Dragging anchor
Grounding accidentų

Typhoon No.18
Cargo Vessel
MV TRI ARDHIANT (6,315tons)
Grounded
September 7th Kasadojima,
Kudamatsu-shi, Yamaguchi Prefecture
Total loss, 19 deceased and 1 missing.

Typhoon No.23
Training Ship
Kaiwo Maru (2,556tons）
Grounded

Sept. 8th
October 20th Fushiki Toyama Port
30 severely injured

×Oct. 21st×th

Sept.7

Typhoon No.18

Oct. 20st

Typhoon No.23
Fig. 28

Looking closely at 233 accidents due to the typhoons in 2004 “by type of case”, the main aspects of typhoon maritime
accidents will follow. The ratio of those accidents will be shown in Fig 29.

Detailed Breakdown ofMarine Accidents
Collision (single)
54

Others 4
2%

23%
Shipwreck
102
44%＊ Collision (single)▶ Whle moored at a pier, the hull collided with the quay due to strong winds.
▶ While berthing was in progress using the anchor, it collided with the quay
because the strong winds did not allow for anchorage.
＊ Aground▶ While anchored, grounded on a rocky stretch due to a dragging anchor andsinking.
▶ While turning round in the harbour, pressed by strong winds and therefore
grounded in a swash.
＊ Equipment damage

Total

233
cases

14%

▶ Due to the strong wind, the antenna at the top of the mast was lost.
▶ Because there was a danger of collision with another vessel due to dragging
anchor, the anchor chain was cut off.
＊ Collision8%2%

Capsize67%Aground32

Equipment damage
19
Collision
16
Fig. 29▶ Pressed by dragging anchor, ships collide with other ships while anchored.
＊ Capsize▶ Very stormy weather (at sea) was brought by typhoons approaching and fishingboats that were sailing out were discovered capsized.
＊ Shipwreck▶ Propellers which made contact and were damaged by floating matter such as
driftwood due to heavy rain.
▶ Towed objects drifting and being grounded in shallows due to a severed tow rope
was cutted.
▶ A loss of a lamp door due to a direct hit from a high wave.

− 11 −

§3

Dragging Anchor Cases(From the Maritime Casualty Analysis Report [Vol. 6]: Typhoons and marine
accidents issued by the Marine Accident Inquiry Agency [MAIA] in 2006)

３−１ The Aomori - Hakodate ferry Touya Maru accident
Touya Maru：
The Aomori - Hakodate ferry, 4,337 tons

Date, time and the point/location of occurrence:
22:45 JST on the 26th of September in 1954 in Hakodate Bay (during harbourage from thetyphoon)Weather at the time of sinking：Rain, southwest wind, wind speed at 20m/s, wave height at 3m and 1 hour had passed since low
tide had begun.

Accident summary
26th September, 1954

Off Nanaehama

Circumstances of Hakodate Bay

Touya Maru sinking
Touya Marudragging anchor

Arikawa
Pier

Hidaka Maru sinking
No.11 Seikan Maru sinking
Hokkaido

Tokachi Maru sinking

Hidaka Marudragging anchor

No.11 Seikan Marudragging anchor

Hakodate Bay

Kitami Marudragging anchor
Hakodate
Pier
Hakodate
Train Station

Tokachi Marudragging anchor
Hakodateyama

Kattoshimisaki Lighthouse

Kitami Maru
sinking
NauticalMileskm

Fig. 30

Regarding the Aomori - Hakodate ferry, Touya Maru, the total number of persons on board was 1,314, (crew members:
111, passengers and so on: 1,203) with 12 freight cars loaded. While Typhoon No. 15 was approaching, Touya Maru
− 12 −

