Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind”
Auditions on Female Musicians
Citation
Goldin, Claudia, and Cecilia Rouse. 2000. “Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of ‘Blind’
Auditions on Female Musicians.” American Economic Review 90 (4) (September): 715–741.
doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.715.

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doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.715

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Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions
on Female Musicians
By CLAUDIA GOLDIN AND CECILIA ROUSE*
A change in the audition procedures of symphony orchestras—adoption of “blind”
auditions with a “screen” to conceal the candidate’s identity from the jury—
provides a test for sex-biased hiring. Using data from actual auditions, in an
individual fixed-effects framework, we find that the screen increases the probability
a woman will be advanced and hired. Although some of our estimates have large
standard errors and there is one persistent effect in the opposite direction, theweight of the evidence suggests that the blind audition procedure fostered impartiality in hiring and increased the proportion women in symphony orchestras.
(JEL J7, J16)

Sex-biased hiring has been alleged for manyoccupations but is extremely difficult to prove.
The empirical literature on discrimination, de-riving from the seminal contributions of Gary
Becker (1971) and Kenneth Arrow (1973), has
focused mainly on disparities in earnings between groups (e.g., males and females), given
differences in observable productivity-alteringcharacteristics. With the exception of various
audit studies (e.g., Genevieve Kenney andDouglas A. Wissoker, 1994; David Neumark etal., 1996) and others, few researchers have beenable to address directly the issue of bias in
hiring practices.1 A change in the way symphony orchestras recruit musicians provides anunusual way to test for sex-biased hiring.
Until recently, the great symphony orchestras in the United States consisted of members
who were largely handpicked by the music
director. Although virtually all had auditioned
for the position, most of the contenders would
have been the (male) students of a select* Goldin: Department of Economics, Harvard University,
Cambridge, MA 02183; Rouse: Woodrow Wilson School,
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544. Rouse acknowledges The National Academy of Education, the NAE Spencer
Postdoctoral Fellowship Program, and the Mellon Foundation
for financial support. We are indebted to the staff members of
the orchestras that gave us access to their audition records andwho provided other assistance, and to the musicians who
responded to our questionnaire. We are particularly grateful to
Joanne Berry, Brigit Carr, Ruth DeSarno, Stefanie Dyson, Josh
Feldman, Barbara Haws, Oren Howard, Cindy Hubbard, Carol
Jacobs, Lynn Larsen, Bennett McClellan, Stephen Molina, Bill
Moyer, Jeffrey Neville, Stephen Novak, Deborah Oberschalp,
Stacey Pelinka, Carl Schiebler, Alison Scott-Williams, Robert
Sirineck, Harold Steiman, and Brenda Nelson Strauss. We also
thank Gretchen Jackson of the University of Michigan Schoolof Music. Rashid Alvi, Brigit Chen, Eric Hilfers, Serena Mayeri, LaShawn Richburg, Melissa Schettini, Thomas Tucker,
Linda Tuch, and Lavelle (Yvette) Winfield served as our
extremely able research assistants. David Howell of the Princeton University Department of East Asian Studies and Jin Heum
Park kindly helped to determine the gender of Japanese andKorean names. We thank them all. We are grateful to ourcolleagues David Card, Anne Case, David Cutler, Angus
Deaton, Hank Farber, Larry Katz, Alan Krueger, David Lee,and Aaron Yelowitz for helpful conversations, and to seminar
participants at the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at
Cornell University, University of Illinois at ChampaignUrbana, Princeton University, University of Toronto, Harvard
University, and Vanderbilt University. We also thank two
anonymous referees for comments that have made this a better
paper. Any remaining errors are ours. Unfortunately the data
used in this article are confidential and may not be madeavailable to other researchers.

1
An extensive literature exists on occupational segregation by sex and the possible reasons for the large differencesin occupations between men and women today and in thepast. The debate is ongoing. On the one hand are those who
believe that discrimination, either individual or societal innature, is the driving force, and on the other hand are those
who claim the evidence shows women and men sort amongoccupations on the basis of different tastes for work characteristics. In the former category see Paula England (1982)and England et al. (1988); in the latter group see Solomon
W. Polachek (1979) and Randall K. Filer (1989). It should
be noted that many other studies (e.g., Ian Ayres and Joel
Waldfogel, 1994) have also attempted to measure discrimination in atypical ways.

715

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THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

group of teachers. In an attempt to overcome
this seeming bias in the hiring of musicians,
most major U.S. orchestras changed their audition policies in the 1970’s and 1980’s making them more open and routinized. Openings
became widely advertised in the union papers,
and many positions attracted more than 100
applicants where fewer than 20 would havebeen considered before. Audition committees
were restructured to consist of members of
the orchestra, not just the conductor and section principal. The audition procedure became
democratized at a time when many other institutions in America did as well.
But democratization did not guarantee impartiality, because favorites could still be identified
by sight and through resumes. Another set ofprocedures was adopted to ensure, or at least givethe impression of, impartiality. These procedures
involve hiding the identity of the player from thejury. Although they take several forms, we use theterms “blind” and “screen” to describe the group.2
The question we pose is whether the hiring process became more impartial through the use ofblind auditions. Because we are able to identify
sex, but no other characteristics for a large sample,
we focus on the impact of the screen on theemployment of women.3
Screens were not adopted by all orchestras atonce. Among the major orchestras, one still
does not have any blind round to their audition
procedure (Cleveland) and one adopted thescreen in 1952 for the preliminary round (Boston Symphony Orchestra), decades before theothers. Most other orchestras shifted to blind
preliminaries from the early 1970’s to the late1980’s. The variation in screen adoption at various rounds in the audition process allows us toassess its use as a treatment.4
The change in audition procedures withthe adoption of the screen allows us to test
whether bias exists in its absence. In both our2
For an article about the blind audition process see The
Economist (1996).
3
The screen may also have opened opportunities forindividuals from less-well-known orchestras, those trained
outside mainstream institutions, and those from minority
groups.
4
The blind audition procedures bear some resemblance
to “double-blind” refereeing in academic journals. See Rebecca Blank (1991) for an assessment of the treatment effectof such refereeing in the American Economic Review.

SEPTEMBER 2000

study and studies using audits, the issue iswhether sex (or race or ethnicity), apart fromobjective criteria (e.g., the sound of a musicalperformance, the content of a resume), is considered in the hiring process. Why sex mightmake a difference is another matter.
Our data come from two sources: rosters andaudition records. Rosters are simply lists oforchestra personnel, together with instrument
and position (e.g., principal), found in orchestra
programs. The audition records are the actual
accounts of the hiring process kept by the personnel manager of the orchestra. Both are described in more detail below.
The audition records we have collected form an
uncommon data set. Our sample includes who
was advanced and hired from an initial group ofcontestants and also what happened to approximately two-thirds of the individuals in our data set
who competed in other auditions in the sample.
There are, to be certain, various data sets containing information on applicant pools and hiring
practices (see, e.g., Harry Holzer and David Neumark, 1996). But our data set is unique because it
has the complete applicant pool for each of theauditions and links individuals across auditions.
Most important for our study is that audition procedures differed across orchestras in known ways
and that the majority of the orchestras in our
sample changed audition procedure during the period of study.5
We find, using our audition sample in an individual fixed-effects framework, that the screen
increases the probability a woman will be advanced out of a preliminary round when there isno semifinal round. The screen also greatly enhances the likelihood a female contestant will be
the winner in a final round. Using both the roster
and auditions samples, and reasonable assumptions, the switch to blind auditions can explain
about one-third of the increase in the proportion
female among new hires (whereas another onethird is the result of the increased pool of female
candidates). Estimates based on the roster sample
indicate that blind auditions may account for 25
percent of the increase in the percentage of orchestra musicians who are female.

5This statement is true for the roster sample. There are
only a few orchestras that changed audition procedures
during the years of our audition data.

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GOLDIN AND ROUSE: ORCHESTRATING IMPARTIALITY

I. Sex Composition of Orchestras

Symphony orchestras consist of about 100
musicians and, although the number has varied between 90 to 105, it is rarely lower orhigher. The positions, moreover, are nearly
identical between orchestras and over time.
As opposed to firms, symphony orchestras do
not vary much in size and have virtually identical numbers and types of jobs. Thus we caneasily look at the proportion women in an
orchestra without being concerned aboutchanges in the composition of occupations
and the number of workers. An increase in thenumber of women from, say, 1 to 10, cannot
arise because the number of harpists(a female-dominated instrument), has greatly
expanded. It must be because the proportion
female within many groups has increased.
Among the five highest-ranked orchestras
in the nation (known as the “Big Five”)—theBoston Symphony Orchestra (BSO), the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, the Cleveland
Symphony Orchestra, the New York Philharmonic (NYPhil), and the Philadelphia Orchestra—none contained more than 12
percent women until about 1980.6 As can beseen in Figure 1A, each of the five lines(giving the proportion female) greatly increases after some point. For the NYPhil, theline steeply ascends in the early 1970’s. For
the BSO, the turning point appears to be a bit
earlier. The percentage female in the NYPhil
is currently 35 percent, the highest among all
11 orchestras in our sample after being thelowest (generally at zero) for decades. Thus
the increase of women in the nation’s finest
orchestras has been extraordinary. The increase is even more remarkable because, as
we discuss below, turnover in these orchestras
is exceedingly low. The proportion of new
players who were women must have been,
and indeed was, exceedingly high.
Similar trends can be discerned for fourother orchestras—the Los Angeles SymphonyOrchestra (LA), the San Francisco Philharmonic (SF), the Detroit Symphony Orchestra,and the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra

6
The data referred to, and used in Figures 1 to 3, arefrom orchestral rosters, described in more detail below.

717(PSO)— given in Figure 1B.7 The upward
trend in the proportion female is also obvious
in Figure 1B, although initial levels are higher
than in Figure 1A. There is somewhat more
choppiness to the graph, particularly during
the 1940’s. Although we have tried to eliminate all substitute, temporary, and guest musicians, especially during World War II and
the Korean War, this was not always possible.
The only way to increase the proportion
women is to hire more female musicians andturnover during most periods was low. The
number of new hires is graphed in Figure
2 for five orchestras. Because “new hires” is avolatile construct, we use a centered five-year
moving average. In most years after the late1950’s, the top-ranked orchestras in the group(Chicago and NYPhil) hired about four musicians a year, whereas the other three hired
about six. Prior to 1960 the numbers are extremely high for LA and the PSO, because, it
has been claimed, their music directors exercised their power to terminate, at will, theemployment of musicians. Also of interest isthat the number of new hires trends down,even excluding years prior to 1960. The important points to take from Figure 2 are thatthe number of new hires was small after 1960
and that it declined over time.
The proportion female among the new hires
must have been sizable to increase the proportion female in the orchestras. Figure
3 shows the trend in the share of womenamong new hires for four of the “Big Five”(Figure 3A) and four other orchestras (Figure
3B).8 In both groups the female share of newhires rose over time, at a somewhat steeper
rate for the more prestigious orchestras. Since
the early 1980’s the share female among newhires has been about 35 percent for the BSO
and Chicago, and about 50 percent for the
NYPhil, whereas before 1970 less than 10
percent of new hires were women.9
Even though the fraction of new hires who
are female rises at somewhat different times
7
Our roster sample also includes the Metropolitan Opera
Orchestra and the St. Louis Symphony.
8
A centered five-year moving average is also used forthis variable.
9
In virtually all cases the share of women among newhires has decreased in the 1990’s.

