Physicians for
Human Rights
November 2014

A Foreseeable
Disaster in Burma:
Forced Displacementin the Thilawa Special
Economic Zone

About Physicians for
Human Rights
Since 1986, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) has beenusing medicine and science to document and callattention to mass atrocities and severe human rights
violations.
PHR was founded on the idea that health professionals,
with their specialized skills, ethical duties, and credible
voices, are uniquely positioned to stop human rights
violations. PHR’s investigations and expertise are used
to advocate for persecuted health workers, prevent
torture, document mass atrocities, and hold those who
violate human rights accountable.
PHR has worked in more than 60 countries, including
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Burma, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, El Salvador, Guatemala, Iran, Iraq, Kenya,
Libya, Mexico, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, and the UnitedStates.

Acknowledgments
This report was written by Andrea Gittleman, JD, PHR
interim U.S. policy director, and Widney Brown, JD, PHR
director of programs.
This report has benefited from review by PHR leadershipand staff, including Donna McKay, executive director;
DeDe Dunevant, director of communications; Eliza B.
Young, MA, publications coordinator; and Kathryn
Striffolino, policy advisor.
This report benefitted from external review by Catherine
DeAngelis, MD, MPH, PHR board member, Johns
Hopkins University Distinguished Service Professor
Emerita, professor emerita at Johns Hopkins University
School of Medicine (Pediatrics) and School of Public
Health (Health Service Management), and editor-in-chief
emerita of the Journal of the American Medical
Association (JAMA); and Adam Richards, MD, PhD, MPH,
PHR board member, assistant professor, Division ofGeneral Internal Medicine and Health Services Research,
UCLA.
Eliza B. Young, MA, PHR publications coordinator, edited
and prepared this report for publication.
PHR interns Brian Campbell, Jason Lee, and Alex Nawar
assisted in the report’s production.
Staff from Mekong Watch and members of Thilawa
Social Development Group (TSDG) contributed to thestudy design and data collection, and reviewed andedited the report.
PHR is deeply indebted to displaced persons andmembers of TSDG who were willing to share theirexperiences with us.
The survey for this report was approved by PHR’s ethicalreview board.
Support for the survey and report was provided by the
National Endowment for Democracy.

Cover: Ma Than Ei, a resident of the Thilawa relocation site, stands infront of her home.

©2014 Physicians for Human Rights
All rights reserved.
Library of Congress Control Number: 2014956141
ISBN 1879707780

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Abbreviations
JICA
Japan International Cooperation Agency
MJTD
Myanmar Japan Thilawa Development, Ltd.
MTSHMyanmar Thilawa SEZ Holdings Public Ltd.
PHQ-2
Patient Health Questionnaire-2
Thilawa SEZ
Thilawa Special Economic Zone
TSDG
Thilawa Social Development GroupTSEZMC
Thilawa SEZ Management Committee
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme

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Table of Contents
5
7

11
13
14
17
18
19
20
24

Executive Summary
Background
Human Rights Atrocities & Economic Sanctions
Investment & Land Confiscations
Human rights, Land, Livelihoods & HealthThilawa Project Threatens Livelihoods & Health
Methods & Limitations
International Guidelines on Forced Evictions
Results
Conclusion
Recommendations
TablesGraphsEndnotes

Map of Burma showing the location of the Thilawa Special Economic
Zone.

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Executive Summary
Recent liberalization of some governmental policies in
Burma1 (officially the Union of Myanmar) has led to thelifting of a number of bilateral sanctions and increases
in foreign aid and investment. Both governments andcorporations are entering into partnerships with
Burmese companies to undertake major development
projects, including building special economic zones(SEZ), developing hydroelectric dams, signing
concession agreements for mining operations, andbuilding pipelines. Despite their potential to create
opportunities for economic advancement, suchdevelopment projects are causing widespread forced
displacement throughout the country, undermining thehuman rights of the people living in affected areas.
Forced displacement threatens people on every
continent. Environmental degradation, conflict, the race
for scarce resources, development projects, and landgrabs have caused a significant number of these illegal
displacements. People living in marginalized
communities, including ethnic minorities andindigenous groups, are particularly vulnerable to forced
displacement.2
Forced displacement affects a number of human rights
issues in the short term, and, if unaddressed, cancontribute to a downward spiral into increasing
insecurity and loss of rights. Health status, access tohealth care, and food security are indicators that often
serve as early warning signs of the longer term negative
human rights consequences of forced displacement.
Food insecurity is particularly devastating for children as
it can lead to stunting, which has lifelong consequenceson health and development. The following survey andreport seek to document the adverse effects on
individuals, families, and communities when relocation
policies displace populations in violation of internationalguidelines.
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) developed an
epidemiological survey tool to identify and assess thehuman rights consequences of such forced
displacements. This tool and resulting findings will
strengthen the imperative for governments to avoid
displacement whenever possible, and to adhere toexisting guidelines when eviction is unavoidable.

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The Thilawa SEZ (including the towns of Alwan Sot andThilawa Kone Tan) is one example in Burma that
illustrates the negative effects of development projects
on the rights of local populations. Situated near Thilawa
port, located approximately 15 miles (25 kilometers)south of Rangoon, the SEZ comprises 2,400 hectares offarmland that will be developed into factory sites. The
Japanese government and three Japanese companies
partnered with the Burmese government and aconsortium of Burmese companies to develop phase
one of the site. The business plan for the development
project claims that it will yield a profit of $53.3 million
by 2018. For the people living in the area, however,their forced displacement is leading to the loss of the
farmland that was their source of income and livelihood.
Phase one of the project, which began in 2013, resulted
in the forced displacement of 68 households. Phase twoof the project will displace an additional 846
households.
International guidelines3 for this type of eviction
stipulate that displacement may occur in “exceptional
circumstances” as long as certain guarantees are met,
including that the eviction is carried out in accordancewith international human rights laws, is reasonable andproportional, and is regulated to ensure full and faircompensation. The displacement should not havenegative impacts on the standard of living of those
displaced. These guidelines apply regardless of whether
or not individuals hold formal title to their home andproperty. In the Thilawa case, the Burmese government
agreed to follow these standards, and the Japanese
government has similar policies in place for its
development projects.4
In August 2014, PHR performed a survey of 29
households displaced by phase one of the project(representing 42.6 percent of the total number ofdisplaced and 78.4 percent of the total number
remaining at the relocation site) and conducted 22 key
informant interviews. PHR found that the displacement
process fell significantly short of meeting internationalguidelines, most notably because the residents felt
threatened by the government with lawsuits andimprisonment if they did not move. Furthermore, thecompensation allotted to displaced persons wasinsufficient for them to maintain their livelihoods. Whilemonetary compensation was given for crops, animals,
and houses, sanitation conditions in the relocation

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Executive Summary continued
village, constructed by the Burmese government, did
not meet international (Sphere) standards5 for refugee
camps. All of the wells and pumps provided by thegovernment were improperly constructed and found to
be contaminated with bacteria found in human feces.
Given that the displacement at Thilawa SEZ was planned,
the situation for those who were relocated should besignificantly higher than required by Sphere, whichassumes displacement was caused a humanitariancrisis, such as a natural disaster or complex emergency.
Farmers who lost their land were not provided withother means or training to successfully earn a living.
People who previously worked in nearby industries wereforced to leave their jobs because the commute fromthe more isolated relocation site was prohibitively
expensive. The average household income dropped by
78.1 percent after relocation, 26 households (89.7
percent) reported not having enough money to meettheir needs, and 23 households (79.3 percent) reported
borrowing money to meet their needs.
The loss of livelihoods has additional adverse
consequences for food security and the health status ofdisplaced households. Eight households (27.6 percent)reported higher levels of household hunger after
displacement, and 13.6 percent of children surveyed
suffered from mild malnutrition. Displacement has
exacerbated already poor access to health care, withmore than twice as many households reporting an
inability to receive treatment when sick (16 households
following relocation versus seven prior to relocation).
The combination of severely diminished income,increasing food insecurity, and constrained access tohealth care creates a precarious situation for displaced
residents. Without intervention to improve livelihoods,
the nutrition and health situation in the relocation site
will continue to deteriorate.

