JAPAN P& I CLUBVol.35 July 2015

P&I Loss Prevention Bulletin
The Japan Ship Owners’
Mutual Protection & Indemnity Association Loss Prevention and Ship Inspection Department

Thinking Safety
Bridge Resource Management and Engine Room Resource Management

Thinking Safety
Bridge Resource Management and Engine Room Resource Management

Index

1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………… 2
2. Thinking Safety
2-1 What is Safety?…………………………………………………………………………………………… 3
2-2 Safety and Culture… …………………………………………………………………………………… 5
2-3 Technicians… …………………………………………………………………………………………… 5
2-4 Human Factors and Human Error……………………………………………………………………… 7
2-5 Causes Which Inhibit Human Abilities………………………………………………………………… 8
2-6 Accident Examples… …………………………………………………………………………………… 11
2-7 Basic Considerations for Preventing Reoccurrence of Accidents… ……………………………… 18

3. Bridge Resource Management (BRM)
3-1 What is Bridge Resource Management (BRM) ?… ………………………………………………… 23
3-2 Physical Resources on the Bridge……………………………………………………………………… 24
3-3 History of BRM…………………………………………………………………………………………… 26

4. BRM in Practice
4-1 BRM on the Bridge… …………………………………………………………………………………… 29
4-2 Clarifying Division of Labor and Ship Handling……………………………………………………… 29
4-3 Increase the Number of Crew on Duty When Passing Through Congested Waters andNarrow Channels with Limited Visibility… …………………………………………………………… 31
4-4 Captain’s Understanding of Crew Abilities and Issuing Thorough Instructions… ……………… 31

5. Engine Room Resource Management (ERM)
5-1 What is Engine Room Resource Management (ERM) ?… ………………………………………… 33
5-2 Three Requirements for ERM…………………………………………………………………………… 35
5-3 Resources to be Managed……………………………………………………………………………… 35
5-4 ERM Examples…………………………………………………………………………………………… 36

6. Thorough BRM and ERM
6-1 Why Have BRM and ERM Not Become Popular?…………………………………………………… 39
6-2 Improving Skill Levels… ………………………………………………………………………………… 40
6-3 Training of Inexperienced Navigators and Engineers with Low Skill Levels……………………… 41
6-4 Meaning and Objectives of OJT - What Is ‘Cultivation’ in the Context of Training… ………… 42
6-5 Requirements for Leaders… …………………………………………………………………………… 50

7. Near Miss and Potential Accident Reports
7-1 Near Miss and Potential Accident Reports…………………………………………………………… 52
7-2 Potential Accident Reports in Practice… …………………………………………………………… 53

8. Conclusion… …………………………………………………………………………… 54
Appendix① Singapore Straits Passage Plan - BRM Briefing Materials (Sample)… ………………………………… 56② Standing Order and Night Order Log（Sample）… ………………………………………………………… 57③ Navigator Education - Navigation Questions and Answers… …………………………………………… 59

JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

Introduction

Chapter 1

Approximately 20 years have passed since the introduction of Bridge Resource Management (BRM) for oceangoing vessels in the mid 1990s.
Proposals for revision of the STCW Convention as related to Engine Room Resource Management (ERM)
were adopted at the IMO Conference in Manila in June 2010. One of these proposals related to the addition of‘Requirements for ERM’ added to the engineers’ abilities requirements list.
While BRM and ERM are understood as an effective means of achieving safe operation of vessels, when actual
implementation is attempted, the word from those on-site is “we can’t get it to work properly’’.
To ensure effective operation of BRM and ERM, it isimportant to raise awareness of crews on-site throughimproved understanding of the overall concept, andin understanding component elements.
In other words, it is necessary that all members of theteam engaged in operation of the bridge and engine
room have a shared awareness, and that this awareness is not limited to specific crew such as captains
and chief engineers.
The following explains the methodology for effective
use of BRM and ERM from the point of view of
those on-site.

BridgeVessel passing through Golden Gate Bridge,
San Francisco

Engine Room

BRM R

ERM R

esourceesource

Management

Management－2－

JAPAN P& I CLUB

Chapter 2

Thinking Safety

The following refers to series of publications for the ‘80th Captains Educational Lecture (Safety in a Proud Occupation, by the late Professor Isao Kuroda of the Japan Institute of Human Factors Institute) held by the Japan Captains
Association on July 31st, 2000.
Expressions such as ‘Safe Operation’ and ‘we pray for your safe voyage’ are heard frequently, however before
explaining BRM and ERM, it is important to consider ‘what exactly is safety?’* 2-1 What is Safety?
If we consider safety from the point of view that, not only thecaptain and chief engineer, but also the entire crew, comprise acollection of technicians, there are many who view safety as beingat the leading edge of technology, and an extension of technology
itself.
In other words, many are of the opinion that ‘as vessel technology
is improved, it automatically maintains safety’.
It must be simply stated that this thinking is incorrect and dangerous.
In the words of Professor Kuroda, ‘Safety must be thought ofas being a social value beyond technology, a dimension beyond
Engine Control Room Console
technology’.
Technologies are specific to various fields, for example, and technology employed in operating vessels, in operating
railways, each being simply a methodology with which our lives are made more plentiful.
Thus, it is necessary to consider that, unless the crew at the frontline of safety in operating the vessel separate safety andtechnology, unless they have a different dimension to safety, safety cannot be maintained.
However, when an accident occurs, the focus is on preventing reoccurrence, and there is a strong tendency to analyze
from a technical perspective, and to develop measures against reoccurrence in technical terms.
For example, a Maritime Accident Inquiry is held following a collision accident, and the vessel is found to be incontravention of Clause XX of the Maritime Collisions Prevention Act.
In consequence, the accident is the responsibility of the person in contravention of the legislation, and that person is then subject to suspension of his/her license for a specified number of days. In other words, the focus is commonly on ‘who was responsible’, and the person in question is punished,and everyone moves on.
However, this approach does not investigate and analyze in practical detail‘why the accident occurred’. As a result, the measures developed toprevent reoccurrence become simply a patch on the problem, and a similar
Launching Ceremony in JapaneseTraditional Style－3－

JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletinkind of accident is likely to reoccur.
Professor Kuroda referred to this as the ‘grave-post type’ of safety measure, i.e. asafety measure which commemorates the accident, calls an end to it, and moves on,
without any connection to preventing reoccurrence.
In fact, what we should really consider are social considerations, for example, ensuringthat no lives are lost, or that no pollution occurs. It is necessary to consider safety fromthe point of view of preventative measures to ensure that the accident does not reoccur.
Professor Kuroda referred to this as the ‘preventative type’ of safety measure.
Safety Management System

An accident-free site, that is, a safe site, is always sought, but is there such a thing as‘safety’? The English psychologist Reason defines safety as ‘having resistance to danger to which an organization isconstantly exposed’.
When we consider operation of a vessel, we focus on existing dangers for example, the dangers of a collision, the dangers of a cargo accident, the dangers of damage to harbor facilities, and the dangers of an engine failure. We thereforesee ‘how to avoid these dangers’ as being associated with safety. As human beings, we face these dangers, and engage inactivities to avoid them.
When proposed measures to prevent reoccurrence are not of the preventative type, many are in the form of guidelines
in the SMS manuals and in Safety Management Regulations for the purpose of preventing reoccurrence of accidents.
Checklists are probably one form of the guidelines. However, implementation of safety management in these guidelines
requires human actions, and thus considerable energy is required. People who lack sufficient energy will therefore necessarily take the easier path. In operation, there is a tendency to ‘check without confirmation’, even though a checklist
has been prepared, and this may be a background factor in reoccurrence of the same type of accidents.
Furthermore, the common personality traits of personnel with high levels of skill such as the captain, chief engineer,navigator, and engineer conflict with these guidelines, and as a result, it is undeniable that the proposed safety management becomes a mere shell of the original in a very short space of time.
A considerable amount of study is required of seamen, in particular, in order to obtain a seamen’s license. The true
meaning of this study becomes effective when qualifications are obtained and they commence working on a vessel.
However, in practical terms, the majority of seamen, once acquiring qualifications, exhibit a tendency to simply performdaily duties without expending effort in further study. Furthermore, while participation in training on days off iscommon, if we think of the true meaning of ‘study’, it is unsatisfactory to refer to simply showing up ‘education andtraining’.
Safety in the true sense requires raising one’s awareness, and improving the safety management culture in the organization.
BRM and ERM, and SMS manuals and Safety Management Regulations, are tools for the purpose of improving safety.

！

Important

Improving one’s awareness, and improving safety
management culture

BRM is one way of achieving these goals－4－

JAPAN P& I CLUB* 2-2 Safety and Culture
As described above, considerable energy is required to activate the system developed within safety management. This
energy must be seen and derived from the safety culture. When we consider this culture, we must see it in terms of thefollowing three components.

1. Science

2. Skill

While this goes without saying, a theoreticalknowledge (e.g. physics) is necessary in
the world of ships. For example, when
stopping the vessel by reversing theengine, an understanding of accelerationis necessary to understand how far thevessel will move ahead with a given
horsepower applied, and how
many minutes it will take.

3. Technicians

Skill is the ability to use scientific theory.

Technicians are persons making best use

Skill differs with the manner in which it isof the skills with a methodology derived

used. Skill is a methodology for effectivefrom the technology. Persons activating

use for the benefit of society, andthe safety management system area means of taking scientificalso considered technicians.

principles to society.

* 2-3 Technicians
Electronic charts, GPS, and AIS have been introduced at a rate hitherto unimaginable, and provide a much greater
volume of information than previously in visual format.
These technologies are integrated on the radar screen to provide digital displays of information such as movement ofvessels, vessel names, and closest point of approach. Technology is available to issue alarms for vessels which are at acollision risk via ARPA (Automatic Radar Plotting Aid).
At the same time, technicians are responsible for setting the point at which alarms
are issued, and for the decision as to whether or not to use the various information
displayed. These devices do not automatically control the vessel to avoid dangers
in navigation. Until the development or the robotic vessel of the future, the captainand chief engineer as technicians, will conduct an overall evaluation of the provided
information and control the vessel accordingly. In addition, vessels employing M0－5－

Inside the Bridge- passenger vessel

JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

operation are increasing in the engine room, and a considerable proportion of operation is now automated. However,even if operation of individual engines can be automated, the captain and chief engineer as technicians view the entire
engine room as plant operated using the five senses to prevent problems, are still necessary.
Technicians are therefore required to acquire knowledge and skills for safe operation of the vessel and devices toensure safety, and obtain a seamen’s license as evidence of having such knowledge and skills. In other words, safe
operation of the vessel and devices is extremely complex and difficult. There are therefore considerable differencesin decision-making and discretion involved in this work, and the seamen’s license can be considered as providing thenecessary authority.
‘Safe operation of the vessel and devices’ is the subject of much expectation from the wider society, and from thispoint of view, the following are required.

！

ImportantRequired： Ability to predict accurately
Evaluation of information provided, and prediction to avoid associateddangers.

Means to achieve these requirements: Experience

Experience is important in improving
the ability to predict
However, the question arises as to why technicians holding a seamen’s license cause the same type of accidents. To
answer this question, it is relevant to point out that highly skilled captains and navigators, and chief engineers andengineers, share common characteristics as noted below.

1.

Pride and confidence in one’s work and skills.

2. When hearing of an accident, they have a strong
conviction that‘I would never cause an accident
like that’.
3. Behind this there is the assumption that safety
comes naturally if one has a high level of skill.  
4. Feel offended by imposition of Safety Management Regulations and SMS manuals etc. from the
management division.  
5.

Occlusive. Protect each other, particularly in thecase of an accident.

6.

Mistakes are matters of acute embarrassment,
and concealed.

－6－

JAPAN P& I CLUBMany readers of this document will undoubtedly be in agreementwith the above. It has occurred to me that all six points apply to me
personally! As an aside, a few years ago, I was aboard a 330m container vessel of approximately 80,000 G/T. After avoiding anchoredvessels and fishing boats while navigating to the specified anchorageprior to passage through the Suez Canal, the anchor was lowered
precisely at the specified location. Furthermore, large changes incourse were made in the Singapore Straits etc. without deviating fromthe planned course on the electronic chart, and the resultant track of
the vessel was able to be displayed.
However, I regularly told my navigators to ‘steal skills to learn’,but none appreciated my guidance. Only the Chief officer’s wife,
the family member on board, graciously commented that my skill
in comfortably navigating such a large vessel was admirable. Thisappreciation brought a tear, and left me without words.

Container vessel anchored off-Singapore

Within the context of the modern world in which technology changes
from day to day, the mission of a technician is one of lifetime study.
It is also necessary to improve awareness through a calm appreciationof one’s own personality. Awareness in prevention and prediction toguard against accidents, creation of one’s own technical framework Plotting Chart - Departing Jeddah, Saudi Arabia(or use of an existing technical framework), its implementation, and constant consideration of what is the mostimportant in its use, is constantly required.

！

Important

Lifetime study
Calm evaluation of one’s own personality
Constant awareness in prevention andprediction to guard against accidents

Increased awareness in everything!
* 2-4 Human Factors and Human Error
Maritime accidents have many causes. In the case of collisions, 80% - 90% are said to be due to insufficient watchkeeping, that is, human error. Furthermore, most accidents are due to a chain of errors, rather than a single error.
If we assume that ‘humans are error-prone’, preventing the chain of human error is a matter of BRM and ERM
designed to achieve safe vessel operation by raising awareness of bridge and engine room teams.
Let’s consider ‘human factors’ and ‘human error’ in this context.

－7－

JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin
Human factors
The study of human factors is the study of the skills and the limitations, andcharacteristics of persons necessary to ensure that systems comprised of machineryand technology function safely and effectively.

Human error
Human error is defined as ‘behavior against expectations’ which is an unintentional
departure from the target to be achieved.

When an accident occurs solely due to human error, the person directly responsible and those in the vicinity are able
to ask ‘What was the mistake?’ and consider the cause on that basis. In most cases, the immediate matter is considered
and a caution given, or in some cases punishment is applied. However, this is the grave-post type of safety measure,and can be considered as of no use at all in preventing reoccurrence.
Rather, the preventative type of safety measures are necessary in which we ask why the accident occurred, and what
was the background to the accident, and consider the best means to prevent reoccurrence.
Nobody operates a vessel or an engine with the expectation of causing an accident. We must be aware that the humanbrain does not possess a ‘voluntary error generation mode’, and that investigating ‘causes which inhibit human abilities’ is associated with preventing reoccurrence.

* 2-5 Causes Which Inhibit Human Abilities
This section considers the mechanism which gives rise to errors inhibiting human abilities.

1. Human Characteristics
Human characteristics as viewed in terms of the information processing process are as shown in Fig. 1. A large
amount of information exists in the surroundings. We evaluate which information to use and the criteria for this evaluation are our past experience and the results of our training.
Humans make an overall evaluation of the various information available and take action. New information appears as
a result of this action. This process is then repeated.

－8－

JAPAN P& I CLUBInformation processing

Large amount of information obtained from external sources

Past experience

Evaluate which
information to use

Results of training

Take action

Fig. 1The process of deciding which information to use is shown in Fig. 2. Approximately 80% is not through individual
evaluations but through our daily activities. As a result, unconscious errors occur, leading to honest mistakes. With
BRM and ERM, an accident occurs if this error chain continues.

