oil leakage caused by abrasive powder from the abnormal wearof piston ring/cylinder liner.
④ Surface wear and burn-out of exhaust valve.
⑤ Exhaust valve sticking due to accumulation of unburnt deposits
in the exhaust valve guide aperture.
⑥ Blow-by and high-temperature corrosion, due to poor sealing of
exhaust valve seat.
⑦ Surface wear and burn-out of piston crown.
⑧ Turbocharger problems due to accumulated unburnt deposits(e.g., explosion overrun).
2 Medium/high speed 4-stroke diesel engine problems

The higher the engine speed, the greater are the chances of adverse
ignition delay. In particular, when the temperature and pressure inside
the cylinder are low and the load is also low, diesel knocking may leadto unstable combustion. This will also increase PM and black smoke
emissions. Such situations can be alleviated by increasing the load to
improve ignition condition. Bear in mind that the same problems related
to the low speed 2-stroke engine mentioned above, can also occur in themedium/high speed 4-stroke engine.
Table 5-30 Ignition and combustibility issues

Detection of and countermeasures for issues arising from oil with poor
ignition and combustibility
Table 5-31 shows a summary of diagnostic issues regarding the detection of ignition andcombustion problems.
Diagnosis of potential issues

Countermeasures

It is essential that crew members carefully
monitor the following engine conditions andmake a correct diagnosis:

In the event of any abnormal
combustion, crew members must take
immediate onboard action and follow theappropriate measures outlined below:

95

Diagnosis of potential issues
1 2-stroke engine① Ensure proper maintenance of the fuelinjection valve and secure the valve
opening pressure in order to atomize
fuel oil properly and produce a good
spray.

② Enhance engine monitoring(e . g . m o n i t o r i n g o f e x h a u s t g a s
temperature, rpm of the turbocharger(surging), specific fuel consumption,
concentration of iron in drain oil
s a m p l e d f ro m t h e b o t to m o f t h ecylinder liner).

Countermeasures
1① Reduce engine load.
Reducing engine load will help toreduce thermal and mechanical loads
at relevant locations. This is effective inpreventing any further deterioration.
②If mechanically possible,
crewmembers should adjust andadvance fuel injection timing.
Be aware though that by advancing
fuel injection timing, Pmax
(maximum in-cylinder pressure) andNox (nitrogen oxide) values will also
rise. Crewmembers must ensure that
Pmax limits are within a range which
does not exceed the upper limit
outlined in the Nox technical file.

③ For engines equipped with temperature
sensors, continuously monitor thecylinder liner temperature.
④ For engines equipped with cylinderpressure sensors, crewmembers mustevaluate the state of combustion byreading the cylinder pressure. Where
sensors are not equipped, measure andevaluate in-cylinder pressure with amechanical indicator.
2 4-stroke engine① Ensure proper maintenance of the fuelinjection valve and secure the valve
opening pressure in order to atomize
fuel oil properly and produce a good
spray.

② Enhance engine monitoring(e.g. monitoring of exhaust gas
temperature, rpm of the turbocharger(surging), specific fuel consumption).

2-stroke engine

2

4-stroke engine① If possible, adjust and increase theengine output to a medium load.
H o w e v e r, f o r t h e g e n e r a t o r s ,consideration must be given to thebalance between onboard power
demand and the number of operating
engines.
②Crewmembers should add a
combustion improver to the fuel(in case of emergency, it is advisable
to keep a reserve stock of combustion
improver onboard).

③ In order to improve startability, cylindercooling water in the engines should be
preheated, if possible.
Table 5-31 Detection of and countermeasures for ignition and combustibility issues

965-3 Countermeasures for the safe use of cylinder oil
The following is a summary of recommended precautions for the selection of cylinder
oil when using low-sulphur compliant fuel oil.
In a two-stroke engine, cylinder oil, which has a close relationship with combustion,
serves the following functions:①

Prevention of corrosion of the cylinder liner and other combustion chambercomponents by neutralizing acids formed from the by-products of the fueloil combustion process.

②

During Hydrodynamic Lubrication, it spreads uniformly over the cylinder
liner surface forming a stable oil film between the piston rings and thecylinder liner to ensure smooth lubrication.

③

Provision of a gas seal between the piston rings and the cylinder liner toprevent blowing out of combustion gas and compressed air.

④

Prevention of build-up of deposits in the piston rings, piston ring grooves
and cylinder liner which could otherwise lead to ring sticking or breakage.

Engine crew members should therefore ensure proper management and control of thecylinder oil which is designed to suppress deterioration of the fuel oil. Care must be taken
to maintain both oil viscosity and the proper functioning of any additives to the cylinderoil. These additives help to disperse any sludge generated by the products of combustionand prevent agglomeration and adhesion to machine parts, whilst also reducing theformation of deposits. Compliant fuel oil (VLSFO sulphur content 0.50% or less) has alower sulphur content than conventional fuel oil (HSHFO sulphur content 3.50% or less).
When selecting a lubricating oil, careful consideration must be given to the ability of thatoil’s alkalinity to neutralize acid (refer to the above mentioned point ① ).
The main component of additives is an alkaline earth metal (mainly Ca). The alkalineability to neutralize is expressed as the base number (BN).

97Characteristics:
alkalinity(can neutralize
acidic products)

Characteristics:
cleaning ability

BN70-100BN70-100Characteristics:
alkalinity(can neutralize
acidic products)

BN 40

Cylinder oils suitable for use
with conventional fuel oils (HSHFO)

Characteristics:
cleaning ability

BN 40

Cylinder oils suitable for use
with compliant fuel oils (VLSFO)

Figure 5-32 BN selection considerations based on degree of pollution by sludge, deposits etc.