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THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWSEPTEMBER 2000

FIGURE 1. PROPORTION FEMALE IN NINE ORCHESTRAS, 1940 TO 1990’s
A: THE “BIG FIVE”; B: FOUR OTHERS
Source: Roster sample. See text.

across the orchestras, there is a discernible
increase for the group as a whole in the late1970’s to early 1980’s, a time when the labor
force participation of women increased generally and when their participation in various
professions greatly expanded. The question,
therefore, is whether the screen mattered in a
direct manner or whether the increase was
the result of a host of other factors, including
the appearance of impartiality or an increased

pool of female contestants coming out ofmusic schools. Because the majority of newhires are in their late twenties and early
thirties, the question is whether the most selective music schools were producing considerably more female students in the early
1970’s. We currently have information by
instrument for only the Juilliard School ofMusic. With the exception of the brass section, the data, given in Figure 4, do not revealVOL. 90 NO. 4

GOLDIN AND ROUSE: ORCHESTRATING IMPARTIALITY

719

FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF NEW HIRES IN FIVE ORCHESTRAS, 1950 TO 1990’s
Source: Roster sample. See text.
Notes: A five-year centered moving average is used. New hires are musicians who were not with the orchestra the previous
year, who remain for at least one additional year, and who were not substitute musicians in the current year.

any sharp breaks in the fraction of all graduates who are female.10 Thus, it is not immediately obvious that an expansion in the
supply of qualified female musicians explains
the marked increase in female symphonyorchestra members; it could, therefore, be because of changes in the hiring procedures oforchestras.
But why would changes in audition procedures
alter the sex mix of those hired? Many of the mostrenowned conductors have, at one time or another,asserted that female musicians are not the equal ofmale musicians. Claims abound in the world ofmusic that “women have smaller techniques thanmen,” “are more temperamental and more likely
to demand special attention or treatment,” and that“the more women [in an orchestra], the poorer the10
We also have data on the sex composition of thegraduates of the University of Michigan School of Musicand Indiana University, but not by instrument. In the Michigan data, both for those receiving the Bachelor of Music(BM) degree and for those receiving the Master of Music(MM) degree, there is no change in the percentage female
from 1972 to 1996. The Indiana University data, for both
BM and MM degrees and excluding voice, piano, guitar,and early instruments, show an increase in the fraction
female from 1975 to 1996. The ratio of females to males
was 0.9 in 1975 but 1.2 in 1996.

sound.”11 Zubin Mehta, conductor of the Los Angeles Symphony from 1964 to 1978 and of the
New York Philharmonic from 1978 to 1990, is
credited with saying, “I just don’t think womenshould be in an orchestra.”12 Many European orchestras had, and some continue to have, statedpolicies not to hire women.13 The Vienna Philharmonic has only recently admitted its first female
member (a harpist). Female musicians, it can beconvincingly argued, have historically faced considerable discrimination.14 Thus a blind hiring
procedure, such as a screen that conceals the identity of the musician auditioning, could eliminate
11

Seltzer (1989), p. 215.
Seltzer (1989), p. 215. According to Seltzer, the factthat new hires at the NYPhil were about 45 percent female
during Mehta’s tenure as conductor suggests that Mehta’sviews may have changed.
13
In comparison with the United Kingdom and the twoGermanys, the United States in 1990 had the highest percentage female among its regional symphony orchestras and was aclose second to the United Kingdom in the major orchestra
category (Jutta J. Allmendinger et al., 1996).
14
In addition, an African-American cellist (Earl Madison) brought a civil suit against the NYPhil in 1968 alleging
that their audition procedures were discriminatory because
they did not use a screen. The orchestra was found not guilty
of discriminating in hiring permanent musicians, but it was
found to discriminate in hiring substitutes.
12

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THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWSEPTEMBER 2000

FIGURE 3. FEMALE SHARE OF NEW HIRES IN EIGHT ORCHESTRAS, 1950 TO 1990’s
A: FOUR OF THE “BIG FIVE”; B: FOUR OTHERS
Source: Roster sample. See text.
Notes: A five-year centered moving average is used. New hires are musicians who were not with the orchestra the previous
year, who remain for at least one additional year, and who were not substitute musicians in the current year.

the possibility of discrimination and increase thenumber of women in orchestras.
II. Orchestral Auditions

To understand the impact of the democratization of the audition procedure and thescreen, we must first explain how orchestra
auditions are now conducted. After determining that an audition must be held to fill an
opening, the orchestra advertises that it willhold an audition. Each audition attracts musicians from across the country and, often,

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GOLDIN AND ROUSE: ORCHESTRATING IMPARTIALITY

721

FIGURE 4. PROPORTION FEMALE OF JUILLIARD GRADUATES, TOTAL AND BY SECTION: 1947 TO 1995
Source: Juilliard Music School files.
15

from around the world. Musicians interested in auditioning are required to submit a
resume and often a tape of compulsory music(recorded according to specific guidelines) tobe judged by members of the orchestra. In
some orchestras this prescreening is dispositive; in others the musician has the right toaudition live in the preliminary round, even if
the audition committee rejects the candidateon the basis of the tape.16 All candidates are
given, in advance, most of the music they are
expected to perform at the live audition.
Live auditions today generally consist of
three rounds: preliminary, semifinal, and final.
But there is considerable variation. Although allorchestras now have a preliminary round, somehave two final rounds and in many there was nosemifinal round until the 1980’s. The preliminary is generally considered a screening roundto eliminate unqualified candidates. As a result,

15

Orchestral auditions, particularly for the nation’s mostprestigious orchestras, are national if not international, in
scope. Many contestants, the vast majority of whom receive
no travel reimbursement, travel long distances to audition.
The auditions span the fewest number of days possible tominimize hotel charges.
16
The tape, in this case, provides information to thecandidate of his or her likelihood of success, sparing themusician a potentially large travel expense.

the committee is free to advance as many, or as
few, as they wish. Candidates advanced fromthe semifinal round are generally considered“acceptable for hire” by the audition committee(which does not include the music director,
a.k.a. conductor, until the finals). Again, thismeans that the committee can advance as manyas it wishes. The final round generally results ina hire, but sometimes does not.17
In blind auditions (or audition rounds) a
screen is used to hide the identity of the playerfrom the committee.18 The screens we haveseen are either large pieces of heavy (but soundporous) cloth, sometimes suspended from theceiling of the symphony hall, or look like large
room dividers. Some orchestras also roll out acarpet leading to center stage to muffle footsteps
that could betray the sex of the candidate.19
Each candidate for a blind audition is given a
number, and the jury rates the candidate’s
17
There is one exception to this general rule. In rarecases when the committee cannot decide between two or
three candidates, each is invited to play with the orchestra
before the final decision is made.
18
It may also serve to hide the identity of the committee
from the player, although that is not its main function. We
use the terms “blind” and “screen” interchangeably.
19
Or, if a carpet is not placed on the stage, the personnel
manager may ask a woman to take off her shoes and heprovides the compensating footsteps.

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THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

performance next to the number on a sheet ofpaper. Only the personnel manager knows the
mapping from number to name and from nameto other personal information.20 The names of
the candidates are not revealed to the juries until
after the last blind round.
Almost all preliminary rounds are now blind.
The semifinal round, added as the number ofapplicants grew, may be blind. Finals are rarely
blind and almost always involve the attendance
and input of the music director.21 Although themusic director still wields considerable power,
the self-governance that swept orchestras in the
1970’s has served to contain the conductor’s
authoritarianism. The music director can ignore
the audition committee’s advice, but does so atgreater peril. Once an applicant is chosen to bea member of an orchestra, lifetime tenure isawarded after a brief probationary period. The
basis for termination is limited and rarely used.
The positions we are analyzing are choice jobs
in the musical world. In 1995 the minimum
starting base salary for musicians at the BSO
was $1,400 per week (for a 52-week year), notincluding recording contracts, soloist fees, overtime and extra service payments, bonuses, andper diem payments for tours and Tanglewood.22
Are blind auditions truly blind, or can a
trained, accomplished musician identify contestants solely from differences in playing style,just as academics can often identify authors of
double-blind papers they get to referee? Unlike
double-blind refereeing, for which one sees an

20
The personnel manager is generally a musician who
played with the orchestra for some time and knows theplayers and the conductor well. The duties involve managing the day-to-day work of the orchestra, getting substitutemusicians, making travel plans, and arranging the hiring of
new musicians.
21
It is almost always the case that if an orchestra in, say,the spring of 1986 holds a blind preliminary round for aposition, it will have all its candidates audition blind in thatround and in all other preliminary rounds during that season,should there be any. That is, there is generally no discretionon the part of the jury (and certainly not on the part of thecontestant) in terms of the audition procedure, particularly
once an audition is underway.
22
Most of the orchestra contracts in the group we haveexamined have similar base salaries. Union contracts list
only the minimum or base starting salary and minimum
increments for seniority. We do not know how many musicians have individually negotiated rates above the statedminimum amounts.

