Stakeholder Engagement, ProSAVANA Master Plan
Final Report for the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

Draft 1 of March, 2016

Final Report, Stakeholder Engagement for the ProSAVANA Programme
Draft 1 of March, 2016

Executive Summary
Between the months of November 2015 and February 2016, the Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA), contracted MAJOL Consultores e Serviços to develop a Stakeholder Engagement
Plan for the ProSAVANA Master Planning Process, and in particular to develop a Civil Society
Dialogue Platform to overcome some of the ongoing conflicts and missed communications
regarding the development of this plan. Over the four months, the consultancy yielded successwith the signing of an agreement on 19 February, 2016, between the ProSAVANA team(including government of Mozambique and JICA representatives) and the newly-created Civil
Society Mechanism for dialogue on ProSAVANA.
The main challenge was designing an interactive process that would help all parties understandthe concerns of the other. These concerns, all of which had to be addressed during the course of
the consultancy, included: all of which had to be addressed during the course of theconsultancy••••

poor communication and the lack of effective dialogue mechanisms between
ProSAVANA and civil society;valid civil society fears about impacts of the program;valid government-side fears about civil society’s relationships with international NGOs
and the possibility of their being co-opted;
the extreme diversity of civil society positions and the fact that civil society is inherently
diverse, which made it difficult for ProSAVANA to know who to negotiate with.

Key elements of success included the use of a third-party mediator (MAJOL), as well as thewillingness to listen, learn, and be flexible, exhibited by all parties, including the ProSAVANA
team as well as the main civil society actors.
Key recommendations going forwards include:
1. The ProSAVANA program should invest in a professionally designed and implemented
Stakeholder Engagement Plan. This is due to the large and very diverse number ofstakeholders involved, including: the actual population of the ProSAVANA districts;
specific interest groups within these populations, such as women, emerging SME’s,vulnerable families, etc.; buyers and other participants in the private sector; suppliers offinancial services; other development agencies; investors and line ministries from other
2

2.

3.

4.
5.

3

sectors such as the mining sector, which may be in potential conflict (or synergy);
Ministries and agencies responsible for support services such as electricity, watersupply, roads, bridges, etc.;
MAJOL suggests that all government and JICA officials who will be working in or
promoting or managing the ProSAVANA program be supported with communications
training on how to deal positively with other stakeholders;
MAJOL believes that the Civil Society Mechanism will need the following kinds ofsupport going forward:
a. assistance in planning the detailed work program to finalize the ProSAVANA
Master Plan.
b. assistance in designing and implementing the public consultations that areplanned;c. assistance in drafting civil society inputs to the Master Plan (the consultancy
previously mentioned);d. assistance in bringing UNAC and other holdout NGOs and organizations into
the dialogue process;e. assistance and advice during the negotiation process with the ProSAVANA
team;
f. assistance in designing civil society engagement in ProSAVANA implementationand monitoring on into the future;g. defining the role of civil society and/or parliamentarians in the grievanceprocedure and ombudsman process (as proposed in this document);h. and others.
National and provincial parliamentarians, if engaged properly to support community
consultations and dialogue, could add real value to the ProSAVANA program;
There are several particular challenges that need to be overcome to the final design of
the ProSAVANA Master Plan:
a. The development of a Land Access Policy, which commits any and all donors
and investors to the ProSAVANA programme to adhere to world best practicestandards;b. The development of a grievance mechanism and perhaps even an ombudsman tohandle complaints and alert ProSAVANA of irregularities in land processes (orany other grievances). Involvement of parliamentarians and civil society
organizations and oversight of land transactions may also be of great benefit;c. The issue of development models is perhaps more problematic even than theland issues. More specifically, civil society is concerned that ProSAVANA clearly
describes and characterizes the interface between the small rural farming family
and the rest of the agricultural sector. There are both good and bad examples in
Mozambique and worldwide here, although MAJOL does not believe that adefinitive model exists. Some research and development will be necessary during
the life of the programme, coupled with a strong institutional learning process.

d. The role of Civil Society in implementation and monitoring of the ProSAVANA
program needs to be more clearly defined;e. To improve project coherence as well as the internal logic, a log frame and a
Theory of Change should be elaborated.
f. A Social and Environmental Management Plan that identifies potential negative
ProSAVANA impacts, and outlines methods for their mitigation, must be
developed;
g. The ProSAVANA Master Plan must address the issue of climate change and theresultant variabilities and risks associated.
6. MAJOL suggests that local consultant support to the JICA Master Plan drafting teammight be appropriate, this being support beyond that which is already provided by
MASA. MASA has given a lot of input so far and brought the project to where it is now;
however, civil society, private sector, and other perspectives must now be included, andit behooves JICA to look for experienced human local resources that can bring fresh
perspectives on the issues listed above.

4

Contents	
  
1.0	
  

Introduction

1.1	
  
2.0	
  

ProSAVANA Stakeholder Engagement
History and Process

10	
  
11	
  
12	
  

2.1	
  

The Decision to Accept the Contract

12	
  

2.2	
  

The work14	
  2.2.1	
  Improving Communication15	
  2.2.2	
  Parties

Supporting all Stakeholders to Understand the Real Fears and Concerns of Other17	
  2.2.3	  Dealing with Civil Society Divisions About ProSAVANA