If cylinder oil previously used in the conventional fuel oil HSHFO is used in thecompliance fuel oil VLSFO, the alkalinity will be excessive, and carbonate deposits will
form around the piston and on the piston crown.
In two-stroke engines prior to 2020, ships used a cylinder oil of about 70 to 100 BN for
the high sulphur content of the conventional fuel oil HSHFO in open sea areas outsideof ECAs.
However, from 2020, ships need to use a cylinder oil of 40 BN which corresponds tofuel oil with a sulphur content of 0.50% or less.
As shown in Figure 5-32, cylinder oil with a high BN has a high ability to disperse
incomplete combustion products, such as soot and other substances inside the cylinder
oil film. Careful consideration should be given to this dispersing ability when the piston
ring/cylinder liner are in poor condition, and when using fuel oil with poor combustion
quality. It is therefore recommended that the company consult with the engine
manufacturer before selecting and using cylinder oil for a two-stroke engine. Pay carefulattention to the matching of compatible fuel oil VLSFO and cylinder oil.
Similarly, consultation is also recommended when selecting lubricating oil for a fourstroke trunk piston type engine.

98

5-4 Onboard check
Regarding the five properties of compliant fuel oil as previously described, there is a
short and simple method to diagnose the compatibility, cold flow properties, and ignitionand combustion quality, which can be done in about 30 minutes whilst bunkering.

Photograph 5-33(a)Ship bunker manifold

Photograph 5-33(b)Sampling of fuel oil

99

=Simple diagnostic test=

5-4-1 Diagnosis of Compatibility
As described in “5-2-1 ① Compatibility”,
asphaltene can begin to aggregate when diﬀerent
fuels are mixed, and/or when undergoing thermal
shock or when the fuel is oxidized. These
particles will grow from fine to coarse, and will
finally deposit as asphaltene sludge.
Compatibility can be checked by a fuel oil spot
test (ASTM D4740) using a portable test kit asshown in Photograph 5-34. Assessment is madeby the circular patterns that appear after the heatedsample oil is dropped onto the test paper and dried.
Particles that cannot smoothly pass through the

Photograph 5-34 Spot test kit for FO
compatibility and stability

test paper are deposited in a circular shape (inner ring), making it easy to judge by theirappearance. As shown in Photograph 5-35, when a more distinctive spot can be seen in
the center of the filter paper, this implies that the fuel is unstable. If we think of the filter
paper as a strainer, it can be seen that the strainer would immediately become clogged if
the oil did not spread evenly and appears thick around the center.

×◎

Left ：Evaluation

1

Good compatibility

Photograph 5-35

100

Right：Evaluation 5

Very Poor compatibility

Example of test result (compatibility of FO)

5-4-2 Diagnosis of cold flow properties
As described in “5-2-3③ Cold flow properties”,

these properties indicate the ability of a fluid to flow
at low temperatures. Since the average temperatureof most domestic refrigerators is around 5°C,crew members can simply evaluate the cold flow
properties of fuel oil by leaving a cup of bunker
sample oil in a refrigerator for about 30 minutes witha thermometer.
Any low viscosity or loss of cold flow properties

Figure 5-36
5 36
Simplified test methods
for Pour point in refrigerator

should be reported to the charterer and the ship
operator and a request made to implement the countermeasures shown in 5-2-3 above.
For issues regarding “Cold flow properties” and“Compatibility”, please refer to Japan P&I NewsNo. 1044 “THE 2020 GLOBAL SULPHUR CAP− Precaution of “Compatibility” and “Cold flow
properties” for compliant fuel oils” published bythis club on 11 November 2019. Please also referto the TEC-1190 “Booklet for ship crew members
Precautions concerning change-over to 0.50%
sulphur compliant fuel oils [First Edition]” publishedby ClassNK on 30 September of the same year. Thisis a particularly practical booklet containing details
about additive manufacturers.

101

5-4-3 Assessment of ignition quality
As described in “5-2-5 ⑤ Ignition and combustion quality”, CCAI has until now been
the main indicator of ignitability. CCAI can be calculated by referring to the density
and kinematic viscosity described in the Bunker Delivery Note (BDN). Depending on
the oil quality grade, the international standard “ISO 8217:2017 Petroleum products —Fuels (class F) — Specifications of marine fuels” states that a CCAI value of 860 or
870 or less is required for the operation of marine engines. This should be compared tothe estimated value calculated by the crew and used as a guide to the ignitability index.
If CCAI exceeds the upper value limits, the ship should report this to the charterer andthe ship operator, and make a request to implement the countermeasures shown in Table
5-31 above.

102

５−５ Summary
For safe usage of compliant fuel oil, it is recommended that the shipowner, ship
management company, and crew members adopt the following onboard measures:With the manufacturer’s cooperation, review the operation manual for

1

proper fuel oil management (engine, purifier, fuel oil, lubricating oil,additives, etc.) and draw up a revised set of operation procedures.

2
3
4
5

Verify previous cases of fuel oil problems.

Establish a system for the monitoring of the operational status ofmachinery, and countermeasures to deal with any abnormalities.
Organize regular inspections to ensure the proper working of machineryin accordance with the manufacturer’s instruction manual.

Ensure a sufficient store of spare parts and fuel oil additives onboard.

Make sure that crew members are fully versant with various work

6

procedures, previous cases of trouble, and appropriate emergency
responses, and provide emergency onboard training drills based on set
contingency plans.

