European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP):
Japanese Perspective(First draft, please do not quote)Kazuto Suzuki
HOPS, Hokkaido University
kazutos@juris.hokudai.ac.jp
September 20, 2008
Introduction
For many years, the process of European integration was regarded with an admiration
which brought a peace and prosperity in the region. For Japanese, one of the mostimportant concerns in its international relationship was the reconciliation with its
neighbours, particularly with China and Republic of Korea. The European integration
process, which deliberately aimed to achieve perpetual peace between France and(West) Germany, was considered as a good precedent, and opened up the possibility thatthe archrivals can not only cooperate but also share their sovereignty for greater good.
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is considered as the final process ofthe sharing of sovereignty. Since the failure of European Defence Community (EDC)
and slow progress of European Political Cooperation (EPC) and Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), it was considered that the European integration would remainintergovernmental as long as Member States jealously protect their national
decision-making autonomy.
However, the rapid progress after the St. Malo
Franco-British summit in December 1998 made us think that the European integration
was transformed into higher dimension, and it will reach to the level that Japan would
hope for Asia – a permanent interlocking relationship economically and militarily.
This paper, however, would discuss that the reality is not that simple, and there are still
a lot of problem in the process of European integration. The ratification of theConstitution for Europe and subsequent Lisbon Treaty notwithstanding, the process ofEuropean integration came to halt and forced to reconsider that ways in which it deals

1with its own citizens. In short, it is still difficult to declare that there is a single
European social space and identity. Nevertheless, this paper argues that the process ofdeveloping ESDP would create a coherent image of what Europe is and what Europe
does towards the world, and there are many things that Japan can learn a lot from thisprocess. In doing so, we shall discuss how ESDP can be seen from outside and what
lessons that Japan can learn from it.
How do we see ESDP
From Japanese point of view, ESDP is often regarded in comparison with the security
and defence policy of the United States. During the Cold War, Japan was in a
comfortable position as a junior partner to the alliance with the United States while
Japanese government retained a position for not sending troops outside its jurisdiction.
The unique alliance system under the US-Japan Security Pact, where Japan would not
bear the obligation to protect the United States while the US forces do, made it possible
for Japan to be a low profile international actor militarily. However, the end of Cold
War changed the circumstances. The United States has much less priority to protect
Japan (without immediate threat from Russia), and demanded Japan to share the burden
not only for maintaining the troops stationed in Japan but also the responsibility tomaintain international peace and stability. The first shockwave came during the Gulf
War in 1991. Although there was a strong pressure from the United States to send
Japanese troops to Iraq, the only things under the Constitution Japan could do were tosend a vessel to sweep mines in the Persian Gulf and 13.5 billion dollar. The Japanesecontribution was heavily underappreciated, which made Japanese government to realize
the importance of more substantial and visible contribution for international peace andstability. Thus, Japan has decided to send troops under the UN command in thepeacekeeping operations which were increasing in numbers after the Cold War. Aftersending a large number of troops, 1,200 men and women, to Cambodia, Japan has been
participated in several UN PKO activities in Mozambique, Rwanda, Golan Heights, andEast Timor etc. However, Japanese participation is limited to contribute for logisticalsupport rather than front line missions which might be involved in combat actions.
This timid participation in peacekeeping operation is a matter of debate in Japan today.
There are certain group of people who encourage to share much heavier burden and to
take more international responsibility for peace and stability from which Japan has been
greatly benefited. On the other hand, there are group of people who would argue that2