Evaluate which
information to use

80% is not through individual
evaluations, but through our daily
activities

Unconscious
behavior

Unconscious errors occur,
leading to honest mistakes
Fig. 2
Causes which inhibit human motion characteristics are as follows. (from Nihon VM centte “Anzen no Komado” No.18 30/6/2002)

Twelve human characteristics❶ Human beings sometimes make mistakes❷ Human beings are sometimes careless❸ Human beings sometimes forget❹ Human beings sometimes do not notice❺ Human beings have moments of inattention❻ Human beings sometimes are able to see orthink only one thing at a time

❼ Human beings are sometimes in a hurry❽ Human beings sometimes become emotional❾ Human beings sometimes make assumptions❿ Human beings are sometimes lazy
⓫ Human beings sometimes panic⓬ Human beings sometimes transgress when
no one is looking

If we consider the above, it appears that human beings are nothing but a collection of defects and shortcomings.
However, from another point of view, ‘human beings have wonderful abilities’.
－9－JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

❶
❷
❸
❹

Attention dispersal model⇔

Simultaneously perform multiple tasks effectively

Evaluate and act on assumptions⇔

Able to make overall decisions

Make decisions on limited information⇔

Able to make decisions efficiently

Haphazard behavior⇔

Able to make flexible responses to suit the conditions

Human beings have a wide range of information input systems, with a single processing system. This system is easilyinterrupted, and the focus easily switched.
Furthermore, human beings tend to seek the comfortable option, to have real intentions and stated reasons, to be
sleepy in time zones, and to find work harder as they become older. These problems are controlled with ‘attentiveness’and ‘awareness’ as information processing sources, however they are limited and become causes of an inability to
avoid errors.
For example, investigation of the time zones in which vessel collisions occur show that it is most common between
2am and 6am, and 2pm and 4pm, which is likely due to these factors.

2. Human behavior patterns: Rasmussen’s SRK behavior pattern
When human beings initiate any kind of behavior, this behavior is processed in a number of steps depending on thedetails of the behavior.
Rasmussen, a Danish cognitive scholar, described this simply with his SRK model in which human behavior can beconsidered in terms of three patterns (S, R, K).

Intuitive behavior bypassing the information（Ｓ：Skill-base）

１ process, behavior at the reflex level

For example, when climbing stairs, we climb without verifying the height in centimeters of each step. Behavior repeateddaily in which we intuitively know the height of each step. Such behavior is mostly unconscious and automatic, and not
determined by verification against memory and knowledge acquired through past experience and the results of training.
Errors such as tripping occur on stairs of unfamiliar height.

2（Ｒ：Rule-base）

Behavior at the rule levelNot to the same extent as the reflex level above, but behavior in accordance with habits and rules learnt in work in which
one is comparatively experienced.
A short period of time is required in comparison to reflex level behavior. Errors due to mistakes of fact, mistakes inselection of rules, and mistakes in application of procedures.

3   Behavior at the knowledge level（Ｋ：Knowledge-base）

Behavior when responding to situations not normally experienced. Behavior with which problems must be resolved with
one’s own knowledge when responding to difficult matters and malfunctions which occur rarely etc. An evaluation ismade that something has occurred, the objective defined, measures developed based on one’s own knowledge of what
to do, a procedure planned, and behavior initiated. In some cases, a new investigation must be conducted to obtain theappropriate information, and a response initiated. Requires more time than behavior at the rules level. Errors are induced
through misunderstanding of fact, lapses of memory, and misapplication of knowledge.

These three behavior patterns are affected by stress, fatigue, the content and volume of information, and the personality of the individual, and these factors affect the frequency of the induced errors.
For example, even an experienced veteran sometimes acts unconsciously when distracted, due to a desire for something, or under external pressure.
－ 10 －JAPAN P& I CLUB

* 2-6 Accident Examples
The following are two examples in a consideration of measures to prevent an accident reoccurring.
Accident example (1)The first example relates to a collision between a container vessel (9,977 G/T) and a fishing vessel (8 G/T) at
Genkainada in off-Hakata port. Movement of both vessels prior to the collision is shown in Fig. 3 and Table 3 (source:
Judgments on the Maritime Accident Inquiry Tribunal website).

Accident example (1)Vessel S

Vessel T

Slightly before 15:14
Vessel T found with ARPAassistance at distance of
3 nautical miles

Reference drawing

Vessel S not noticed
until collision

14：57
Co <112>
Spd 15.6kts

appended ﬁgure 1
15：19
Vessel T veriﬁed with
ARPA at distance of
1.9 nautical miles
Course changed to
<107>

1000

0

1

0

15：22
Vessel T veriﬁed with
ARPA at distance of
1.0 nautical miles
Course changed to<098>

Collision
at 15:26

小ロ島

玄界島灯台

Nokitaﬁshing port

10000m
5M

Port of
HakataFIg.3

Collision example (1) location: Genkainada weather: cloudy SE wind, wind strength 2, good visibility

Time

Distance
to othervessel(nautical
miles)

Vessel S

Vessel S, 9,977 G/T, container
vessel, with 18 Chinese crew.
From Port of Qingdao, China
bound for Port of Hakata.
Original course <112>
Speed 15.6 Kts
Second mate and able seaman on duty.

Vessel T

Vessel T, 8 G/T, fishing vessel,with 2 Japanese crew.
Returning from Genkainada to
Nokita fishing port.
Original course <180>
Speed 15.0 Kts
Captain on duty.

Slightly
before15:14

3.3

Vessel T verified at range of 3 nautical miles (offcenter) on radar, supplemented with ARPA.

Determined that no other vessels were in vicinity, and switched to automatic steering. Commenced processing catch with deck crew.

15:19

2.0

Based on ARPA information, thought vessel T
was cutting across bow, changed course 5º toport to course of <107>.

Continued above work.
Did not notice vessel S.

1.0

Based on ARPA information, thought CPA was
0.1 nautical miles crossing ahead, changed
course 9˚ to port to course of <098>.
No warning signal and no joint action

In situation in which vessel S was visible, however, continued with above work.

Turned full to starboard immediately before
collision. Insufficient. Collided with bow whenturned to <114>.
Grazing marks amidships on port side.

Did not notice until collision, continuing on same
course and speed.
Crushing of bow plating, no injuries. Returned to
Nokita fishing port under TOW by consort.

15:22

15:26 Collision－ 11 －

Table 3

JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin+ Maritime Accident Inquiry Judgment - main points +The judgment of the Maritime Accident Inquiry is summarized as follows.

１
2

Principal text

License of captain of vessel T suspended for 1 month.

Applicable legislationC lause 15(Crossing Situation) of COLREGS …
– International Regulation for Preventing Collision at Sea

Note: Clause 15.1(Crossing Situation) of COLREG
 hen two power-driven vessels are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the vessel which has the other on her own starWboard side shall keep out of the way and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel.

3  	 Outline of accident

After completing fishing, the fishing vessel T (8.0 G/T) headed for the fishing port of Nokita in Fukuoka Prefecture.
After determining that no other vessels were in the vicinity, the vessel was switched to automatic pilot. The bridge
was left unattended and the captain commenced processing the catch with the deck crew. Vessel S was unnoticed
until the collision.
Vessel S verified the image of vessel T on radar, assisted by ARPA, at a distance of 3.3 nautical miles approximately
15 minutes before the collision, however movement was not verified. The vessel was further verified again visually
7 minutes before the collision, however it was thought that it would continue to cross the bow of vessel S, and course
was altered 5º to port to ensure sufficient distance for avoidance. Change in heading was subsequently not verified,and course again altered 9º to port 4 minutes prior to the collision. Turned full to starboard immediately prior to thecollision, however this action was insufficient, resulting in the collision.

4 	 Cause of accident

5

Primary cause

Insufficient watch-keeping by vessel T

Secondary cause

Vessel S did not issue warning, and no joint action (action as will best aid to avoid collision) was taken.

Discussion of causes
Vessel TV essel should have been under control of one crew on watch. Avoiding action could
have been taken if a crew member was on watch.

Vessel S

T he possibility of collision would have been apparent if watch-keeping or look-out were
sufficient and crew had not relied solely on the ARPA signal.

+ Transport Safety Board Report – main points +The Transport Safety Board report is summarized as follows based on causes and measures to prevent reoccurrence.

１ Causes
The 2 crew of vessel T were busy processing the catch and ignored watch-keeping or proper look-out. The
second officer of vessel S assumed that vessel T would take avoiding action.

2 Reference (measures to prevent reoccurrence)• Sound horn as necessary, and signal to attract attention.
• The most appropriate joint action is necessary when it is apparent that the burdened vessel is unable to avoid
collision solely by adjustments to course of the give-way vessel.
• Do not leave the wheelhouse unmanned while under way, and maintain a sharp look-out on the surroundings
as appropriate.
－ 12 －JAPAN P& I CLUB
Accident example (2)The second example relates to a collision between a container vessel (44,234 G/T) and fishing vessel (18 G/T) in
Katsuura Light House off Chiba Prefecture. Movement of both vessels prior to the collision is shown in Fig. 4 andTable 4 (source: Judgments on the Maritime Accident Inquiry Tribunal website).

Accident example (2)Vessel B

22:46
Co <230>
Spd 17.0 kts

Chiba Prefecture

Collision at 23:12

Katsuura
lighthouse

23:02
Co <230>
Spd 17.0 kts
47

23:02
Co <018>
Spd 8.5 kts

°

22:30
Co <018>
Spd 8.5 kts
1000 0
190°

°

7
23

1

Vessel H

2000m

15M

0

Fig. 4-2 Enlargement of Area Within Blue Rectangle

23：12

Collision

23:02
Co <230>
Spd 17.0 kts

Vessel B
23:07
Co <230>
Spd 17.0 kts

22:08
Co <090>
Spd 8.0 kts

23:08
Co <230>
Spd 17.0 kts

23:07
Co <018>
Spd 8.0 kts

23:02
Co <018>
Spd 8.0 kts

Vessel H

Fig 4-1－ 13 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

Accident example (2) location: Katsuura Bay off Chiba Prefecture weather: rain wind NNW, visibility 7-8 nautical miles
Vessel B

Time

Distance
to othervessel(nautical
miles)

44,234 G/T container

vessel with 21 Filipino crew
Bound for Tokyo from Oakland USA
Original course <230>

Vessel B

Speed 17.0 Kts
Third mate and able seaman on
duty

22:30

14.7

ー

Course <018>, 8.5 Kts full speed ahead.
Sitting in chair watching radar.

Course <230>, speed 17.0 kts. Generalconversation with able seaman continued
until 23:08. Radar range set to 12 nautical
miles.

ー

2.0

Situation allowed vessel H to be recognizedapproaching Northwards at distance of 2.0
nautical miles 7.5˚ <237.5> off starboardbow, however it was not noticed. Communications of other vessel monitored on
VHF.

Radar set to 3 nautical miles range.
Recognized vessel B on radar at a distanceof 2.0 nautical miles 37.5˚ <055.5> off
starboard bow. Not supplemented with
ARPA. Situation allowed mast lights andgreen light of vessel B to be verified visually,and passage on vessel B’s heading was able
to be verified, however it was not verified
visually.

1.4

Vessel H proceeded further on the sameheading. The situation allowed recognition of
the other vessel at 15.5˚ <245.5> on the starboard bow at a distance of 1.4 nautical miles,
however it was not noticed.

Able to pass starboard-to-starboard at
6.3 cables on a heading of 47.5˚ <065.5>
off starboard bow at a distance of 1.4
nautical miles, however attempted to passport-to-port without ARPA assistance.
Furthermore, gave rise to the danger ofanother collision with a course of <090>.

0.6

The able seaman discovered vessel H to
starboard at 0.6 nautical miles and reported it
to the third mate, however after changing theradar range to 6 nautical miles and checking
the image, was unable to find the vessel.

ーCollision

The mast lights and red light of vessel H wererecognized as a danger 27˚ <257> on the
starboard bow at a distance of 0.3 nautical
miles. A long blast was sounded on the horn
and the wheel turned hard to starboard,
however it was too late and the collisionoccurred as the bow was turned to <237>.

(approx)

22:46

10.5
(approx)

23:07

23:08

23:11

23:12

Vessel H

Vessel H 18 G/T fishing vessel with
3 Japanese and 3 Indonesian crew
Returning to the port of Choshi fromfishing grounds 410 nautical miles
south of the port of Chosi off Chiba
Prefecture.
Original course <018>
Speed 8.5 Kts
Captain on duty alone

Vessel B recognized on radar at a distanceof 0.3 nautical miles 13˚ <077> off port bow
and turned hard to starboard, however it was
too late and the vessel collided with the bowof vessel B as the bow was turned to <190>.
The vessel sank, however all crew were
rescued by vessel B.

Table4－ 14 －JAPAN P& I CLUB+ Maritime Accident Inquiry Judgment - main points +The judgment of the Maritime Accident Inquiry is summarized as follows.

１

Principal text２

Applicable legislation

License of captain of vessel H suspended for 1 month.
S ince vessel H turned to starboard after passing in the bow
direction of vessel B, giving rise to the danger of a collision,
no regulation exists in legislation. This case is therefore
judged in accordance with Clause 38 and 39 (normal duties ofseamanship) of the Japan Maritime Collisions Prevention Act.

Note: Clause 38 of the Japan Maritime Collisions Prevention Act (special situations associated with dangers
in approach)In construing and complying with these Rules due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation andcollision and to any special circumstances, including the limitations of the vessels involved, which may
make a departure from these Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger.
Note: Clause 39 of the Japan Maritime Collisions Prevention Act (responsibility for negligence)

Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner, master, or crew thereof, from theconsequences of any neglect to comply with these Rules or of the neglect of any precaution which may
be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case.
Note: Statutory interpretation of normal duties of crew: From description of the Japan Maritime
Collisions Prevention Act.
‘Normal duties of crew’ is commonsense to all those associated with maritime matters, and covers ‘theknowledge, experience, and practices of seamen’. Scope is wider since it is not limited to ‘operation’ as
in ‘Appropriate practices for operation of vessels’ (Clause 8.1). A typical example is the avoidance ofanchored vessels by vessels underway.
Note: Clause 8(a) of the Maritime Collisions Prevention Act(a). Any action to avoid collision shall be taken in accordance with the Rules of this Part and shall, if thecircumstances of the case admit, be positive, made in ample time and with due regard to the observanceof good seamanship.

３ Outline of accident
Vessel H was proceeding north with vessel B underway on a south-easterly heading to starboard as required
when there is a danger of collision. The captain of vessel H was sitting in the chair watching the radar (set to
3 nautical mile range), and recognized vessel B on the radar at a distance of 2 nautical miles (not assisted by
ARPA). At this point, the vessel passed in the bow direction of vessel B, however no visual check was conducted. The image on vessel H’s radar shows 47.5˚ to starboard at a distance of 1.4 nautical miles. Attempted topass port-to-port on a course of <090>, however vessel B had already passed in the bow direction of vessel H,
and the heading for a collision was set.

－ 15 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

The navigator on duty on vessel B was busily engaged in conversation with the able seaman, and neglected
to watch the radar and conduct visual checks. Although he was monitoring VHF communications of the othervessel, he neglected watch-keeping. The able seaman first noticed vessel H at a distance of 0.6 nautical miles
and reported it to the navigator on duty, however the navigator continued trying to find vessel H on the radar
without conducting visual checks. The only measure taken was to switch the radar from 12 to 6 nautical milerange, and since the STC (Sensitivity Time Control circuit), used to eliminate sea clutter) was applied to a highdegree, vessel H was not found.

４ Cause of accident
Primary cause

Vessel H placed vessel B (ready to pass without problems) in a new danger of collision.

Secondary cause

Vessel B neglected to watch the surroundings sufficiently, did not issue a warning, anddid not take action to avoid collision.