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The Thilawa SEZ committee is charged with managing
and running the daily affairs of the development project,including the relocation process. During phase one ofthe project, affected households were not consulted,
received inadequate compensation, and were given
limited time to prepare for relocation, violating not only
the communities’ right to adequate housing, but also
their right to health and effective remedy.
The small community PHR sampled during this survey
serves as a harbinger of adverse consequences for the
additional 846 households that will be displaced duringphase two of the Thilawa project. Unless thegovernments of Japan and Burma achieve a standard ofpractice consonant with their stated commitment tointernational norms and guidelines, these 846
households will very likely suffer a fate similar to thoseaffected during phase one. The recommendations below
highlight several opportunities for the Burmese
government and its Japanese partners to prevent theimpending disaster and forge a positive future in
partnership with affected communities.

Rows of houses in the Thilawa relocation site.
Photo: Lauren Sakae

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Background
Widespread human rights atrocities and economic
sanctions in Burma
Through most of the second half of the 20th century,
Burma was ruled by military-led governments thatcommitted grave human rights violations. The scale ofthese abuses compelled some countries to place
economic sanctions on Burma.6 Between 1958 and2011, campaigns by the military governments torepress the population resulted in widespread mass
atrocities against civilians. The state employed counterinsurgency military tactics against ethnic minority
communities with no attempt to distinguish between
civilians and combatants in the border regions7 and in
the central parts of the country. Burma’s Special Branchpolice and military intelligence imprisoned and tortured
thousands of individuals suspected of anti-government
and pro-democracy activities.8 In 1988, the army
crushed pro-democracy rallies in Rangoon, killing an
estimated 3,000 protesters.9
Burma remained a pariah state for decades. In response
to a series of actions by the government in 2011,
Western nations eased economic sanctions. Theinternational community heralded the release of politicalprisoners, the signing of temporary ceasefires witharmed groups, the completion of fair by-elections, andthe voting of democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi into
parliament. To reward these changes and promote
democracy, a number of states – including Australia,
Canada, Japan, the United States, and many European
countries – increased development aid and allowed theirbusinesses to operate in Burma for the first time indecades. International companies responded with aflood of investment,10 and the government of Burmaenacted several laws and tax exemptions to facilitate
foreign investment and economic development.11
This investment has the potential to help lift the country
out of its economic woes. Decades of government
mismanagement, corruption, and economic sanctions
have destroyed the country’s economy.12 Burma wasranked 150 out of 187 countries in the United Nations
Development Programme’s (UNDP) 2013 Human
Development Index – a composite measure of several
indicators on health, education, and standard of living.13
In 2010, 25 percent of the country was living below thenational poverty line,14 and the gross national income
per capita in 2011 was just $1,144.15 This poverty
coincides with poor food security; UNICEF estimatedthat between 2008 and 2012, 22.6 percent of children
under the age of five years were moderately or severely

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underweight.16 In order for economic growth to benefit
the country, more job opportunities and better wages
must be provided, as well as a bigger tax base to ensurethat the government progressively implements
economic, social, and cultural rights, such as the rightto food, health, housing, and education.
Burma is ripe for investment – and land
confiscations.
In 2011, Burma was one of the last untapped consumer
markets: it was a country of 55 million people withalmost no access to foreign products. The abundance of
natural resources – coal, gold, metals, hydropower,
timber, rice, sugar, oil, and gas – makes the country
highly attractive for international investment. As
economic sanctions were being lifted, foreign direct
investment grew from $1.9 billion in 2011 to $2.7
billion in 2012,17 and exceeded $4.1 billion as of April
2014.18“Myanmar is a gold mine any way you look at it –natural resources, gas and oil deposits, spatial
dimensions, location between China, India, Southeast
Asia.”19– Craig Steffensen, Asian Development Bank Official
Economic development in Burma, however, has haddevastating impacts on the communities living in
project locations. In a 2011 survey, PHR found thathouseholds in or near the Dawei Special Economic Zone
(SEZ) in eastern Burma were twice as likely to experiencea human rights violation and 7.9 times more likely toexperience forced labor compared to households inother, comparable locations, mostly due to increased
military presence and land rights violations associatedwith the development project.20
Reports of government confiscation of land fordevelopment projects are widespread in Burma; dams,
plantations, pipelines, industrial sites, and mines havepushed people off their land in nearly every state anddivision in the country.21 In a review of reports on land
confiscations published between January 2011 andJanuary 2014, the U.S. Campaign for Burma identified
94 separate instances of displacement resulting fromprojects by corporations, the government, and themilitary.22 The actual extent of displacement is likely
much greater, as this review only covered publishedcases.
Despite political liberalizations in the country, the legacy
of Burma’s military dictatorship remains, notably in thegovernment’s unfair practices of land confiscation.
Burma was ranked 157 out of 174 countries in

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Background continued
Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption
Perceptions Index,23 and several laws24 enacted since2008 facilitate land confiscation and displacement.25
Challenging confiscation is particularly difficult forindividuals given that documentation of land ownershipin Burma has been historically weak and people whohave lived and worked on the land for decades may nothave proof of ownership.26
Burma faces numerous other problems that have goneunaddressed under the new government,27 including
government impunity for human rights violations,
official corruption, strong central government presenceat the township level that does not represent residents,28
bureaucratic red tape and an unpredictable businessenvironment,29 military control over key government
agencies,30 and weak rule of law.31 The government has
little accountability to its people, and power is awarded
to wealthy individuals and corporations. These
conditions, which enable corporations, the government,
and the military to operate with near impunity, set thestage for widespread land confiscation and humanrights abuses with little to no repercussions for
perpetrators.

Poverty represents a significant barrier to fully realizing
human rights, as the detrimental effects on health andnutrition impede one’s ability to fulfill human potential,
realize aspirations, and participate in social, cultural,and political life.37 Some of these rights, specified by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, include therights to housing, an adequate standard of living,education, work, health, and life.38
Livelihoods include everything people use – capabilities,
assets, and strategies – to provide for themselves and tostay out of poverty.39 For example, people may seek an
education to gain the necessary technical skills to find a
job and earn money to support their family. In othercases, individuals may borrow money to start a small
business to generate income to support their family.

Human rights, land, livelihoods, and health arelinked.
Human rights violations – such as forced labor,
restrictions on movement, and particularly the unlawful
seizure of land – affect families’ abilities to provide forthemselves and avoid poverty. Poverty is the lack ofbasic human, economic, political, socio-cultural, andprotective capabilities that are required for living a life
with dignity.32 The World Health Organization (WHO)cites poverty as a cause of low vaccination rates, poor
water and sanitation, lack of access to medicines, andmaternal mortality.33 Poverty limits a family’s capacity to
pay for transportation to a medical clinic and for theprovision of services and medicine. It can lead to
reduced life expectancy, disability, and starvation.34
Malnutrition is an underlying cause of over 50 percent
of child deaths globally, because it limits a child’s ability
to fight the effects of conditions such as measles,
diarrhea, pneumonia, and malaria, which are maincauses of child mortality.35 Food security and basic
nutrition are preconditions for enjoying the basic humanright to health and the ability to provide for one’s self
and family.36

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U Ba Than, a Burmese man of Indian heritage sits inside his home at
the Thilawa relocation site. Mr. Than formerly earned his living as a
farmer, but now has no income because farming is not permitted at therelocation site.