Japan shall not take part the activities which might endanger Japanese soldiers andConstitution (which declared that Japan would not possess military force for solving
international conflict), meanwhile the UN decision is based on the accord of powerfulstates (Permanent 5 countries) and not democratically decided.
For both groups, the experience of Europe is a quite useful reference for the debate.
First, the neutral countries such as Sweden, Ireland etc. have been in favour ofparticipating in the ESDP. For a long time, Japan has certain admiration to theseneutral countries which demonstrated their conviction for standing up against the big
powers. However, it became clear that the same countries also have convictions thatthey shall contribute to the peace and stability of the world, and they may use themilitary means for achieving this aim. This demonstration of commitment to the peaceand security is something that Japan shall regard as a reference of its policy.
Second, the method of intervention to global affairs by European countries is based on
the multilateral and civilian methods, unlike that of the United States. As it has shownin the case of Iraq War, European countries (France and Germany in this case) tried torespect the UNSC as much as possible. Even Britain, which eventually went into war
with the United States, tried to convince the Bush Administration that it should respect
the UN diplomatic process. At the peacekeeping operations, the European countries
have contributed heavily in military forces as well as civil policy and "rule of law"
missions. These operations are also very useful reference for Japan on how tocontribute to the peacekeeping operations without using much of military forces.
Third, although the European method of intervention is based on multilateral andcivilian one, it does not mean that Europe put a self-constraint on the use of militaryforce. It is still controversial but the military intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo was
widely regarded as a "humanitarian intervention" and its use of force was justified for
stopping atrocities of brutal violation of Human Rights. Obviously, Japan would nottake the same action in such circumstances, but it is certain that Japan shall take someaction within the limit of its Constitution to prevent such violation of Human Rights.
What is important in this issue is that there should be a firm and convincing principle ofintervention. I think Japan has avoided the discussion of what should be the base ofsuch principles for taking military and non-military actions.
Just taking these three points, it became clear that there are many things that Japan can3refer to, and learn from, the experience of ESDP. Of course, we shall not look only thebrighter side of the story. There are actual combat actions in Bosnia and Kosovo, andthere are many European soldiers lost lives in Afghanistan and other peacekeeping
operations. Nevertheless, it would be difficult for Japan to avoid thinking about its
role in the global society (as expressed in this symposium) and to remain uncommitted
to the maintenance of peace and security of the world.
Having said that, there are two questions raised in the observation of the process of
ESDP development. First is that whether Europe would seek a position of thesuperpower or hegemony in the future. Although the focus of ESDP is strictly on thePetersberg Missions, which is mainly on peacekeeping, humanitarian support, conflict
resolution etc., but given the situation between Georgia and Russia, in Iran, and in
Middle East, Europe might need to demonstrate itself as a "superpower" for effectively
conducting its external policy. Obviously, Europe as a "superpower" does notnecessarily possess a heavy military arsenal which may harm the image of Europe as a"leader of conscience", but at the same time, it would not be useful if nobody listen towhat Europe says. From Japanese point of view, it would be interesting to see how
Europe would use its resources of influence with minimum exercise of military power.
Second question is the relationship between national strategies and European action.
As it became clear in the Iraq War, there are many domains where European countries
do not share the strategic visions, particularly with regard to the transatlantic relations
or vis-à-vis Russia. Although there are certain degrees of common ground, but whenpush comes to shove, there are many things that cannot be done at the European level.
In my assumption, the European Constitution or Lisbon Treaty were supposed toprovide firmer ground for common actions, but without institutions as much as strategic
cohesion, it would be difficult to predict which direction that Europe would move. Asa scholar of European integration, these are interesting questions that motivate us to
study ESDP.
What can we learn from Europe?
So what are the lessons what we need to learn from European experience? First, weneed to respect the sincere response to the changing international structure. In Japan,
the question of peace and security has been always an ideological issue which divided
the political camps from left to right. The Constitution, which renounces the use of4