５ Discussion of causes
Vessel H• Had the duty to sufficiently monitor and issue caution of movement of vessel B to ensure that a new
danger of collision did not occur.
• Should have used ARPA assistance, radar plots, and visual verification.
Vessel B• Should have kept watch and sharp look-out by radar and visual observation.

+ Transport Safety Board Report – main points +The Transport Safety Board report is summarized as follows based on causes and measures to prevent reoccurrence.

１

Causes
Vessel H•••

Turned to starboard without monitoring the movement of vessel B sufficiently.
Assumed that when turning to starboard, the other vessel must be avoided by passing port-to-port.
Did not appropriately monitor movement of the other vessel using the electronic cursor on the radar, andARPA.

Vessel B••

The third officer did not pay appropriate look-out to radar and visual checks.
Attention was directed to conversation and communications of the other vessel, and not to appropriate
watch-keeping.

２ Reference (measures to prevent reoccurrence)•

Do not allow conversation to interfere with watch-keeping and look-out.

－ 16 －JAPAN P& I CLUB••

Ensure that radar is watched appropriately.
Ensure that changes in heading of the other vessel are carefully measured with the radar cursor and
ARPA, make accurate decisions on the possibility of collision, and maintain a safe distance while passing.

Major revisions were made to the Japan Maritime Accident Inquiry Act in May 2008, and causes of accidents are now
clarified as follows by the Transport Safety Board.

Before and after comparison of
Maritime Accident Inquiry Act
Revised Maritime Accident Inquiry Act(revised May 2nd, 2008)

Previous Japan Maritime Accident
Inquiry Act
Clause 1

BeforeThis legislation is designed toclarify the causes of maritime
accidents through inquiry by
the Marine Accidents Inquiry
A g e n c y, a n d t o c o n t r i b u t e
towards preventing theirreoccurrence.

after

Clause 1
This legislation determines proceduresfor inquiry at the Maritime Accident
Inquiry Tribunal established in the
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure andTransport for the purpose of providing
disciplinary punishments for maritime
accidents caused by intentional or unintentional neglect of duty by maritime
technicians, small vessel operators,
or pilots, and to contribute towards
preventing their reoccurrence.

Clarification of causes of maritime accidents
Transport Safety Board Establishment Act(revised May 2nd, 2008)(Purpose)
Clause 1
This legislation establishes a Transport Safety Board to accurately conduct investigations toclarify the causes of air accidents, railway accidents, and maritime accidents, the causes ofdamage arising from such accidents, and to seek implementation of the necessary policies
and measures by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and persons associatedwith causes based on the results of these investigations, and to contribute to preventing such
accidents, and to alleviating damage arising from such accidents.

The Maritime Accident Inquiry touches on the causes of accident when determining disciplinary punishments formaritime technicians etc., however the primary task of clarifying causes is the work of the Transport Safety Board.
In the case of collisions, lawyers for both parties negotiate the division of responsibility based on the judgment of the
Maritime Accident Inquiry and the Transport Safety Board, however in some cases it appears that causes as noted by
the Maritime Accident Inquiry and as investigated by the Transport Safety Board differ.

－ 17 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin* 2-7 Basic Considerations for Preventing Reoccurrence of Accidents
Consideration of the causes of the two accident examples introduced above, and points common to parts related topreventing reoccurrence, are as follows.

+ Maritime Accident Inquiry +In accordance with the New Maritime Accident Inquiry Act, Japanese holders of a seamen’s license are subject topunishment by suspension of license for a period of one month, and responsibility for the cause of the accident, thereason for punishment, is sought in terms of crew negligence.

+ Transport Safety Board +It refers to enforcement of watch-keeping and look-out, cooperative action by burdened vessels, and failure to issue
warning signals, however the point of ‘why was that action taken?’ appears not to have been touched.
Grave-post and preventative types of measures have been explained above. In the following, human characteristics,
factors which inhibit these characteristics, and the occurrence of human error will be considered in relation to reoccurrence of the same accidents if preventative measures are not developed.
In other words, most accidents are caused by human error. From the Accountability type of measure inwhich the person is investigated to determine what mistakes were made, responsibility apportioned,
and the curtain drawn, it is necessary to change our awareness to the pursuit of background factorsof human error, investigating ‘why it happened’, and the development of valid measures of theCountermeasures-oriented type.

！

Important

A change in awareness from the Accountability
type to the Countermeasures-oriented type

If we return to the point of view of preventing reoccurrence of the same type of accident, we need to change ourconsideration of accidents and phenomena.
As noted above, no one undertakes a task, or pilots a vessel, with the intention of causing an accident. Furthermore,
if we consider the matter in terms of human factors, punishment of the person involved has no suppressive effect, andmakes no major contribution to preventing reoccurrence.
In other words, when developing preventative measures, an analysis in terms of the following points is necessary.

1. Analyze the accident from the point of view of the person involved.
Analyze the phenomena occurring up to the accident in terms of ‘what would I have done if it had happened to me?’.

－ 18 －JAPAN P& I CLUB

2. Consider human characteristics
Consider why human error occurred, and the background factors, in terms of ‘Human Characteristics’ in 2-5.

3. Based on a consideration of causes
Analysis results in terms of ‘should’ and ‘should have’ simply conclude with seeking responsibility of the person
involved, and are meaningless from the point of view of preventing reoccurrence. It is necessary to return to the origin
and consider that matters collapsed, giving rise to the accident.
Use of the M-SHELL model, an element in Bridge Resource Management explained in Chapter 3 results in thefollowing.
As shown in Fig. 5, the person at the center (resources such as: ‘:Hardware: ’, ‘:Person responsible for the accident ) is surrounded by those:Software’, ‘:Environment’, and ‘:Persons other thanthe person responsible for the accident.’ Each resource is always in a state of change. This situation can beshown in terms of quivering rectangles. Here, if communication and cooperation between the person ‘
those resources are insufficient, ‘’ and’ is unable to have sufficient contacts with others and human error occurs; inconsequence, safety is no longer assured.

M-SHELL ModelYou
Hardware
SoftwareEnvironment
People around you

Management(managing and activating the SHELL)→ ＢRＭ / BTM※Refer to chapter 3 for “BTM”

Fig. 5The accident example has been summarized in Fig. 6 and Table 6 by evaluation against human characteristics andanalysis using the M-SHELL model.

－ 19 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin+ Accident example (1) +Human Characteristics and Comparison of Behavior of Persons Involved
Human characteristics
①
②
③
④
⑤
⑥
⑦
⑧

Human beings sometimes makemistakes
Human beings are sometimes
careless
Human beings sometimes forget
Human beings sometimes do not notice
Human beings have moments ofinattention
Human beings sometimes are able tosee or think only one thing
Human beings are sometimes in a hurry
Human beings sometimes emotional
Human beings sometimes makeassumptions

Vessel S
2/O

Behavior

Vessel T
captain

Behavior○

Turned to port despite being stand-on
vessel.

×

ー

×

ー

○

○
×

Ignored Maritime Collisions Prevention Act.
ー

○
○

○

Verified only with ARPA.

○

Aware of need for watch-keeping,
however intervals were too long.
Ignored Maritime Collisions Prevention Act.
Did not notice other vessel.
Aware of need for watch-keeping,
however did not execute.

×

ー

○

Busy processing catch.

×
×

○
×

○

In a hurry to return to port.
ーThought all was normal, and no
problems.
Aware of need for watch-keeping,
however did not execute.
ー
Nobody on-site to call attention to
insufficient watch-keeping.

⑩ Human beings sometimes lazy○

⑪ Human beings sometimes panic
Human beings sometimes transgress⑫
when no one is looking

×ーーAssumed other vessel would takeavoiding action.
Did not issue warning signal or takeappropriate action.
ー

×

ー

⑨

○

○
○
×

Table 6

Analysis of Accident Example (1) Using SHELL Model
Exclusive node

Why

Why

Why

Cause

Preventative type measures

Engaged automatic
pilot and continued
processing catch.

Did not notice othervessel, even at a distance of 1 nauticalmile, and did not
check radar.

Did not notice othervessel until just before collision. Nobody on-site tocall attention to insufﬁcient watch-keeping.

Insufﬁcient awareness of importanceof watch-keeping.
No order of priority
for tasks.

Instruction of Maritime
Collisions Prevention
Act.

Give-way vessel, but
took no action.

In a hurry to return toport.

Thought all was asusual and no problems

Vessel T supplemented with ARPA at 3
nautical miles, however did not continue
monitoring.

Veriﬁed ARPA informa tion a t the distance of 2 and 1 nautical miles, but did not
check visually.

Assumed that othervessel would takeavoiding action.

Vessel T captainB o th cr e w sbusy with processing catch.
Did not keep
watch.

Insufﬁcient understanding of Maritime Collisions Prevention Act.
Impatient and lack of
caution.

Instruction in importance of watch-keeping and watch-keeping by various means,and veriﬁcation ofchanges in azimuth.

Vessel S second ofﬁcer
Did not issue
warning signal,or take joint
action.

Crossing burdenedv e s s e l, h o w e v e rturned to port twice.

Insuf ﬁcient understanding of watch-keeping by various means.

Insuf ﬁcient understanding of Maritime
Collisions Prevention
Act.

Did not issue warning
signal, or take joint
action, at 1 nauticalmile.

Instruction in trafﬁc
regulations in Maritime
Collisions Prevention
Act.
Instruction in importance of watch-keeping by various means,
and in veriﬁcation ofchanges of azimuth.

Exclusive node: Direct and indirect causes of accident.
(Node: A point of focus for speech, behavior, or a decision etc.)
Fig. 6－ 20 －JAPAN P& I CLUB

5 of the 12 human characteristics apply to the second officer of vessel S, and 9 of the 12 apply to the captain of vessel
T. An analysis using the M-SHELL model of why the behavior was taken in relation to these characteristics using isshown in Fig. 6.

In the examination of causes by the Maritime Accident Inquiry, and in reference to the Transport Safety Board(measures to prevent reoccurrence), associating primary causes and measures to prevent reoccurrence are associatedas the exclusive node, and items verified against human characteristics as ‘why?’ in considering corresponding
resources. Thus, the cause becomes apparent as a background factor, and preventative type improvement measures canbe established for that cause.
In this accident example, ‘Reeducation of Maritime Collisions Prevention Act’ and instruction on the ‘importance ofwatch-keeping, watch-keeping by various means, and verification by change in bearing’ were established as measuresfor both vessels. These factors are considered as a commonsense result by the vessel operator.
Note: Exclusive node: Direct and indirect causes.
(Node: A point of focus for speech, behavior, or a decision etc.)+ Accident example (2) +Accident example (2) similarly summarized in Table 7 and Fig. 7.
Human characteristics

Vessel B
3/O

Behavior

Vessel H
captain①

Human beings sometimes makemistakes

×

ー

○

②

Human beings are sometimes
careless

×

ー

×

ー

③ Human beings sometimes forget

×

ー

×

ー

Human beings sometimes do not④notice○Did not conduct watch-keeping.

○

Verified other vessel solely by radar.

⑤

Human beings have moments ofinattention○

Negligent in watch-keeping.

○

Verified other vessel solely by radar.
No visual verification.

⑥

Human beings sometimes are able tosee or think only one thing○

Distracted by VHF and conversation.

○

Verified other vessel solely by radar.

⑦

Human beings are sometimes in a
hurry

×

ー

×

ー

⑧ Human beings sometimes emotional

×

ー

×

ー

Human beings sometimes makeassumptions○

Thought that radar displayed imagesof all vessels.

○

Assumed that all crossing must be
port-to-port.

⑩ Human beings sometimes lazy○

Did not verify visually.

○

Sitting in chair concentrating on radar.
Did not conduct watch-keeping byvarious means.

⑪ Human beings sometimes panic

×

ー

×

ー

○

Did not carry out captain's
instructions (careful watch-keeping).

○

Did not conduct watch-keeping byvarious means.

⑨

Human beings sometimes transgress⑫
when no one is looking

Behavior
Gave rise to another danger ofcollision.

Table 7
Verification against human characteristics shows six characteristics applicable to the third officer of vessel B, and 7
applicable to the captain of vessel H. Exclusive nodes can be taken as ‘did not notice other vessel until immediately
prior to collision’ for vessel B, and ‘operation giving rise to a new danger of collision’ for the captain of vessel H.

－ 21 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin
Analysis of Accident Example (2) Using SHELL Model

Exclusive node

Why

Why

Why

Cause

Preventative type measures

Sitting in chair concentrating on radar.
Did not use ARPAassistance.

Vfd on radar but did
not carry out visualchecks.

Checked radar only
immediately before
collision. Did not carry out visual checks.

Insufﬁcient awarenessof importance ofwatch-keeping. Did notuse various means forwatch-keeping.

Instruction in Maritime
Collisions Prevention
Act.

Give-way vessel, but
took no action.

Passed in bow direction ofother vessel, but attempted to pass port-to-port
and turned to starboard.

Gave rise to a new
danger of collision.

Insufﬁcient understandingof Maritime Collisions
Prevention Act, and turned
to starboard based onassumptions.

Busy in conversation
with able seaman,neglecting
watch-keeping.

Busy listening to
VHF, neglecting
watch-keeping.

Did not follow
captain’s instructions(enforcement ofwatch-keeping).

Insufﬁcient knowledgeof importance ofwatch-keeping, andinattentive

Vessel H captain
Gave rise to
new dangerof collision.

Instruction in importance of watch-keeping
and watch-keeping byvarious means, andveriﬁcation of changes
in bearing.

Third ofﬁcer ofvessel B
Did not noticeother vessel
until just before
collision.

Received report fromable seaman on
approach at 0.6
nautical miles, however
checked only on radar.

Insufﬁcient knowledgeof radar settings andimages. Relied too
much on radar.

Instruction in trafﬁc regulations in Maritime Collisions Prevention Act.
Instruction in importance of watch-keeping
by various means, andin veriﬁcation of changes of bearing.
Instruction in radar performance.

Exclusive node: Direct and indirect causes of accident.
(Node: A point of focus for speech, behavior, or a decision etc.)
Fig. 7
In accident example (2), as with accident example (1), it can be seen that ‘Reeducation of Maritime Collisions Prevention Act’ and education on the ‘importance of watch-keeping, watch-keeping by various means, and verification bychange in bearing’ were necessary. Additionally, for the third officer of vessel B, ‘instruction in radar performance’
was also necessary. The method of instruction for crew is described in Chapter 6.

－ 22 －JAPAN P& I CLUB

Chapter 3

Bridge Resource Management (BRM)

This chapter describes the outline and history of BRM.

* 3-1 What is Bridge Resource Management (BRM)?
Bridge Resource Management is the effective use (M as in management) of the range of resources (R: personnel,
objects, information) available on the bridge (B) for safe and efficient operation of the vessel. The term Bridge TeamManagement (BTM) has also come into use in recent years.
The following describes the difference between BRM and BTM.
As described above, the objective of BRM is the effective use of resources (including personnel) on the bridge, inparticular the effective use of human resources for management functions which must be implemented by a leader ofan organized team.
However, the achievement of safe operation is not simply due to the efforts of the leader, but it requires all membersof the team to raise the level of their abilities. Improved functioning of all members of the team, including the leader,is essential. The function to achieve this, including management, is the BTM.
From the relationship between the two, the functions which must be achieved by the leader of the team are positioned
as BRM, and since the leader is a member of the team, he/she must achieve BTM as a function to be executed as amember.

！ BRM is a part of BTM, and a function to be achieved by the leader.

BTM is a function to be achieved by all members of the team.