19	
  

3.0	
  

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

21	
  

4.0	
  

Appendix 1. Introduction to Stakeholder Engagement (PPT) for JICA

27	
  

5.0	
  

Appendix 2. Theory of Change Proposal/Example

27	
  

5

Abbreviatura
ABC

Brazilian Cooperating Agency

AfDB

African Development BankAIDS

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

AIFM

Integrated Assessment of Forests in Mozambique

AMODER

Association of Mozambique for Rural Development

ANE

National Agency for Roads

CARE

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere

CEPAGRI

Agriculture Promotion Center

CLUSA

Cooperative League of the USA

CPI

Investment Promotion Centre

CSO

Civil Society Organization

CTA

The Confederation of Economic Associations of Mozambique

DFID

Department for International Development, United Kingdom

DNA

National Directorate of Water

DNTF

National Directorate of Land and Forestry

DPA

Provincial Directorate of Agriculture

DPASA

Provincial Directorate of Agriculture and Food Security

DPCA

Provincial Directorate for the Coordination of Environmental Action

DPIC

Provincial Directorate of Industry and Commerce

DPOPH

National Directorate of Land Planning and Management

DPTC

Provincial Directorate of Transport and Communications

DUATLand Use Rights

EIA

Environmental Impact Assessment

FAO

Food and Agriculture Organization

FDA

Fund for Agriculture Development

6

FDD

Fund for District Development

FIPAG

Water Supply Investment and Assets Fund

GOM

Government of Mozambique

IIAM

Agriculture Research Institute of Mozambique

INCAJU

Institute for Promotion of Cashew Nuts

INE

National Statistics Institute

INGC

National Institute of Disaster Management

ITC

Community Land Initiative

JICA

Japan International Cooperation Agency

MASA

Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security

MITADER

Ministry of Land, Environment, and Rural Development

MOPHRH

Ministry of Public Works, Housing, and Water Resources

MPD

Ministry of Planning and Development

MT

Meticais

MTC

Ministry of Transport and CommunicationNGO

Non-government Organization

OECD

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OMM

Organization of Mozambican Women

PARP

National Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty

PARPA

Action Program for Reduction of Absolute Poverty

PEDSA

Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development

PEMA

Strategic Plan of Agricultural Mechanization

PROMER

National Program for Agrarian Extension

ProSAVAN
A

Triangular Cooperation Program for Agricultural Development of theAfrican Tropical Savannah

SDAE

District Services for Economic Activities

7

SDC

Swiss Development Cooperation

SDPI

District Service of Planning and Infrastructure

SIDA

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

SIMA

The Agriculture Market Information System

SME

Small and Medium Enterprises

SNS

National HealthService

SPER

Provincial Agricultural Extension Services

SPFFB

Provincial Service of Forest and Wildlife

SPGC

Provincial Service of Geography and Cadaster

TIA

Agricultural Census

UBS

Seed Processing Unit

UCASN

Union of Peasants of South Niassa

UNAC

National Union of Peasants

UNDP

United Nations Development Program

UNEP

United Nations Environment Program

UPCN

Provincial Union of Farmers for Peasants in Niassa

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

VAT

Value Add Tax

WB

World BankWFPWorld Food Programme

WHO

World Health Organization

8

Notes and Acknowledgements:
This document is produced in response to Terms of Reference issued by the Japan International
Cooperation Agency. For further information, please contact:

Hiroshi Yokoyama
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Mozambique Office
Address:Av. 24 de Julho No 7, 11 Andar, Maputo, Mozambique

Telephone:

21-486357

Facsimile:

21-486356

E-mail:yokoyama.hiroshi@jica.go.jp

MAJOL Consultoria e Serviços would like to thank all those involved the Stakeholder
Engagement Process, particularly those who gave or their time to organize meetings, lobby
others, and create plans and documents. We are delighted to have worked with you; any
mistakes have been our own.

Joao Lameiras
Eduardo Costa
Harry C van den Burg
Peter H Bechtel

9

1.0

INTRODUCTION

The Agricultural Development Master Plan for the Nacala Corridor is being formulated
through the study of nineteen districts in three provinces of the Nacala Corridor Area located innorthern Mozambique. The Master Plan aims to improve the livelihood of inhabitants,
especially small scale farmers in the Nacala Corridor and to contribute to socio-economic
development in the area. This Master Plan is one of the key elements of the ProSAVANA
Programme, which is based on a Triangular Agreement between the Governments ofMozambique, Japan, and Brazil.
The Nacala Corridor is located in the northern part of Mozambique. It starts at the Nacala Portat the coast of the Indian Ocean connecting Mozambique to Malawi and Zambia. ProSAVANA
Districts include:
NampulaProvince:

The districts of Monapo, Meconta, Muecate, Mogovolas,
Rapale (Nampula), Murrupula, Mecuburi, Ribaue, Lalaua
and Malema.

NiassaProvince:

The districts of Chimbonila (Lichinga), N’Gauma,
Mandimba, Cuamba, Sanga, Majune and Mecanhelas.

Zambezia
Province:

The districts of Gurue and Alto Molocue.

The ProSAVANA Districts have an extent of
107,002 km2 and an estimated population of
about 4,287,4151. The Master Plan isformulated to generate a new development
model,
taking
into
consideration
environmental and socio-economic aspects,
aiming at a rural and regional market-oriented
agricultural development with a competitive
advantage.
The formulation of the Master Plan started in2012 and involved a technical team thatconsisted of experts in various fields from the

1 2011 National Statistic Institute (INE) Population Census estimate

10

Figure 1. ProSAVANA Districts

Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security of Mozambique (MASA). It also included theProvincial Directorates for Agriculture and Food Security (DPASAs) of the Provinces of
Nampula, Niassa, and Zambezia. Technical Assistance (TA) was provided by the governmentsof Japan and Brazil. A local company was subcontracted to conduct specific surveys of farmers’organizations and agricultural trade.
The Process to date has included many consultations with a variety of stakeholders, farmers
groups, and other interested parties. However, ProSAVANA planners felt the need tostrengthen stakeholder engagement, with particular regard to the interaction with communities
and farmers’ organizations and representatives of farmers. Identification of legitimate farmer
and community representatives is also a concern.

1.1

PROSAVANA STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENTProSAVANA would like to develop a Stakeholder Engagement Plan that will help the centrallevel coordination in assessing the social environment in which it operates and in particular to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Identify conflicts of interest between stakeholders in order to help manage such
relationships during the course of the Programme and its Projects;
Identify relationships between stakeholders that may enable the creation of "coalitions"of Programme and its project sponsorship, ownership and co-operation;
Assess the capacity of different stakeholders and stakeholder groups to participate inengagement activities;
Formulate a strategic and flexible engagement strategy built on principles oftransparency, coalition and cooperation between the Programme and the stakeholders;
Assess the appropriate type of participation by different stakeholders at successive
stages of the Programme cycle;
Identify weaknesses and strengths, and opportunities and threats of the programme atpresent;
Formulate appropriate policies, tools, and approaches to ensure inclusivity with respect
to gender, youth, and other vulnerable groups.