military force for solving international disputes, became untouchable due to a longdebate over the role of Self-Defence Force (SDF) and US-Japan alliance. As a result,
we became very conscious about the domestic dogmas rather than the actual change ofinternational structure. Even after the collapse of Soviet Union and 9.11, the basic
principle of security policy has not changed. We have sent SDF to Indian Ocean andIraq, but only as a response to the request from the United States, rather than its own
conviction for the fight against terrorism or maintenance of peace.
On European side, there was a significant debate over the role of Europe in the global
security through the experience of Bosnia, Kosovo, Madrid and London. The
recognition that the world has changed and the Cold War alliance (NATO) does nolonger guarantee American intervention in European affairs made European leaders
responsible for taking their own actions for international crises, particularly that withstrategic importance. And it is not only the leaders of larger Member States such as
Britain, France and Germany, but also Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland, andeven Switzerland which is not the Member of EU. This transformation of the security
strategy may not be completed, but it is certain that European leaders are fully aware of
the necessity of change, whereas Japanese leaders don’t.
Second, the sense of responsibility as the largest market in the world, population bigger
than the United States, and internationally influential actor is very high in Europe.
Although Japan, as a single nation, is the second largest economy, the sense of
responsibility and the role in the international affairs are very limited and timid. Of
course, it is as the result of the devastating memory of the World War II as it was in thecase of Germany. Nevertheless, Japanese lack of sensitivity to the responsibility issomewhat outstanding.
In my understanding, the underlying cause of this difference comes from therelationship with the United States. During the Cold War, both Japan and Europe havebeen dependent on the United States so that they were able to concentrate on theirdomestic/internal issues and economic growth. However, through the experience ofBosnia and Kosovo, European countries realized that it is no longer possible to dependon the United States, so it should act of its own for protecting its interest, whereas Japan
still believes the United States would provide security guarantee when the Japaneseinterest became in danger. Thus, European states realized that they need to be moreproactive towards the maintenance of peace and stability whereas Japan need to5strengthen the relationship with the United States. In order to do so, Japanese
government has to respond to the requests from the United States for sending troops toconflict zones and providing services to the troops based in Japan. In other words,
Japanese security policy is a product of compromise between the US pressure and theConstitutional constraints. In this regard, Europe, through its development of ESDP,
became much more independent actor in global affairs. The role in negotiating with
Iran and peacekeeping in Afghanistan (both are not successful yet) is more spontaneous
one compare to Japanese role in Indian Ocean and Iraq. In short, Europe became a
global actor whereas Japan does not.
The other thing which divides Japan and Europe is autonomous capability. Britain andFrance are the permanent member of the UN Security Council and they can use vetopower as a leverage for leading the negotiation to their favour. None of the European
countries has constitutional constraints for sending troops outside Europe except
Germany. Although European countries depend on various infrastructure particularly
related to C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance) and strategic airlift, European countries have at least
minimum capability to conduct their operation outside Europe as in the case of Artemis
in DR Congo. Japan, on the other hand, does not have such capability at all. SDF
may independently conduct its humanitarian aid missions or truce monitoring missions,but it critically lacks the strategic and tactical infrastructure for autonomous operations.
This made Japan more dependent on the United States in security field.
Furthermore, we can learn from Europe on its role for securing regional stability,
especially after the fall of Berlin Wall. The former Communist countries were quickly
turned into a chaotic free market and democracy where there was a little institutional
and legal framework. It was the EU which provided a model and hope for thesecountries to transform their market, administrative system, and political structure. The
Copenhagen criteria requires these countries to achieve (a) stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and, protection ofminorities, (b) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity tocope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, and (c) the ability
to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political,
economic and monetary union. Among which the most difficult one was to accept
acquis communautaire (acquis) to meet the requirement to participate in the single
market. The acquis is a comprehensive legal system of EU laws which contains 31

6

Chapters, 8,000 items in 18,000 page-documents. It provides a detailed model ofmarket regulation and public administration. Without these guidelines it was difficult
to stabilize the confused countries in the East.
The Copenhagen criteria were in fact a product from the lessons of former Yugoslavia.
Since the fall of Communist regime, the critical issue for EU (then EU-15) was how to
avoid the ethnic violence among Central and Eastern European nations. ThroughCopenhagen criteria, the EU provided these countries a hope for their future as a
Member State of EU, which became very strong incentives to overcome the ethnic
divide and historical tensions. This model of regional stability is also working inEuropean Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to some extent. EU exercise certain influence
over Ukraine, Croatia and Turkey, and also involved heavily in the Russia-Georgia
crisis. The role of EU in regional stability is becoming more and more important.
On the other hand, Japan has not been active for establishing such a role. Of course,
there are various issues which made it difficult for Japan, such as territorial disputes
with South Korea, China and Russia, and historical issues represented in textbook issue
and Yasukuni, but it is also true that Japanese governments were not eager to takeresponsibilities and initiatives for regional stability. They have not been keen to
activate the economic leverage for altering the attitudes of neighbouring countries, as in
the case of Copenhagen criteria. In my opinion, Japan still has the capability to takeinitiative, but given the fiscal constraints and confusion of its economic condition, it isincreasingly difficult to exercise its influence whereas the growing economies such as
China would possibly be good at doing so.
Having said that, it is misleading just to list up good things about EU. There are somebad examples of EU as a model. First, its effort to anti-terrorism coordination was far
from perfection. Although there has been a significant improvement of Police andJudicial cooperation, notably the intelligence coordination, there are many weak spots.
The most crucial part is the border control on eastern side. Since many Central andEastern European countries joined the EU, the EU border stretched to large extent.
And given the free movement of people, information and money, it is difficult to trace
the traffic of terrorists through EU countries if they use these weak borders. Japan has
also its weakness for border control and intelligence activities in particular. So there
are issues for both of us.

