assistant), Susanna Burmeister (Administrator& Finance Assistant), Linnea Fox (Data Manager & Data Engineer), Lisa
Gastaldi (Data Analyst & Program Manager), Ana Good God (DataCollection Coordinator), Sandra Grahn (Data Collection Coordinator),
Sara Haug Andersson (Communications Officer), Melina Liethmann(Data Manager & Data Engineer), Martin Lundstedt (Researcher), Valeriya
Mechkova (Assistant Professor), Natalia Natsika (Program Manager),
Marina Nord (Postdoctoral Researcher), Evie Papada (Research & Policy
Analyst), Josefine Pernes (Executive Officer and Director of Grants), Oskar
Rydén (Snr Data Scientist), Maria Verkhovtseva (Program Manager), andStaffan I Lindberg (Director & Professor).
Editor: Staffan I Lindberg
Design: Nils Pennlert, Newsroom
Printing: Stema Specialtryck AB
Cover Photo: A woman placing her vote into a ballot box at a polling
station on election day in Funafuti, the capital of the south Pacific nationof Tuvalu, Jan 25, 2024. (Sam Pedro/AFP via Getty Images)
How to cite the main report: Nord, Marina, Martin Lundstedt, David
Altman, Fabio Angiolillo, Cecilia Borella, Tiago Fernandes, Lisa Gastaldi, Ana
Good God, Natalia Natsika, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2024. Democracy Report2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot. University ofGothenburg: V-Dem Institute.
March 2024
Copyright ©2024 by V-Dem Institute. All rights reserved.
V-Dem Institute:
Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Gothenburg, Sweden
contact@v-dem.net+46 (0) 31 786 30 43
www.v-dem.net

A Word from the Team

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Executive Summary6

1. Democracy in the World

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Autocracies and Democracies
Freedom of Expression and Elections
Getting Worse

2. Trends of Regime Change
The World Continues to Become More Autocratic
60 Countries in Episodes of Change

3. Autocratizing Countries“Stand-Alone” Autocratization“Bell-Turn” Autocratization
Elections Now Also Under Attack by Autocrats

4. Democratizing Countries“Stand-Alone” Democratization“U-Turn” Democratization
Freedom of Expression and the Media are theMost Common to Improve

5. Windows to the Future

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25 “Near Misses” of Autocratization
9 “Near Misses” of Democratization
2024 – The Year of Elections

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Digital Technology as a Tool for Repression
Commentary on the Democracy Report
Methodology
Publications from the V-Dem Team
Data Figures and Tables

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DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

V-Dem in Numbers
WHERE IS V-DEM DATA USED ?

V-DEM IS AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT C­ OMPRISED OF

T he V-Dem dataset has been downloaded
by users 360,000 times in 200+ countries
since 2016.

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134

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4,200+PERSONNEL AT THE V-DEM
INSTITUTE

PROJECT MANAGERS 3 million graphs created using the online
2
tools by users in 200+ countries since 2016.

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORSREGIONAL MANAGERSCOUNTRY COORDINATORSCOUNTRY EXPERTS

ALL WORKING TOGETHER TO PRODUCE
Global Standards, Local Knowledge: morethan 63% of the data is provided by local
experts born in/residing in the country they
are coding.

DATASET DOWNLOADS (2016–2023)

31,000,000
DATA POINTS IN THE V14 DATASETEXPERT CODERS BORN IN 185 DIFFERENT COUNTRIES

4,200+

360,000
Europe, 45%
North America, 30%

Averageyears spent incountry coded:
39

Percentage
of coderswith a PhD:
73%

Mean Age:
47 years

Gender:73% Male,
27% Female

Asia, 13%
Latin America, 8%
Africa, 3%
Oceania, 1%
V-DEM PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS TO ACADEMIC AND POLICY COMMUNITIES839DEMOCRACY REPORTS

POLICY BRIEFS

180

147

JOURNAL ARTICLESWORKING PAPERS

870+
PRESENTATIONS across the world by V-Dem
scholars since 2007

120+
VISITING SCHOLARS presented at the V-Dem
Institute since 2014

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

A Word from the TeamW

E ARE PLEASED TO PRESENT the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Insti-

tute’s 8th annual Democracy Report 2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at
the Ballot. The V-Dem Institute is hosted by the Department of Political
Science, University of Gothenburg. It serves as the headquarters for theinternational V-Dem project with the main responsibility of running theannual data collection, but also pursues several independent projects.

THE DEMOCRACY REPORT is an endeavor by the Institute and only the author group at the Institute is responsible for its contents. We hope that you will find the Democracy Report 2024 useful. Later this year, both Spanish and Portuguese editions are planned to be released, thanks to Professor
David Altman, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and the Regional Center for Latin America,and Professor Tiago Fernandes, University Institute of Lisbon (ISCTE) and the Regional Center forSouthern Europe.

THE 2024 REPORT shows that autocratization continues to be the dominant trend, as we havereported in previous Democracy Reports. New for this year is a systematic look at more fine-grained
regime changes – countries that are experiencing democratic declines despite having recently improved (what we call Bell-turns), and inversely countries that are improving despite having recently
been in a period of decline (what we call U-turns). This volatility is often masked when simply taking
the difference between countries' present democracy levels and ten years ago, as done in previous
Democracy Reports. Yet, countries’ democratic volatility is of substantial interest. Not least, examples of countries that have stopped and reversed autocratization are critical for pro-democratic
actors to learn from. Likewise, examples of countries where democratization has in short order been
reversed are tales of caution in how democratization can fail to take a permanent foothold. We think
this new analysis provides a more nuanced depiction of trends of regime change and informs thereader on how both democratization and autocratization can be stopped and reversed.
SINCE 2019, the V-Dem Institute has also been the host of the newly established (inter)national
infrastructure DEMSCORE, which brings together some of the world’s leading research infrastructures and contextual databases. More information can be found at https://www.demscore.se.
Additionally, over the past year, V-Dem has continued to expand on existing collaborations andentered new ones.
VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY is an international collaboration involving more than 4,200 scholars
from over 180 countries. Including the tremendous support and contributions of Country Experts,
Country Coordinators, Regional Managers, and Project Managers. Without all of you, V-Dem would
not be possible. The new version 14 of the V-Dem dataset contains 31 million data points and covers 202 countries from 1789 to 2023. We invite you to visit https://www.v-dem.net, download thedata, try out the innovative graphing tools, and use the additional resources such as policy briefs,
country- and thematic reports, as well as our academic working paper series.

The V-Dem Institute TeamThe Democracy Report
2024 will soon beavailable in Spanish andPortuguese
Spanish Version
Reporte de la democracia:
Democracia ganando y perdiendoen las urnas
Translation and Production by
V-Dem Regional Center in Latin
America, led by Professor David
Altman.

Portuguese Version:
Relatório da democracia:
A Democracia a ganhar e a perder
nas urnas

Back row: Linnea Fox, Oskar Rydén, Melina Liethmann, Valeriya Mechkova, Fabio Angiolillo. Front row: Hennie Refstad
Steinveg, Sara Haug Andersson, Martin Lundstedt, Marina Nord, Staffan I Lindberg, Anna Good God, Cecilia Borella,
Natalia Natsika. Not pictured: Susanna Burmeister, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahn, Evie Papada, Josefine Pernes, and Maria
Verkhovtseva.

Translation and Production
by V-Dem Regional Centerin Southern Europe, led by
Associate Professor Tiago
Fernandes.

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DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

Executive Summary
1. Democracy in the World

2. Trends of Regime Change The level of democracy enjoyed by the average
person in the world in 2023 is down to 1985-levels;by country-based averages, it is back to 1998.

 A total of 60 countries are in episodes of regime
transformation – autocratizing or democratizing.

 Since 2009 – almost 15 years in a row – the shareof the world’s population living in autocratizing
countries has overshadowed the share living indemocratizing countries.
 The decline is stark in Eastern Europe and South andCentral Asia.
 Latin America and the Caribbean goes against the
global trend: Democracy levels increase, and large
countries are more democratic than smaller ones.
Autocracies and Democracies
•
•
•
•
•

The world is almost evenly divided between 91 democracies
and 88 autocracies.
But 71% of the world’s population – 5.7 billion people – live
in autocracies – an increase from 48% ten years ago.
Electoral autocracies have by far the most people – 44% of
the world’s population, or 3.5 billion people.
29% of the world’s population – 2.3 billion people – live inliberal and electoral democracies.
Israel falls out of the liberal democracy category for the firsttime in over 50 years.

Freedom of Expression and Elections Getting Worse
•

•
•

•

Almost all components of democracy are getting worse in
more countries than they are getting better, compared toten years ago.
Freedom of expression remains the worst affected component of democracy and is worsening in 35 countries in 2023.
Clean elections is now the second – deteriorating in 23
countries and improving in 12. This core institution of democracy used to be relatively unaffected.
Freedom of association, including civil society, is the third
most deteriorating component – 20 countries are restricting
this right while only 3 are expanding it.

COUNTRIES HOLDING ELECTIONS IN 2024 THAT ARE
DECLINING OR IMPROVING ON DEMOCRACY LEVELS

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COUNTRIES3
COUNTRIES The wave of autocratization is notable.
Autocratization is ongoing in 42 countries, home to
2.8 billion people, or 35% of the world’s population.
India, with 18% of the world’s population,accounts for about half of the population living in
autocratizing countries.
 There may be signs that the autocratization wave isslowing down but one should be cautious with thatinterpretation.
 Democratization is taking place in 18 countries,
harboring only 400 million people, or 5% of theworld's population. Brazil makes up more than halfof this, with its 216 million inhabitants.

3. Autocratizing Countries 42 countries are currently in ongoing episodes of
autocratization.
 28 of the 42 autocratizers were democracies at thestart of their episode. Of these 28 only about half, or
15, remain democracies in 2023.
 Of the 42 ongoing episodes, 23 are “standalone” processes and 19 are “bell-turns”
where democratization failed and turned into
autocratization.
 8 of the top 10 “stand-alone” autocratizers were
liberal or electoral democracies. In 2023, none areliberal democracies, and only 2 can be consideredelectoral democracies.
 8 of the top 10 “bell-turn” autocratizers were
democracies at some point after democratization.
Only 3 remain democracies after autocratization set
in, illustrating that democratization processes are
fragile and are often reverted.
 Notably, elections are now increasingly undermined.
EMB autonomy is weakening substantially in 22 of
the 42 autocratizing countries.

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

4. Democratizing Countries

NUMBER OF COUNTRIES DEMOCRATIZING

 7 out of 9 “stand-alone” democratizers havetransitioned away from autocracy.
 The 9 “stand-alone” democratizers harbor only
30 million people, and 5 of the 9 are island states.
These facts reflect the smaller impact of current
democratization in the world.

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COUNTRIES

2003

2023

 3 “U-turn” democratizers have restored their initiallevels of democracy, but the other 6 are still at lower
levels than at the beginning of the episode.
 Freedom of expression and the media are typicalareas of improvement – increasing substantially inmore than half of all democratizing countries.

5. Windows to the Future 25 countries are “near misses” of autocratization,
meaning that they show signs of deterioration.
If developments continue, several could join the listof autocratizers in the near future.

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COUNTRIESNUMBER OF COUNTRIES AUTOCRATIZING

1142

COUNTRIESCOUNTRIES

2003

2023

 9 countries are “near misses” of democratization andthus potential upcoming “bright spots”.
 60 countries are holding national elections this year.
Of these, 31 are worsening on their democracylevels, while only 3 are improving.

SHARE OF WORLD POPULATION LIVING IN AUTOCRACIES Elections are “critical events” that can either trigger
democratization, enable autocratization, or aid
stabilization of autocratic regimes.
QUALITY OF ELECTIONS DETERIORATING

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2003:

23

COUNTRIESCOUNTRIES

2003

2023

50%

2023:

71%

SHARE OF WORLD POPULATION LIVING IN
AUTOCRATIZING COUNTRIESFREEDOM OF EXPRESSION DETERIORATING

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COUNTRIES35

COUNTRIES

2003:

2003

2023

7%

2023:

35%

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8

DEMOCRACY REPORT

Aerial view of a pedestrian bridge that
reads "Democracy" in downtown Sao
Paulo, Brazil. (Nelson Almeida/AFP via
Getty Images)

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD

1 | Democracy in the Worldy The level of democracy enjoyed by the average
person in the world in 2023 is down to 1985-levels;by country-based averages, it is back to 1998.

Box 1. Democracyy Since 2009 – almost 15 years in a row – the shareof the world’s population living in autocratizing
countries has overshadowed the share living indemocratizing countries.

Is it possible to measure democracy? V-Dem is a unique approach toconceptualizing and measuring democracy distinguishing between
multiple core principles of democracy: electoral, liberal, majoritarian,
consensual, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. The main
V-Dem dataset includes over 60 indices and 500 indicators. On thewebsite, you also find other datasets from associated projects suchas the Varieties of Parties (V-Party), the Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT), the Digital Society Project (DSP), and the Varieties ofIndoctrination (V-Indoc).

y The decline is stark in Eastern Europe and Southand Central Asia.
y Latin America and the Caribbean goes against
the global trend: Democracy levels increase, andlarge countries are more democratic than smaller
ones.

The V-Dem Institute’s Democracy Report centers on the Liberal
Democracy Index (LDI). It combines the “core” institutions of electoral
democracy with the liberal dimension: constraints on the executive by
the legislature and the judiciary, and the rule of law ensuring respect
for civil liberties.

The world map in Figure 1 shows the state of democracy in 2023
based on the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI).1 Democracy is moreprevalent in Western Europe and North America, as well as in parts ofEast Asia and the Pacific, and South America. More autocratic countries are concentrated in Central America, East Asia, South and Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

In the Democracy Report, we often weigh levels of democracy by
population size (as different from simple averages across number ofcountries). This is because democracy means rule by and for the people.
How many people in the world enjoy democratic freedoms and rights
is therefore critical when describing trends.

Democracy for the Average Person in theWorld is Back to 1985

Visit the website and explore the data, for example, by using our online
graphing tools: https://v-dem.net

Democracy across the world is in decline. All metrics used below in
Figure 2 show a rollback of democratic rights and institutions: thecountry-based averages (panel A), the population-weighted (panelB), the territory-weighted (panel C), and the GDP-weighted averages(panel D).

the confidence intervals, meaning that we cannot be certain to what
extent a change has occurred. One should therefore be cautious in
drawing too strong conclusions.

The level of democracy in 2023 was last seen in 1998 by country-based averages (red line in panel A). Yet, this decline is within

The level of democracy enjoyed by the average person worldwide
in 2023 is down to levels last seen in 1985 – almost 40 years ago. The

FIGURE 1. STATE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (LDI), 2023







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1 The Democracy Report 2024 is based on V-Dem dataset v14. With each annual update, V-Dem improves the quality of the data and engages a large number of experts, which may leadto correction of scores reported in previous years’ reports. V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) captures both electoral and liberal aspects of democracy and goes from the lowest(0) to the highest (1) levels of democracy. The electoral component is measured by the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) that captures the extent to which all elements of Robert Dahl’s(1971) famous articulation of “polyarchy” are present, including the quality of elections, individual rights, as well as freedoms of expression, the media, and association. The LiberalComponent Index (LCI) captures the liberal aspects including checks and balances on the executive, respect for civil liberties, the rule of law, and the independence of the legislatureand the judiciary. Dahl, R.A. 1971. Polyarchy: participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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DEMOCRACY REPORT

red line in panel B traces the 2023 population-weighted level of
democracy back in time to show this. To put this into perspective,
1985 marked the end of the military dictatorships in Brazil and Uruguay, as the third wave of democratization was beginning to gain
momentum. Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as the leader of the Soviet
Union and met with United States President Ronald Reagan for the
first time at the Geneva Summit as an early sign to the coming endof the Cold War.

LATIN AMERICA STANDS OUTIn sharp contrast to all other regions of the world, the democracy
enjoyed by the average person in Latin America and the Caribbean increased in the past year. This is primarily a result of recent improvements in Brazil, the most populated country in the region with
216 million citizens. Smaller countries like Bolivia and Honduras also
contribute to this change of direction. Yet, the left panel in Figure
3 portrays a different picture based on country-averages. By thismeasure, the trend for democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean is leveling out. The region stands out compared to the rest of
the world in that a large country is democratizing while more of thesmaller countries are autocratizing. It is also noticeable that the population-weighted level has been a lot higher than the country-based
for most of the time. In other words, large countries in Latin America are on average more democratic than the smaller ones and havebeen so for quite some time.

By territory-weighted averages, the level of democracy is now
back to the levels last seen in 1987 – the year of the crisis between
India and Pakistan followed by the 1987 Pakistan atomic alert, which
had a major impact on the region.
The level of democracy measured by the relative size of theeconomy stands out, marking the most dramatic change. The
world is already below where it was in 1973 – which was before thestart of the third wave of democratization beginning with Portugal’s
carnation revolution in 1974.

Democracy declines the most in Eastern Europe when going by
population-weighted averages (Figure 3, right panel). The level of
democracy enjoyed by the average person in Eastern Europe has
gradually declined to levels last recorded in 1990, before the collapseof the Soviet Union. Belarus and Russia are two prominent examplesof post-Soviet consolidation of autocracy in the region and their large
populations weigh down the average. Hungary and Serbia are also
driving this trend in recent years, as well as Croatia and Romania. The
country-based averages in the right panel show a different picture
demonstrating that democracy was declining between 2010 and2018 but has stayed relatively stable since then. This in part reflects
recent improvements in less populated countries, such as Kosovo,Montenegro, and North Macedonia. The overall difference between
the population-weighted and the country-based measures is stark.
In Eastern Europe, the large and populous countries are on averagemuch more autocratic than the smaller ones – the exact opposite toLatin America.

Why are there such stark differences between the country-based
and other weighted averages? It is quite simple. Large countries
with big populations and large economies such as India, Mexico,
The Philippines, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, and Türkiye have declined
significantly on democracy. Countries that are advancing are typically small countries with lesser populations such as The Seychelles,
Timor-Leste, and Lesotho. Brazil joined the advancers group this year
leading to a slight change in the overall picture.
Since 2009 – almost 15 years in a row – the share of the world’s population living in autocratizing countries has overshadowed the shareliving in democratizing countries. Many autocratizing countries arealso economic and military regional and global powers.
Ignoring the role of population size and economic size of countries indetermining the future of global democracy would be naïve. There isan abundance of research on the decisive role of global and regional
powers for peace and security, human rights, and democratic freedoms. We analyzed shifts in the balance of economic power between
democracies and autocracies in Section 5 of Democracy Report 2023.

FIGURE 2. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY BY COUNTRY AVERAGES, POPULATION, TERRITORY, AND GDP WEIGHTS, 1973–2023
A. COUNTRY AVERAGES

B. POPULATION-WEIGHTED

C. TERRITORY-WEIGHTED

D. GDP-WEIGHTED

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The black lines represent global averages on the LDI with the grey area marking the confidence intervals. Panel A is based on conventional country averages. Panels B, C, and Dshow levels of democracy weighted by population, territory, and GDP, respectively. The data for the latter three figures are drawn from the World Bank and Fariss et al. (2021), bothincluded in the v14 of the V-Dem dataset.

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLDFIGURE 3. REGIONAL LEVELS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY,
1973–2023
B. POPULATION-WEIGHTED

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y 29% of the world’s population – 2.3 billion people – live in
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liberal      ­ 
y Israel falls out of the liberal democracy category for the first −­ 
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from the World Bank, included in the v14 of the V-Dem dataset.

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y Electoral autocracies have by far the most people – 44% of
the world’s population, or 3.5 billion people.

        ­  −­  The lines
are regional averages on the LDI. Panel A is based on conventional country   
averages.
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levels of democracy weighted by population size using data y But 71% of the world’s population – 5.7 billion people – live
in autocracies – an increase from 48% ten years ago.

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The level of democracy is in steep decline also in South and Cen tral Asia, especially by the population-weighted measure. The levelof liberal democracy enjoyed by the average human in the region is
now down to levels last seen in 1975 - almost half a century ago. That
was when the Vietnam War ended and when Indira Gandhi declareda state of emergency in India. The population-weighted level of democracy is affected by recent deteriorations of democracy in India
with 1.4 billion citizens. Going by country-based averages (Figure 3,
left panel), the decline is less marked. By 2023, the region’s level of
democracy by population-weighted measure is now roughly at thesame level as by country averages: During the last decades, smaller
countries were gradually improving, while larger countries gradually
declining on their democracy levels.
Democracy is now at levels equivalent to around the year 2000 in
Sub-Saharan Africa and there are no stark differences between
the population-weighted and country-based measures of democracy, as shown in Figure 3. There were deteriorations occurring in theregion during the last five years, in part due to coups d’état in Gabon
and Niger in 2023 and military takeovers in five other countries in
the region since 2020 – Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, and Chad.
Levels of democracy in East Asia and the Pacific, The Middle
East and North Africa, and Western Europe and North America remain relatively stable during the last two years, but the declines
on the population-weighted measures over the past decade or so,
are noticeable. Looking at it from the perspective of country-based
averages, East Asia and the Pacific has fluctuated around the samelevel of democracy over the past two decades. The Middle East andNorth Africa has gradually declined since the Arab Spring. Western
Europe and North America has equally been on a slow but steadydecline since around 2010.

ure,2 the world is almost evenly divided between 91 democracies(liberal and electoral) and 88 autocracies (electoral and closed) at
the end of 2023 – very similar to our reporting in the last few years.
Figure 4 (left panel) provides the exact count by regime category
over the past 50 years using the RoW measure (see Box 2 for details).
RoW is based on the same V-Dem data that goes into the LDI andthis fourfold categorization captures some broader global trends interms of autocracy and democracy.
Naturally, categorical classifications like the RoW measure sacrificesome nuances and risk misclassifying countries when the underlying data puts them at, or very close to, thresholds. Some uncertainty therefore remains about regimes that are close to the threshold
between democracy and autocracy. Figure 4 (right panel) showsthat there are 18 countries that could be misclassified due to suchmeasurement uncertainty as they are either in the “lower bound” ofelectoral democracies (N=13) or in the “upper bound” of electoral
autocracies (N=5).3 We treat them as “grey zone” regimes.
Taking this uncertainty into account, we are confident that there areat least 78 democracies and 83 autocracies in the world, while we list

FIGURE 4. REGIME TYPES BY NUMBER OF COUNTRIES,
1973–2023
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A. COUNTRY AVERAGES

Autocracies and Democracies

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Figure 4 plots the number of countries (left panel) by regime type. The right panel
takes into account measurement uncertainty, highlighting the number of “grey zone”
countries above or below the line, distinguishing between democracies and autocracies. The “grey zone” estimates are based on the version of the RoW measure that
includes uncertainty (v2x_regime_amb in the V-Dem codebook, v14).

2 Lührmann, A. et al. 2018. “Regimes of the world (RoW).” Politics and Governance 6(1).
3 There is a variant of the RoW-measure that models uncertainty and identifies countries close to thresholds, see the variable v2x_regime_amb in the V-Dem codebook, v14.



11

DEMOCRACY REPORTBox 2. Regimes of the World – Democratization and Autocratization
Democratization means that a country is making moves towards moredemocracy, regardless of starting point. Autocratization is the opposite(see Figure 1).
Democratization can start in an autocracy (liberalization) or a democracy(deepening), and inversely, autocratization in a democracy (backsliding)or an autocracy (regression).
We distinguish between four types of regimes: Closed and Electoral
Autocracies, and Electoral and Liberal Democracies. For this, we use theRegimes of the World (RoW) measure (v2x_regime). There is also a versionof the RoW measure taking uncertainty into account (v2x_regime_amb).
We use this to show “grey zone” cases where confidence intervals in thedata overlap making the classification more uncertain. They are classified
as either upper bound electoral autocracies (“EA+“) or as lower boundelectoral democracies (“ED-“).
RoW builds on V-Dem data as well as V-Dem’s liberal and electoral democracy indices but is not officially endorsed by the V-Dem Steering Committee.
For details, see Lührmann et al. 2018. “Regimes of the World (RoW)”. Politics
and Governance 6(1).

FIGURE 1. REGIMES AND REGIME CHANGE
DEMOCRATIZATIONAUTOCRACY

DEMOCRACY

Closed Autocracy

Electoral Autocracy

Grey Zone

Electoral Democracy

Liberal Democracy

No multi­party elections
for the executive;
absence of fundamental
democratic components
such as freedom of
expression, freedom of
association, and free andfair elections.

Multiparty elections for the
executive exist; insufficientlevels of fundamental
requisites such as freedomof expression andassociation, and free andfair elections.

Countries
belong in thiscategory if
confidence
intervals
overlap
making theclassification
more
uncertain.

Multiparty elections forthe executive are free andfair; satisfactory degrees
of suffrage, freedom of
expression, freedom of
association.

Requirements of Electoral
Democracy are met;
judicial and legislative
constraints on theexecutive along with theprotection of civil liberties
and equality before thelaw.

AUTOCRATIZATION

The left panel of Figure 4 shows that the number of liberal democracies declines from a peak of 43 in 2007–2012 to 32 in 2023. By contrast, the number of closed autocracies is going up from a low of
22 in 2012 to 33 in 2022–2023. The world now harbors more closed
autocracies than liberal democracies. The last time this was the casein 1995.
Six countries descended into closed autocracies in just the last
two years: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Haiti, and Turkmenistan. This is another reminder of how the present global wave
of autocratization is affecting autocracies. It is not only, or perhaps
not even mainly, about “democratic backsliding.” A significant portion of changes for the worse in the world comes from autocracies
becoming more autocratic.
The number of electoral autocracies has been growing markedly in numbers over the past 50 years, from 36 in 1973 to peak at
65 in 2012, and we count 55 in 2023. Much of this upward trend is
explained by many closed autocracies liberalizing in the 1980s and1990s and starting to hold multiparty elections. Some became democracies, but many stalled as electoral autocracies, for example,
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Mozambique, Pakistan, and Uganda.
For the past 30 years, electoral autocracy has dominated as the mostcommon regime type in the world. We now see a possible shift.

FIGURE 5. REGIME TYPES BY WORLD POPULATION,
1973–2023
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grey zone regimes in Table 1, along with a more nuanced categorization of all countries. Thus, the number of democracies could range
from 78 to 96, with 91 being our best estimate, while the number of
autocracies might range from 82 to 101 countries, with 88 being ourbest estimate.

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12

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Figure 5 plots the share of the world's population (left panel) by regime type. The rightpanel takes into account measurement uncertainty, highlighting the number of “greyzone” countries above or below the line, distinguishing between democracies andautocracies.

Electoral democracies not only outnumber electoral autocracies
making it the most common regime type for the third year in a row,
but in 2023, their numbers also repeated the record of 59 set in 2021.
While there are not many positive signs for democracy in the world
today, this may be one to take note of. The only fly in the ointment

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD

A woman walks past a banner advertisingthe 2023 BRIC's summit in Johannesburg,
South Africa, Aug. 20, 2023.
Figure(Jemal
6 plotsCountess/UPI/Shutterstock)
the share of population living in liberal democracies, electoral democracies, electoral autocracies, and closed autocracies, including “grey zone” subcategories,

breions of the world.

is that this recent prominence of electoral democracies is partly aconsequence of liberal democracies backsliding.
MOST PEOPLE LIVE IN AUTOCRACIES
According to the RoW classification drawing on V-Dem data, 71%of the world’s population – 5.7 billion people – live in electoral orclosed autocracies in 2023.4 That is an increase from 48% of theworld population ten years ago. This fact captured in Figure 5 (leftpanel), is another reminder of how the world is affected by the unfolding wave of autocratization.
A plurality – 44% of the world’s population, or 3.5 billion people –reside in electoral autocracies, which include populous countries
such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Russia, The Philippines, and Türkiye.
Closed autocracies with sizeable populations include China, Iran,
Myanmar, and Vietnam. This regime type accounts for 27% of theworld’s population, or 2.2 billion people.
By contrast and despite being the most common regime type in
the world, 59 electoral democracies host only 16% of the world’s
population. Some of the more populous countries in this category
include Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa.
The 32 liberal democracies are home to 13% of the world’s population. The United States of America is by far the biggest liberal democracy, making up 4% of the world's population and about a thirdof the total population residing in liberal democracies.

Taking uncertainty into account, countries in the "grey zone" that
could be misclassified have a population share of 10% – 3% in electoral autocracies in the “upper bound,” and 7% in electoral democracies in the “lower bound.” This means that if all of them are in fact
misclassified, the share of the world’s population living in autocracies
could be as high as 78% or as low as 68%.