departed Hakodate Pier from within the Port of Hakodate bound for the Port of Aomori. She was to take refuge at the
Hakodate Bay because outside the Port of Hakodate had already been seeing very stormy weather (at sea), however,she dragged anchor due to a gale and high waves. Touya Maru therefore grounded in the shallows of Nanaehama
in Hakodate Bay. She then capsized and sank which caused a total number of 1,155 deceased or missing persons
including passengers etc.
Also, four other vessels from the Aomori - Hakodate ferry, namely, No. 11 Seikan Maru, Kitami Maru, TokachiMaru and Hidaka Maru capsized and sank in Hakodate Bay in succession. The total number of deceased and missing
passengers etc. came to be 275.
The state of aﬀairs at Hakodate Bay on the 26th of September in 1954 is shown in Fig. 30. Hakodate Bay has a land
shape that makes it less influenced by wind and waves because it is shielded by high mountains, when there is anorthwest wind.
“However, the bay mouth is open widely towards the direction of the ‘south-southwest’. Thus, because of the longfetch, in the event that a southerly wind blows continuously, high waves are thrusted into the bay as time goes by”.

Typhoon No.15 (International name: Marie)
Typhoon No.15, Marie, formed at the north of the Yap Islands on the 21st of September and hit the Northern Osumi
Peninsula from Kagoshima Bay on the 26th at around 14:00 JST at a very fast speed. Afterwards, she cut across theeastern part of Kyushu and passed through the region of Chugoku, at a speed of 100km/h.
On the 26th at approximately 08:00 she moved off of Sanin to the Japan Sea and grew as she headed north to
Hokkaido. At 21:00 on the same day, she reached her peak then she passed oﬀ Suttsu in Hokkaido. She reached nearby
Wakkanai City at around 0:00 on the 27th. Regarding the precipitation of this typhoon, there are some areas which
exceeded 200mm like the regionsof Kyushu and Chugoku, however,there were lesser amounts in otherareas. Because the typhoon continued
developing even after entering the Sea
of Japan, a violent storm of more than
9/26 21:00 JST
30m/s was blowing in each area ofwestern Japan, Tohoku and Hokkaido.
9/26 15:00 JST
Normally we rarely think that typhoons 9/26 09:00 JST
develop in the Sea of Japan at theend of September when the seawater
9/26 02:00 JST
temperature is lower. Therefore, it canbe considered that the typhoon had
in fact changed into an extratropical
9/25
cyclone (a so-called “bomb low
pressure” cyclone) from approximately
3:00 on the 26th of September when she
landed in Kyushu.
9/18
Fig. 31− 13 −

Hakodatewarm front

TD

Aomorioccluded
front

cold front

Sept. 26th 16:00 JST
Fig. 33

Sept. 26th 09:00 JST
Fig. 32

Path of Typhoon No. 15

958mb 27 th 03：00

956mb 21:00
Esashi port
960mb 15:00
Hakodate Bay

The following are characteristics of Typhoon
No.15 (International name: Marie):

964mb 09:00① After crossing the regions of Kyushu andChugoku, she went up north to the Sea ofJapan while maintaining her force.
② She approached Hokkaido at approximately
100km/h, then her speed decreased toth

26 03:00
965mb

approximately 50km/h as she reached thesea in the southwest of Oshima Peninsula.
Fig. 34− 14 −

Photograph 35

Photograph 36"Capsized Touya Maru""Bygone days of Touya Maru"

Movement of Touya Maru
The movement of Touya Maru on the 26th of September is as follows.

11：05

She moored Hakodate Pier (Aomori → Hakodate Port).
“Typhoon No. 15 proceeded northeast 100km northwest of Noto Peninsula.
According to the weather information, it was highly possible that it would pass to the south of
Hakodate in the evening”.

14：40

Station for leaving port. (Leaving the Hakodate Pier bound for the Port of Aomori)

15：00

Because it was not possible to remove a movable bridge between the railway track and the ship due
to a blackout, the Master decided to delay departure for the time being. Touya Maru was awaiting withpassengers on board, while mooring.
“Weather information: the typhoon passed the northern part of the Ou region or the southern part of
Hokkaido in the evening and proceeded to the Kuril Islands at night”.

17：00

The wind suddenly weakened, sunny spells were observed in the sky and it would have seemed as if
they had been swallowed up and had reached the centre of the typhoon.
“At Hakodate Pier, there were no changes in wind direction for over one hour from 17:30. Then, thewinds became stronger, but there were no changes in atmospheric pressure”.