SEPTEMBER 2000

entire paper with its distinctive writing style,methodology, sources, and citations, the candidates play only predetermined and brief excerpts from the orchestral repertoire. Eachcandidate typically has just 5 to 10 minutes toplay for the audition committee, particularly inthe early rounds. There is little or no room forindividuality to be expressed and not much time
for it to be detected.23 Even when an individual
musician is known in advance to be auditioning,jury members often cannot identify that individual. Only the rare, well-known candidate, withan unusually distinctive musical style could
conceivably be correctly identified.
The many musicians and personnel managers
with whom we have spoken uniformly deny that
identification is possible for the vast majority ofcontestants. They also observe that, although it
is tempting to guess the identity of a contestant,particularly in the later rounds, audition committee members, more often than not, find they
are wrong. To base a hiring decision on speculation would not be in the best interests of theorchestra. Further, although an individual committee member may believe that he or sheknows the identity of a player, it would be rare
for the entire committee to be secure in suchknowledge. Thus, even if one committee member’s vote is swayed by such a belief, the committee’s vote must correspond to the consensus
view of the player’s musical ability for it todetermine the outcome. Thus, auditions heldwith a screen, apart from very few exceptions,
are truly blind.
The audition procedures of the 11 orchestras in the roster sample are summarized inTable 1.24 Although audition procedures are
now part of union contracts, that was not thecase in the more distant past and the procedures were not apparently recorded in any
surviving documents. We gathered information on these procedures from various
sources, including union contracts, interviews
with personnel managers, archival documents
on auditions, and a mail survey we conductedof orchestral musicians concerning the proce23
Also, there is generally not a standing audition committee that might become familiar with the musicians who
audition frequently.
24
We identify the orchestras by letter, rather than by
name, to preserve confidentiality of the audition sample.

VOL. 90 NO. 4

GOLDIN AND ROUSE: ORCHESTRATING IMPARTIALITY

723

TABLE 1—ORCHESTRA AUDITION PROCEDURE SUMMARY TABLE
Orchestra

Preliminaries

A

Blind since 1973

B

Blind since at least 1967

C
D

Blind since at least 1979
(definitely after 1972)
Blind since 1986

EF

Use of screen varies until 1981
Blind since at least 1972

G
H
I
J
K

Blind since 1986
Blind since 1970
Blind since 1979
Blind since 1952
Not blind

Semifinals
Blind (varies) since1973
Use of screen varies
Not blind: 1991–present
Blind: 1984–1987
Blind since 1986; varies
until 1993
Use of screen varies
Blind since at least
1972
Use of screen varies
Not blind
Blind since 1979
Blind since 1952
Not blind

FinalsNot blind
Blind 1967–1969; since
winter 1994
Not blind
1st part blind since 1993;
2nd part not blind
Not blind
Blind since at least 1972
Not blind
Not blind
Blind since fall 1983
Not blind
Not blind

Notes: The 11 orchestras (A through K) are those in the roster sample described in the text. A subset of eight form the audition
sample (also described in the text). All orchestras in the sample are major big-city U.S. symphony orchestras and include the“Big Five.”
Sources: Orchestra union contracts (from orchestra personnel managers and libraries), personal conversations with orchestra
personnel managers, and our mail survey of current orchestra members who were hired during the probable period of screen
adoption.

dures employed during the audition that won
them their current position.
An obvious question to ask is whether the
adoption of the screen is endogenous. Of particular concern is that more meritocratic orchestras adopted blind auditions earlier, producing
the spurious result that the screen increased thelikelihood that women were hired.25 We estimate a probit model of screen adoption by year,
conditional on an orchestra’s not previously
having adopted the screen (an orchestra exits
the exercise once it adopts the screen). Twotime-varying covariates are included to assess
commonly held notions about screen adoption:
the proportion female (lagged) in the orchestra,
and a measure of tenure (lagged) of then-current
orchestra members. Tenure is included because
personnel managers maintain the screen was
advocated more by younger players.
As the proportion female in an orchestra increases, so does the likelihood of screen adoption in the preliminary round, as can be seen in

25
Note, however, it is unlikely that the orchestras thatsought to hire more women chose to adopt the screen earlier
since the best way to increase the number of women in theorchestra is to have not-blind auditions (so that one could be
sure to hire more women).

columns (1) and (2) in Table 2, although theeffects are very small and far from statisticallysignificant.26 We estimate a similar effect when
we assess the role of female presence on the
adoption of blind finals [see column (3)]. The
impact of current tenure, measured by the proportion with less than six years with the orchestra, is— contrary to general belief—negative
and the results do not change controlling forwhether the orchestra is one of the “Big Five.”27
In all, it appears that orchestra sex composition
had little influence on screen adoption, although
the stability of the personnel may have increased its likelihood.28
26
An increase in the proportion female from 0 to 0.35,
the largest for any of the orchestras (see Figure 1), would
enhance the likelihood of adopting the screen in the preliminary round by a mere 0.0021 percentage points.
27
Our measure of tenure begins at the first date forwhich we have rosters, but not earlier than 1947. Tenure
then cumulates for each member until the individual exits
the orchestra. Because tenure will increase for all orchestras
with time, we use the proportion of all members with fewer
than six years of tenure.
28
A change in conductor could also have led to a change
in the audition policy, but we find no supporting evidence.
For example, current players contend that Charles Munch
had complete authority in hiring at the BSO before 1952.
The BSO adopted the screen in 1952, but Munch was

724

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWTABLE 2—ESTIMATED PROBIT MODELSFOR THE USE OF A SCREEN

Preliminaries blind
(1)

(2)

Finalsblind(3)(Proportion female)t ⫺ 1

2.744
3.120
0.490
(3.265)(3.271)(1.163)[0.006][0.004][0.011](Proportion of orchestra⫺26.46⫺28.13⫺9.467
personnel with ⬍6(7.314)(8.459)(2.787)
years tenure)t ⫺ 1[⫺0.058] [⫺0.039] [⫺0.207]“Big Five” orchestra
0.367(0.452)[0.001]
pseudo R 2
0.178
0.193
0.050
Number of observations
294
294
434
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if the orchestra adopts ascreen, 0 otherwise. Huber standard errors (with orchestra
random effects) are in parentheses. All specifications include a constant. Changes in probabilities are in brackets.
“Proportion female” refers to the entire orchestra. “Tenure”
refers to years of employment in the current orchestra. “BigFive” includes Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, New York Philharmonic, and Philadelphia. The data begin in 1947 and anorchestra exits the exercise once it adopts the screen. The
unit of observation is an orchestra-year.
Source: Eleven-orchestra roster sample. See text.

III. The Role of Blind Auditions on the
Audition and Hiring Process

A. Data and Methods
Audition Records.—We use the actual audition records of eight major symphony orchestras
obtained from orchestra personnel managers andthe orchestra archives. The records are highly confidential and occasionally contain remarks (including those of the conductor) about musicians
currently with the orchestra. To preserve the fullconfidentiality of the records, we have not revealed the names of the orchestras in our sample.
Although availability differs, taken together
we obtained information on auditions datingfrom the late 1950’s through 1995. Typically,
the records are lists of the names of individuals

conductor from 1949 to 1962. Our inability to explain thetiming of screen adoption may result from our lack ofintimate knowledge of the musical world, although it is alsodifficult to explain blind refereeing policy among economics journals (see the list in Blank, 1991).

SEPTEMBER 2000

who attended the auditions, with notation near
the names of those advanced to the next round.
For the preliminary round, this would indicate
advancement to either the semifinal or final
round. Another list would contain the names ofthe semifinalists or finalists with an indicationof who won the audition.29 From these records,
we recorded the instrument and position (e.g.,
section, principal, substitute) for which the audition was held. We also know whether theindividual had an “automatic” placement in asemifinal or final round. Automatic placement
occurs when a musician is already known to be
above some quality cutoff and is invited tocompete in a semifinal or final round.30 We also
recorded whether the individual was advanced
to the next round of the current audition.
We rely on the first name of the musicians todetermine sex. For most names establishing sex
was straightforward.31 Sexing the Japanese andKorean names was equally straightforward, atleast for our Japanese and Korean consultants.
For more difficult cases, we checked the namesin three baby books (Connie Lockhard Ellefson,
1990; Alfred J. Kolatch, 1990; Bruce Lansky,1995). If the name was listed as male- or
female-only, we considered the sex known. The
gender-neutral names (e.g., Chris, Leslie, andPat) and some Chinese names (for which sex isindeterminate in the absence of Chinese characters) remained ambiguous. Using these procedures, we were able to determine the sex of
96 percent of our audition sample.32 We later
assess the impact that sex misclassification may
have on our results.
In constructing our analysis sample, we exclude incomplete auditions, those in which there
were no women (or only women) competing,rounds from which no one was advanced, andthe second final round, if one exists, for which29
In rare cases, we have additional information on the
finalists, such as resumes.
30
The person will be known to be above a quality cutoff
either because the individual is a current member of acomparable orchestra or because the person was a semifinalist or finalist in a previous audition.
31
For 13 percent of the contestants, sex was confirmed
by personnel managers, resumes, or audition summary
sheets.
32
Most of the remainder were sexed using census databy assigning to them the dominant sex of individuals with
their first name.