103

Chapter6

Conclusion

In the current climate, in Japan’s domestic shipping industry, the securing of younger
crewmembers is becoming a challenge, and the current personnel is aging, thus theshortage of human resources is becoming more serious. On the other hand, in Japan, theinternational shipping industry tends to rely heavily on foreign crew because of intenseinternational competition, meaning that more Japanese crewmembers are engaged inland-based activity. As a result, on the rare occasion that they board a ship, they tend
to have mostly theoretical knowledge. In the past, the environment was conducive tofostering skills whereby it was natural to hand over maritime ship skills (operation,
repair/inspection/maintenance, and management, and so on) to the succeeding
generations: ① On oceangoing vessels all of the crew members were Japanese, and ②
on coastal vessels, there was a seamless transition between ages of the personnel on
board. However, under the current circumstances, it is diﬃcult for the shipping industry
to realize this. Furthermore, the STCW Convention and the Mariners Act in Japanrequire that crewmembers of the engine department acquire ERM ability to function
more organically with resources such as information, human resources, and equipment.
As mentioned in the conclusion of Chapter 2, how to create a sustainable workplace iskey. Experienced crewmembers are required to take the following actions (non-technicalskills):104

(1) To move out of their comfort zone.
(2) To aid the development of younger crewmembers who willlead the next generation.
(3) To create and secure a Psychologically Safe Space whereexperienced crewmembers can fully support their younger
counterparts.

This will lead to a mutual understanding of the entire team and encourage cooperationand empathy. It will also build robust teamwork.
On the other hand, it is impossible to prevent human error that may cause a marine
accident. And, in order to break the chain of human errors, it is also necessary to foster
harmony amongst people, systems, and the environment. Shipowners, ship managementcompanies, and even the ship may realize a reduction in engine accidents by including
awareness, that harmonizes and aligns the gap between technical safety and humanweak points, to form a firm understanding of (must-do) maintenance.
For “effective engine management and maintenance”, the engine department’s
crew members should build the strongest “One Team” relationship through mutual
understanding. They must then continually be aware that human beings are to be at
the center daily jobs being performed, such as lubricating oil management, fuel oil
management, and inspection/repair/maintenance of the engine. Furthermore, throughregular drills/training, shipowners, ship management companies, and even the ship needto prepare measures that incorporate both soft aspects and hard aspects, so that humanbeings do not panic in an emergency and can respond calmly without making errors.

105

Reference Materials
Reference Material 01:
Ability diagnosis of onboard work performance: Main Text P. 7
To achieve the purpose and mission on board, the Chief Engineer conducts the engine
department’s ability diagnosis within one week after boarding.
・There are 3 scores (A: Merit, B: Pass, C: Needs to improve) allocated for all aspectsof the engine department that make up a comprehensive evaluation. If ability or
knowledge is not satisfactory (less than 60%), an “F” will be given.
・Chief Engineers and First Engineers will work together with experienced crewmembers
in order to further strengthen management of the engine department.
They are to support younger crewmembers and develop countermeasures that will
work on improving their weak points.
・If anyone remains below average for 3 months, it is considered dangerous, so it will
be necessary to consult with the captain and discuss the reassignment of crew with
the Human Resources Department.

106

Rank

Behaviouralcharacteristics

Each person's
fundamental
capability

Total Score

Average
score

Emergency
response

Blackout recovery

Alarm Response

SMS

Communication

Routine WorkEngine & Equipment
operation

Periodical
maintenance

No. of ships
experienced

C/E

Hurries(impatient)

75

A

80.9

81

81

78

86

76

86

76

83

15

1/E

Lazy

80

A

84.9

85

85

82

90

80

90

80

87

13

2/E

Emotional

65

B

74.9

75

75

72

80

70

80

70

77

9

3/E

Assumptions(preconceptions)

55

C

69.9

70

70

67

75

65

75

65

72

4

G/E

Does not notice

75

B

79.9

80

80

77

85

75

85

75

82

13

Engineer/OtherTransgression(violation)

30

F

59.9

60

60

57

65

55

65

55

62

2

FitterHurries(impatient)

50

B

74.9

75

75

72

80

70

80

70

77

20

Oiler/A

Only able tosee one thing

45

C

64.9

65

65

62

70

60

70

60

67

15

Oiler/B

Transgression(violation)

55

C

69.9

70

70

67

75

65

75

65

72

10

Oiler/C

Moments ofinattention

60

C

64.9

65

65

62

70

60

70

60

67

10

Oiler/D

Careless

45

F

54.9

55

55

52

60

50

60

50

57

5

Wiper

Forgets

35

F

39.9

40

40

37

45

35

45

35

42

4

Oiler/Other

Panics

30

F

34.9

35

35

32

40

30

40

30

37

2

Total
evaluation
score ofEngine
Dept.

—

54

F

65.7 65.8 65.8 62.8 70.8 60.8 70.8

60.8

67.8

—

Table: Reference 1 Example of ability diagnosis

107

Reference Material 02:
Under what circumstances does an error occur?: Main Text P. 16
The following tables are from a seminar on human factors of the Japan AeronauticalEngineers’ Association, and is used by the shipowner/ship management company or
the ship to analyze fault weaknesses. If it is known how such errors occur, it will help
develop eﬃcient responses to human factors that may have caused the fault.

(1) Error when registering information
Error when registering information
・Vision/hearing is limited.
Information is not registered.

・Field of view is limited.
・Visible range is limited.

Information is registered, but

・A lack of interest.

not processed.
Information registered, but
was illuded.

・The information is of interest but misinterpreted. (Hasty
judgments, misunderstanding, assumptions)

Table: Reference 2 Error when registering information(2) Error in the memory process (lapse)
To prevent errors in the memory process (Lapse), there must be opportunity for crew
members review everything repeatedly. For example, in the engine department, “In themeeting before work starts, the person in charge explains the specific notes of importantwork from the viewpoints of 4 M.” Moreover, “Engine crewmembers check the
emergency response procedures, including the low probability of accidents, one theme
each day.”Error in the memory process (Lapse)
・Memory is limitated. Most of the information kept in short-term memory
Limitation of
Short-term
memorywill be stored for approximately 20 seconds. The memory can be improved
using visuals and rehearsal.
・Normal person, 7 items (5-9) Example: Colours of the rainbow, musicalscales (c d e f g a b), main characters of a drama (The Magnificent Seven)・It is easy to remember telephone numbers, because they are grouped.