17：40

It was decided that the ship depart at “18:30”.

17：59“Weather information: the typhoon proceeded 100km northeast or north-northeast off Esashi Port
offing”.

18：39
Departed Hakodate Pier from the port of Hakodate. While being blown by a south-southeast gale fromher astern port side, she manoeuvred the normal route in the breakwater at full speed.

18：53

Passed the breakwater entrance nearby. It was confirmed that the port side bow took gale force winds
and that the waves were also high.

− 15 −

18：55
19：01

19：30

She passed the breakwater lighthouse which was on her port side.
Anchored due to a violent storm and waves (two-anchor mooring with 8 shackles on her starboard sideand 7 shackles on her port side).
“There was a south-southwest wind at 25 - 30m/s, a gust at 40m/s and there were no changes inatmospheric pressure”.

Along with pitching of the hull, car deck flooded from the opening of the stern.

Low freeboard
Photograph 37

19：50

Fig. 38

The 7 shackles at port side were extended by 1 shackle to become 8 shackles on both sides. Flooding
started in the engine room (machinery room).

20：00
Anchor dragging started. Flooding started in the boiler room.

20：10

Initial accident report was made to JCG via radio communications.

20：30

Operated the ballast pump, but shortly it became in vain. Flooding started in the steerage.

20：40“The anemometer on the ship was recording gusts of 57m/s anda wave height of 6m”.

Photograph 39

21：00

Ship heeled to the port side.

Photograph 40− 16 −

21：40Further heeled to the port side.

21：50

Main engine on the port side became inoperable, and the bilge could not be discharged. Ship’s heel
started shifting from port side to starboard side.

22：05

Main engine on the starboard side became inoperable and the vessel became trim by the stern due toflooding.

22：15

Passengers were instructed to wear life vests.

22：26

Grounded in the shallow off Nanaehama, with a
45 degree inclination to the starboard side.

Fig. 41

22：42

Blackout on board with a deluge of water flowing in.

22：45

Sinking after rolling over to the starboard side.
2IŰQJ

1DQDHKDPD

6HDVXUIDFH
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FODVVFDELQ(QJLQHURRP
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Photograph 43

Fig. 42

Sinking circumstances: location at a depth of 8.3m
The hull was parallel with the coast with a 135 degree inclination on her starboard side. The starboard
side was buried in the seabed under mud with the port side bilge keel visible on the sea surface.
Later the Japan Meteorological Agency concluded that “the reason why the wind had weakened
for a moment near the Hakodate Bay was because a cold air current, accompanying the cold front,
offset the wind of field, and therefore, the cold front rapidly disappeared when it interacted withthe wind field”. Regarding the “wind becoming weak along with a mysterious westering sun”, they
announced that this was not caused by the typhoon as the centre of the typhoon passed the vicinityof the port of Hakodate.
Also, the four Aomori - Hakodate ferries, including Touya Maru, experienced groundings andcapsized as a result of a dragging anchor.

− 17 −

Registered nameof ship

No.11 Seikan Maru

Kitami Maru

Touya Maru

Tokachi Maru

Hidaka Maru

G/T

3,142 tons

2,928 tons

4,337 tons

2,911 tons

2,923 tons

Length113.8 meters113.7 meters113.7 meters113.6 meters113.7 meters

No. of Crew

90

76

111

76

77

No. of Passengers

None

None

1,203

None

None

Loaded freight cars

45

46

12

35

43

Route

Hakodate → (Anchoredin heavy weather)

Hakodate → (Anchoredin heavy weather)

Hakodate → Aomori

Aomori → Hakodate

Aomori → Hakodate

Between 13:00
and 14:00:
East-southeast
8-12m/s
999.2mb

13:20 Left port of
Hakodate boundfor port of Aomori
Departed (Hakodate
Pier)

Between 14:00
and 15:00:
East
15-17m/s
989.2mb

Between 17:00
and 18:00:
South
12-15m/s
982.6mb
Between 18:00
and 19:00:
South
15-20m/s
982.6mb