Box 3. Why Population-Weighted
Measures?
Since democracy is rule by the people, it matters how many people
enjoy democratic rights and freedoms around the world. The population-weighted metric is therefore more indicative of ‘how much’ ofthe world lives in a democracy than simple averages across countries.
Country-averages give the same weight to advances in a small country
like the Seychelles (one of the top performers) as to declines in a hugecountry like India (one of the worst autocratizers lately). When speaking
about how much of the world is undergoing a democratic decline, we
do not think that advances in a small country compensate for declines ina large one. That is why we focus more on population-weighted metrics
while also reporting the averages that give equal weight to all countries.

4 Percentages are rounded throughout the Report. The 71% mentioned here builds aggregating rounded figures for liberal and electoral autocracies in Figure 4. Population data comefrom the World Bank included in v14 of the V-Dem dataset.

13

14

DEMOCRACY REPORTFIGURE 6. REGIONAL SHARES OF POPULATION BY REGIME TYPE, 2023

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Figure 6 plots the share of population living in liberal democracies, electoral democracies, electoral autocracies, and closed autocracies, including “grey zone” subcategories,
by regions of the world.

LARGE REGIONAL DIFFERENCES
There is significant variation across regions in the share of the population that enjoys freedoms and rights in democracies or is subjected
to oppression in autocracies. Figure 6 shows the situation at the endof 2023 across seven regions of the world.
In East Asia and the Pacific, 78% of the population reside in autocracies and are denied some or all democratic rights and freedoms.
This includes closed autocracies such as China and Vietnam, andelectoral autocracies like Singapore and The Philippines. Only 9%of the regional population live in liberal democracies like Japan andAustralia. There are no countries in the region that are certain to beelectoral democracies, but 13% of the population live in “grey zone”
electoral democracies where the uncertainty bounds overlap withthresholds for electoral autocracy. Indonesia and Malaysia are two
prominent examples by 2023. Thailand moved on the RoW classification from a closed to an electoral autocracy, while Malaysia – for the
first time in its history – moved from a “grey zone” electoral autocracy to a “grey zone” electoral democracy in 2023.
South and Central Asia is now the second most autocratic region in the world. More than nine out of ten people, or 93% of the
population reside in electoral autocracies like India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan. Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
are closed autocracies, accounting for 4% of the regional population.
A mere 3% reside in electoral democracies, including countries like
Armenia, and Georgia, while only one country, Bhutan, is a liberal
democracy. In 2023, only Mongolia descended from an electoral democracy regime type to the democratic “grey zone”.
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains the most autocratic region in the world, with 98% of its population residing in
autocracies. A large share (45%) lives in closed autocracies such as
Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, but 53% live in electoral autocracies,
such as Türkiye and Iraq. 2% of the region's population reside in Tunisia, which is in the “grey zone” electoral autocracy category. The
remaining 2% live in Israel. Notably, Israel lost its long-time status asliberal democracy in 2023. It is now classified as an electoral democracy – for the first time in over 50 years. This is primarily due to substantial declines in the indicators measuring the transparency andpredictability of the law, and government attacks on the judiciary.
Among other things, Israel’s Knesset passed a bill in 2023 stripping
the Supreme Court of the power to declare government decisions
unreasonable. Indicators that are in substantive decline also include
freedom from torture.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the vast majority of people (82%) residein electoral and closed autocracies like Democratic Republic of theCongo, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. This makes it thethird most autocratic region worldwide. However, 20% reside in
the four “grey zone” electoral autocracies Benin, Mauritius, Nigeria,
and Sierra Leone. Most of these four, however, lean towards
qualifying as cer-tain autocracies. Meanwhile, 18% live in electoral
democracies such as Ghana and South Africa, out of which 6% arefound in three “grey zone” electoral democracies: Botswana, Kenya,
and Zambia. The Sey-chelles remains the only liberal democracy inthe region. Four of the region's countries have lost the status ofliberal democracy in the last decade: South Africa in 2013, Mauritius
in 2014, Ghana in 2015, and Botswana in 2021. Four countries inthis region also changed regime type in 2023. Three of those –Niger, Mauritius, and Sierra Leone – from electoral democracy toelectoral autocracy, and one, Burkina Faso, from electoral
autocracy to closed autocracy.
In Eastern Europe, 66% of the population live in electoral autocracies like Hungary, Russia, and Serbia. Electoral democracies host
29% of the population in countries such as Bulgaria, Croatia,
and Romania. Of these, 2% live in the ambiguous “lower bound”
elec-toral democracies – Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Only 5% reside in liberal democracies Czechia, Estonia, and Latvia.
Slovenia is the only country in this region that deteriorated on
regime type in 2023, from liberal to electoral democracy, while
North Macedonia and Montenegro improved from “grey zone”
electoral democracy to non-ambiguous electoral democracy status.

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD

Western Europe and North America remains the most democratic region of the world, and most of its inhabitants (96%) live inliberal democracies. The remaining 4% reside in electoral democracies. Cyprus and Portugal fell from liberal to electoral democracy in2023, while Austria and Greece made the same transition in 2021 and
2022, respectively.
The vast majority of Latin Americans (86%) live in electoral democracies such as Argentina and Brazil, and 4% live in liberal democracies like Chile and Uruguay. However, Latin America is also the region with the largest share of the population living in “grey zone”
regimes. No less than 24% of people reside in Guatemala, Guyana,
Honduras, and Mexico – countries in the lower bound of electoral
democracies that qualify as democracies only with a certain degreeof uncertainty. Autocracies in the region are comparatively smaller
countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, making up 10%of the region’s inhabitants. The only country to decidedly change
regime type in 2023 was Suriname, moving from electoral to liberal
democracy, while autocratizing Mexico deteriorated from electoral
democracy to “grey zone” electoral democracy.

Freedom of Expression and Elections GettingWorsey Almost all components of democracy are getting worse in
more countries than they are getting better, compared toten years ago.
y Freedom of expression remains the worst affected component of democracy and is worsening in 35 countries in 2023.
y Clean elections is now the second – deteriorating in 23 countries and improving in twelve. This core institution of democracy used to be relatively unaffected.
y Freedom of association, including civil society, is the third
most deteriorating component – 20 countries are restricting
this right while only three are expanding it.

Most components of democracy are now declining in more countries than they are improving – a stark contrast to a decade ago when
the opposite was true. Figure 7 provides evidence of how extensive
the changes are. The left panel shows the total number of countries
in which different aspects of democracy improved or deteriorated
by 2013 compared to 2003, while the right panel shows the same forthe last ten years, 2023 compared to 2013.
Freedom of Expression remains the worst affected aspect of
democracy and is deteriorating in 35 countries in 2023 (right panel), while improving in only eleven. This includes media freedom,
freedom of citizens to discuss political issues, as well as freedomof academic and cultural expression. Ten years ago, only elevencountries were limiting freedom of expression, while twelve wereexpanding it.
The Clean Elections Index assesses the extent to which elections
are free and fair. This core aspect of democracy – the freedom, fairness, and integrity of elections – was deteriorating in ten countries
back in 2013, while improving in 23 countries. In 2023, the data indicates a complete reversal: the quality of elections is worsening in 23
countries and improving in twelve.
Freedom of Association is the third most affected component of
democracy in 2023, deteriorating in 20 countries and improving in
only three. In 2013, it was declining in three countries and improving ineleven. This aspect of democracy captures the extent to which parties
are allowed to form and to participate in elections, and the extent towhich civil society organizations can form and operate freely.
Deliberation is the only component worsening in both panels. It is
declining in 19 countries in 2023, compared to 14 in 2013, while improving in eleven countries both in 2013 and 2023. The deliberative
component measures respect for opposition, pluralism, and counterarguments with several different indicators and is central to thedemocratic process.
Two aspects of the Liberal Component have weakened substantially in the past ten years. Rule of law is declining in 13 countries in

FIGURE 7. DEMOCRATIC ASPECTS IMPROVING AND DECLINING, 2013 AND 2023

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For indices measuring components of democracy, Figure 7 shows the number of countries improving and declining significantly and substantially. An index is declining substantially and significantly if its 2023 value is at least 0.05 points lower than its 2013 value on a scale ranging from 0 to 1, and the confidence intervals do not overlap. The left panel
shows changes in 2013 compared to 2003, and the right panel shows changes in 2023 compared to 2013.

15

16

DEMOCRACY REPORT

2023, while ten years back it was only four. Similarly, legislative constrains are deteriorating in eleven countries in 2023, which is almost
three times higher than in 2013, when it was only four.
MOST OFTEN UNDER ATTACK: MEDIA, ELECTIONS, AND
CIVIL SOCIETY
Each component of democracy discussed in the analysis above ismeasured with an index that aggregates up to 20 individual indicators. Those individual indicators capture specific aspects of the coredemocratic principles. With the V-Dem data, we can drill down into
these details, and provide a more nuanced picture of what specifically is under attack.
Figure 8 displays the top 20 indicators that declined in most countries over the past ten years. It reveals a growing trend of threatsagainst freedom of expression, free and fair elections, and civil society organizations. The list of indicators also testifies to a worseningof the space for deliberation and undermining of the rule of law, thatmanifest through “executive aggrandizement.”5 Note that only substantial and statistically significant changes are included.
Freedom of expression including freedom of the media is what “aspiring autocrats” attack most often and to the greatest degree. Government censorship of the media takes a dubious first place on
the top 20 list. It worsened in 45 countries over the past ten years.
Among the worst government offenders when it comes to increasing their efforts to censor the media are El Salvador, India, and notably Mauritius. The latter island nation is a long-standing democracy
where several rights and freedoms have deteriorated significantly inthe last few years.

Harassment of journalists is increasing in 36 countries, for example, Algeria, Hungary, and Poland. Media bias, or discrimination of
opposition parties and candidates in favor of incumbent governments, is deteriorating in 26 countries. Nicaragua, South Africa, andPakistan are examples of countries where media bias is becoming
increasingly common and undermines democratic institutions.
Freedom of expression means an open space not only for the media,
but also for whole societies. Academic and cultural expression is
declining in 39 countries. Russia and The Philippines are among thecountries where this forum for “speaking truth to power” is declining
the most. Freedom of discussion for women and men is declining
in 33 and 31 countries, respectively. For women, this freedom has
declined notably in Indonesia, while for men in Tajikistan and Yemen,
to name just some examples.
Notably, the quality of elections is now worsening across the world.
The data shows that 35 countries are declining on the free and fairelection-indicator of this core institution of democracy. This is a
substantial increase from 30 countries in last year‘s Democracy Report, and in 2019, the number was only 16. The Election Management Body’s (EMB) autonomy is under attack by governments in
24 countries – a substantial increase from last year. These numbers
demonstrate that democratic elections are now increasingly undermined by governments. Bangladesh, Egypt, and Venezuela are examples of countries where the last held elections were significantly
less free and fair than before. We provide further perspectives on the2024 “record year” of elections in Section 5.

Freedom of association for civil society is also under pressure. In 35
countries, governments are repressing civil society organizations (CSOs) more actively than ten years ago. Control over CSOs’  ­−−− 
existence (‘entry and exit’) is tightening in 30 countries. Civil society    
FIGURE 8. TOP-20 DECLINING INDICATORS, 2013–2023  

­−−−constitutes
a fundamental
defense against autocratic rule because 
   of


its
capacitytomobilize
peoplein protests and demonstrations.
  ­−−−  
 

This underscores why infringements on the rights of CSOs are so     
  ­−−−
 

 perilous. Countries where conditions for civil society have become     

     
significantly worse in the last ten years include a diverse set of coun
 
     
   
tries from Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, and The Philippines, to Hungary, 
  

   
 
     and Türkiye.

                  
   
       

  


  


   


 



 



  



  

          
Space for democratic deliberation is another area that governments 
          
 restrict.
   
     
The rangeof consultation by government is worsening in 
 
    
34
countries,   
while the extent to which governments provide rea     
     
soned justification for their actions is declining in 29 countries.
      
    
     
    
  
The extent to which society is engaged in deliberation on policy 
     
    
andthe level of respect for counterarguments are worsening in 
   
  
  25 and 24 countries, respectively. These aspects have become signif    

   
   
 icantly worse in countries like Botswana, Mexico, and Thailand.
 

   
     Finally, liberalism and executive oversight are undermined by many

  governments. A total of 26 countries have undermined transparent     
 
laws with predictable enforcement, 25 have infringed more on

the impartiality of the administration, and freedom of movement between countries, while executive oversight is worsening
in more than 20 countries compared to ten years ago. Among theworst offenders are Nicaragua, Central African Republic, Guatemala,and Türkiye.

Figure 8 plots the top 20 indicators that decline significantly and substantially in thelargest number of countries between 2013 and 2023. The red line marks the top 10
indicators. An indicator is declining substantially and significantly if its 2023 value is atleast 0.5 points lower than its 2013 value on a scale from 0 to 4 (for most indicators) or
0 to 5, and the confidence intervals do not overlap.

5 Executive aggrandizement is a process that contains a series of institutional changes by the elected executives, impairing the ability of the political opposition to challenge thegovernment and hold it to account. See: Bermeo, N. 2016. “On democratic backsliding.” Journal of Democracy 27(1).

DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLDTABLE 1. REGIMES OF THE WORLD, 2023
Table 1 presents the classification of countries according to the Regimes of the World measure. The
countries are sorted by regime type in 2023, and within regime type – in alphabetical order.

LD

Liberal Democracy

ED

Electoral Democracy

We use the plus/minus sign to indicate the possible uncertainty of the classification, and to underlinethat some countries are placed in the "grey zone" between regime types. This is based on the V-Dem'sconfidence intervals and accounts for potential measurement errors that may arise due to the natureof the data.

EA

Electoral Autocracy

CA

Closed Autocracy  –indicates that the country could also belong to the lower category  +

indicates that the country could also belong to the higher category

The typology is published in Lührmann et al. 2018. Regimes of the World (RoW), Politics and Governance 6(1). While based on the V-Dem’s data, this measure is not officially endorsed by the Steering
Committee of V-Dem (only the main V-Dem democracy indices have such an endorsement).
LIBERAL DEMOCRACIESELECTORAL DEMOCRACIESCOUNTRY

2023

Australia
Belgium

CHANGEERTFROMEPISODE
2013
2023

COUNTRY

2023

LD

AustriaED+

LD

CyprusED+

Costa RicaLD

GreeceED+

Czechia

LD

IsraelED+

DenmarkLD

JamaicaED+

EstoniaLD

Lithuania

ED+

Finland

LD

Malta

ED+

GermanyLD

Moldova

ED+

IcelandLD

Montenegro

ED+

IrelandLD

Namibia

ED+

Japan

LD

PortugalED+

LatviaLD

SloveniaED+

Luxembourg

LD

Trinidad and Tobago

ED+

Netherlands

LD

Vanuatu

New ZealandLD

Argentina

Seychelles

LD

Armenia

ED

Spain

LD

BoliviaED

SwedenLD

BrazilED

Switzerland

LD

Bulgaria

Taiwan

LD

USA

LD

Barbados

LD-

BhutanLD-

CanadaLD-Chile  indicates a country moving from one category to anotherIn an episode of autocratization, as of 2023
In an episode of democratization, as of 2023

Grey zone democracies/autocracies are marked

ELECTORAL AUTOCRACIESCHANGE
FROM
2013
EPISODE








COUNTRY

2023

Benin

EA+

Mauritius

EA+

Nigeria

EA+

Sierra Leone

EA+

Tunisia

EA+

Algeria
Angola

CLOSED AUTOCRACIESCHANGEERTFROMEPISODE
2013
2023










COUNTRY

2023

KuwaitCA+

Turkmenistan

CA+

Uzbekistan

CA+

Afghanistan

CA

BahrainCA

EA

Burkina Faso

CA

EA

Chad

CA

Azerbaijan

EA

China

CA

Bangladesh

EA

Cuba

CA

Belarus

EA

EritreaCA

BurundiEA

Eswatini

CA

CAR

EA

GuineaCA

Cambodia

EA

Haiti

CA

ED+

Cameroon

EA

Hong Kong

CA

ED

Comoros

EA

Iran

CA

Congo

EA

Jordan

CA

DRC

EA

Laos

CA

Djibouti

EA

Libya

CA

ED

Egypt

EA

Mali

CA

Cape VerdeEDEl Salvador

EA

MoroccoCA

Colombia

ED

Equatorial Guinea

EA

MyanmarCA

CroatiaED

Ethiopia

EA

North Korea

CA

Dominican Republic

ED

Gabon

EA

Oman

CA

EcuadorED

Guinea-Bissau

EA

Palestine/Gaza

CA

LD-

GambiaED

Hungary

EA

Qatar

CA

FranceLD-

Georgia

ED

India

EA

Saudi Arabia

CA

Italy

LD-

Ghana

ED

Iraq

EA

SomaliaCA

NorwayLD-

KosovoED

Ivory Coast

EA

South Sudan

CASouth Korea

LD-

LesothoED

Kazakhstan

EA

Sudan

CA

SurinameLD-

LiberiaED

Kyrgyzstan

EA

Syria

CA

Lebanon

EA

UAE

CA

Madagascar

EA

VietnamCA

Mauritania

EA

Yemen

CA

Mozambique

EA







































United Kingdom

LD-

MalawiED

UruguayLD-

Maldives

ED

Nepal

ED

North MacedoniaED

Panama

ED

Niger

EA

Paraguay

ED

Pakistan

EA

Peru

ED

PolandED

RomaniaED

S.Tomé & P.

ED

SenegalED

SlovakiaED

Solomon Islands

ED

South AfricaED

Sri Lanka

ED




















Palestine/West Bank

EA

Papua New Guinea

EA

Philippines

EA

RussiaEA

RwandaEA

SerbiaEA

Singapore

EA

Somaliland

EA

Tajikistan

EA

Timor-LesteED

Tanzania

EA

AlbaniaED-

Thailand

EA

BiH

ED-

Togo

EA

BotswanaED-

Türkiye

EA

Fiji

ED-

UgandaEA

GuatemalaED-

UkraineEA

GuyanaED-

Venezuela

EA

HondurasED-

Zanzibar

EA

Indonesia

ED-

Zimbabwe

EA

Kenya

ED-

Nicaragua

EA-

MalaysiaED-

MexicoED-

Mongolia

ED-

Zambia

ED-
































































CHANGEERTFROMEPISODE
2013
2023





































17

18

DEMOCRACY REPORT

Dozens of indigenous Mayan weavers
demanded the resignation of the
Guatemalan prosecutor in a protest
accusing her of "weaving corruption",outside the Public Ministry in
Guatemala City Aug 20, 2023.
(Johan Ordonez/AFP via Getty Images)

Box 4. ERT Methodology (Episodes of Regime Transformation)
The V-Dem Institute’s Democracy Report 2024 switches tothe sophisticated ERT method (Maerz et al. 2023) to identify
countries that are democratizing or autocratizing. This
more scientific method is more cautious than the one usedin our previous reports and takes underlying measurement
uncertainty into account. The switch means that numbersin this year’s Democracy Report are not fully comparable
to previous editions.
A large team at the V-Dem Institute developed the ERT method over several
years. It has now been vetted by extensive peer review in the scientificcommunity and publications in several high-ranking journals. All details,
including the code and a visualization app, can be found in associatedpublications and on Github.
Reduced to the bare bones, one can say that the ERT method works by first
identifying small annual changes (>0.01 on the 0-1 scale) in a country’s levelof democracy measured by V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index (EDI). If
they accumulate within several years to substantial (>0.1), it is an episode.
If changes are smaller, it is deemed mere fluctuations without substantialchange that could result from uncertainty in the underlying measures. The ERT
then classifies the outcome of democratization and autocratization episodes.
The ERT has several advantages over the method used in previous Democracy Reports that simply took the difference between scores ten years ago
and the last year. The most important is that the sophisticated, multilayered,and tested decision-rules for coding in the ERT, ensures greater confidence

about “democratizers” and “autocratizers” than before. The ERT also allows
us to distinguish between episodes that are 1) substantial and ongoing right
now like autocratization in India; from those that 2) recently ended but stillamount to being among the “worst offenders” in the last ten years, such as
Tükiye’s descent into electoral autocracy. We make use of that feature inthis year’s Democracy Report.
In the Democracy Report, we use the ERT on the EDI to identify start- andendpoints for ongoing episodes, including a couple of smaller methodological adjustments of the method introduced with this year’s ERT release. In
the Democracy Report we, however, display countries’ scores on the Liberal
Democracy Index (LDI) as in previous year’s reports (and the EDI is one thetwo main components of the LDI).
Featured Article:
Maerz, Seraphine F., Amanda Edgell, Matthew C. Wilson, SebastianHellmeier, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2023. “Episodes of Regime Transformation.” Journal of Peace Research online first.
Codebook:
Edgell, Amanda B., et al. 2023. Episodes of regime transformation dataset
and codebook, V4. V-Dem Institute.
Data, Code & Codebook Repository:
https://github.com/vdeminstitute/ERT
Shiny App for Visualizations:
https://episodes.shinyapps.io/validation/

TRENDS OF REGIME CHANGE

2 | Trends of Regime Changey A total of 60 countries are in episodes of regime
transformation – autocratizing or democratizing.

Reports, where we focused on countries that have changed themost in the last ten years only. A country which autocratized a lot
during the decade or so but has already stabilized, for example anelectoral autocracy like Türkiye, no longer shows up as an ongoing
autocratizer using the more scientific ERT methodology. By contrast,
a country which democratized a lot during the last decade but is
now in the period of autocratization, for example an electoral democracy like Armenia, shows up as an ongoing autocratizer in 2023
– despite previous positive changes – because of its present (ongoing) direction of change. The ERT gives the analyses more precisionand reliability than before, and improves the validity of conclusions.

y The wave of autocratization is notable. Autocratization is ongoing in 42 countries, home to 2.8
billion people, or 35% of the world’s population.
India, with 18% of the world’s population, accounts
for about half of the population living in autocratizing countries.
y There may be signs that the autocratization wave
is slowing down, but one should be cautious withthat interpretation.

The World Continues to Become More
Autocraticy Democratization is taking place in 18 countries,
harboring only 400 million people, or 5% of theworld's population. Brazil makes up more thanhalf of this, with its 216 million inhabitants.

42 countries are currently undergoing autocratization as identified
using the new ERT methodology. The number of autocratizing countries in 2023 remains near an all-time high of 47 countries registeredin 2021. Figure 10 shows that the number of countries entering episodes of autocratization has been increasing dramatically over thelast 30 years.

In this part of the Democracy Report 2024, we focus on countries thatare in change, and on the direction of change – towards more democracy or more autocracy? How many countries are democratizing
and autocratizing, and how much?

The noticable decline in the number of autocratizing countries andthe slight uptake in the number of democratizing countries in thelast two years is good news. It could indicate that the current wave
of autocratization has crested and would be waning going forward.
Yet, one should be careful not to immediately draw that conclusion.

This focus is different from the analyses in Section 1 that looked at
the state of democracy in terms of average levels of democracy, andregime types over time.
The world map in Figure 9 shows which countries are now in an ongoing period of democratization (blue) or autocratization (red) according to the ERT methodology (see Box 4). The intensity of colors
indicates the magnitude of change.

The ERT method forces us to be cautious with declaring that a country has entered a period of change (see Box 4 for details). The datafor 2023 shows that 25 countries register decline in democracy levels
that qualify as “potential” episodes of autocratization, but the criteria
for declaring them “manifest autocratizers” are not yet completely
fulfilled. If deteriorations in these countries continue in the coming
years, the number 42 for 2023 could increase substantially post-fac-

With the new ERT methodology, we can identify exactly which countries are in a period of continued change. The ERT methodology isdifferent from the methodology used in previous year’s ­Democracy
FIGURE 9. COUNTRIES AUTOCRATIZING VS. DEMOCRATIZING, 2023

−0.5

−0.4

−0.3

−0.2

−0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

Figure 9 shows countries in which the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) has improved (blue) or declined (red) by at least 0.1 (or 10 percent of the possible range of the variable)
by 2023, according to the ERT methodology (see Box 4). Color intensity indicates the magnitude of change since the start of regime transformation. Countries in grey are not inchange as of 2023.

19

DEMOCRACY REPORTFIGURE 10. AUTOCRATIZING VS. DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIES,
1973–2023

















        


 

























 ­   









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­   

OVER ONE-THIRD OF THE POPULATION IN
AUTOCRATIZING COUNTRIESAutocratizing countries host more than one third of the world’s
population in 2023 (right panel of Figure 10). The share has recededslightly in the last two years, from a peak of 39% in 2021. Yet, theshare remains near an all-time high. For comparison, 19% of theworld's population lived in autocratizing countries in 1973, and only
0.1% in 1987-1988.
Fewer people live in democratizing countries in 2023, as shown by
the dashed blue line in the right panel of Figure 10. The share of theworld population living in democratizing countries has remained
below 10% since 2011 and reached 5% by 2023 – about 400 million
people.
FIGURE 11. DEMOCRATIZERS VS. AUTOCRATIZERS,
BY POPULATION SIZE, 2023

Figure 10 shows patterns of democratization and autocratization over the last 50
years. The left panel displays the number of countries in each category, and the rightpanel shows the share of the world’s population living in autocratizing or democratizing countries.







tum (since the beginning of these “censored” cases of potential episodes was in or even before 2023).
Figure 10 presents the global patterns of autocratization and democratization over the last 50 years. The red line in the left panel showsthat autocratizing countries declined gradually from 17 in 1973 to 1 in
1989. By 1990, the trajectory reversed, and the numbers were slowly
increasing up to 13 autocratizing countries in 2008. Since 2009, thenumbers rise steeply and hit a record of 47 countries in 2021.
The development over time for democratizing countries is inverseto the autocratizing over this 50-year period. The dashed blue linein the left panel of Figure 10 shows that there are 18 democratizers
in 2023 – one more than the 17 in 1973, at the eve of the third wave
of democratization. The number of democratizers skyrocketed after
1989 and the fall of the Berlin Wall reaching its peak in 1992, when
70 countries were democratizing at the same time. The number
then plummeted to 29 in 1997 sliding down to 14 by 2017, which
was the lowest point in 50 years. In 2023, there are a few more – 18
countries – in an ongoing episode of democratization. Note that the
caveats about the numbers of episodes for the last two-three years
discussed above also apply to democratizers. The numbers could
therefore increase post-factum in the coming years if countries thatnow qualify as “potential” democratizers continue to improve, anddemocratization episodes become “manifest.”
The ERT method is superior in increasing precision for identifying
which countries are in ongoing episodes of change, which countries
have ended such processes of change, and determining start andend dates of these transformation episodes. It introduces a precautious set of coding rules taking uncertainty into account to avoid
wrongfully declaring countries “autocratizers” or “democratizers.”
Yet, that increase in sophistication also means bringing along someuncertainty about the last couple of years’ counts. More countries
may add to the counts of autocratizers and democratizers post-factum if and when their magnitude of change makes them qualify.
The ERT method then back-dates the start year of those processes ofchange to the year the change began in earnest.

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Figure 11 displays country scores on the LDI in 2023 (y-axis) and at the start of autocratization / democratization episodes (x-axis), as identified by the ERT methodology. The
starting year of change varies across countries. Size of the bubbles reflects population
size. Countries above the diagonal line have become more democratic whereas countries below the diagonal line have become more autocratic. The graph only includes
countries that are in an episode of regime transformation in 2023 as identified by the
ERT methodology.

Many of the autocratizing countries are influential regional and global powers that have large populations, such as India, Mexico, andSouth Korea, as illustrated in Figure 11. Other populous countries
that are autocratizing include Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and
The Philippines. Autocratization is also manifest within the European Union, affecting Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. This
adds to the heft of the current wave of autocratization when influential countries with large economies can be expected to impact onother countries.
The democratizing countries are typically smaller in size, economy,
and population, for example The Gambia, The Maldives, and The
Seychelles. The recent addition of Brazil to the list of democratizers is an important exception. With its 216 million population andlarge economy, it is an important regional as well as global power.

TRENDS OF REGIME CHANGE

60 Countries in Episodes of Change– Across Regions
The 42 autocratizing and the 18 democratizing countries are distributed across all regions of the world, as shown in Figure 12.
Four countries (or 17% of the region) in the East Asia-Pacific arein episodes of democratic progress that are ongoing as of 2023: Fiji,
Solomon Island, Thailand, and Timor-Leste. However, six (26% of theregion) are in a substantial decline: Cambodia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Myanmar, South Korea, and The Philippines.
Only one country with a tiny population of some 526,000 (The
Maldives) is democratizing in South and Central Asia. The same
number as in East Asia-Pacific – six countries (35% of countries in theregion) are autocratizing: Afghanistan, Armenia, India, Kyrgyzstan,
Mongolia, and Pakistan. India with 1.4 billion and Pakistan with almost 250 million are two of the most populated countries in theworld. Their autocratization contributes greatly to the high share of
the world population living in both autocracies and autocratizing
countries.
In the MENA region, with the lowest overall level of democracy inthe world, there is only one democratizer (Tunisia) while two countries (10% of the region) are autocratizing: Libya and Lebanon.
The region with the largest number of countries progressing on
democracy is Sub-Saharan Africa. Five countries (or 10% of theregion) are democratizing: Benin, Lesotho, The Gambia, The Seychelles, and Zambia. Yet, the region also has the largest number of
autocratizers – thirteen (25% of the region): Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, The Comoros, Ghana, Guinea,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, and Sudan.
Three democratizing countries are in Eastern Europe, which makes
14% of the region: Kosovo, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Morethan double (32%, or seven countries) are in processes of substantial decline: Belarus, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, andUkraine. Ukraine’s regression is largely a consequence of Russia’s illegal invasion that put one-third of the territory under harsh authoritarian rule and forced the Ukraine government to impose state of
emergency and restrict media freedom and related aspects.