108

Please imagine the folowing situations.
・When you know something, but cannot recollect it when you need to.
・When you lose your memory.
Limitation of・When your memory gets distorted.

Long-term

・Semantic memory: letters, symbols, numbers, etc.

memory・Episodic memory: personal memories such as joining a company or
wedding.
・Procedural memory: procedural (how to ride a bicycle, how to use
chopsticks, etc.)
Table: Reference 3 Error in the memory process (Lapse)(3) Error in the judgment process (mistake)
Error in the judgment process (mistake)
Making misjudgements such as:・Insufficient consideration

・Prospect・Short cut reaction

・Mechanical reaction

・Hopeful observation

・Speculation

・Reckless/indiscreet
Table: Reference 4 Error in the judgment process (mistake)(4) Temptation to deviate (violation)
Temptation to deviate (violation)
May deviate from the rules because of:・Time pressure
・Too much work・Respect for speed (even if the outcome of work is not perfect, it is fast anyway)
・Rules that are unclear or unfit for the situation.
・Situations where it is permissible not to follow the rules
・Inappropriate deployment of appropriate facilities and materials (resources)
・Supervisor is too tolerant or lacks ability to manage
・A climate that overvalues boldness
・A climate that places less emphasis on safety (aloft work/high places of work (2m or more) but
no safety belt is worn)Countermeasure: We must not make excuses.
Table: Reference 5 Temptation to deviate (Violation)109

(5) Error in the output process (slip)
Error in the output process (slip)
Errors in output (behaviour) ⇒ Subconsciously unwillingly.
In spite of the correct judgment result, if the action (output) is different from the decision result at
the action stage, an error may be caused by any of the following.
・Limitation of movement capability (force, dimensions).
・Limitation of operating time.
・Confused by surrounding events.
・Subconsciousness.
Example: He meant to address the audience with "an opening address" butinstead used "a closing address".
Table: Reference 6 Error in the output process (Slip)110

Reference Material 03
Problem Solving Method: Main text P. 21, P. 41
Even if younger crewmembers have little experience, they can analyze accidents in a
logical way, and can plan countermeasures by utilizing solution methodology.
MUST POINT

Build up a stock of solutions.
Finally, establish a successful formula.
We have provided the following with reference to “Jyohowo shunjini seirishi Aidhiawo
Umidasu! Noto・Memo Furukatsuyo Jyutsu.” (provisional translation) by Nagaoka
Shoten.

1. Logic tree: We would like to analyze problems and plan solutions!
1. Introduction“How to analyze problems & come up with a solution!” (Provisional translation.)
A logic tree is a useful thinking tool for logically analyzing work problems andformulating solutions.
First, break down a problem or solution into elements to be considered and then analyze
them further into a lower hierarchy.
As a result, the logical reason is shown in the form of a tree diagram (tree)
2. Advantage① It is possible to grasp the whole picture of the task.
② It is possible to avoid oversight/omission of problems, and it is possible to findsolutions easily.
③ It is possible to correct gaps in the discussion easily, because it is clear whichhierarchy the discussion belongs to.

111

3. How to draw a logic tree (Refer to Figure Reference 7)① At the starting point, write down the problem you want to solve and start thinking
about how you may solve it, e.g. reducing work stress.
② Break down the starting point task into 2 to 4 components (up to 5). (The first layer
in Figure: Reference 7)
At this time, it is important to be aware that there should be "no overlap, mutually
exclusive and collectively exhaustive" information (called "MECE"). Also,
depending on the task, the method of disassembling will be "Result ⇒ Cause" (Why),"Purpose-Means" (How), "Whole-Part" (What), etc.
③ Disassemble the disassembled components into 2 to 4 elements.We will extend it tolower layers to make it more specific. (The second layer in Figure: Reference 7)④ Similarly, disassemble the components disassembled in the first layer to appear in thesecond layer. Do this until you reach the fifth layer.
⑤ Objectively compare and examine ways to solve problems by referring to thecompleted logic tree.

112

113

Reducework stress

1st layer(Problems)

4th layer(Problems)Establish a proposal and patent
system for innovation collaboration
with manufacturers

Upgrade to lightweight material

Develop and install special jigs
that can facilitate device
disassembly and transportationmeans to the workshop

Arrange machinery layout easework

Establish a proposal and patent
system for innovation withshipyards, increase movablescaffold or fixed scaffolds onsite

Introduce machinery layout of
ergonomic design considering how
to ease repair/maintenance workon machines

Establish re-training programs suchas manufacturer's training for all
employees (manage training
history)

Experienced crewmembers toacquire common skills above acertain level to train and guideyoung crewmembers

Reduce and miniaturize numberof tool parts

Establish onboard education
program for younger crewmembers

Make supply of new spare parts to thesite after repair/maintenance work
mandatory

Unify specifications to simple structure
design and general-purpose models of
all machinery, equipment, and devices
onboard

5th layer(Countermeasures)

Conduct training repeatedly
on-site to aid young
crewmembers in working moresmoothly and accurately

Stop reusing used parts andmeasuring devices during
maintenance and replace all

Simplify and unify work
procedure at each job site

ConcretenessConduct work inworkshop

Reduce weight oftoolsStandardize
implementation of
conventional work
recommended bymanufacturer

Streamline work
procedures

3rd layer(Problems)Figure: Reference 7 How to consider reducing work stress

Improve work
surroundings

No duplicationand no omission

Shorten time

2nd layer(Problems)2. Fishbone: Illustrate issues and their causes in the form of a fishskeleton!
1. Overview

・Fishbone is an idea generation method that looks at “Cause and eﬀect”.
・Originally it was a classic tool for analyzing factors that aﬀect quality
characteristics in the quality control of products.
・Business analysis often uses this method. This is similar to a logic tree.
・It is not exhaustive. This method’s characteristics are such that we can understandthe causal relationship between issues and factors more intuitively.
2. Advantages① It is easy to visualize causal relationships and find solutions.
② It is possible to grasp issues and factors intuitively.
③ It is easy to summarize important points and organize discussions. We can also
apply ideas to develop a special tool for maintenance.

