Explaining European Integration:
The contribution from Historians

Wilfried LOTH

Normally historians are not expected to develop theories. Their purview is the facts, thedetails, the particular course of events, the many deviations from the norm. Detractors assertthat historians merely have to go into the archives in order to find evidence for the theories ofpolitical scientists; this, so they claim, is the appropriate division of labour between thedisciplines. If one wants to put it less problematically, one could say that historians are to
pursue detailed case studies and upon this foundation the actual social scientists then erect
their explanatory theories. 1 Making use of available information on developments anddecision-making processes, historians take upon themselves the review of theories, and it is
one of the secret pleasures of their profession to cause mighty theoretical edifices to tumble in
the face of incontrovertible facts.

At the same time, there are also productive links between historians and theory
discussions in a double sense: on the one hand, historians continually work with theories,
attempting to search among the full range of facts for the essential ones and establish links
between them. The selection of what is essential to consider as well as the reconstruction oflinks depend on theoretical presuppositions –independently of whether the historian is awareof them or not. Thus, even those historians who are outspokenly opposed to theory in theirworks are themselves influenced by theory. 2 Even more important is the fact that the results
reached by historians not only disprove theoretical presuppositions but also offer explanations
themselves. These explanations focus above all on the individual case being investigated but
they can also be generalized, approaching theoretical pronouncements more closely as the1

This is the tendency of the contributions in P.G. LAUREN (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in
History, Theory, and Policy, Free Press, New York, 1979; and M.G. FRY, History and International Studies,
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC, 1987. For an organized dialogue between
diplomatic historians and political scientists, see C. ELMAN, M.F. ELMAN, Diplomatic History andInternational Relations Theory. Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries, in: International Security,
1(Summer 1997), pp.5-21; as well as the subsequent contributions to the debate by J.S. LEVY, St.H. HABER,
D.M. KENNEDY, St.D. KRASNER, A.L. GEORGE, Ed. INGRAM, P.W. SCHROEDER, and J.L. GADDIS,
pp.22-85.
2
Cf. the articles in: J. KOCKA, Th. NIPPERDEY (eds.), Theorie und Erzählung in der Geschichte,
Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, München, 1979.

2
subject of the investigation is more fully grasped. The willingness to undertake suchcomprehensive presentations varies among historians, as does the ability to do so successfully.
The tendency of historians’ work is toward comprehensive pronouncements, however. 3

The Development of Integration Historiography

Historians have been dealing with European integration for some time and continue to do soto an increasing extent. The beginnings of European integration historiography reach back to
the 1960s. These efforts were strongly characterized by a focus on intellectual history and, toan extent, on universal history as well; the interest focussed on the development from theEuropean idea to the United States of Europe as a new epoch in the history of the oldcontinent after the catastrophes of two world wars. At the end of the 1970s and beginning of
the 1980s, researchers began taking a diplomatic history approach as well with the opening ofstate archives, which in the member states of the European Union normally occurs after thirty
years’ time; this thirty-year-rule applies also to EU organs and most other European
institutions. 4 In the analysis of government records, research was primarily directed toward
the foreign policy of the individual member states. The interest of historians in the European
theme grew to the extent that this national foreign policy evolved towards a European
integration policy after the Second World War. Since the late 1980s, there have also been
approaches based on social history and the history of mentalities. These contribute to broaden
the chronological and perspective frameworks of research emphasized by diplomatic history,
and in a certain sense, they linked up with the early universal history approaches developedby Geoffrey Barraclough, Rolf Hellmut Foerster, Helmut Gollwitzer and others. 5

3

The history of European integration can be regarded as a part of the field of “international history.” On
that field, cf. W. LOTH, J. OSTERHAMMEL (eds.), Internationale Geschichte. Themen - Ergebnisse Aussichten, Oldenbourg, München, 2000.
4
Initial overviews of publications of records and archival collections are offered by W. LIPGENS (ed.),Sources for the History of European Integration (1945-1955). A Guide to Archives in the Countries of theCommunity, Springer Verlag Leiden, 1980; and M. PETER, H.-J. SCHRÖDER, Einführung in das Studium der
Zeitgeschichte, UTB, Paderborn, 1994, pp.205-254. Regarding opportunities to use archives: Archivführer der
Außenministerien der Mitgliedsstaaten und der Institutionen der Europäischen Union, 2. Auflage, Amt fürVeröffentlichungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Luxemburg, 1997.
5
See H. DUCHARDT, et al. (eds.), Europa-Historiker. Ein biographisches Handbuch, 3 vols.,
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2006-2007. For an overview of the development of integration
historiography up to the beginning of the 1990s, see the contributions in: Lettre d'Information des Historiens del'Europe Contemporaine, 1-2(June 1992); and C. WURM, Early European Integration as a Research Field:
Perspectives, Debates, Problems, in: C. WURM (ed.), Western Europe and Germany. The Beginnings ofEuropean Integration 1945-1960, Berg Publisher, Oxford and Washington, DC, 1995, pp.9-26; P. GERBET, La