A woman holds a placard
with the inscription "Don't letothers choose for you" during
The Million Hearts Marchin Warsaw, Poland, Oct. 1,
2023. (Volha Shukaila/SOPA
Images/Shutterstock)

No country across North America and Western Europe is substantially improving on democracy levels, while Greece experiencesa democratic decline.
Finally, in Latin America and the Caribbean, 16% of countries –four – are in episodes of democratization: Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican
Republic, and Honduras. Among these, Bolivia and Brazil are successfully reversing an autocratization course from previous years (see further below). Yet, almost double the share of countries in the region(28%) – seven – are currently regressing: El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru.

FIGURE 12. AUTOCRATIZATION VS. DEMOCRATIZATION ACROSS REGIONS, 2023
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21

22

DEMOCRACY REPORT

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ImagesCity, Nov.
21, 2023. (Moises Castillo/AP Photo)AUTOCRATIZING COUNTRIES

3 | Autocratizing Countries
y 42 countries are currently in ongoing episodes of
autocratization.
y 28 of the 42 autocratizers were democracies at thestart of their episode. Of these 28 only about half,
or 15, remain democracies in 2023.

Taking advantage of the new, peer-review vetted ERT methodology,
Democracy Report 2024 can for the first time show the trajectoriesof the countries with currently ongoing processes of autocratization.
There are two types: “Stand-alone” autocratization where the process of deterioration starts independently, after a period of relative
stability, and “bell-turns” where autocratization follows shortly after,
and is connected to, a period of democratization. The complete listof the 42 autocratizing countries grouped into the 23 stand-alone
and 19 bell-turn processes is presented in Figure 13. Countries areordered according to their levels on the LDI at the onset of autocratization. The LDI score for 2023 reveals the total magnitude of
deterioration by the end of 2023. Note that all these autocratization
episodes are still ongoing.

y Of the 42 ongoing episodes, 23 are “stand-alone”
processes and 19 are “bell-turns” where democratization failed and turned into autocratization.
y 8 of the top 10 “stand-alone” autocratizers were
liberal or electoral democracies. In 2023, none areliberal democracies, and only two can be considered electoral democracies.
y 8 of the top 10 “bell-turn” autocratizers were
democracies at some point after democratization.
Only 3 remain democracies after autocratization
set in, illustrating that democratization processes
are fragile and are often reverted.

Of the 42 autocratizers, 28 were democracies at the start of their episode. 13 of these are now autocracies. Other 14 were already autocracies when they started to deepen even further. Seven of them are 42 CASES OF ONGOING AUTOCRATIZATION, 2023
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y Notably, elections are now increasingly undermined. EMB autonomy is weakening substantiallyin 22 of the 42 autocratizing countries.


















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       Figure 13 shows the LDI scores and confidence intervals at the start of autocratization. By the ERT methodology, these are technically “pre-episode” in the sense that the year after
was the first recording a decline. The values in 2023 are highlighted in orange and reveal the total magnitude of change. The ERT is based on the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI)
for identifying episodes, and we follow that but display countries’ values on the LDI. A country may change more on the EDI than on the LDI, which explains cases with overlapping confidence intervals (they do not overlap on the EDI).

23

DEMOCRACY REPORT

closed autocracies by the end of 2023. This shows the breadth of thecurrent wave of autocratization, affecting citizens in both democracies and autocracies.

“Stand-Alone” Autocratizationof democracy in Hong Kong’s closed autocracy continues to depreciate further in 2023.
We start with discussing the two countries that remain democracies
in 2023.

Figure 14 shows the top 10 out of the 23 countries with ongoing“stand-alone” episodes of autocratization, and details their trajectories on the LDI from the start of each country’s episode to the endof 2023. Table 2 shows the “worst offenders” by ranking countries by
the total magnitude of decline.

Most observers of Greece perhaps associate its democratic troubles
with the recent past. Yet, the descent can be traced back all the way
to 2012 with the ERT. In the first seven years, changes were incremental, and the process was very slow, in the archetypical pattern for
autocratization in the “third wave”.7 The steeper downward trajectory begins in 2016 driven by a weakening of institutional checks and

FIGURE 14. TOP 10 “STAND-ALONE” AUTOCRATIZERS, 2023

TABLE 2. RANK ORDER BY MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE, FIGURE 14 ­

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Hungary

Change on LDI-0.444

2

Poland-0.376

3

Nicaragua-0.3594

India-0.2955Serbia-0.276

6

Mauritius-0.2717

Greece-0.2328

Afghanistan-0.195

9The Comoros-0.194

10

Hong Kong-0.186

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Figure 14 plots the LDI values for the top 10 “stand-alone” autocratizing countries.
“Stand-alone” means that autocratization in these countries started after a periodof relative stability (i.e., no substantial change on the EDI levels). This is different frombell-turn episodes of autocratization (see below). Note that the first year on the graphis technically a “pre-episode” year in the sense that the year after was the first one
recording a decline by the ERT methodology. The plot visualizes the total magnitudeof change during autocratization.

Eight out of ten countries in this group were democracies before
the start of autocratization. Democracy broke down in six of thoseeight cases – The Comoros, Hungary, India, Mauritius, Nicaragua, and Serbia. Only Greece and Poland remain democracies
in 2023. This frequency of democratic breakdown matches with arecent study showing that 80% of democracies break down if they
start autocratizing.6
Two countries among the top “stand-alone” autocratizers alreadystarted out as autocracies. Afghanistan is going from an electoral
to a closed autocracy during the process, while the initially low levelbalances as well as encroachments on the freedom of expression
and the media. A recent wiretapping scandal involved Prime Minister Mitsotakis and the National Intelligence Service in 2022. The government was tapping in on opposition leaders, journalists, and evenother members of the government.8 The European Parliament Special Committee of Inquiry (PEGA) officially declared a breach of EU
laws and issued a call requiring Greece to revoke laws undermining
the rule of law in 2023.9 Mitsotakis and his New Democracy party got
an absolute majority of the vote share in the elections in the same
year, and three new nationalist far-right parties (Spartans, Greek Solution, and Victory) got a total of 34 seats. The European Parliament
raised an alarm over serious threats to democracy in Greece in February 2024.10 Greece remains a democracy but no longer qualifies asa liberal democracy by the end of 2023.
Poland is another case of a liberal democracy autocratizing
sub-stantially. The Law and Justice (PiS) party ascended to power in2015 and has weakened democratic rights and freedoms since then,for instance by cracking down on media freedom and undermining
the rule of law.11 The 2023 elections led to the defeat of Prime Minister Morawiecki and the PiS. A coalition government consisting of the
Civic Coalition, Third Way, and The Left is led by the new Prime Minister Tusk. Notably, 2023 shows a small but statistically insignificant
uptick in the LDI levels. As of 2023, Poland is an electoral democracy.
In six countries that started as democracies autocratization led toelectoral or closed autocracy:
The Comoros only just fulfilled the criteria for an electoral democracy when an autocratization process started in 2014. The 2016 elections were marred by violence and irregularities that further deepened the process of autocratization. In 2018, President and former
army official Assoumani used a constitutional referendum – that wasboycotted by the opposition – to extend presidential term limits thatwould disrupt the presidential rotation between the three main is-

6 Boese, V. et al. 2021. How democracies prevail: Democratic resilience as a two-stage process. Democratization 28(5).
7 Lührmann, A. and SI. Lindberg. 2019. A Third Wave of Autocratization Is Here. Democratization 26(7).
8 https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/20/world/europe/greece-spyware-hacking-meta.html
9 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/pega/about and https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/PEGA-RD-740554_EN.pdf
10 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240202IPR17312/parliament-concerned-about-very-serious-threats-to-eu-values-in-greece ; https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0069_EN.html
11 https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/12/poland-targets-tv-channel-limits-press-freedom-and-pluralism

AUTOCRATIZING COUNTRIES

lands.12 Protests were repressed by the army and Assoumani won athird term in the 2019 elections, and a fourth one in January 2024.13
The Comoros is classified as an electoral autocracy since 2015.
Hungary ranks first among all 42 ongoing episodes of autocratizationin terms of the magnitude of change (see Table 2). Figure 14 showsthat it was a liberal democracy in 2009 and details its trajectory until
2023, which is one of the steepest in the world in recent times. When
Viktor Orbán and his anti-pluralist,14 Christian-nationalist Fidesz party
came to power in 2010, they initiated incremental reduction of checks
and balances. A series of well-documented derailments of democracy
over the years15 led to downgrading of Hungary to electoral autocracy
in 2019. The European Parliament declared that Hungary is no longer ademocracy in 2022.16 With its majority in the legislature, Fidesz passed
the “Protection of Sovereignty Act” in 2023, which opens for arbitrary
scrutiny, giving virtually unlimited access to personal data, and comeswith its own Office for the Protection of Sovereignty.17 Hungary remains an electoral autocracy as of 2023.
India’s process of autocratization begins in earnest from 2008 andcharacteristically proceeded in the incremental, slow-moving fashion of the “third wave”. Over the years, India’s autocratization process
has been well documented, including gradual but substantial deterioration of freedom of expression, compromising independenceof the media, crackdowns on social media, harassments of journalists critical of the government, as well as attacks on civil society andintimidation of the opposition. The ruling anti-pluralist, Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with Prime Minister Modi at thehelm has for example used laws on sedition, defamation, and counterterrorism to silence critics.18 The BJP government undermined theconstitution’s commitment to secularism by amending the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) in 2019. The Modi-led government
also continues to suppress the freedom of religion rights. Intimidation of political opponents and people protesting government policies, as well as silencing of dissent in academia are now prevalent.19
India dropped down to electoral autocracy in 2018 and remains inthis category by the end of 2023.
Mauritius is the top “stand-alone” autocratizer with the most recent
autocratization beginning from 2018. Once hailed as the only liberal
democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, Mauritius recently introduced several regulations that restrict the work of broadcasting companies andjournalists, while government media censorship efforts have increased
significantly since 2019.20 The series of actions undermining democracy led to a declassification of Mauritius to electoral autocracy in 2023.
Nicaragua is the country with the longest still ongoing process of“stand-alone” autocratization. A period of democratic deterioration
can be traced back to 2005, but a relatively swift downgrading toelectoral autocracy occurred in 2007 with the return to power ofDaniel Ortega and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).
Under the FSLN government, the quality of elections declined, andpresidential term limits were abolished. The government also eliminated opposition parties from serious contention and used legal reforms to undermine checks on executive power. Virtually all democratic improvements the country achieved since 1990 were unmade.
In two decades, Nicaragua has dropped from an electoral democracy to the bottom rung of ranks on the LDI.

Serbia is yet another case of protracted, incremental backsliding,typical for the “third wave.” The process started in 2009, and by 2014,
Serbia slid into an electoral autocracy. Since then, democracy levels continued to regress further, for example due to harassment of
the opposition, increasing election irregularities, and underminingof media freedom. Figure 14 reveals signs of authoritarian stabilization in the last three-four years. The 2023 elections included intimidation against opposition candidates, and electoral fraud leading
the incumbent right-wing government led by Deputy Prime Minister
Vučevič and his SNS coalition to a new victory.21
Two countries were already autocracies when autocratization started.
In Afghanistan, the first signs of deterioration can be traced backto 2015. Yet, its score on the LDI plummeted after the Taliban entered
Kabul on August 15, 2021 in a re-conquering of power after 20 years.
The country went through a sharp curtailment of freedoms within
less than 12 months. The Sharia law was imposed, women’s rights
revoked, and universities systematically shut down in short order,
making Afghanistan one of the most repressive closed autocracies
in the world by 2023.
In Hong Kong, deterioration of democracy levels can be traced
back to 2014. Yet, autocratization intensified in 2019, when the Hong
Kong government introduced a bill allowing extraditions to mainland China. The 2019–2020 anti-government protests touched millions of people for almost a year. They were eventually curbed withrepression and mass arrests directed by the central government inBeijing. Xi Jinping and Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam adopted the “National Security Law,” which allows the Chinese authorities
to investigate and arrest anyone in Hong Kong suspected of serving for foreign interests either in Chinese territory or abroad.22 Hong
Kong, which has always been a closed autocracy, has lost most of its
freedoms by 2023.

“Bell-Turn” Autocratization
Figure 15 shows trajectories on the LDI for the top 10 episodes of“bell-turn” autocratization. Countries’ ranking in terms of the total
magnitude of decline by the end of 2023 is presented in Table 3.

Box 5. Bell-Turns and U-Turns
Bell-turns are episodes where democratization is closely followed by
autocratization. Inversely, U-turns are episodes of change in a country
where autocratization is closely followed by democratization.
We use the ERT to identify episodes of democratization and autocratization (see Box 4). We adopt a rule of no more than five years
between the episodes to make a Bell- or U-turn. This comes from therecently published academic working paper “When Autocratization
is Reversed: Episodes of Democratic Turnarounds since 1900.”
Simply put, Bell-turns are episodes where democratization turns into
autocratization within maximum five years after the end of democratic
advances. U-turns are episodes where autocratization transmutes into
democratization within an equivalent period.

12 https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1KK11D/
13 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68002934
14 Medzihorsky, J., and SI. Lindberg. 2023. Walking the Talk: How to Identify Anti-Pluralist Parties. Party Politics. Online first.
15 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2022-0217_EN.html
16 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220909IPR40137/meps-hungary-can-no-longer-be-considered-a-full-democracy
17 https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/en/2023-88-00-00
18 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-56111289; https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/openindia/india-turning-colonial-era-laws-silence-journalists/
19 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/india; https://www.scholarsatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Scholars-at-Risk-Free-to-Think-2020.pdf
20 https://rsf.org/en/country/mauritius
21 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240202IPR17327/serbia-did-not-fulfil-its-commitments-to-free-and-fair-elections-say-meps ; https://www.reuters.com/
world/europe/serbian-elections-marred-by-presidents-involvement-vote-buying-observers-2023-12-18/
22 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown ; https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R46473.pdf

25

DEMOCRACY REPORTFIGURE 15. TOP 10 “BELL-TURN” AUTOCRATIZERS, 2023
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Rank
1

Country
El Salvador

Change on LDI-0,360

2

Burkina Faso

-0,3363

Myanmar-0,246

4

Haiti-0,225

5

Armenia-0,2096

Mali-0,202

7

Niger-0,2018

Libya-0,197

9South Korea-0,195

10

Indonesia-0,186

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Figure 15 plots the LDI values for the top 10 “bell-turn” autocratizing countries.
“Bell-turn” means that autocratization in these countries follows shortly after, and isconnected to, a period of democratization (i.e., substantial improvement on the EDI
levels). Note that the first year on the graph is technically a “pre-episode” year in thesense that the year after was the first one recording a change by the ERT methodology. The plot visualizes the total magnitude of change during a “bell-turn” episode.

“Bell-turns” can be thought of as cases of “failed democratization,”or re-autocratization. They are perhaps of particular interest for understanding vulnerabilities of democratization processes and could
be studied in-depth for that purpose. We provide only brief descriptions of these cases here.
Eight of the top 10 “bell-turn” autocratizers were democracies at somepoint during their episode: Armenia, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, Indonesia, Libya, Mali, Niger, and South Korea. After autocratization
set in, only three of them – Armenia, Indonesia, and South Korea – remain democracies as of 2023. Out of the five where democracy broke
down, three – Burkina Faso, Libya, and Mali – have become closed
autocracies. The “survival rate” among democracies undergoing thebell-turn type of autocratization turns out to be about the same as forthe stand-alone autocratization processes discussed above.
Two countries – Haiti and Myanmar – were at best electoral autocracies after short periods of improvements in the mid-2000s andearly 2010s, respectively. For both, the autocratization process has
led to closed autocracy by the end of 2023.
It is worth noting that five of the "bell-turn" countries – Armenia,
Burkina Faso, Libya, Myanmar, and Niger – were among the top
10 democratizers of the last decade. South Korea – a country thatwas featured as a rare case of democracies that are bouncing backin last year’s Democracy Report – has recently reversed back to its
pre-democratization episode levels. El Salvador and Indonesia
went through very slow but steady episodes of democratization for
more than a decade before the reversals. In other words, these werepromising cases and their reversals into bell-turns point to the uncertainty of holding on to democratic gains across very different contexts.
Among the three countries where democracy still survives, Armenia democratized gradually beginning from 2009 and then mademarked progress with the 2018 Velvet Revolution. A corrupt government was replaced with a democratically elected one,23 and Armenia was ranked as one of the world’s top ten democratizers in the Democracy Report for several years. Yet, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflictintersected Armenia’s path. The government under Prime Minister
Pashinyan restricted civil liberties and the right to freedom of information, introduced a new censorship law, and outlawed government criticism.24 Azerbaijan’s victory in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023
adds to the uncertainty about the future in Armenia. Yet, it remains
an electoral democracy as of 2023.
Indonesia’s gradual democratization process dates from the resignation of the authoritarian President Suharto in 1998 until the mid
2000s. The bell-turn process started in 2009 leading to an episode ofslow-moving democratic decline into 2023. Increasing societal polarization and the rise of populism since 2014 are central to Indonesia’s
fifteen-year-long autocratization. Reelected in 2019, Widodo's government issued a crackdown on Islamist opposition figures and forbade
civil servants from engaging in “hate speech” against the government,
including on social media.25 President Widodo remained a popularpresident despite weakening civil liberties and dismantling checks
and balances on the excuse that he was protecting democracy.26 The
scores on V-Dem’s indicators mean that Indonesia keeps its statusof electoral democracy – however only barely so as indicated by its
placement in the “grey zone” of electoral democracies as of 2023. In
February 2024, Indonesia held general elections and elected a new
President, former army general Prabowo Subianto (see Section 5).
South Korea’s episode started with advances on the LDI after a corruption scandal leading to mass mobilization by civil-society organizations, large-scale protests with millions of citizens on the streets,
and President Park Geun-hye’s departure in 2016. The next President
Moon Jae-in was a human rights activist during the previous military
dictatorship. He turned South Korea back to its pre-Park LDI levels.
Yet, South Korea’s presidents can serve only one five-year term, andthe following elections in 2021 brought the right-wing and conservative Yoon Suk-yeol to power. His recent professional history alreadyshowed abuse of power.27 The change of president set South Ko-

23 Lanskoy, M., and E. Suthers. 2019. Armenia’s Velvet Revolution. Journal of Democracy 30(2).
24 https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/democracy-in-armenia-one-step-forward-two-steps-back/25 https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/18/deepening-polarization-and-democratic-decline-in-indonesia-pub-82435
26 Mujani, S., and RW. Liddle. 2021. Indonesia: Jokowi Sidelines Democracy. Journal of Democracy 32(4).
27 http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/11/356_299941.html

AUTOCRATIZING COUNTRIES

rea back on a downward slope. President Yoon Suk-yeol’s coercive
measures to punish members of the former Moon administration,28
along with attacks on gender equality,29 set South Korea to decrease
its LDI levels, forming a bell-turn. Although South Korea remains aliberal democracy at the end of 2023, Moon’s efforts have been virtually neutralized.
There are five bell-turn cases that first became democracies but thendemocracy broke down.
Among them, Burkina Faso’s democratization followed after the2015 military coup and general elections. It swiftly became a process of bell-turn autocratization in 2018. After two coups in 2022 andclashes with Jihadists, the military junta mandated French forces outof the country, reconnected diplomatically with North Korea, andcurbed freedom of expression further. A decree issued on April 13,
2023 empowers the military to curtail civil liberties during counterterrorism operations, including silencing of civil society and the media.30 The 2024 elections are postponed indefinitely.31 Burkina Faso
moved from an electoral democracy to a closed autocracy withinjust two years and now ranks second among the bell-turns based on
the magnitude of deterioration.
El Salvador was democratizing very slowly from 1992, gained thestatus of electoral democracy in 1998, and continued advancing until around 2014. The bell-turn reversal began in 2018, and the country
now holds the first place in terms of magnitude of decline on the
LDI among the “bell-turn” episodes of autocratization (see Table 3).
Almost all democratic gains of the last two decades are gone by theend of 2023 – within only five years of President Bukele’s rule. Actions include executive- and legislature-mandated arbitrary arrests
under the pretext of fighting gang violence, targeting of civil society
actors, journalists, judges, academics, and human rights defenders,32
and maneuvering re-election rules.33 Dismantling of the judiciary in
May 2021 tipped El Salvador over to electoral autocracy, which is thestatus the country retains by the end of 2023. President Bukele won alandslide re-election in El Salvador in February 2024.
The 2011 revolution in Libya that toppled the regime of Colonel
Gaddafi also ushered in the National Transitional Council governingover the 2012 general elections. They were largely viewed as free andfair,34 and for one year (2013) Libya was classified as an electoral democracy. Since 2014, however, Libya has been mired in a civil war between two rival governments, each supported by an array of militias.
The bell-turn came quickly, and as of 2023, Libya is a closed autocracy.
Mali’s bell-turn began with significant upward gains in 2014 to become an electoral democracy after the 2013 presidential elections
that returned civilian control of the government. During the ongoing conflict in northern Mali between the government and rebel
groups backed by Islamist militants, Mali’s fledgling democracy was
supported by numerous foreign assistance and military peacekeeping interventions. Yet, the autocratization-part of the bell-turn began in 2017 and the next year Mali became an electoral autocracy
amid increasing instability. The 2020 and 2021 military coups led to aclosed autocracy – the status it holds as of 2023.
Niger is another example of a bell-turn autocratization following
a military takeover in the context of insurgent attacks from Jihad-

ist groups. The 2011 general election led to a status of electoral democracy. Yet, tensions and conflicts in Mali started to spill over intoneighboring countries by 2016, and Niger’s government went on to
impose restrictions on freedom of expression.35 The 2020-2021 general elections marked Niger’s first-ever democratic transition of power, but the elected government was overthrown by a military junta in
July 2023. Niger is a closed autocracy by the end of 2023.
Of the two “bell-turn” autocratizers that never became a democracy,
Myanmar’s 2021 military coup ended a fragile political liberalization
going on since 2009. The coup led to civil war, humanitarian crisis,
more than 3,000 protestors killed, and 20,000 people arrested.36 The
military junta postponed the August 2023 general elections and extended the state of emergency rule. At the end of 2023, Myanmar
ranks 177 on the LDI, just above North Korea and Eritrea, indicatingthat it is one of the most repressive closed autocracies in the world.
After a short period of democratic improvements in 2006-2008 thatturned Haiti into an electoral autocracy, the country has been ina long and protracted period of autocratization. Haiti has been in
the abyss of ungovernability after the 2010 earthquake, and criminal gangs with their political patrons dominate the scene.37 After theassassination of President Moïse in July 2021 and the expiration ofcongressional terms, Haiti became a closed autocracy in 2022. As of
February 2024, no new date has been set for elections due to security concerns.

Elections Now Also Under Attack by Autocrats
Drilling down to the individual indicators of the components analyzed above, Figure 16 reveals further details about the process of
autocratization. For this analysis, we include all indicators that go into
any of the democracy indices (similar to Figure 8), but only indicatorsfrom the electoral and liberal indices show up among the top 20
most affected indicators. All 42 autocratizing countries (both “standalone” and “bell-turn” types) are included in the analysis. The comparison is between their levels at the end of 2023 and each country’s
onset year of autocratization (which are shown in Figure 13).
The most notable change from our reporting in earlier years’ Democracy Reports is that elections are now increasingly undermined in
autocratizing countries. In the 2022 report, for example, only one of
the indicators in the Clean Elections Index was found among the
top 20 declining indicators. That was the Election Management
Body (EMB) autonomy, and it is again on the top list in this year’s
report. Data shows that governments are curbing this key institution’s autonomy in 22 of the 42 autocratizing countries. Among theoffenders we even find relatively democratic countries like Ghana
who last held elections in 2020 and has upcoming ones scheduledfor December 2024. But there are also more troubled electoral democracies verging on the threshold towards autocracy like Mexico
where the most recent elections were held in 2018 and the next
ones are scheduled for 2024.
This year, two additional indicators that go into the Clean Elections
Index appear on the top 20 list of aspects that are undermined in
the largest number of autocratizing countries. The indicator for freeand fairness of elections deteriorated substantially and signifi-

28 https://www.9dashline.com/article/evaluating-south-koreas-democratic-backsliding
29 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/07/outcry-as-south-korean-president-tries-to-scrap-gender-equality-ministry-to-protect-women#:~:text=South%20Korea%27s%20
president%2C%20Yoon%20Suk,an%20improvement%20in%20women%27s%20rights
30 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/burkina-faso
31 https://africacenter.org/spotlight/2024-elections/burkinafaso/
32 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/06/el-salvador-president-bukele-human-rights-crisis/
33 https://elfaro.net/en/202312/opinion/27182/Fraud-upon-Fraud-Bukele-Is-Not-on-Presidential-Leave.htm
34 https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/220578.pdf
35 https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/niger/report-niger/
36 https://www.eastwestcenter.org/news/east-west-wire/understanding-military-coup-myanmar-two-years-later
37 https://latinoamerica21.com/en/haiti-hostage-of-criminal-organizations/

27

28

DEMOCRACY REPORT

cantly in 18 countries, including the EU-member Hungary, the mostpopulous country in the world India, and The Philippines. Government intimidation during election periods increased substantiallyin 16 autocratizing countries, among them in the African island stateof The Comoros and in one of Europe’s worst autocratizers of the last
decades, Serbia.
These findings give further weight to the analysis presented in partone of the report and the results from Figure 7, which demonstrates
that the overall global trend for election quality has been reversed
over the last decade: 23 countries were still improving on the quality of elections in 2013, but by 2023 the situation was turned upside down with 23 countries registering substantial and statisticallysignificant backsliding. As late as in the 2021 Democracy Report, we
showed that elections tended to come late in the autocratization
process, after a series of other aspects of democracy have first been
derailed. The data shown in Figure 16 could indicate that many of thecurrent autocratizers have advanced so far in the process that they
now feel confident enough to attack and undermine democracy’s
core institution.
Meanwhile, the results shown in Figure 16 also demonstrate that
freedom of expression and the media and freedom of association
are the democratic freedoms that are under the most frequent attack
during autocratization. Almost half of the top 20 declining indicators
in Figure 16 belong to these two critical components of democracy.
Media censorship is what rulers in autocratizing countries engage

FIGURE 16. TOP 20 DECLINING INDICATORS,AUTOCRATIZING COUNTRIES, 2023    −−−           
     −          
             
             
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   in most frequently and to the greatest degree. It is closely followedby restrictions on academic and cultural expression and therepression of civil society organizations (CSOs). These threecore institutions worsened substantially in more than 20 autocratizing countries. Governments’ censorship of the media, for instance,
worsened the most in Nicaragua, closely followed by Afghanistan,Hong Kong, and Myanmar. Ortega’s comeback to power in Nicaragua set the stage for a rapid decline on this indicator. Afghanistan
experienced rapid declines on this indicator after the Taliban takeover. In Hong Kong, a crackdown on media freedom including thearrest of media tycoon and owner of more liberal newspapers Jimmy
Lai in 2023, followed the enactment of the National Security Law in
2021. In Myanmar, the miliary introduced several digital restrictions
and internet blackouts after the 2021 coup.38 However, freedom of
expression and the media and repression of civil society worsen alsoin less repressive states like Croatia, Peru, and Senegal, showcasingthat this is far from a phenomenon only taking place in the mostautocratic settings.
The indicators showing declines in media freedom are often related. Government censorship efforts that decline substantially in
27 countries, are frequently targeting printed and broadcasted
media critical of the government, which is waning noticeably in
20 countries. Another mean of repression of freedom of expression
is increasing levels of media self-censorship. This indicator showsthat such more elusive expressions of repression are getting worse in
20 countries. Efforts by governments to curtail the media’s freedom
and independence commonly coincide with and works through harassment of journalists, and it is therefore no surprise to find that
this indicator is deteriorating in 19 countries. Greece and South Korea
are examples that also demonstrate that undermining of freedom of
expression and the media are far from reserved for countries that arebecoming harsh autocracies. The data for the past decades acrossthe world demonstrates that media freedom is also underminedin still relatively liberal and somewhat democratic countries at early stages of autocratization, such as in Hungary beginning in 2009
when it was still a democracy and Türkiye around the same time. The
data also shows substantial and statistically significant deteriorationin freedom of discussion for men as well as for women in 21 and20 countries, respectively.
The liberal aspects of democracy are also increasingly under assault.
Only four of the 23 indicators that go into the Liberal Component
Index appeared on the top 20 list last year. Now there are six. Governments in 19 autocratizing countries are curbing legislatures’ ability to investigate wrongdoings by the government; the indicatorfor executive oversight worsened considerably in 18 countries;
while the impartiality of public administration, opposition
parties’ capacity to leverage the legislature to investigate
the government, governments’ respect for the constitution,and governments’ compliance with the high court are declining significantly and substantially in 16 countries. Countries that havedeclined on several of these indicators on the liberal component include Botswana and Indonesia. This is evidence of an increasingly
aggressive incursion by autocratic-minded leaders to achieve “executive aggrandizement.”39

Figure 16 plots the number of autocratizing countries declining significantly andsubstantially on the top 20 most affected indicators. The red line marks the top 10
indicators. An indicator is declining substantially and significantly if its 2023 value is atleast 0.5 points lower than the value at the start of the autocratization episode, on ascale ranging from 0 to 4 (for most variables) or 0 to 5, and the confidence intervals do
not overlap.