To begin this process, MAJOL Consultoria & Serviços was contracted (via a tender process) todevelop a stakeholder dialogue platform, and to research and draft a partial stakeholder map,
both as first steps towards a ProSAVANA Stakeholder Engagement Plan.
Deliverables of the consultancy were as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
11

Inception Report and Workplan
ToR and Functioning of the Dialogue Platform (Draft Proposal)
Stakeholder Engagement Report
Stakeholder Engagement Platform, Established and Functioning5. RoadMap of the Consultation Process
6. Final Report documenting the Process, with lessons learned and recommendations fornext steps and future interventions.
All deliverables were delivered on time or ahead of time, with the exception of the Stakeholder
Engagement Report, which was delivered approximately two weeks late, as the interviews
required took more time than expected. This report represents the 6th and final deliverable.
It is not the purpose of this report to summarise the information contained in the previous
reports. Rather, this report is to analyse the process, its successes and failures, and extract
lessons learned, all to create recommendations for the ProSAVANA programme and process
going forwards.

2.0

HISTORY AND PROCESSThe MAJOL approach from the beginning, even as from the time of the Inception Report,
followed the principles of both sociological investigation as well as Stakeholder Engagement(for an introduction to Stakeholder Engagement, please see Annex 1, Introduction to
Stakeholder Engagement for JICA, a presentation made by the MAJOL team to JICA in
February 2016, as a part of this consultancy).

2.1

THE DECISION TO ACCEPT THE CONTRACT

The first thing to say is that MAJOL consultant team members have good contacts throughout
not only civil society, but also in the rural areas and among farmers in the north of the country,
having worked there for many years. We knew that there was both fear of the ProSAVANA
process and the approach, as well as a desire for development to occur, among the target
population. It was clear that this fear was related to communications, as well as to the various
ways that government has been using the legal framework about lands. Specifically how
government had used expropriation clauses as well as shortcuts to the land authorization
process in the past. Although people wanted help, they did fear that their land would be taken
away from them. So, prior to signing the contract, the MAJOL team discussed whether it could,
in good conscience, take this contract. In the end, MAJOL decided to accept the contract,knowing that we would work long hours and receive much criticism. In the end, we all felt that
this would be a good thing to do for the country. As we all know, the North is very
underdeveloped.

12

The next issue that MAJOL discussed before signing the contract was the issue of the threemonths contract duration. During the negotiations it became clear that JICA had for many years
neglected the stakeholder engagement process, not giving it enough to attention and seriously
under-funding it. It was also clear that there was no systematic approach to stakeholder
engagement. Some of the early documents that we sent to JICA reflected our belief that what isreally needed for ProSAVANA is a long-term stakeholder planning and engagement process.
We suggested a number of documents and a longer-term approach. In the end, when the tendercame out for only three months, we were concerned that it might not be possible to do anythingof lasting impact during those three months. However, MAJOL decided to advance, hoping thatwithin three months, the three governments aligned with ProSAVANA would learn enoughabout Stakeholder Engagement to see the value in adopting a long term and properly funded
approach. This is why, for example, MAJOL suggested that a presentation to JICA about
Stakeholder Engagement would be an important activity, even though it was not a deliverable
in the contract.
The next issue that MAJOL had to discuss was the issue of reputational risk to ourselves.
MAJOL did not want to be seen as sellouts, as people who were accepting money to adopt
positions that would be against the interests of the rural population of the Nacala corridor.
MAJOL decided that the approach to handle this would be strict honesty and openness with allparties involved. MAJOL decided that would faithfully represent civil society concerns togovernment and ProSAVANA partners, and would also faithfully represent ProSAVANA andgovernment positions to civil society. The most important point however, was that MAJOL
would also always present their own personal views and opinions to all parties involved. Inthat way MAJOL could be sure that were not selling out to anyone for anything.
This decision resulted in some very difficult conversations and misunderstandings between
MAJOL and the ProSAVANA team, and, in some cases, between MAJOL and civil society. In
the end however, we firmly believe that this was the secret of our success, as everyone knew
exactly where we stood at all times. In this way, even though people did not always agree withus, We, MAJOL, think they came to trust our team. This openness also created opportunities for
us to both learn from and educate all project partners, for the betterment of all concerned. This
openness also opened the door for us to help identify ways to overcome some of the mostproblematic issues in ProSAVANA, such as the lack of adequate legal safeguards for poor
farmers land rights, within the current Mozambican legal framework.
The last issue that we discussed before signing the contract was the number of days allocated toeach of us for the work. The number of days on offer was, quite frankly, ridiculously low; as itturned out, each person on our team worked more than three times the number of days
allocated as per the contract. MAJOL says this not to complain. In the end we decided to accept
the contract and knowing that we would all work many days beyond those allocated. The
reason we did this was once again, our love for our country and a desire to improve the lives of13the poor people of the North. Many times we have discussed among ourselves that this is one of
the great advantages of being a consultant, when you see good work that needs to be done, you
don’t always have to get paid for it but can do some pro bono. We certainly regard the work we
did for JICA over the past four months as mostly pro bono, although a minor part was paid for.
MAJOL would like to be clear that we are not saying this to complain; we took the decision toact as we did and we are very happy that we were able to move ProSAVANA forward. We are
not asking for more payment for our work nor are we expecting praise or thanks; we did exactly
what we wanted to do. The only reason to mention this is that we do not want to give the
ProSAVANA partners an unrealistic idea about the real costs of an effective Stakeholder
Engagement Program. If JICA was paying full market price for the work we did, the bill would
have been at least three times as much, and this should be taken into account in JICA budgetingand planning going forwards.
In the end, we are extremely happy at the way everything turned out, and hope that the
ProSAVANA process will move forward and will help millions of people in northern
Mozambique.