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TABLE 3—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ABOUT AUDITIONS, BY YEAR AND ROUND OF AUDITION

Year

Number ofauditions

Proportion
femaleNumber ofmusicians

Number ofauditions

Proportion
femaleCompletely blind auditions
All

254

Pre-1970

10

1970–197969

1980–1989

102

1990⫹

73

0.367
(0.013)0.187(0.042)0.329(0.026)0.394(0.019)0.390(0.027)43.4(3.13)

60

42.5(4.29)
44.6(4.64)

0.393(0.029)33

0.375(0.034)0.415(0.049)27

Number ofmusicians

Proportion
femaleNot completely blind auditions
38.1(1.74)
16.3(2.27)
31.4(2.10)
39.6(2.73)
50.6(4.52)

BlindroundsRound

Number ofauditions

194
10
69
69
46

0.359
(0.015)0.187(0.042)0.329(0.026)0.403(0.022)0.375(0.033)

Not-blindroundsPreliminaries,
without
semifinals

170

0.357
(0.015)34.3(1.87)

125

0.367(0.017)24.7(2.33)

45

0.327(0.029)Preliminaries,
withsemifinals

137

Finals167

0.395(0.019)0.404(0.022)0.472(0.040)49.3(17.0)
10.4(1.21)
7.12(0.310)

3

114

45.5
(2.54)
12.3(0.649)4.93(0.448)134

Semifinals

0.396(0.019)0.415(0.019)0.430(0.016)0.425(0.205)0.455(0.043)0.422(0.017)

89
28

25
130

Notes: The unit of observation for the top portion is the audition, whereas it is the round for the bottom portion (e.g.,
proportion female in the top portion of the table is averaged across the auditions). Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Eight-orchestra audition sample. See text.

the candidates played with the orchestra.33 In
addition, we generally consider each round of
the audition separately. These sample restrictions exclude 294 rounds (199 contained no
women) and 1,539 individuals. Our final analysis sample has 7,065 individuals and 588 audition rounds (from 309 separate auditions)
resulting in 14,121 person-rounds and an average of 2.0 rounds per musician.34
As can be seen in the bottom portion of
Table 3, 259, or 84 percent, of our 307 preliminary rounds were blind, 78 percent of the
114 semifinals were blind, but just 17 percentof the 167 final rounds were blind. Most of
our audition sample is for the period after
1970. The blind preliminaries contained 40
33
Although the results are unaffected, harp auditions are
excluded because it has typically been a female-dominatedinstrument.
34
See Table A1 for descriptive statistics.

candidates on average, whereas those without
the screen had 26. Women were about 37
percent of all preliminary candidates but 43
percent of finalists, and the difference holds
for both the blind and not-blind auditions.
The percentage female among all candidates
increased over time, from 33 percent in the1970 to 1979 period to 39 percent in the
post-1990 years (see upper portion).
Roster Data.—Our second source of information comes from the final results of the audition process, the orchestra personnel rosters.
We collected these data from the personnel pageof concert programs, one each year for elevenmajor symphony orchestras. These records arein the public domain and thus we have used theorchestra names in the graphs containing thosedata alone. As opposed to the auditionees, wewere able to confirm the sex of the playerswith the orchestra personnel managers and726

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

archivists. We considered a musician to be new
to the orchestra in question if he or she had notpreviously been a regular member of that orchestra (i.e., we did not count returning members as new). We excluded, when possible,
temporary and substitute musicians, as well as
harpists and pianists. Our final sample for 1970
to 1996 has 1,128 new orchestra members (seeTable A2).
Econometric Framework.—We take advantage of the variation that exists across orchestras, time, and audition round to identify theeffect of the screens on the likelihood that afemale is advanced from one round to the next
and ultimately hired. The probability that individual i is advanced (or hired) from an auditionat orchestra j, in year t, from round r, is afunction of the individual’s sex (F), whether ascreen is used (B), and other individual (X) andorchestral (Z) factors, that is:(1)

P ijtr ⫽ f共X it , F i , B jtr , Z jtr 兲.

The screen, it will be recalled from Table 1, varies across orchestra, time, and audition round.
Orchestras adopted the screen in different years.
Some used the screen in the preliminary round
only, whereas others used the screen for theentire audition process. We use this variation toestimate a differences-in-differences strategy.
In linear form, we write(2) P ijtr ⫽ ␣ ⫹ ␤ F i ⫹ ␥ B jtr ⫹ ␦ 共F i ⫻ B jtr 兲⫹ X it ␪ 1 ⫹ Z jtr ␪ 2 ⫹ ␧ ijtr .
The coefficient on B jtr , ␥ , identified from themen who audition with a screen, controls forwhether all individuals are more or less likely tobe advanced from a blind than from a not-blindaudition. Thus the parameter of interest is thaton the interaction between F i and B jtr , ␦ , whichmeasures the change in the probability that awoman will be advanced if a screen is used,
relative to her auditioning without a screen (after accounting for other blind audition effects).
We also test whether the use of the screen
eliminates sex differences in the likelihood anindividual is advanced from one round to the

SEPTEMBER 2000

next. Because no restrictions exist on the number of individuals advanced from the preliminary and semifinal rounds, there is no zero-sum
game between men and women for theserounds.
B. The Effect of the Screen on the Likelihoodof Being Advanced
Tabulations and Regression Results With andWithout Individual Fixed Effects.—The raw
data in Tables 4 and 5 can reveal the impact on
women of changes in the audition process andprovide an important introduction to the data.
We demonstrate that in the absence of a variable
for orchestral “ability,” women fare less well inblind auditions than otherwise. But if the orchestral “ability” of the candidate is held fixed,
the screen provides an unambiguous and substantial benefit for women in almost all auditionrounds.
Table 4 gives the success rate by sex, roundof audition, and over time. We define “relative
female success” as the proportion of women
advanced (or hired) minus the proportion ofmen advanced (or hired). The relative successof female candidates appears worse for blind
than for not-blind auditions and this finding also
holds for each round of the audition process.
One interpretation of this result is that the adoption of the screen lowered the average quality offemale auditionees in the blind auditions. Only
if we can hold quality constant can we identify
the true impact of the screen.
Because we have the names of the candidates, we are able to link their success in one
audition to that in another. (In our sample, 24
percent of the individuals competed in morethan one audition.) In Table 5 we report audition success statistics, by round and overall, formusicians who appear more than once in our
sample and for whom at least one audition (orround) was blind and one was not blind. The
evidence tells a very different story from that inTable 4, and taken together they suggest thatblind auditions expanded the pool of female
applicants to include more who were less qualified. When we limit the sample to those who
auditioned both with and without a screen, thesuccess rate for women competing in blind auditions is almost always higher than in thosethat were not blind.

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TABLE 4—AVERAGE SUCCESS AT AUDITIONS BY SEX, YEAR, AND ROUND OF AUDITION
Relative female successCompletely blindauditions

Not completely blindauditions⫺0.022(0.012)Year

All auditions

All⫺0.001(0.008)0.053(0.115)0.001(0.021)⫺0.006(0.009)⫺0.003(0.010)⫺0.039(0.016)⫺0.001(0.017)0.006(0.010)0.053(0.115)0.001(0.021)0.010(0.009)⫺0.003(0.013)Round

All rounds

Blind rounds

Not-blind rounds

Preliminaries, without semifinals⫺0.032(0.019)⫺0.048(0.016)⫺0.030(0.038)0.009(0.036)⫺0.048(0.021)⫺0.052(0.016)⫺0.059(0.044)⫺0.028(0.102)0.012(0.040)0.116(0.228)0.071(0.080)0.016(0.038)Pre-1970
1970–1979
1980–1989
1990⫹

Preliminaries, with semifinals
Semifinals
Finals

Notes: For the top part of the table “success” is a “hire,” whereas for the bottom portion “success” is advancement from one
stage of an audition to the next. The unit of observation for the top portion is the audition, whereas it is the round for thebottom portion (e.g., relative female success in the top portion of the table is averaged across the auditions). Standard errors
are in parentheses. “Relative female success” is the proportion of women advanced (or hired) minus the proportion of men
advanced (or hired). By hired, we mean those who were advanced from the final round out of the entire audition.
Source: Eight-orchestra audition sample. See text.

Take the preliminary round with no semifinals,
for example, in Table 5. In the blind auditions 28.6
percent of the women are advanced, as are 20.2
percent of the men. But in the not-blind column,
just 19.3 percent of the women are advanced,
although 22.5 percent of the men are. Even thougha woman has a small advantage over a man when
the screen is used (by 8.4 percentage points), her
success rate, relative to that of a man, is increasedby 11.6 percentage points above that in the notblind regime. Note that because these are the same
women, Table 5 suggests that a woman enhances
her own success rate by 9.3 percentage points byentering a blind preliminary round. Not only dothese differences suggest that women are helpedby the screen, the differences are large relative tothe average rate of success.35
Women’s success is also enhanced by the35
Because of the infrequency of position availability, it
is unlikely there was much gaming by women (e.g., tryingout only for blind auditions), although the change in thescreen in the finals and for the overall audition(termed “hired” in the table). For the finals, a
woman’s success rate is increased by 14.8 percentage points moving to blind auditions(23.5 ⫺ 8.7) and is enhanced by a hefty 28.1
percentage points above that of men. All success rates are very low for auditions as a whole,
but the female success rate is 1.6 times higher(increasing from 0.017 to 0.027) for blind thanfor not-blind auditions. The only anomalous
result in the table concerns the semifinals, towhich we return later. We now show that theseresults stand up to the controls we can add,
including the year of the audition and the
instrument.36

general environment of auditions could have altered thepool of contestants.
36
We do not discuss the regression analog to Table
4, that is, the analysis without individual fixed effects,
because we have firmly established that individual fixed
effects matter. Table A3 shows the results of regressions

728

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWSEPTEMBER 2000

TABLE 5—AVERAGE SUCCESS AT AUDITIONS BY SEX AND STAGE OF AUDITION FOR THE SUBSETOF MUSICIANS WHO AUDITIONED BOTH BLIND AND NOT BLIND
Blind
Proportion
advanced

Not blind
Number of
person-rounds

Proportion
advanced

Number of
person-rounds

Preliminaries without semifinals
Women
Men

Women
Men

0.286
(0.043)0.202(0.026)112

0.193(0.041)247
0.225(0.031)Preliminaries with semifinals

187

0.200
(0.092)0.083(0.083)20

0.133(0.091)0.000(0.000)15

0.385(0.061)0.368(0.059)65

0.568(0.075)0.295(0.069)44

0.087(0.060)0.133(0.091)23

0.017(0.005)0.027(0.005)

599

12

93

8

Semifinals
Women
Men

68

44

Finals
Women
Men

0.235
(0.106)0.000(0.000)17

0.027(0.008)0.026(0.005)

445

12

15

“Hired”
Women
Men

816

1102

Notes: The unit of observation is a person-round. Standard errors are in parentheses. For the round in question, only musicians
who auditioned more than once and who auditioned at least once behind a screen and at least once without a screen are
included. “Hired” means those who were advanced from the final round out of the entire audition. Blind in the “hired”
category means for all rounds. Not blind in the “hired” category means that at least one round was not blind. This differencein the definition of what constitutes a “blind” round or audition is one reason why the number of observations in the first four
panels is less than the number of observations in the “hired” panel. The number of observations also differ because we exclude
auditions or rounds in which no individual is advanced or in which there are only women or no women. Finally, unlike insubsequent tables, we exclude a few candidates for whom we could not determine or impute their sex. Note that the binding
constraint for the preliminaries is the not-blind category, for which we have only one orchestra. The binding constraint in the“hired” category are the blind auditions, for which we have (at most) three orchestras. Musicians can appear more than oncein either the blind or not-blind categories.
Source: Eight-orchestra audition sample. See text.