38 https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/06/myanmar-un-experts-condemn-militarys-digital-dictatorship
39 Bermeo, N. 2016. On Democratic Backsliding. Journal of Democracy 27(1); see also Khaitan, T. 2019. Executive aggrandizement in established democracies: A crisis of liberal democratic
constitutionalism. International Journal of Constitutional Law 17(1).

AUTOCRATIZING COUNTRIESBox 6. BRICS Expansion and the Future of Global Democracy
Five countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) joined thegroup of top emerging economies – BRICS – earlier this year. The resulting
BRICS+ assembly with ten members harbors 46% of the world’s population,encompasses 34% of the world’s land surface, and generates 29% of theworld’s real GDP.
The expansion into BRICS+ sends a message about a shifting balance of
global power and an emergence of a multipolar world. The weakening of
democracies’ relative economic power also poses questions about prospects
for human rights and democratic freedoms around the world.

BRICS+ Counterposing G7
The BRICS+ trajectory in terms of economic growth has been truly remarkable. Figure 1 shows that the group’s total share of global real GDP has morethan tripled during the last 30 years – from 9% in 1993 up to 29% in 2023
(left panel). At the same time, G7’s share of world real GDP has shrunk from
68% in 1993 to 44% in 2023.
Even before adding new members, the original founding BRICS nations
surpassed the G7 group when measured by share of global GDP based onpurchasing power parity (Figure 1, right panel). By this measure, BRICS+
countries now account for 37% of global GDP, while the share of G7 countries
is down to 30%.
The relative success of BRICS is all the more remarkable when taking into
account that ideologically different autocracies China and Russia and now
electoral autocracy India managed to work pragmatically together with still
democratic Brazil and South Africa for many years. Even the Sino-Indian
border dispute, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the following sanctions
did not break up the block.
The addition of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE adds important economic
heft to the group. BRICS+ now includes three of the world’s largest oil
exporters as well as Russia – giving it a relevance in the geopolitics of the
global oil market. As energy sanctions have become more prevalent, theexpansion of BRICS is also a sign that countries are exploring ways to reduce
their dependence on the US dollar.

FIGURE 1. SHARE OF WORLD GDP, BRICS+ VS. G7,
1993–2023
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With the expansion, BRICS+ is not only consolidating its status as the voiceof the Global South but is also bringing more weight to bear on international politics. Given the blighted autocratic records of BRICS+ members,
the expansion of the bloc now also raises fundamental questions about the
future of global democracy.

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BRICS’ two remaining democracies – South Africa and Brazil – are now asmall minority in the expanded bloc. Additionally, they have problems withdemocracy of their own. South Africa is now experiencing a democratic
decline caused by endemic corruption and violation of human rights (seeSection 5), while Brazil – despite being a recent U-turn democratizer (seesection 4) – still struggles with the legacy of polarization in the society left
by ex-President Jair Bolsonaro.2

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Among the original founding members of BRICS, China and Russia havebecome increasingly more repressive in recent years. China has tightened
control over all aspects of private life and has increased the use of media
surveillance and censorship apparatus. Russia has virtually eradicatedpolitical opposition and independent media, while political repression isso harsh that it is leaving virtually no corner of the society untouched. Indianauthorities have also intensified their crackdowns on journalists, activists,and critics of the regime.

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Obviously, civil liberties, democratic norms, and human rights are not among
the entry criteria in the BRICS assembly. Three of the five new members –Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia – are some of the worst human rights abusers in
the world.1 The UAE also routinely ranks near the bottom on many measuresfor human rights, freedom of speech and freedom of the media, while situation in Ethiopia has deteriorated seriously since the outbreak of conflictin the Tigray region.

FIGURE 2. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX, G7 VS. BRICS+,
2023

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With the admission of five new members, the bloc’s average LDI score dropped
from an already low 0.33 to 0.21 (Figure 2). India’s descent from a relatively
decent democracy ten years ago to today’s increasingly oppressive electoral
autocracy had contributed to the LDI decline even before the enlargement.
BRICS+ is now firmly established as a club where nations that respect humanrights, democratic freedoms, and the rule of law are in a clear minority.

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2 https://clas.osu.edu/news/january-8th-political-polarization-brazil  
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29

30

DEMOCRACY REPORTThe 2023 general electionof Thailand in the part ofChanthaburi Municipality,
Mueang Chanthaburi
District, Chanthaburi
Province. May 14, 2023.
(Adirach Toumlamoon/
Pacific Press/Shutterstock)

DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIES

4 | Democratizing Countries
y 7 out of 9 “stand-alone” democratizers have transitioned away from autocracy.

in different circumstances, which is reflected by the distribution ofstarting levels on the LDI in Figure 17.

y The 9 “stand-alone” democratizers harbor only
30 million people, and 5 of the 9 are island states.
These facts reflect the smaller impact of current
democratization in the world.

“Stand-Alone” Democratization
Figure 18 shows the nine countries going through “stand-alone”
democratization processes and details their trajectories on the LDIfrom the start of each country’s episode of democratization to theend of 2023. Table 4 shows which are the “best improvers” by ranking
countries by the total magnitude of increase.

y 3 “U-turn” democratizers have restored their initiallevels of democracy, but the other 6 are still at lower levels than at the beginning of the episode.

The “stand-alone” democratizers are not only a small group but arealso small countries in general. This speaks to the dominance ofautocratization as a much more influential global trend. The ninecountries combined hold a population of about 30 million people,
with 70% of those residing in Dominican Republic (11 million) and
Honduras (10 million). The 30 million corresponds to a mere 0.38%
of the world population. This fact, of course, does not undermine thepositive developments within these countries.

y Freedom of expression and the media are typicalareas of improvement – increasing substantially inmore than half of all democratizing countries.
Using the ERT methodology (see Box 4), we show the trajectories of
the countries with currently ongoing processes of democratization.
We distinguish between two types, just like for autocratizers. “Standalone” democratization is a process of improvement that starts independently after a period of relative stability. In “U-turns”, a period of
democratization follows shortly after, and is connected to, a periodof autocratization.40 The complete list of the 18 democratizing countries grouped into the nine stand-alone and nine U-turn processes
is presented in Figure 17. Countries are ordered according to theirlevels on the LDI at the onset of democratization. The LDI score for2023 reveals the total magnitude of democratic improvement by theend of 2023. All 18 democratization episodes are still ongoing.

Seven out of nine “stand-alone” democratizers were autocracies before the start of democratization – only Dominican Republic andKosovo began their episodes as democracies to improve further. All
nine countries are democracies in 2023, but only The Seychelles
has developed into a liberal democracy so far.
Fiji, The Gambia, Honduras, Montenegro, Solomon Islands,
and Timor-Leste were electoral autocracies by the start of theirepisodes – all have transitioned into electoral democracies by 2023.
Fiji is the most recent case of stand-alone democratization, whichstarted only two years ago. The 2022 elections led to a change ofleadership. Sitiveni Rabuka from the People’s Alliance became Prime
Minister, defeating the incumbent Frank Bainimarama from the Fiji

Of the 18 democratizers, 14 were autocracies at the start of their episode. By 2023, 15 of the 18 are democracies. Four other countries
were already democracies, and thus experienced further democratic
deepening. This overview shows that democratization can take off
FIGURE 17. ALL 18 CASES OF ONGOING DEMOCRATIZATION, 2023

Stand-Alone Democratization

Score and Confidence Intervals
1997
2016

ThailandMaldives
Tunisia
Bolivia
ZambiaBenin
North Macedonia
LesothoBrazil2017

U−Turns

Timor−Leste
The Gambia
Honduras
Fiji
Dominican Republic
Solomon Islands
Montenegro
Seychelles
Kosovo

0.0

0.1

2020
2022

2017
2022

0.2

2019

2020
2020
2021
2016

2006
2019
2012
2017

2017
0.3

2021
0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

Liberal Democracy Index
Democratizing in 2023

0.8

0.9

1.0

start

Figure 17 shows the LDI scores and confidence intervals at the start of democratization. By the ERT methodology, these are technically “pre-episode” in the sense that the year after
was the first recording an increase. The values in 2023 are highlighted in blue and reveal the total magnitude of change. The ERT is based on the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI)
for identifying episodes, and we follow that but display countries’ values on the LDI. A country may change more on the EDI than on the LDI, which explains cases with overlapping confidence intervals (they do not overlap on the EDI).

40 Nord, M. et al. 2024. “When autocratization is reversed.” V-Dem Institute: V-Dem Working Paper 147.

31

DEMOCRACY REPORTFIGURE 18. ALL 9 “STAND-ALONE” DEMOCRATIZERS, 2023

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Figure 18 plots the LDI values for the nine “stand-alone” democratizing countries.
Timor-Leste’s episode started in 1998 and the trajectory of the first five years is notshown on the graph. Note that the first year on the graph is technically a “pre-episode” year in the sense that the following year was the first one recording an increaseby the ERT methodology. The plot visualizes the total magnitude of change during
democratization.

First party and ending his 16-year rule.41 The new government hasenacted some reforms that led to higher LDI scores, such as repealing a media law that threatened freedom of expression.42
The Gambia’s democratization began from electoral autocracy in2016, with the lowest LDI levels among all stand-alone democratizers. The 2017 presidential elections led to the first democratic transfer of power by popular elections since the 1994 military coup led
by Yahya Jammeh. At first, President Jammeh refused to step down.
President-elect Adama Barrow was sworn in only after an international military intervention by members of the Economic Community of West African States. Barrow ’s reforms included the release ofpolitical prisoners43 and the promotion of freedom of expression.44
Honduras was an electoral autocracy in 2020 but progressed toelectoral democracy after the 2021 elections. Part of the advances
are due to improvement in the quality of elections. After years ofpolls marked by electoral violence and fraud, the 2021 elections wererelatively peaceful and inclusive, had record turnout, and resulted in

TABLE 4. RANK ORDER BY MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE, FIGURE 18
Rank
1

Country
The Gambia

Change on LDI
0.408

2

The Seychelles

0.279

3

Honduras

0.157

4

Fiji

0.144

5

Dominican Republic

0.138

6

Solomon Islands

0.135

7

Montenegro

0.110

8

Kosovo0.097

9Timor-Leste

0.094

the first woman president, Xiomara Castro.45 Since 2021, Honduras
has notably advanced on civil liberties and somewhat improved on
freedom of expression, although there is still significant room for improvements.46
Montenegro became an electoral democracy after the 2020 elections that brought an opposition coalition to power and ended
three decades of rule by the Democratic Party of Socialists. The 2020
elections took place amidst the “envelope affair” corruption scandal,
that revealed recordings and documents implicating members ofgovernment in bribery.47 Montenegro’s trajectory was somewhat
troubled in 2021-2022 by the President’s alleged violations of theconstitution and a conflict about responsibilities.48 However, the2023 elections were largely free and fair, and Montenegro remains
an electoral democracy as of 2023.
Solomon Islands is another example of elections leading todemocratization. The 2006 elections led to a change of leadership,with a new prime minister elected under a coalition of opposition
parties. Subsequent elections have improved further in quality,
along with freedom of association. Despite some weakness in therule of law and problems with corruption, democratic rights andfreedoms are generally respected in Solomon Islands.49 It remains
electoral democracy since 2007.
Timor-Leste is one of the youngest countries in the world. An independence referendum in 1999 led to the separation from Indonesia
and initiated a three-year transition period under a UN administration.50 The first ever legislative elections in independent Timor-Leste
were held in 2001, and the first presidential elections followed in
2002.51 Thus, the onset of the East Timorese democratization coincides with its independence. Since formally becoming an independent state in 2002, Timor-Leste has been slowly but consistently improving on the LDI.
The democratization process in The Seychelles can be traced
back to 2012, when it was an electoral autocracy and quickly developed to a liberal democracy after substantial improvements inmost democratic aspects measured by the LDI. In 2015, The Seychelles took several steps to improve its legal framework including
revisions of its electoral code,52 and opposition parties won theparliamentary elections in 2016. Opposition leader Wavel Ramkalawan won the presidential election in 2020 leading to the first41 https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/fiji-lawmakers-vote-install-sitiveni-rabuka-next-prime-minister-2022-12-24/
42 https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/fiji-repeal-of-restrictive-media-law-reverse-of-travel-bans-and-other-reform-commitments-a-positive-signal-for-civic-freedoms/
43 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/2/20/president-adama-barrow-orders-release-of-171-prisoners
44 https://rsf.org/en/we-re-ready-help-gambia-do-more-promote-journalism-rsf-tells-barrow
45 https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/es/content/success-story-honduras
46 https://srfreedex.org/statement-by-irene-khan-on-her-visit-to-honduras-16-27-october-2023/
47 https://freedomhouse.org/country/montenegro/freedom-world/2020
48 https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/02/montenegrin-parliament-criticized-for-law-restricting-presidents-powers/
49 https://freedomhouse.org/country/solomon-islands/freedom-world/2023
50 https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unmiset/
51 https://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/63/
52 https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/freehou/2016/en/111996

DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIES

peaceful transfer of power to the opposition since independence
in 1976. As of 2023, The Seychelles remains the only liberal democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Dominican Republic and Kosovo started their democratization
processes as (electoral) democracies and are now further improving,or deepening, the quality of their democratic institutions. In Dominican Republic, democratization followed the election of Luis Abinader as president in 2020. In Kosovo, the process started with the 2017
parliamentary election after a vote of no confidence on the previous
parliament.

“U-Turn” Democratization
Figure 19 displays trajectories on the LDI for the nine countries thatrecently were in an episode of autocratization and are currently
democratizing – episodes of U-turn democratization. U-turns can bethought of as cases of “reversed autocratization,” or democratic turnaround. 53 They could be of particular interest for understanding why
and how some countries successfully halt and revert autocratization.
The Democracy Report does not provide answers to such questions
but identifies the cases and describes them briefly. We encourageother analysts to probe and rejoin with in-depth analyses of what
helps to turn autocratization into processes of democratization. All
FIGURE 19. ALL 9 “U-TURN” DEMOCRATIZERS, 2023

 



Three of the nine U-turns have by 2023 restored levels of democracy
they had before the start of autocratization – Lesotho, The Maldives, and Zambia. The other six – Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, North
Macedonia, Thailand, and Tunisia – are still at lower levels in
2023, and some substantially so. Since we focus on ongoing U-turndemocratization episodes, we still do not know final outcomes ofthese episodes, meaning that there is still a possibility that their trajectories continue upwards.
Two countries – Brazil and Lesotho – managed to halt autocratization before a democratic breakdown and are now “bouncing back.”
Four countries – Bolivia, The Maldives, North Macedonia, andZambia – went through democratic breakdowns but the U-turns
are turning them back to democracies.
Two countries – Benin and Tunisia – suffered democratic breakdowns, and while their LDI levels are improving, they remain quite
distant from regaining democracy. Thailand is recovering from an
authoritarian regression into a closed autocracy. We briefly review
these nine cases below.

TABLE 5. RANK ORDER BY MAGNITUDE OF CHANGE, FIGURE 19

the nine cases also seem potentially important for the international
democracy community to pay attention to.



Rank
1

Country
The Maldives

Change on LDI
0,274

2

Brazil0,1643

Zambia0,161

4Lesotho0,1315Thailand

0,128

6

Bolivia

0,121

7

Tunisia

0,103

8North Macedonia

0,082

9

Benin

0,050

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            

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Figure 19 plots the LDI values for the nine countries currently in a U-turn episode. Notethat the first year on the graph is technically a “pre-episode” year in the sense thatthe following year was the first recoding a change by the ERT methodology. The plot
visualizes the total magnitude of change during a “U-turn” episode.

Out of the two cases that halted autocratization before breakdown,
Brazil took a turn down in 2016 when former President Rousseff
was removed from office in a process that polarized Brazilian voters
and Bolsonaro was elected president two years later. His presidency
was marked by attacks on the media,54 restrictions to academic freedom,55 attempts to undermine the electoral system,56 and conflicts
with the legislative and judiciary powers. “Lula” da Silva defeatedBolsonaro in the polls in 2022 and took office on January 1, 2023,
leading to a year of refutation of Bolsonaro’s policies and ceasing of
his transgressions. Bolsonaro was convicted of abusing his office todiscredit the electoral system and is ineligible to seek or hold public
office until 2030.57 (Also see Box 8).
Lesotho also managed to turn autocratization around before democratic breakdown. A collapse of the coalition government resulted
in three elections between 2012 and 2017 under contested circumstances, a weakening of rule of law, polarization between ruling
elites, and an attempted coup d’état.58 Prime Minister Thabane was
eventually forced to resign by his own party. This opened a periodof reforms beginning in 2019 and significant liberalization. While
Lesotho continues to be troubled by political instability, its record
is improving, and the 2022 elections were generally free and fair.59

53 Nord, M. et al. 2024. “When autocratization is reversed.” V-Dem Institute: V-Dem Working Paper 147.
54 https://rsf.org/en/bolsonaro-family-vents-more-anger-ever-brazil-s-media
55 https://gppi.net/media/GPPi_LAUT_2020_Academic_Freedom_in_Brazil.pdf
56 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/10/25/world/americas/brazil-bolsonaro-misinformation.html
57 https://apnews.com/article/brazil-bolsonaro-ineligible-court-ruling-vote-99dee0fe4b529019ccbb65c9636a9045
58 https://au.int/en/documents/20190514/report-african-union-election-observation-mission-3rd-june-2017-national-assembly
59 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/EU%20EOM%20LSO%202022%20Final%20Report.pdf

33

34

DEMOCRACY REPORTBox 7. Nearly Half of Autocratization
Episodes are Turned AroundA new Working Paper from the V-Dem Institute offers a first systematic
empirical overview of patterns and developments of U-turns from
1900-2022. The analysis shows:• 98 episodes of U-turns spread out over 65 countries, 1900-2022.
• 48% of all episodes of autocratization become U-turns.
• 70% of autocratization cases are turned around in the last 30
years.
• 93% of U-turns end with levels of democracy higher than, or
similar to, those found before autocratization, while only 7%
end up being less democratic.
• Of the 44 episodes that start in demo­
cracies, 39 countries saw their demo­
cracy break down before returning todemocracy.
Nord, M., et al. 2024. "When Autocratization is Reversed: Episodes of
Democratic Turnarounds since 1900."
University of Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute:
Working Paper No. 147.

When Autocratization is Reversed:
Episodes of Democratic Turnarounds
since 1900

Marina Nord, Fabio Angiolillo, Martin Lundstedt,
Felix Wiebrecht, and Staffan I. Lindberg

January 2024

Working Paper
SERIES 2024:147
THE VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE

Lesotho’s LDI score is now back to the equivalent level it had when
the process started ten years ago.
Among the cases where democracy broke down for a short while,
Bolivia’s process started with President Morales ascending to power in 2006. He set Bolivia on a slow path of gradual autocratization,
typical for the “third wave”. Accusations of electoral fraud provoked
mass mobilization, international pressure,60 and loss of the army’s
support forced Morales to resign in 2019, and turned Bolivia into anelectoral autocracy.61 After a tumultuous year, the turnaround camewith the much cleaner 2020 general elections and Bolivia regained astatus of electoral democracy in 2021. However, there has not beenmuch progression since then and Bolivia remains at a far lower LDI
level than before the start of autocratization.
Likewise, The Maldives went through a period of substantial autocratization starting in earnest in 2009. The process led to an electoral
autocracy in 2013 when President Yameen was responsible for violations of civil liberties and executive overreach.62 Facing mounting
dissatisfaction, Yameen lost the 2018 presidency to Ibrahim Solih. The
reduced repression, along with the free and fair parliamentary elections in 2019 won by President Solih’s Maldivian Democratic Party,63
led to the regaining of status as electoral democracy. The Maldivescontinues its upward trajectory, and the 2023 presidential elections
were also free and fair.64 The new government formed by the opposition is led by Mohamed Muizzu.65 The Maldives is now at democracylevels slightly above those before the start of autocratization.

North Macedonia’s process of autocratization can be traced backto 2004, but a relatively swift deterioration started in 2007 when
Prime Minister Gruevski’s government started to shrink the freedom
for media and civil society organizations.66 The country became anelectoral autocracy in 2011. The Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) decided to boycott the parliament after the 2014 election.67 The SDSM and an alliance of civil society organizations theninstigated widespread mobilization in 2015, following disclosure ofa massive illegal wiretapping campaign by the government.68 Prime
Minister Gruevski’s resignation, a parliamentary crisis, and the 2016
elections set North Macedonia on a U-turn path. However, a slightdecline on the LDI since 2019 follows renewed polarization between
the elites and concerns about the rule of law.69 By the ERT methodology, it is too early to claim that the U-turn episode has ended. Asof 2023, North Macedonia is above its pre-autocratization LDI levels
and qualifies as an electoral democracy.
Zambia seemed like an unlikely case to make a U-turn after autocratization started in earnest in 2009 and it became an electoral autocracy
in 2013. The regression deepened with the election of President Lungu from the Patriotic Front (PF) in 2014. His tenure was characterized
by severe restrictions on freedoms of expression and the media, andassembly.70 Eventually, civil society groups reacted with pro-democratic mobilization and opposition leaders united in resisting Lungu’s
attempts to make constitutional amendments. This resulted in a 2021
electoral victory for the opposition leader from the United Party for
National Development (UPND), Hakainde Hichilema.71 As of 2023,
Zambia restored the LDI levels it had before autocratization, returned
to electoral democracy, and repression has largely ceased.
Benin is one of the two cases where breakdown of democracy
has been followed by some improvements which are however notenough to restore an electoral democracy. The process of autocratization took hold under President Talon, who was elected in largely free and fair democratic elections in 2016. Within less than five
years, the government eroded judicial independence, undermined
political competition, harassed political opponents and critical journalists, and conducted elections with severe irregularities.72 Only
parties supporting President Talon were allowed to compete in the2019 parliamentary elections. During the 2021 presidential election,
all main opponents were either disqualified, under arrest, or in exile
and President Talon won a second term.73 An incremental liberalization process led up to the parliamentary elections in 2023. Opposition parties were allowed to compete, and the main opposition (theDemocrats) won 24% of the seat share.74 While still in a U-turn process, Benin remains an electoral autocracy and its 2023 LDI score issubstantially lower than before the start of autocratization.
Tunisia – the success story of the Arab spring – is the other casewhere democracy broke down and has not returned, despite some
improvements. It was an electoral democracy until President Saieddissolved parliament in 2021, postponed elections indefinitely, andin effect started ruling by decree.75 Attacks on civil liberties followed

60 Lehoucq, F. (2020). Bolivia’s Citizen Revolt. Journal of Democracy, 31(3).
61 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-bolivian-government-is-on-a-lawless-course-its-democracy-must-be-preserved/2021/03/18/3b816a4e-880b-11eb-8a8b5cf82c3dffe4_story.html
62 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-election-idUSBRE9AG09L20131117
63 https://production-new-commonwealth-files.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/documents/MaldivesFinalReport_13-06-19.pdf?VersionId=_z.
LyIxtXReiilJgvhlQCKL5HPgQtX6f
64 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/Final%20Report%20-%20EU%20EOM%20Maldives%202023%20-%209%20January%202024.pdf
65 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/01/pro-china-candidate-mohamed-muizzu-wins-maldives-presidency-upending-relationship-with-india
66 https://www.boell.de/en/2016/12/14/macedonia-captured-society - 1
67 Tomini, L., Gibril, S., and Bochev, V. 2023. Standing up against autocratization across political regimes. Democratization 30(1).
68 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32771233
69 https://freedomhouse.org/country/north-macedonia/freedom-world/2023
70 https://www.eods.eu/library/eu_eom_zambia_2021_-_final_report.pdf
71 https://www.eods.eu/library/eu_eom_zambia_2021_-_final_report.pdf
72 https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2022
73 https://freedomhouse.org/country/benin/freedom-world/2022
74 https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/benin-opposition-party-wins-seats-parliament-after-more-open-election-2023-01-11/
75 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/14/thousands-protest-against-tunisian-president-kais-saied-seizure-of-near-total-power

DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIESFIGURE 20. TOP 20 IMPROVING INDICATORS,DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIES, 2023

The most notable finding is that aspects of freedom of expression
and the media are the most common to improve among democratizing countries. Five indicators (20%) that go into the Freedom ofExpression Index appear on the top 20 list of aspects that improvein the largest number of democratization countries. Three of themoccupy the top spots. It shows how critical this core area of democracy is, also when it comes to opening up and initiating a process of
democratization.

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Figure 20 plots the number of democratizing countries improving significantly andsubstantially on the top 20 most affected indicators. The red line marks the top 10
indicators. An indicator is declining substantially and significantly if its 2023 value is atleast 0.5 points higher than the value at the start of the democratization episode, ona scale ranging from 0 to 4 (for most variables) or 0 to 5, and the confidence intervals
do not overlap.

as people opposed the draconian measures.76 The return of elections in 2022–23 and the reinstallation of parliament led to an uptick in the LDI level, but the elections seemed a façade to legitimate
Saied’s rule. The main opponents boycotted, and only 11% of theelectorate turned out to vote.77 By the end of 2023, Tunisia remains
an electoral autocracy with the LDI score substantially lower than atits peak in 2012.
Thailand is the only U-turn case that turned into a closed autocracyin the process. The 2014 coup led to five years of military rule. The
2019 flawed elections resulted in some liberalization under the military-backed government.78 The 2023 elections were cleaner,79 andresulted in a surprise win of the Move Forward party and the resignation of Prime Minister and former 2014 coup-leader Chan-ocha.80
Yet, the Pheu Thai party went into a coalition with military-backed
parties to elect Thavisin as the new Prime Minister, leaving The Move
Forward Party out of the government.81 Despite some liberalization,
Thailand remains an electoral autocracy with the LDI score substantially lower than before the military rule.

Freedom of Expression and the Media are theMost Common to Improve
Figure 20 reveals further details about the process of democratization by displaying the top 20 indicators that improve in the greatest number of countries across the 18 “stand-alone” and "U-turn"democratizers. Similar to Figures 8 and 16, we include all indicatorsthat go into any of the democracy indices into analysis. The comparison is between the end of 2023 and each country’s onset year of
democratization (which are shown in Figure 17).

Among these indicators, freedom of academic and cultural expression is improving in the greatest number of democratizers –eleven out of 18. The Gambia, The Seychelles, and Timor-Leste aremaking especially striking gains on this indicator. Second on the top
20 list is government censorship efforts, which is declining substantially in nine countries, and The Maldives and Zambia are among
them. Other encouraging improvements are the significant declinesof harassment of journalists in eight countries placing this indicator third on the top 20 list. Noticeable improvements in the extent
of critical media and freedom of discussion for men in sevencountries each adds to the picture of how central freedom of expression is to democracy.
The liberal component of democracy is the area with the most indicators on the top 20 list (six). Most notably, transparent lawswith predictable enforcement, rigorous and impartial public administration, and compliance with the judiciary improve
substantially in seven countries each. Legislative investigations,executive respect for the constitution, and high court independence increase in six countries each. Two countries, The Gambia
and The Maldives, improve on all of these indicators.
The deliberative aspect of democracy capturing the quality of debate and respect for opponents, is improving in more than one thirdof the democratizing countries. Four of the indicators capturing thedeliberative component of democracy (80%) make it to the top 20
list, and three of those are in the upper half. While not part of thecomponents that go into the LDI, this demonstrates the importance of the deliberative democratic practices for democratic progress. The extent to which politicians justify their positions in termsof the common good increase considerably in eight countries, forexample Brazil, Dominican Republic, and Montenegro. The extent
to which politicians provide reasoned justification for their positions, the range of consultation in policy making, and the extent
of public deliberation – all increase significantly and substantiallyin seven countries each.
Three indicators measuring election qualities are also found on the
top 20 list. That seems natural since without this key institution of democracy functioning adequately, it is hard to imagine that a processof democratization can really take hold. The extent to which elections are free and fair is substantially improving in seven countries,
such as Honduras, Lesotho, and Thailand. Considerable reduction
in voting irregularities and strengthening of the Election Management Body (EMB) autonomy take place in six countries each.
Finally, freedom of association is another core area of democracy
where several democratizing countries register significant and substantial advances. CSO repression is declining considerably in eight
countries, while CSO entry and exit are improving in six. North
Macedonia, Timor-Leste, and Zambia are examples of countries thathave seen striking improvements on both indicators.