Between 19:00
and 20:00:
South
15-20m/s
982.6mb

Departed port of
Aomori)

14:48 Because thewaves rose could
no longer sail andreturned to port

14:40 Bound for port of
Aomori

14:20 Departed portof AomoriS/B Station for departure

15:17 Left wharf toshelter from stormy
weather(Arikawa
Pier)

Between 15:00
and 16:00:
East
15-17m/s
986.6mb

Between 16:00
and 17:00:
East
10-15m/s
985.2mb

11:20

15:30 Anchored(starboard anchor
with 8 shackles)

15:00 Due to blackout, adjustable shore
ramp could not be
removed. This caused adelay,and departure wassuspended.

16:33 Anchoredin the break water（starboard anchor
with 5 shackles andport anchor with 5
shackles)

16:02 Left wharf toshelter from stormy
weather (Hakodate
Pier)
16:25 Anchored
17:40 Departed andbound for port of
Aomori

Details are
unknown because
all crew deceased

17:30 Commenced
anchoring watch

18:40 Commenced
anchoring watch
Engine ready

18:38 Departed Port of
Hakodate (Hakodate
Pier)

18:50 Anchored(starboard anchor
with 8 shackles andport anchor with 4
shackles)

19:00 Used engine

19:01 Anchored(starboard anchor with
8 shackles and port
anchor with 7 shackles)

19:30 Used engine
Flooded in car deck

19:30 Flood inengine room andboiler room

19:30 Flooded in cardeck
19:50 Laid down bothanchors with 8 shackles
Flood in boiler room

− 18 −

19:30 Used engine
Laid down bothanchors with 8
shacklesRegistered nameof ship

Between 20:00
and 21:00:
South
20-30m/s
979.9mb

No.11 Seikan Maru

Kitami Maru

20:00 Sinking fromastern

20:20 Dragging
anchorTouya Maru

Tokachi Maru

20:00 Dragging anchor
Flood in boiler room

20:00 Dragging
anchor Flood in boilerroom

20:45 Weighing
anchor commencesin order to heave-to

Between 21:00
and 22:00:
South
15-20m/s
979.9mb

20:40 Drifted 1 nauticalmile northeasterly bywind pressure andoscillates violently

21:15 Heaved cable
to 3 shackles and fullspeed ahead Heeled
10 degrees to portside

21:40 Heel increased on
port side

22:00 Heeled at 15
degrees starboardside

22:05 Main engine on
starboard side inoperable

22:30 Engine
inoperable, rolled
over to starboard
side, sinking

Between 22:00
and 23:00:
Southwest
15-20m/s
979.9mb

Hidaka Maru

21:50 Heel increasedon starboard side

21:50 Main engine on
port side inoperable

21:15 Weighing
anchor commencesin order to shift
outside of breakwater
21:45 Weighingof the anchor
completed and fullspeed ahead

22:15 Instructed passengers to wear life vests

22:20 Engine
inoperable

22:00 Flooded to cardeck

22:30 Generator
stopped (Blackout)

22:10 Flooded inengine room andboiler room

22:26 Grounding in shallows and heeled at 45
degrees starboard side

22:25 After lowering
anchor (starboard
anchor with 4
shackles), entire
anchor cable (10shackles) was laiddown

22:42 Blackout, large
amount of seawater encroached
22:45 Rolled over tostarboard side, sinking
23:41 Loaded cars
were rolled over

Between 23:00
and 24:00:
Southwest
20-250m/s
981.2mb

23:42 Capsized on
starboard side

23:00 Heeled at 10
degrees starboardside
23:35 Discarded
anchor, but engine
inoperable. Engine
stopped23:43 CapsizedTime of marine
accident
occurrence
Point of marine
accident
occurrence
No. of deceased
and missing

20:00
257 degrees
and 1,785m
from Hakodate
Port breakwater
lighthouse

90

22:30
89 degrees and2,900m from
Kattoshimisaki
lighthouse

22:45
257 degrees and 1,785m
from Hakodate Port
breakwater lighthouse

70

1,155

23:42
257 degrees
and 1,785m
from Hakodate
Port breakwater
lighthouse

59

23:43
257 degrees
and 1,785m
from Hakodate
Port breakwater
lighthouse56

Note: The wind direction, wind speed and pressure are figures that are read at Hakodate Pier every hour on the hour.
Table 44

It is presumed that it was difficult to grasp the actual changes of the typhoon’s state, because there wasno means of observation via weather satellite, bar that of weather forecasts based on the information
available from weather stations located in each region.