The results given in Table 6 are the regression analogs to the raw tabulations in Table
5.37 Because the effect of the blind procedurecomparable to those in Table 6 but without individual fixed
effects.
37
In the (total) subsample of individuals auditioning
both with and without a screen, all eight orchestras in our
audition sample are represented, and seven of the orchestras
changed audition policy during our sample time frame. The
sample sizes in Table 6 are considerably larger than those in

could differ by the various rounds in the audition process, we divide audition rounds into
the three main rounds (preliminary, semifinal,
and final) and also separate the preliminaries
into those that were followed by a semifinal

Table 5. The reason is that the regressions in Table 6 include
all individuals whether or not they auditioned more thanonce, whereas Table 5 includes only those who auditioned
at least twice, blind and not blind.

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729

TABLE 6—LINEAR PROBABILITY ESTIMATES OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING ADVANCED: WITH INDIVIDUAL FIXED EFFECTS
Preliminaries
Without
semifinals

Blind
Female ⫻ Blind

With semifinals

Semifinals

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

⫺0.017(0.039)0.125(0.068)0.003(0.046)0.111(0.067)⫺0.020(0.014)⫺0.005(0.007)0.109(0.172)0.013(0.215)0.224(0.242)⫺0.025(0.251)0.010(0.010)⫺0.006(0.005)0.026(0.089)⫺0.179(0.126)⫺0.154(0.150)0.308(0.196)0.222⫺0.060(0.149)0.331(0.181)
0.126(0.028)0.016(0.015)⫺0.069(0.073)⫺0.059(0.084)⫺0.262(0.756)0.067(0.159)⫺0.185(0.076)0.079(0.217)
0.042

No
0.811
1,127

Yes
0.878
1,127

Number of auditions attended
Years since last audition

0.342⫺0.059(0.024)0.014(0.031)
0.312(0.134)⫺0.078(0.019)0.123(0.093)
0.285

0.089

0.102
(0.096)⫺0.235(0.133)0.015(0.030)⫺0.005(0.013)⫺0.096(0.064)0.006(0.081)⫺0.371(0.521)0.104(0.218)⫺0.082(0.066)0.167(0.183)
0.170

No
0.687
6,239

Yes
0.697
6,239

No
0.774
1,360

Yes
0.794
1,360

Automatic placement

0.053⫺0.154(0.035)⫺0.003(0.081)0.118(0.139)⫺0.079(0.037)0.165(0.081)
0.063

No
0.748
5,395

Yes
0.775
5,395

“Big Five” orchestra
Total number of auditioners inround (⫼100)
Proportion female at the auditionround
Principal
Substitutep-value of H 0 : Blind ⫹ (Female⫻ Blind) ⫽ 0Year fixed effects?
R2
Number of observations

Finals

Notes: The unit of observation is a person-round. The dependent variable is 1 if the individual is advanced to the next roundand 0 if not. Standard errors are in parentheses. All specifications include individual fixed effects, an interaction for the sex
being missing and a blind audition round, a dummy indicating if years since last audition is missing, and [in columns (3)–(8)]whether an automatic placement is missing.
Source: Eight-orchestra audition sample. See text.

round and those that were not. In the evennumbered columns we include year and instrument fixed effects, as well as individual
and audition covariates. The individual correlates are whether the musician had an automatic placement in a semifinal or final round,years since the last audition in the sample,
and the number of previous auditions inwhich we observe the musician to have competed. We also control for the total number ofmusicians in the round, the proportion female
among contestants, and whether the audition
is for a principal or substitute position.
Because 42 percent of the individuals in our
sample competed in more than one round in ourdata set (24 percent of the musicians competedin more than one audition) and 6 percent competed both with and without a screen for aparticular type of round (e.g., semifinal), we areable to use an individual fixed-effects strategy
to control for contestant “ability” that does notchange with time. In all columns of Table 6 weinclude individual fixed effects, in which casethe identification is from individuals who auditioned both with and without a screen.38 The
38
There are 639 person-rounds comprised of individuals
who auditioned at a preliminary round that was not followed
by a semifinal round [columns (1) and (2) of Table 6], bothwith and without a screen; on average these individuals
competed in 2.7 such preliminary rounds. There are 55
person-rounds comprised of individuals who auditioned at apreliminary round that was followed by a semifinal round[columns (3) and (4)], both with and without a screen; onaverage these individuals competed in 2.4 such preliminary
rounds. There are 223 person-rounds comprised of individuals who auditioned at a semifinal [columns (5) and (6)],730

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

effect of the screen here, therefore, is identified
from differing audition procedures both within
and across orchestras.39 Note that we include adummy variable for whether the orchestra isamong the “Big Five,” to control for the qualityof the orchestra.
The coefficient of interest is the interaction
between “Female” and “Blind.” A positivecoefficient would show that screened auditions enhance a woman’s likelihood of advancement. Because screened auditions are
more likely to take place in later years than
auditions without screens, the interaction between “Female” and “Blind” might simply
reflect the fact that female musicians get better over time. Note, however, that for thiseffect to bias the coefficient, female musicians would have to improve faster with timethan male musicians. Nevertheless, we havealso included (in the individual covariates)
the number of previous auditions the musician attended in our sample, the number ofyears since the last audition in the sample,
and whether the candidate was an automatic
placement. The coefficient on “Blind” reveals
whether blind auditions change the likelihoodthat all contestants are advanced.
As in the raw tabulations of Table 5, wefind that the screen has a positive effect on thelikelihood that a woman is advanced from thepreliminary round (when there is no semifi-

both with and without a screen; on average these individuals
participated in 2.8 semifinal rounds. Finally, there are 67
person-rounds comprised of individuals who auditioned at a
final round [columns (7) and (8)], both with and without ascreen; on average these individuals participated in 2.4 final
rounds. It should be noted that the number of person-rounds
off of which we are identified in Table 6 can also be foundin Table 5, with one exception. There are 223 person-rounds
comprised of individuals who auditioned at the semifinal,
both with and without a screen, in Table 6 and only 221 inTable 5 because there are two individuals we could not sex.
We include these individuals in the regressions in Table
6 and add a dummy variable indicating that the sex is
missing.
39
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) across the entire
sample, that is pooling all rounds, indicates that 19 percentof the variation in the use of the screen is across orchestras.
Looking by audition round reveals that 73 percent of thevariation in preliminaries, 53 percent of the variation in
semifinals, and 71 percent of the variation in finals is acrossorchestras. By contrast, in Table 7 (which includes a subsetof the orchestras, see table notes), just 1 percent of thevariation in the use of the screen is across orchestras.

SEPTEMBER 2000

nal) and from the finals.40 The effects, moreover, are statistically significant in both cases.
The effect in the semifinal round, however,remains strongly negative.41 In addition, themagnitudes of the effects in Table 6 are similar to those implied by the raw tabulations(Table 5). For preliminaries that are not preceded by a semifinal, the blind audition increases the likelihood that a woman will beselected by about 11 percentage points. For
female musicians who made it to the final
round, the individual fixed-effects regression
result indicates that the screen increases thelikelihood of their winning by about 33 percentage points.42
Assessing Potential Biases.—A concern withthe preceding fixed-effects analysis is that, as
noted earlier, female musicians who are improving over time are those who switch fromnot-blind to blind auditions and that the growthrate of their “ability” is faster than that of men.
We attempted to address this potential bias byincluding several individual time-varying co-40
An exception occurs when preliminaries are followed
by semifinals. There are, however, only three preliminary
rounds that are not blind when there is also a semifinal
round (see Table 3). Thus the coefficients in columns (3)and (4) of Table 6 are identified using very few separate
audition rounds. We also note that when we estimate fixedeffects logit models we obtain results similar to those incolumns (1) and (2) in Table 6 (and in Table 7). Because of
the small samples with the identifying requirements of the
fixed-effects logit, standard errors for the estimates in columns (3)–(8) of Table 6 could not be computed. Further, forthe results without individual fixed effects, logits and linear
probability models give qualitatively similar results.
41This result on the semifinals is robust across time,
instrument, position, and orchestra. One interpretation isthat it represents a form of affirmative action by the auditioncommittees. Committees may hesitate to advance womenfrom the preliminary round if they are not confident of thecandidate’s ability. On the other hand, semifinals are typically held the same day as are preliminaries and give theaudition committee a second chance to hear a candidate
before the finals. Thus, audition committees may actively
advance women to the final round only when they arereasonably confident that the female candidate is abovesome threshold level of quality. If juries actively seek toincrease the presence of women in the final round, they can
do so only when there is no screen.
42
As noted earlier, an obvious explanation for the importance of the individual fixed effects in the estimation isthat the screen altered the pool of female applicants; however, we have been unable to show this empirically.

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GOLDIN AND ROUSE: ORCHESTRATING IMPARTIALITY

variates (in the even-numbered columns of Table 6). The inclusion of these individual
covariates had little effect on the estimated effect of the screen.
A related concern is that those individuals
who get hired at their first audition, and therefore do not contribute to the identification of theeffect in the presence of individual fixed effects,
are more able musicians than those who audition multiple times. (Alternatively, some individuals who audition and are not hired may get
discouraged and not audition again and are
therefore worse than those who audition multiple times.) Although this is a potential source ofbias, it is important to remember that only avery small number of musicians win an auditionin any given year, since there are just a handfulof auditions (for a given instrument) among the
major orchestras. Furthermore, many of thecontestants in our sample did audition at least
twice.
In addition, there are three pieces of empirical evidence that suggest this potential
source of bias is not a major problem in ourdata. First, we control for the number of previous auditions in the even columns of Table
6, and this control does not change the results
significantly. Second, there is no significant
difference in the proportion female among
those who auditioned both with and without ascreen and those who auditioned only once(or who auditioned under only one policy
regime). Finally, the coefficient estimates
generated when the sample is restricted tothose who auditioned at least three times are
not perceptibly different from those generated
from the full sample or from the sample ofindividuals who auditioned both with andwithout a screen. (These results are presented
in Table A4.)
A third potential bias is that, because theeffect of the screen is partially identified fromdiffering audition procedures across orchestras, the results in Table 6 may indicate thatorchestras that use screens are less discriminatory against women than those that do not.
Specifically, because we include individual
fixed effects, a bias would arise if women
who are improving faster than average are
more likely to audition for orchestras that use
screens and are more likely to be advanced
because these orchestras are intrinsically less731