Important

The following explains the situation before the introduction of the concept of BRM and BTM, and the difference
between the two.
In terms of the work performed on the bridge, there
is no difference in the work of watch-keeping,vessel positioning, external communications, andYou
handling navigation equipment etc. However, if
Hardware
we combine resources and consider matters from
Softwarean outline of human factors, BRM and BTM are
Environment
intended behavior. Here it becomes the concept ofPeople around you
the M-SHELL model.

M-SHELL ModelManagement(managing and activating the SHELL)－ 23 －→ ＢRＭ / BTM

JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

As described above,(You) at the center, and the surrounding resources, are never static. BRM and BTM act toensure good communication with each resource, eliminate causes inhibiting the 12 motion characteristics of humanbeings, and suppress the occurrence of errors.

* 3-2 Physical Resources on the Bridge
How communication between physical resources on the bridge and human resources take place?

1. Hardware
Hardware provides information available from various navigational equipments(radar, ARPA: Automatic Radar Plotting Aid, electronic charts). Binoculars arealso an important item of hardware.
If visual information such as radar images and electronic charts is available,
audio information emitted by ARPA etc. is also available. In particular, information for the prevention of collisions requires the operator’s communication withthe equipment to set ARPA alarms. Furthermore, work to obtain
information by aligning the ARPA cursor on information onother vessels on radar images requires communication with the
hardware.
Thus, the pilot is required to be skilled in the use of the
hardware, and information set manually must be shared withthe team. For example, even if the captain sets the CPA: Closest
Point of Approach, and TCPA: Time to CPA, alarms in the
ARPA settings, the officer on duty may sometimes change thealarm settings without the permission of the captain if the alarmis excessively loud. However, from the BRM point of view, thisbehavior gives rise to misunderstandings by team members in
relation to alarm tones and further errors.

2. Software
Software cover navigation regulations such as the Maritime Collisions Prevention Act and the Maritime Traffic Safety
Act, and procedures determined in SMS manuals and safety management rules. Movement of stand-on vessels whencrossing is regulated under Clause 17 of the Maritime Collisions Prevention Act (stand-on vessels) as ‘unless suchaction is impossible, the stand-on vessel is required to turn to port’.
However, the second officer of vessel S in accident example (1) turned to port after evaluating only the ARPA
information CPA and the vector, and did not visually check the change in bearing of the other vessel. Furthermore, fornavigation in conditions of restricted visibility, Clause 19.5.1 of the Maritime Collisions Prevention Act regulates that－ 24 －JAPAN P& I CLUB‘when other shipping is in a position abeam or forward
of abeam (excluding the case in which one’s own vessel
passes the other vessel), one’s own vessel changes course
to port’ shall be followed unless such action is impossible.
However, in conditions of restricted visibility, most collisions are due to one of the vessels not monitoring vessel
movement sufficiently with radar etc. while turning toport. In such cases, the navigator on duty and the captainhave ignored the requirements of the Maritime Collisions
Prevention Act.
Many accidents can be prevented by simply following
the procedures laboriously established in SMS and safety
management regulations. In such cases, as well, it isnecessary not only to determine the responsibility of theperson on duty, but also to investigate causes in terms of why the regulations were not followed.

3. Environment
Handled as environment in the SHELL model. The following information from external sources is relevant.

Information from External Sources● N avigation information: For example, MARTIS information from theMarine Traffic Center.
● Weather maps and navigation alarms● Communications with other vessels via VHF etc.
● Navigation alarms from the Maritime Safety Agency● Various information from the company

In particular, with navigation under conditions of restricted visibility in congested sea areas and narrow channels, a
careful examination of information obtained via VHF to identify valid and invalid information is necessary, however
the priority of work must be clarified simultaneously before taking action. The third officer in example (2) was busy
listening to the VHF communications from the other vessel, and engaged in conversation with the able seaman,neglecting watch-keeping, resulting in the collision.
Very few maritime collision accidents resemble motor vehicle collisions in which the two vehicles are head-on. Most
reports indicate that the collision occurred despite the other vessel having been already recognized. In most cases, theMaritime Accident Inquiry and the Transport Safety Board Report indicate insufficient watch-keeping. However, mostcollision accidents can be prevented not only through awareness of the insufficient watch-keeping ‘exclusive node’,
but also by breaking the error chain.

－ 25 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

Fig. 8 shows the error chain up to a collision accident.

Insuﬃcient
watch-keeping

errorCollision

Delay in noticing
other vessel

Timing of avoidance
action delayed

Insuﬃcient mutual
understanding

Assumptions in
avoidance action

Collision accidents can be prevented

by breaking the error chain

Fig. 8The initial error chain was insufficient watch-keeping. This gave rise to a delay in noticing the other vessel, and as
a result, the start of avoidance action was delayed. Then the assumption that the other vessel would take avoidance
action was made without confirming the name of the other vessel in the AIS information in order to call it on VHF
to verify each other’s intentions; and a collision resulted. A collision could have been prevented by executing one ormore of these five error chains.

* 3-3 History of BRM
The concept of human factors was first introduced at the Hawthorne plant of the US electrical manufacturer WesternElectric between 1924 and 1930 in an effort to improve efficiency of work.
Subsequently, the idea that machines must be suited to human characteristics in order to obtain optimum results was
taken up in the US in 1940 for the manufacture of military equipment during WWII.
A large number of aircraft accidents occurred in the 1960s, and while no major change occurred in the accident rate,
the greater size and number of aircraft resulted in an increase in the number of casualties. It became apparent that if
the accident rate continued, by the year 2000, an aircraft accident would occur every week somewhere in the world.
A sense of impending crisis grew in the aircraft industry that the public would come to view an aircraft as an unsafe
mode of travel.
In 1971, the training in ‘Human Factors in Transport Aircraft Operation’ commenced at Loughborough University－ 26 －JAPAN P& I CLUBin the UK. Voice recorders and flight recorders were then fitted to aircrafts, and the majority of aircraft accidents
subsequently were considered to have resulted from human error.
The trigger for the training by the airline industry incorporating human factors was the accident at Tenerife described
below.

Jumbo Jet Collision at Tenerife
This accident occurred in the island of Tenerife in the Spanish territory of the Canary Islands at 17:06 local
time on March 27th, 1977 on the runway at Los Rodeos airport.
The accident involved two 747 Jumbo aircraft, one KLM, and one Pan American, the aircraft colliding on the
runway after failing to visually identify each other. A total of 583 passengers and crews were killed, with 54
passengers and 7 crews surviving. The accident was the worst in the history of the airline industry.

● Circumstances of the accident
The captain of the KLM aircraft released the brakes and began moving down the runway. The co-pilot notedthat clearance had not been received, and a few seconds later checked and obtained clearance from the controller.
This clearance was only for ‘standby to takeoff’, and not for ‘takeoff when ready’. When the controller issued
clearance he used the term ‘takeoff’, and it is thought that crew on the KLM aircraft understood this as permission for ‘takeoff when ready’. At 17:06:23 the KLM co-pilot, speaking with a Dutch accent, responded witheither “We are at take off” or “We are taking off”. The controller was confused by this response, and in turnresponded with “OK”, followed after a 2-second silence by “Stand by for take off. I will call you”. This ‘OK’and the following 2-second silence subsequently became a point of contention.
The crew on the Pan Am aircraft were listening to this conversation, and immediately felt uneasy and warned
that “No, we are still taxiing down the runway”. This silence from the Pan Am aircraft occurred immediately
after the 2-second silence noted above, and on the KLM aircraft, the crew heard only “OK”, and transmission
then became inaudible due to interference, and nothing was recorded.
On the Pan Am aircraft, the 2-second silence was interpreted as completion of the controller’s transmission, and
the Pan Am crew then began transmission, however controller was still holding down the send button, resulting
in the interference. Neither the controller nor the Pan Am crew noticed this interference.
Thus, the Pan Am crew thought that the warning had reached both the KLM aircraft and the controller, thecontroller thought that the KLM aircraft was waiting at the takeoff position, and the KLM crew thought that
‘OK’ meant that permission to take off had been issued, and opened the throttle for takeoff.
Due to the thick fog, the KLM crew thought that the Pan Am 747 was still on the runway, and were unawarethat it was moving in their direction. Furthermore, personnel in the control tower were unable to see either
aircraft, and even worse, no ground control radar was installed on the runway.
There was, however, one last chance to avoid the collision - only 3 seconds after the conversation noted above,the controller asked the Pan Am crew to “report when runway is clear”. The Pan Am crew responded with “OK,
we’ll report when we’re clear”. The KLM crew heard this conversation clearly, and the KLM fight engineer
feared that the Pan Am aircraft was on the runway. The conversation at this point was recovered after the－ 27 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

accident from the cockpit voice recorder of the KLM aircraft.
KLM flight engineer ：“Looks like it’s still on the runway”.
KLM captain：“What!”

KLM flight engineer ：“Looks like Pan Am is still on the runway”.
KLM captain/co-pilot ：“We’re OK”(in a strong voice)

The situation was that the KLM captain was not only the superior of the flight engineer, but also one of themost experienced pilots. It appears that in this context, the flight engineer clearly hesitated to push the point.
Since 1980, CRM (Cockpit Resource Management) has become a fixture, and the training is now conducted in theairline industry.
Currently, Crew Resource Management includes cabin staff, and thus includes all crew. In Japan, the training wasintroduced in 1985 triggered by the Osutakayama crash.
In the maritime world, BRM training was introduced in Europe and the US in the 1990s. In Japan, it was introducedby large shipping companies in 1998.

－ 28 －JAPAN P& I CLUB

Chapter 4

BRM in Practice* 4-1 BRM on the Bridge

BRM was introduced to ocean-going vessels almost 20 years ago. As described in Chapter 2-4 Human Factors andHuman Error, BRM was introduced with the understanding that ‘everyone makes a mistake’ and ‘there are limits toabilities’, and to cover the weakness of human beings on the bridge with team work and information to ensure thaterrors do not lead directly to a threat to the safe operation of the vessel.
However, while the efficacy of BRM is understood, complaints to the effect that it cannot be put into practice on-site
are heard. The following explains how to use BRM to ensure that it functions effectively.

* 4-2 Clarifying Division of Labor and Ship Handling
BRM: Division of Navigator / Crew when captain increases numberof assistant navigators and watch-keeping personnel

ＡＲＰＡ

Captain* Requests for information* Decisions on behavior* Instructions on behavior

Eng.Telegraph

Visual information
reports
Watch-keeping
personnel

Trafﬁc information

Navigator on duty

Answer BackSteering instructions

Course information* Requests for information

Course, distance, speed,* Decisions on behavior

advice on timing of turns* Instructions on behavior

ETA information
External communications

Visualinformation
reports
Quartermaster

Captain's instructions

Assistant navigator

Chart

Reports by personnel on duty

Fig. 9Fig. 9 shows the command structure for steering of the vessel when entering and leaving port, in congested Fig.9
areas, andin narrow channels with increased numbers of assistant navigators and watch-keeping crew.
1

CaptainTakes command at the center of the bridge.
In particular, when giving instructions to change course and for engine control, it is important to explain theintentions to team members if sufficient time is available. For example, to change course and reduce speed
to avoid another vessel, or course change towards the next turning point and increase or decrease speed to
avoid another vessel. It is also necessary to clarify switching between manual and automatic pilot to the able
seaman.

－ 29 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

2

Navigator on duty

The primary task is watch-keeping work using ARPA, while using the engine telegraph and communicatingwith other sections of the vessel such as the engine room and deck. Follow the instructions of the captain in
communicating with engine control and other sectors of the vessel, and advise captain on steering.
3

Able seaman on duty

Focus on steering of vessel, as well as watch-keeping.
4

Assistant navigator

Verify vessel position and associated reports on course, giving successive reports on course and distance tonext turning point, assistance in steering timing, and external communications via VHF.
5

Increasing number of watch-keeping crews

Focus on watch-keeping tasks, and also quick and clear reporting to all bridge crews on current situation ina clear voice.

Instructions of the leader (captain), instructions of team members, and reports must be heard by all crew members on
the bridge. To which crew each instruction is addressed must clearly be understood, and repetition of the message isrequired for all instructions and reports from the leader.
It is important that the leader in command of the vessel repeat the message and visually confirm all reports from teammembers. For example, identification of other vessels moving in the vicinity, verification of reports from the able seaman with the rudder indicator, and verification of engine speed during engine operation.
Caution is required on the following points by the leader (captain) and team members when considering this bridge teamcommunication.
Leader (captain)

Verify vessel position and associated reports on course, giving successive reports on course and distance tonext turning point, assistance in steering timing, and external communications via VHF.
Repeat content of report. Answering with a simple ‘Understood’ or ‘OK’ does not constitute verification whenlarge amounts of information are current. In other words, in these situations, it becomes unclear what the answer
referred to, and which task or report is ‘OK’.
Team members

Report simply and clearly.
Care is required with instructions by the leader to other crew on duty, and with reports to the leader. Ensure thatall questions on each instruction and report are resolved.

When taking over from the navigator on duty, even the captain is formally required to take command of the vessel. It is
important the captain declares to all crew on the bridge that ‘I am taking control’ to clarify that he now has responsibility.
In one case, an ocean-going shipping company notes the taking of command of the vessel in its bell book and daily
navigation log.
Conversely, if this is not the norm and the captain repeatedly issues sudden instructions to the able seaman to change
course, and communicates personally with the engine room without communicating these details to the crew on duty,
the bridge crew will automatically assume that the captain takes command of the vessel when he comes up to the bridge,
resulting in errors. .
－ 30 －JAPAN P& I CLUB* 4-3 Increase the Number of Crew on Duty When Passing ThroughCongested Waters and Narrow Channels with Limited Visibility
While a captain’s view that, if possible, the navigator and able seaman should rest after cargo handling after entering
port, and when leaving port immediately after cargo handling, is admirable, if we consider the priority requirement forsafe operation of the vessel, it is important not to hesitate to increase the number of crew on duty at these times.
When the schedule for passing through navigation
areas such as congested waters and narrow
channels can be predicted, a plan to increase thenumber of crew on duty can be scheduled inadvance, allowing for crew working hours etc. tobe planned.
The passage plan in Table 10 shows the watch
level, and who is to be added for watch-keeping.
Watch level
Watch level
1
Watch level2
Watch level3
Watch level
4

Personnel
Navigator on duty

Captain
Captain

Able seaman on duty

Navigator on duty
Navigator on duty

Able seaman on duty

Total 2 persons

Navigator on duty

Total 3 persons

Captain

Able seaman on duty

Increasing number of watch-keeping crews
CaptainControl of vessel

Total 4 persons

CaptainNavigator on duty

Assistant navigator

Able seaman on duty

Increasing number of watch-keeping crews

Captain

Total 5 persons

Table 10

* 4-4 Captain's Understanding of Crew Abilities andIssuing Thorough Instructions+ Understanding Crew Individuality and Abilities +Abilities of individual navigators and able seamen differ considerably. The captain should understand the following
points.

(1) Knowledge and skill
It is important to understand the knowledge of traffic regulations and handling of navigational equipment, and the levelof skill of each crew member on duty.

－ 31 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

A wide variety of training, notably simulator training, of navigators isundertaken, however nothing is more effective than experience gained onsite. Understanding the efficacy of OJT (On the Job Training) as described in
Chapter 6, and training crew, is an important part of the work of a captain.
As far as time allows, briefing and debriefing of all on duty when enteringand leaving port, and passage through narrow channels is important not onlyin terms of actual operations, but also as an effective method of OJT (seeAppendix (1) Singapore Straits Passage Plan BRM Briefing Materials (sample)).

