<Nature and Our Future: The Mekong Basin and Japan>

2-2. Mainstream Dam Development: Construction ofthe Xayaburi Dam Forges Ahead without Agreement
According to a strategic environmental impact assessment (SEA) commissioned by the Mekong River
Commission (MRC), implementation of the 11 planned dam projects on the Lower Mekong Riverwould deal a destructive blow to the region, as outlined below1:
1） 55% of the river basin would become stagnant reservoirs or experience sudden changes in flow
due to dam discharge;
2） There would be a 26% to 42% decrease in the numberof fish species, resulting in an annual loss of 50
million USD. Reservoir fisheries would only make up
for one tenth of this loss;
3） Some 100 endemic and endangered species, such as
the Irrawaddy dolphin and Mekong giant catfish could
face extinction;4） Agricultural damage due to submersion would reachan annual 5 million USD. There would be more than A lookout onto the Mekong River Koogkoo
Rapids in northeastern Thailand’s Loei Province.
50% reduction in sediment load, blocking nutrients Chiang Khan District. Local people areand making more fertilizer use necessary, incurring concerned about the Xayaburi dam’s impacts on
the area (May 2010).
additional annual expenses of 24 million USD. Losses
in riverbank farming would result in a loss of more than 21 million USD. The effect ofirrigation from the dams would only bring in about an annual 15 million USD;
5） Impacts would be felt on fertile flood plains and shores in places like Cambodia’s Tonle Sap
Lake and Vietnam’s delta region. Agricultural production and fishing in inland waters andalong the coast would suffer damage. In the delta region, there would be an acceleration oferosion on coastlines and in riverine systems; and6） The livelihood and steady food supply for the approximately 30 million people who make theirliving from fishing would be threatened.
One challenge that the mainstream dams bring to light is the need for joint management and use ofnatural resources in the Mekong Region. This necessity can already be seen in the Sesan River Basin,
where dam projects in Vietnam are having transboundary environmental impacts on downstream
communities across the boarder in Cambodia, and effective solutions have yet to be implemented
either by the governments involved or MRC2. In regard to mainstream development, Laos, Thailand,Cambodia, and Vietnam signed the Mekong Agreement in 1995. This agreement establishedprocedures for negotiation among the signatories, giving MRC its mandate. The MRC’s effectivenessis now being put to the test3.

The Xayaburi Case: The Lao Government Makes Mockery of the MRC
The project progressing most rapidly in the middle and downstream regions of the Mekong River isthe Xayaburi Dam project in northern Laos. In September 2010, the Lao government notified the MRCof the dam plans, and the negotiation procedures defined by the Mekong Agreement were used for thefirst time. Civil society—including local and international NGOs and community organizations that
had already been voicing concerns and objections—and “development partners,” i.e., governments ofJapan, western nations and international financial institutions all became embroiled in the negotiation<2-2>
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procedures. Also, in addition to the aforementioned SEA, additional surveys on impacts on fisheries
and cost effectiveness calculations were conducted. As negotiations progressed, the Vietnamese andCambodian governments raised concerns, and Thai media revealed that the Lao government had
already begun construction related to the dam before negotiations were complete. This resulted ineven more criticism. The MRC, which civil society had been critiquing for its lack of transparency
and failure to disclose sufficient information, held its annual Council meeting (ministerial meeting)in December 2011, and there it was decided to implement an additional survey on mainstream damdevelopment to be funded by the Japanese and other governments. Prior to the Council meeting, theLao government pledged to halt construction until an agreement was reached among member nations.
Attention shifted to whether the Lao government would hold to its promise to stop construction in accordancewith the MRC Council agreement, and whether or not additional
studies were being done with sufficient information disclosure andstakeholder participation. The Lao government, however, continuedconstruction. Based on its own studies, it decided that the impacts ofthe Xayaburi Dam would be minimal and unilaterally claimed that theMRC negotiation process was complete. More recently, not only are thebenefits of the Xayaburi Dam being trumpeted in the government public
The Xayaburi Dam under construction relations paper, the Vientiane Times, Laos is even beginning to launch(July 2012 by International Rivers).
projects such as the Pak Beng Dam in the north, and the Don Sahong
Dam near the Cambodian boarder. While Laos is forcefully pressing forward with its Xayaburi Dam plans,
the MRC and development partners have not been able to come up with an effective course of action, and theMRC in particular is finding that the Mekong Agreement, the foundation of its own existence, is falling apart.

Evidence-Based Consultations are Needed
As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the two main challenges posed by dam projects on theMekong’s mainstream are: 1) a wide range of environmental and social impacts threatening foodsecurity and the livelihoods of tens of millions of people living in the Mekong Basin; and 2) the needfor an effective framework for joint resource management and use. The Lao government neglecting
the Mekong Agreement procedures and forging ahead with the construction of the Xayaburi Dam
are about the worst things that could happen in regard to these two challenges. Proponents of theXayaburi Dam should objectively review the studies which have made the dam’s negative impacts
very clear, recognize the current problems from a broad and long-term perspective, immediately
stop construction, and resume meaningful consultations with civil society. The MRC’s development
partners must provide financial and technical support to conduct supplementary studies to fill in theknowledge gaps (especially regarding transboundary impacts of the Xayaburi Dam) and make othersuch efforts to create an environment for discussion among member countries.
ReferencesInternational Rivers (IR). 2011. Key Findings of the MRC’s Strategic Environmental Assessment on Mekong Mainstream Dams.
Berkeley, California: IR. http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/foretelling-the-mekong-river-s-fate-2634
Mekong River Commission (MRC). Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin 5 April 1995.
http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/agreements/agreement-Apr95.pdf

Toshiyuki Doi

1. Based on International Rivers (2010)
2. See BP 2-4 Cross-Border Environmental Issues: The Sesan, Srepok, and Sekong (3S) Rivers Dam Developments.
3. See BP 2-1 The Mekong River Mainstream: Looking back on Hydropower Dam Development.

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