3In the process, historical research on integration has become Europeanized andinternationalized. Given the national composition of the historians’ guild and its close links tonational history, this development was by no means an obvious one; for that reason, we needto point out the moderating function of the European Liaison Committee of Historians, which
publishes the Journal of European Integration History. After preliminary work undertaken by
Walter Lipgens as the first professor for integration history at the European University
Institute in Florence from 1976 to 1979, this committee was created in 1982 at a conference in
Luxemburg as an association of leading integration historians from the member states of theEuropean Community who worked with the European Commission in Brussels while
maintaining their scholarly independence.

The members of this Liaison Committee regard it as their task to coordinate research
into the history of European integration, to make the results of research known beyond
national borders, to encourage the examination of source materials, to call attention to gaps inresearch, and to promote exchanges among historians working on integration. To these ends,
they regularly hold international conferences gathering and advancing research on a particulartime period in integration history. The first conference, which took place in November 1984
in Strasbourg, dealt with the beginnings of European integration from 1948 to 1950; 6 thetenth conference in October of 2005 in Groningen dealt with the breakthrough towards a“second Europe”, from The Hague Summit in December of 1969 to the Paris Summit Meetingin December of 1974. 7 At an eleventh conference in Rome in March of 2007, an assessment
was made of research on integration history up to the present. 8
France et l'intégration européenne. Essai d'historiographie, Peter Lang, Berlin, 1995; A. VARSORI, La
storiografia sull’integrazione europea, in: Europa 10, 1(2001), pp.69-93.
6
Cf. R. POIDEVIN (ed.), Histoire des débuts de la construction européenne (mars 1948-mai 1950),
Bruylant/Nomos, Bruxelles/Baden-Baden, 1986.
7
Cf. J. VAN DER HARST (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union. The European Community’s Quest forCompletion, Deepening and Enlargement, 1969-1975, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007. Further conference volumes
are K. SCHWABE (ed.), Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans 1950/51, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1988; E. SERRA(ed.), Il rilancio dell'Europa e i trattati di Roma, Giuffrè, Milano, 1989; G. TRAUSCH (ed.), Die Europäische
Integration vom Schuman-Plan bis zu den Verträgen von Rom, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1993; M. DUMOULIN(ed.), Plans des temps de guerre pour l'Europe d'après-guerre 1940-1947, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1995; G.
TRAUSCH (ed.), Le rôle et la place des petits pays en Europe au XXe siècle, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005; A.
DEIGHTON, A.S. MILWARD (eds.), Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic
Community 1957-1963, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1999; W. LOTH (ed.), Crises and Compromises: The European
Project 1963-1969, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2000, M.-Th. BISCH, G. BOSSUAT (eds.), L’Europe unie etl’Afrique. De l’idée d’Eurafrique à la Convention de Lomé I, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005; A. VARSORI (ed.),Inside the European Community. Actors and Policies in European integration, 1957-1972, Nomos, BadenBaden, 2006.
8
Work is currently underway on the publication of the papers of this colloquium.

4

The activities of the Liaison Committee are supplemented by a series of othernetworks. Especially worthy to be mentioned is the research group “European Identity in the
Twentieth Century”, initiated in 1988 by René Girault and currently led by Robert Frank, whoholds the chair in the history of international relations at the University of Paris I. This
organization links together a large number of historians who examine the development of thementalities of Europeans in the twentieth century. No fewer than 180 historians have so far
participated in work groups and international colloquia in order to share their research on thedevelopment of Europeans’ mentalities and perceptions.9 Additionally, the integration history
research seminar at the European University Institute in Florence has been and continues to beimportant for the formation of a “European” school of integration historians. This seminar has
at various times been led by Walter Lipgens, Richard Griffith, Alan Milward, and Pascaline
Winand. Lastly, doctoral candidates dealing with the history of European integration havecome together in their own networks: the History of European Integration Research Society(HEIRS) and the Réseau International des jeunes Chercheurs en Histoire de l’Intégration
Européenne (RICHIE). 10 Most historians are linked together by several of these networks.