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Background continued
In developing countries like Burma, ownership of andaccess to land is a crucial component for maintaining
livelihoods. Approximately 66 percent of Burma’s
population lives in rural areas, and half work inagriculture, hunting, or forestry, while only 6 percent
work in manufacturing.40 The United Nations Population
Fund reported in June 2011 that the size of a family’s
farm was inversely correlated with poverty and thatlandlessness was correlated with poverty.41 People in
Burma who are not farmers but have access to landfrequently supplement their incomes and nutrition bygardening. As a key component in food and income
production, access to land is closely linked tolivelihoods and food security.42
Indicators related to livelihoods and food security candemonstrate the secondary effects of displacement andcall attention to the harm inflicted when evictions do notconform to international standards. Forced
displacement – a human rights violation wheninternational standards are not followed – has thepotential to drive families into poverty, cause
subsequent human rights violations, or otherwise
worsen the situation for people who were already living
in poverty.

project. The agreement joined Myanmar Japan Thilawa
Development, Ltd. (MJTD) with JICA and three Japanesefirms: Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Marubeni
corporations. The Japanese companies control 49
percent of MJTD, and the remaining 51 percent is
controlled by the Thilawa SEZ Management Committee(TSEZMC), the Burmese government agency formed
specifically to oversee development of the Thilawa SEZ,
and Myanmar Thilawa SEZ Holdings Public Ltd. (MTSH),
a consortium of nine Burmese companies.46
MJTD plans to develop 400 hectares of farmland, with afocus on producing clothing, cars, and othermanufactured items.47 MTSH projects $10.6 million in
profit in 2014, increasing to a projected $53.3 million in
profit by 2018.48 The Myanmar Investment Commission,a government body that regulates foreign investment,
said the SEZ would create 200,000 jobs.49
The project is divided into multiple phases: phase one,which began in 2013, includes the development of a
400 hectare area including parts of Alwan Sot andThilawa Kone Tan villages. Phase two will develop 2,000
hectares in nearby farmlands. Developing the farmland
required the displacement of 68 households duringphase one (one household refused to move and remains
in Alwan Sot), and will require the displacement of anadditional 846 households (3,869 people) in phase two.

The Thilawa SEZ development project threatens
livelihoods and the health of farming communities.43
The port of Thilawa has been operating for decades inThanlyin township located on the Rangoon Riverapproximately 15 miles (25 kilmeters) south ofRangoon. The Burmese government confiscated landaround the port in 1983, 1993, 1996, 1997, 1998, and2007 to make space for industrial sites, and in 2014
reaffirmed that the area was a SEZ, which created tax
breaks for foreign companies investing there.44
At the end of 2012, the governments of Japan andBurma signed a memorandum of agreement to develop
the Thilawa SEZ, and the Japanese government pledgeda ¥ 50 billion ($500 million) loan to start the project.45
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), an
independent governmental agency coordinating Japan’s
development assistance programs with other countries,
represents the Japanese government in the Thilawa

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Japanese Parliamentary Vice Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry
Yoshihiko Isozaki speaks during the Commencement Ceremony of
Thilawa Special Economic Zone Project in Thilawa, on the outskirts ofRangoon, in November 2013.
Photo: Soe Than WIN/AFP/Getty Images

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Background continued
People can be relocated under international law and inaccordance with international human rights principles if
certain standards are followed. JICA and the Burmese
government have established guidelines for relocating
people based on these international standards. States
have the power to remove people from their homes orland under the principle of eminent domain, whereby
private property is taken over by the state for publicuse. However, this power is constrained by otherobligations of the state. Article 17 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – which prohibits
unlawful or arbitrary interference with one’s home,among other protections – safeguards individuals
against forced evictions. Forced evictions are involuntary
removals of people from their homes or land throughactions that involve some element of force, coercion, or
threat, which are directly or indirectly attributable to thestate. For such removals or relocations to be consistent
with human rights standards, they must, at a minimum,
adhere to the following principles50:

Residents of Thilawa told PHR researchers thatinternational, Burmese government, and JICA guidelines
were not followed during the relocation process.
Families living near the Thilawa SEZ who were concerned
about their future formed the Thilawa Social
Development Group (TSDG) to advocate for their needs.
PHR joined advocacy group Mekong Watch toinvestigate possible human rights violations associatedwith the displacement process, including food security,
health status, humanitarian needs of displaced persons,and changes in livelihoods and household income. This
report describes the findings of the investigation.

 Relocation should be avoided and if it is not
avoidable, all efforts should be made to ensurethat it is minimized;
 Those who are relocated should never be worse
off after relocation than before and any
resettlement plan should allocate sufficient
resources to ensure those who are impacted
are fairly compensated and should benefit fromthe development process on a sustainablebasis;
 Those facing relocation should be full participantsin the planning and management of therelocation;
 Those benefiting from the development projectthat is causing the relocation should pay thefull costs of the relocation process, including
socio-economic rehabilitation, which has
particular resonance for those who lose landthat was their source of income and foodsecurity; and There should be a legal forum in which people
facing relocation can challenge either thesubstance (for example, the argument that
relocation is the only option) and/or theprocess.

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10Methods and Limitations
The goal of this survey was to determine if human rights
violations occurred during displacement from theThilawa SEZ, and to assess the loss of livelihoods, healthstatus, and humanitarian needs of affected families.
Given that forced displacements are an everyday
occurrence in Burma, PHR developed an epidemiologicalsurvey tool that could be used in displaced communities
throughout the country. To pilot the survey, PHR
intentionally selected a community that was nototherwise facing significant human rights violations inorder to test whether the negative consequences offorced displacement alone could be captured in a timely
manner. Therefore, we did not test this survey tool in a
conflict area or on communities that were alreadysuffering persecution based on their ethnicity or
religion.
PHR researchers visited the site several times between
August and October 2014, and performed 24 key
informant interviews with community leaders, activists,
displaced persons, and people who had been displacedby the project, but had since moved away from therelocation site. PHR used a checklist based on theminimum standards established by the Sphere Project toassess the health and sanitation situation in therelocation site.51 Sphere standards are guidelines thatdefine minimum standards of living for people inhumanitarian emergencies. Given that the displacement
at the Thilawa SEZ was planned, the situation for those
who were relocated should be significantly higher thanrequired by Sphere, which assumes displacement
caused by an emergency, such as a natural disaster orcomplex emergency.
PHR trained seven community members from TSDG on
conducting surveys and another seven individuals who
had previous survey experience. The surveyors worked
in pairs composed of one community member and one
experienced surveyor. PHR researchers used random
sampling to identify 29 out of 37 displaced households
that were still living at the relocation site to interview.
This sample size was selected in order to gather as
much data as possible while also ensuring anonymity
among respondents.