76 https://freedomhouse.org/country/tunisia/freedom-world/2022
77 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/30/tunisian-election-records-11-turnout-in-rejection-of-presidents-reforms
78 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/26/thai-election-process-deeply-flawed-independent-observers
79 https://anfrel.org/2023-thai-general-election-democracy-at-a-crossroads/
80 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/11/thai-pm-retire-politics-nine-years-power-coup-prayuth-chan-ocha
81 https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/23/asia/thailand-explainer-election-prime-minister-intl-hnk/index.html

35

36

DEMOCRACY REPORTBOX 8. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE FROM BRAZIL?

Lula's final campaign rally ahead of
the runoff presidential election in Sao
Paulo, Brazil, on Oct. 29, 2022. (Tuane
Fernandes/Bloomberg via Getty Images)

Autocratization was not only halted in Brazil but also turned aroundinto a definitive U-turn case. What made Brazil turn around and whatguidance can it offer?
Brazil’s process shows the importance of using elections as “criticalevents” to halt autocratization. This both resonates with findings
based on the eight U-turn cases discussed in last year’s Democracy
Report and carries an important message for the 2024 “record yearof elections”. A majority of the elections in 2024 take place in autocratizing contexts and whether elections will be used to turn autocratization around, or not, could be defining for democracy in theworld (see Section 5). Below are factors that significantly contributed
to making Brazil a U-turn before, during, and after the elections in
October 2022.
PRE-ELECTION:•Countering Dis- and Misinformation: Jair Bolsonaro fueled
distrust in the electoral system.1 Disinformation used to attack
candidates and delegitimize the elections was a challenge during the 2022 electoral period.2 In response, the Electoral Justice, Brazil’s Electoral Management Body, created a website tofact-check information disseminated on social media3 and todisavow fake news about the electoral process.4 The SupremeFederal Court started an investigation about “digital militias”, or
online criminal groups that work against democracy and the
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

democratic state.5 The importance of Brazil’s efforts to counter
disinformation is also evidenced in analyses in last year’s Democracy Report showing that democratization is very clearly
associated with decreasing levels of disinformation.
•

Pro-Democracy Opposition Alliance: A broad coalition ofnine opposition parties joined Lula in his election bid to defeat Bolsonaro.6 Lula’s vice president Geraldo Alckmin was his
political adversary for decades but decided to join the alliance“to save democracy”.7 A unified opposition alliance again echoes findings in last year’s report and seems to be an importantfactor to successfully turn autocratization into a U-turn democratization.

•

Judicial Independence: Investigations by the Supreme Federal Court on sources of online disinformation campaigns underlying attacks on democracy pointed to Bolsonaro and hisallies. The former president lashed out against the court andespecially Justice Alexandre de Moraes, who also presides over
the Supreme Electoral Court. Bolsonaro went as far as declaring that he would no longer oblige by Moraes’ and the court’s
rulings8. However, the judiciary withstood the pressure. In thewords of the president of the Electoral Court: “Democracywon”.9https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/10/25/world/americas/brazil-bolsonaro-misinformation.html
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2022/09/fake-news-sobre-urnas-pesquisas-e-tse-dominam-eleicao-de-2022.shtml
https://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/fato-ou-boato/#
https://www.tre-go.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Outubro/fato-ou-boato-justica-eleitoral-desmentiu-as-principais-fake-news-sobre-o-processo-eleitoral-em-2022
https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2021/07/16/pf-abre-inquerito-sobre-atuacao-de-milicia-digital-contra-a-democracia.ghtml
https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2022/08/06/lula-maior-alianca-nove-partidos-eleicoes-2022.htm
https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/politica/unidade-entre-lula-e-alckmin-existe-para-defender-a-democracia-diz-presidente-do-psb/
https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/2021/09/07/bolsonaro-ataca-alexandre-de-moraes-e-diz-que-ministro-tem-tempo-para-se-redimir-ou-se-enquadra-ou-pede-para-sair.
ghtml
9 https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2024/Janeiro/201ca-democracia-venceu201d-afirma-presidente-do-tse-em-evento-que-marca-um-ano-dos-ataques-antidemocraticos

DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIESELECTION CONDUCT:•
Resilient Electoral Management: Bolsonaro tried to change
the electoral system for the 2022 elections, questioning the reliability of electronic voting machines. He sought to have them
replaced with paper ballots,10 and orchestrated a parade of military vehicles in a perceived intimidation attempt on the day
congress voted on the issue. Yet, the proposal was defeated.11
The Supreme Electoral Court also acted removing election disinformation online, forbade the use of inaccurate information incampaigns, and ordered media houses to remove content withfalse information related to the elections.
•

Diplomatic Support: Bolsonaro held a meeting with foreign
diplomats to try and discredit the electoral system without any
supporting evidence.12 In response, ambassadors from France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom publicly praised the Brazilian electoral system.13 The United States’ Under Secretaryof State for Political Affairs said that Brazil has one of the mostreliable and transparent electoral systems in the Southern hemisphere.14 This support seems to have been critical to unite theinternational community behind endorsing the legitimacy ofthe elections displacing Bolsonaro.

•

Free and Fair Elections: The free- and fairness of the elections
were evidenced by reports from both national and international election observers,15 including the Organization of American
States, the Carter Center, and the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB).
In fact, no fraud has been shown since the introduction of electronic voting machines in 1996,16 but electoral violence increasedin the 2022 elections despite the Supreme Electoral Court´s attempts to prevent it by banning firearms on and around the election day.17 Nonetheless, ensuring a clean election that produces alegitimate result which the general public trusts, seems critical toturning around a process of autocratization.

POST-ELECTORAL:•
Swift International Endorsement: World leaders congratulated Lula as soon as the results came out, recognizing theelectoral outcome.18 Among others, this seems to have affected
Bolsonaro’s vice president, General Mourão, who said after theelections that a military coup would leave Brazil in a “difficult position towards the international community”. In another show of
support, high level representatives from several countries were in
Brasilia for Lula’s inauguration.19 This also tallies with our conclusions in the Democracy Report last year. The international community can play an important role in putting strong pressure on
incumbents to refrain from unconstitutional actions, (reluctantly)
accept defeat, and hand over power peacefully.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

•

Institutional Backing: Representatives of key Brazilian institutions also recognized the opposition’s victory directly after
the elections. The presidents of the chambers in the National
Congress, the Attorney General, and Supreme Court justices forexample, recognized the victory immediately and discarded
the possibility of fraud.20 This was probably key to that several
political allies of Bolsonaro soon also publicly accepted defeat
without questioning the election results.21•

Military Staying in Barracks: Bolsonaro frequently praised
the military dictatorship in Brazil22 and kept members of thearmed forces in his government.23 Large groups of Bolsonaro
supporters also rallied behind the idea of a military intervention.24 Investigations show that some high-level members ofthe military were in favor of a military intervention after the2022 elections.25 Yet, they did not act on it, perhaps in part
because of the swift endorsement of the results by both theinternational community and domestic institutions. Moreover,
the Ministry of Defense observed the elections and neither reported evidence of electoral fraud nor contested the results.26
That the military stayed in the barracks was probably critical to
the turnaround.

•

Ensuring Transition of Power: After the confirmation of theelection result, Bolsonaro supporters took to the streets to protest against the election results with claims of electoral fraud.27
Pro-Bolsonaro groups promoted a rigged election narrative onsocial media, blocked roads, and called for a military coup.28 A
Bolsonaro supporter attempted a bombing in Brasilia to “createchaos”.29 The transfer of power could be ensured on January 1,
2023 with the swearing in of President Lula and Vice President
Alckmin. Even so, Bolsonaro supporters stormed the buildingsof Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Presidential Palaceon January 8 but the military did not support them, and theleaders of the three government branches30 and the state governors31 in unison condemned the riots. The Supreme Federal
Court played a critical role ordering the dissolution of blockages and camps, the arrest of those involved in the riots, andthe suspension of their social media accounts.32 The day after,
thousands of people demonstrated against the riots and in favor of democracy.33 Later, Bolsonaro was convicted of abusing
his office and declared ineligible to seek or hold public officefor 8 years.34

https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/politica/relembre-vezes-em-que-jair-bolsonaro-questionou-o-sistema-eleitoral/
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-military-parade-presidential-palace-rattles-politicians-2021-08-10/
https://apnews.com/article/jair-bolsonaro-elections-caribbean-voting-brazil-8acf78e1e58650424b1dec4ecfc35ce4
https://www.estadao.com.br/politica/embaixadores-do-reino-unido-e-alemanha-parabenizam-processo-eleitoral-brasileiro/
https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/politica/eua-confiam-nos-sistema-eleitoral-brasileiro-diz-subsecretaria-de-assuntos-politicos-de-biden/
https://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/eleicoes-2022/missoes-de-observacao-eleitoral
https://noticias.uol.com.br/confere/ultimas-noticias/2021/07/08/eleicoes-brasil-fraude.htm
https://noticias.uol.com.br/eleicoes/2022/10/02/eleicao-escalada-de-violencia.htm
https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-63451626
https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-64122354
https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2022/10/30/moraes-lira-pacheco-e-rosa-weber-o-que-disseram-autoridades-sobre-vitoria-de-lula
https://www.estadao.com.br/politica/aliados-de-bolsonaro-reconhecem-vitoria-de-lula-presidente-se-mantem-em-silencio/
https://oglobo.globo.com/epoca/brasil/oito-vezes-em-que-bolsonaro-defendeu-golpe-de-64-24949762
https://www.estadao.com.br/politica/presenca-de-militares-em-cargos-de-confianca-cresce-193-no-governo-bolsonaro/
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/22/brazil-bolsonaro-militants-lefist-lula-president
https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/articles/cg6d2gv3np1o
https://g1.globo.com/politica/eleicoes/2022/noticia/2022/11/09/ministerio-da-defesa-entrega-relatorio-sobre-o-sistema-eleitoral.ghtml
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-latin-america-63479345
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2022/10/grupos-bolsonaristas-reagem-a-derrota-com-fraude-nas-urnas-e-apelo-por-golpe-das-forcas-armadas.shtml
https://g1.globo.com/df/distrito-federal/noticia/2022/12/26/bolsonarista-preso-por-montar-explosivo-em-brasilia-o-que-se-sabe-e-o-que-falta-saber.ghtml
https://www.gov.br/planalto/pt-br/acompanhe-o-planalto/noticias/2023/01/nota-em-defesa-da-democracia
https://www.em.com.br/app/noticia/politica/2023/01/09/interna_politica,1442841/lula-e-os-27-governadores-caminham-do-palacio-do-planalto-ate-o-supremo.shtml
https://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/noticiaNoticiaStf/anexo/DECISA771OAfastagovernadoreoutrasmedidas2.pdf
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-64219119
https://apnews.com/article/brazil-bolsonaro-ineligible-court-ruling-vote-99dee0fe4b529019ccbb65c9636a9045

37

38

DEMOCRACY REPORTMalaysia General Election 2022.
Kuala Lumpur, Nov. 19, 2022
(Afif Abd Halim/NurPhoto/
Shutterstock)

WINDOWS TO THE FUTURE

5 | Windows to the Futurey 25 countries are “near misses” of autocratization,
meaning that they show signs of deterioration. If
developments continue, several could join the listof autocratizers in the near future.
y 9 countries are “near misses” of democratizationand thus potential upcoming “bright spots”.
y 60 countries are holding national elections thisyear. Of these, 31 are worsening on their democracy levels, while only 3 are improving.

Starting from the top in the figure, South Africa has been on a slow
decline since 2012, moving from a liberal to electoral democracy by
2013. The main feature of this relative deterioration has been the growing corruption of the governing party African National Congress (ANC),
undermining the rule of law and state institutions.83 In 2023, concerns
have been raised related to elections, intimidation of opposition activists and journalists, and protection of human rights.84
FIGURE 21. TOP 5 “NEAR MISSES” OF AUTOCRATIZATION,
2023

y Elections are “critical events” that can either trigger democratization, enable autocratization, or aid
stabilization of autocratic regimes.

Second, 2024 is “the biggest election-year” in over a century, andseveral billion people are called to cast their votes in an uncertain
political environment worldwide. This might translate into a makeor-break year for democracy in the world. We show below that over
52% of elections in 2024 are held in countries where democratic levels are in decline. Only 5% take place in the context of democratization. This puts the specter of the current wave of autocratization into
perspective.

25 “Near Misses” of Autocratization
The previous sections of the Democracy Report 2024 focus oncountries that are in ongoing episodes of positive (democratizing)or negative (autocratizing) changes in democracy levels that aresubstantial according to the ERT methodology. The ERT thresholds
deliberately exclude smaller changes because they could stem frommeasurement uncertainty in the underlying indicators. Yet, the larger such “non-significant” changes are, the more likely they are indicating a real change on the ground. This can sometimes be usefulfor detecting potential upcoming autocratizers and democratizers.
This section turns to countries where we already see improvements
or declines in democracy that are close enough to substantial levels
to call them “near misses”. 82
There are no less than 25 countries that can be labeled as “near misses”
of autocratization. A few of them are very close to the bottom on the
democracy levels and are therefore unlikely to show up as autocratizers in the next years due to the “floor effect”. Even discounting those,
we might register anything up to 20 or so autocratizers in the next few
years if the declines in these countries continue. Figure 21 shows the
trajectories of five countries that are at the very top of the list of “nearmisses” in terms of magnitude of deterioration.



­  Smaller changes and focal events such as elections can, sometimes,
form the future of countries. This section first highlights countries
that have experienced recent declines or improvements in their democracy levels. These changes may potentially translate into manifest episodes of autocratization or democratization in the coming
year(s). These are countries the international community could therefore decide to pay increasing attention to.


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­­­“Near misses” are cases that are very close to qualify as autocratizers by the ERT
methodology. Their magnitude of change falls between 0.05 and 0.10 on the EDI. All
top five “near-miss” countries lie within only 0.02 points on the EDI from the standard
ERT threshold. Note that we use the EDI to identify episodes of autocratization anddemocratization. A country may change more on the EDI than on the LDI, which isparticularly true for countries that have lower democracy levels.

Georgia is in regression since 2017 but remains an electoral democracy in 2023. The greatest flaws are in Georgia’s electoral processes.
The 2018 presidential elections were marred by misuse of state funds
and concerns over voter intimidation.85 The 2020 parliamentary election involved mismanagement that led the opposition to accuse theelectoral process of being fraudulent and to boycott the runoff,86
setting off a political crisis in Georgia. The government is also accused of infringing on civil society and independent media.87

82 We identify “near misses” by using the standard ERT methodology but with a lower threshold, i.e., 0.05 instead of 0.1 on the EDI. Countries are then ranked by their total magnitude ofchange, and the top five closest to the 0.1 threshold are selected. All top five “near-miss” autocratizers lie within only 0.02 points on the EDI from the standard ERT threshold.
83 https://freedomhouse.org/country/south-africa/freedom-world/2023
84 https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/11/southern-africa-backsliding-democracy-jeopardizes-rights
85 https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/4/412724_2.pdf
86 https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/4/480500.pdf
87 https://www.justsecurity.org/85699/backsliding-georgias-crackdown-on-civil-society-may-be-just-a-start/

39

DEMOCRACY REPORT

Ivory Coast has been declining since 2019 and lost the status ofelectoral democracy after the 2020 presidential elections, which saw
restrictions on competition and opposition boycotts, along with limitations on civil liberties, and political unrest.88 In the aftermath ofthe election results, widespread protests broke out. They were met
with repression by the police leaving more than 50 dead,89 hundreds
arrested, and thousands fleeing to neighboring countries.90

FIGURE 22. TOP 5 “NEAR MISSES” OF
DEMOCRATIZATION, 2023



Gabon was on a path of a slow decline between 2019 to 2023. However, the decline accelerated after the August 2023 elections whichwere followed by a military coup that installed General Nguema
as transitional president.93 New elections have been scheduled for
2025, and the military will hold on to power in the meantime.94

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Mozambique has been on a slow decline since 2015, remaining anelectoral autocracy throughout. A poorly run 2019 election that saw
violence and mismanagement,91 and an increasingly repressive media environment92 are contributing to this decline. The next generalelection in Mozambique is scheduled for October 2024.

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9 “Near Misses” of Democratization
There are nine “near misses” of democratization currently.95 These arecountries that could come to qualify as democratizers in the next
few years should their positive developments continue. From an international democracy support perspective, these potential “brightspots” could be taken as cases especially worthy of attention andsupport by the international community.



Figure 22 shows the trajectories of five countries that are at the topof the list of “near misses” in terms of magnitude of improvement.

Starting from the top in the figure, Vanuatu is an electoral democracy that has gradually improved its democratic track record since2015. For example, the largely independent judiciary and the Supreme Court have increasingly shown their capacity to hold the legislative and the executive power to account.96 The country also has
an increasingly free and pluralistic media.97
Argentina has gradually improved its democratic track record after
holding well-run elections in 2019 and 2023 and strengthening its
protection of freedom of expression and the media. Javier Milei’s win
in the 2023 presidential election perhaps reflects popular dissatisfaction with the highest inflation in over 30 years. Whether Argentina’s
upward trajectory will continue under newly elected President Milei
remains to be seen, but his election campaign included criticism ofsome of the most recent Argentinian political developments.98
Nepal is on a gradual path of improvement as an electoral democracy. Examples of this development include the Supreme Court being
able to independently handle a constitutional crisis in 2021,99 and2022 national elections that were well-run.100
Kenya has transitioned from an electoral autocracy in 2020 to electoral democracy by 2023. This is mainly the result of the 2022 elections, which, due to effective measures of conflict prevention, were
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

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“Near misses” are very close to qualify as democratizers by the ERT methodology. Theirmagnitude of change falls between 0.05 and 0.10 on the EDI. Note that we use the EDI
to identify episodes of autocratization and democratization. A country may change
more on the EDI than on the LDI, which is particularly true for countries that havelower democracy levels.

not marred by violence and systematic mismanagement that has
been prevalent in Kenya’s history.101
Malaysia continues its slow upward path and is categorized in 2023
as an electoral democracy - for the first time in its history. This development follows the incumbent Barisan Nasional coalition losing
their six-decade hold on power after the 2018 elections, and the2022 national elections that led to yet another peaceful transfer of
power.102 Legal reforms such as the Freedom of Information Act
passed in 2023, are also somewhat assuring.103

2024 – The Year of Elections
Citizens in 60 countries go to the polls in 2024.104 Countries holding
elections make up nearly half of the world’s population (45%) since thehttps://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2020/cote-divoire-110220.html
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/02/cote-divoire-post-election-violence-repression
https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/cote-divoire/https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eueom_moz2019_final_report_en.pdf
https://rsf.org/en/country/mozambique
https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230904-gabon-coup-leader-general-oligui-to-be-sworn-in-as-transitional-president
https://www.africanews.com/2023/11/13/gabon-military-authorities-announce-elections-for-august-2025/
The threshold for “near misses” of democratization is the same as for “near misses” of autocratization, i.e., between 0.05 and 0.1 on the EDI. Countries are ranked by their total
magnitude of change, and the top five closest to the 0.1 threshold are selected.
96 https://freedomhouse.org/country/vanuatu/freedom-world/2023
97 Veenendaal, W. 2021. “How instability crates stability.” Third World Quarterly, 42(1).
98 https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/elections/why-did-argentina-just-elect-a-radical-right-wing-political-outsider/99 https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/nepals-supreme-court-reinstates-parliament-orders-new-pm-be-appointed-2021-07-12/
100 https://anfrel.org/2022-nepalese-federal-and-provincial-elections-achieving-maturity/
101 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/EU_EOM_Kenya_2022_EN.pdf
102 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/24/anwar-ibrahim-appointed-malaysian-prime-minister-after-unprecedented-hung-parliament
103 https://www.article19.org/resources/malaysia-slow-progress-on-reforms/
104 We discuss the 60 countries for which data is available in the V-Dem dataset v14. Four additional countries also hold national elections in 2024: Kiribati, Palau, Tuvalu, and San Marino.
Additionally, V-Dem does not code elections to the European Union Parliament, so countries holding only those elections during 2024 are also excluded.

WINDOWS TO THE FUTURE

list includes seven of the world’s ten most populous countries: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States.
Figure 23 groups the 60 countries that hold elections in 2024 into declining (autocratizers and “near misses”), improving (in practice only
U-turn democratizers), and a category of “Others”.105
More than half – 31 countries – are in periods of decline on democracy. Eleven of them are “stand-alone” episodes of autocratization, nineare “bell-turn” autocratizers, and eleven are “near-misses”.
Only 5%, or three out of the 60 countries holding elections in 2024,
are improving, and all three are processes of U-turn democratization,
meaning that they are recovering from previous decline. Finally, 26
countries fall into the “other” category, without substantial and ongoing improvements or declines in their democracy levels.

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FIGURE 23. ELECTIONS IN 2024



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Figure 23 shows the number of countries holding elections in 2024 for which
V-Dem data is available. Countries are grouped into declining, improving, andother regimes. Note that in this figure we include “near misses” in both categoriesof changing regimes.

Why is this perspective important? Elections in autocratizing countries
are critical events that can shape the future of the country’s political regime. Brazil is a recent example of the key role of elections in upending
autocratization (see Box 8). Last year’s Democracy Report shows that
this is a common pattern in recent cases of U-turn democratization.106
Surprise victories for a democratic opposition in critical elections canlead to the ousting of an incumbent, even in autocratic settings. The
Maldives and Zambia are two recent examples of this.
Contrastingly, elections can also serve as powerful instruments of legitimation and spur further autocratization when challengers fail,107
such as in Hungary and Türkiye in recent times. The fact that a majority of elections during the “record election-year” 2024 take placein such contested spaces makes this year likely to be critical for the
future of democracy in the world.
Table 6 below provides a full list of countries that hold elections in
2024. Among the eleven “stand-alone” autocratizers, we find India, Mexico, and Senegal. In India, Prime Minister Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is expected to win a third consecutive term.
This could lead to further autocratization given the already substantial democratic decline under Modi’s leadership and the enduringcrackdown on minority rights and civil society.108 Mexico has elections scheduled for June 2024, and tensions are high amid the gradual autocratization under President Obrador and the MORENA party.
President Obrador is now accused of trying to rig the system in favorof his successor Claudia Sheinbaum. Large crowds are turning out toprotest and to protect the independence of the electoral authority.109
In Senegal, President Sall of the Alliance for the Republic postponed
the elections initially scheduled for February 25, but the Constitutional
Council recently annulled the postponement and ruled that the President cannot stay in power beyond the end of his term that ends on
April 2.110 Other “stand-alone” autocratizers that are due to hold elections in 2024 are Botswana, Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Ghana, Mauritius, and Mongolia. There were no surprises in parliamentary electionsin Belarus held on February 25, and President Lukashenko has alreadyannounced that he will stand for re-election in 2025.
Nine “bell-turn” autocratizers are holding elections in 2024,
including El Salvador, Indonesia, and Pakistan who held elections
earlier in February this year. In El Salvador, President Bukele was
re-elected for a second term despite the constitutional ban on
re-election. El Salvador has been autocratizing during his term due
to increasing human rights violations, the undermining of the judicial
independence, and changes to the electoral system.111 In Indonesia,
the presumable win of Prabowo Subianto makes Indonesia’s democratic path and commitment to human rights and accountability
uncertain.112 He is a former army general with alleged involvement
in torture and disappearances under the Suharto dictatorship.113 In
Pakistan, elections took place in a tense political environment. The
leader of the opposition and former President Khan is in prison. Allegations of rigging and irregularities across the country led to violent
protests.114 In a major upset, Kahn’s party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf(PTI) won a plurality of seats, but incumbent Prime Minister Sharif is
forming a new coalition government without the PTI. The military’s
role in politics also sheds a shadow over the possibility for democrat-

105 “Other” refers to countries that do not reveal any ongoing substantial changes in democracy levels according to the ERT rules. The most prominent country in this category is theUnited States of America.
106 See Democracy Report 2023 for further details.
107 Knutsen, C.H.,et al. 2017. ”Autocratic elections.” World Politics 69(1).
108 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/dec/31/bjp-modi-india-general-election-2024 ; https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/12/07/decoding-india-s-2024-election-contestpub-91178
109 https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexicans-turn-out-droves-protect-democracy-ahead-elections-2024-02-18/
110 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68326782
111 https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/elections/how-the-worlds-most-popular-dictator-wins/
112 https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/why-indonesias-democracy-is-in-danger/
113 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/15/indonesia-presidential-election-results-prabowo-subianto-likely-victory
114 https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/09/asia/pakistan-election-nawaz-sharif-intl/index.html

41

42

DEMOCRACY REPORT

ic improvements.115 The other “bell-turns” to hold elections in 2024
are Croatia, Mali, Mauritania, Romania, South Korea, and Ukraine.
Elections in the eleven countries who are “near misses” of autocratization are expected to be consequential. If the incumbents
win the elections and stay in power, it seems reasonable to expectthat further deteriorations can follow. In other cases, the undermining of democracy can be traced to radical opposition parties who
may get a seat in government. South Africa might see its position
as a leading light of democracy in the region fade if the corruption
and undermining of state institutions by the ruling ANC continues
for another term. In already highly autocratic Russia, the recent deathof the most prominent opposition leader Alexei Navalny ahead of
the March presidential election emphasizes the control Putin exerts
over Russia’s politics. Putin is expected to win his fifth term in officehaving thoroughly manipulated the electoral and political system inhis favor for decades, including the amendment of the presidential
term limits in 2020.116 Other “near misses” of autocratization to holdelections in 2024 are Algeria, Bhutan, Georgia, Iceland, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Portugal, and Uruguay.
Only three countries holding elections in 2024 are democratizers, and all of them are “U-turn” processes: North Macedonia,
The Maldives, and Tunisia. North Macedonia is showing some worrying signs of a reversal of democracy in part due to the increasing
political polarization. The 2024 elections may well be decisive forwhether North Macedonia continues to be a U-turn democratizer ornot. If The Maldives’s parliamentary election follow the trend of thelast years, it would be good news. The 2018 presidential and 2019
parliamentary elections were instrumental for the U-turn, and the2023 presidential elections were considered free and fair,117 despitesome concerns about freedom of expression and peaceful assemblyin the pre-election months.118 Finally, Tunisia remains an electoral autocracy whose recent gains on the index are marginal relative to theprevious precipitous decline under the current President Saïed. The
2024 presidential elections will be the first for executive office since
President Saïed’s 2021 self-coup.119
26 countries lacking notable declines or improvements indemocracy levels in recent years, are holding elections in
2024. The election in the United States is likely to be highly consequential. The expected Republican nominee and former President
Donald Trump undermined American democracy substantiallyduring his previous tenure, not least regarding media freedom, judicial independence, and executive oversight. Among the innumerable anti-democratic statements, Trump has called his opponents“vermin” during campaign speeches, declared he wants to purge
the Department of Justice and dismantle the FBI, pardon himself offederal crimes, and have journalists arrested.120 A second presidential
term for Trump could have significant ramifications also for democracy internationally given the United States’ key role in world affairs
and the affinity for autocrats Trump sported during his first term.
Other liberal democracies holding elections include Belgium, Finland, and the United Kingdom. Relatively stable electoral autocracies
are also on the list. For example, Bangladesh held general elections
on January 7. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her party the Awami
League secured a majority of parliamentary seats in a controversial
contest. The opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party boycotted thepoll and many of its leaders and supporters were under arrest.121 Finally, a few closed autocracies like Iran and North Korea hold theirversion of elections where no upsets are expected.

TABLE 6. ALL 60 COUNTRIES HOLDING ELECTIONS IN 2024, BY REGIME TYPE
LD

Liberal Democracy  –indicates that the country could also belong to the lower category

ED

Electoral Democracy  +indicates that the country could also belong to the higher category

EA

Electoral Autocracy

Grey zone democracies/autocracies are marked

CA

Closed Autocracy

LIBERAL DEMOCRACIESELECTORAL DEMOCRACIESELECTORAL AUTOCRACIESCLOSED AUTOCRACIESCOUNTRY

ELECTION DATERoWCOUNTRY

ELECTION DATERoWCOUNTRY

ELECTION DATERoWCOUNTRY

ELECTION DATE

RoW

Belgium

June 9LD

Austria

Sept. 29

ED+

Mauritius

Nov. 30

EA+

Uzbekistan

Oct.-Dec.