Thus, historical research has become “European” in its study of the history of
integration - at least in the sense that there is cooperation beyond national borders and that
there are no distinct “national” schools of historical writing on Europe. Due to language
barriers, mutual familiarity with research in various countries still fails to come up to
expectations; the discussions are, however, carried on internationally with the inclusion ofsome American specialists but centred on a British-French-German triangle. There are signs
too that people are learning from one another with regard to methods and the framing ofquestions. Thus, cooperation among historians of Europe has had effects on the field ofhistory in general. It plays a key role in the Europeanization of contemporary history andcontributes to the rise of a “Europe of historians”. 11

9

An overview of the results of the first phase of the project is given by R. GIRAULT (ed.), Identité etconscience européennes au XXe siècle, Hachette, Paris, 1994. For the second phase, cf. R. FRANK (ed.), Les
identités européennes au XXe siècle, Ed de la Sorbonne, Paris, 2004.
10
The contributions to the gatherings in Paris and Copenhagen are found in: L. WARLOUZET, K.
RÜCKER (eds.), Quelle Europe? / Which Europe?: Nouvelles Approches en Histoire de l'Intégration
Européenne, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2006; M. RASMUSSEN, A.-Ch. KNUDSEN, J. POULSEN (eds.), The
Road to a United Europe - Interpretations of the Process of European Integration, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2007.
11
Cf. R. GIRAULT, Das Europa der Historiker, in: R. HUDEMANN, H. KAELBLE, K. SCHWABE(eds.), Europa im Blick der Historiker (Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft 21), Oldenbourg, München, 1995, pp.5590.

5

The Model of the Four Driving Forces

What are the main results of this research so far? To present them in a coherent way it seems
to me useful to use a model which I have developed on the base of my own work. 12 It ischaracterized by the view that regarding the functional deficit of nation-states which have led
to the steps toward integration, there are several problem areas to be distinguished, which,firstly, can be of different degrees of urgency and, secondly, can also call for different
solutions. It seems sensible to me to distinguish among four types of problems from which
there result driving forces for European integration. Two of them are old and have acquired
new urgency due to technological development in the twentieth century; the other two emerge
directly from this development. 13

The first problem is that of preserving peace among sovereign states - or in otherwords, the problem of overcoming anarchy among states. This constitutes the essential motiveof the European unification plans of earlier centuries, from Dante to Immanuel Kant andVictor Hugo. The urgency of this problem has grown dramatically due to the development ofmodern military technology in the twentieth century. The vast increase in the number ofcasualties, the amount of human suffering, and economic destruction has strengthened calls
for institutions capable of securing peace, especially during and after the catastrophes of thetwo world wars. Thereafter, the danger of nuclear destruction and self destruction and theemergence of new nationalisms after the end of the East-West Bloc structure have accentuatedthis problem in new ways.

Secondly, the German question must be seen as a special aspect of the preservation ofpeace. This problem too is older than the twentieth century but has become more pressing
12

Cf. W. LOTH, Sozialismus und Internationalismus. Die französischen Sozialisten und die
Nachkriegsordnung Europas 1940-1950, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1977; W. LIPGENS and W.
LOTH (eds.), Documents on the History of European Integration, vol.3: The Struggle for European Union by
Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries, 1945-1950, De Gruyter, Berlin/New
York, 1988; vol.4: Transnational Organizations of Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Struggle forEuropean Union, 1945-1950, De Gruyter, Berlin/New York, 1990; W. LOTH, Der Weg nach Europa.
Geschichte der europäischen Integration 1939-1957, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1990, 3rd ed.: 1996.
13
Formulated for the first time in: W. LOTH, Der Prozeß der europäischen Integration: Antriebskräfte,Entscheidungen, Perspektiven, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 46(1995), pp.703-714; an updated version in:
Jahrbuch für europäische Geschichte, 1(2000), pp.17-30. Cf. idem., Identity and Statehood in the Process ofEuropean Integration, in: Journal of European Integration History, 1(2000), pp.19-31.

6with the development of industrial society in Europe. For reasons of population and economic
power, a German nation-state in the centre of Europe constituted and constitutes a latent threat
to the independence of its neighbours. This resulted in a vicious circle of encirclement andexpansion, which could only be broken by integrating the Germans together with theirneighbours into a larger community. To have understood this after two calamitous turns ofthat vicious circle is undoubtedly one of the great achievements of the Europeans in thesecond half of the twentieth century.