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After approaching a house, PHR surveyors obtained
informed consent from an adult (18 years or older if
unmarried, 15 years if married). During the informed
consent process, surveyors explained the risks andpossible benefits of participating in the research, thatthe respondent would not be compensated, that there
was no penalty for refusing to participate or answer any
question, and that the respondent could stop theinterview at any time.
The survey questionnaire consisted of five pages ofquestions covering health status, food security, accessto healthcare, changes in income and livelihoods, andtransparency of the displacement process. Surveyors
used the Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance
Project’s six-question Household Food Insecurity Access
Scale, a validated instrument used to evaluate
household hunger in low and middle income countries
and assess food insecurity before and after
displacement.52 To screen for depression, surveyors
used the Patient Health Questionnaire-2 (PHQ-2),53 whichmeasures a respondent’s perception of their healthstatus. PHQ-2 is used by clinicians as the first step in ascreen for depression, but it cannot be used to diagnose
depression or assess its severity.54 Acute malnutrition
was assessed by measuring the mid-upper arm
circumference of children.55
Due to logistical constraints, PHR surveyors did not
perform the household survey with families that had
moved away from the relocation site, though two headsof household in areas outside the relocation site wereinterviewed by phone as key informant interviews, andkey informants in the relocation site described why
other households had moved away.
Although land confiscation is widespread in Burma, thesampling frame of this survey included only households
displaced in phase one of the Thilawa SEZ development
project. Results from this survey thus apply only tohouseholds that had a statistical chance of participatingin this survey, and they cannot be generalized to people
displaced by land confiscations in other parts of Burma.
Other limitations of the survey include its cross-sectional
design and lack of a comparison group, as well as
potential for dissatisfied households to minimize
challenges they faced prior to displacement andexaggerate challenges after displacement (recall bias).

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Methods and Limitations continued
Responses may also have been influenced by social
desirability if respondents perceived that surveyors
expected to hear complaints and that these complaints
might have resulted in stronger advocacy and benefits
for the respondents. It is also possible that respondents
minimized the severity of the challenges they faced due
to fear of retribution by the government; however, thisseems unlikely given the frank terms villagers used todescribe their plight.
Although PHR surveyed only 29 households, this grouprepresented most (78.4 percent) of those remaining in
the relocation site. Thus, the findings likely reflect theexperience of households displaced in phase one of theThilawa SEZ development project, suggesting theinternal validity of the survey is high. PHR was not able
to determine whether households that had moved awayfrom the relocation site were better or worse off thanhouseholds that remained.
PHR’s Ethical Review Board (ERB) approved this research.
PHR has had an ERB since 1996 to ensure protection ofhuman subjects in its research and investigations. PHR’s
ERB regulations are based on Title 45 CRF Part 46 (see:http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/45cfr46.html)
provisions, which are used by academic Institutional
Review Boards (IRBs). All of PHR’s research andinvestigations involving human subjects must be
approved by the ERB and conducted in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki as revised in 2000.

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International Guidelines on Forced Evictions
The obligation of states to refrain from and protect
against forced evictions is included in several
international legal instruments: the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention
on the Rights of the Child; the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Women; and the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.56 The
government of Burma has ratified the Convention on the
Rights of the Child as well as the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, which place binding obligations on thegovernment.
The two major international legal frameworks relating toevictions and displacements are the Guiding Principles
on Internally Displaced Persons (Guiding Principles) andthe Basic Principles and Guidelines on Developmentbased Evictions and Displacement (Basic Principles andGuidelines).57 According to these frameworks,
displacement may occur in “exceptional circumstances,”
as long as certain guidelines are followed, including thatthe eviction is carried out in accordance withinternational human rights laws, is reasonable andproportional, and is regulated to ensure full and faircompensation. These standards apply regardless ofwhether or not individuals hold formal title to theirhome and property. Before displacement, states mustensure that all those likely to be affected receive
appropriate notice, reasonable time for public review,
opportunities to challenge displacement, and otheroptions for relocation. States must explore all possible
alternatives to displacement, demonstrate that aneviction is unavoidable, and ensure that it will not resultin individuals becoming vulnerable to human rights
violations.

According to the Guiding Principles and the Basic
Principles and Guidelines, the government of Burma is
obligated to: Disseminate a comprehensive resettlement plan inadvance of the eviction;
 Provide affected persons with the option of legal,
technical, and other advice; Give affected persons the opportunity to challenge
the eviction;
 Demonstrate that the eviction is unavoidable andconsistent with international human rights
commitments that protect general welfare; Guarantee that individuals are not renderedhomeless or vulnerable to other human rights
violations; and Ensure that – to the extent not covered byassistance for relocation – the assessment of
economic damage takes losses and costs into
consideration.

During evictions, government officials must be present,
neutral observers should be allowed access, any use offorce must respect principles of necessity andproportionality, and precautions must be taken to
ensure that no one is subjected to violence or arbitrarily
deprived of property.
After evictions, the government and other responsible
parties must provide timely and appropriatecompensation, proper accommodation that adheres tointernationally recognized standards, and access tonecessary medical care.

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Results
PHR surveyors approached 29 households, and allconsented to the interview. Respondents included 17
men and 12 women, between the ages of 25 and 80
years. The number of people living in each household
ranged from two to five, for a total of 93 people. This
population was 53 percent female, and the ages ranged
from two months to 88 years. All percentages reported
in the figures outlined below, as well as the tables andgraphs (page 18–22), use the 29 respondents as adenominator, which can be generalized to the 37
households living in the relocation site at the time of thesurvey.
Residents were not informed of the results of socialand economic impact assessments.
PHR’s investigation found that the government of Burmadeviated from most of the Guiding Principles and the
Basic Principles and Guidelines. Although the regional
government in Rangoon performed social and economic
surveys, most people in the Thilawa SEZ did not know
they had the right to see the results of the assessments
until after they were relocated.
Residents were not clearly informed about the relocation
process, in direct contradiction to international
principles that require transparency and concerted
outreach to affected communities. JICA requires that
affected residents have access to the resettlement work
plan in order to promote transparency, but PHR foundthat 82.8 percent of residents did not read the work
plan before they moved, and that 62.1 percent ofresidents did not know they could see the resettlement
work plan at the SEZ office (Graph 2 on page 19).
The government did not provide opportunities forresidents to seek legal or technical advice, nor tochallenge the displacement in court.
In September and October 2013, the townshipauthorities offered households in Alwan Sot
compensation for the displacement: a governmentsupplied house in the relocation site or 2.5 million kyat($2,500), and varying amounts of money for fruit trees
and animals. People who owned farmland were given
the cash equivalent of six years of harvest. Householdswith elderly people received a one-time award of 50
kilograms of rice. Despite this compensation, families
were struggling just seven months after displacement.
Many of them spent much more than 2.5 million kyat onbuilding their houses and were left with insufficient
funds for living expenses.

phr.org“They took all our lands without fair compensation,
and we have no land left to grow the crops.”– Household interview #8, in Rangoon Division(August 2014)
Thilawa residents told PHR that the amount of money
awarded in compensation was inadequate, and that theyreceived below-market rates for the land, animals, andorchards that they lost in the process. Households also
reported that they did not receive ownership papers forthe plots of land they were given with their houses, andwere concerned that they could easily be displaced
again. The offers of compensation from the government
were made under threat of arrest for noncompliance,and many households accepted the offers out of fearthat the alternative was to receive nothing. Graph 3(page 20) shows that 93 percent of the households
surveyed by PHR reported that they felt threatened orafraid of what would happen if they refused to move.
“The new land is too small, so we couldn’t keep theanimals and sold them for whatever price wasoffered. The compensation is very low.”– Household interview #18, in Rangoon Division(August 2014)
Instead of providing affected families with anopportunity to challenge the displacement or offeredcompensation, as outlined in international standards,
the government issued threats to Thilawa residents. On
January 31, 2013, Thanlyin and Kyayktan townshipauthorities sent letters to residents of Thilawa, requiringthem to leave their land within 14 days or face apunishment of 30 days in prison.58 At a public meeting
concerning the displacement held on Sept 21, 2013, an
SEZ representative said that Thilawa residents could
accept the offer as it stood, or dispute the offer incourt.59 Community members misinterpreted the phrase“dispute in court,” understanding that if they did not
accept the offer, the government would sue them.
Community members told PHR about otherdisplacements they had read about in newspapers,
believing that the government could easily push themoff their land. Most people told PHR that they felt it was
better to take the deal than to risk losing everything,even though they thought that the compensation was
inadequate.
“They [the government] told us to be satisfied withwhat they provided. If not, we will face a legal charge
from the regional government. As we do not have agood understanding of the laws, we just have toaccept it.”– Household interview #1, in Rangoon Division(August 2014)