CA+

FinlandJan. 28

LD

ED+

EA+

Chad

OctoberCA

LD

Pres. May 12;
Parl. Oct. 13

Fall

June 1

Lithuania

Tunisia

Iceland

Algeria

December

EA

IranMarch 1CA

TaiwanJan. 13LD

Moldova

NovemberED+

Azerbaijan

Feb. 7

EA

JordanNovemberCA

USA

Nov. 5LD

Namibia

NovemberED+

BangladeshJan. 7

EA

MaliFeb., postponedCA

BhutanJan. 9LD-

PortugalMarch 10ED+

BelarusFeb. 25

EA

North Korea

April 10CA

South Korea

April 10LD-

Croatia

ED

CambodiaFeb. 25

EA

South Sudan

DecemberCA

United Kingdom

Expected 2024

LD-

Presidential Dec;
parliamentary TBD

Comoros

Jan. 14

EA

Syria

TBD

CA

Uruguay

Oct. 27LD-

El Salvador

Feb. 4EA

Guinea-Bissau

TBD

EA

India

April–May

EA

Madagascar

May

EA

Mauritania

June 22

EA

MozambiqueOct. 9

EA

Pakistan

Feb. 8EA

RussiaMarch 17

EA

RwandaJuly 15

EA

Somaliland

Nov. 13

EA

Togo

April 13

EA

UkraineMarch 31

EA

Venezuela

December

EA

Dominican Republic May 19
GeorgiaED

Parliamentary Oct. 26;
ED
presidential TBD

Ghana

Dec. 7

ED

Maldives

March 17

ED

North Macedonia

May 24ED

PanamaMay 5

ED

Romania

Nov–Dec

ED

SenegalDec. 15ED

Slovakia

March 23

ED

Solomon Islands

April 17

ED

South Africa

May–AugustED

Sri Lanka

TBD

ED

Botswana

OctoberED-

Indonesia

Feb. 14ED-

MexicoJune 2

ED-

Mongolia

June

ED-

115 https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/02/understanding-pakistans-election-results
116 European Parliament Research Service, May 2020. Briefing: Constitutional change in Russia. More Putin or Preparing for post-Putin?
117 EU Election Observation Mission. 2024. Presidential Election Maldives 2023.
118 https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/maldives
119 https://africacenter.org/spotlight/2024-elections/tunisia/
120 See, for example, https://www.spj.org/news.asp?ref=2985
121 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67889387* Countries that are holding elections in 2024
but are not included in the V-Dem dataset:
Kiribati (TBD), San Marino (December),Palau (Nov. 12), and Tuvalu (Jan. 26).

43

WINDOWS TO THE FUTURE

Box 9. Women are Still Underrepresented in Political Positions
The world is still far from achieving gender parity in politics. Women remain
underrepresented. Men lead 90% of countries and hold on average 74% of seatsin legislatures worldwide. The term “glass ceiling effect” is often used to capture
the obstacles hindering women’s advancement into these leadership positions.1
Figure 1 shows the evidence for this over the last 50 years, using factual variables from the V-Dem dataset. There were three female heads of state and threefemale heads of government in 1973, but 17 and twelve respectively by 2023. This
corresponds to an increase from three to ten percent in female heads of state andgovernment. On the positive side, several countries elected a woman head ofstate or government for the first time in this period. For example, Chile elected its
first woman president, Michelle Bachelet, in 2005, and Victoire Tomegah-Dogbé
became Togo’s first female prime minister in 2020.
FIGURE 1. PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN WORLD LEADERS,
1973–2023

Women head of state / government

15%

10%

5%

The percentages arecalculated using thevariables v2exfemhos andv2exfemhog in the V-Dem
dataset v14, considering
only women in poweron the default date ofDecember 31.

In 1973, almost all women elected to parliament did so without any type of
quota. By 2023, the number of women in parliament is four times higher thanin 1973. This substantial growth is mainly driven by the adoption of gender
quotas. Figure 2 visualizes the difference gender quotas have made. The sharp
growth since 1993 suggests that the adoption of gender quotas has improved
gender representation. More than half of women legislators are elected in the
86 countries with some type of quota in place for legislative elections by 2023.
Recently, Sierra Leone,2 India,3 and Mongolia4 passed gender quota laws toimprove women representation in the legislature. After the June 2023 election,
Sierra Leone’s new parliament includes 42 women, more than twice the 19
representatives in the previous legislature.
However, de jure gender quotas do not tally with de facto political influence of
women.5 Many countries, not least several autocracies, have adopted “paper
tiger” laws to improve gender balance without actually improving women’s
power to influence politics. In Figure 3 we therefore split women’s representation
by regime type over the last 50 years. Overall, liberal democracy seems to be
critical for better gender equality.
For top executive offices, women have consistently performed better in liberal
democracies and doubled their presence as heads of state or government in
the last 50 years, from eleven to 21%. In electoral democracies women’s shareadvanced only four percent since 1973. Electoral autocracies had no woman
leaders in 1973 but increased significantly in the last decade to a total of eightpercent in 2023. Closed autocracies have had either very few or no womenin executive power during the last 50 years. Over the past decade, electoral
autocracies seem to have detached from closed autocracies in a more distinctive
way, and both electoral democracies and autocracies significantly increased theshare of women in power.

Women have greater success in entering the legislative branch, especially in thelast 30 years, as demonstrated in Figure 2. Around 26% of legislators in lower orunicameral chambers worldwide are women in 2023, compared to six percent
in 1973.

Liberal democracies also have the highest number of women in parliament in
2023 (34%), but the values for electoral democracies, electoral autocracies, andclosed autocracies are very similar (26%, 24%, and 21%, respectively). Althoughthese values increased consistently from the values between three and sevenpercent in 1973, women in parliament in electoral democracies in 1973 (three
percent) were less than half than in closed autocracies (seven percent, same asliberal democracies). This trend only changed after the fall of the Berlin Walland collapse of the Soviet Union. By 2004, electoral democracies had a higher
percentage of women in parliament than closed autocracies.

FIGURE 2. PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT,
1973-2023

FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN HEAD OF STATE OR
GOVERNMENT AND IN PARLIAMENT BY REGIME TYPE,
1973-2023

0%
1973

1983

1993

2003

2013

2023





30%

34%

21%



15%
10%
5%
0%
1973

1983

1993

Countries with quotas

1
2
3
4
5



26%

2003

2013

2023

Countries without quotas

The graph is based on
the variables v2lgfemleg,
which measures
the percentage ofwomen in the lower orunicameral chamberof the legislature, andv2lgqugen, that identifies
gender quotas for the
lower or unicameralchamber of thelegislature.



Women in parliament

20%     

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25%

21%



13%
11%

11%

10%

7%

8%
3%

0%

0%

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27% 26%
24%

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The left panel percentages are calculated using the variables v2exfemhos andv2exfemhog and, the right panel percentage are based on the variable v2lgfemleg.
They are divided into the four regime types from the Regimes of the World.

Folke, O., & Rickne, J. 2016. The Glass Ceiling in Politics: Formalization and Empirical Tests. Comparative Political Studies 49(5).
https://www.ipu.org/news/news-in-brief/2023-07/record-number-women-mps-elected-in-sierra-leone
https://www.idea.int/democracytracker/report/india/september-2023?pid=4606
https://thediplomat.com/2023/07/can-recent-constitutional-reforms-augment-womens-role-in-mongolias-democracy/
Bjarnegård, E., Zetterberg, P. 2022. How Autocrats Weaponize Women’s Rights. Journal of Democracy 33(2).



44

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

Digital Society Project:
Digital Technology as a Tool for Repression
Authors: Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, and Steven Wilson from the Digital Society Project.
Empirical analysis and graphs by courtesy of Dr. Marina Nord.

W

hile the early days of the internet and social
media initially sparked hope as potential ways
to provide wider forums for deliberation andthereby bolster democracy, there has been anotable shift in perspective. Today, the internet
and social media platforms are often identified as serious threats todemocracy. Notably, disinformation and hate speech proliferate onsocial media, fueling growing polarization, while autocratizing governments have used information technologies as yet another tool
for repression. What are the most notable trends when it comes tointernet and democracy in 2023?
In this box, we look at four specific strategies, all of which have been
increasingly used by governments as tools for repression. These are
the censoring of political content on social media; government shutdowns of the internet; and the spread of disinformation both fromthe domestic government and from foreign governments.
CENSORSHIP OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Figure 1 plots the changes taking place over the past ten years, between 2013 and 2023 on the indicator capturing the extent to whichgovernments censor political content on social media, (for example,
deleting or filtering specific posts for political reasons). A score of

FIGURE 1. COUNTRIES WITH CHANGES OUTSIDEOF CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR SOCIAL MEDIACENSORSHIP, 2013–2023

0 indicates that censorship is minimal, while 4 corresponds to total
ban of social media. The vertical axis plots scores for 2023 while thehorizontal axis shows scores from 2013. The plot only shows countries that have improved or declined to a substantial degree, withchanges surpassing the confidence intervals between 2013 and2023. Countries below the diagonal line have improved over thelast ten years, while countries above the diagonal have significantly
worsened in their censorship of social media.
Scores have improved for only three countries – DRC, The Gambia,
and The Maldives. On the other hand, censorship of social media has
substantially increased in 14 countries over the last decade.
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Guinea, Nicaragua, Myanmar, and Russia
are all countries with scores higher than 2 for 2023, indicating the
successful censorship of most targeted political content on social
media. Belarus, Hong Kong, Kyrgyzstan, India, Montenegro, Tanzania, Ukraine, and Yemen are among those where social media
content has been increasingly controlled, though not at as significant an overall level.
INTERNET SHUTDOWNS
Governments are increasingly resorting to shutting down the internet either nationally or regionally to control the flow of information,

FIGURE 2. COUNTRIES WITH CHANGES OUTSIDE OF
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR INTERNET SHUTDOWN,
2013–2023

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often as an attempt to address a specific problem. Scores in this figure have improved significantly between 2013 and 2023 only for The
Gambia.

used this tactic less, while the countries above the line have engaged more often with this tactic in 2023 than previously.
The most important finding that comes out of Figure 3 is that thecountries that have autocratized, as marked with red dots, are also
those that have worsened in their scores on disinformation frequency. Focusing on domestic disinformation (left panel), Afghanistan, Belarus, Hong Kong, Hungary, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Poland,
and Serbia are all countries where V-Dem registers high levels of
disinformation and are also some of the most prominent cases of
democratic backsliding. While we cannot draw any causal conclusions from this descriptive graph, we can conclude that spreading
disinformation is one of the tools autocratizing governments haveused.

By contrast, 14 countries have seen a significant decline over the lastten years on this indicator. The scores above two for Belarus, Eswatini,
Guinea, India, Iran, Myanmar, and Sudan indicate that in 2023, thesegovernments shut down the internet multiple times during the year.
DISINFORMATION AND DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
One of the biggest challenges of social media is that it relies on user-generated, and crucially, unchecked information, which can be
spread with great speed. This has resulted in scholars announcingthat disinformation - intentionally false, inaccurate, or misleading information intended to cause harm - has become the most important
communication issue of our times.1

By contrast, democratizers – Brazil, Dominican Republic, The Gambia, The Maldives, and The Seychelles have improved both in termsof spreading less disinformation and achieving higher quality democracy.

But to what extent does the spread of disinformation correlatewith declining quality of democracy? Figure 3 focuses on two indicators: How often government and its agents use social media
to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence its own population (left panel), and the frequency of foreign
governments spreading disinformation in the country (right panel). The vertical axis marks the scores for 2023, and the horizontal
axis notes the scores on disinformation at the onset of autocratization or democratization respectively. In Figure 3, we compare thelevels of disinformation only for countries which have experienced
decline or improvement in their levels of electoral democracy as
captured by the ERT methodology. Countries depicted with red
dots have autocratized, and countries marked with blue square
have democratized.

When it comes to disinformation from foreign governments (rightpanel), we note that there are fewer countries that have substantively higher or lower scores on this measure that coincide with changes
in levels of democracy. Yet, there are several prominent examples.
Armenia, Belarus, Hungary, and Poland are all countries that havebeen exposed to massive disinformation campaigns from Russia at
substantively higher levels when comparing 2023 to the year when
the specific autocratization period started for that country. By contrast, Bolivia, and The Seychelles democratized at the same time asdisinformation from abroad declined.
Note that Lesotho and Montenegro democratized despite seeing
higher levels of disinformation from foreign and domestic sources
respectively, meaning the democratic quality in these countries did
not decline even if disinformation was spread more widely.

As with previous graphs, the countries that lie below the diagonalline have improved in terms of disinformation, meaning they have

FIGURE 3. GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN SOURCES OF DISINFORMATION, 2023
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1 Freelon, D., & Wells, C. (2020). Disinformation as political communication. Political communication, 37(2), 145-156.

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46

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

V-Dem Co-Principal Investigators:
Commentary on the Democracy Report
Authors: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, and Jan TeorellT

he Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project involves numerous researchers worldwide, with the comprehensive and annually updated V-Dem dataset as its main
output. The project includes five principal investigators(PIs), a steering committee, and the V-Dem Institute(based in Gothenburg and led by Staffan I. Lindberg). The Institutepublishes the annual Democracy Report (DR). Recognizing differences of opinions among the PIs about the DR, the DR authors graciously allowed us (four of V-Dem’s five PIs) to offer commentary.
Our commentary does not challenge the quality of V-Dem data,
which we believe is very high. We also stand behind much of the
DR’s analysis. However, we do question some choices, which lead tointerpretations that we disagree with. We consider three elementsof the DR problematic: (a) interpretations of trends based on population-weighted measures, (b) use of crisp categories, and (c) insufficient attention to measurement uncertainty. Considering these factors, we find a less alarmist view of recent backsliding than presented
in several issues of the DR.

Categorical measures can be useful. However, when constructed by
imposing cutoffs on continuous indices, categories are inevitably arbitrary. Figure 1 demonstrates that countries coded within the same
RoW-category are highly diverse; their scores on the underlying indices span broad ranges. Similarly, countries falling just above andbelow each cutoff are quite similar; it is only by chance that countries close to a threshold are placed in different categories. Indeed,slight movements upward or downward – which may be artifacts ofmeasurement uncertainty or arcane classification rules – could recategorize countries. For example, Canada is classified as an Electoral
Democracy for 2022 with a Liberal Democracy Index score of 0.759;
yet it is classified as a Liberal Democracy in 2023 although its score
was basically unchanged at 0.755.

FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTIONS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEXSCORES FOR ROW CATEGORIESPOPULATION WEIGHTING AND TRENDS
In the DR, global data are sometimes weighted by population; a few
large countries are thus responsible for much of the variation (see Figure 11). Weighting by population is appropriate for describing trends
in the experiences of the “average global person”. However, it may
give misleading impressions if used to describe or interpret systematic global trends. It is misleading to suggest that global democracy has
declined in a dramatic fashion largely because India is backsliding.
From 2012 to 2022, the mean Electoral Democracy index score fell by
0.03, from 0.53 to 0.50, when weighting all countries equally. Weighted by population, however, it fell by 0.13 points, from 0.54 to 0.41.
Weighed by population, but excluding India, it fell only 0.05, from 0.46
to 0.41. Hence, developments in India drive many of the most dramatic developments depicted in different DR figures (e.g. Figure 10,
showing that 35% of global population living in autocratizing countries), and this insight is important for interpretating global trends.
CRISP CATEGORIZATIONSThe DR also relies heavily on crisp categories. For example, it reportsthat 88 of 179 countries are “autocracies” and only 13 percent of the
global population live in “liberal democracies.” Specifically, the DR
draws heavily on the Regimes of the World (RoW) typology (which is
not an official V-Dem index).1 RoW uses (cut-offs on) several continuous V-Dem measures to arrive at four categories: closed autocracy,electoral autocracy, electoral democracy, and liberal democracy. The
bars RoW sets for categorizing countries as, for instance, “liberal democracies” are very high. Hence, when the DR describes Austria or
Portugal in 2023 as mere “electoral democracies”, this largely reflects
RoW’s arbitrary but very demanding threshold criteria.

The DR also leans heavily on the Episodes of Regime Transformation(ERT) classification to categorize countries that are transitioning (e.g.,“autocratizing”).2 Twenty-one transition types (including classifications and sub-classifications) are proposed based on the direction,
extent, and duration of year-to-year changes in V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index and whether those changes pass thresholds specified
in RoW. Readers should note that the rules defining the various transition types are very complex and – since they are based on continuous
indicators – inevitably arbitrary. Conclusions based on the ERT, such aswhether a particular country is “autocratizing” or not, might thus turnout differently if different – equally plausible – choices were adopted.

1 Lührmann, Anna, Marcus Tannenberg, Staffan I. Lindberg. 2018. ”Regimes of the world (RoW): Opening new avenues for the comparative study of political regimes.” Politics andGovernance 6(1):60-77.
2 Maerz, Seraphine F., Amanda B. Edgell, Matthew C. Wilson, Sebastian Hellmeier, Staffan I. Lindberg. 2023. ”Episodes of regime transformation.” Journal of Peace Research
OnlineFirst:1-18.

COMMENTARYUNCERTAINTY CONSIDERATIONS
All measurement is subject to error. Expert-based measures of democracy, which are critical to most indices (including V-Dem’s), can,for example, be sensitive to differences in how experts interpret
question formulations and use scales.
A principal benefit of V-Dem stems from our coding procedure bywhich each indicator receives ratings from multiple country experts,
working independently. Measurement reliability can therefore be assessed, e.g., by degree of agreement across coders for each indicator.
Unfortunately, this aspect of V-Dem has received short shrift in the
DR. Trends are often presented without confidence intervals (obscuring that small changes through time might reflect measurement
error) and, more generally, interpreted without highlighting uncertainty.
BACKSLIDING
Given these considerations, one should be careful about interpreting global trends in democracy. If one calculates a global averagescore on V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index, weighting each country equally, a trend in an autocratic direction begins after the peakof 0.53 in 2012. This decline of 0.03 points over 10 years to a global
mean of 0.50 in 2023, although statistically significant (95% level)
since 2020, is fairly modest.

Another under-communicated fact is that the vast majority ofcountries have had fairly stable democracy scores, even recently, as
shown in Figure 2. In yet other (though far fewer) cases, regimes
have moved in a democratic direction. Discussions of democratic
backsliding, globally, concern a minority of countries whose democratic status has deteriorated.
Short-term changes are often difficult to interpret as they are happening. Naturally, we are concerned with adverse democracy trends
in several countries, including large ones such as India, and what lies
ahead. However, recent trends are not forecasts: they say nothing
about what is likely to happen in coming years. What we can say withconfidence is that the momentous expansion of democracy that began in the 19th- and continued for much of the 20th century, has atleast paused in the 21st century. In this light, apprehension about the
future is understandable. But we do not want to read more into current trends than is warranted.
We sincerely appreciate many aspects of the DR, which reaches abroad audience. Yet, given the concerns outlined here, we would
have wished it adopted a more measured tone on the current state,
and future prospects, of democracy globally.

FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WITH SIGNIFICANT CHANGES ON ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY INDEX OVER 1 OR 10 YEARS

47

48

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

V-Dem Methodology:
Aggregating Expert Assessments
Author: Kyle L. Marquardt

V-DEM USES INNOVATIVE METHODS TO aggregate expert judgments and thereby produce
estimates of important concepts. We use expert
judgement because many key features of democracy are not directly observable. For example, it iseasy to observe whether or not a legislature has the legal right toinvestigate an executive. However, assessing the extent to which
the legislature actually does so requires extensive conceptual andcase knowledge.

V-Dem typically gathers data from five experts per country-year
observation, using a pool of over 4,300 country experts who
provide judgment on different concepts and cases. Experts hailfrom almost every country in the world, allowing us to leverage
diverse opinions.
Despite their clear value, expert-coded data pose multiple problems. Rating concepts requires judgment, which varies across experts and cases; it may also vary systematically across groups ofexperts. We address these concerns by aggregating expert-coded
data with a measurement model, allowing us to account for uncertainty and potential biases.
The logic of the V-Dem measurement model is that unobserved
concepts exist (e.g. a certain level of academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression) but we only see imperfect manifestations of these concepts. That is, experts report their judgments
about these concepts as applied to specific cases using rough ordinal categories. Our model then converts these expert ratings toa single continuous latent scale and thereby estimates values of
the concept.
In the process, the model algorithmically estimates both the degree to which an expert is reliable relative to other experts, as wellas the degree to which their perception of the response scale differs from other experts. Similarly, we use patterns of overlapping
coding – both from experts who code multiple countries andexperts who code hypothetical cases – to estimate the degree
to which differences in scale perception are systematic across experts who code different sets of cases. Given the iterative natureof the estimation process, these estimates of reliability and scale
perception weight an expert's contribution to the estimation of
the unobserved concept.
In the resulting V-Dem dataset, we present users with a best estimate of the value for an observation (the point estimate), as wellas an uncertainty estimate (credible regions, a Bayesian corollaryof confidence intervals). More precisely, the output of the measurement model is an interval-level point estimate of the latent trait
that typically ranges in value from –5 to 5, and its associated measurement error. These estimates are the best version of the data to
use in statistical analysis.
However, the interval-level estimates are difficult for some users
to interpret substantively. We therefore also provide interval-level
point estimates that we have linearly transformed back to the coding scale that experts originally used to code each case. These estimates typically run from 0 to 4 (the modal scale range); users canrefer to the V-Dem codebook to substantively interpret them. Fi-

nally, we provide ordinal versions of each variable for applications
in which users require ordered categorical values. Each of the latter two data versions are also accompanied by credible regions.
VERSIONS OF THE V-DEM INDICATORS
SuffixNone

Scale
Interval

Description
V-Dem measurement model
estimates

Recommended use
Regression analysis_ospInterval

Linearized transformation of
the model estimates on theoriginal scale

Substantive interpretationof graphs and data

_ord

OrdinalMost likely ordinal valueof model estimates on theoriginal scale

Substantive interpretationof graphs and data_codelow /_codehighInterval

One standard deviation
above (_codehigh) and below(_codelow) a point estimate

Evaluating differences acrossunits and over time within
units

_sd

Interval

Standard deviation of theinterval estimate

Creating confidence intervals
based on user needs

The final V-Dem dataset thus includes a set of versions of indicators of democratic institutions and concepts, which allow academics and policymakers alike to understand the different features of a polity. The text box summarizes the output with which
we provide users.

Key Terms
Point Estimate: A best estimate of a concept’s value.
Confidence Intervals: Credible regions for which the upperand lower bounds represent a range of probable values fora point estimate. These bounds are based on the interval inwhich the measurement model places 68 percent of the probability mass for each score, which is generally approximately
equivalent to the upper and lower bounds of one standard
deviation from the median.
Significant Differences or Changes: When the upper andlower bounds of the confidence intervals for two point estimates do not overlap, we are confident that the difference
between them is not a result of measurement error.

REFERENCES
Marquardt, Kyle L. and Daniel Pemstein. 2018. IRT Models for Expert-Coded
Panel Data. Political Analysis 26(4).
Pemstein, Daniel, et al. 2024. The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent
Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded
Data. Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper No. 21, 9th edition.
Pemstein, Daniel, Eitan Tzelgov and Yi-ting Wang. 2015. Evaluating and
Improving Item Response Theory Models for Cross-National Expert
Surveys. Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper No. 1.

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

47

130+

OUTPUT UNITS

1,000+DATASETSMERGE OPTIONS

25,000+VARIABLES

Demscore, acronym for research Infrastructure for Democracy, Environment, Migration,
Social policy, Conflict, and Representation, offers harmonized world-leading Social
Science Data. The data is open source and free to use worldwide.
A fully normalized, joint PostgreSQL database, sophisticated programming, and a web-based interface enable the selection of variables from all six partnering data infrastructures. This results in a custom-designed
dataset and codebook generated automatically in a matter of seconds, making Demscore an enormously
time-efficient resource compared to merging several datasets manually.

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)Uppsala Conflict Data Program andViolence Early-Warning System(UCDP/VIEWS)

Explore our Thematic Datasets
Demscore's Thematic Datasets assemble a wide range of variables from datasets
across all partnering Modules related to a selected topic.

Thematic Datasets

Thematic Datasets
Thematic Datasets
Thematic Datasets

Codebook
GenderQoG (Quality of Government)

Thematic Datasets

Codebook

Codebook

The Labour Market, Unemployment, andOut-of-Work Benefits

Codebook

Environment

Migration

Codebook

Political Parties and Elections

Comparative Policy Laboratory(COMPLAB)

October 2023

October 2023
Based on Demscore
Version 2.0

Copyright © Demscore
All rights reserved

Copyright © Demscore
All rights reserved

October 2023
Copyright © Demscore
All rights reserved

Based on Demscore
Version 2.0

October 2023
Based on Demscore
Version 2.0

Based on Demscore
Version 2.0

Copyright © Demscore
All rights reserved

October 2023
Copyright © Demscore All
rights reserved

GenderEnvironment

Based on Demscore
Version 2.0

Political Parties andElectionsMigration

Unemployment

The Representative Democracy
Data Archive (REPDEM)

For additional user-friendly resources, including online visualization tools, static
datasets, and a quick-start handbook, please visit: https://www.demscore.se
Historical Data Archive (H-DATA)DEMSCORE IS FUNDED BY

SwedishResearch
Council49

50

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

Publications
from the V-Dem Team

Democratic Quality in Southern Europe
Tiago Fernandes (Ed.)
2024 | University of Notre Dame Press Fueled by new data from the Varieties of Democracy project, Democratic Quality in Southern
Europe takes a close look at the democratic trajectories of France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain overthe past fifty years. Despite similar beginnings, the five countries have experienced significant variationsin the way their democracies have evolved. The book combines new data with classical methodologies
to create fresh, convincing hypotheses on the development, quality, and depth of democracy in thiscritical region.

Editor Tiago Fernandes expertly draws together a collection of essays that look beyond the impact ofsocioeconomic development in these five countries, exploring innovative and nuanced explanations fortheir diverging paths.

Featured Publications
Episodes of Regime Transformation
Seraphine F. Maerz, Amanda B. Edgell, Matthew C. Wilson, Sebastian Hellmeier,and Staffan I. Lindberg
2023 | Journal of Peace Research 0(0).
 This article provides a new conceptualization of regime transformation thatallows scholars to address democratization and autocratization as related but
obverse processes. It introduces a dataset that captures 680 episodes of regime
transformation (ERT) from 1900 to 2019 and offers novel insights into regimechange over the past 120 years. Previously V-Dem Working Paper 113.
Academic Freedom and the Onset of Autocratization
Lars Pelke.
2023 | Democratization, 30(6): 1015-1039.
 This article presents the first systematic investigation of the influence of
academic freedom on the onset of autocratization. In particular, it reveals how
academic freedom protects regimes from an onset of autocratization andargues that more academic freedom reduces the risk of autocratization by
imprinting a pro-democracy bias on students and researchers.

2023
David Altman, Sergio Huertas-Hernández, and Clemente T. Sánchez. Two paths
towards the exceptional extension of national voting rights to noncitizen residents. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 49(10): 2541-2560.
Fabio Angiolillo. Authoritarian Ruling Parties’ Recruitment Dilemma:
Evidence from China. Journal of East Asian Studies. 23(3): 491-515.
Fabio Angiolillo. Introducing the One-Party Membership Dataset: A
dataset on party membership in autocracies. Journal of Peace Research. 0(0).
Larry M. Bartels, Ursula E Daxecker, Susan D Hyde, Staffan I Lindberg, Irfan
Nooruddin. (2023). The Forum: Global Challenges to Democracy?
Perspectives on Democratic Backsliding. International Studies Review. 25(2).
Vanessa A. Boese, and Charles M. Wilson. (2023). Contestation andparticipation: Concepts, measurement, and inference. International Area
Studies Review. 26(2): 89-106.