Economics in a narrower sense can be characterized as the third functional deficit: it
became increasingly clear that the national markets in Europe were too small for rational
production methods. Their mutual walling-off was only sensible on a temporary basis anddepending on the specific production sector; in the long term, this threatened to result in a lossof productivity and consequently also a loss of the state’s legitimacy.

This was linked, fourthly, to a loss of power and competitiveness vis-à-vis larger state
units, as the US in economic and political terms, and as the Soviet Union in military terms.
Thus, self-assertion in the face of the new world powers became an additional motive ofEuropean unification policies. Depending on one’s perception, it was either defence against
American hegemony or against Soviet expansion that stood in the foreground. It was often thecase that both were pursued simultaneously: the preservation of the Europeans’ freedom ofaction in an alliance with the US.

These four motives have not always been equally strong, and they have not always
worked in the same direction. Hence, it was the case that the need for self-assertion and theunresolved German question made an association of Western Europe after the Second World
War seem quite appropriate; regarding the goal of preserving peace, however, it became
problematic. The common necessity for unification stood against very different sensitivities
and needs of the participating states, the overarching interest in a common market contrasted
the very different economic needs of individual states as well as different interests ofindividual production sectors. European policy thus could not be a unified policy; it always
was embedded and continues to be embedded in conflicts among different conceptions oforder and interests at the European level.

7
Steps towards Integration and their Consequences

The German question in the context of the Cold War reveals itself as decisive for the creationof the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the core of supranational community
building in Europe in 1950-51. This motive was augmented by a certain amount of selfassertion and reinsurance towards the US as the leading power - both in the context of thegrowing significance of economic potential for one’s international power position, which
Guido Thiemeyer has also pointed out in his study of the beginnings of European agricultural
policy. 14 After worries about a split between East and West had initially prevented many
Europeans from promoting unification plans restricted to the Western hemisphere, such plans
seemed to be an indispensable prerequisite for winning back freedom of action after theSoviets rejected the Marshall aid in the summer of 1947. At the same time, a framework wasneeded for the long-term inclusion of the West Germans, who became indispensable allies
now. The French initiative in the summer of 1948 that led to the founding of the Council ofEurope intended indeed such a structure. This was clearly not successful due to British
hesitancy, and so a second attempt became necessary. What was actually new in Robert
Schuman’s proposal of 9th May 1950 for a coal and steel union was his willingness to begin
supranational unification without the participation of Great Britain; he thereby secured thesuccess of the second French attempt at pursuing European policy. 15

The European Defence Community (EDC), another integration project which was
proposed even before the end of the negotiations over the coal and steel union, failed due tothe impossibility of reconciling the respective goals of the participants. The Netherlands
wanted the creation of a common market as a condition for the initiative, but the French said
themselves unprepared for that. Thus, the idea of giving the EDC a strong supranationalframework - the European Political Community - disintegrated; the French public thereby saw
itself confronted with an amount of German resurgence, which was very difficult to accept.

14

Likewise G. THIEMEYER, Vom "Pool Vert" zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Europäische
Integration, Kalter Krieg und die Anfänge der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Agrarpolitik 1950-1957, Oldenbourg,
München, 1999.
15
Cf. W. LOTH, Sozialismus und Internationalismus …, op.cit.; R. POIDEVIN (ed.), Histoire des débuts …,
op.cit.; idem., Robert Schuman …, op.cit.; K. SCHWABE (ed.), Die Anfänge …, op.cit.; U. LAPPENKÜPER,Der Schuman-Plan. Mühsamer Durchbruch zur deutsch-französischen Verständigung, in: Vierteljahrshefte fürZeitgeschichte, 42(1994), pp.403-445; A. WILKENS (ed.), Le Plan Schuman dans l’Histoire. Intérêts nationaux
et projet européen, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2004. On Jean Monnet as "father of the Schuman Plan", see E.
ROUSSEL, Jean Monnet, Fayard, Paris, 1996; and G. BOSSUAT, A. WILKENS (eds.), Jean Monnet, l'Europe
et les chemins de la Paix, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 1999.