7

Second is the question of non-proliferation. It is no secret that the black market of
nuclear technology developed by A.Q.Khan of Pakistan was composed with thetechnology leaked from Europe. Khan learned the nuclear physics in the Netherlands,
and involved in procuring nuclear sensitive technologies from Switzerland and theNetherlands. Both Japan and most of European countries are the member of
non-proliferation regimes including Nuclear Suppliers’ Group or Wassenar Arrangement,
and it is very difficult to prevent the transfer of technology, however, because of thefreedom of movement of people and goods made it easier for Khan to develop a
network of black market.
Third is a quite different issue on strategic understanding. It is the question withregard to the arms embargo to China. For Japan as well as the United States, lifting
embargo to China would mean a serious empowerment of Chinese military capability.
However, there was a serious discussion during 2004-2005 that Europe would lift
embargo unilaterally. It was largely motivated by political concerns with China, butalso there was an economic interest in selling arms and related goods to China. It isalso true that even the embargo is still effective, European countries export certain
amount of military-related goods to China, which might be classified as arms inJapanese standards. This issue implies that Europe may be very proactive formaintaining the security in Europe, Africa and Eurasian continent, but not so much in
Asia.
What can we do with Europe?
Although there is a big difference in our strategic objectives, relationship with theUnited States and autonomous capabilities, there are many things that Japan and Europe
can do together. First of all, both Japan and Europe have been and continued to becooperative for anti-terrorism actions. Although no one knows how terrorist network
extends worldwide, everyone knows that it does. There has been a strong transatlantic
cooperation on intelligence sharing and coordinated operations for home-grown andforeign terrorist activities. Also there is a certain degree of cooperation between Japanand the United States. Nevertheless, there is little evidence that there is an intensive
cooperation between Europe and Japan. It may be true that the terrorist operations in
Asia and Europe are not strongly linked, but there are reasons to believe that thecooperation is important. For one thing, both Japan and Europe shares to fight against
home-grown terrorism. In 1995, the sarin gas attack in Tokyo shook Japan and the8world. The Aum Shinrikyo was not linked with Al-Qaida or global extremist network,
but it was a religious extreme cult with global ambition. Japan has successfully
contained the threat of Aum Shinrikyo, and it would be a useful asset for othercounter-terrorism efforts. On the other hand, Europe also faced large scale terrorist
attacks in Madrid and London, and there have been many operations to capture terrorist
plans in Germany and Britain. The European experience provides useful lessons forJapan.
In wider context, the fight against terrorism, particularly the actions in Afghanistan, may
be another area where Japan and Europe can cooperate. Although the security
situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating, there is a definite need for reconstruction andfight against Taliban. Under the Constitution, it is not easy for Japan to substantiallycontribute to the ISAF operations, however, Ichiro Ozawa, the leader of the largest
opposition, and potentially next Prime Minister after the election, once expressed his
opinion for sending SDF to ISAF because there is a clear mandate by the UN Security
Council whereas Japanese operation for supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
that was not authorized by the UNSC. Whether Japan sends its SDF to Afghanistan ornot, it is certain that the current operation in Indian Ocean to support OEF is not enoughto show Japanese commitment to counter-terrorism action. Cooperation with Europe
would certainly contribute to build an image that Japan is the ally for counter-terrorism.
Furthermore, it is important for Japan to collaborate in the United Nations. Recently,
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) issued a report analysing that theEuropean effort for carrying out its policy for peace negotiation with Iran, Human
Rights issues in Africa and international development is not well accepted by otherMember States, notably with developing countries, China, Russia and India1. Not onlyin the UN but also in other international organizations, it would be beneficial for both
Japan and Europe to cooperate to achieve the shared objectives. Of course in somecases such as whaling which may not be able to share among us, but there are many
areas where the collaboration would be possible, certainly on the case of anti-terrorism
and other global security issues. In doing so, Japan needs to shift its foreign policy
focus from bilateral relationship with the United States to more multilateral cooperation
with Europe.