discriminatory. Our sample contains only one
orchestra per audition round that changed
policy. As a result, we cannot separate theestimation by audition round and include orchestra fixed effects. We can, however, pool
the audition rounds for the three orchestras
that changed audition policy during our sample frame and include both individual andorchestra fixed effects.43 These results arepresented in Table 7.
In column (1) of Table 7 we include individual
fixed effects, in which case the identification isfrom individuals who auditioned both with andwithout a screen. We add orchestra fixed effects incolumn (2) such that the identification now is fromindividuals who auditioned for a particular orchestra both before and after the orchestra began usinga screen.44 Finally, in column (3) we exclude
individual but keep orchestra fixed effects to illustrate the importance of individual fixed effects.
Again, the coefficient on “Blind” shows whether
all musicians are more likely to be advanced when
the audition is blind. The interaction between
whether the individual is female and whether theaudition is blind indicates whether women receive
an extra boost relative to men when the screen isused.
The coefficient of interest is positive incolumns (1) and (2) but negative in column(3), similar to the difference between thetabulations in Tables 4 and 5. In addition,
the estimated effect of the blind auditions on
the success of women is similar to that inTable 6. The point is that individual fixedeffects estimation matters; orchestra fixed effects, however, do not matter. In all cases,
blind auditions increase the probability of advancement for both men and women. More43
We do not include the type of audition round since wehave only one orchestra that changed procedures for the
preliminaries, one that changed for the semifinals, and onethat changed for the finals (and for which there were musicians who auditioned for that orchestra and audition roundwith and without a screen). We have also estimated these
regressions separately for each of these three orchestras.
Although the point estimates are not statistically significant,the magnitudes are quite similar to those presented in Table
6 for the corresponding round of the audition.
44
In this subsample, there are 1,776 person-rounds comprised of individuals who auditioned for a particular orchestra, both behind and without a screen; on average these 552
individuals competed in 3.2 audition rounds.

732

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWSEPTEMBER 2000

TABLE 7—LINEAR PROBABILITY ESTIMATES OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING ADVANCED: WITH
INDIVIDUAL AND ORCHESTRA FIXED EFFECTS
Include individual
fixed effects

BlindFemale ⫻ Blind

Exclude individual
fixed effects

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.404
(0.027)0.044(0.039)0.399(0.027)0.041(0.039)

0.000

0.000

0.103
(0.018)⫺0.069(0.022)⫺0.005(0.019)
0.090

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
0.615
8,159

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.615
8,159

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.048
8,159

Femalep-value of H 0 :Blind ⫹ (Female ⫻ Blind) ⫽ 0
Individual fixed effects?
Orchestra fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?
Other covariates?
R2
Number of observations

Notes: The unit of observation is a person-round. The dependent variable is 1 if the person isadvanced to the next round and 0 if not. Standard errors are in parentheses. All specifications
include an interaction for the sex being missing and a blind audition; “Other covariates” include
automatic placement, years since last audition, number of auditions attended, size of the auditionround, proportion female in audition round, whether a principal or substitute position, and adummy indicating whether years since last audition is missing. These regressions include only theorchestras that changed their audition policy during our sample years and for which we observe
individuals auditioning for the audition round both before and after the policy change. These
regressions include 4,836 separate persons and are identified off of 1,776 person-rounds comprisedof individuals who auditioned both before and after the policy change for a particular orchestra.
Source: Eight-orchestra audition sample (three orchestras of which are used; see Notes). See text.

important, even though the effect is not statistically significant, the blind procedure has apositive effect on women’s advancement.45
Finally, sex misclassification may also bias
our estimates because, if the misclassification
errors are uncorrelated with the equation error,
the estimated effect of the screen will be attenuated (see, e.g., Richard Freeman, 1984). To
address this potential problem, we use a lesssubjective assessment of the probability that theindividual is male or female. A U.S. Bureau of
the Census tabulation, based on the postenu45
Although the results from these three orchestras may
not generalize to the other five, it should be noted that thecoefficient estimate in column (3) of Table 7 is similar tothat derived from a similar regression on the entire sample.
This result is not surprising because the primary reason weare able to include both individual and orchestra fixed
effects for these three orchestras is because they have unusually good record keeping, which allows us to observe theresults of many auditions rather than another reason thatmight be correlated with how meritocratic the orchestra is.

meration survey of the 1990 census, gives us the
proportion female and male of the top 90 percent of all names.46
In Table 8 we estimate the same specifications given by columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) of
Table 6 and column (2) of Table 7 using thecensus data in two ways. First, we simply replace our female covariate with the census probability.47 Note that we also use a census
estimate of the percentage of the audition roundthat is female (slightly changing our samplesize), and a census estimate of the percentage of
our sample for which the sex is indeterminate.
In addition, our interaction term is constructedusing the census probabilities. Second, we use
46
These data can be downloaded from http://www.census.
gov/ftp/pub/genealogy/names. A possible problem with thedata is that names are generational; a male name in one
generation may become female in another.
47
We do not impute census probabilities for the individuals whose sex we know with certainty (see footnote 31).

VOL. 90 NO. 4

GOLDIN AND ROUSE: ORCHESTRATING IMPARTIALITY

733

TABLE 8—LINEAR PROBABILITY ESTIMATES OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING ADVANCED: ADDRESSING SEX MISCLASSIFICATIONPart A: Preliminary rounds
Preliminaries
Without semifinals

Blind
Female ⫻ Blind
Other covariates?
Individual fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?
R2
Number of observations

With semifinals

OLS

IV

OLS

IV

⫺0.012(0.043)0.139(0.066)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.771
5,696

0.057
(0.045)0.137(0.068)
Yes
Yes
Yes

⫺0.174(0.093)0.272(0.188)
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.290
(0.241)⫺0.035(0.251)
Yes
Yes
Yes

5,395

6,546

6,239

Part B: Semifinal and final rounds, and with orchestra fixed effects
Semifinals

Blind
Female ⫻ Blind
Other covariates
Individual fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?
R2
Number of observations

With orchestras fixed
effects

Finals

OLS

IV

OLS

IV

OLS

IV

0.100
(0.083)⫺0.242(0.120)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.776
1,600

⫺0.197(0.700)⫺0.193(0.429)
Yes
Yes
Yes

⫺0.028(0.125)0.160(0.171)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.848
1,509

⫺0.025(0.141)
0.324(0.181)
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.010
(0.028)0.069(0.035)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.654
8,882

0.061
(0.033)0.052(0.036)
Yes
Yes
Yes

1,360

1,127

8,159

Notes: The unit of observation is a person-round. The dependent variable is 1 if the individual is advanced to the next roundand 0 if not. Standard errors are in parentheses. The instruments are the census probability that the individual is female, adummy for whether the person has been sexed with certainty, and proportion female calculated using the census data and aninteraction between whether the census data are missing and a screen has been used. The “OLS” columns use these asregressors. All specifications include an interaction for the sex being missing and a blind audition; “Other covariates” include
automatic placement, years since last audition, number of auditions attended, whether a “Big Five” orchestra, size of theaudition round, proportion female at the audition round, whether a principal or substitute position, and a dummy indicating
whether years since last audition and automatic audition are missing. These are the same specifications as in columns (2), (4),(6), and (8) of Table 6 and column (2) of Table 7. The sample sizes change because in the even-numbered columns we simply
replace our female covariate with the census probability and also use a census estimate of the percentage of the audition roundthat is female, which changes the sample size slightly.
Source: Eight-orchestra audition sample. See text.

the census probability as an instrument for ourestimate (and for the percentage of the audition
that is female, the percentage missing sex, andthe interaction between female and whether theaudition is blind).
The results are quite robust across thesedifferent methods for addressing potential
measurement error. More important, the coefficients and their standard errors are generally similar in magnitude to those in Tables 6
and 7. With the exception of the semifinal
round, the screen appears to have increased

the likelihood that a woman would be advanced.48
48
Another potential bias is from the short panel, which
may affect the consistency of the estimates (Hsiao, 1986).
We address the extent of this short panel problem in two
ways. We first restrict our sample to those whom we observe auditioning at least three times (for the same round).
Second, we restrict the estimation to those who auditioned
at least once in a blind round and at least once in a not-blindround (those off of whom we are identified). The results do
not change markedly from those in Table 6, showing thatthe short panel may not be a problem. See Table A4.

734

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWSEPTEMBER 2000

TABLE 9—LINEAR PROBABILITY ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF BLIND AUDITIONSON THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING HIRED WITH INDIVIDUAL FIXED EFFECTS

Completely blind audition
Completely blind audition ⫻ female
Year effects?
Other covariates?
R2
Number of observations

Without semifinals

With semifinals

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

All
(6)

⫺0.024(0.028)0.051(0.046)
No
No
0.855
4,108

0.047
(0.041)
0.036(0.048)
Yes
Yes
0.868
4,108

0.001
(0.009)0.001(0.016)
No
No
0.692
5,883

0.006
(0.011)⫺0.004(0.016)
Yes
Yes
0.707
5,883

0.001
(0.008)0.011(0.013)
No
No
0.678
9,991

0.005
(0.009)0.006(0.013)
Yes
Yes
0.691
9,991

Notes: The unit of observation is a person-round. The dependent variable is 1 if the individual is advanced (or hired) fromthe final round and 0 if not. Standard errors are in parentheses. All specifications include individual fixed effects, whether thesex is missing, and an interaction for sex being missing and a completely blind audition. “Other covariates” are the size ofthe audition, the proportion female at the audition, the number of individuals advanced (hired), whether a “Big Five”
orchestra, the number of previous auditions, and whether the individual had an automatic semifinal or final.
Source: Eight-orchestra audition sample. See text.