(2) Individual differences (individuality)
Human beings exist in many different personality types, for example, those who are overconfident, those who are
negligent, and those who are quiet and modest.
In bridge work, it is necessary to provide consistent BRM training that minimizes these individual differences including the provision of methodology for instructions and reports stated above.

(3) The limits of ability
The captain cannot handle an infinite amount of work. For example, it is impossible to check the position of the vesselon the chart, issue steering commands, and communicate on VHF while watch-keeping, all simultaneously, for eventhe most experienced captains. It is therefore important to have a plan for crew deployment that allows for sufficient
time to carry out tasks.

+ Thorough instructions +Standing orders and the night order log are very important in providing practical instructions on such matters as the CPA
to be followed, the minimum visibility (in nautical miles) at which a report to the captain is required
The watch level is often handled only by the navigator and able seaman on duty. If the details of the captain’s instructions are not fully understood, matters are at the discretion of the navigator on duty, giving rise to errors in communication between the captain and navigator on duty (see Appendix (2) Standing Orders and the Night Order Log (sample)).
Appendix (2) provides a sample of Standing Orders and a Night Order Log issued by the author while aboard the vessel.
The author has obliged the navigator to read aloud the Standing Orders each time before coming on duty.
The Night Order Log was not only read thoroughly and signed before coming on duty, but the navigator previously on
duty explained verbally the main points to the current navigator.
As described previously, it is necessary to clearly accept authority to control the vessel. Even the captain must formallybe handed over the control after accepting it from the navigator on duty.
In terms of BRM/BTM, the most important point is ensuring the atmosphere on the bridge. It is an important duty of thecaptain to ensure that the atmosphere is always one in which anyone with doubts is able to verify as necessary.
As explained in * 4-1, by clarifying the division of labor of crew on duty, wasteful duplication is avoided and efficient
BRM/BTM can be practiced.

－ 32 －JAPAN P& I CLUB

Chapter 5

Engine RoomResource Management (ERM)+ From ‘Maritime Human Resource Institute: Engine Room Resource Management’ +* 5-1 What is Engine Room Resource Management (ERM)?
Proposals for revision of the STCW Convention were adopted at the IMO Conference in Manila in June 2010. One ofthese proposals related to the revision of Requirements for ERM added to the engineers’ abilities requirements list.
This requires knowledge of abilities in the list and ‘Maintaining Safe Engine Watches’, knowledge of ERM in termsof understanding and skills, and their practical implementation.
To ensure the functions of ERM, it is important that all crew grasp the overall picture, understand the constituent
elements, and increase their knowledge in practice. Furthermore, both ERM and BRM are shared knowledge, notsomething which can be implemented if understood by specific crew, and it is vital that all members of the team havea common awareness of this requirement.
ERM is a method of ensuring safe operation of the vessel through appropriate management of resources in the machinery space (resources: equipment and plant, crew, information) while using these resources effectively. The revisedabilities requirements list regulates the following as important items when practicing ERM.

Abilities requirements list
● Disposition of resources● Duties and order of priority● Effective communication● Clear indication of intention and leadership● Situational awareness● ‌Apply the experience of team members, and under-

stand the principles of ERM
Resource management is summarized in Fig. 11.

Resource
management

Crewmanagement

Optimum disposition based on qualiﬁcations and quality

Equipment
management

Operation management, maintenance management,
management of operation and maintenance records

Information
management

Sharing of information throughout the ship, recording of information,
optimum understanding and response to information

Fig. 11－ 33 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

The correlation diagram for ERM requirements based on the ability requirement list is shown in Fig. 12.

Skills and elements comprising ERM
ERM principles

Resource duties

Resource
disposition

Communication
Clear indicationof intention

Leadership

Employ experienceof team members

Situationalawareness

Determine order ofpriority for resources

Management
Resource: Object of management
Equipment
and
plant

Team members

Information

Fig. 12This diagram shows that communication is the most important element in ERM, that leadership and clear indication of
intention are abilities based on the foundation of communication. Applying the experience of team members is also an
ability based on the foundation of communication, and shares points with leadership.
The three requirements (duty, disposition, determine order of priority) related to resources and situational awareness have no commonality with communications, and can be seen as independent requirements. The principles of
ERM are these four as shown within the rectangle, and are elements shared within ERM. They are the disposition ofcrew necessary for maintenance of safe operation, and the principles related to abilities necessary for crew and scopeof activities.
In particular, ERM principles for implementation are, as per the ‘ERM Principles in the 2010 Revised STCW Convention’, regulated in Part 3 (General Principles of Duty Maintenance) of the revised STCW code A-VIII/Section 2 (Duty
System and Principles to be Observed).

－ 34 －JAPAN P& I CLUB* 5-2 Three Requirements for ERM(1) Resource disposition(2) Duty
Resource disposition and duty are requirements related to humanresources. It indicates that crew assigned duties in accordance with
their occupations should be disposed appropriately and is the part
corresponding to ‘

’ in the BRM SHELL model. In particu-

lar, within the context of preparing for entry and exit from port, itis necessary to develop an appropriate command structure and asystem for effective operation of equipment. An optimum disposition of crew is required over and above the normal work on thevoyage. While keeping in mind the need for the right man in the right place, positioning of experienced crew in thenecessary locations according to the situation, and training of younger crew in these situations should be considered.

(3) Determining order of priority
Crew assigned to management of specific equipment are required to thoroughly read and understand the manual forthe equipment, and obtain sufficient information on its operation and maintenance in order to develop operation andmaintenance plans. They must also record detailed information on operation, maintenance, and consumption of spareparts to ensure that successors have the appropriate information.

* 5-3 Resources to Be Managed
The three resources to be managed (plant and equipment, crew, information) are shown in Fig. 12.

(1) Plant and equipment management
Plant and equipment is required to have the functions necessary for operation of the vessel and equipment must be
disposed in a manner optimum for maintenance of safe operation of the vessel, and functions of the plant and equipment must be sufficiently manifested.
Management of plant and equipment involves management of operationof each item of equipment, maintenance management, and management ofrecords of operation and maintenance. Temperature, pressure, and operational
status are transmitted by each item of equipment, and such information must
be received and viewed.
Crew on duty in the engine room are in charge of operation and maintenanceof the equipment, and are therefore naturally required to circulate periodicallyaround the engine room, however they must also be aware of slight changes
in noise and vibration etc. emitted by the equipment as a sign of problems.

－ 35 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin(2) Crew management
Crews are dispersed around the vessel to ensure safe its operation. In addition to having the appropriate abilities to carry out their duties, including
relevant maintenance, they must also have the ability to manage and makegood use of other crew. Each member of the crew is required to have agood understanding of the functions of the plant and equipment, verify thatthese functions are available, and understand the information from the plantand equipment and be able to use it.

(3) Information management
Information from spaces other than the machinery space, e.g. fromthe bridge, information from each item of plant and equipment in themachinery space (e.g. noise, vibration, temperature, pressure, alarms), andinformation from team members ensures good teamwork and therefore effective equipment operation and continuing high levels of team motivation.
In particular, although information from external sources tends to be insufficient, for the engine room team, understanding the external situation can be difficult: therefore information on the movement of the vessel permits prospective responses, and is useful in improving the reliability and speed of equipment operation. Exchange of information
with the bridge is therefore a matter of the utmost importance.
Each member of the team must be aware of the fact that he/she is associated with operation of the vessel, and that it
is important to share information held by the team and by the individual on any point that is a source of concern. The
chief engineer, as the leader, and the first engineer, are responsible for creating this atmosphere in which informationis shared.

* 5-4 ERM Examples
The ERM videos at the Maritime Human Resource Institute website
introduces the main points of ERM. Videos are available on the
homepage stated below:
Maritime Forum
http://www.maritime-forum.jp/en/index.php)

Maritime Education and Training

Maritime Forum

http://www.maritime-forum.jp/en/index.php－ 36 －JAPAN P& I CLUB

1. Situation
Problems with No.2 generator in the engine room while on standby to enter port.

2. Description● S tarted the No.2 generator. Commenced operation of two gen-erators in parallel, and third engineer immediately commenced
checks.
● T he third engineer monitoring the No.2 generator on-site

noticed that the increase in temperature was a little too rapid,
but thought that it would settle down.
● A fter a period of operation, the No.2 generator’s No.1 cylinder

exhaust temperature alarm indicated ‘High’. The No.3 generator
was started in the engine control room and the No.2 generator was shut down.
● R eduction in speed of the main engine continued while switching over to the No.3 generator, and S/BEng. preparations were completed, however the second engineer was busy with the generator problem
and forgot to notify the bridge and chief engineer in the engine room. Upon receiving a request for
confirmation from the bridge, he noticed his mistake and reported the trouble to the chief engineer.
Simultaneously, the main engine exhaust temperature dropped, requiring closure of the exhaust gas economizer damper, however the second engineer forgot.
● T he chief engineer shouted at the second engineer to reprimand him for the two mistakes.
● T he first engineer in the engine control room, at his own decision, instructed the third engineer to replace theNo.1 cylinder fuel valve which was the cause of the alarm from the No.2 generator.
●

The third engineer at the generator anticipated that (1) S/B Eng. was approaching, and that the labor
required in replacing the fuel valve would make a response to another emergency difficult, and (2) if theNo.2 generator was unusable there would be no backup generator: therefore, if, for some reason, a problem
occurred with the generator during operation, the vessel would
have insufficient power. The third engineer made these twopoints to the first engineer.

● T he chief engineer accepted the third engineer’s suggestions

and halted the replacement of fuel valve of the No.2 generator,and decided to undo the operation and hold it as the standby
generator, issuing appropriate instructions to all members of
the engine section.

－ 37 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

3. The ERM point of view
A consideration of the above case from the ERM point of view reveals a number of interesting points.
● T he third engineer was at the generator when it commenced operation. This is the standard

position and enables immediate communication with the engine control room.
Consider the division of labor and dispersal of crew to appropriate positions.
● T he third engineer thought that the exhaust temperature was increasing too rapidly on the No.2

generator, though did not report this fact.
On the basis of his intuition, he did not share the information sent from the equipment with otherteam members and his superiors. If he had, it would have resulted in cautious monitoring from thecontrol room, and the situation being resolved before an alarm sounded. Doubts and thoughts must
be conveyed to the leader.
● T he second engineer noted the condition of the No.2 generator, and did not report completionof S/B Eng. preparations to the engine control room crew and to the bridge. And also, he forgot
to close the damper.
T here may be a subsequent problem with operation of the vessel if there is no confirmation from thebridge. The order of priority was not determined for the tasks (duties) in hand.
● T he chief engineer shouted at the second engineer.

This had the effect of inhibiting communication with the second engineer and other members of theteam. All needed was to instruct him to close the damper calmly.
In terms of maintaining a system of good communication, shouting in an emotional tone should be
avoided at all costs.
● T he third engineer judged and suggested from the point of view of the person in charge on-site

the first engineer’s instruction to replace the fuel valve should not be carried out because of thesmall possibility of another problem.
 his corresponds to the ERM rule thatT
doubts must be voiced out, and was gooddecision-making that he clearly expressed
his intention.
I t was also the correct decision in terms ofboth verifying the situation, and determining the order of priority.

－ 38 －

Let's do theregular auxiliary engine
switch-over while wehave the time.
engine switch-over while
we have the time.

I'm a bit worried
about doing it at
this time.

JAPAN P& I CLUB

Chapter 6

Thorough BRM and ERM* 6-1 Why have BRM and ERM Not Become Popular?
Despite 20 years having elapsed since the introduction of BRM, neither BRM nor ERM have become popular. Possible causes are given below.

Possible causes
1） If technical skills are at a high level, it is assumed that ‘safety is guaranteed’.
2） M anagement is not seen as a skill, and the traditional idea of separate
deck and engineering sections remains strongly entrenched.
3) C rew training is primarily on OJT, leaving responsibility to the site.

A revolution in awareness is required in light of this way of thinking, the way of thinking of safety, the question ofwhat is management, and reconsideration of OJT, as described in Chapter 2.
The captain, chief engineer, and the company are required to develop ‘an atmosphere in which subordinates (i.e. teammembers) are able to speak up on matters of safety in operation’. This is the foundation of effective use of BRM andERM.
In comparison with the shipping industry, CRM (Crew Resource Management) appears to be running smoothly inthe airline industry. When we compare the two, it appears thedifference lies in the level of technology. In an aircraft, thedifference in level of skill between the captain and the co-pilot
is appears to be greater than between a ship’s captain and chief
officer, or between a chief engineer and engineer.
For example, if the captain of an aircraft were incapacitated inflight, the co-pilot should be capable of landing.
On the other hand, can a third officer operate his vessel safely
to its destination? There is a major difference between ships
and aircrafts in terms of the methodology of crew training,
including up-skilling.

－ 39 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin* 6-2 Improving Skill Levels(source: Japan Captains’ Association DVD - Individual Competence That Support BRM - How to Improve the Skill
Level of Inexperienced Navigators)
The nine technical elements necessary for navigation with watch-keeping crew are listed below.
❶ Skills associated with watch-keeping❷ Skills associated with measuring vessel position❸ Skills associated with handling navigation instruments (e.g. radar)❹ Skills associated with exchanging information by communication❺ Legislative compliance skills❻ Vessel piloting skills
 anagement skills to identify the work necessary in response to a situation, and assign and execute❼ M
an order of priority❽ Skills associated with verifying charts etc. before going on duty
❾ Skills for emergency response to equipment problems

When the captain takes control of the vessel and is assisted by the navigator, able seamen, and watch-keeping crew
in navigating in congested waters and narrow channels, or when entering and leaving port S/B, ❶ Skills associatedwith watch-keeping, ❹ skills associated with exchanging information by communication, and ❼ Management skills
to identify the work necessary in response to a situation, and assign and execute an order of priority become apparent
when evaluated in terms of whether or not they are used effectively for BRM.
Execution of BRM will be inhibited unless skill levels for other than ❶ , ❹ , and ❼ are able to satisfy the levels of
the bridge team members (including the team leader). As a result the ability of the entire bridge team will deteriorate,
leading to errors.
In particular, ‘threats’ are sources of errors. With BRM and ERM, if threats are considered as elements which
increase the possibility of errors, the following can be noted.
● A large volume of work (i.e. not enough personnel available to do the work)● T ime pressure (when the leader is in a rush and this is picked up by team members, it will leave everybody

unsettled)● P ressure from superior (in particular, regularly shouting at subordinates, scaring them into silence, and inhibiting
operation of BRM and ERM)
● F
 atigue and stress (attention is distracted when fatigued, and external stress is a cause of deterioration in abilities)
In other words, unless BRM and ERM can operate properly, not only will errors occur, but stress will develop
between the leader and team members, giving rise to a vicious cycle.

cle
y
c
s
u
Captain
Vicio
Inexperienced Navigator

Captain becomes emotional due to stress.
Inexperienced navigator becomes scared to
speak out, and communication deteriorates.

－ 40 －JAPAN P& I CLUB

* 6-3 Training of Inexperienced Navigators andEngineers with Low Skill Levels
To prevent errors, inexperienced navigators and engineers with low skill levels must individually and objectively
evaluate and understand the skills with which they are deficient, and endeavor to reach the level of an experienced
captain/navigator or chief engineer/engineer as soon as possible.
OJT and training on shore are methods used in training inexperienced navigators and engineers with low skill levels.
However, the awareness and motivation of the trainee is important.
If we consider the level to which skills can be raised with OJT and shore training, Student Oriented in Fig. 13 below
provides guidelines.