2.2

THE WORK

The intention of this section is not to rehash all the work that was done, but simply to commenton the MAJOL strategy and how it played out over time.
The contract was started with a literature review, which gave insights into the origins of the
ProSAVANA consultancy conflict. It became very clear that the origins of the ProSAVANA
conflict date to the very beginning of the process and the way it was communicated to civilsociety. There can be no doubt that poor communication and the lack of effective dialoguemechanisms contributed greatly to the conflict.
However, behind the poor communication, there were genuine civil society fears, which we as
MAJOL felt were valid. Many of these are summed up in the No to ProSAVANA Campaign’s
Manifesto of December 15, 2015. There were also valid government-side fears about national
civil society being co-opted by their international counterparts. These became even stronger
after the release of the Zero Draft ProSAVANA Master Plan in March 2015 which was largely
ignored by civil society, despite the fact that it did show that ProSAVANA was listening andstarting to engage. In fact this Zero Draft Master Plan, though it was not accepted widely (oreven read) by civil society, was an important step taken to create an enabling environment forlater negotiation. We think it is fair to say that if JICA had never published the Zero Draft in
March, no one would have been willing to talk in December. Evidence for this was the publicpresentation by Dr.Joao Mosca in Maputo in December 2015 wherein he also acknowledged that14

this Zero Draft demonstrated a change of approach. Still, without a structured Stakeholder
Engagement process in place, the ProSAVANA partners were unable to engage civil society
during most of 2015.
A third contributing factor was that civil society itself was divided about ProSAVANA. The
majority of farmers wanted some help, but were afraid of land expropriation and speculation;some civil society organizations (these generally being the more well-known and more
introspective ones) were organized into a No to Land Grabbing Campaign; and other CSO’s
solidified their positions into a project-specific No to ProSAVANA campaign.
We therefore knew that we would have to work on at least three fronts. The first would be
improving communication, the second would be helping all stakeholders to understand the realfears and concerns of the other side; and lastly, the third challenge would be to bring civilsociety together and create a structure which could dialogue with ProSAVANA. Strategies foreach are reviewed below.
2.2.1

Improving Communication

All stakeholders contacted shared a common ground of frustration. This included theGovernment of Mozambique, JICA, and all civil society stakeholders contacted. The teamquickly learned that the first objective in any interview with anyone was simply to let that
person speak. This could sometimes be a 2 to 3 hour process as frustrations were unloaded. We
also learned that positions adopted in the first interview with any individual stakeholder
tended to change and become more reasonable over time as the negotiations in dialogue
advanced. An excellent example of this occurred between the three stakeholder meetings
undertaken. At first the general position was that civil society was not interested in reviewing
any documents, and that the ProSAVANA Master plan would have to be redrafted from the
beginning. During the second and most of the third meeting the civil society position was thatsome good ideas could be extracted from the existing ProSAVANA Master plan, but that afterthat it should be ‘put away in a drawer- colocado na gaveta’. The final position was that the
document would be used as a starting point, with issues, knowledge gaps and strategy gaps
identified, and that these would be then filled in by civil society working hand-in-hand with thethree governmental partners. It was also interesting to find fixed positioning occurring within
JICA and the government of Mozambique. An example of this is related to timelines, where thein the earliest conversations we were told that the April deadline must be complied with.
However, as the process advanced and trust was gained, an eventual compromise deadline was
accepted.
It turned out to be an excellent idea to have a third party doing the mediation; we do believethat it would have been very difficult for the two sides to talk to each other given the amount offrustration encountered and expressed. As third parties we did not have any emotional

15

involvement or anger when each party expressed their frustrations with the other. We also
were able to say things that the parties involved could not. A perfect example of this was theissue of the name, ProSAVANA. Government and JICA positioning was that the ProSAVANA
brand could not be changed. Civil Society’s original positioning was that the ProSAVANA
brand could not be maintained; stakeholders had invested so much time and effort in protesting
ProSAVANA that they could not accept anything less than victory in this campaign. Both sides
needed validation that neither was getting from the other. The ProSAVANA team wanted theirefforts in adapting ideas and listening to farmers (as shown by the Zero Draft) to be recognized,
and were appalled at civil society accusations of infringement of human rights when they were
trying so hard to listen and be flexible. The ProSAVANA team needed an acknowledgment of
this effort. Civil society on the other hand needed someone to acknowledge that they had also
worked hard and fought to bring changes about. Both sides also had public image issues andneeded a way to save face.
MAJOL decided that the only way for everyone to save face was to maintain the name
ProSAVANA but still acknowledge to civil society that their efforts and their campaigns were
fundamental in changing the ProSAVANA approach. It helped very much that the
ProSAVANA team reacted so well to the MAJOL explanations of the nature of civil society
concerns; both the government as well as the JICA team consistently demonstrated willingness
to understand civil society concerns with things like land tenure and development models.
Thus was born the famous “CIVIL SOCIETY WON… WHAT DO YOU WANT TO DO WITH
YOUR VICTORY?” slide that opened the January 11 and 12th meeting of civil society in
Nampula. The wording of this slide was careful and intentional. It acknowledged the fact thatcivil society had worked hard and ProSAVANA had evolved over the years. But it also wasmeant to trigger thoughts about the next steps, to provoke a thought process about what civilsociety really wants from ProSAVANA. And it sidestepped the issue of changing the
programme name. In all respects it was very successful as the final results show.
There is one other thing that must be said about the decision to use this slide to open themeeting. Many times during the course of this consultancy MAJOL consciously and knowingly
used the principle that “it is often better to ask for forgiveness than permission”. We knew that
had we shared this particular language with the ProSAVANA team before the meeting, it
would have provoked a lot of discussion and maybe bad feelings. So we did not share ahead oftime. We must confess that we used this principle many times during this consultancy. By theend however, and, given the evidence of the absolutely wonderful interviews given by both Dr.
Sudo and Dr. Limbau, we do think that all parties finished the consultancy really
understanding each other’s positions. The fact that we all ended up understanding each otherbodes very well for the future of the ProSAVANA process.