3. How to draw a Fishbone diagram (Refer to Figure Reference 8)① We draw an arrow shape with a triangle and a horizontal bar and write ourtheme (issue or situation) in the triangle. This corresponds to the ﬁsh head andbones.
② We focus on 3 to 8 important factors when thinking about the theme. We draw
large bones coming out of both sides of the spine in a well-balanced manner andwrite each factor at the end of each large bone.
③ We further break down the factors written at the end of the large bones andconsider 3 to 6 elements. We draw medium-sized bones on either side of the largebones and write down considered elements.
④ We then break down these elements further and consider causes and solutions.
Similarly, stretch small bones from the medium-sized bones and write down
considered elements.

114

⑤ After you have completed your Fishbone diagram, you can develop ideas andfurther ideas based on this. It is similar to a logic tree, but it is not a birdʼs-eye
view, yet it allows you to intuitively understand causal relationships.

2
Workload（Stress)

Manufacturer's support

Exclusive special tool
made onboard

3
Working surroundings
NarrowCheaper andheavy material

4

Hot
Structures of machinery
Special-shaped parts
Impossible to use general tools

No exclusive special
tool for maintenanceon certain machinery,so work takes a lot oftime to complete.

Foundational strengthof science(physics, chemistry)and engineering
Quality control
Developing Know-how

Specifications forship construction

Figure: Reference 8

Proposal and patent
system for innovation

How to develop a special tool for maintenance115Reference Material 04:
Details of Power Loss Accident in Norway: Main Text P. 35
Chapter 3 introduces an accident in which an electric propulsion ship lost its powercompletely while cruising in stormy weather and where it was forced to urgently drop
anchor.
The details of the accident are as shown in Table: Reference 9 below.
Accident details（1）

At 13:50 on March 23, 2019, an electric propulsion passenger vessel was sailingsouthwest from Tromsø in Norway to Stavanger with three generators operating.

（2）

The weather at that time is as follows. Strong gale to storm winds: from thesouthwest (Beaufort 9-10 or 22-25 m/s).
Very high waves: Total Significant Wave Height from the west over deep waterof 9-10 meters (with a mean wave period of 12-13 seconds).

（3）

The total number of people was 1373 people. (915 passengers on board and458 crew members.)

（4）

116

The following abnormalities in the generator had occurred by the time theaccident occurred on the afternoon of March 23.
(a) On March 16, the turbocharger on No. 3 generator (hereinafter referred toas DG3. In the same manner No. 1, No. 2, and No. 4 generator are referred
to as DG1, DG2, and DG4 respectively) failed rendering the turbocharger
inoperable. On the day of the blackout, a maker's technician was on board
to dismantle the damaged turbocharger to prepare for a replacement tobe fitted at the next port.
(b) The ship was equipped with 4 generators, but since DG3 was inoperable,
generators DG1, DG2, and DG4 continued to operate. 3 generator engines
could manage to supply electric power for the propulsion machinery andship services without the use of a standby generator engine.
(c) Between 05:00 and 09:04, on March 23, before the accident occurred, theoperational DGs registered alarms of "Lubricating oil low level and low
volume" 18 times.
The Engineers on watch accepted them, but each alarm was cleared
within a few seconds.
After that, the alarms did not occur until 13:37.

Accident details(d) 13:37 When DG4 registered an alarm indicating that the DG was
shedding load due to low lubricating oil pressure. A few seconds later, it
registered a low lubricating oil pressure alarm.
(e) 13:39 DG1 registered a low lubricating oil sump level alarm.
(f) 13:45 DG4 shut down, and then eight seconds later, DG2 shut down.
(g) 13:56 DG2 was restarted.
13:58 DG1 and DG2 shut down.
It caused a complete blackout and loss of propulsion, and then the ship
began drifting toward the bank (shoal).
(h) Within 30 seconds of the blackout: The emergency diesel generator
started and powered the emergency switchboard.
（5）

14:00 Master broadcasted a "mayday".

（6）

14:06 ～ 14:20 Master instructed the crew to drop both anchors. However, theanchors did not hold, and the ship continued to drift astern towards the shore
at a speed of 6–7 knots.

（7）

14:22 The engineers transferred a total of 10.8 m3 of lubricating oil to the
lubricating oil sump tanks of DG1, DG2, and DG4. DG2 started. DG2 restored
power to the main switchboard, in manual load-sharing mode.

（8）

14:29 ～ 14:34 hours: Both propulsion motors started, providing sufficient
propulsive power to maintain slow speed ahead.

（9）

15:05 The first helicopter hoisting operation took place. The evacuation ofpassengers continued until the next morning.

（10）

15:24 ～ 15:46 DG1 and DG4 were restarted in automatic load-sharing mode,and the starboard propulsion motor was restarted to enable the propulsion
motors' output to maintain a speed between slow ahead and half ahead.
Although DG1, DG2, and DG4 had been restarted, the engineers had tocontinuously balance the electrical load manually. The Navigation Officers
manoeuvred towards open waters, still with both anchors lowered.

（11）

16:40 The first tugboat arrived. However, the weather conditions were too
severe to secure a towline.