Student Oriented

Extent to which skills are picked up

With written texts

10％

With audio-visual materials (e.g. videos)30％

Coach shows by example

50％

Student tries him/herself

70％

A change in awareness of
the individual

100％

70% achievableby pushing education

A change in awareness of
the individual is important.
Guidance must be accompanied by motivation.

Fig. 13
Approximately 10% of skills are considered to be learned in classroom lessons using written texts. These skills consist
primarily of fundamental theory and knowledge.
Use of videos, PCs, and the Internet as audio-visual materials is considered to raise the skill level to approximately
30%.
Subsequent practice and OJT in which the coach demonstrates is considered to increase the skill level to 50%. Further
use of simulators and OJT to provide the student with experience is considered to increase the skill level to 70%. Insummary, pushing the student is effective to a certain degree, however the 100% skill level is only achieved on-site.
Increasing the remaining 30% skill level is fundamentally a matter of changing the awareness of the individual.
Education at this stage is primarily focused on OJT, and coaching is required to raise the motivation of the student.

－ 41 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin* 6-4 Meaning and Objectives of OJT- What Is‘Cultivation’in the Context of Training+ from the P&P network website +http://www.h2.dion.ne.jp/~ppnet/
The following introduces an interesting item on OJT found on the Internet.

Basic concepts
OJT is about building the team for tomorrow. Lack of OJT will come back to bite you and your team.

(1) OJT (On-the-Job Training) is training during and via work.
OJT is not simply a matter of being thrown into the workplace, and being left to understand and learn alone. It is
designed to consciously incorporate the following training and guidance activity through the assistance of managers
and those more experienced.

❶ Preparation for growth to become a member of the organization.
❷ An attitude incorporating the necessary knowledge and skills in one’s work.
 ow to best convey to one’s subordinates and those less experienced the value and sense of achievement of work.
❸ H
To a manager, training and guiding subordinates is about building tomorrow’s organization. To forget this is sunset
management.
● I t is to ‘strengthen today’s fighting abilities for tomorrow’● I t is to ‘cultivate one’s successors’● I t is to ‘build the personnel of tomorrow’● I t is to ‘work with one’s eyes on the next step’The strength of the organization must be more than the sum of the strengths of each individual. The backbone of management binding and focusing this strength in a single direction is the fruit of having cultivated one’s subordinates.
There is no leadership without cultivating and binding one’s subordinates as the organization for tomorrow.
For managers to achieve the objectives of the team and section they are entrusted with, the effective distribution of theresources of people, things, money, information, knowhow, and time, is work of major importance.
OJT and guidance of subordinates is simply the improvement of human resources day-by-day. Improvement of the－ 42 －JAPAN P& I CLUB

most important of the available resources, i.e. the human resource, is not work that can be hastened, or from which
immediate results can be expected. On the other hand, it is a core task affecting the very future of the organization,and therefore requires reappraisal of its value.

(2) OJT itself is not the purpose
OJT itself is not an objective. The objective of OJT differs from the point of view of the manager, the person engaged
in OJT, the company, and the team.

❶ The awareness of problems by the manager must naturally increase the strength of the team members. The
power of the team can be increased through efficient integration and use of the total of resources of all
members. The maintenance and improvement of such a team depends on the manager and individual teammembers developing the abilities (knowledge, experience, skills) to fulfill their roles within the division oflabor, to improve themselves further, and to develop this as the total of members (i.e. teamwork). The total
strength of the team is the source and the pivot of its ability to achieve objectives. The objective of OJT is
here for the organization, the system, and the managers.

❷ The motivation of personnel receiving OJT is to be recognized as member of the team which naturally
entails them adopting the problem awareness of the team, however this does not always match the growthobjectives of the individual.
As shown in Fig. 14, adjustment of what the organization should do with what the individual wants to do, andindividual growth, cannot be forced on the individual. These matters are not to be forced on the individual, but mustbe at the will of the individual, and continued voluntarily.
The individual thus comes to understand that that growth is necessary for oneself, or must not forget that it is left tothe manager. From the point of view of the organization, ‘we want you to do it’ does not result in a long-term desire in
the individual.
What to do
to achieve this?

What to do as an organization?

What to do
to achieve this?

What must be done as an individual?

Individual
targetWhat do you want to do as an individual?

Individual
targetWhat to do to achieve this?

What to do to realize this?

Objective

Division target

Growth target which isthe contact point between
What I want to do and What I should do?
▶ How to set growth target as a superior?
(this is the reason for existence of the manager )Individual step-up

Current situation

Fig. 14－ 43 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin❸ To the company, if the ‘mind’ of the enterprise and the employment culture ‘identity’ is acquired, a continuing effect should be expected. In other words, the DNA of the organization is inherited for cultivation of thenext generation.

(3) Meaning of ‘cultivation’ of the next-generation – What, who, is OJT for?
+ The departure point in consideration of OJT – Component elements + omponent elements● C

When considering ‘cultivation’ through work, the component elements are shown in Fig. 15.

For what?

▶

PurposeWhat is on-the-job training for? What does it mean, and who is it for?

Who?

▶

Subject

Superiors, one’s seniors. While not directly so, cultivation engages the entire workplace.

When, where? ▶

Opportunity

For whom? ▶

ObjectProviding work themes in the process of carrying out the work.
Consider new entrants, juniors, successors separately.

What?

▶ Target and details

Acquire the knowledge, skills, and mind to carry out the task.

How?

▶

MethodThrough daily work, set individual guidance/new themes and opportunities for tasks.

How far?

▶

Level

Expectation level: What kind of situation? Cultivation level.

Fig. 15
 JT component elements (purpose, target, method) – OJT itself is not the purpose● O

Simply considering the component elements of OJT, and drawing up a plan, achieves nothing. It must be considered
in terms of the starting point of who OJT is for. The final target is the development of the independence of the person
receiving the OJT (see Fig. 16).

For what?
(purpose)What?
(target)Do what?
(means)PurposeFor what?

Purpose of on-the-job training = Independence

Answer to why

What will bring independence?

Means

On-the-job training priority
How to proceed? P-D-C-A

Work departure point

Until completenessFig. 16－ 44 －JAPAN P& I CLUB(4) The meaning of ‘cultivation’ through work – Raising the strength as a team.
Different meanings for the OJT leader, the OJT partner, the company, the organization, and the team, however the
problem awareness of the team leader raises the strength of the whole team.
● T he power of the team can be increased through efficient integration and use of the total of resources of all

members. The maintenance and improvement of such a team depends on each individual team member developing the abilities (knowledge, experience, skills) to fulfill their roles, to improve themselves further, and todevelop this as the total of members (i.e. teamwork). This team (synthesis) strength is the needed source of thestrength to achieve targets. The purpose of OJT must be considered in these terms.
● T he motivation of personnel receiving OJT is to be recognized as a member of the team which naturally

entails them adopting the problem awareness of the team, however this does not always match the growthobjectives of the individual.
● T o the company, if the ‘mind’ of the enterprise and the employment culture ‘identity’ is acquired, a continuing

effect should be able to be expected.

(5) Cultivation expectation value (standard) – Cultivating subordinates (juniors)
What is the level of expectation when we consider ‘independence ’, the target of OJT?

❶ Competent Subordinates at work    We are aiming at ‘competent subordinates (juniors) at work’. The word ‘competent’ implies ‘having
confidence and perspective to effect changes through one’s own efforts’.
This ability and confidence are manifested in a ‘sense of capability’ and a ‘sense of effectiveness’. In responding to a ‘sense of capability’ and a ‘sense of effectiveness’, it is essential that the object of these efforts
is one’s own autonomy (ability to make one’s own decisions). In other words, it is possible to see matters interms of the confidence that ‘one should be more effective if one’s thoughts are realized’.

❷ Abilities required
In any given situation, abilities are ‘competence’ in response to understanding of the expected role and its
execution, and individual ‘abilities’ such as the ability to speak English. Irrespective of the subjective ‘senseof capability’ to be acquired, lacking an understanding of one’s situation, and the corresponding competence,
will serve only to inhibit other members (membership deficiency).

❸ Awareness of role expectations
In carrying out tasks within the organization, one must be aware of the expected role in carrying out tasks
under the prevailing conditions. The importance placed on the competence in carrying out these tasks isthe need to have an awareness of what one ‘should do’. The sole requirement is to accept subjectively therequirements under the circumstances, and the intentions to achieve the objective, consider how to execute
one’s own tasks, and to have the required overall competency associated with results as output.

－ 45 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin❹ ‘Sense of effectiveness’ and ‘sense of capability’
The following processes are considered important in cultivating a ‘sense of effectiveness’ and a ‘sense ofcapability’ (Argyris).
● D etermine the target yourself.
● F ind out what to do to achieve the target, and take up the challenge.
● B ased on what you consider of value, determine yourself what should be done.
● H ave a sense that your abilities are insufficient to achieve the task, and the need to extend yourself.
● H ave the results achieved acknowledged by persons you take seriously.

(6) C ultivation processes as cooperative work – Effects of self-monitoringof ‘cultivation’ behavior
OJT must be considered for each thought of both teams, that is, the team that teaches and the other team that is taught;
and the following points must be considered for cultivation processes as cooperative work.

 elationship between teaching and taught, the cultivators and the❶ Rcultivated
In a wider sense, this raises the level of one’s own team strength, while in a narrower sense, ‘teaching’ and‘cultivating’ should be seen as ‘taught’ and ‘cultivated’ from one’s own position.
In other words, OJT is cooperative work between the teaching and the taught. This is not always in one
direction, and even though the OJT leader may unilaterally set the cultivation target, subordinates (juniors)
must have self-awareness and independently conceive it.
‘How to cultivate’ is what the cultivating party’s consideration of the team, the organization, the company,
and the work is being incorporated into actual work, and alignment in the processes accomplished.
As a result, it becomes processes aligning values and ways of thinking such as ‘to the team’, ‘eventually thestate of the organization and achieving work for teamwork’, and ‘growth of each member’.

 ooperative work
❷ C
As shown in Fig. 17, in the OJT process implementing the division of labor (cooperative work) to confirm
the purpose of ‘cultivation’, and clarify the target of ‘being cultivated’, team targets are shared, and thedivision of labor implemented: This can be considered as teamwork for mutual understanding of intentions.

－ 46 －JAPAN P& I CLUBCooperative
work

Teach

Communicate

Communicate

Accomplish

UnderstandCommunicate

Communicate

Not communicated/cannot be communicatedDo not understand/is not understood
I do not know/other party knows
Not a precise expression

Motivated

Play catch

Communicate

Through teaching, one is able to know oneself(one’s limits), and one’s work style is conﬁrmed.

⇒ Teaching is learning
Fig. 17

 ffects of self-monitoring❸ E‘Teaching’ is an act of monitoring of one’s own view of work and work style.
Effects of ‘cultivating’ target achievement process – OJT must be considered as tasks.

(7) Effects of ‘cultivating’ target achievement process+ Think of OJT as tasks +Effects of ‘cultivating’ target achievement process must also be considered.

 ultivation of subordinates (juniors) = Set as task
❶ C
For example, think of yourself as one who has been given the task of ‘cultivating subordinates (juniors)’.

PurposeWhat for?

Task

What to do to achieve this?

Independent

Skill of the individual irstly, clarify what must be achieved to clear the task
❷ F

Fig. 18

What can be done? What is the sign? What to do to achieve the task as it becomes an increasingly practical－ 47 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletintarget? - These questions specifies practical methods. In order to clarify this meaning, it is important todetermine what is to be communicated and how.

 his is training for a team leader❸ T
What are you aiming at? What do you want to achieve? These must be shared with members in order toensure that methods for achievement are unified.

 ne is cultivated through achievement of such tasks❹ O
What is the task? One is taught through considering what must be done to achieve it, and is cultivated.

 ultivation of subordinates (juniors) = See it as a project❺ C
For example, think it is as a ‘subordinate (junior)’ cultivation project and you are leader of it; so as to sharethe same target and proceed one by one (see Fig. 19).

What to do for this?

What to do for this?

TargetTargetFig. 19 he target must be shared by the leader and subordinates (juniors)❻ T
This requires targets, meanings, and directions that are worth for sharing. Persuasiveness, self-confidence,and belief (OJT leader’s belief supports the belief of subordinates (juniors)) are also required.

 his is clarification of the ‘control’ in ‘control function’ and ‘maintenance❼ Tfunction’ - the two roles of the leader❽ In this case, unless the leader ensures that the subordinates understandthe abilities required, and their expected roles, they cannot be shared
Once sharing is achieved, and the ring for the first mutual catch game is prepared.

 eam requirements are sharing of targets, division of labor, and❾ Tcommunication

Subordinates (juniors) and OJT leaders can be seen as forming a team for the shared task of ‘cultivation’.
Subordinates (juniors) must also be considered as important members for achievement of shared targets.
－ 48 －JAPAN P& I CLUB ubordinates (juniors) cultivation = Plan as an implementation plan
 S
- The OJT process as PDCA –Planning for achieving the target of cultivation of subordinates (juniors) and the execution flow is shown
below in Fig. 20.
This is not simply a project, but daily task management and guidance of subordinates (juniors). PDCA (Plan→ Do → Check → Act) is also self-monitoring of work.

PurposeWhat to do for this?

Target achievement

What to do for this?

Target is determined by
the practical means andprocedure.
PDCA has a checkmechanism for constantmodiﬁcation.

Developing practical means

What to do for this?
What procedure to use in
executing a range of items?

Plan (plan) ▶ Do (execute) ▶ Check (check and modify) ▶ Action (response to next)
Fig. 20

 ultivation of subordinates (juniors) = skill
 C+ Cultivation of subordinates has the following two aspects:

two aspects●

Leadership and process management skills in order to achieve the target● B usiness skills for cultivation required in the process of cultivation of subordinates (juniors)

The former can be seen as team building and accomplishment planning for realizing themes, the latter ascommunication skills (inter-personal skills).

－ 49 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin+ Skills in guidance of subordinates (juniors) can be summarized as follows.

+ Basic guidance skills (guidance of subordinates, cultivation points)❶ Methods of offering praise and caution❷ Methods of practical guidance❸ Methods of cultivating motivation❹ Methods of cultivating role awareness❺ Methods of cultivating target achievement+ Guidance communication skills
Demanded functions/sympathetic functions/transmitted functions+ Guidance methods
Individual guidance/situational guidance* 6-5 Requirements for Leaders
When considering OJT, requirements and points of caution for captains, experienced navigators, chief engineers,experienced engineers, and company ‘leaders’ are as follows.
 emember your days as an inexperienced navigator or engineer.
1 R onduct briefings before entering and leaving port, and passage
2 C
through narrow channels.

 onduct debriefings after entering and leaving port, and passage
3 C
through narrow channels.

 liminate variation in teaching content between individual instruc4 E
tors to ensure commonality between teaching materials and texts.

 nderstand that OJT is the most effective method of instruction,
5 U

and ensure that the company prepares teaching materials andtexts for trainees and instructors.

 nsure that tests and reports are presented to verify degree of
6 E
achievement.

－ 50 －JAPAN P& I CLUBWhen the number of coastal vessels and port visits is large
and schedules become tight, there may not be sufficient
time available to conduct briefings and debriefings before
entering and leaving port, and passage through narrow
channels.
However, inexperienced navigators and engineers recently
boarding the vessel must receive briefings at least once
immediately after coming aboard.
With the same content and in the same scenario, variationsin the methods of teaching of instructors result in differinginterpretations by those receiving instruction. For example,
a problem arises if one captain avoids to starboard, andanother to port, inexperienced navigators and engineers will
always tend to take the easy route.
It is important that the company prepares materials and texts mindful of Safety First and compliance with rules andregulations to ensure common guidance for all.
Appendix (3) ‘Navigator Education – Navigation Questions and Answers’ provides an example of tests the author has
always given young navigators during voyages. When looking at reports and the circumstances of normal independentnavigation duties etc., the author was able to understand the technical level of young navigators.