16

2.2.2

Supporting all Stakeholders to Understand the Real Fears and Concerns of Other Parties

As noted earlier, the MAJOL team had a lot of sympathy with many of the civil society
positions, particularly given the way the government has been dealing with land issues in themining sector for the past several years. We all felt it was very important to spend timeeducating the ProSAVANA team about civil society positions and also to talk about ways inwhich these might be accommodated. This is one of the reasons we said so many times that it isimportant for the ProSAVANA team to be flexible and open to civil society recommendations. It
is also why we at times also sided quite openly with civil society on several areas of potential
conflict. Another key element of the success of this consultancy was the willingness andopenness of the ProSAVANA team to be flexible and understand civil society concerns.
Sometimes we did not understand each other right away, but by the end, MAJOL wasabsolutely delighted with JICA’s and the ProSAVANA team’s decisions and flexibility. Thisagain is an excellent sign for the future. We were also very pleased at the JICA reaction to thevideo conference with Japan on Stakeholder Engagement. It would be great if the same
presentation could be made to the entire ProSAVANA team, including the government
representatives as well as any others such as ABC. This is because one of the weaknesses thatstill exist in the ProSAVANA programme is a lack of a Stakeholder Engagement Plan, with allof its associated plans and policies. We sincerely hope that ProSAVANA will decide to make acommitment to development of the following instruments:
1. Full Stakeholder Engagement Plan (this will build on the partial stakeholder map that
we produced as a part of this consultancy);
2. Communications Plan based on the engagement strategies outlined in the stakeholder
engagement plan;
3. Land Access Policy, which commits any and all donors and investors to the
ProSAVANA programme to adhere to world best practice standards, such as the IFC
2012 Performance Standards2 (at very least this ProSAVANA policy should guarantee
rigorous compliance with the letter and the spirit of existing Mozambican land legal
framework, as well as a binding promise that expropriation clauses of this legal
framework will not be used in the context of ProSAVANA, with the exception of
expropriation for the construction of necessary public infrastructure such as roads,
bridges, etc.);2

http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/ifc+sustai
nability/our+approach/risk+management/performance+standards/environmental+and+social+pe
rformance+standards+and+guidance+notes174. Grievance Mechanism and Policy, which is a publicly available policy that should be
widely disseminated through the media, so that complaints and potential conflicts canbe resolved before they escalate to previous levels;
5. Gender and Vulnerability Family Policies, to make sure that women and vulnerable
groups have equal access to ProSAVANA programs and benefits; and,6. If not a full Social and Environmental Impact Assessment, at least a Social andEnvironmental Management Plan that identifies potential negative ProSAVANA
impacts and outlines methods for their mitigation.
There was also a role for MAJOL to play in helping civil society to understand the ProSAVANA
team’s concerns. Perhaps the most demanding of these was the need for civil society to create asingle instrument that could negotiate with government. Civil society in general is usually very
diverse and it was no small thing to bring the various elements of Mozambican civil society
together in a framework which nearly all of them could agree to. The MAJOL team was alsodelighted by the way in which civil society was able to understand and organize itself for thispurpose. While the MAJOL team did develop most of the basic structure (and it was very timeconsuming to develop the structure and then to “sell” the idea to civil society organizations),
the civil society members did come up with several key elements that bode well for the futureof the ProSAVANA process.
The first of these was the decision to create a negotiating team and a technical team, thetechnical team being responsible for the generation of ideas and analysis, as well as the nittygritty details of project planning, with the negotiating team more responsible for inclusion andcommunication. These are two distinct skill sets, and the idea to separate these responsibilities,
with the technical team submitting ideas to the negotiating team, which then communicates andbuild consensus and negotiates, was really very well thought out.
The second very good idea was presented in the meeting of February 18 and 19th, and wasbrought forward by the representatives of OMR. This was the notion that the technical team
could do analysis and bring forward ideas, but that the actual writing of the necessary sections,the actual documentation and then technical input into the ProSAVANA document, is really a
job for a consultancy. The general consensus of the meeting was to agree to this, and this makes
great sense. Hiring a consultant to systematize the civil society ideas and make sure they are
documented in a way that makes them implementable is perhaps the best way to guarantee
excellent inputs into the ProSAVANA Master Plan final draft.
The third decision was to give financial management responsibility for the Civil Society
Mechanism to the WWF, via the National Alliance. One of the ongoing key weaknesses ofMozambican civil society is financial management. The decision to give financial management
to an international organization with a rigorous accounting system and annually audited18

accounts is one that JICA should encourage, support, and perhaps even insist upon should
there be a move to change this.
2.2.3

Dealing with Civil Society Divisions About ProSAVANA

As noted earlier, civil society was divided in terms of what it wanted with respect to
ProSAVANA at the beginning of this consultancy. However, from previous work with civilsociety, including the EU Civil Society Mapping Study done early in 2015, MAJOL did have theimpression that it would be possible to create a broad though not complete consensus about
ProSAVANA. The MAJOL team knew from the beginning that there were several civil society
organizations that simply would not accept dialogue. We decided to try to build as broad-baseda consensus as possible, based on honest dialogue, which consensus would hopefully be wide
enough that extremists and diehards would be an isolated minority. After the results of the
stakeholder mapping, we were very confident that those diehard institutions did not havebroad-based support, and, once isolated, other members of civil society would react negatively
to them which would only increase their isolation.
We put this theory to the test during the first day of meetings on January 11. On this day, twotechnical staff of UNAC dominated the discussion to such an extent that, during lunch time, anumber of civil society organizations spoke to MAJOL wondering what we were doing andwhy we were allowing these two representatives to “defeat” us. We ‘lost’ that morning ofdiscussions on purpose. We wanted everyone to listen carefully to what we had to say, andwhat the two UNAC representatives had to say, and then choose sides based on the quality ofthe discussions, ideas, and openness on display by both sides.
This tactic worked well. After lunch, we tightened up the moderation, we made sure thateveryone was allowed to speak and not just these two representatives, and by the end of the
day there was consensus from nearly everyone, including the UNAC President and Provincial
Representatives, to engage ProSAVANA.
After that meeting there were of course accusations and recriminations in the press, which werereally nothing more than we expected, but there were also, for the very first time, many people
on the side of civil society defending ProSAVANA. Those recriminations also served a purpose,
for we found out through our own contacts in civil society that the behavior of these two
representatives had been censured within UNAC. We heard from a mutual friend, one of thenational opinion leaders of civil society, that the National Coordinator of UNAC had spoken tohim specifically mentioning that these two representatives did not represent either the ideas or
the approach of UNAC. By the time the February meeting came around, the UNAC National
Coordinator wrote an email to the meeting organizers wishing them “bom trabalho”, andlamenting the fact that he was unable to attend. And there was absolutely no reaction in thepress against the signing of the agreement between the Civil Society Mechanism and the19