Sebastian Hellmeier, and Michael Bernhard. (2023). Regime Transformation
From Below: Mobilization for Democracy and Autocracy From 1900 to
2021. Comparative Political Studies. 0(0).
Daniel Korell, Niklas Reinecke, and Lars Lott. Student-led replication studies
in comparative politics: new findings by fresh eyes? Zeitschrift Für
Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. 17: 261–273
Lars Lott. (2023). Academic freedom growth and decline episodes. Higher
Education 0(0)Lars Lott, Aurel Croissant, and Christoph Trinn. The Ambivalent Effect ofAutocratization on Domestic Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 0(0).
Kyle L. Marquardt, and Daniel Pemstein. Estimating latent traits from expert
surveys: an analysis of sensitivity to data-generating process. Political
Science Research and Methods. 11(2):384-393.
Valeriya Mechkova, and Amanda B. Edgell. Substantive Representation,
Women’s Health, and Regime Type. Comparative Political Studies. 0(0).
Juraj Medzihorsky, and Staffan I. Lindberg. Walking the Talk: How to Identify
Anti-Pluralist Parties. Party Politics. 0(0). (Previous V-Dem Working Paper 116.)
Lars Pelke. Reanalyzing the Link between Democracy and Economic
Development. International Area Studies Review. 26(4): 361-383.
Yi-ting Wang. Supporting democracy when other democracies prosper?
Democratization. 30(7): 1240-1263.
Felix Wiebrecht. Corruption, Elite Contestation, and Parliaments: Why
Do Legislatures Become Stronger in Authoritarian Regimes? Political
Research Quarterly. 0(0).
Felix Wiebrecht, Yuko Sato, Marina Nord, Martin Lundstedt, Fabio Angiolillo &Staffan I. Lindberg (2023) State of the world 2022: defiance in the face ofautocratization. Democratization. 30(5): 769-793.

PUBLICATIONSDemocratization and Autocratization:
Concepts, Currents, Causes, Consequences, and Challenges
Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning
2024 | Abingdon: Routledge
 This book provides balanced, critical, and comprehensive coverage of the theories and realities of
autocratization and democratization. It sketches developments in the conceptions of democracy,
discusses how to distinguish between different forms of political rule, and maps the development of
democracy and autocracy across space and time.

The book reviews the major debates and findings about domestic and international causes and consequences of democratization and autocratization. It synthesizes theoretical models and empirical
relationships based on an explicit comparative perspective which focuses on similarities and differences across countries and historical periods.

V-Dem Working Papers and Reports
V-Dem Working Papers
2023
Fabio Angiolillo and Felix Wiebrecht. (2023). From Individual Parties toParty Systems: A New Approach to Calculate Party Systems’ Variables.
V-Dem Working Paper, 146.
Amanda B. Edgell, Jean Lachapelle, and Seraphine F. Maerz. (2023). Achieving
Transparency, Reproducibility, and Readability with Hard-Coded Data:
A Review. V-Dem Working Paper, 145.
Yuko Sato, Felix Wiebrecht, and Staffan I. Lindberg. (2023). Disinformationand Episodes of Regime Transformation. V-Dem Working Paper, 144.
Fabio Angiolillo, Felix Wiebrecht, and Staffan I. Lindberg. (2023). DemocraticAutocratic Party Systems: A New Index. V-Dem Working Paper, 143.
Lars Pelke and Janika Spannagel. (2023). Quality Assessment of the
Academic Freedom Index: Strengths, Weaknesses, and How Best to
Use It. V-Dem Working Paper, 142.
Kelly Morrison, Martin Lundstedt, Yuko Sato, Vanessa A. Boese-Schlosser,
Klas Markström, and Staffan I. Lindberg. (2023). Chains in Episodes of
Democratization. V-Dem Working Paper, 141.
Carl Henrik Knutsen, Kyle L. Marquardt, Brigitte Seim, Michael Coppedge,
Amanda Edgell, Juraj Medzihorsky, Daniel Pemstein, Jan Teorell, John Gerring,and Staffan I. Lindberg. (2023). Conceptual and Measurement Issues in
Assessing Democratic Backsliding. V-Dem Working Paper, 140.
Kelly M. McMann and Daniel J. Tisch. (2023). How Lower Levels of Corruptionin Democracies Prevented COVID Deaths. V-Dem Working Paper, 139.
Adrián del Río, Carl Henrik Knutsen, and Philipp M Lutscher. (2023). Education
Policies and Systems across Modern History: A Global Dataset. V-Dem
Working Paper, 138.

Matthew C. Wilson, Karoline Wiesner, and Samuel Bien. (2023). The Hidden
Dimension in Democracy. V-Dem Working Paper, 137.
Anja Neundorf, Eugenia Nazrullaeva, Ksenia Northmore-Ball, Katerina
Tertytchnaya, and Wooseok Kim. (2023). Varieties of Indoctrination(V-Indoc): Introducing a Global Dataset on the Politicization of
Education and the Media. V-Dem Working Paper, 136.
Michael Coppedge. (2023). V-Dem’s Conceptions of Democracy and Their
Consequences. V-Dem Working Paper, 135.
Marcus Tannenberg. (2023). Legitimacy as Congruence: Matching ExpertCoded and Public Opinion Data. V-Dem Working Paper, 134.

V-Dem Reports and Policy Briefs
2023
Martin Lundstedt, Felix Wiebrecht, Vanessa Boese-Schlosser, Kelly Morrison,
Natalia Natsika, Marina Nord, Evie Papada, Yuko Sato, and Staffan I. Lindberg.
(2023). Case for Democracy Report. University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute
Report.
Abhik Pramanik and Brigitte Seim. (2023). Comparing PRC and U.S. Foreign
Assistance Approaches. University of Gothenburg: V-Dem Policy Brief, 38.

Book chapters
Agnes Cornell, Jørgen Møller, and Svend-Erik Skaaning (2023). ”Political
Regimes”. Pp. 166-188 in Andrew Denning & Heidi Tworek (eds.), The Interwar
World. Abingdon: Routledge.
Lasse E. Leipziger, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Matilde Thorsen (2023). “Does
Economic Inequality Harm Democratic Quality: No, but Yes.” Pp. 187-201
in Christoffer Green-Pedersen; Carsten Jensen & Barbara Vis (eds.), No Normal
Science. Aarhus: Politica.

51

52

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

V-Dem Indices
The Liberal Democracy Index
The V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) captures both liberal andelectoral aspects of democracy based on the 71 indicators includedin the Liberal Component Index (LCI) and the Electoral Democracy
Index (EDI). The EDI reflects a relatively ambitious idea of electoral
democracy where a number of institutional features guarantee free

and fair elections such as freedom of association and freedom of
expression. The LCI goes even further and captures the limits placedon governments in terms of two key aspects: The protection of individual liberties, and the checks and balances between institutions.

FIGURE A1.1. THE V-DEM LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1900/1960–2023
Average Value
Average Value

1.0
0.9
0.8

Average Value, Population Weighted
1.0 Average Value, Population Weighted

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7
0.7

0.6
0.5
0.4

0.6

South and Central Asia

The Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East and North Africa

0.5

Sub−Saharan Africa

Sub−Saharan Africa

Eastern Europe

0.4

0.4

Eastern Europe

0.4

0.3

0.3
0.3

0.2

0.2

0.2
0.2

0.1

0.1

0.1
0.1

0.0

East Asia and the Pacific

East AsiaSouthand thePacific
andCentral Asia

0.5

0.5

1900

World

0.6

0.3

0.0

World

0.7

0.6

Western Europe and North America

Western Europe and North America

Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean

0.0

0.0

1900

1920

1920

1940

1940

1960

1960

1980

2000

1980

2000

2020

1960

2020

1960

1970

1970

1980

1980

1990

1990

2000

2000

2010

2010

2020

2020

FIGURE A1.2. EXPLANATION OF THE V-DEM LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX
V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index

Electoral Democracy Index

Liberal Component Index

Suffrage

Electedofficials

Cleanelections

Freedom of
association

Freedom of
expression andalternative sourcesof information

Equality
before the law
and individual
liberty index

Judicial constraints
on theexecutive index

Legislative constraints
on theexecutive index

1

16

8

6

9

20

5

4

indicator

indicators

indicators

indicators

indicators

indicators

indicators

indicators

V-DEM INDICESThe Electoral Democracy Index
For several decades, scholars and practitioners alike depicted democracy in the world as though the extant measures really captured what is meant by the concept “electoral democracy”. Yet, wehave all known that they did not. V-Dem is the first systematic effort
to measure the de facto existence of all the institutions in Robert
Dahl’s famous articulation of “polyarchy” as electoral democracy.
The V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) captures not only theextent to which regimes hold clean, free and fair elections, but also
their actual freedom of expression, alternative sources of information and association, as well as male and female suffrage and thedegree to which government policy is vested in elected political
officials.

FIGURE A2.1. THE V-DEM ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY INDEX: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1900/1960–2023
Average Value
Average Value

1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7

Average Value, Population Weighted
1.0Average Value, Population Weighted

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.9
0.8
0.7

0.6

World

0.6
0.6

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.20.20.1

0.1

0.10.1

0.0

0.0

0.4
0.3

1900

East Asia and the Pacific

East Asia andthe PacificSouthand Central Asia

0.6

0.5

World

South and Central
Asia East and North Africa
The Middle

0.5

The Middle Sub−Saharan
East and North Africa
AfricaSub−Saharan Africa

Eastern Europe

0.4

Eastern Europe

Western Europe and North America

Western Europe and North America

Latin America and the Caribbean

0.3

Latin America and the Caribbean

0.00.0

1900

1920

1920

1940

1940

1960

1960

1980

1980

2000

2020

2000

2020

1960

1970

1960

1970

1980

1980

1990

2000

1990

2010

2000

2020

2010

2020

FIGURE A2.2. THE V-DEM ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (EDI)
Expanded freedom of expression index

Government censorshipeffort – Media

Government censorshipeffort – Internet

Freedom of discussion
for men

Harassment ofjournalists

Media selfcensorship

Freedom of discussion
for women

Media
bias

Barriers toparties

Opposition parties
autonomy

Electionsmultiparty

Print/broadcast media
perspectives

Freedom of academic andcultural expression

Freedom of association index

Party
ban

Print/broadcast
media critical

Share of population with suffrage

CSO entry
and exit

CSO
repression

Percent of population
with suffrage

Clean elections index

EMB
autonomy

EMB
capacity

Election voter
registry

Election votebuyingElection other voting
irregularities

Elected officials index

Election government
intimidation

Election otherelectoral violenceElection free
and fair53

54

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

The Liberal Component Index
In V-Dem’s conceptual scheme the liberal principle of democracy
embodies the importance of protecting individual and minority
rights against both the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the
majority. It also captures the “horizontal” methods of accountability between more or less equally standing institutions that ensure the effective checks and balances between institutions andin particular limit the exercise of executive power. This is achievedby strong rule of law and constitutionally protected civil liberties,
independent judiciary and strong parliament that are able to holdthe executive to account and limit its powers. The three indicesthat capture these dimensions are: the equality before the law
and individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive(v2xlg_legcon). Taken together they measure the V-Dem LiberalComponent Index (v2x_liberal).

FIGURE A3.1. THE V-DEM LIBERAL COMPONENT INDEX: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1900/1960–2023
Average Value
1.0
0.9

Average Value, Population Weighted

Average Value

Average Value, Population Weighted
1.0

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.9

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5

0.8
0.7

0.6

0.6

0.5

0.5

0.30.30.2 0.2

0.20.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

1900

1900

South and Central Asia

The Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East and North Africa

Sub−Saharan Africa

0.3 0.3

0.1

East Asia and the PacificSouth and Central Asia

0.40.40.1

World

East Asia and the Pacific0.5

0.4 0.4

0.1

World

0.6

Sub−Saharan Africa

Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe
WesternEuropeand North America
Western Europe
and North
America
Latin America
andAmerica
the Caribbean
Latin
and the Caribbean

0.1

1920

1920

1940

1940

1960

1960

1980

1980

2000

2000

0.0

2020

2020

1960

1960

1970

1970

1980

1980

1990

2000

1990

2010

2000

2020

2010

2020

FIGURE A3.2. THE V-DEM LIBERAL COMPONENT INDEX (LCI)

Equality before the law and individual liberty index

Rigorous and impartial
public administration

Freedom from
tortureTransparent laws withpredictable enforcement

Freedom frompolitical killings

Access to justicefor menFreedom from forcedlabor for men

Freedom of domestic
movement for men

Access to justicefor women

Freedom from forcedlabor for women

Property rights
for menFreedom of
religion

Property rights for
women

Freedom of foreign
movement

Freedom of domestic
movement for women

Judicial constraints on the executive index

Executive respects
constitution

Compliance with
judiciaryCompliance withhigh courtHigh court
independence

Lower court
independence

Legislative constraints on the executive index

Legislature questions
officials in practice

Executive
oversight

Legislature investigates inpractice

Legislature opposition
partiesV-DEM INDICESThe Egalitarian Component Index
The egalitarian principle of democracy measures to what extent allsocial groups enjoy equal capabilities to participate in the politicalarena. It relies on the idea that democracy is a system of rule “bythe people” where citizens participate in various ways, such as making informed voting decisions, expressing opinions, demonstrating,running for office or influencing policy-making in other ways. The

egalitarian principle of democracy is fundamentally related to political participation, as systematic inequalities in the rights and resources of citizens of specific social groups limit capabilities to participate
in the political and governing processes. Therefore, a more equal
distribution of resources across groups results in political equality
and hence democracy.

FIGURE A4.1. THE V-DEM EGALITARIAN COMPONENT INDEX: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1900/1960–2023
Average Value

Average Value, Population Weighted

Average Value

1.0

Average Value, Population Weighted

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.9

0.9

0.8
0.7
0.6

0.8
0.7
World

0.6

0.6

World
East Asia and the Pacific

East Asia and the Pacific

0.6South and Central Asia

South and Central Asia

The Middle East and North Africa

0.5 0.5

0.5

0.5

The Middle East and North Africa

0.4 0.4

0.40.4Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe

0.3 0.3

0.30.3Sub−SaharanAfricaSub−SaharanAfricaWestern Europe
and North
America
WesternEuropeand North America

0.2
0.1
0.0

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

0.0

0.0

1900

1900

Latin America
andAmerica
the Caribbean
Latin
and the Caribbean

0.2
0.1

1920

1920

1940

1940

1960

1960

1980

1980

2000

2000

0.0

2020

1960

2020

1960

1970

1970

1980

1980

1990

2000

1990

2010

2000

2020

2010

2020

FIGURE A4.2. THE V-DEM EGALITARIAN COMPONENT INDEX (ECI)

Equal protection index

Social class equality
in respect for civil liberties

Social group equality
in respect for civil liberties

Weaker civil liberties
population

Equal access index

Power distributed bygenderPower distributed bysocioeconomic position

Power distributed bysocial group

Equal distribution of resources index

Encompassingness

Means-tested vs.
universalistic welfare

Educational equality

Health equality

55

56

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

The Participatory Component Index
The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active partici­
pation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. This principle prefers direct rule by citizens as practicable. The
V-Dem Participatory Component Index (PCI) takes into account four
important aspects of citizen participation: civil society organiza-

tions, mechanisms of direct democracy, and partici­pation and representation through local and regional govern­ments. Four different
V-Dem indices capture these aspects and are the basis for the PCI.

FIGURE A5.1. THE V-DEM PARTICIPATORY COMPONENT INDEX: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1900/1960–2023
Average Value
Average Value

1.0
0.9

Average Value, Population Weighted
Average Value, Population Weighted

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.9

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5

0.8
0.7
World

0.6

0.6

East Asia and the Pacific

East Asia and the Pacific

0.6South and Central Asia

South and Central Asia

The Middle East and North Africa

0.5

0.5

World

The Middle East and North Africa

0.5

Sub−Saharan Africa

Sub−Saharan Africa

0.4

0.4

0.40.4Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe

0.3

0.3

0.30.3Latin America
andAmerica
the Caribbean
Latin
and the Caribbean

0.2

0.2

0.20.2

0.1

0.1

0.0

0.0

0.1
0.0

1900

1900

Westernand North America
Western Europe
and Europe
North America

0.1

1920

1920

1940

1940

1960

1960

1980

2000

1980

2000

2020

0.0

1960

2020

1960

1970

1970

1980

1980

1990

1990

2000

2010

2000

2020

2010

2020

FIGURE A5.2. THE V-DEM PARTICIPATORY COMPONENT INDEX (PCI)
Civil society participation index

Candidate selection –National / Local

CSO participatoryenvironment

CSO consultation

CSO womens participation

Local government index

Direct popular vote index

Local government
electedLocal offices
relative power

Regional government index

Regional government
electedRegional offices
relative power

Regional government
existsLocal government
existsV-DEM INDICESThe Deliberative Component Index
The V-Dem Deliberative Component Index (DCI) captures to what
extent the deliberative principle of democracy is achieved. It assesses the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning, focused on
the common good, motivates political decisions – as ­contrasted
with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests

or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires morethan an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be
respectful dialogue at all levels – from preference formation to
final decision – among informed and competent participants who
are open to persuasion.

FIGURE A6.1. THE V-DEM DELIBERATIVE COMPONENT INDEX: WORLD AND REGIONAL AVERAGES, 1900/1960–2023
Average Value
Average Value

1.0
0.9

Average Value, Population Weighted
Average Value, Population Weighted
1.0

1.0

1.0

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.7
0.6
0.5

0.7
World

0.6

0.6

World
East Asia and the Pacific

East Asia and the Pacific

0.6South and Central Asia

South and Central Asia

The Middle East and North Africa

0.5

The Middle East and North Africa

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.4

Eastern Europe

0.3 0.3

0.30.3Latin
and the Caribbean
Latin America
andAmerica
the Caribbean

0.2 0.2

0.20.20.1 0.1

0.1

0.4

0.0

1900

Eastern Europe

WesternEuropeand North America
Western Europe
and North
America

0.1

0.0
1900

Sub−Saharan Africa

Sub−Saharan Africa

0.4

0.0

0.0

1920

1920

1940

1940

1960

1960

1980

1980

2000

2000

2020

2020

1960

1960

1970

1970

1980

1980

1990

2000

1990

2010

2000

2020

2010

2020

FIGURE A6.2. THE V-DEM DELIBERATIVE COMPONENT INDEX (DCI)
Deliberative Component index

Reasoned justification

Common good

Respect
counterarguments

Range of consultation

Engaged society

57

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

FIGURE A7. COUNTRIES BY SCORE ON V-DEM’S LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (LDI), 2013 COMPARED TO 2023

Score and Confidence Intervals

Figure A7 shows every country’s rating on
the LDI in 2023 in rank order, as well as
the change over the last 10 years. Country
names highlighted in blue highlight the
13 countries with significant democratization and red country names reveal which
39 countries have undergone substantial
autocratization. Countries are also divided
into groups from the top 10 to 50% to thebottom 50 to 10%.

Top 10%Top 50% of countries

Denmark
SwedenEstonia
Switzerland
NorwayIreland
New ZealandFinland
Costa Rica
Belgium
Germany
FranceCzechia
Australia
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Chile
Austria

Autocratizing countries
Democratizing countries
2013
2023

Top 20−30%

Score
Confidence interval

Seychelles
Slovenia
Cape Verde
Malta
Croatia
CyprusTrinidad and Tobago
IsraelSuriname
Moldova
South Korea
Bulgaria
South Africa
GreecePeru
PanamaColombia
Sao Tome and Principe

Top 30−40%

Top 10−20%

United States of America
United Kingdom
Uruguay
LatviaItaly
Spain
CanadaPortugal
Iceland
Slovakia
Lithuania
Japan
TaiwanBrazilVanuatuArgentina
Jamaica
Barbados

Ghana
Nepal
Namibia
The Gambia
Timor−Leste
LesothoRomania
KosovoMalawi
Solomon Islands
Georgia
EcuadorMontenegro
SenegalKenya
Maldives
BhutanPolandTop 40−50%

58

Dominican Republic
Liberia
BotswanaParaguay
ZambiaArmenia
Sri Lanka
Fiji
Mongolia
Albania
Honduras
Tanzania
Sierra Leone
Papua New Guinea
Indonesia
Mauritius
North Macedonia
Malaysia
0.00

0.25

2023

0.50

Liberal Democracy Index
Autocratizing

0.75

Democratizing

1.00

2013

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

Score and Confidence Intervals

Bottom 40−50%

Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
GuyanaSingapore
Nigeria
Benin
Hungary
KuwaitGuatemalaTunisia
MexicoPhilippines
Niger
India
Ivory Coast
JordanSerbiaBottom 30−40%

Bottom 50% of countries

MoroccoUkraineSomaliland
Madagascar
LebanonGuinea−Bissau
Zanzibar
ThailandMozambique
UgandaTogo
Pakistan
Iraq
Kyrgyzstan
Mauritania
Burkina Faso
Gabon
Zimbabwe

Autocratizing countries
Democratizing countries
2013
2023

Bottom 10−20%

Score
Confidence interval

Libya
Central African Republic
Bangladesh
RwandaLaos
Eswatini
GuineaQatar
Iran
Uzbekistan
United Arab Emirates
Palestine/Gaza
Haiti
South Sudan
Azerbaijan
RussiaBurundiCuba

Bottom 10%

Bottom 20−30%

AngolaMali
Kazakhstan
Palestine/West Bank
Oman
Somalia
Cameroon
Egypt
Hong Kong
Democratic Republic of Congo
Djibouti
Algeria
Republic of the Congo
VietnamTürkiye
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Comoros

Cambodia
Equatorial Guinea
Venezuela
Syria
Bahrain
Yemen
Chad
Sudan
Saudi Arabia
Tajikistan
China
BelarusTurkmenistan
Afghanistan
Nicaragua
Myanmar
North Korea
Eritrea
0.00

0.25

2023

0.50

Liberal Democracy Index
Autocratizing

0.75

Democratizing

1.00

2013

59

Togo

Cambodia

Zimbabwe

UgandaIndonesia

China
1979
Fiji

1973

ZambiaHong Kong
Japan

1985

Laos

1991

TABLE A1. HISTORY OF REGIMESOF THE Australia
WORLD BY COUNTRY-YEAR,
1973–2023
Hong Kong
Zanzibar
Malaysia
Cambodia

Zimbabwe

Indonesia

China
1979
Fiji

1973

Japan

1985

Myanmar
New Zealand
1997

1991

Japan

1985

East Asia and the P

Australia

ZanzibarIndonesia

China
1979
Fiji

1973

ZambiaDEMOCRACY REPORT The
2024
GambiaHong Kong

Cambodia

Zimbabwe

UgandaTanzania

60

Australia

Zanzibar

Togo

East Asia and the Pacific

The Gambia

Sudan

East Asia and the PacificSouth Africa
South Sudan

Malaysia
Myanmar
New Zealand1997

1991

Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar

New Zealand
1997
North Korea

Papua New Guinea

Philippines

CanadaWestern Europe and North America

CyprusDenmark
FinlandFranceGermany
GreeceIcelandJapan
LaosMalaysia
Myanmar
New Zealand
North Korea
Papua New Guinea

Malaysia

Myanmar
New Zealand
North Korea
Papua New Guinea
Philippines

South Korea

TaiwanLuxembourg

Thailand

Malta

Timor−Leste

Netherlands

Vanuatu

NorwayVietnam

Portugal
Spain

VanuatuThailand

1973

Vanuatu
1973

ClosedSwedenSwitzerland
United Kingdom

1985Autocracy

1979

Closed1979

1985Autocracy

ClosedAutocracy

Electoral
Autocracy

USA

1991

Electoral
Autocracy
1997
Year

Autocratic
2003Zone
Grey

Autocratic
2003Zone
Grey

2009 Grey Zone

Autocratic
Grey Zone

Democratic
Grey Zone

Electoral
Democracy

Democratic

1973

1979

1985

1991

1997

2003

2009

2015

2021

1973

1979

1985

1991

1997

2003

2009

2015

2021

1973

1979

1985

1991

1997

2003

2009

2015

2021

1973

1979

1985

1991

1997

2003

2009

2015

2021

Argentina
Barbados
Bolivia
BrazilChile

Latin America and the Caribbean

Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
EcuadorEl Salvador
Guatemala
GuyanaHaiti
Honduras
Jamaica
MexicoNicaragua
PanamaParaguay
Peru
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela

Albania
BelarusBosnia Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czechia
Estonia

Eastern Europe

German Dem. Rep.
Hungary
KosovoLatviaLithuania
Moldova
Montenegro
North Macedonia
PolandRomania
RussiaSerbiaSlovakia
Slovenia
UkraineAfghanistan
Armenia
Azerbaijan

South and Central Asia

Bangladesh
BhutanGeorgia
India
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Maldives
Mongolia
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan

ClosedAutocracy

Electoral
Autocracy

Year

Autocratic
Grey Zone

Democratic
Grey Zone

Electoral
Democracy

1991

Electoral
Autocracy
1997
Year

1991

Electoral
Autocracy
1997
Year

1991

ClosedClosedAutocracy
1985

1979

Vietnam

1979

Autocracy
1985

Autocracy
1985

1979

ClosedVietnam

Timor−Leste

1973

1979

VietnamVanuatuTaiwan

1973

1973

1973

202

2021

VietnamThailand
Timor−Leste

Thailand2015

VanuatuTaiwanSingapore
Solomon Islands

Timor−Leste

South Korea

Solomon Islands
South Korea

Republic of Vietnam

2015

Solomon Islands
2009

Timor−Leste

South Korea

TaiwanSolomon Islands

Singapore

Solomon Islands

Philippines

Singapore

Philippines

Italy

Papua New Guinea

South Korea

Republic of Vietnam

Republic of Vietnam

Ireland

East Asia and the Pacific

East Asia and the Pacific

Austria
Belgium

East Asia and the PacificIndonesia

2009Singapore

TaiwanCountries are divided into political regions. Regions with higher density of population
living in democracies
are placedin higher position. The
Laos
North Korea
Singapore
ThailandAustralia
Hong
Kong
Malaysia
figure shows the history of Regimes of the World (RoW) in the last 50 years, 1973–2023, for eachcountry.
corresponds
to one yearTimor−LesteandPapua New
Guinea Each tile Solomon
Islands
Cambodia
Myanmar
Korea
Vanuatu
we use the PanelView R packageChina
developed by Mou,Indonesia
Liu,and Xu (2022) to visualize
the history ofPhilippines
RoW. The typologySouthis publishedin Lührmann
Japan
New ZealandRepublic of Vietnam
TaiwanVietnamFiji
et al. 2018. Regimes of the World (RoW),
Politics and Governance
6(1).
Laos
North Korea
Singapore
ThailandHong Kong

2009

Papua New Guinea
Republic ofVietnam
2003

Philippines
Republicof Vietnam
2003

2003

North Korea

LiberalDemocracy

1991

Electoral
Autocracy 1997
Year
Autocratic
2003
Grey
Zone
Democratic

2009 Grey Zone

2015

1985

Electoral
Democracy
2021
LiberalDemocracy

Electoral
Autocracy

Autocratic
Grey2003
Zon

Democra2009Grey Zo

2015

Electora
Democr202

LiberalDemocrUgandaAustralia

Hong Kong

Cambodia

Indonesia

East Asia and the Pacific

China
Fiji
Hong Kong

East Asia and the PacificIndonesia
Japan
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar

The Middle East and North Africa

Iran

New Zealand

Iraq

IsraelJordan

North Korea
Papua New Guinea

KuwaitPhilippines

LebanonRepublic of Vietnam

Libya

Singapore

MoroccoOman

Malaysia
Myanmar
New Zealand
North Korea
Papua New Guinea

North Korea
Papua New Guinea
Philippines

Papua New Guinea

Closed1985Autocracy

1979

1991

1973

1979

ClosedAutocracy
1985

1991

Electoral
Autocracy 1997

1973

1979

1985

1991

1973

1979

1985

1991

TürkiyeVietnam1973

1973

ClosedClosedAutocracy
1985
Electoral
Autocracy
1997
Year

1991

Electoral
Autocracy
1997
Year

Autocratic
2003Zone
Grey

1991

Autocratic
2003Zone
Grey
Democratic

2009 Grey Zone

2009

1997

2003

2009

2015

2021

1997

2003

2009

2015

2021

Democratic
Grey Zone 2015

Electoral
Democracy
2021

Benin
Burkina Faso
BurundiCameroon
Cape VerdeCentral African Rep.
Chad
ComorosCongo
Djibouti
DRC
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Eswatini
Ethiopia
Gabon
Ghana
GuineaSub−Saharan Africa

Guinea−Bissau
Ivory Coast
Kenya
LesothoLiberia
Madagascar
MalawiMali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
RwandaSão Tomé & Príncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Somaliland
South Africa
South Sudan
Sudan
Tanzania
The Gambia
Togo
UgandaZambiaZanzibar
Zimbabwe

Australia
Cambodia
China
FijiHong Kong

East Asia and the PacificIndonesia
Japan
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
New Zealand
North Korea
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Republic of Vietnam
Singapore
Solomon Islands
South Korea
TaiwanThailand
Timor−Leste
Vanuatu
Vietnam