LNG Vessel navigating Bisan-Seto－ 51 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

Chapter 7

Near Miss and Potential
Accident Reports

In terms of prevention, near miss and potential accident reports are an effective means of understanding the root
causes of accidents before they occur.

7-1 Near Miss and Potential Accident Reports
Behind one major accident or disaster is said to lie
29 minor accidents or disasters, and a further 300
potential accidents.

Heinrich's law

In order to prevent a major accident or disaster it
is necessary to deal with problems in the potential
accident stage at which they can be predicted.

1 major accident

Heinrich’s law
Simulation such as risk prediction training, andproviding simulated risk experience in training
facilities etc. is considered as an effective methodof accident prevention.
Summarized as follows.

！

Important

29 minor accidents
300 potential accidents

Disasters are eliminatedif accidents are prevented
Elimination of unsafe behavior
and unsafe situations eliminates
accidents and disasters.
(safety checks and maintenance in the workplace environment, in particular in reference to appropriate employment, training, and monitoring of personnel, and therelated responsibility of managers)－ 52 －JAPAN P& I CLUB

* 7-2 Potential Accident Reports in Practice
A large number of companies have introduced the potential accident report system, however the frequent complaint
from managers in the shore-based management division is that ‘we can’t get the reports’. The following must be
considered in order to use potential accident reports effectively.

1

2

3

The basic data for the potential accident report is a report from the site(the vessel and the navigation management division). The report is therefore prepared by personnel on-site, and it is those personnel in which
improved awareness is required. The captain and chief engineer, and thecompany, must take the lead in the awareness program.
It is also important that not only ‘potential accident items’, but also
improvement measures etc., are reported.

Making a tabulation and analysis of the potential accident report haveto be done periodically. The presented potential accident reports must
be classified every 3 - 6 months, and the time zones for occurrence andpreventative measures to be summarized.

If measures to prevent reoccurrence, and improvement measures, areproposed for each report and summarized monthly in table format, they
can be used as attachments to the analysis results described above. It is
important to use the preliminary figures as feedback for the vessel.

4 It is important that tabulation and analysis results are taken up as topics
by the safety conference etc.

The name of the vessel and the name of the person preparing the report must not be disclosed, and care is required tomaintain anonymity.
Feedback to the person reporting, and to the vessel in question, must be provided with thanks for the submission of thereport, and measures to prevent reoccurrence, and handled confidentially. These measures increase the motivation of
the person reporting, and are linked to submission of the next report.
Furthermore, one proposal is to award each person reporting and each site (the vessel and the navigation management
division) in accordance with details and number of reports at safety conferences etc.
Conversely, unless these measures are taken, the person reporting is unsure as to how his/her potential accident reporthas been taken up by the company, and the number of reports will diminish.
In addition to potential accident reports, introduction of an improvement submissions system etc. is linked to raising
motivation on-site.
－ 53 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The author is confident that readers have understood thatmanagement with BRM and ERM are effective in achieving
safety in operation.
However, in comparison with the difference in technical level
between aircraft pilots and co-pilots, that of between captains
and navigators, or between chief engineers and engineers, isconsiderable. The question of how to cultivate inexperienced
navigators and engineers to the levels expected of captains andchief engineers is a topic for future discussion.
PCC navigating Seto Inland sea

Furthermore, modern vessels are manned by a combination ofdifferent nationalities, and BRM and ERM management must also apply to non-Japanese navigators, engineers, andcrews. In other words, BRM and ERM management must also be considered with diversity in characteristics, culture,and customs.
In the case of aircraft, landing and takeoff are associated with the most tension being concentrated into a period of approximately 11 minutes, referred to as the ‘critical eleven’. For shipping, coastal voyages and passage through narrow
channels, arriving and departing the pier, loading and unloading, various vessel inspections, looking after customers,
and repairs, makes for continued tension within the context of the increasingly diverse crews employed. This work
may justifiably be termed critical week (month).
Under these conditions, using OJT as the means for education of inexperienced navigators and engineers may place
too greater burden on the captain and chief engineer.

In this context, the large number of frameworks in the SMS manual and safety management regulations have led to an increase in the volume of reports and document management work which is, without exaggeration, by a factor of anything from a few to a few tens over the former level. Furthermore,such regulations as ballast water management and the use of low sulfur fuel, and vessel inspections
such as PSC, have increased.
Approximately 20 years have passed since introduction of the SMS manual. Almost ten years has passed since introduction of safety management regulations for coastal vessels. These may be essential tools for safe operation, however
if the same accident occurs again, and we consider that they have not served to eliminate the accident, it may be time
to consider revising SMS and safety management regulations documentation control and preparation of reports andreduce the load on site personnel.

－ 54 －JAPAN P& I CLUB

Reference materials
Provided by Maritime Human Resource Institute:* Engine Room Resource Management* Above on DVD（http://www.maritime-forum.jp/en/index.php）
Japan Captains Association:* Educational lectures
No.75 Human Error from the Point of View of Psychology
No.77 BRM
No.80 Safety in a Proud Occupation – Why is BRM necessary?
No.81 Eliminating Accidents Caused by Human Factors
	Skills of Individuals Supporting BRM – Improving the Skills of Inexperienced Navigators (DVD)
Nihon VM Centre : Anzen no Komado(http://www.maroon.dti.ne.jp/nvmc/komadobkNo.html)
P&P Network: Meaning and Objectives of OJT(http://www.d1.dion.ne.jp/~ppnet/prod06150.htm)
Seizando Shoten: Bridge Resource Management
Maritime Accident Inquiry Tribunal:(http://www.mlit.go.jp/jmat/saiketsu/saiketsu_kako/04saiketsu.htm)
Transport Safety Board Report(http://jtsb.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/ship/)－ 55 －

－ 56 －

03:40

-1.7

Brothers Lt Ho

ESE

00:17

W/L 3.0(Tr.3/O, 2/O)

□ VTIS Report

06:54

09:36
1.0

<120>

10:57

14:30

1.2

18:32

Brothers Lt Ho

<300>

21:07

0712
12.0

-0.5

<060>4.6
0:23

▶▶▶

<200>

2.8

1/O

1/O

2/O

2/O

10:57

<040>6.6
0:33

C/E

C/E

21:27

<066>4.9⑥ Buffalo Rk

21:51 Hours

0:24

-1.5

15:29

<245>

02:45

+1.0

06:47

Baﬀalo Rock(72 RPM)<049>4.9
23:34

0:17

22:17

06:54

<238>

12:34

<058>

15:34

-0.9

+4.8

Batu Berhanti

-0.7

17:27

-1.7

-0.7

19:07

Master of S.S. XXXX
Capt. Takuzo OKADA

<236>

14:25

11:00

Horsburgh<056>

Watch same way, crossing vessels and fishing boats.

□ Steering Single

0050hrs ～ Level - 1

0:10

＊W
 atch departing/arriving vessels, check VTis
information

0:18□ VTIS Report

1.0<049>5
23:51□ Passing Singapore Report to ECR, CCR

Level-1.5

16.5 72 RPM Plan

Horsburgh L't H▶▶▶ ⑨ Horsburgh L't H ▶▶▶ ⑩ Clear Out SPR St@sp'd

CautionSame way andCrossing Vsls

Pu Mungging

Horsburgh LH
R/Up Eng.

R/up eng. and Start increasing rpm

1:42▶▶▶ ⑧ Pu Mungging<066>28.1
21:51

<082>

★ Pirates Counter 1800hrs/26th Aug. - 0700 hrs/27th Aug.
Measure Disch. Sea Water.

<065>

16.5

▶▶▶ ⑦ B.Berhanti@sp'd

23:34 Hours
Pu Mungging
Watch Level 2

CautionOPL Vsls

Batu Berhanti L't H
Oﬀ Singapore
Start increasing RPM＊ Check ship's position Caution other vessels＊ Passing Deep Draft Channel

20:54

▶▶▶

B.Berhanti

<056>

T3/O

T3/O

Passing Day Time

3/O

3/O

CautionDep./Arr. Vsls

⑤ Takong Kecil(48 RPM)age

Phillip Channel<026> 07:43

20:31

Reduce RPM depend on situation

0:03

Buﬀalo Rk

20:54 Hours
Takong Kechil(Phillip Channel)

1938▶▶▶ ④ Racon "D"

P.M. 25th Aug ～ AM. 28th Aug
1930 ｈ rs ～ 2300hrs 27th Aug.
Depending on Traffic

W/L 2.0

20:28<090>0.6③ Racon "D"★ Lock Entrance/ light up on poopdeck / water injection★ A.B. Double Watch★ Call Capt. 30' to TSS Ent.

One Fathom Bank

WNWStart Reduce□ VTIS Report

1:08

19:30

S/B Eng.

<121>18.8

19:20

▶▶▶

@sp'd

Sun SetSun Rise

Watch leaving/entering vessels for anchorage

1:49▶▶▶ ② Brothers L't H

16.5 (70 RPM)

11.95

10.95

Racon "D"Caution Small Vsls
Sameway Vsls

Takong Kechil

Buﬀalo Rock

21:27 Hours

Pasir Panjang

C/O

C/O

Singapore

Capt

De-brief ing
28th Aug 081140 ～□ Check Navigational equipment□ Report to VTiS

19:05 ～ W/L 1.5

17:30<131>30① Call Capt.

Tidal Current Information

Remarks

Watch Level

Eng. Motion

Actual Time

ETPassTime Req.

Co./Dist.

Point

@sp'd

dF

(72 RPM)dA@sp'd 16.5

27th Aug 08

20:31 Hours
Racon "D"
Reduce RPM

CautionCrossing Ships

Voy. No. 98 Laden

Brothers L't H

Tg Pelepas

19:20 HoursBrothers L't H
S/B Eng. .
19:30 Watch Level 2.0
Start Reduce

17:30 Hours
Call Capt.
17:30 Hours
Watch Level 1.5

Capt

Brief ing Capt
26th Aug 08
1300 ～

00:10 Hours

1 day before at Bridge

S.S. "XXXX" Passage Plan for Malacca & Singapore Strait （East Bound)

Singapore Straits Passage Plan = BRM Brieﬁng =JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

Appendix ① Singapore Straits Passage Plan - BRM Briefing Materials (Sample)

JAPAN P& I CLUBAppendix ②－１

Standing Order and Night Order Log（Sample）
xxth XXXXXX, 20XX

MASTER'S  STANDING  ORDER
This is master's standing order during the time I command the vessel M.V. "ABC'' and I do expect all OOW tomaintain safe navigation.

1.  Be proud of Your Duty
There are many lives on board M.V. "ABC'' and the vessel carries an enormous sum of cargoes from manycustomers.
Value of cargoes are too high and the influences of damage to cargoes or late arrival of cargoes caused by accident
are too much to estimate.
This means you have so much important responsibilities with safe lives and cargoes on board the vessel on behalfof Master during you are on navigational watch and you can be proud of your important duty.

2. Avoid Any Navigational Accident
Study International COLREG well and other rules of navigation and consult SMS Manual and so on continuously
to make use of avoiding any navigational accident.
1When in Ocean, give all other vessels ample room;
More than 2.0 miles of CPA and 5 miles clearance in front.

2

When in Coastal cruising, give all other vessels ample room;
At least 1 mile of CPA and 2 miles clearance in front.

3

I t is highly recommended to alter her course before the distance between the ship becomes lessthan 6- 8 miles.

3. Do Call Me at Anytime and Well Ahead of Time
Call me at anytime and well ahead of time when you encounter situations Mentioned below and instructed by
SMS Manual or Master's night order.
＊ Visibility less than 3 miles.
＊ Heavy traffic or group of fishing boats.
＊ Ship's position in doubt.
＊ Remarkable change of weather and sea condition.
＊ Difficulties in maneuvering the vessel.
In addition to the above, Call me when you find anything unusual or any sign of Trouble.

4.  Pay Keen attention to All Aspects to catch any sign of trouble all the time.
5. Keep a Sharp Lookout All the Time when on Watch.
Keep good, Sharp and Continuous look out using all available means regardless of weather and other situation.
Secure at least one person always who gives exclusive attention to look-out.

6.  Read this Master's Standing Order before your duty in every time.
C/Off.

2/Off.

3/Off.

M/V "ABC"－ 57 －

Capt. Takuzo OKADAJAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

Appendix ②－ 2

Standing Order and Night Order Log（Sample）

Date : xxth XXXXX, 20XX

From Yokohama
G.Co <220>

to Singapore
Mg. Co<225>1.   Keep a Sharp Lookout continuously with all available means
2.   Give a wide room to all passing vessels and other boats
3.  Keep a following CPA and Distance to all passing vessels
CPA

Mor than 2.0 miles

Distance in front

More than 5.0 miles

4.  Call me at any time Visibility 	 less than 3 miles
Observe fishing group in front
Remarkable change of weather and sea condition

5.  Do not hesitate;  
Use a whistle
Use a Main Engine
Call Captain

6.  Follow the Master's Standing Order and SMS manual strictly (Signiture)
Have a good watch
C/Off

2/Off

3/Off

AB-A

AB-B

AB-C

Master of M/V"ABC" Capt. Takuzo OKADA－ 58 －

－ 59 －

14 nautical miles

１４海里
Other vessel: 18kts

Abt 40度

本船の取るべき動作を箇条書きにこ

第十七条 この法律の規定により二隻の船舶のうち一隻の船舶が他の船舶の進路（保持船）

他関係船はない。

他の船舶は、その針路及び速力を保たなければならない。
Actions to be taken by vessel itemized.

No other vessels involved.

50˚ (approx.)
Bearing changed slightly to starboard
本船 18 kts
due to vessel crossing.
On this heading, the vessel will pass
横切り関係で、ベアリングが僅かに右に変化。
in approximately 0.3 nautical miles(in
このままだと、本船船首方向 ０．３海里程度でapproximately 36 minutes).
航過。（３６分後）Vessel speed
Vessel travelling at 18kts. Other
本船は１８ノット、相手船は１５ノット。
15kts
vessel travelling at 15kts.

Case２

Ｃ

２ 前項の規定により針路及び速力を保たなければならない船舶（以下この条におの法律の規定に基づく適切な動作をとつていないことが明らかになつた場合は、同との衝突を避けるための動作をとることができる。この場合において、これらの船舶
Burdened vessel
用があるときは、保持船は、やむを得ない場合を除き、針路を左に転じてはならない
Rule 17 Where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course and speed.

No other vessels involved.

Vessel speed
18kts

40˚ (approx.)

14 nautical miles

Other vessel: 15kts

Bearing changed slightly to
starboard due to vessel crossing.
On this heading, the vessel willpass in approximately 0.3 nautical
miles (in approximately 36
minutes).
Vessel travelling at 18kts. Other
vessel travelling at 15kts.

Case１

Navigation for vessels crossing (test question)

相手船 : 15kts

Ｃａｓｅ １横切り船 航法（試験問題）

Appendix ③ -1 Navigator Education - Navigation Questions and Answers

When, from any cause, the vessel required to keep her course and speed ﬁnds herself so close that collision cannot

be avoided by the action of the give-way vessel alone, she shall take such action as will best aid to avoid collision.

３

this case, if the requirements of Rule 15.1 apply to these vessels, the burdened vessel shall turn to port unless impossible.