ProSAVANA team. The fact that the UNAC president and provincial representatives did notattend the final meeting should not be seen as a setback. Indeed it should be seen as progress,
because UNAC was subject to intensive lobbying from a visiting Japanese delegation during thetime of this meeting. The fact that there was no UNAC attendance, but also no public reaction to
the meeting, shows that the UNAC position is in flux, and this creates an opportunity, withproper engagement, to bring them fully into the negotiation process.
We strongly feel that such outreach should be undertaken by the ProSAVANA team.
ProSAVANA should not simply let civil society dialogue with UNAC; there are tensions within
civil society that might militate against success of a civil society led effort here.
Even assuming a worst-case scenario, that UNAC cannot come to an agreement on participation
or not, and remains outside the dialogue framework, MAJOL made calculations and sharedthem with the ProSAVANA team showing that at absolute maximum, UNAC represents a mere
2.5% of Mozambican farmers.
We are aware that some elements of Japanese civil society see UNAC as being the largest
organization of farmers and thus the de facto representative of Mozambican farmers in the
Nacala corridor. The tactic of the Nampula civil society organizations to invite Provincial andNational Parliamentarians, (members of the Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture and theEnvironment) to the February seminar goes some way towards responding to this argument.
After all, who is better placed to represent farmers than their own elected representatives? The
two biggest political parties both had members in attendance, thus the civil society mechanism
cannot be accused of political favoritism. MAJOL strongly recommends that JICA and the
ProSAVANA team engage parliamentarians throughout the ProSAVANA process. There are atleast two specific roles that parliamentarians should play.
•

•

•

20

Parliamentarians should be involved in all aspects of the public consultation,accompanying teams into their constituencies and making sure that there is adequate
public dialogue and consultation. This is fully in line with their role as elected
representatives of their respective constituencies. When the MAJOL team discussed thiswith parliamentarians who attended the seminar, all parliamentarians present notedthat this was their role and they would be very happy to play it. The involvement ofparliamentarians in this manner will provide some buffer towards outside criticisms
about inclusiveness and consultation.
Parliamentarians should also engage their counterparts in Japan, using interparliamentary mechanisms to make sure that an accurate view of the ProSAVANA
design process is portrayed to the Japanese government and to the Japanese people ingeneral.
Budgets and work plans should reflect the fact that parliamentarians need to be
mobilized for these and perhaps other purposes.

3.0

LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The first lesson learned was the value of a professionally designed and implemented
approach to stakeholder engagement.
This the MAJOL team started for the
ProSAVANA project during the time of this consultancy. This process is far fromcomplete, with only the sector of civil society stakeholders partially mapped, and theengagement process only partially designed (see point 2 below).
2. The stakeholder map prepared for civil society stakeholders provided information thatallowed MAJOL to design the early drafts of the civil society mechanism and help civilsociety to bring itself together to finalize and create the Civil Society Mechanism. Thiswas done with obvious great success. However, the Mechanism has only been designed,
it has not yet started work. This Mechanism will need a variety of types of support inorder to 1) conclude the design of the ProSAVANA Master Plan and 2) engage with
ProSAVANA during the implementation and monitoring of the ProSAVANA Master
Plan.
3. MAJOL believes that the civil society mechanism will need the following kinds ofsupport going forward:
a. assistance in planning the detailed work program to finalize the ProSAVANA
Master Plan.
b. assistance in designing and implementing the public consultations that areplanned;c. assistance in drafting civil society inputs to the Master Plan (the consultancy
previously mentioned);d. assistance in bringing UNAC and other holdout NGOs and organizations into
the dialogue process;e. assistance and advice during the negotiation process with the ProSAVANA
team;
f. assistance in designing civil society engagement in ProSAVANA implementationand monitoring on into the future;g. defining the role of civil society and/or parliamentarians in the grievanceprocedure and ombudsman process (as proposed in this document);h. and others.
4. There are quite a number of other groups that need to be engaged as well, for example:
a. the actual population of the ProSAVANA districts;
b. specific interest groups within these populations, such as women, emerging
SME’s, vulnerable families, etc., with approaches and engagement designed
specifically for eachc. private sector operators in these districts;
d. infrastructure authorities (roads, ports, railways);e. buyers and other participants in the private sector;
f. bankers and other potential suppliers of financial services;21

g. other bilateral agencies who may be making synergistic investments orparticipating in the financing of ProSAVANA programs;
h. investors and line ministries from other sectors such as the mining sector, which
may be in potential conflict;i. investors in line ministries from other sectors which may be in potential synergy(upstream suppliers, downstream transformational industries, the transportindustry etc.);
j. Ministries and agencies responsible for support services such as electricity, watersupply, infrastructure, etc.;
k. The various levels of government who will be involved in ProSAVANA. This is aparticularly sensitive group, as conflicts have arisen in the past due tocommunication styles of government officials. Civil society and farmers
complain in particular of arrogance and top-down communication styles, issues
which are particularly sensitive giving the current land tenure regime in
Mozambique, in which all land by law belongs to “the state”. MAJOL suggeststhat all government officials who will be working or promoting or managing the
ProSAVANA program be supported with communications training on how todeal positively with other stakeholders;l. As mentioned earlier, parliamentarians are a specific group, with specific tasks,
that, if engaged properly, could result in great benefit for the ProSAVANA
program. Parliamentarians should also receive training about the program andhow to communicate it to their constituents;
This list is in no way comprehensive; a comprehensive list is only possible through acomplete Stakeholder Mapping process. Engagement for each stakeholder group canthen be planned on the basis of knowledge and deep understanding of theircharacteristics.
All of these groups will need Stakeholder Mapping and Stakeholder Engagement
Planning, designed to make sure that they are correctly brought into the process andwind up in support of ProSAVANA.
5. A clear definition of roles for all stakeholders within the overall ProSAVANA programis also important. For example, the role of government must be clearly defined;
government is generally not a good private sector player, but is absolutely necessary forcreating an enabling environment in which the private sector can thrive. ProSAVANA
will need to identify those elements of the enabling environment that need to beaddressed in order for program goals to be achieved.
6. Stakeholder engagement is particularly important for a program as ambitious as
ProSAVANA, which covers a large geography, and requires the cooperation of a great
number of stakeholders of various types including private sector, government, civil