117

Accident details（12）

Until the morning of March 24, the helicopter rescue of passengers continued.

（13）

06:30 On 24 March: Weather conditions had improved sufficiently to enabletugs to be made fast, and towlines were secured fore and aft, although thevessel maintained its propulsion.

（14）

09:15 The master decided that the vessel was out of danger and that it wassafe to stop the passengers' evacuation. The local Police reported that 479
passengers had been evacuated safely and received at the emergency centre
ashore.

（15）

Around 16:25 The ship was moored alongside in Molde.
Table: Reference 9 Details of power loss accidents on electric propulsion ships

118

Reference Material 05:
The investigation reports of the Japan Transport Safety Board:cases of loss of power: Main Text P. 39
Probable causes and countermeasures for the eight accidents in “3-2-3 Transport Safety
Board investigation reports for Japan: Cases of loss of power” are summarized in Table:
Reference 10 and Table: Reference 11.
List of probable causes of loss of power in Japan
Accident
Vessel type,
LocationNo.
Accident type

Probable causes

If emergency
anchored

CoastalNorthern
Japan

Cargo ship
(Blackout)

In stormy weather following a wind, snow andwave warning, during coastal navigation, the ship
became unable to run the main engine due to lossof power (blackout). The coast guard patrol boat
tried in vain to tow the ship but was forced to giveup due to the stormy weather. After anchoring andrepairing by the crew, the ship restored power, andshe resumed sailing after anchoring. There was noannouncement as to the cause.

Droppedemergency
anchoring

Car carrier(Blackout)

While departing port, the "crimp type terminal
connecting the electric wires of electric motor forthe stern thruster " broke due to hull vibration,
resulting in a single-phase operation. An overcurrent
flowed, the overload protection device of the stern
thruster was activated, and the generator was
unable to accept the load fluctuation which resulted
in over-speed. Since the over-speed protection
device activated, the ship lost electric power andcould not run the main engine.

―

Cargo ship
(Loss ofcontrol power)

While the ship supplied power onboard using ashaft generator during coastal navigation, thefuse holder of the DC24V power on charge anddischarge board caused contact failure, and theship lost control power. Finally, the ship could not
run the main engine.

―

1

Insideharbour
2
CentralJapan

3

CoastalCentralJapan

119Accident
Vessel type,
LocationNo.
Accident type

Probable causes

If emergency
anchored

CoastalCentralJapan

Cargo ship
(Loss ofcontrol power)

During coastal navigation, the cooling fan of the"converter that converts AC current to DC current"
broke down, which caused the converter tooverheat, and the ship became unable to supply
DC 24V as control power. Finally, the ship could notcontrol both the main engine and the changeable
pitch propeller. After emergency towing, the ship
dropped emergency anchoring.

Afteremergency
towing,droppedemergency
anchoring.

Cargo ship
(Blackout)

The ship operated two generators in parallel while
manoeuvring for entering port operation. However,
emergency stop was activated due to a lubricating
oil leakage of the governor.
The ship equipped with four generators driven
by a diesel engine, two of which were operated
in parallel normally while passing the narrow
channel, and the ship used the other two as
standby generators. However, when the accident
occurred, the crew cleaned the engine's lubricating
oil strainers, and set the automatic start switch tomanual so as not to start the standby generator.
Therefore, the backup standby generator could not
automatically backup.

―

Passenger
ferry(Blackout)

While departing port, a phase-to-phase shortcircuit occurred in the wiring of A and B circuits inthe junction box, resulting in a short-circuit current
flow between circuits A and B. Then, the safety
protection device of the main switchboard A-MCCB(Moulded Case Circuit Breaker) was activated. The
function worked and turned off (disconnected). At
that time, the two branch lines connected to the
A-MCCB were damaged and bounced off, resulting
in an interphase short circuit caused by contact
with the C-MCCB branch line. The ground fault
generated by contact with the wall surface of themain switchboard caused an excessive current toflow to the main switchboard's busbar. As a result,the ACB (Air Circuit Breaker) safety protection
function was activated and opened. The ship
stopped the main engine due to loss of power, andthe generator was still running, and crewmembers
tried to reconnect the ACB, but it was impossible.

Droppedemergency
anchoring

4

In thebay
5
CentralJapan

Insideharbour
6
Western
Japan

120

Accident
Vessel type,
LocationNo.
Accident type

Insideharbour
7
CentralJapan

Probable causes

If emergency
anchored

Cargo ship
(Blackout)

While entering the port at the harbour, the safety
protection device functioned incorrectly due to a
defective sensor board of the boiler. This resulted
in the main boiler misfiring. Therefore, in orderto reduce steam consumption, crewmembers
transferred electric load from one of the two
turbine generators (2,500 kW ) to the diesel
generator. However, after crewmembers opened
the ACB of one turbine generator, the operation
condition of the manually started diesel generator(1,500kW) became unstable. As a result, the ACBs ofboth generators tripped, and the ship lost power.

After theemergency
towing,droppedemergency
anchoring.

Cargo ship

The Chief Engineer stopped using the heavy fueloil shortly after leaving the port in the bay. In orderto improve the combustion condition of the main
engine, the switching valve was opened halfway
in an attempt to mix marine gas oil with heavy
fuel oil. He had "confirmation bias" regarding thecheck valve, and he assumed that heavy fuel oil
would never flow to the marine gas oil side. Since
the heavy fuel oil service tank's oil level was higher
than that of the marine gas oil service tank, theswitching valve opened at the same time, so theheavy fuel oil flowed back into the marine gas oil
service tank. In the generator engine, heavy fueloil flowed to the marine gas oil service tank. As
a result, the running generator received Fuel oilwith increased viscosity, and the atomization of
the fuel injection valve became defective and thegenerator engines stopped, resulting in the ship
losing power. As a result, the main engine also
stopped suddenly (emergency procedure). Afterthe accident, crewmembers discovered that thevalve was not a switching valve.