Autocratic
Grey Zone

Democratic
Grey Zone

Electoral
Democracy

1991

Electoral
Autocracy
1997
Year

AngolaElectoral
Autocracy

ClosedAutocracy
1985

Autocracy
1985

1979

Botswana

ClosedAutocracy

1979

1979

Autocratic
Grey2003
Zone

Year

2021

Vietnam

Closed1973

2015

TaiwanVanuatu

1985Autocracy

1979

South Korea

Timor−Leste

1979

2021

VanuatuTaiwanVanuatu

2015

Timor−Leste

Vanuatu

1973

2009

ThailandThailand

Vietnam

61

Solomon Islands
2009South Korea

1973

2009

Singapore

Solomon Islands

Solomon Islands

Timor−Leste

1973

Republic ofVietnam
2003

Singapore

Singapore

2003

North Korea
Philippines

Philippines
Republicof Vietnam
2003

Philippines

Thailand

Solomon Islands

North Korea

Republic of Vietnam

New Zealand1997

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024
Papua New Guinea

VietnamVanuatu

Yemen

Papua New Guinea

New Zealand
1997

Thailand

VietnamUnited Arab Emirates

North Korea

TaiwanVanuatuTunisia

Myanmar
New Zealand
1997

Myanmar

1991

Malaysia
Myanmar

1991

Laos

Timor−Leste

South Korea

Singapore

Vietnam

Syria

Laos
MalaysiaJapan
Malaysia

TaiwanSingapore
Solomon Islands

Philippines

Japan

1985

1985

South Korea

Republic of Vietnam

Republic of Vietnam

Timor−Leste

Saudi Arabia

Myanmar
New ZealandThailandThailandSouth Yemen

1991

Laos

Timor−Leste

Taiwan

Qatar

Laos

Japan
Malaysia

TaiwanSouth Korea

Palestine/Gaza

Japan

1985

South Korea

Solomon Islands

Palestine/West Bank

East Asia and the Pacific

Australia

Egypt

Indonesia

China
1979
Fiji

1973

Algeria

Hong Kong

Cambodia

Zimbabwe

Indonesia

China
1979
Fiji

1973

ZambiaHong Kong

Cambodia

Zimbabwe

Zanzibar

Bahrain

Australia

Indonesia

East Asia and the P

Togo

China
1979
Fiji

1973

ZambiaZanzibarHong Kong

Cambodia

Zimbabwe

UgandaTanzania
The Gambia

Australia

Zanzibar

Togo

East Asia and the Pacific

The Gambia

Sudan

East Asia and the PacificSouth Africa
South Sudan

LiberalDemocracy

1991

Electoral
Autocracy 1997
Year
Autocratic
2003
Grey
Zone
Democratic

2009 Grey Zone

2015

1985

Electoral
Democracy
2021
LiberalDemocracy

Electoral
Autocracy19
Autocratic
Grey2003
Zone

Democrat

2009Grey Zone

2015

Electoral
Democrac
2021

LiberalDemocrac

62

DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

TABLE A2. COUNTRY SCORES FOR THE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (LDI) AND ALL COMPONENTS INDICES, 2023


Indicates that the country’s score has improved over the past 10 years, substantially and at a statistically significant level
Indicates that the country’s score has decreased over the past 10 years, substantially and at a statistically significant level

SD+/– reports the standard deviation to indicate the level of uncertainty
EGALITARIAN COMPONENTINDEX (ECI)PARTICIPATORY COMPONENTINDEX (PCI)

DELIBERATIVE COMPONENTINDEX (DCI)

COUNTRYRANK

LIBERAL DEMOCRACYINDEX (LDI)
SCORE

SD+/–

RANK

ELECTORAL DEMOCRACYINDEX (EDI)
SCORE

SD+/–

RANK

SCORE

SD+/–

RANK

SCORE

SD+/–

RANK

SCORE

SD+/–

RANK

SCORE

SD+/–

Denmark
SwedenEstonia
Switzerland
NorwayIreland
New ZealandFinland
Costa Rica
Belgium
Germany
FranceCzechia
Australia
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Chile
Austria
United Kingdom
USA
Uruguay
LatviaSpain
Italy
CanadaPortugal
Iceland
Slovakia
Lithuania
Japan
TaiwanBrazilVanuatuArgentina
Barbados
Jamaica
Seychelles
Slovenia
Cape Verde
Malta
Croatia
CyprusTrinidad and Tobago
IsraelSuriname
Moldova
South Korea
Bulgaria
South Africa
GreecePeru
PanamaColombia
S.Tomé & P.
Ghana
Nepal
Namibia
GambiaTimor-Leste
LesothoRomania
KosovoMalawi
Solomon Islands
Georgia
EcuadorMontenegro
SenegalKenya
Maldives
BhutanPolandDominican Rep.
Liberia
BotswanaParaguay
ZambiaArmenia
Sri Lanka
Fiji
Mongolia
Albania
Honduras
Tanzania
Sierra Leone
Papua New Guinea
Indonesia
Mauritius
North Macedonia
Malaysia

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

0.88
0.85
0.84
0.84
0.84
0.83
0.83
0.82
0.82
0.81
0.81
0.81
0.80
0.80
0.80
0.80
0.79
0.77
0.77
0.77
0.77
0.77
0.76
0.76
0.76
0.75
0.74
0.74
0.74
0.73
0.72
0.69
0.69
0.69
0.68
0.68
0.66
0.65
0.65
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.64
0.63
0.63
0.61
0.60
0.59
0.58
0.58
0.58
0.57
0.56
0.56
0.56
0.52
0.52
0.52
0.51
0.50
0.50
0.49
0.48
0.48
0.47
0.47
0.47
0.46
0.46
0.45
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.43
0.43
0.42
0.42
0.42
0.41
0.41
0.40
0.39
0.39
0.38
0.38
0.36
0.36
0.36
0.36

.040
.043
.043
.047
.046
.047
.045
.049
.048
.049
.046
.052
.050
.051
.049
.049
.050
.051
.051
.052
.049
.051
.050
.049
.056
.052
.055
.056
.055
.052
.051
.057
.059
.057
.057
.058
.059
.054
.058
.058
.056
.059
.061
.057
.061
.059
.057
.059
.058
.057
.058
.062
.057
.058
.059
.060
.062
.058
.060
.058
.056
.059
.053
.060
.055
.056
.055
.054
.053
.057
.046
.051
.058
.059
.053
.055
.052
.055
.055
.049
.049
.050
.052
.040
.048
.046
.050
.045
.049
.047

1
8
4
5
6
2
7
13
12
3
15
10
11
16
17
9
26
23
18
20
22
19
24
27
14
21
28
29
33
31
30
36
35
25
34
32
44
39
40
37
45
38
42
47
41
48
50
59
53
43
51
46
49
56
60
55
62
64
52
63
58
57
75
67
69
61
73
68
77
70
84
71
54
65
79
76
83
66
74
91
85
88
81
101
93
96
80
95
78
89

0.92
0.88
0.90
0.89
0.89
0.90
0.89
0.86
0.87
0.90
0.86
0.88
0.87
0.85
0.85
0.88
0.84
0.84
0.85
0.85
0.84
0.85
0.84
0.84
0.86
0.84
0.83
0.82
0.80
0.82
0.82
0.78
0.80
0.84
0.80
0.80
0.74
0.76
0.75
0.78
0.73
0.77
0.75
0.72
0.75
0.71
0.70
0.67
0.69
0.75
0.70
0.73
0.70
0.68
0.66
0.68
0.65
0.64
0.70
0.64
0.67
0.67
0.58
0.62
0.60
0.65
0.58
0.62
0.56
0.60
0.53
0.59
0.69
0.64
0.56
0.58
0.53
0.63
0.58
0.50
0.53
0.51
0.53
0.44
0.50
0.48
0.54
0.48
0.56
0.51

.035
.040
.038
.042
.041
.039
.039
.046
.044
.039
.043
.046
.044
.047
.044
.042
.047
.047
.046
.047
.045
.045
.043
.043
.049
.046
.049
.053
.053
.047
.045
.057
.057
.049
.055
.055
.059
.053
.058
.053
.055
.054
.061
.059
.060
.061
.056
.064
.062
.055
.061
.059
.059
.062
.066
.064
.068
.063
.063
.062
.058
.063
.062
.069
.063
.060
.064
.064
.063
.064
.054
.060
.072
.067
.064
.064
.063
.063
.067
.063
.060
.061
.064
.054
.059
.058
.061
.057
.062
.059

2
1
8
5
9
15
12
3
10
23
4
16
14
6
11
22
7
17
20
19
18
25
26
21
34
33
29
24
13
27
36
32
37
55
44
45
30
38
39
54
35
53
47
31
48
41
40
28
43
70
52
66
58
49
42
72
59
57
86
68
79
82
50
67
64
87
61
80
60
77
51
76
105
91
69
83
63
94
88
62
74
71
85
46
78
65
96
84
100
90

0.98
0.98
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.93
0.95
0.97
0.95
0.91
0.97
0.93
0.93
0.96
0.95
0.91
0.96
0.93
0.91
0.92
0.92
0.91
0.90
0.91
0.88
0.89
0.90
0.91
0.94
0.90
0.88
0.89
0.87
0.80
0.85
0.85
0.89
0.86
0.86
0.81
0.88
0.82
0.84
0.89
0.84
0.86
0.86
0.90
0.85
0.75
0.82
0.76
0.79
0.84
0.86
0.74
0.79
0.80
0.69
0.76
0.72
0.70
0.83
0.76
0.76
0.69
0.78
0.72
0.79
0.73
0.82
0.73
0.58
0.64
0.75
0.70
0.77
0.61
0.69
0.78
0.73
0.75
0.70
0.84
0.73
0.76
0.60
0.70
0.58
0.66

.016
.012
.024
.025
.021
.033
.028
.018
.024
.039
.020
.031
.031
.022
.023
.039
.021
.031
.034
.033
.033
.040
.044
.036
.046
.041
.043
.035
.027
.040
.045
.036
.046
.056
.047
.048
.041
.043
.045
.057
.044
.061
.051
.037
.054
.049
.049
.039
.048
.062
.052
.064
.055
.051
.046
.061
.060
.058
.070
.062
.065
.070
.050
.061
.060
.067
.064
.065
.055
.067
.053
.061
.063
.075
.063
.071
.060
.073
.067
.058
.065
.063
.068
.049
.068
.062
.076
.067
.069
.071

1
11
16
6
2
20
24
12
17
5
3
37
8
29
15
4
60
14
38
78
34
26
27
10
45
41
21
42
23
7
9
95
50
48
33
32
31
18
59
13
49
22
43
51
63
40
25
52
83
28
114
109
111
72
70
97
138
74
107
57
71
69
125
116
44
123
47
67
98
89
30
19
127
106
75
155
101
36
85
80
91
65
142
64
79
122
134
56
92
58

0.97
0.90
0.89
0.93
0.96
0.88
0.87
0.90
0.89
0.93
0.94
0.81
0.91
0.83
0.89
0.94
0.72
0.89
0.81
0.65
0.82
0.86
0.84
0.90
0.78
0.80
0.87
0.79
0.87
0.93
0.91
0.59
0.76
0.77
0.82
0.83
0.83
0.88
0.72
0.89
0.77
0.87
0.79
0.76
0.71
0.80
0.86
0.76
0.63
0.84
0.52
0.54
0.53
0.67
0.68
0.59
0.42
0.66
0.56
0.73
0.67
0.69
0.48
0.52
0.78
0.49
0.77
0.69
0.59
0.61
0.83
0.88
0.46
0.56
0.66
0.32
0.58
0.81
0.62
0.64
0.61
0.71
0.39
0.71
0.64
0.49
0.44
0.73
0.60
0.73

.025
.048
.055
.043
.032
.052
.059
.044
.052
.044
.039
.067
.048
.063
.050
.038
.080
.054
.070
.087
.066
.056
.061
.045
.074
.072
.059
.068
.053
.044
.047
.086
.076
.074
.070
.065
.069
.052
.078
.057
.076
.062
.080
.075
.083
.069
.061
.080
.083
.064
.090
.099
.094
.085
.076
.082
.103
.085
.090
.079
.088
.081
.092
.091
.068
.092
.076
.075
.086
.091
.070
.052
.086
.085
.084
.090
.086
.070
.087
.094
.088
.085
.092
.077
.091
.088
.087
.085
.086
.080

6
25
34
1
21
36
9
35
30
27
15
38
56
8
41
61
16
26
17
20
2
12
31
5
28
45
18
11
10
69
4
32
76
42
145
55
146
7
88
23
39
63
62
49
64
13
46
14
71
33
40
99
29
73
135
43
108
54
79
94
19
97
67
100
86
3
72
59
50
105
75
78
52
112
118
89
24
117
81
119
127
77
85
92
57
96
53
66
47
91

0.72
0.65
0.64
0.88
0.66
0.63
0.70
0.64
0.65
0.65
0.66
0.63
0.58
0.70
0.62
0.58
0.66
0.65
0.66
0.66
0.77
0.67
0.64
0.75
0.65
0.61
0.66
0.69
0.69
0.56
0.75
0.64
0.56
0.62
0.30
0.59
0.29
0.71
0.54
0.65
0.62
0.57
0.58
0.60
0.57
0.66
0.61
0.66
0.56
0.64
0.62
0.52
0.65
0.56
0.38
0.61
0.49
0.59
0.55
0.53
0.66
0.52
0.57
0.51
0.54
0.76
0.56
0.58
0.60
0.49
0.56
0.56
0.60
0.47
0.43
0.54
0.65
0.44
0.55
0.43
0.40
0.56
0.54
0.53
0.58
0.53
0.60
0.57
0.61
0.53

.017
.025
.031
.015
.016
.041
.040
.029
.039
.023
.014
.034
.047
.040
.035
.069
.035
.037
.029
.014
.040
.037
.031
.035
.023
.043
.037
.045
.041
.053
.029
.029
.062
.037
.037
.054
.046
.033
.057
.050
.052
.052
.048
.041
.053
.040
.042
.049
.049
.040
.056
.063
.046
.056
.056
.041
.061
.051
.055
.064
.061
.058
.049
.062
.055
.048
.057
.054
.049
.071
.053
.054
.042
.035
.072
.059
.037
.081
.057
.044
.069
.056
.058
.075
.055
.056
.045
.055
.056
.051

5
22
33
2
1
21
44
8
6
20
3
11
27
15
7
4
10
46
38
39
34
47
45
19
48
28
35
108
50
23
24
14
66
82
25
53
9
30
84
55
89
40
13
64
60
12
36
17
31
29
122
70
83
91
32
111
78
73
76
88
143
103
67
123
54
116
65
37
43
57
16
77
41
42
107
124
26
87
102
58
61
130
92
59
18
119
51
52
96
94

0.97
0.90
0.85
0.98
0.99
0.90
0.83
0.94
0.94
0.91
0.98
0.94
0.88
0.92
0.94
0.98
0.94
0.83
0.84
0.84
0.85
0.82
0.83
0.91
0.82
0.87
0.84
0.58
0.82
0.90
0.90
0.92
0.75
0.70
0.89
0.81
0.94
0.87
0.70
0.80
0.68
0.84
0.93
0.76
0.77
0.93
0.84
0.91
0.86
0.87
0.51
0.74
0.70
0.68
0.85
0.56
0.71
0.73
0.72
0.69
0.35
0.60
0.75
0.50
0.80
0.54
0.76
0.84
0.83
0.78
0.92
0.72
0.84
0.84
0.59
0.49
0.88
0.69
0.61
0.78
0.77
0.44
0.68
0.78
0.91
0.52
0.82
0.81
0.64
0.66

.641
.629
.635
.646
.637
.632
.624
.626
.635
.626
.631
.631
.630
.637
.634
.639
.632
.631
.622
.631
.631
.628
.631
.650
.634
.627
.641
.632
.627
.627
.634
.631
.633
.628
.631
.634
.636
.628
.628
.629
.635
.637
.637
.637
.635
.640
.633
.639
.631
.633
.621
.630
.630
.629
.634
.637
.634
.628
.628
.630
.633
.626
.630
.634
.627
.638
.627
.632
.637
.638
.635
.617
.639
.638
.635
.626
.644
.630
.639
.640
.624
.627
.637
.633
.648
.628
.637
.647
.624
.626





















































LIBERAL COMPONENTINDEX (LCI)




































































DEMOCRACY REPORT 2024

EGALITARIAN COMPONENTINDEX (ECI)PARTICIPATORY COMPONENTINDEX (PCI)

DELIBERATIVE COMPONENTINDEX (DCI)

COUNTRYRANK

LIBERAL DEMOCRACYINDEX (LDI)
SCORE

SD+/–

RANK

ELECTORAL DEMOCRACYINDEX (EDI)
SCORE

SD+/–

RANK

SCORE

SD+/–

RANK

SCORE

SD+/–

RANK

SCORE

SD+/–

RANK

SCORE

SD+/–

Bolivia
BiH
GuyanaSingapore
Nigeria
Benin
Hungary
KuwaitGuatemalaTunisia
MexicoPhilippines
Niger
India
Ivory Coast
JordanSerbiaMoroccoUkraineSomaliland
Madagascar
LebanonGuinea-Bissau
Zanzibar
ThailandMozambique
UgandaTogo
Pakistan
Iraq
Kyrgyzstan
Mauritania
Burkina Faso
Gabon
Zimbabwe
AngolaMali
Kazakhstan
Palestine/West Bank
Oman
Somalia
Cameroon
Egypt
Hong Kong
DRC
Djibouti
Algeria
Congo
VietnamTürkiye
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Comoros
Libya
CAR
Bangladesh
RwandaLaos
Eswatini
GuineaQatar
Iran
Uzbekistan
UAE
Palestine/Gaza
Haiti
South Sudan
Azerbaijan
RussiaBurundiCuba
Eq. Guinea
Cambodia
Venezuela
Bahrain
Syria
Yemen
Chad
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Tajikistan
China
BelarusTurkmenistan
Afghanistan
Nicaragua
Myanmar
North Korea
Eritrea

91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

0.35
0.35
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.32
0.32
0.31
0.31
0.30
0.30
0.29
0.28
0.28
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.24
0.24
0.23
0.23
0.23
0.22
0.22
0.22
0.21
0.21
0.20
0.18
0.18
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.15
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.13
0.13
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01

.049
.049
.045
.037
.045
.047
.040
.025
.048
.041
.044
.043
.035
.033
.039
.023
.032
.024
.038
.038
.040
.030
.035
.026
.026
.030
.026
.035
.031
.033
.032
.032
.020
.022
.025
.029
.020
.023
.021
.020
.019
.022
.019
.018
.024
.021
.021
.024
.019
.021
.022
.020
.020
.020
.021
.018
.020
.021
.020
.019
.016
.017
.014
.016
.017
.013
.016
.012
.013
.013
.013
.013
.012
.011
.012
.014
.013
.012
.013
.012
.010
.011
.009
.010
.011
.006
.005
.007
.004

72
86
87
107
94
92
100
119
90
98
82
102
108
110
99
134
113
133
105
106
97
112
103
124
125
116
130
104
118
111
115
114
144
123
126
117
139
128
135
156
154
122
148
160
120
137
132
138
162
127
109
129
131
146
121
136
142
168
171
152
173
159
140
172
166
141
165
149
147
150
153
151
145
143
170
164
169
163
179
167
157
177
158
161
176
155
175
174
178

0.59
0.51
0.51
0.40
0.49
0.50
0.44
0.33
0.50
0.47
0.53
0.43
0.39
0.38
0.45
0.26
0.36
0.26
0.42
0.40
0.47
0.36
0.42
0.29
0.29
0.35
0.28
0.42
0.34
0.37
0.36
0.36
0.20
0.29
0.29
0.35
0.23
0.28
0.25
0.17
0.17
0.30
0.19
0.15
0.32
0.25
0.27
0.24
0.15
0.29
0.39
0.28
0.28
0.19
0.30
0.25
0.21
0.13
0.12
0.18
0.09
0.16
0.22
0.10
0.14
0.21
0.14
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.18
0.18
0.20
0.21
0.13
0.15
0.13
0.15
0.01
0.14
0.17
0.07
0.16
0.15
0.07
0.17
0.08
0.08
0.07

.063
.061
.060
.047
.059
.063
.050
.031
.062
.053
.060
.056
.039
.045
.057
.024
.044
.024
.053
.051
.056
.037
.041
.030
.031
.040
.030
.052
.043
.047
.045
.049
.019
.027
.031
.042
.017
.034
.021
.017
.019
.032
.017
.020
.037
.026
.031
.026
.018
.031
.049
.033
.025
.018
.033
.028
.023
.013
.015
.018
.016
.017
.021
.017
.017
.019
.015
.016
.018
.017
.015
.016
.017
.019
.016
.008
.015
.017
.006
.016
.013
.005
.011
.009
.006
.014
.007
.010
.003

110
93
104
73
98
102
89
56
109
108
116
101
99
92
117
75
103
81
113
112
127
111
124
95
97
114
106
126
115
118
121
130
107
122
120
133
125
134
132
119
123
141
129
128
148
139
142
138
131
147
163
149
150
140
155
151
145
136
135
144
137
146
153
143
152
160
154
158
162
164
161
165
168
171
157
159
166
170
156
167
173
169
175
174
172
177
176
178
179

0.53
0.62
0.58
0.74
0.60
0.58
0.67
0.80
0.54
0.56
0.48
0.58
0.60
0.62
0.46
0.73
0.58
0.71
0.50
0.51
0.40
0.53
0.42
0.61
0.60
0.50
0.58
0.41
0.48
0.45
0.43
0.37
0.56
0.43
0.44
0.36
0.41
0.34
0.36
0.44
0.43
0.29
0.39
0.40
0.24
0.30
0.29
0.30
0.37
0.24
0.15
0.24
0.23
0.30
0.19
0.22
0.25
0.31
0.32
0.25
0.31
0.25
0.20
0.27
0.22
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.15
0.14
0.15
0.14
0.13
0.12
0.16
0.15
0.14
0.13
0.18
0.13
0.09
0.13
0.08
0.08
0.10
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.03

.071
.073
.064
.065
.069
.068
.070
.054
.080
.069
.072
.080
.062
.068
.073
.065
.069
.069
.076
.074
.071
.075
.069
.072
.066
.070
.073
.072
.074
.076
.075
.072
.067
.058
.070
.071
.066
.061
.064
.071
.065
.060
.064
.064
.065
.063
.061
.076
.068
.059
.044
.056
.059
.067
.056
.053
.066
.076
.073
.065
.061
.061
.044
.058
.060
.042
.057
.041
.042
.045
.045
.043
.041
.035
.044
.050
.047
.043
.051
.044
.034
.041
.031
.035
.042
.020
.020
.027
.015

94
76
68
39
121
55
82
102
160
35
129
150
88
137
113
104
53
105
77
166
157
118
128
66
126
117
139
84
168
130
99
149
87
81
146
161
90
93
86
103
162
120
152
61
147
112
62
148
73
110
156
115
96
132
165
167
108
135
170
143
144
119
131
124
100
176
179
145
140
158
46
151
169
164
141
175
178
171
133
172
174
154
54
163
177
159
173
153
136

0.60
0.66
0.69
0.81
0.49
0.73
0.63
0.58
0.29
0.81
0.45
0.33
0.61
0.43
0.52
0.57
0.75
0.57
0.65
0.28
0.31
0.50
0.45
0.70
0.47
0.51
0.42
0.63
0.24
0.45
0.58
0.34
0.62
0.63
0.36
0.29
0.61
0.60
0.62
0.58
0.29
0.50
0.32
0.72
0.35
0.53
0.72
0.34
0.66
0.53
0.32
0.52
0.59
0.45
0.28
0.24
0.55
0.44
0.22
0.39
0.38
0.50
0.45
0.49
0.58
0.13
0.08
0.37
0.40
0.31
0.77
0.33
0.22
0.28
0.39
0.17
0.11
0.22
0.45
0.21
0.20
0.32
0.73
0.29
0.11
0.31
0.21
0.32
0.44

.084
.083
.082
.069
.087
.075
.083
.077
.080
.064
.084
.091
.073
.088
.091
.090
.075
.092
.090
.086
.091
.087
.093
.086
.089
.080
.095
.091
.078
.092
.088
.092
.081
.091
.086
.081
.076
.090
.094
.080
.089
.090
.085
.078
.095
.092
.082
.093
.093
.091
.081
.093
.091
.090
.070
.080
.100
.098
.077
.086
.063
.091
.090
.080
.101
.061
.050
.079
.086
.083
.070
.083
.075
.082
.067
.060
.056
.073
.077
.073
.068
.082
.086
.076
.056
.084
.073
.079
.100

37
95
101
167
48
107
65
159
106
82
22
68
51
103
44
147
80
125
60
102
104
111
139
115
133
87
131
110
84
114
130
98
122
74
93
161
58
144
121
132
152
153
158
168
126
128
156
83
70
124
113
134
90
116
142
143
123
129
151
120
177
175
162
173
138
150
155
171
136
160
154
172
137
109
170
166
157
140
174
149
164
169
163
176
178
148
141
165
179

0.63
0.53
0.51
0.13
0.61
0.49
0.57
0.19
0.49
0.55
0.65
0.57
0.60
0.51
0.61
0.28
0.55
0.41
0.58
0.51
0.50
0.47
0.34
0.46
0.39
0.54
0.39
0.48
0.54
0.46
0.39
0.52
0.42
0.56
0.53
0.18
0.58
0.30
0.42
0.39
0.25
0.25
0.21
0.13
0.40
0.40
0.23
0.55
0.56
0.42
0.47
0.38
0.53
0.45
0.31
0.30
0.42
0.39
0.25
0.42
0.04
0.08
0.17
0.10
0.36
0.26
0.23
0.12
0.38
0.18
0.24
0.11
0.37
0.48
0.12
0.14
0.22
0.34
0.09
0.28
0.16
0.12
0.16
0.06
0.03
0.28
0.31
0.15
0.03

.047
.054
.064
.051
.040
.064
.060
.058
.063
.062
.056
.055
.055
.059
.049
.072
.058
.071
.051
.061
.068
.067
.057
.079
.088
.055
.068
.067
.057
.069
.070
.076
.073
.056
.057
.059
.056
.069
.076
.070
.061
.068
.050
.056
.070
.072
.063
.066
.054
.061
.062
.069
.062
.074
.062
.069
.078
.054
.096
.074
.035
.046
.055
.054
.091
.058
.050
.041
.050
.068
.082
.044
.059
.066
.064
.057
.058
.066
.048
.081
.054
.053
.052
.035
.025
.049
.072
.034
.027

115
90
138
69
98
120
142
95
127
62
113
68
56
101
49
86
125
74
63
121
131
93
133
80
144
110
85
71
118
105
141
112
81
117
114
140
75
128
135
156
72
152
146
165
97
136
132
109
99
160
150
100
126
79
139
148
106
163
166
154
134
162
129
149
157
104
173
169
158
159
147
171
161
174
155
175
164
145
151
167
168
137
176
177
172
179
153
178
170

0.54
0.68
0.38
0.74
0.61
0.52
0.36
0.66
0.46
0.77
0.54
0.75
0.79
0.61
0.82
0.69
0.49
0.73
0.76
0.51
0.44
0.67
0.40
0.70
0.34
0.56
0.69
0.74
0.53
0.59
0.37
0.55
0.70
0.53
0.54
0.37
0.72
0.45
0.39
0.20
0.73
0.23
0.30
0.17
0.63
0.39
0.43
0.56
0.61
0.20
0.26
0.61
0.48
0.70
0.37
0.30
0.59
0.18
0.16
0.22
0.39
0.19
0.44
0.28
0.20
0.60
0.08
0.12
0.20
0.20
0.30
0.10
0.19
0.07
0.21
0.06
0.18
0.33
0.25
0.16
0.15
0.38
0.04
0.04
0.09
0.03
0.22
0.04
0.11

.628
.631
.639
.636
.622
.623
.622
.648
.627
.624
.626
.635
.636
.623
.629
.631
.637
.626
.632
.633
.634
.632
.635
.642
.632
.622
.625
.623
.637
.636
.619
.646
.621
.633
.624
.632
.630
.634
.666
.624
.632
.641
.623
.629
.663
.627
.627
.637
.633
.630
.632
.629
.629
.632
.645
.628
.627
.638
.649
.632
.621
.652
.626
.631
.651
.636
.642
.629
.641
.639
.627
.640
.631
.628
.631
.635
.629
.622
.642
.641
.628
.629
.646
.648
.653
.641
.637
.638
.627

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













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

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

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







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




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LIBERAL COMPONENTINDEX (LCI)

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

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
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












































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

63

Global Standards,
Local Knowledge

V-Dem Regional Centers
The Regional Centers aim to further enhance regional researchand the involvement of regional s­ cholars in the V-Dem Project

Balkans

Central Asia

East Asia

Eastern Europe& Russia

Latin America

North America

Southern Africa

Southern Europe

Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
Sprängkullsgatan 19, PO 711
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contact@v-dem.net+46 (0) 31 786 30 43
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