8
The integration framework as a means of controlling the German contribution to defence thengave way to the American presence in Europe and the prospect of a French nuclear force;
integration into NATO took the place of a projected European integration. 16
Given this background, the Treaties of Rome signed on 25th March 1957 constituted an
attempt to salvage what was possible of the European project after the debacle of theEuropean Defence Community - by means of concentrating on a compromise acceptable to allparticipants in extremis. It rested on France’s acceptance of the economic community
demanded by the Netherlands - admittedly, only in the distant future and to be achieved innumerous stages – while France’s European partners swallowed the idea of creating a
European nuclear community, a prospect which no one besides French technocrats foundattractive. Decisive for the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) was thelasting conviction that there was a need to integrate the Germans better and to have greater
autonomy vis-à-vis the Americans. This led Guy Mollet on the French side and Konrad
Adenauer on the German side to make compromises which in the light of their respective
economic interests could hardly be justified. The European Economic Community was thus
primarily a political construction, even if that was hardly ever stated publicly. 17

The fact that the Community of the Six was able to prove itself and expand is therefore
largely due to its growing economic attractiveness. Even in its rudimentary beginnings with
the Six, the Common Market demonstrated that it was an instrument of socially acceptable
increase of productivity, something, which soon seemed indispensable and which became
attractive for an increasing number of candidates for membership. It was economics morethan the interest in European self-assertion that compelled Great Britain to enter; approval of
its accession after long resistance was the price France had to pay for the completion of the
agricultural market and the prospect of deepening the Community. 18 With the entry of Britain,
Ireland, and Denmark in 1973, the Common Market further increased in economic

16

G. TRAUSCH, Europäische Integration …, op.cit.; W. LOTH, Die EVG und das Projekt derEuropäischen Politischen Gemeinschaft, in: R. HUDEMANN, H. KAELBLE, K. SCHWABE (eds.), Europa im
Blick …, op.cit., pp.191-201; R. MAGAGNOLI, Italien und die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft.
Zwischen europäischem Credo und nationaler Machtpolitik, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1999; D. PREDA,
Alcide De Gasperi, federalista europeo, Mulino, Bologna, 2004.
17
E. SERRA (ed.), Il rilancio …, op.cit.; W. LOTH, Deutsche und französische Interessen auf dem Weg
zu EWG und Euratom, in: A. WILKENS (ed.), Die deutsch-französischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 1945-1960,
Thorbecke,, Sigmaringen, 1991, pp.178-187; G. THIEMEYER, op.cit.
18
Cf. N.P. LUDLOW, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist
Challenge, Routledge, London and New York, 2006.

9
significance and weight. At the same time, more and more domains of economic activity
wound up in the realm of common regulation. Even if one may not speak of a direct andirreversible development toward ever stronger integration - as the functionalist theory of
integration would like to suggest - it is a fact that more and more political and social actors
have made use of the European dimension to pursue their various goals.

This process was disrupted by a lack of agreement on the political goals that lay
behind the development of the Community. With regard to the role that the European
Community was to play within the Western Alliance, views diverged greatly; only a few wereprepared to accept Charles de Gaulle’s conception of a European defence community armed
with nuclear weapons within the framework of the Western Alliance. 19 Severe crises resulted
from this, which could only be overcome with great effort.20 Divergent political interests andwaning awareness of the political dimension of European construction finished by reducing
the willingness to compromise on contentious economic issues as well. The search forcompromise thereby became an arduous business, and the Community repeatedly failed todevelop into a world political actor. The political artistry of a Willy Brandt and a Georges
Pompidou was sufficient to get the “Europe of the Nine” underway; the ability to act in thepolitical realm was not achieved, however - essentially due to French mistrust of German
efforts toward reunification. 21 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt had to content
themselves with pragmatic steps toward further development of the Community. 22

Behind the impetus toward integration initiated in 1985-86 by the Single European Act(SEA), there stood - as far as François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl were concerned - the oldpolitical goals which had brought together Schuman and Adenauer: integration of the
19
Along with G.-H. SOUTOU, L'alliance incertaine …, op.cit., cf. also W. LOTH, De Gaulle und Europa.
Eine Revision, in: Historische Zeitschrift 253(1991), pp.629-660; M. VAÏSSE, La grandeur. Politique étrangère
du général de Gaulle 1958-1969, Fayard, Paris, 1998.
20
Cf. A. DEIGHTON, A.S. MILWARD, Widening …, op.cit.; W. LOTH, Crises …, op.cit.; M.
KOOPMANN, Das schwierige Bündnis. Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen und die Außenpolitik der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1958-1965, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2000. On the “empty chair crisis” of 1965, seealso W. LOTH, W. WALLACE, W. WESSELS (eds.), Walter Hallstein: The Forgotten European? Europa
Union, London/New York, 1998; J.-M. PALAYRET, H. WALLACE, P. WINAND (eds.), Visions, Votes andVetoes. The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years on, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2006;
N.P. LUDLOW, The European Community …, op.cit., pp.40-124.
21
Cf. C. HIEPEL, Willy Brandt – Georges Pompidou et la gouvernance européenne, in: W. LOTH (ed.),La gouvernance supranationale dans la construction européenne, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005, pp.163-183.
22
Cf. E. GUASCONI, L’Europa tra continuità e cambiamento: Il vertice dell’Aja del 1969 e il rilanciodella costruzione europea, Edizioni Polistampa, Firenze, 2004; F. KNIPPING, M. SCHÖNWALD (eds.),
Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung 1969-1984, Wissenschaftlicher Verlag,
Trier, 2004; M. WEINACHTER, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et l’Allemagne. Le double rêve inachevé, Harmattan,
Paris, 2004.