1 Richard Gowan & Franziska Brantner, A Global Force for Human Rights? an Audit of European
Power at the UN, European Council for Foreign Relations, 20089

This would imply further cooperation in peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Middle
East or Caucasus. Traditionally, these are the areas where Japan did not express its
interest for contributing peace and stability, but for Europe, these are strategicallyimportant. Taro Aso, former Foreign Minister, and hopeful next Prime Minister,
proposed a concept called “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” including support for newly
democratized countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Jordan, India, Thailand and so on.
The idea of supporting baby democracy and putting pressure for non-democraticsocieties to alter their political regime does not contradict with European principle forexternal policy.
However, we must pay attention for factors which may constrain further cooperative
actions. First, both Japan and Europe shall pay attention how the United States would
react to the cooperation. Obviously, it would support for Japan and Europe tocooperate on counter-terrorism, particularly for strengthening the ISAF, but it would not
do so for the joint effort in the UN. As we have witnessed, the United States wasagainst the European proposal for International Criminal Court of Justice. As long asJapan-Europe activities are coherent with the US interests, there would be no problem,
but it may not be always the case.
Second, we shall pay attention to emerging big powers such as China, India and Russia.
Both Europe and Japan have high stakes in these countries economically and arevulnerable due to economic and energy dependence. These countries might takeadvantage of energy and economic giant for pushing Japan and Europe to be active inpeacekeeping operations (as we can see in Georgian case) and international institutions(WTO would be a good example).
Other than these outside factors, there are many internal factors which would constrain
the scope of cooperation between Japan and Europe. First and foremost, theConstitutional constrains would prohibit full-fledged military cooperation, particularly
in combat action. Such a constraint assumes that there would be no immediate
necessity for developing interoperably as both Japan and Europe do with the UnitedStates. Cooperation in logistics, command and communication infrastructure, andprocurement of military equipments is based on the assumption that there will be a joint
operation with higher degree of integration. However, because of the Constitutional
constraint, there is no such assumption between Japan and Europe. Thus, thecooperation should be based on the division of role and responsibility, i.e. Europe will10

be in the frontline operation whereas Japan would remain in the back seat. This, infact, was the case in Southern Iraq where Japan provided humanitarian assistance while
Dutch and British Armies protected Japanese troops. If this kind of division of the roleis acceptable, the cooperation will be the most efficient one.
The other internal factor is the problem of strategic objectives. As discussed in thecase of arms embargo, European strategic interest is not located in Asia whereas the
security situation in Asia is crucial to Japan. From geopolitical and geoeconomic pointof view, it is not surprising that there is a difference in strategic objectives, but it isworrying for developing further cooperation between Japan and Europe. However,this difference is coming from the lack of mutual communication and recognition as
security partners. Since the importance of China, India, and Russia in the global
security structure is increasing, it would not be wise for Japan and Europe keep awayfrom strategic dialogs. Such a difference can easily overcome, and should overcome,through more intensive dialog between Japan and Europe.
Without strategic objective and necessity to develop interoperability, there is not muchincentive for developing a scheme to share infrastructure for C4ISR. In a modern
period, the security is heavily dependent on the intelligence, surveillance andcommunication, and both Japan and Europe possess technological and industrial
capability to develop infrastructure for C4ISR, but it is difficult to foresee that there will
be cooperation in this domain. However, as discussed above, the cooperation between
Japan and Europe becomes increasingly important, and it would make a lot of sense forJapan and Europe to cooperate in developing common C4ISR architecture. First, it
would reduce dependency on the American intelligence on both sides. Of course,
Japan-Europe cooperation shall not undermine the relationship with the United States,
but this cooperation would be supplement in case where the United States is reluctant
for sharing intelligence. Second, the European experience of multilateral cooperation
on intelligence sharing such as BOC (Besoin Opérationnelle Commun, or Common
Operational Requirements) would give a softer image for Japanese activities to develop
infrastructure for C4ISR. There is a wide spread public perception that any
intelligence activities would be something conspiratorial and intrigue, which mightsneak into a military operation without Constitutional scrutiny. However, thecollaboration with Europe would provide a positive image that such intelligence
infrastructure would be used for better and humane purposes.