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Results continued
In September 2013, township officials visited Alwan Sot
and had residents sign an agreement that they would
accept compensation and move. At that time,
authorities did not provide residents with copies of theagreement; paperwork was eventually distributed toaffected individuals in August 2014, but only after
members of the TSDG filed an official objection to JICA
that complained about the lack of transparency in therelocation process.
“We aren’t experienced in these matters and areworried that we will be arrested. I have heard thatthe government destroyed houses with bulldozers
previously, and I am afraid.”– Household interview #23, in Rangoon Division(August 2014)
Some residents were not able to read the agreement,
given that approximately 30 percent of community
members are of Indian descent and do not read
Burmese script; these individuals reported that they
signed the agreement without a translated version orunderstanding the document. The Indian population
had been living in the region for several generations andthere were no differences in treatment or discriminationby the government before or after relocation, from what
the Burman population reported.
“We are afraid because they said ‘Take 25 lakhs [2.5
million kyat] and land or face a lawsuit from theregional government.’”– Household interview #19, in Rangoon Division(August 2014)

Kone Tan, they could not afford the long commute andsubsequently returned to their original villages.60 Other
households reported to PHR that they were forced toborrow money to pay for food after displacement andhad to put their houses up as collateral. As they
continued to borrow money and their debts increased,some residents decided it would be better to sell thehouse to pay off the debts and move to another place.61
The displacement had negative effects on
livelihoods.
In contradiction to standards that require any
displacement to safeguard the human rights of thoseaffected, the government of Burma failed to ensure that
individuals were not rendered vulnerable to abuse. The
government also did not consider the costs associatedwith loss of farmland in determining appropriatecompensation. As a result, displaced families’ incomes
have been severely affected, which has led to a decline
in food security and the ability to access health care.
The displacement dramatically affected households’
abilities to provide for themselves. Over half of thehouseholds reported depending on some kind of
farming before displacement, as shown in Table 1 (page18). All of these households lost their land and theability to generate an income. Several households(including most that moved away from the relocationsite) worked in factories before displacement, but thecost of getting to work increased dramatically after
displacement because the relocation site was more
remote.

Throughout the displacement process, TSDG sent 12
letters in total to the Burmese government and JICA
requesting meetings to negotiate better compensation.
Public consultations were held, but no decisions werereached regarding compensation.
Residents were dissatisfied with the displacement
process, but have little recourse.
Of the 29 households PHR surveyed, 23 were notsatisfied with the compensation they received, and 23
were not satisfied with the relocation process.
Of the 68 displaced households, 31 left the relocationsite within the first nine months after the displacement.
Most of these households were not from the Thilawa
SEZ originally, and had moved there to work in nearby
industries, according to interviews with residents who
remained in the relocation site. When they weredisplaced from the towns of Alwon Sot and Thilawa

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Daw Myint Myint Thein and her son in front of their home in the
Thilawa relocation site. Ms. Thein said that her children missed a fullyear of school as a result of their displacement.

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Results continued
Only four households reported increases in income after
the displacement, while 24 reported decreases,
including nine that reported the loss of all income. The
average monthly income dropped from 327,000 kyat($327) before displacement to 71,000 kyat ($71)
afterwards, as shown in Graph 5 (page 21). Of the 23
households living above the UNDP poverty line for
Burma – 376,151 kyat ($376) per adult per year – before
displacement, 14 households (61 percent) dropped
below this line after displacement, for a total of 20
households (69 percent) living below the poverty line
after displacement (Graph 6 on page 21).62 The UNDP
establishes a food poverty line by assessing the amountof money required to meet caloric requirements if allhousehold income is spent on food. This figure
represents a level of extreme hardship. The UNDP has
calculated the food poverty line in Burma at 274,990
kyats ($275) per adult per year.63 Of the 23 households
living above the food poverty line before displacement,
10 households (43 percent) went into food poverty after
displacement.
“In the previous place, even if we did not have enoughincome, we could eat the crops from the garden.
Here in this place, we starve when we do not haveincome.” – Household interview #19, in Rangoon
Division (August 2014)
Given the loss of income, 23 households reported thatthey needed to borrow money to pay for expenses after
displacement; the average household debt since
relocation was 2.2 million kyat ($2,200) – or about
225,000 kyat ($225) per month – and only threehouseholds reported having enough money to meettheir needs. Households told PHR that they put theirhomes up for collateral, and those that avoided debt
were forced to sell off their assets, such as gold or otheritems. These households voiced concerns that they willsoon run out of items to sell, driving them to borrowmoney.
Most households (23) said they were farming land
before they were displaced, and that they lost between
0.4 and 35 acres, for a total of 154 acres between allfamilies. Households received money for crops,
vegetable gardens, and trees, but no household
received new land as compensation for the
displacement. Displaced residents told PHR that the
government had previously confiscated their lands in

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1996 and 1997, but allowed them to continue farming
on it. In the case of the Thilawa SEZ, the government
may be classifying the residents as squatters, absolving
the state from providing compensation for the land
itself, according to the country’s 2012 Farmland Law.
Some humanitarian conditions at the relocation site
are below international standards for refugees.
PHR found that the water sources and latrines provided
by the TSEZMC did not conform to international
standards established by the Sphere Project. Spherestandards are dignity-based guidelines that define
minimum standards of living for people in humanitarian
emergencies. Given that these standards weredeveloped for emergency situations, they represent theextreme minimum requirements for living with dignity.
Table 2 (page 18) shows assessment areas, Spherestandards, and PHR findings.
In addition, members of TSDG collected water samples –following Myanmar Ministry of Health (MoH) guidelines –from the seven pumps and wells provided by the
TSEZMC at the relocation site, and had them tested at a
MoH water quality testing lab in Rangoon to assesswater quality. The lab found that all of the samples were“bacteriologically unsatisfactory,”64 meaning that theamount of bacteria from human feces that was found in
the water samples exceeded a level deemed acceptableby the MoH, and thus was unfit for humanconsumption.

Community leader, Aye Khaing Win, in front of a row of houses at theThilawa relocation site. His family had 20 acres of land before being
relocated to a plot of less than half an acre.

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Results continued
Food security, depression, and access to health carebecame worse following displacement.
PHR documented the health effects that these changes
in livelihoods have had on displaced households. Most
respondents of the survey reported having poor healthover the last six months.
PHR used the Patient Health Questionnaire-2 (PHQ-2)
scale to screen for possible depression; respondents
who score a 3 or greater may have depression oranxiety, although further tests would be required toconfirm this diagnosis. Out of 29 respondents, 20 (69percent) scored 3 or higher, suggesting that they may
have depression or anxiety.
“I was born there [Alwon Sot] and all my previous
generations lived there. Since after I moved here [therelocation site], I have no interest in my work and I
got depressed every day staying at home.” –Household interview #8, in Rangoon Division(August 2014)
Eight households (27.6 percent) reported an increase inhousehold hunger in August 2014 (after displacement)
compared with the previous August, and 13.6 percent
of children surveyed suffered from mild malnutrition.
Ability to access medical care was also affected bydisplacement. PHR found increases in the number ofhouseholds unable to afford to pay for medical care ortransportation to clinics after they were displaced. The
number of households reporting that someone was sickbut unable to access treatment more than doubled(from 7 to 16) after displacement, as shown in Graph 8(page 22).