− 19 −

＝ Quoted from the Marine Accident Inquiry Agency (MAIA) determination ＝Provisional translation Courtesy of the Marine Accident Inquiry Agency (MAIA) homepage
The Marine Accident Inquiry Commissioner’s Office completed their survey in a short period of only 62 days
following the occurrence of the accident. Appointing the 2nd navigation officer and the 2nd engineer of
Touya Maru as examinees, appointing also the president of the Japanese National Railways (JNR), the chiefof Aomori ‐ Hakodate Railway Bureau, the chief of the Central Meteorological Observatory and chief of the
Marine Meteorological Observatory in Hakodate as designated persons regarding the marine accident, filed
an application for a trial to commence on the 27th November, 1954 at the Marine Accident Inquiry Agency in
Hakodate.The first trial was concluded on the 15th of July, 1955. The decision regarding the second trial wasconcluded on the 9th of February, 1959.

Main text of judgement:

Although this accident occurred because the Master of Touya Maru neglected to carry out his duty, other factors
include inappropriate operation management of the Aomori ‐ Hakodate ferry company along with a generallack of understanding regarding the vessel’s hull construction.

① Master's negligence of duty regarding shipping operation▶

Even though the vessels are structured and equipped to the standards stipulated in the convention and law,
it is necessary for the Master to pay extra attention to the safety of the vessel and lives of those on board,
because it should be anticipated that navigating will be dangerous, in the event of encountering a typhoon.

▶

The Master should have departed as usual once the danger of the typhoon had passed.

▶

In the vicinity of the port of Hakodate, the wind veered and gradually increased from the southwest west
between 22 - 25m/s, and turned into a squall at 32m/s. Thus, it could not be accepted that the typhoon
had passed, as the barometric height decreased and stagnated. This accident was caused by the Master’s
negligence, who proceeded to set sail from the port of Hakodate bound for the port of Aomori while
carrying a large number of passengers and cargo, under rough sea conditions.

② Hull construction▶

Because there was a vessel that encountered such weather and sea conditions whereby sea waves flowed
deep into the car deck of the vessel, whose hull structure was similar to this one, in the past, this hull
structure was not appropriate, taking into consideration the actual operation to be carried out on this sea
route.

▶

Regarding the accident, having not being able to have prevented flooding from the various openings on the
cargo deck would have caused the subsequent sinking after rolling over. Thus, the inappropriateness of thehull construction is one of the factors concerning this accident.

③ Inappropriate operation management▶

Despite such rough seas that could be expected to bring about great danger when navigating, the vessel
continued operating on a fixed schedule and the operation continued as long as possible, without
evacuating at an early phase, as would have normally been the case.

▶

The management department were of the opinion that it was enough to leave the safe operation of ferries
to the Masters and that they should not intervene.

▶

There was no arrangement of personnel or personnel charged with authority in order take necessary care

− 20 −

and measures for the safe operation of the ship in the organization. In addition, there was no provision regarding
emergency personnel arrangement and authority of management, in time of an emergency such as this.
▶

The management mechanism and policy for ferries had been properly carried out over the years, from when thegovernment started managing this sea route until this accident occurred. It is not however appropriate for it to be
managed by a shipping management company, when considering how dangerous this route is.