22society, and the population in general. MAJOL sincerely hopes that the examples given
above and the experience of the past months is enough to demonstrate the value of
Stakeholder Engagement planning for the program.
7. With respect to the final design of the ProSAVANA Master Plan, there are several
particular challenges that need to be overcome. These are outlined in the list below withsuggestions on how this might be approached.
a. With respect to lands, this is a very large challenge, with two components.
i. The first component has been described above, and it is that civil society
in general fears that the Land Law and the voluntary principles foragrarian investment outlined in the current ProSAVANA Master plan do
not provide sufficient safeguards. A solution has been proposed earlier inthis document, being the development of a ‘Land Access Policy, which
commits any and all donors and investors within the ProSAVANA
programme to adhere to world best practice standards, such as the IFC
2012 Performance Standards3. At the very least this ProSAVANA policy
should guarantee rigorous compliance with the letter and the spirit of theexisting Mozambican land legal framework, as well as a binding promisethat the expropriation clauses of this legal framework will not be used in
the context of ProSAVANA, with the exception of expropriation for theconstruction of necessary public infrastructure such as roads, bridges,
etc..
ii. The second component is that of land speculation. There has been someevidence that politically and economically powerful individuals arecoming into the Nacala corridor with the intention of securing land forthemselves so that they may benefit from ProSAVANA. In the current
draft of the ProSAVANA Master Plan, the government is postulated as
the institution to safeguard the rights of the population, through better
application of the existing legal framework. The problem here is that the
government is subject to influence from politically and economicallypowerful individuals and a counterbalancing power is needed. MAJOL
suggests that there is a role for civil society here, in overseeing landtransactions within the Nacala corridor. There is also the need for agrievance mechanism, as described earlier, and perhaps even an
ombudsman to handle complaints and alert ProSAVANA of irregularities3

http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/ifc+sustai
nability/our+approach/risk+management/performance+standards/environmental+and+social+pe
rformance+standards+and+guidance+notes23

in land processes. Involvement of parliamentarians (creating a channel
for the registration of grievances that works through Parliament
members, at provincial and national level) might add an additionalcounterbalancing power, in addition to civil society. All of this needs tobe thought through carefully, designed, piloted, tweaked, documented,
and communicated about, to those who will implement the grievancemechanism and ombudsman, as well as those who will registercomplaints and irregularities.
b. The issue of development models is perhaps more problematic even than theland issues. The development model is of primary concern to almost all civilsociety actors. More specifically, civil society is concerned that ProSAVANA
should clearly describe and characterize the interface between the small rural
farming family and the rest of the agricultural sector, both government services
as well as, and most importantly, agricultural value chains. This is of concern
because there are many bad examples throughout the world and in
Mozambique. The structure of the cotton value chain, for example, which wasdeveloped in such a way that each corporate buyer has sole rights for cottonpurchase throughout a specific geography, effectively solved the serious problem
of side selling, but at the expense of creating local monopolies, which eventually
drove the price of cotton down so low that nearly everyone in Mozambique hasabandoned the farming of cotton. Internationally, price manipulations on thepart of cocoa buyers have kept the price of cocoa so low that worldwide, farmers
have not been motivated to replant cocoa trees. With trees currently in
production reaching the end of their productive life, the world price of cocoa inthe past couple of years has leapt from about US$500 per ton to more than $3000.
i. There are also good examples. The Westphalia Fruit Corporation4 hasdeveloped a worldwide model of avocado and other fruit outgrowingthat it is currently bringing into Mozambique in Chimoio. Vanduzi andMozorganics also have relevant experiences, as do some others. All ofthese should be brought into the dialogue and design process, and havenot been so far; it may be too much to expect of the Civil Society
Mechanism that they will be able to successfully engage with thesestakeholders. Lurio Green Resources and Portucel are both designing
outgrower schemes; the MAJOL team leader has been instrumental in thedesign of both of these.
ii. The central problem here seems to be how to design a fair system thatcreates a win-win for everyone. Farmers and civil society in general are4

http://www.westfaliafruit.com/en-za/Pages/default.aspx

24not happy with the contract farming model, as failure to produce means
failure to fulfill the contract and this puts farmers’ lands at risk.
Outgrowing has been problematic in the past due to issues of side selling,which has been called the biggest impediment to agriculturaldevelopment in all of Mozambique. Is probably true to say that no one
solution will fit every situation, and that the ideal one has yet to be
designed. Thus ProSAVANA will need to describe a process rather thanprescribe a solution for resolving these issues, and eventually come up
with a clear interface between the small producer and his/her value
chain. MAJOL think is is also important to think and explore thepossibility of including crop insurance into farming contracts.
iii. This implies the development of a conscious institutional learning cycle.
This, together with the initial lines of inquiry, will need to be clearly
outlinedin the ProSAVANA Master Plan.
c. The issue of agricultural financing is another bugbear. The current land tenure
regime of most small producers means that their lands cannot be used to secureloans. And even for those relatively few families who have DUATs and cansecure loans, doing so creates the risk of loss of land, which adds additional
insecurity into an already food insecure situation. As noted earlier, civil society
organizations and farmers have deep concerns about this. ProSAVANA needs toinvestigate options here; it may be the case that once again a good solution does
not exist as of the time of writing the Master Plan, and thus a period ofexperimentation and testing should be described as well as an institutional
learning process as noted above.
d. The current draft of the Master Plan describes the importance of civil society
participation and engagement. However, it is weak on characterizing andcreating openings and budgets for this to occur. MAJOL suggests that civilsociety organizations should be involved not only in the design process (throughthe Civil Society Mechanism), but also in implementation and monitoring of
ProSAVANA. Strategies should be developed, and written into the Master Plan,
to allow for society organizations to participate in at least the following ways. It
goes without saying that budgeting, specifically appropriate line items, will benecessary as well.
i. As implementing subcontractors for agriculture extension services as wellas other types of services. This should be established through competitive
tendering processes. Competitive vendors and competing institutions
create a dynamic towards excellence within the bidding, and this would
serve ProSAVANA very well over time. If implementation is basedlargely on government as the service provider, then this dynamic for
excellence is lost.