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Conclusion
The displacement in Thilawa took place amid a broader
climate of state-sponsored abuse in Burma, where
people have no recourse to challenge illegal government
action. Specifically, the displacement process in Thilawa
violated residents’ human rights, negatively affected
their ability to provide for themselves, and resulted indeteriorating food security and limited ability to accesshealth care. The TSEZMC will relocate 846 morehouseholds when development begins on phase two of
the project. If the TSEZMC, the Burmese government,
and JICA continue to operate as they did in the firstphase of the project, these households will suffer thesame fate.
Burma requires economic development, but given thehistorical context of forced displacement, impunity forhuman rights violations, weak rule of law, andcorruption, there is great risk that economic
development projects will benefit a select few in powerat the expense of deepened deprivation and poverty formany others. Although the results of this survey cannot
be generalized for the country as a whole, the survey
does highlight risks inherent to any major development
project in Burma. Having recently emerged from morethan 50 years of military dictatorship, it will take timeand commitment to build a strong civil society that is
capable of educating people in Burma about their rights.
Residents generally fear their government, which fordecades has controlled the population by force. The
government has yet to implement sufficientmechanisms to protect people from human rights
abuses and ensure justice for victims.
Given this context, any development project in the
country carries great risk of human rights violations.
JICA and other organizations implementing suchprojects should make every effort to proactively identify
the potential negative outcomes and consult with theaffected community about how best to minimize or
eliminate these risks. The Thilawa case suggests that
foreign organizations cannot rely on the Burmese
government to protect the human rights of forciblydisplaced populations.

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Recommendations
To the government of Burma: Immediately implement transparent proceduresconsistent with the UN Basic Principles andGuidelines on Development-Based Evictions andDisplacement, which:o uphold the principles of necessity andproportionality for any evictions;o provide any individuals to be affected by
the eviction with clear notice andeffective opportunities to challenge thedisplacement; ando ensure that all those displaced receive
appropriate compensation as well as
real and tangible income-generating
opportunities;
 Improve humanitarian conditions at relocationsites to uphold international standards,
including ensuring that conditions meet or
exceed Sphere standards on drinking water andsanitation, which represent the bare minimum
required to prevent feces in latrines fromcontaminating drinking water sources;
 Guarantee that displaced populations have fullaccess to health care and other essential
services; Cease the practice of threatening or harassing
individuals who challenge eviction orders; Ensure that those displaced receive formal
registration of their new land and house; Provide public explanation of how particularcompensation is calculated; Respond in writing to each request submitted by
the Thilawa Social Development Group; Ensure that international standards will befollowed in future relocations in Thilawa andelsewhere in Burma; and Follow recommendations from the EthnicCommunity Development Forum and theCustomary Land Protection Committee, inparticular their call for redrafting the national
land use policy, including the meaningful
participation of representatives of small scale
farmers, ethnic groups, women, youth, andother people and communities who will bemost affected, as well as parliamentarians andindependent experts.

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To the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
and the government of Japan:
 Ensure that JICA guidelines on displacement
mirror internationally recognized standards on
displacement, and that these guidelines are
effectively implemented;
 Promote transparency regarding the agreements
between the government of Burma and JICA,
human rights impact assessment findings,
environmental assessment findings, and othermatters of interest to those who are or who
may become displaced; and Make sure that any collaboration with thegovernment of Burma is based on upholding
internationally recognized standards ofrelocation.
To the government of the United States: Raise the issue of forced displacement in bilateralcommunications with Burma and Japan, andcall on both governments to respect
internationally recognized standards oneviction; Demonstrate that the United States will monitor
phase two of development in Thilawa andstress that continued patterns of threats andharassment will jeopardize future cooperation
between the United States and Burma; Establish improvements in land rights as abenchmark for any further benefits, economicor otherwise, from the U.S. government; and Strengthen the voluntary reporting requirementsfor U.S. corporations doing business in Burma.
Require that all reporting be made public andspecifically include independent assessments of
the impacts of investment on livelihoods andhealth.
To shareholders and management of companies
investing in development projects in Thilawa andelsewhere in Burma: Ensure that corporate codes of conduct address
the rights of relocated persons, and that thesecodes of conduct are followed in Burma; and For shareholders, propose and vote forshareholder resolutions that 1) requiretransparent, participatory processes forrelocation that adhere to international
standards; and 2) assess the potential risk toshareholder value due to adverse publicity
surrounding substandard displacement
processes that have thus far fallen short ofinternational norms and threatened the healthand livelihood of local populations.
.

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Tables
Table 1. Changes in Livelihoods Due to Displacement
What was your primary job
before displacement?
Rice farmer

Frequency

Percentage

10

34.5

Vegetable farmer

8

27.6

Wage laborer

4

13.8

Other

4

13.8

Factory worker

3

10.3

Frequency

Percentage

10

34.5

Rice farmer

1

3.5

Wage laborer

5

17.2

Other

9

31.0

Fisherman

2

6.9

Factory worker

2

6.9

What was your primary job
after displacement?
Not working

Table 2. Results of Water and Sanitation Assessment of Relocation Site
Water & Sanitation
Area Assessed

Sphere Standards Key Indicators65

Acceptable?

PHR Findings

No

Most latrines are located in lowlying areas and susceptible toflooding and overflow; latrine
pits likely extend to depths
below the water table; all water
sources were closer than 30
meters (98 feet) to latrines.

No

Collars were present on wells,
but lids were not; all pumps andwells were closer than 98 feet tolatrines; fecal coliforms were
present in all wells.

No

No collar on pumps; all pumps
and wells were closer than 98
feet to latrines. The borehole forone pump had been drilled
through a cement-lined drainage
ditch. Fecal coliforms were
present in all pumped water.

Yes

Government-built houses were18.2 square meters (196 squarefeet) which is acceptable forfamilies up to five people (nofamily surveyed had more than
five people).

Pit latrines and soakaways (for most soils)
are at least 30 meters (98 feet) from any
groundwater source.
Latrines

The pit of any latrine is at least 1.5 meters(approximately 5 feet) above the watertable. Drainage or spillage fromdefecation systems must not run towards
any surface water source or shallow
groundwater source.

Well protection

There are no fecal coliforms per 100ml ofwater at the point of delivery and use. All
affected people drink water from aprotected or treated source in preference
to other readily available water sources.

Pump construction

There are no fecal coliforms per 100ml ofwater at the point of delivery and use. All
affected people drink water from aprotected or treated source in preference
to other readily available water sources.

House (size)

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The initial covered floor area per person isat least 3.5 square meters.