３―２ Cargo Vessel B Dragging anchor and grounding accident
Cargo Vessel B:
General cargo vessel with 2 cargo holds of 5,552 G/T
Date, time and location of occurrence:
30th of August 2004, 12:25 Japan time (JST), Yura-misaki oﬃng of Ehime Prefecture
Weather at time of sinking:rain, southeast wind: wind force 12, wave height 8m, end of ebb tide

Accident summary
Twenty Vietnamese crew were on board Vessel B, which departed the Port of Pohang of the Republic of Korea andarrived at the Port of Ohita via the Kanmon Straits on the 26th of August. Anchored in order to await berthing. The
Master (Vietnamese) was at the age of 42 with 18 years of sea experience and 4 years as Master.
In the morning of the 28th, the Master knew that Typhoon No.16 was approaching Oita, between the 29th and the30th, via weather information provided by NAVTEX and telex from the local agent. He decided to shelter from thetyphoon by moving to another sea area. The vessel heaved up anchor in the afternoon, and the Master made a plan tostart operating southward toward the Bungo Suido (Channel), while searching for an appropriate place to anchor.
The vessel heaved up anchor on the 29th of August at 09:55 JST, the Master started sailing southward along the
Bungo Suido (Channel) as planned. However, due to the deep depth of the water that was also present in Uwakai etc.
she continued southward and conducted single anchor mooring at a location of 92 meters depth of water in the bay ofthe southeast part of Yura-misaki oﬃng of Ehime Prefecture at 14:40 on the same day. Afterwards, the wind directionchanged to the southeast and sea waves encroached from the bay mouth that was exposed to the south. However, theMaster continued to anchor without shifting from an early stage.
At 17:40 on the 29th, noticing that the anchor was dragging, the Master attempted to heave up the anchor in order toevacuate oﬀshore. However, the vessel had no choice but shift oﬀ while dragging the anchor, and anchored again at
20:40, because it was not possible to weigh the anchor due to the extremely deep depth of water. At 11:30 on the 30thof August, the anchor was dragging again and Vessel B was grounded on the shore of Yurajima at 12:25 on the same
day.
Four crew members who panicked and climbed down the stern deck and were carried away by the waves (one was
deceased and three missing). The remaining 16 crew members including the Master were rescued by the helicopters of− 21 −

the Japan Coast Guard and the Self-Defense Force. Photograph 45, Figs. 46 and 47 show the path of Vessel B and its
anchor being dragged.

Aug. 29th 09:55

Departed anchorage

Source: website courtesy of the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI)

Photograph 45

Fig. 46

suge
Ehime Prefecture

20m

Aug. 29th 14:40
Single anchor mooring

Aug. 30th 12:25
Grounded×Yuranohana
Yuranohana
light house

<11

3>

2.6

0>

<07

2.6

nau

tica

+

iles

lm

ica
aut

n

Aug. 29th 17:40
Dragging anchor started

lm

iles

th

Aug. 30 11:30+

Aug. 29th 20:40
Single anchor mooring again

Dragging anchor started again

Regarding the wind direction from thesoutheast to southwest, the topography001of the land was considered as such thatsea waves could easily encroach fromthe south. There are also few shields
such as land or islands.

3km
1

2 nautical miles

Source: courtesy of the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI) website

Fig. 47− 22 −

Typhoon No.16 in 2004 (Asian name: Chaba)〔Chaba: Naming country: Thailand, Meaning: Hibiscus〕

Aug. 30th 18:00JST
965hPa 35m/sec
Aug. 30th 15:00JST
965hPa 35m/sec

200km

Aug. 30th 12:00JST
955hPa 40m/sec

Point grounded
Aug. 30th 06:00JST
950hPa 40m/sec
Source: courtesy of the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI) website

Fig. 48

Fig. 49

Photograph 50
Typhoon No.16 at her peak (August 23rd)
910hp Maximum wind speed 155kts (80m/s)− 23 −