10
Germans and self-assertion in world politics. 23 The idea of constructing a politicalCommunity was clearly still very foreign to the newcomers of 1973, Britain, Denmark, andIreland; they only signed the compromise because they hoped to improve the performance of
the European economies in the face of Japanese competition. Additionally, Margaret Thatcher
aspired to overcome vested rights in the social welfare state which could not be directly
eliminated at the national level 24 through deregulation on the European level.

The European Community was nevertheless relatively well equipped when new tasks
fell to it in the wake of the end of the East-West conflict and the collapse of the Soviet empire.
It was able to - or had to - take over functions to ensure order on the European continent that
had previously been the purview of the superpowers and their blocs. Among these wereintensified efforts to bind the Germans after Germany had been reunified and the Four-Power
responsibilities for the country had ended. There was also the fact that the Community
suddenly became partly responsible for the restructuring of the former Eastern Bloc countries.
At the same time, the political barriers which had formerly kept the neutral countries of theEuropean Free Trade Association (EFTA) from joining a body more effective for the pursuitof economic modernization now faded away.

The new tasks can explain why, with the end of the Cold War, the Community not
only did not break apart - as was feared by many who had too one-sidedly identified theSoviet threat as the main reason for the association’s existence - but instead actually tookfurther significant steps towards integration. The spillover effect played only a limited role inthe completion of the internal market, the introduction of the common currency, and thecommitment to enter new political realms; decisive in each case for the implementation of all
this was insight into the whole political context. The acceptance of new integrative steps wasmade easier because, with the end of the East-West division, the ambivalence of the European
project regarding the peace question disappeared. 25
23

Cf. E. GADDUM, Die deutsche Europapolitik in den 80er Jahren. Interessen, Konflikte und
Entscheidungen der Regierung Kohl, Schöningh, Paderborn, 1994; G. SAUNIER, Le tandem François
Mitterrand – Helmut Kohl. Une gouvernance franco-allemande symbolique?, in: W. LOTH, Gouvernance …,
op.cit., pp.239-254.
24
Cf. H. YOUNG, One of Us. A Biography of Margaret Thatcher, Macmillan, London, 1989; idem., The
Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe From Churchill to Blair, Humanities Press, London, 1998.
25
Historians have not systematically investigated developments since 1989-90, however. For initial
analyses upon which I base my theses here, cf. W. KOWALSKY, Projekt Europa. Die Zukunft der europäischen
Integration, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 1997; D. ROMETSCH, Die Rolle und Funktionsweise derEuropäischen Kommission in der Ära Delors, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1999; K. DYSON, The Road to
Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999; W. WOYKE,

11

The Way to a European Society

Reference to the different driving forces of European integration also explains why certain
methods of integration have been successful whereas others did not work. In the light of thedifferent ways to consider a united Europe, there was always a broad majority amongst themember states of the Community of the Six for a fundamental commitment to a united
Europe; at the same time, however, there was never unambiguous support for any form ofEuropean unification which was actually feasible. A similar situation may well apply to thelarger European Union; in any event, this must be more fully investigated. The discrepancy
between what is desired and what is actually achievable in European integration explains firstof all the outstanding significance of individual personalities in the European integration
policy decision process, from Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer to Jacques Delors andHelmut Kohl. Given the ambivalence of public opinion, strong leaders could set the course,
bypass the routine of the bureaucratic apparatus via a direct contact with partners, and commit
majorities to their projects. Secondly, these figures explain why with the coal and steel union
and the Treaties of Rome, a form of integration could succeed that put little value on citizen
participation and withdrew integrated political spheres from public discussion. Only by
allowing the implications to remain unclear was it possible to avoid having negative coalitions
derail the always controversial steps on integration.