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Graphs
Graph 1Graph 2

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Graph 3

Graph 4

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Graph 5

Graph 6

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Graph 7

Graph 8phr.org

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Endnotes
In the wake of the violence of the 1988 student uprising in Burma, the military regime that seized power in a coup d’étatchanged the country’s name to Myanmar and the name of the then-capital from Rangoon to Yangon. Pro-democracy groups,
such as the National League for Democracy, and ethnic minority groups did not recognize the name changes. In support ofthese groups, Australia, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other governments continue to recognize thecountry as Burma. In this report, PHR uses the names Burma and Rangoon for the same reason.
2
Forced Migration Online, “Vulnerable Groups,” http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/forcedmigration-and-public-health/vulnerable-groups.
3“Basic principles and guidelines on development-based evictions and displacement,” Human Rights Council Fourth Session,
General Assembly, A/HRC/4/18, Annex 1, Feb. 5, 2007, http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/housing/guidelines_en.pdf.
See also UNHCR, “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,” September 2004, http://www.unhcr.org/43ce1cff2.html.
4
Jonas Moberg, “Mining the benefits of transparency,” Myanmar Times, August 26, 2013,
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/special-features/170-energy/7968-mining-the-benefits-of-transparency.html; Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Japan, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry of Japan, Memorandum on the Cooperation for theDevelopment of the Thilawa SEZ, December 21, 2012, http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2012/12/20121227003/201212270032.pdf. Provision I.1.(e) of the memorandum states: “Both sides recognize that the development of the Thilawa SEZ should be inline with the international environmental standards.” International environmental standards include the standards for social
impact, such as resettlement.
5
The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response” (2011),
http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook/.
6
For a more information on sanctions placed on Burma, see the following: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41336.pdf;
https://www.gov.uk/arms-embargo-on-burma; http://eeas.europa.eu/myanmar/index_en.htm;
http://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/burma-birmanie.aspx?lang=eng; https://www.dfat.gov.au/sanctions/sanctionsregimes/burma.html; and https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/country-travel-information/myanmar/switzerland-myanmar.html.
7
Wai Mo, “Napyidaw Orders New ‘Four Cuts’ Campaign,” Irrawaddy, March 4, 2011,
http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20880.
8
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), Silencing Dissent: The Ongoing Imprisonment of Burma’s Political
Activists in the Lead Up to the 2010 Elections, Oct. 2010,http://aappb.org/2014/03/silencing-dissent/.
9“Burma’s 1988 Protests,” BBC News, Sept. 25, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7012158.stm.
10
Matthew Fisher, “‘Like a gold rush’: Investing in Burma ‘high-risk’ and potentially ‘high-reward,’” National Post, Nov. 27,
2012, http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/11/27/like-a-gold-rush-investing-in-burma-high-risk-and-potentially-high-reward/;“Investing in Myanmar: Triplicating Success,” Economist, Jul. 23, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/07/investing-myanmar; “Will Burma Become Asia’s Next Economic Tiger?”Time, Aug. 22, 2012, http://business.time.com/2012/08/22/will-burma-become-asias-next-economic-tiger/.
11
KPMG, “Investing in Myanmar,” Nov. 2012,
http://www.kpmg.com/MM/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Investing-Myanmar-update-29Oct.pdf.
12International Crisis Group, “Myanmar the Politics of Economic Reform,” Asia Report, Nº231, July 27, 2012,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/231-myanmar-the-politics-of-economicreform.pdf.
13
UNDP, 2014 Human Development Reports: Myanmar, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MMR.
14
The World Bank, World Development Indicators: Poverty, Myanmar, http://data.worldbank.org/topic/poverty.
15
United Nations Statistics Division, World Statistics Pocketbook: Myanmar,
https://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=MYANMAR.
16
UNICEF, Statistics: Republic of the Union of Myanmar, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/myanmar_statistics.html.
17
The World Factbook, “Myanmar,” CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/print_2116.html.
18“DICA release revised FDI figures,” Charltons Myanmar, Charltons Legal Consulting Services, Apr. 2014,
http://www.charltonsmyanmar.com/dica-release-revised-fdi-figures/.
19
Invest in Myanmar, The Myanmar Investment Guide (2013), http://www.investinmyanmar.com/myanmar-investment-guide/.
20
Adam Richards and Bill Davis, Bitter Wounds and Lost Dreams: Human Rights Under Assault in Karen State, Burma, Aug.
2012, Physicians for Human Rights, http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/reports/bitter-wounds-and-lost-dreams.html.
21
Karen Human Rights Group, Losing Ground: Land Conflicts and Collective Action in Eastern Myanmar, Mar. 2013,
http://www.khrg.org/sites/default/files/losinggroundkhrg-march2013-fulltext.pdf; Alternative Asian Network on Burma(ALTSEAN Burma), “Land Confiscation in Burma, A Threat to Local Communities & Responsible Investment,” Mar. 25, 2014,
http://www.altsean.org/Docs/PDF%20Format/Thematic%20Briefers/Land%20Confiscation%20in%20Burma_5%20May%202014.
pdf; Human Rights Foundation of Monland-Burma, Disputed Territory: Farmers Fight Against Unjust Land Acquisition andBarriers to Their Progress, Oct. 2013, http://rehmonnya.org/reports/DisputedTerritory.pdf; Pa-Oh Youth Organization, Poison
Clouds: Lessons from Burma’s Largest Coal Project at Tigyit, 2011, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs11/47252781-PoisonClouds-in-English.pdf; Arakan Oil Watch, Danger Zone: Giant Chinese Industrial Zone Threatens Burma’s Arakan Coast, Dec.
2012, http://www.burmapartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/SEZ-Report_English.pdf; Burma Partnership,
Campaigns: Environmental and Economic Justice, http://www.burmapartnership.org/issues/environmental-and-economicjustice/; Stanley A. Weiss and Tim Heinemann, “How to Invest in Myanmar”, Foreign Affairs, Jan. 17 2014,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140658/stanley-a-weiss-and-tim-heinemann/how-to-invest-in-myanmar; Phil Thornton,“Myanmar’s Lawless Land,” The Diplomat, Oct. 23, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/myanmars-lawless-land/; Kyaw
Kyaw, “Land Reform Key to Burma’s Future,” The Diplomat, Aug. 25, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/land-reform-keyto-burmas-future/; Kevin Woods, “A Political Anatomy of Land Grabs,” Myanmar Times, Mar. 3, 2014,
http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/9740-a-political-anatomy-of-land-grabs.html.
22“Development and Displacement in Burma,” U.S. Campaign for Burma, https://developdisplaceburma.crowdmap.com/.
1