25

ii. As participants in monitoring of grievance procedure implementationand of the ombudsman. Specific roles and mechanisms will have to be
developed here.
iii. Civil society participation in ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the
program at various levels should also be developed. The Civil Society
Mechanism could be an important structure here.
iv. ProSAVANA is a master plan for the development of agriculture in the
Nacala corridor and therefore will need funding from a number ofdifferent sources. Civil society organizations have their own funding
sources and it may be productive to develop ways to engage civil society
organizations in the fundraising process.
e. The project as written, to MAJOL eyes, reads like a list of activities without an
overarching internal logic. MAJOL suggests development of a project logframe
as an important step in increasing the internal logic of the project.
f. An additional step for increasing the Master Plan internal logic and structure
might be the development of a Programme Theory of Change. A discussion of asimple theory of change which may be of interest to ProSAVANA is found in
Appendix 2.
g. If not a full Social and Environmental Impact Assessment, at least a Social andEnvironmental Management Plan that identifies potential negative ProSAVANA
impacts and outlines methods for their mitigation.
h. The ProSAVANA Master Plan must address the issue of climate change and theresultant variabilities and risks associated.
8. MAJOL suggests that local consultant support to the JICA Master Plan drafting teammight be appropriate, this being support beyond that which is already provided by
MASA. MASA has given a lot of input so far and brought the project to where it is now;
however, civil society, private sector, and other perspectives must now be included, andit behooves JICA to look for experienced human local resources that can bring fresh
perspectives on the issues listed above.

26

4.0

APPENDIX 1. INTRODUCTION TO STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT (PPT) FOR
JICA

5.0

APPENDIX 2. THEORY OF CHANGE PROPOSAL/EXAMPLE

The following General Theory of Change explains the relationship between land and resource
ownership, investments in land, and sustainable land management. It explains how
improvements in land tenure, such as those contemplated by the ProSAVANA project, motivateand mobilize people to make productive investments such as conservation agriculture or fruit
trees or irrigation systems. And then, when people are getting more benefit from their land andresources, this will then motivate them to manage the more sustainably. As is, it is applicable to
the ProSAVANA project, however, to be a complete theory of change, some further work would
be needed to tie this overall vision closely to the project logic as outlined in the logframe. As
such, this may serve as a starting point for the development of the full theory of change of the
ProSAVANA program. At least, it will help program planners to think about the full range ofthings necessary to actually bring about permanent and long-term improvements in agricultural
production systems and livelihoods for people in the Nacala corridor.
The proposed theory of change is perhaps best expressed visually as the “Fogão	   Africano,” theAfrican Stove, the three stones sitting on the ground that African women use to balance a
cooking pot over a fire. The Fogão	
  Africano represents in visual form the relationship between
land tenure, land and resource productivity and use, and land and resource management.
• Land tenure- no one is motivated to sustainably manage resources which are not theirown. The converse of this is that open access commons are generally not managed, but
simply overexploited. In order to create an enabling environment for sustainable use
and management, ownership must clearly be defined.
• Land	   and	   resource	
   productivity and use - a resource that does not provide benefit to its
owner is not managed. It is usually abandoned or discarded. Once ownership isdefined, an enabling environment is created for sustainable use, rather than resource
mining. Sustainable use includes the making of productive investments, such as
investing in increased soil fertility, forest health, fruit trees, or dams and irrigation
canals. An owned resource, producing valued and recognized benefits, then creates an27enabling environment for...
• Land and resource management- Individuals and communities that own resources andare deriving benefit from them will be motivated to manage them in a sustainable way.

The	
   African	
   traditional	
   “stove”,	
   or	
   Fogão Africano.	
   	
   One	   rock	
   represents	
   land	   and	   resource	  tenure,	  the	
  second	
  represents	
  investment	
  in	
  land	  and	  resources	
  and	
  subsequent	
  benefits,	
  and	  the	
   third	
   represents	
   sustainable	
   management	
   of	
   land	   and	   resources.	
   	
   These	
   elements	
   are	  interrelated	
   and	   depend	
   upon	
   each	   other.	
   Remove	
   one	   rock	
   and	   the	   whole	
   thing	
   collapses	
  
(and	
  no	
  one	
  gets	  to	
  eat).
Note that in the absence of any one of these three stones, the whole system does not function,
just as a cooking pot falls into the fire when a stone is removed. With respect to agricultural
production systems, slash and burn agricultural systems as well as insecure land title can resultin an itinerant population that does not make any long-term investments in either land
management or in productivity. Fields are used and abandoned when they are used up. Once28

clear land title is established however, using either the DUAT mechanism or throughcommunity delimitation (both key elements of the government of Mozambique’s Terra Segura
Programme), land tenure is more secure, and people become more confident in making
productive investments like conservation agriculture (which can take many years to yield full
benefits), fruit trees, or small irrigation systems. As a result of these investments, benefits fromthe land increase, increasing both the perceived and actual value of the land to the family,
which will motivate them to manage ever more sustainably so that benefit flows will continue
or increase.

Expressed another way, a field whose fertility has been exhausted is usually abandoned, for it
offers no benefits to the family. Only when ownership is clearly defined and benefits are
realised will people be motivated to manage resources.
Thus the change of more secure land tenure unlocks the possibility to make productive
investments, leading to increased benefits, which both together motivate sustainable
management. This creates an upward spiral as increases in benefit and investment lead toincreases in perceived value and thus motivate ever more intensive and sustainable
management. A failure to clarify resource rights and/or land tenure creates the inverse sort ofspiral.
The proposal specific theory of change is shown in the diagramme below. The diagramme
outlines how the inputs planned in this proposal lead to the project outputs, which work
together to create the outcome. This outcome then contributes to the achievement of the
Impact, working together with the support to livelihoods and management provided by theother components. Thus do land tenure, livelihoods benefits and investments, and improved
land and resource management come together, exactly in line with the General Theory of
Change, the Fogão Africano.

(The Master Plan Drafting Team can insert a diagrammatic representation of the logframe here)29