Thirdly, it becomes clear in this context why the so-called democratic deficit has in themeantime emerged as the most pressing problem of the European Community: in the light ofthe expansion of the Community’s competence and the resulting increase in regulation,
majority decisions in the twilight of various ministerial council formations, negotiations
within Coreper, and the low democratic legitimacy of the Commission are no longer
acceptable in the eyes of citizens, independently of the pronouncements of constitutional
jurists on the subject who refer to the nation-state model. The technocratic detour to Europe,
first embarked upon by Jean Monnet in 1950 and successfully continued over many years,
most recently once again in the launching of the Maastricht programme, doesn’t work any
Deutsch-französische Beziehungen seit der Wiedervereinigung. Das Tandem faßt wieder Tritt, Leske & Budrich,
Opladen, 2000; P. LUDLOW, The Making of the New Europe: the European Councils in Brussels and
Copenhagen 2002, Eurocomment, Brussels, 2005; M. RAMBOUR, Les réformes institutionnelles dans l’Union
Européenne avant et après Nice, in: W. LOTH, Gouvernance …, op.cit., pp.283-308.

12longer, as the fierce public debates about the Maastricht Treaty and the difficulties at the
moment of its ratification have made clear. With the blocking of the treaty on a European
constitution, this has become completely evident. 26

The findings on the societal dimension of European integration are supported by theobservations on the European social structure compiled by Hartmut Kaelble. According to
Kaelble, European societies in the twentieth century feature many commonalities “in which
they differentiate themselves very clearly from American, Japanese, and Soviet society”. 27
Among these factors are family structure, employment structure, company structure, social
mobility, social inequality, urban development, social security, and regulation of work
conflicts. In all these spheres, European societies have become increasingly similar, especiallysince the Second World War and also beyond the crisis years of the European Community. At
the same time, a “gradual reorientation of the Western Europeans” has taken place: “awayfrom exclusively national perspectives toward more consciousness of the whole European
situation and identity”. 28

Recently, Kaelble has extended his observations to the subjective dimension of social
integration in Europe. He reports on a discourse about European civilization developed since
the late eighteenth century and which since the 1960s has been characterized by a new
European self-confidence that lacks the earlier claims of superiority. At the same time, heoutlines the gradual development – or better, structural change – of a European public sphere.
He differentiates between three phases: the classical era of the public sphere that consisted ofsmall intellectual and liberal circles in the age of Enlightenment, which included lively
exchanges among intellectuals and scholars across national borders; the era of a national mass
public sphere accompanied by exchanges among experts at international congresses and byinternational political movements; and lastly, since the Second World War, the period ofchanges ushered in by mass media, supranational institutions, an intensified debate about

26

Cf. Wilfried LOTH, ”Mise en perspective historique de la constitution européenne,” in: idem.,
Gouvernance (fn. 38), pp. 339-371 ; idem., ”Die Verfassung für Europa in historischer Perspektive,” in: idem.
(ed.), Europäische Gesellschaft. Grundlagen und Perspektiven, Wiesbaden, 2005, pp.244-264.
27
H. KAELBLE, Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft. Eine Sozialgeschichte Westeuropas
1880-1980, C.H. Beck, München, 1987, p.149.
28
Ibid., p.157. Cf. too the detailed findings on the Franco-German relationship in: H. KAELBLE,
Nachbarn am Rhein. Entfremdung und Annäherung der französischen und deutschen Gesellschaft seit 1880, C.H.
Beck, München, 1991; idem., Europäische Vielfalt und der Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft, in: S.
HRADIL, S. IMMERFALL (eds.), Die westeuropäischen Gesellschaften im Vergleich, Leske & Budrich,
Opladen, 1997, pp.27-68; idem., Sozialgeschichte Europas, C.H. Beck, München, 2007.

13
European themes since the 1980s, as well as the gradual strengthening of the European
Parliament and European civil rights. 29

Studies under the auspices of the identity project led by René Girault and Robert Franksignal a strengthening of the consensus regarding Europeans’ conception of political values.
Since the middle of the 1980s, the European Community has been understood more and moreas a community of values committed to pluralism and democratic freedoms, the rule of law,human rights, and the protection of minorities. To that extent, a common constitutional
inheritance has arisen from the discussions of recent decades and has resulted in aconstitutional patriotism at the European level. 30 This European patriotism, which is based on
a commitment to a system of values rather than on an emotional affinity, is compatible withnational patriotism. In times of dynamic change, it even contributes to the stabilizing of
national patriotisms, informed as they are by different historical experiences, different
languages, and different cultures. In this regard, one can certainly speak of European identity
in the singular. This is certainly not a particularistic conception of identity but instead auniversal one which respects national identities and national achievements. 31