C. The Effect of the Screenon the Hiring of Women
Using the Audition Sample.—Our analysis,thus far, has concerned the rounds of the audition process and the degree to which the screen
enhances the likelihood of a woman’s advancing from one round to the next. We turn now tothe effect of the screen on the actual hire andestimate the likelihood an individual is hired outof the initial audition pool.49 Whereas the use of
the screen for each audition round was, more or
less, an unambiguous concept, that for the entire
process is not and we must define a blind audition. The definition we have chosen is that ablind audition contains all rounds that use thescreen. In using this definition, we compare
auditions that are completely blind with thosethat do not use the screen at all or use it for the
early rounds only. We divide the sample into
auditions that have a semifinal round and thosethat do not, because the previous analysis suggested they might differ.
The impact of completely blind auditions on
the likelihood of a woman’s being hired is given
in Table 9, for which all results include individ49
There are four auditions in which the committee could
not choose between two players and therefore asked each toplay with the orchestra. We consider both to be winners.
The results are not sensitive to this classification. For thisanalysis we exclude auditions with no women, all women,or no winner; these exclusions do not change the results.

ual fixed effects.50 The impact of the screen is
positive and large in magnitude, but only when
there is no semifinal round. Women are about 5
percentage points more likely to be hired thanare men in a completely blind audition, although the effect is not statistically significant.
The effect is nil, however, when there is asemifinal round, perhaps as a result of the unusual effects of the semifinal round. The impact
for all rounds [columns (5) and (6)] is about 1
percentage point, although the standard errors
are large and thus the effect is not statisticallysignificant. Given that the probability of winning an audition is less than 3 percent, we
would need more data than we currently have toestimate a statistically significant effect, andeven a 1-percentage-point increase is large, as
we later demonstrate.
50
In Table 9 we are identified off of individuals whocompeted in auditions that were completely blind and thosethat were not completely blind (that is, any one round could
not be blind). The unit of observation is the person-roundand there are 92 fulfilling this criterion for auditions without
a semifinal [columns (1) and (2)]; on average these persons
competed in 3.6 auditions in this sample. There are 625
person-rounds fulfilling this criterion that included a semifinal [columns (3) and (4)] and on average these persons
competed in 3.5 auditions in this sample. Finally, there are
911 person-rounds fulfilling this criterion across all audition[columns (5) and (6)] and on average these persons competed in 3.5 auditions in this sample. The sample off ofwhich we are identified is larger for all auditions than for thesum of the other two because some individuals auditioned
both with and without a semifinal round.

VOL. 90 NO. 4

GOLDIN AND ROUSE: ORCHESTRATING IMPARTIALITY

735

TABLE 10—PROBIT ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF BLIND AUDITIONS ON THE SEX OF NEW
MEMBERS: 1970 TO 1996

Any blind auditions

Any blindauditions

Only blind preliminaries
and/or semifinals vs.
completely blindauditions

(1)

(2)

0.238
(0.183)[0.075]

Only blind preliminaries and/or
semifinals

0.232(0.184)[0.074]0.361(0.438)[0.127]

Completely blind auditions
Section:Woodwinds
Brass
Percussion
p-value of test: only blind preliminaries
and/or semifinals ⫽ completely blind
pseudo R 2
Number of observations⫺0.187(0.114)[⫺0.058]⫺1.239(0.157)[⫺0.284]⫺1.162(0.305)[⫺0.235]⫺0.188(0.114)[⫺0.058]⫺1.237(0.157)[⫺0.284]⫺1.164(0.305)[⫺0.235]
0.756

0.106
1,128

0.106
1,128

Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if the individual is female and 0 if male. Standard errors
are in parentheses. All specifications include orchestra fixed effects and orchestra-specifictime trends. Changes in probabilities are in brackets; see text for an explanation of how they
are calculated. New members are those who enter the orchestra for the first time. Returning
members are not considered new. The omitted section is strings.
Source: Eleven-orchestra roster sample. See text.

Using the Roster Data.—The roster data afford us another way to evaluate the effect of thescreen on the sex composition of orchestras.
Using the rosters we know the sex of new hires
each year for 11 orchestras, and we also haveinformation (see Table 1) on the year the screen
was adopted by each orchestra. We treat theorchestra position as the unit of observation andask whether the screen affects the sex of theindividual who fills the position. We model thelikelihood that a female is hired in a particular
year as a function of whether the orchestra’s
audition procedure involved a screen, again relying on the variation over time within a particular orchestra. Thus, in all specifications, we
include orchestra fixed effects and an orchestraspecific time trend.
The roster data extend further back in timethan do the audition data and could conceivably
begin with the orchestra’s founding, although
there is no obvious reason to include many
years when none used the screen. We report, inTable 10, the effects of the screen on the hiringof women from 1970 to 1996 using a probit
model. The screen is first defined to include any
blind auditions [column (1)]. In column (2) weestimate separate effects for orchestras using
blind preliminary (and semifinal) rounds but notblind finals and those with completely blindauditions.
To interpret the probit coefficient, we firstpredict a base probability, under the assumptionthat each orchestra does not use a screen. We
then predict a new probability assuming theorchestra uses a screen. The mean difference inthe probabilities is given in brackets.

736

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWThe coefficient on blind in column (1) is
positive, although not significant at any usuallevel of confidence. The estimates in column (2)are positive and equally large in magnitude tothose in column (1). Further, these estimatesshow that the existence of any blind roundmakes a difference and that a completely blind
process has a somewhat larger effect (albeit
with a large standard error).51 According to thepoint estimates in column (1) of Table 10, blindauditions increase the likelihood a female will
be hired by 7.5 percentage points. The magnitude of the effect must be judged relative to theoverall average and, for the period under consideration, it was about 30 percent.52 Thus blindauditions increased the likelihood a female
would be hired by 25 percent.
Making Further Sense of the Results on Hiring.—The audition sample results suggest thatblind auditions increase the probability of eventual success for a female candidate by 5 percentage points, but only if there is no semifinal
round. The average effect for both types ofauditions is closer to 1 percentage point (with alarge standard error). The following example,
using assumed values based on the actual data,
demonstrates that an increase of about 2 percentage points in the probability of a woman’s
success out of an audition can explain the entirechange in female hires, allowing the share ofcandidates who are female to increase from 0.2
to 0.3. Thus an increase of 1 percentage point—
our point estimate— can account for a substantial share.
Consider two regimes: one without the screen(not blind) and another with the screen (blind).
In the not-blind regime, assume that 20 percentof the candidates are female and that in the blindregime 30 percent are female.53 We know that51
We have also attempted to interact the effect of blindauditions with section dummies. We find that the main
effect of blind auditions is almost identical to that for thestring section, which is not surprising given that the strings
comprise 65 percent of the observations. In addition, fewer
than 4 percent of the musicians hired into the percussion andbrass sections are female.
52
See Table A2.
53
The fraction female in the not-blind regime (taking it
to be the period before 1970) is 0.187 in our data (see Table3). In the blind regime it was between 0.35 and 0.4. We
have chosen the more conservative 0.3 in the example

SEPTEMBER 2000

in the era (say, before 1970) when few orchestras used the screen for the preliminary round(see Table 1), 10 percent (that is, 0.0996) of
new hires were women. Also assume that 30
candidates enter each audition, independent ofaudition regime, and that one musician is hiredout of each audition. Using these assumptions,taken from the actual data, the success rate forthe typical female audition candidate in the notblind regime will be 0.0166 and that for the
typical male will be 0.0375. If in the blindregime, however, the percentage of new hires
who are female increases to 35 percent (itsapproximate figure for the past 10 years), thesuccess rate for a female audition candidate
must have increased to 0.0389 (and that for amale must have decreased to 0.0310). That is,for consistency with the data on percent female,the success rate for female candidates would
have had to increase by about 2.2 percentage
points, moving from the not-blind to the blindregime. Our point estimate is that about half ofthat increase—1 percentage point—was the result of the effect of the screened audition process.
Using the example we just offered, the increase in the probability of a woman’s being
hired out of an audition accounts for 66 percentof the total increase in the fraction female
among new hires. Half of the 66 percent comesfrom the switch to blind auditions.54 The otherhalf could have resulted, for example, from abecause we want to use a number that is independent of theswitch to using the screen. That is, we would like to use afraction female that is solely the result of increases infemale participation in general but independent of changes
in audition procedures.
54
The proportion female among new hires is (n 䡠 ␭ 䡠 ␣ ),where n ⫽ the number of audition candidates (in thisexample n ⫽ 30); ␭ ⫽ the success rate of the average
female candidate, which may be enhanced by the screen (inthis example ␭ increases from 0.0166 to 0.0389 or by 2.2
percentage points, about half of which is due to the screen,
based on our estimates); and ␣ ⫽ the fraction female among
candidates (assumed here to increase from 20 to 30 percent
independent of ␭). The percentage of the total change accounted for by the change in ␭ is given by (n 䡠 ␣ 䡠⌬ ␭ )/⌬(n 䡠 ␭ 䡠 ␣ ) or on average by [(30 䡠 0.25 䡠 0.022)/(0.35 ⫺ 0.0996) ⫽ 66 percent. (The 0.25 figure is theaverage of that in the treatment period and that previously.)
Since half is accounted for by the screen, about 33 percentof the increase in the proportion female among new hires
comes from the blind audition process.

VOL. 90 NO. 4

GOLDIN AND ROUSE: ORCHESTRATING IMPARTIALITY

greater acceptance of female musicians by music directors. The remainder (34 percent) of theincrease in the fraction female among new hires
is accounted for by the increased percentage
female among audition candidates. That portion
comes primarily from the increase in the fraction female among music school graduates.
The point estimates from the roster data alsosuggest that a substantial portion of the increasein female hires across the two regimes, notblind and blind, can be explained by the change
in audition procedures. In the not-blind regime
about 10 percent of all hires are female but inthe blind regime about 35 percent are, a difference of 25 percentage points. The estimates incolumn (1) of Table 10 show that the switch tothe blind regime increases the likelihood awoman will be hired by 7.5 percentage
points—30 percent of the total change—although we emphasize that the coefficient is imprecisely estimated.
One may wonder why there was disparate
treatment of female musicians before the screen
was used. A great orchestra is not simply acollection of the finest musicians. It is, rather, agroup of great musicians who play magnificently as an ensemble. Substantial amounts ofspecific human capital are acquired on the job
and tenure differences by sex, therefore, could
influence hiring decisions.55 Leaves of absence
are ordinarily allowed for medical (including
maternity) and professional reasons. We find,using the roster sample from 1960 to 1996, thatthe average female musician took 0.067 leaves
per year, whereas the average male musician
took 0.061, a difference that is not statisticallysignificant, and that their length of leave wastrivially different. Tenure differences were also
small and some specifications show that women
accumulated more years with an orchestra,
given their starting year and orchestra.56 Turn55
Musicians of the Vienna Philharmonic made this argument in a radio broadcast by the West German StateRadio in February 1996 [translation provided by William
Osborne]. See also New York Times (1996) in which aplayer for the Vienna Philharmonic argued that female
musicians would cost the orchestra considerably more because substitutes would have to be hired if they became
pregnant.
56
The general specification is number of actual years withan orchestra as a function of the starting year, section dummies, and a female dummy, for the period since 1959. The