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Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results.
This includes the Burmese Constitution, which articulates that the state owns all of the land and has the right to take it. The
2012 Vacant Lands Law allows the state to confiscate fallow land and also gives the state authority to determine if land is
fallow.
25
Alternative Asian Network on Burma (ALTSEAN Burma), “Land Confiscation in Burma, A Threat to Local Communities &Responsible Investment,” Mar. 25, 2014,
http://www.altsean.org/Docs/PDF%20Format/Thematic%20Briefers/Land%20Confiscation%20in%20Burma_5%20May%202014.
pdf.
26
Kyaw Kyaw, “Land Reform Key to Burma’s Future,” The Diplomat, Aug. 25, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/landreform-key-to-burmas-future/; USAID, “USAID Country Profile: Property Rights and Resource Governance, Burma,” May 2013,
http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-profiles/full-reports/USAID_Land_Tenure_Burma_Profile.pdf.
27
Jared Bissinger and Linn Maung Maung, Subnational Governments and Business in Myanmar, Discussion Paper No. 2, Feb.
2014, Asia Foundation & Myanmar Development Resource Institute’s Center for Economic and Social Development, 22 and 29,
http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/SubnationalGovernmentsandBusinessinMyanmarEnglish.pdf.
28
Hamish Nixon, Cindy Joelene, Kyi Pyar Chit Saw, Thet Aung Lynn, and Matthew Arnold, State and Regional Governments in
Myanmar, Sept. 2013, Asia Foundation & Myanmar Development Resource Institute’s Center for Economic and Social Development,
14, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/StateandRegionGovernmentsinMyanmarCESDTAF.PDF.
29
Bissinger and Maung Maung, Subnational Government and Business in Myanmar, 5.
30
Nixon et al, State and Regional Governments in Myanmar, 19.
31
Ibid, 15.
32
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, The DAC Guidelines: Poverty Reduction (Paris, France, April 25–
26, 2001), http://www.oecd.org/dac/povertyreduction/2672735.pdf.
33
United Nations Department of Public Information, “Poverty: An Obstacle to Human Rights,” last modified October 1998,
http://www.un.org/rights/poverty/poverty5.htm.
34
Ibid.
35
Laura E. Caulfield, Mercedes de Onis, Monika Blossner, and Robert E. Black, “Undernutrition as an Underlying Cause of Child
Deaths Associated with Diarrhea, Pneumonia, Malaria, and Measles,” The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, Vol. 80, No.
1, (July 2004): 193-198, http://ajcn.nutrition.org/content/80/1/193.full.
36
CARE, Household Livelihood Security Assessments: A Toolkit for Practitioners, TANGO International Inc., Jul. 2002,
http://pqdl.care.org/Practice/HLS%20Assessment%20-%20A%20Toolkit%20for%20Practitioners.pdf; Jonathan M. Mann,“Protecting human rights is essential for promoting health,” British Medical Journal, 312:924 (April 13, 1996),
http://www.bmj.com/content/312/7036/924.
37
United Nations Department of Public Information, “Poverty: An Obstacle to Human Rights.”
38
Ibid.
39
“Gender and Livelihood in Emergencies,” Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action, Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Dec.
2005, http://www.ungei.org/resources/files/09.pdf.
40World Bank, World Development Indicators: Rural Population Data, Myanmar,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS; UNDP, 2014 Human Development Reports: Myanmar.
41
UN Development Programme, Integrated Household Living Conditions in Myanmar (2009-2010): Poverty Profile, Jun. 2011,40, http://www.mm.undp.org/content/dam/myanmar/docs/FA1MMRPovertyProfile_Eng.pdf.
42“Project Level Impacts: Land,” Myanmar Oil and Gas Sector-wide Impact Assessment, Institute for Human Rights and Business,
Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, and Danish Institute of Human Rights, Sept. 4, 2014, http://www.myanmarresponsiblebusiness.org/pdf/SWIA/Oil-Gas/09-Land.pdf; USAID, Property Rights and Resource Governance: Burma, May 2013, 7,
http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-profiles/full-reports/USAID_Land_Tenure_Burma_Profile.pdf.
43
For a detailed analysis of Burmese law pertinent to this displacement, see upcoming publication by EarthRights
International: “Thilawa Special Economic Zone: Analysis of the Affected Communities’ Rights and Remedies Under Myanmar
Law and JICA’s Guidelines,” EarthRights International.
44
Japan International Cooperation Agency, “Private Sector Investment Finance for the Thilawa Special Economic Zone,” Apr. 23, 2014,
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2014/140423_01.html.
45
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry of Japan, “Memorandum on the Cooperation
for the Development of the Thilawa SEZ,” Dec. 21, 2012, http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2012/12/20121227003/20121227003-2.pdf.
46
Japan International Cooperation Agency, “Private Sector Investment Finance for the Thilawa Special Economic Zone”; Mitsuru
Obe, “Moving Forward in Myanmar Finally,” Wall Street Journal, Nov. 5, 2013,
http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2013/11/05/moving-forward-in-myanmar-in-fits-and-starts/.
47
Sophie Song, “Myanmar Thilawa Special Economic Zone (SEZ): Mitsubishi (8058) and Other Japanese Companies Set to Begin
Infrastructure Development,” International Business Times, Nov. 5, 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/myanmar-thilawa-special-economiczone-sez-mitsubishi-8058-other-japanese-companies-set-begin-1456030; Thike Zin, “Japanese Car Builders Bid on Thilawa,” DVB, Mar.
2, 2014, http://www.dvb.no/news/japanese-car-parts-eyeing-thilawa-sez-burma-myanmar/37973; Marubeni, “Establishment of a
Consortium for the development of the Thilawa SEZ,” Oct. 29. 2013, http://www.marubeni.com/news/2013/release/00056.html;
Mitsubishi Corporation, “Establishment of a Consortium for the development of the Thilawa SEZ,” Oct. 29, 2013,
http://www.mitsubishicorp.com/jp/en/pr/archive/2013/html/0000022732.html; Sumitomo Corporation, “Establishment of a
Consortium for the development of the Thilawa SEZ,” Oct. 29, 2013, http://www.sumitomocorp.co.jp/english/news/detail/id=27309.
48
Myanmar Thilawa SEZ Holdings Public Limited, Prospectus, Feb. 27, 2014,
http://mtshmyanmar.com/download/301%20MTSH%20Prospectus%20-%2027%20Feb%2014%20Final%20(clean).pdf.
49
Thike Zinn, “Japanese Car Builders Bid on Thilawa,” DVB, Mar. 2, 2014, http://www.dvb.no/news/japanese-car-parts-eyeingthilawa-sez-burma-myanmar/37973.
50
See “General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant),” adopted at the Sixth Session of
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 13, 1991, UN Doc. E/1992/23,
http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079a1.html; “General Comment 7: Forced Evictions, and the Right to Adequate Housing
23
24

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(Art. 11 (1) of the Covenant),” adopted at the Sixteenth Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
May 20, 1997, UN Doc. E/1998/22, http://www.refworld.org/docid/47a70799d.html.
51
The Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response.”
52
Megan Deitchler, Terri Ballard, Anne Swindale, and Jennifer Coates, “Introducing a Simple Method of Household Hunger for
Cross-Cultural Use,” Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance 2, Technical Note No. 12, USAID, Feb. 2011,
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/wa_workshop/docs/HH_Hunger_Scale.pdf; Paula Bilinsky and Anne Swindale;“Months of adequate household food provisioning (MAHFP) for measurement of household food access: Indicator guide,” Foodand Nutrition Technical Assistance 2, Jun. 2010,
http://www.fantaproject.org/sites/default/files/resources/MAHFP_June_2010_ENGLISH_v4.pdf.
53
Pfizer Inc., “Patient Health Questionnaire-2 (PHQ-2),” Stable Resource Toolkit, http://www.cqaimh.org/pdf/tool_phq2.pdf.
54
American Psychological Association, “Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9 & PHQ-2),”
http://www.apa.org/pi/about/publications/caregivers/practice-settings/assessment/tools/patient-health.aspx.
55
For background information on this method, see “Mid-Upper Arm Circumference (MUAC)” at
http://www.unsystem.org/scn/archives/adults/ch06.htm.
56“Basic principles and guidelines on development-based evictions and displacement,” Human Rights Council.
57
The Guiding Principles apply during the time that people are in displacement, while the Basic Principles and Guidelines cover in detailthe phases prior to, during, and after evictions, especially where evictions are irreversible due to development projects or disaster. See
also UNHCR, “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement”; “Basic principles and guidelines on development-based evictions anddisplacement,” Human Rights Council.
58
PHR obtained a copy of the letter and had it translated. The letters were individually addressed to households living in Thilawa andhand-delivered.
59
Eleven households reported in the survey that they moved because they were afraid of lawsuits from the government. Six key
informants said they were at the meeting and witnessed the threat.
60
Interview with key informants numbers 2 and 3, in Rangoon Division, Aug. 1, 2014.
61
Telephone interview with key informants numbers 23 and 24, Oct. 1, 2014.
62
The World Bank, World Development Indicators: Poverty, Myanmar.
63
Ibid.
64
The Rangoon lab found more than 16 total coliforms in MPN/100ml in each sample.
65
See Sphere Project, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response.

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