Droppedemergency
anchoring

In thebay
8Southern
Japan

Table: Reference 10 List of probable causes of loss of power in Japan

121

List of countermeasures of loss of power in Japan
Accident No.

Countermeasures: Safety Action:1(1) The ship must review measures for stormy weather. The ship is toimplement additional remedial measures if necessary.

2(1) The ship must make an inspection plan for the crimp typeterminals that connect the electric wires of the thruster motor. This
is to be carried out regularly.

(1) The ship is to establish an inspection plan for the fuse holder of theDC 24V power supply charge/discharge board. To be carried out
regularly.
3(2) Since the managers/supervisors of the ship managementcompanies had discovered that the fuse holders had deteriorated
after the accident, fuse holders on all ships have been replaced.

4(1) The ship must develop an inspection plan for the cooling fan andregularly carry it out. This is to be replaced if necessary.
(2) The ship must install a failure alarm device for the cooling fan.

5122(1) When carrying out maintenance and inspection work on
generators, and so on, the ship must consider the navigation
area. When passing a narrow channel traffic route such as the
Uraga Channel and Kanmon Straits, the ship must maintain anengine plant system so that it can automatically start the standby
generator in case of an emergency. The crewmembers must refrainfrom cleaning the strainer.

Accident No.

Countermeasures: Safety Action:
As a safety measure for the entire company, the managementcompany held a Masters/Chief Engineers meeting to disseminate
information among the ship and other managed ships within thecompany.
The ship must do the following:(1) Secure the wiring to the junction box.
(2) Replace any damaged MCCB (Moulded Case Circuit
Breaker).
(3) Correct final drawings and important documents for
newly installed electric equipment for appropriate
inspection/repair/maintenance. Carry out an occasional
survey by a Recognized Organization after the repair.
(4) Measure and record insulation resistance of electric
equipment and devices for refrigerated vehicles with aninsulation resistance tester, every month: ① insulation
resistance between the electric circuit and the hull and ②interphase insulation resistance.

6(5) Regularly vacuum-clean the interior of electricalequipment and devices and remove soot and dust.
(6) ① Inform and remind crewmembers of the danger ofshort circuits related to electrical equipment and devices,and ② conduct re-training regarding safety such as
inspection, cleaning, and electric shock.
(7) Crewmembers must use and operate the public address
system onboard effectively based on the procedure"Information for passengers in an emergency" to provide
the correct information to passengers.
Other recommended measures(1) The ship must consult with manufacturing companies, and so on,
regarding the main switchboard and MCCB, and establish regular
maintenance plans for all equipment and devices, including
equipment and devices that were not part of the accident.
The company must continuously confirm and evaluate the recordof insulation resistance measurement of electric equipment anddevices for refrigeration vehicles with the managing ship andtheir crewmembers of their ship.

123

Countermeasures: Safety Action:

Accident No.

The management company must instruct on the following safetymeasures to both the ship and other ships.
(1) A major casualty may occur during manoeuvring standby,
berthing, and passing congested or high traffic routes if themain boiler misfires.
A ship must not operate the main boiler in combustion
mode if it is difficult to handle load fluctuations well.
(2) The ship must regularly hold tests to confirm the starting
and running of diesel generators, with it operating in normal
load. The generators are also to be regularly overhauled.
7

A ship must carry out the following maintenance: Renewing
air cooler, and repair/inspect/maintain/overhaul theturbocharger and cooling freshwater system, and so on.
(3) A ship must hold tests to confirm the starting and runningof the emergency diesel generator using a load applicablethe machinery in accordance with the manual.
A ship must carry out the following maintenance: Inspect
the switchboard, and replace ACB.
(4) A ship must increase the frequency of operation tests for theboiler safety protection device. A ship must carry out thefollowing maintenance: Renew damaged sensors.
(1) The ship must evaluate risk and check for any adverse
influences on the system using piping diagrams before
opening and closing the valves.

8(2) The ship must mix marine gas oil and heavy fuel oil using
a dedicated device and not mix them directly by operating
several switching valves simultaneously.
Table: Reference 11 List of countermeasures of loss of power in Japan

Please refer to the URL in a list of references at the end of this bulletin regarding detailsof the above tables.

124Reference Material 06:
Emergency response checklist immediately after loss of propulsion
and loss of power: Main Text P. 45
The following is a checklist for emergency response on board.

✓ CHECK LIST
□ Master must follow the company SMS procedures for loss of propulsion
and blackout, which is described in the “Emergency Procedures Manual”
as a contingency plan.
□ Crewmembers must record the position of the vessel and time accurately
in the deck logbook and in the engine logbook.
□ Master may have to drop anchors to reduce the ship’s speed. Whenmanoeuvring in confined waters, the anchors should be ‘cleared’ for
immediate use.
□ M a s t e r a n d C h i e f E n g i n e e r m u s t “ k e e p g o o d ” a n d e ff i c i e n tcommunication between the bridge and the engine room. The bridge andengine room should exchange critical information so that key personnel
can fully understand the situation and make informed decisions.
Each department on board must quickly inform other departments asfollows:

・What they require,・what is happening at their station,・what problems they are facing and experiencing,・and what risks are present? And so on.

If bridge and engine room crewmembers do not exchange critical information
during an emergency, we must know that there is a risk that key personnel will
not be fully aware of the situation and may make ineffective decisions.