737

over and leaves of absence do not appear todiffer by sex and thus should not have rationallyinfluenced hiring decisions.
IV. Conclusion

The audition procedures of the great U.S. symphony orchestras began to change sometime in the
1970’s. The changes included increasing the number of candidates at auditions—a democratizationof the process—and using a physical screen during the audition to conceal the candidate’s identityand ensure impartiality. We analyze what difference blind auditions have meant for female
musicians.
We have collected, from orchestral management files and archives, a sample of auditions foreight major orchestras. These records contain thenames of all candidates and identify those advanced to the next round, including the ultimate
winner of the competition. The data provide a
unique means of testing whether discrimination
existed in the various rounds of a hiring process
and even allow the linkage of individuals acrossauditions. A strong presumption exists that discrimination has limited the employment of female
musicians, especially by the great symphony orchestras. Not only were their numbers extremely
low until the 1970’s, but many music directors,
ultimately in charge of hiring new musicians, publicly disclosed their belief that female players had
lower musical talent.
The question is whether hard evidence can
support an impact of discrimination on hiring.
Our analysis of the audition and roster data
indicates that it can, although we mention various caveats before we summarize the reasons.
Even though our sample size is large, we identify the coefficients of interest from a muchsmaller sample. Some of our coefficients ofinterest, therefore, do not pass standard tests ofstatistical significance and there is, in addition,
one persistent result that goes in the opposite
direction. The weight of the evidence, however,is what we find most persuasive and what we

coefficient on the female dummy is ⫺0.299 with a large
standard error (the mean of tenure is 11.7 years). With theaddition of orchestra fixed effects, the coefficient on the female
dummy is ⫹0.062, again with a large standard error. The
difference in tenure by sex, therefore, is extremely small.

738

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

have emphasized. The point estimates, moreover, are almost all economically significant.
Using the audition data, we find that thescreen increases— by 50 percent—the probability that a woman will be advanced fromcertain preliminary rounds and increases by
severalfold the likelihood that a woman will
be selected in the final round. By the use of
the roster data, the switch to blind auditions
can explain 30 percent of the increase in the
proportion female among new hires and possibly 25 percent of the increase in the percentage female in the orchestras from 1970 to
1996.57 As in research in economics and otherfields on double-blind refereeing (see, e.g.,
57
The point estimate for the increased likelihood awoman would be a new hire, as a result of the adoption ofblind auditions, is 7.5 percentage points using the roster data
(see Table 10). Because the percentage female among newhires increased from 10 to 35 percent from before 1970 to
the 1990’s, our estimate implies that 30 percent of the 25
percentage-point increase can be explained by the adoption

SEPTEMBER 2000

Blank, 1991), the impact of a blind procedure
is toward impartiality and the costs to thejournal (here to the orchestra) are relatively
small. We conclude that the adoption of thescreen and blind auditions served to help female musicians in their quest for orchestral
positions.

of the screen. How this increase affected the percentage
female in the orchestra depends on the sex composition of
the orchestra, retirement (or turnover), and the time frame.
We assume a 25-year time frame (from 1970 to 1995) andtwo retirements (thus two hires) per year. An increase in thepercentage female among new hires from 10 percent (itslevel pre-1970) to 17.5 percent (10 ⫹ 7.5%) implies that in
25 years, 13.75 women (out of 100) will be in the orchestra,or an increase of 3.75. The actual increase was 15 women,
meaning 25 percent of the increase can be explained by the
adoption of the screen. We assume in this example that theage distribution of the 100 players in 1970 is uniform
between ages 25 and 74, that all hires occur at age 25, andthat men and women are drawn from the same age distribution.

APPENDIXTABLE A1—SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, AUDITION DATA
Preliminaries
Without semifinals

Advanced
Blind
FemaleFemale ⫻ Blind
Missing female
Missing female ⫻ BlindYears since last audition
Years since last audition,
missing
Automatic placement
Number of auditions
attended“Big Five” orchestra
Total number ofauditioners
Proportion female at roundPrincipal
Substitute
Number of observations(person-rounds)

MeanStandard
deviation

0.184
0.793
0.376
0.305
0.002
0.002
2.480
0.663

With semifinals
MeanStandard
deviation

0.387
0.405
0.485
0.461
0.047
0.043
1.661
0.473

0.185
0.976
0.374
0.362
0.002
0.002
2.621
0.505

—
1.611

—
1.137

0.607
44.348
0.375
0.192
0.025
5,395

Semifinals

FinalsMeanStandard
deviation

MeanStandard
deviation

0.388
0.152
0.484
0.481
0.047
0.047
2.209
0.500

0.349
0.808
0.410
0.325
0.004
0.004
2.432
0.386

0.477
0.394
0.492
0.469
0.066
0.061
2.393
0.487

0.200
0.122
0.411
0.056
0
0
2.272
0.505

0.400
0.328
0.492
0.230
0
0
1.895
0.500

—
2.147

—
1.717

0.267
2.490

0.443
1.886

0.137
2.051

0.345
1.513

0.488
22.2020.323
64.2790.467
35.9140.213
15.054

0.409
7.187

0.391
8.622

0.488
4.445

0.206
0.394
0.157

0.373
0.368
0.005
6,239

0.239
0.482
0.071

0.407
0.211
0.353
0.478
0.010
0.101
1,360

Source: Eight-orchestra audition sample. See text.

0.411
0.213
0.278
0.448
0.021
0.141
1,127

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GOLDIN AND ROUSE: ORCHESTRATING IMPARTIALITY

739

TABLE A2—SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, ROSTER DATA: 1970 TO 1996

Proportion female among new hires(Proportion female)t ⫺ 1
Only blind preliminary auditions
All auditions blind
Section:Strings
Woodwinds
Brass
Percussion
Number of observations

Mean

Standard deviation

0.293
0.179
0.572
0.104

0.455
0.081
0.495
0.305

0.642
0.158
0.165
0.035

0.480
0.365
0.371
0.185
1,128

Note: Means are musician weighted, not audition weighted.
Source: Eleven-orchestra roster sample. See text.

TABLE A3—LINEAR PROBABILITY ESTIMATES OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING ADVANCED: BY ROUND
Preliminaries
Without
semifinals

FemaleFemale ⫻ Blind
Blind audition
p-value of H 0 :Female ⫹ (Female ⫻Blind) ⫽ 0
Other covariates?
Instrument fixed
effects?
Year fixed effects?
Orchestra fixed effects?
R2
Number of observations(person-rounds)With
semifinals

Semifinals

Finals

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.007
(0.025)⫺0.062(0.028)0.015(0.022)
0.000

0.011
(0.025)⫺0.067(0.028)0.040(0.030)0.000⫺0.054(0.069)0.005(0.070)0.024(0.057)0.000⫺0.085(0.069)0.037(0.070)0.027(0.062)
0.000

0.103
(0.061)⫺0.142(0.066)0.053(0.049)
0.210

0.099
(0.061)⫺0.137(0.067)0.115(0.078)
0.222

0.002
(0.028)⫺0.091(0.075)0.058(0.058)0.207

0.0004(0.028)⫺0.078(0.075)0.123(0.089)
0.271

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
No
0.062
5,395

Yes
Yes
0.070
5,395

Yes
No
0.033
6,239

Yes
Yes
0.045
6,239

Yes
No
0.074
1,360

Yes
Yes
0.081
1,360

Yes
No
0.064
1,127

Yes
Yes
0.068
1,127

Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if the individual is advanced to the next round and 0 if not. Standard errors are inparentheses. All specifications include dummies indicating whether the sex is missing, and an interaction for the sex
being missing and a blind audition. “Other covariates” include automatic round, number of auditions attended, whether
a “Big Five” orchestra, size of round, proportion female at the round, and whether a principal (including assistant andassociate principal) or substitute position; except in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) for which “Other covariates” include
only automatic placement and number of auditions attended. These results are comparable to those in Table 6 but
without individual fixed effects.
Source: Eight-orchestra audition sample. See text.

740

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWSEPTEMBER 2000

TABLE A4—LINEAR PROBABILITY ESTIMATES OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING ADVANCED: ASSESSING SHORT-PANEL BIAS
Part A: Preliminary rounds
Preliminaries
Without semifinals

Blind
Female ⫻ Blindp-value of H 0 :Blind ⫹ (Female ⫻ Blind) ⫽ 0
Other covariates?
Individual fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?
R2
Number of observations (person-rounds)

With semifinals

Ia

IIb

Ia

IIb

⫺0.024(0.066)0.126(0.095)0.233⫺0.042(0.063)0.095(0.071)
0.502⫺0.047(0.383)⫺0.035(0.403)0.807⫺0.095(0.744)0.041(0.275)
0.943

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.491
1,025

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.537
639

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.423
1,928

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.732
55

Part B: Semifinals and finals, and with orchestra fixed effects
Semifinals

Blind
Female ⫻ Blindp-value of H 0 :Blind ⫹ (Female ⫻ Blind) ⫽ 0
Other covariates?
Individual fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?
R2
Number of observations (person-rounds)

With orchestras
fixed effects

Finals

Ia

IIb

Ia

IIb

Ia

IIb

0.060
(0.133)⫺0.179(0.195)
0.438

0.169
(0.109)⫺0.284(0.142)
0.298

0.123
(0.356)0.157(0.408)0.212⫺0.140(0.449)0.403(0.415)
0.587

0.084
(0.047)0.042(0.051)
0.011

0.352
(0.056)0.021(0.041)
0.000

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.438
269

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.593
223

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.721
127

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.728
67

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.506
2,321

Yes
Yes
Yes
0.603
1,776

Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if the individual is advanced to the next round and 0 if not. Standard errors are inparentheses. These are the same specifications as in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) of Table 6 and column (2) of Table 7.
Source: Eight-orchestra audition sample. See text.
aIncludes those who auditioned at least three times (for the relevant round).
b
Includes those who auditioned at least once in a blind audition and at least once in a not-blind audition (for the relevantround).

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