The results of research on the history of mentalities and social history correspond very
well with the implicit consensus which I see in research on political history. It must be
acknowledged, however, that the work done thus far on social integration and thedevelopment of European identity is not more than a preliminary sketch, having developed
into a substantial picture only at a few points. 32 Research on European integration policy and“la construction européenne”, as my French colleagues aptly term it, based on archival
evidence has progressed in detail only up to the mid-1970s. We know only very little about

29

H. KAELBLE, Europäer über Europa. Die Entstehung des modernen europäischen
Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Campus, Frankfurt am Main/New York, 2001; idem.,Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert, Campus, Frankfurt am Main/New York,
2002.
30
Siehe V. CONSTANINESCO, Le rôle du Conseil européen dans la formation d'une identité
européenne, in: M.-Th. BITSCH, W. LOTH, R. POIDEVIN (eds.), Institutions européennes et identités
européennes, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1998, pp.435-447; J. GERKRATH, La Cour de Justice des Communautés
européennes, la constitutionnalisation du traité de Rome et son impact sur l'émergence d'une identité
européenne, ibid., pp.451-474; ibem., L'émergence d'un droit constitutionnel dans l'Europe. Modes de formation
et sources d'inspiration des Communautés et de l'Union européenne, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1997.
31
Cf. W. LOTH, Nationale Interessen, Supranationalität und europäische Identität in historischer
Perspektive, in: Ch. GAAITANIDES, S. KADELBACH, and G.C. RODRIGUEZ IGLESIAS (eds.), Europa undseine Verfassung. Festschrift für Martin Zuleeg, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005, pp.59-71.
32
Cf. M.-Th. BITSCH, W. LOTH, Ch. BARTHEL (eds.), Cultures politiques, opinions publiques etintégration européenne, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007.

14
decision-making processes since that time; we can only speculate as to how they fit with thesocietal and mental shifts mentioned above.

Prospects for Integration Research

Indications as to where the emphasis in future historical research will lie are beginning tobecome clearer. In my view, special attention should be paid to the role of personalities, notonly of the founding fathers but also of the many figures who have not been at the centre of
public interest up to this point: Sicco Mansholt, Maurice Faure, 33 Guy Mollet, 34 Walter
Hallstein, Edward Heath, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Helmut Schmidt, and François
Mitterrand 35 to name just a few. 36 Likewise, we need a more systematic examination of thevarious conceptions of Europe, their respective weights, and their development, especiallybeyond the original core Community. 37 Then there is also the necessity to analyze the effectsof the actual existing Community on conceptions of Europe and Europe policy — not in thesense of a functionalist spillover, for which there is only limited historical evidence, but rather
in regard to changes in the conceptualization of problems resulting from those effects. The
public sphere, identities, and methods of government have changed with the expansion of theEuropean Union; all that must be systematically examined as well. It is my hope that themodel of the four driving forces can be made dynamic in this way and thus also become
somewhat more systematized.

From the findings of the historians, the relationship of between democratic legitimacy
and efficiency in political decision-making will be in my opinion the central issue for future
integration research. What possibility is there to democratize the European Union morethoroughly without simultaneously hindering its ability to act? The future of the European
Union will depend to a decisive degree on whether that looming dilemma can be successfully

33

Cf. B. RIONDEL, Itinéraire d'un fédéraliste: Maurice Faure, in: Journal of European Integration
History, 2(1997), pp.69-82.
34
Cf. F. LAFON, Guy Mollet. Itinéraire d’un socialiste controversé (1905-1975), Fayard, Paris, 2006.
35
Cf. Frédéric BOZO, Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l’unification allemande. De Yalta àMaastricht, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2005.
36
Important contributions to integration history are to be found in the biography of Paul-Henri Spaak: M.
DUMOULIN, Spaak, Ed. Racine, Bruxelles, 1999.
37
As a research program for this, H. KAELBLE, Europabewußtsein, Gesellschaft und Geschichte.
Forschungsstand und Forschungschancen, in: R. HUDEMANN, H. KAELBLE, K. SCHWABE (eds.), Europa
im Blick …, op.cit., pp.1-29.

15resolved. 38 This question concerns primarily jurists and political scientists. In formulating
answers, however, they should consider that things are in constant flux, that nothing remains
as it was, and therefore the possible is not only that which has so far been possible. This couldat the same time be called the core of the message which historians can contribute to thetheoretical discussion of European integration. If it is not taken into account, then European
integration may become in the long term a topic studied only by historians. Certainly, no one
would want that.

38

Cf. W. Merkel, Die Europäische Integration und das Elend der Theorie, in: Geschichte undGesellschaft, 25(1999), pp.302-338.