11

Finally, the Three Principles of Arms Export Control would be an internal constraint fortechnological and industrial collaboration between Japan and Europe. The Three
Principles is originally defined that Japan would not export arms and related
technologies to (a) Communist countries, (b) countries with UN arms embargo, and (c)countries in conflict or with potential to go into conflict. However, in 1976, the Three
Principles are re-interpreted to: (1) The government will not authorize the export ofarms or related goods and technologies to the countries concerned in the previous Three
Principles; (2) To the countries other than the previous Three Principles, the export ofarms or related goods and technologies shall be abstained, based on the spirit of theConstitution and Foreign Exchange Law; (3) The export of installations related to the
manufacturing arms shall be regulated according to the arms.
Under this 1976 interpretation of the Three Principles, any international technologicaland industrial collaborative programme is prohibited, even with the United States.
Recently, the Three Principles were relaxed only for research and development of
missile defence system with the United States, but these principles remain effective on
everything else. If Japan and Europe try to pursue international collaborative projectfor developing common system, it would be extremely difficult within suchself-imposed regulation. However, there is a sign of hope that the Three Principles
may further be relaxed for non-combat purpose technologies. For example, there is a
discussion on exporting landmine destroyer for ISAF and other peacekeeping operations.
Even equipments important for peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction such as
landmine destroyer was not allowed to be exported because it may be used to adversary
forces to clear up the landmine field for invasion. However, as the case of missile
defence demonstrated, the interpretation of the Three Principle would be made by the
Cabinet, and there is a possibility that the Cabinet may allow the export ofnon-combatant equipments. This policy can be applied for research and developmentof non-combatant, peace-contributing technologies with Japan’s allies. Thus, there is apossibility to collaborate with Europe where expertise and competences on
peacekeeping operations are accumulated.
Conclusion
For Japan, there are many things that can be learned from Europe. From the historicalbackground, the European experiment of establishing perpetual peace and providing
stability and prosperity in and around the region is highly admired by Japanese public.

12

The cooperation with Europe would be more easily acceptable option for Japan than its
cooperation with the United States. Furthermore, the concept of strengthening
autonomous capability from the United States becomes increasingly important in Japan,
while maintaining firm and secure relationship with the United States. Particularly intimes like this, where there are insecurity in the region with unpredictability of Russian
actions, non-transparent Chinese military spending, and uncertainty about the future of
North Korean regime, the autonomous security capability as well as strong coalition
with the United States is crucially needed. The European experience – maintaining
coalition with the United States while developing autonomous capability – is definitely
a lesson that Japan should learn.
Together with the autonomous capability and cooperation with the United States,
Europe has been very active as an international peace maker in Georgia, Lebanon, andIran. This is something that Japan shall learn from it. For many years, it wasconsidered that Japanese weakness in diplomatic effort for peace making was becauseof lack of military capability. However, the EU, not a military alliance or military
superpower, has been quite successful in the peace negotiations and peacekeeping
operations. Of course, Britain and France are UNSC permanent members and possesscertain military capability, but their negotiation is not backed by their military capability.
Mr. Solana, the High Representative of CFSP, and the leader of Presidency of the EU
have certain influence over the global issues, not because they are military giant, but
because they represent EU. Perhaps, Japan as a single country may not be able to do
the same thing as Europeans do, but it would be possible if Japan would cooperate andwork together with its regional neighbours, or with Europe.
There are several areas of security where Japan-Europe cooperation would be fruitfuland contributing to the peace and stability of the world.
It is definitely true that thepeacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace building such as DDR(Decommissioning, Demobilizing and Reintegration) and reconstruction. Japaneseparticipation in the DDR process in Afghanistan (at the initial stage, but withdrew in ashort while) together with the European countries was a good model for cooperation,
though it was the case of American-centred cooperation. It would be fruitful because
Japan and Europe share the similar value in intervening in post-conflict situation.
Both Japan and Europe are not eager to exercise their influence over the territory andcontrol the local governments. Rather both Japan and Europe genuinely contribute to
the peace and reconstruction of the region from humanitarian point of view, and try to13

maintain the peace for economic development. This does not mean that Japan andEurope are contributing because of greed, but it is their interest for having secure andstable global market as economic and non-military giants.
In conclusion, it is logical and rational goal for both Japan and Europe to act together as
global multilateral and civilian forces, contributing peace and stability, for the greater
good of international community. Japan and Europe, as non-military power, economic
giant, conscious on humanitarian issues and allies of the United States, share basic
common foundation for their security policy, and it is unmistakably true that thecooperation would bring a better and secure world.

14