Figs. 48 and 49 show the route of Typhoon No. 16 in 2004, which caused a case of dragging anchor.
On the 19th of August 2004, approximately 21:00 JST, the tropical cyclone in the sea around the Marshall Islands
formed Typhoon No.16. Afterwards, the typhoon proceeded to the west while developing gradually. Then on August
23rd, she became 910hPa and 110knots (55m/s) at her peak and the strong wind area broadened. In Saipan, amaximum wind speed of 65m/s and a maximum instantaneous wind speed of 75m/s was observed.
At approximately 10:00 on the 30th of August, she landed as a “large and strong force” in the vicinity of Kushikinocity of Kagoshima Prefecture (Currently Ichikikushikino-city). Central pressure upon landing was 950hPa. Afterwards,
she crossed Kyushu. The central location of the typhoon was in the vicinity of Amakusa of Kumamoto Prefecture at
12:00 on the 30th when Vessel B experienced a dragging anchor and grounding accident. Where it was located wasapproximately 200km from Yurajima, within the storm area and the wind speed was greater than 25m/s.
After that, typhoon No.16 landed again in the vicinity of Hofu-city of Yamaguchi Prefecture at approximately 17:30 on
the 30th. It then increased in speed but later decayed and landed again near Hakodate-city of Hokkaido at around 12:00
on the 31st. Then, at 15:00 on the 31st, she changed into an extratropical cyclone in the eastern part of Hokkaido. She
was the largest typhoon both in terms of force and size among the typhoons that landed in 2004.

Movement of Vessel B
August 26th
12：40

Entered into the outside port of Ohita from the Port of Pohang of the Republic of Korea. Lowered
anchor at the point of anchorage in order to wait for berthing.

August 28th

In the morning of the 28th, the Master knew that Typhoon No.16 was approaching Ohita, between
the 29th and the 30th, via weather information provided by NAVTEX and telex from the local agent.
He decided to shelter from the typhoon by moving to another sea area. In the afternoon or on thefollowing morning they heaved up the anchor and the Master decided to sail southward to the Bungo
Suido (Channel), while searching for appropriate anchorage.

22：00

The first warning was issued by the harbour master of Ohita.
“Regarding the ships at harbour, they must take measures that allow the ship’s personnel to beable to operate immediately if necessary. On top of that they must wait while paying attention to
the movement of the typhoon while keeping in close contact with organizations on shore such as
shipping agencies. They must also prepare for countermeasure of rough sea.

August 29 th

Departed anchorage in the Port of Ohita and sailed southward to the Bungo Suido (Channel).

9：55
14：40
Started anchoring at 6.5 shackles on the port side at a point of 92 meters of water depth at <070>, 2.6
nautical miles from Yuranohama-Misaki Lighthouse.

16：00

The second warning was issued by the harbour master of Ohita.“Regarding the large vessels in the
harbour, immediately evacuate to a safe area outside port in principle”.

17：00 (Approx.)
The wind direction changed from north east to south east and reached a wind force of 8. In addition,
the waves from the south increased in height to 7 meters. Anchor cable was extended by one
shackle.

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17：40Dragging anchor started. Tried weighing the anchor, but it was not possible to heave up it. Gaveup weighing the anchor and started shifting to the south while using the engine under dragging theanchor.
20：40
Started anchoring at 8 shackles of the anchor cable at the point <113>, 2.6 nautical miles from Yuramisaki Lighthouse. Using the engine, countermeasures were taken to prevent anchor dragging
against the wind.
August 30th
11：30

Wind force reached 12 due to the increase of southeast wind, and dragging anchor started in a
leeward direction.

11：57
Distress alarm was activated via Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) and Digital
Selective Calling (DSC). Instructed the crew to wear life vests and muster at the bridge.

12：25
Grounded at the point of <066> 1,750m from Yuranohana Cape Lighthouse. At approximately 13:00,
four panicked crew members left the bridge. When they climbed down the stern deck they werecarried away with the waves and fell into the sea.

The 16 crew members were rescued by thehelicopters of the Japan Coast Guard and the
Self-Defense Force. Among the four who fell
into the sea, one was confirmed as deceased
and three as missing.

Photograph 51− 25 −

＝ Quoted from the Marine Accident Inquiry Agency (MAIA) determination ＝Provisional translation
Cause① The selection of the anchorage was not conducted appropriately.
▶

If appropriate anchorage; where the depth of water is shallow and she was shielded from gale force
winds and waves, was chosen, it was thought that the accident could have been avoided.