３ as
保持船は、避航船と間近に接近したため、当該避航船の動作のみでは避航船と2 The latter vessel may however take action to avoid collision by her manoeuvre alone,soon as it becomes apparent
る場合は、第一項の規定にかかわらず、衝突を避けるための最善の協力動作をとら
to her that the vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action in compliance with these Rules. In

JAPAN P& I CLUB－ 60 －

Vessel speed
18kts

40˚ (approx.)

-1

0

1

2

3

4

-

-

-

8 nautical
miles

-

After
9 minutes-

5.5 nauticalmiles

After 9 minutes
Approximately 3̊
after coming on
port beam

After 37 minutes
Crosses course ofother vessel

After 18 minutes
Approximately 46̊
after coming on
port beam

1.6 nauticalmiles
After 27 minutes
Approximately 8̊
after coming on
port beamAfter
36 minutes

4.1 nautical
miles

After
27 minutes

4.3 nautical
miles

After
18 minutes

3.5 nautical miles→ within reason.

* 90̊ turn = 18 minutes (turn rate 5̊/minute) = speed 18kts, distance of travel 5.4 nautical miles, turn radius 2.9 nautical miles. Remember these values while on board.

* Steer the vessel while ensuring that the other vessel is not ahead of port abeam.

Evaluate whether or not to make the turn at this point. Continue verifying compass direction.

* While maintaining a safe distance, return to the original course to cross ahead (cross 1.6 nautical miles ahead of other vessel)* If the other vessel does not take avoiding action, measure distances ahead and astern, and to port, immediately the parallel course is reached (3.5 nautical miles
ahead and astern, 3 nautical miles to port).

* While watching movement of the other vessel, steer the vessel with the intention of turning until on a parallel course with the other vessel. If the other vesseltakes avoiding action, return to the original course while ensuring that it is not ahead of abeam.

* When 8 nautical miles (next approach in approximately 20 minutes) is reached, begin turn to port while holding turn rate to approximately 5̊/minute to ensure thatspeed does not drop.

* The other vessel sometimes turns to starboard to avoid. Use VHF for communication up to 8 nautical miles (approx.), and request passing astern of your vessel.

* When another vessel is crossing safely ahead after turning 90̊ to starboard, turn to port to cross ahead of the other vessel. Continue with a full turn if anxious.

Give-way vessel

No other vessels involved.

Bearing changed slightly to
starboard due to vessel crossing.
On this heading, the vessel willpass
in approximately 0.3 nautical miles(in approximately 36 minutes).
Vessel travelling at 18kts. Other
vessel travelling at 15kts.

5

6

7

8

Case１

3 nauticalmiles

3 nauticalmiles

Appendix ③－２

14 nautical miles

Other vessel: 15kts

Miles

Navigation for vessels crossing (answer)

JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin
Navigator Education - Navigation Questions and Answers

－ 61 －

Vessel speed
15kts

50˚ (approx.)

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

-6

-

-

-

-

7.8 nautical miles-

5.2 nautical miles

2.7 nautical miles

After 27 minutes
Almost port abeam
After 18 minutes
Approximately 48̊
astern of port abeam

After 9 minutes
Approximately 5̊
astern of port abeam

4.0 nautical miles

After 36 minutes
Other vesselcloses to and passes
0.2 nautical miles oﬀ bow

Since the other vessel sometimes turns to starboard suddenly, do not turn to port.

When the speed of the other vessel is greater that your vessel, the ﬁrst assumption should be that turning to starboard
and passing ahead is not possible.

Repeatedly request via horn, signal lamp, and VHF to encourage avoiding action by the other vessel.

Do not begin a turn to port after turning to starboard to a course parallel to the other vessel (a collision course will result if
the other vessel turns to starboard).

Crossing ahead of the other vessel is not possible when turning to starboard. Turn provided if the other vessel does not takeavoiding action.

Turning to port to pass astern of the other vessel to port should be done only when intentions have been mutually veriﬁed
by VHF while at least 10 nautical miles is available.

Give-way vessel:

No other vessels involved.

Bearing changed slightly to starboard
due to vessel crossing.
On this heading, the vessel will passin approximately 0.3 nautical miles (inapproximately 36 minutes).
Vessel travelling at 18kts. Other
vessel travelling at 15kts.

4

5

6

Case２

Appendix ③－３

14 nautical miles

Other vessel: 18kts

7

Miles

Navigation for vessels crossing (answer)

JAPAN P& I CLUB

Navigator Education - Navigation Questions and Answers

－ 62 －
5
4
3

To the other vessel?

What action should the vessel

take?

0

1

2

6

7

8

9

-9

10

11

12

13

14

15

applicable to the vessel?

What navigation measures are

Question

Often in Watch Level 1 sea areas.

to Ise Bay, and the Malacca Straits.

Osaka Bay, approaches to Tokyo Bay, approaches

comparatively frequently in the approaches toThis relationship with other vessels occurs

17

nautical miles or more)
16

18

19

(captain’s standing orders instructed as CPA 1.5

Other vessels A and C evaluated as problematic.

20

21

22

23

-8

-7

-6

-5

-4

<300> 9.'o

-3

-2

Co
<030>
Sp'd 15.6 kts
CPA 0.0
TCPA 60 mn.
B'g
<300>
Dist 9.0 miles

Vessel A

-1

Co
<180>
Sp'd 20.0 kts
CPA 5.1
TCPA 24 mn.
B'g
<342>
Dist 16.4 miles

Vessel B

0

Co
Sp'd

1

2

3

<000>
18 kts

Vessel

4

5

<180>
Co
Sp'd 16.0 kts
CPA 1.0
TCPA 40 mn.
B'g
<003>
Dist 22.6 miles

Vessel C

6

Appendix ③－４

with ARPA.

Information as shown in drawing at left obtained

Vessel avoidance (question)

24

JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin
Navigator Education - Navigation Questions and Answers

－ 63 －

When a number of vessels are passing, predict the relative positions after 30
minutes, 60 minutes, and 90 minutes,
and prepare a plan to determine which side each vessel will pass on.

On the other hand, Vessel A is required to maintain position relative to Vessel B.
Since Vessel B is travelling at 20kts,
it may be advisable to delay a starboard turn to cross ahead of Vessel B.

Vessel C crosses ahead, and passes port-to-port. When commencing a starboard
turn after 20 minutes,
the distance to Vessel C is still 11 nautical miles. The course of Vessel C is
therefore crossed after 27 minutes.

Contact Vessel A and Vessel B on VHF to mutually determine intentions before
turning to port to go behind Vessel A.

As shown on the left, the vessel is on a parallel course to the other vessel when
Vessel A is at a distance of 6 nautical miles.
When approximately 1 nautical mile further ahead, it returns to its original course,
and while monitoring the change in direction, crosses ahead of the other vessel.
Even after the vessel travels 3 nautical miles to starboard, the other vessel is
eventually seen at 1.5 nautical miles on the port beam after 71 minutes.
The vessel then crosses the course of the other vessel 0.7 nautical miles ahead ofit.
The other vessel is still too close at this distance, and the situation is therefore
checked after 60 minutes,
and if necessary, another turn to starboard initiated, and the CPA must be
expanded (CPA set as 1 nautical mile or more).

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

-9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

-8

-7

-6

-5

-4

<300>6.'0<300> 9.'o

Vessel A

After
20 minutes

-3

-2

-1

60°

<293>6.'0

After
40 minutes

Vessel B

73°<287>3.'1012

Vessel3

After 20 minutes

4

After 27 minutes

5

6

After 40 minutes

Co <000>

After 60 minutes

Co <030>

67°

After 20 minutes

After
60 minutes

After 71 minutes<207>0.'7

After 80 minutes

Port abeam
1.5 nautical miles

Vessel C

Appendix ③－５

Navigation measures of vessel crossing course of Vessel A. Vessel is burdened
vessel.
After 20 minutes, while turning to starboard, other vessel is requested to turnbehind vessel.
Although wish to turn to port as passing vessel, do not turn to port without
communication on VHF etc. to determine mutual intentions.

Answer

Vessel avoidance (answer)

25

JAPAN P& I CLUB

Navigator Education - Navigation Questions and Answers

－ 64 －

4.5miles3.0miles1.5miles

0.0miles1.5miles3.0miles18 miles15 miles

CPA 1.0 mile
TCPA 22 min.
Co<088>
Sp'd 14.0 kts
B'g
<263>
Dist. 12.0miles

Ｅ

12 miles

CPA 1.0 mile
TCPA 28 min.
Co<086>
Sp'd 12.0 kts
B'g
<269>
Dist. 14.0 miles

Ａ

12 miles9 miles

CPA 4.0 mile
TCPA 15 min.
Co<088>
Sp'd 18.0 kts
B'g
<293>
Dist. 9.7miles

Ｆ

9 miles

6 miles

CPA 0.3 mile
TCPA 35 min.
Co
<268>
Sp'd 12.0 kts
B'g
<267>
Dist. 3.5miles

CPA 0.2 mile
TCPA 25 min.
Co
<270>
Sp'd 7.0 kts
B'g
<270>
Dist. 4.5miles

ＣＤ

6 miles

3 miles

3 miles

0 milesspeed
18 Kts<268>

Vessel0 miles-3 miles-6 miles-6 miles

CPA 2.0 mile
TCPA 45 min.
Co
<267>
Sp'd 22.0 kts
B'g
<054>
Dist. 3.7 miles

Ｉ

CPA ***TCPA - 30 min.
Co
<268>
Sp'd 14.0 kts
B'g
<133>
Dist 2.8miles

Ｇ-3 miles4.5miles3.0miles1.5miles

0.0miles1.5miles3.0miles4.5miles

TCPA for other vessels noted is less than 25 – 30 minutes, with CPA a maximum of 1 nautical mile (vessels noted above bycolors).
Vessel Ａ
Almost dead ahead (slightly to starboard). CPA at 14.0 nautical miles is 1.0 nautical miles. TCPA in 28 minutes.
Displaying green navigation light.
Vessel Ｂ
Port 2˚, CPA at 17.5 nautical miles is 0.2 nautical miles. If following ARPA information, pass on port side in 0.2 nautical miles
after 30 minutes. Port and starboard navigation lights can be distinguished, however the red light appears slightly stronger.
Vessel Ｃ
Vessel on same course. Speed 7kts. Gradually opening to starboard. Distance 4.5 nautical miles.
Vessel Ｄ
Vessel on same course. 1 – 2˚ to port, 12kts. Course parallel to your vessel.
Other vessels involved shown in black.
Vessel Ｅ
Vessel on opposing course. Parallel at 5˚ to port. CPA 1.0 nautical mile. TCPA 22 minutes. Co<088> Speed 14kts.
Vessel Ｇ
Vessel on opposing course. Parallel at 25˚ to starboard. CPA 4.0 nautical miles. TCPA 15 minutes. Co<088> Speed 18kts.
Vessel Ｆ
Vessel on same course. 2.8 nautical miles astern. Passed to port 30 minutes ago at 1.7 nautical miles.
Vessel Ｈ
Vessel on same course. Starboard astern <054> Distance 4.0 nautical miles. Passing at Co <267> Speed 22kts.
CPA 2.0 nautical miles, TCPA 50minutes.

Mast

A, B, C, D lights

Underway at night in Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean (between Pu RONDO and Dondra Head) Co<268> Speed 18kts

21 miles15 miles

CPA 0.2 mile
TCPA 30 min.
Co<087>
Sp'd 17.0 kts
B'g
<266>
Dist. 17.5miles

Ｂ

18 miles

CPA 0.1 mile
TCPA 35 min.
Co<088>
Sp'd 19.0 kts
B'g
<267>
Dist. 21.0 miles

Ｈ

21 milesOrder of priority, and reasons, for paying attention to other vessels when taking avoiding
action.

Vessels on opposing and same courses may approach each other in 25 - 30 minutes at a
distance of 1 nautical mile under these conditions. Avoiding action is therefore necessary.
What avoiding action should be taken?

Appendix ③－６

4.5miles

Vector : 12 min.

Radar and ARPA Information (Question)

JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin
Navigator Education - Navigation Questions and Answers

－ 65 －

21 miles18 miles18 miles12 milesH

12 miles9 milesＢ

9 miles

6 milesＡ

6 milesE

3 miles

3 miles

PointsＣＦ

Ｄ

I-3 miles-6 miles3.0miles4.5miles1.5miles

0.0miles0 miles-3 milesOther vessels to be aware of.

Predict the relative to positions of the vessels after 15 minutes (use the ARPA simulation function if available).
In this case, Vessels A and C follow the rules for vessels in opposing directions, and Vessel C will therefore possibly turn to starboard. Because of its position relative to Vessels D and B it is apparent
that there is a possibly of turning to starboard.
In this case, one possibility is to follow up on Vessel F, and turn further to starboard.
Crossing will occur 2 nautical miles ahead of Vessel I. Communicate by VHF beforehand the intended avoiding action (turn to starboard), and the intention to cross 2 nautical miles ahead of Vessel I.
Avoid causing any unease on the part of Vessel F. The best option is to cross the course of Vessel I if possible and return to the original course after Vessel I passes on your port side.
Without Vessel E present, an early turn to port is possible, however since Vessel G is crossed in all aspects, a wide turn to port while maintaining a safe distance is desirable (to avoid the possibility ofcollision even in the case of the next vessel in the opposing direction).

An example of taking cautios
avoiding action in advance

4 Vessel D Possibility of turn to starboard to avoid Vessel B.

3 Vessel C Possibility of turn to starboard to avoid Vessel A.

2 Vessel A Possibility of turn to port to avoid Vessel C.

1 Vessel I After crossing at a point 2 nautical miles ahead.

-6 miles4.5milesAvoid to port: <243> Position of vessel after 15 minutes
3.0milesG

When no avoiding action is taken

1.5milesAvoid to starboard: <293> Position of vessel after 15 minutes

0 miles

Underway in Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean (between Pu RONDO and Dondra Head)

15 miles15 milesTurn to starboard towards Vessel F. Ensure that course is not ahead of Vessel F. Always ensure that heading does not cross stern of Vessel F.
Diagram above shows relative positions of the vessels after 15 minutes. Changed from original course of <268> to <293>.
4.5 nautical miles travelled in 15 minutes. Vessel is therefore 1.9 nautical miles to starboard from original course, and all vessels except Vessel
F are visible to port.
Sin 24° x 4.5 nautical miles = 1.90 nautical miles
Commencing avoiding action after 15 minutes is too late (cannot pass Vessels I and A) => Only solution is to turn hard to starboard.
A 25˚ turn to port moves vessel 1.90 nautical miles from original course, permitting crossing 4.5 nautical miles ahead of Vessel E, however
Vessels E and Ｄ are in opposing directions,and if an attempt is made to pass Vessel G following astern port-to-port there is a considerable possibility of a turn to starboard.
In this case, unless there is a further turn to port to approximately <190>, Vessel E may not be able to pass safely.
This will also result in dangerous positioning of the two vessels. It is also possible to avoid vessels Ｂ and Ｄ by turning to starboard.

Answer

4.5miles3.0miles1.5miles

0.0miles1.5miles21 milesAfter 15 minutes

Appendix ③－７

3.0miles4.5miles

Vector : 12 min.

Radar and ARPA Information (answer)

JAPAN P& I CLUB

Navigator Education - Navigation Questions and Answers

JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin－ 66 －JAPAN P& I CLUBP&I Loss Prevention Bulletin

The author

Capt. Takuzo Okada
Master Mariner
General Manager
Loss Prevention and Ship Inspection Dept.
The Japan Ship Owners’Mutual Protection & Indemnity Association

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