② Obtaining information on the typhoon and taking shelter by anchoring was insufficient.
▶

There were facts related to the process leading to the accident such as not obtaining the information aboutanchoring from the agency and only obtaining weather information by means of NAVEX. Also, not being
able to use the anchor on the starboard side due to windlass failure was one of the causes of the accident.

The anchor and anchor cable outﬁtted on the ship were as follows:
Anchor:Anchor cable:

JIS type Weight 3,300kgs
1 shackle was at 27.5m × 9 shackles
per side 248m

When tentatively calculating the minimum required length for an anchor chain, in
92m of water, an anchor chain with 513m (19 shackles) of length is required (at timesof rough seas: 4 × d + 145m). Sheltering from stormy weather in a location which
exceeds 50m in water depth is thought of as unsuitable.

Photograph 52
JIS type anchor

３―３ Cargo Vessel C Dragging anchor and grounding accident
Cargo Vessel C :Panamax bulker with cargo holds 36,080 tons
Loa : 224.0m
Date, time and point of occurrence :On the 25th of July 2002, at 21:11 JST Shibushi Bay of Kagoshima Prefecture
Weather at the time of grounding :Rain, east-northeasterly wind, wind force of 10, wave height at 5m and end of ebb tide

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Accident summary
Regarding dry bulk, Vessel C, the total number of crew
members on board was 23 (four Indian nationals and
19 Filipino nationals) and 57, 474 tons of corn was
loaded at the Port of New Orleans in North America.
She entered into the Port of Shibushi, Kagoshima
Prefecture, on the 23rd of July, 2002 in order to unload.
At the Port, among the people disembarking were: 9crew members (a chief officer [Indian national] and8 others [Filipino nationals]) that disembarked and a
total number of 5 crew members (the successor, a chief
officer [(Indian national)] and 4 other crew members)
relieved them and boarded. The crew arrangement at the
Photograph 53
time when the accident occurred was 4 Indian nationals
made up of the Master, the chief oﬃcer, the chief engineer and the 1st engineer and 15 other Filipino nationals. (Thenumber of crew members decreased by 4)
The Master boarded Vessel C as the Master at the Port of New Orleans on June 4th, after serving as a Master of several
large cargo ships. The Master had a boarding history of 7 years as a Master in his 27 years of sea-service. During thisperiod of time, the Master had experience calling at many diﬀerent ports in Japan, however, it was the ﬁrst time forhim to enter the Port of Shibushi.
At Shibushi Port, the Shibushi Port Typhoon Response Committee was established with the purpose of preventing any
accidents due to a typhoon at the port and the sea area in the vicinity.
This Typhoon Response Committee consisted of the Chairman of the Kagoshima Coast Guard Director who was the
harbour master of Shibushi Port, governmental organizations such as Kagoshima Local Meteorological Observatory
and Kyushu Regional Development Bureau Shibushi Port and Harbour Construction Oﬃce, regional organizations
such as Shibushi Town, Police Station, Fire Station, Shibushi Port and Harbour Oﬃce etc, Kagoshima Licensed Pilot’s
Association and 43 other organizations and groups such as harbour related companies engaged in various businesses
in the port. The committee used to hold a regular annual committee meeting in early July before the typhoon season
came and attempted to inform all members on the typhoon countermeasure guidelines thoroughly regarding thewarning issue and the communication system to ensure that the procedure for sending information to the ships in the
harbour when a typhoon approaches was well known.
Regarding the warning system and recommendations to be issued by the Typhoon Response Committee, in the eventthat a possible accident is predicted to occur due to an approach of a typhoon to Shibushi Port, they are to hold apolicy committee meeting, if necessary, in order to discuss how to spread typhoon information, prediction of thetyphoon’s path and its impact, grasp of the ships in the port, preparation for rough seas regarding ships, timing of
evacuation recommendations and how to relay the information thoroughly and so on. Then, based on the outcomeof the discussion and typhoon countermeasure guidelines, before it would become diﬃcult to navigate the ships, thechairman would issue the warning and contact the ships in the port via each member.
Because the strong wind area of typhoon No. 9 was predicted to reach Shibushi Port within 48 hours, on the 23rd

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