125✓ CHECK LIST
□ Master and Chief Engineer must instruct some of the crewmembers to
go to the emergency generator room to try and start the generator when
it does not automatically start.
□ Master and Chief Engineer must instruct some of the crewmembers to
go to the steering room to attempt emergency steering.
However, the master and deck officers must predict and recognize that
this becomes less effective when the engine has stopped and when
the ship’s speed is reduced to below steerage along with the vessel’s
forward movement cutting through the water.
□ When engineers find that the machinery driven by steam turbine devices
has stopped after a blackout or boiler emergency trip, they must carryout turning the rotor shaft by any means possible to prevent the rotor
shaft from bending.
□ Engineers must operate the feedback system from ESB to the main
switchboard (MSB) if possible.
Some ships are equipped with an electric feedback system. On such a
ship, the electric power source from the emergency generator via the
ESB can feedback to the main switchboard, so that the ship recovers
power to the main switchboard (MSB) during a blackout. (Please refer to“3-3-3(2) 2) Precautions for recovery work”). Engineers must understandand be familiar with how to operate and control it practically.
□ When engineers find an overload of current on the electrical devices,
they must operate (push) the reset button to reset and recover theelectrical breaker function after it has tripped.
□ It will probably be necessary to bring the engine to a STOP to enable
the restart. The engine control room should take control until power has
been fully restored.

126

Reference Material 07:
How to prevent panic: Main text P. 55(1) Inability to move or think
Ms. Amanda Ripley investigated and wrote about some of the most harrowing
catastrophes in history in order to piece together exactly how humans react in a crisis
such as survivors from the September 11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina, in her book “TheUnthinkable: Who Survives When Disaster Strikes - and Why”, Random House Audio(Translated into Japanese by Machiko Oka, Kobunsha Co., Ltd.). According to thebook, in moments of total disaster, the first phase of human reaction is “denial”, the next
phase moves into “deliberation” that considers the actions to be taken, and as a result,humans take “action”. However, in many cases, after “awareness of the situation”, mostpeople tend to shut down their mind entirely in the disaster and seem to lose all strategic
awareness. On the other hand, those who have been selected for special missions havethe common features of being able to react more effectively under stress, which isprobably due to the environment and background in which they developed.
In other words, when humans are exposed to hazards, they experience what is known asnormalcy bias in which they consider themselves to be indiﬀerent or minimally aﬀectedby threat warnings, “It is okay” and “That can’t be true.” when faced with a situation.
However, in the event of an emergency, ship crewmembers are required to do thefollowing:① to train themselves to deal with stress effectively,② to react calmly, and③ to respond immediately to critical situations without panic,in the same way as those who are selected for special
missions.

127

(2) Preventive measures against panic
As mentioned above, when humans encounter an emergency, they fall into a state of“Inability to move or think”. To prevent this, it is essential to plan controllable measuresfor emergencies and implement such manageable measures during normal conditions as
well. (Please always be ready for what you have planned).

① Reduce the anxiety factor (discomfort) in an emergency② Foster a flexible mentality that can cope with anythingon siteAccording to the book “Behavioral Science of Natural Disasters, (preliminarytranslation)” in order to prevent panic, it is possible to divide panic into soft aspects andhard aspects for both during normal times and in emergencies:
Soft aspect measures(measures that include information and social psychological elements)：
・・・Information transmission, trouble recovery procedures,training for situation judgment, and so on.
Hard aspect measures（measures that mobilize both physical and human resources)：・・・The reviewing and improvement of machinery, securing of
personnel, emergency machinery operation, emergency repair,and so on.

The table “Panic prevention measures during disaster evacuation (preliminarytranslation)” from the book is divided into 2 classifications of which 4 categories canserve as countermeasures. Following the same structure, we have applied this to the caseof loss of power, as can be seen in Table: Reference 12 below.
For example, regarding soft aspect measures during ordinary times, “emergency
response training, including low probability accidents” should be carried out repeatedly.

128Regarding hard aspect measures, “modifying wiring to important machinery such as
cooling water pumps and air compressors from an emergency generator” and “changing
specifications of the speed control scheme of the induction motor using the pole change
method, so that these motors will be able to run using the power supply from anemergency generator” should be prepared.
It is recommended that the ship management company and the ship take account ofthese tips when considering a further framework for emergency response.
Preparation for panic prevention measures for loss of power

A. Ordinary

1. Soft measures

2. Hard measures(1) Clarify and establish information trans- （1）Reconfirm fuel supply pipeline of themitting organization / role allotment.
regular generator and the emergency(2) Produce manuals for:generator.
・normal recovery procedures,（2）Carry out regular inspections of thefollowing batteries:
・feedback method from the emergency
generator via emergency the・for starting the emergency generator.
switchboard to the main switchboard,・for the control system power source.
・t h e s w i t c h i n g m e t h o d r e c e i v i n g （3）Improve regular repair and maintenancepower from the main switchboard
methods for defective piping, structure,
to emergenc y switchboard for thewiring, machinery, and equipment.
Diesel generator air compressor in an （4）Re-inspect machinery/equipment thatemergency.
can be operated from the emergency
generator and switchboard.
・the special recovery procedures to plantup the engine system by the emergency （5）Modify the power supply wiring thatgenerator.
can start the regular generator start
air compressor from the emergency(3) Regularly conduct recovery training forswitchboard. Modify auxiliary machinery
loss of power, including low probability
required for plant-up to low powersituations (Normal start-up, air circuit
variable specifications.
breaker failure, emergency generator(Please consult this with thestart fail, regular use generator start fail,classification society, manufacturer, andemergency anchoring, etc.)
shipyard beforehand.)(4) Conduct simulations (to strengthen the（6）Test run emergency generator andmind) assuming that the worst-casebackup alternative power supply.
scenario occurs based on past accident（7）Secure and store parts for important
cases.
machinery.
（8）Secure space for temporary evacuation
space when engine room overheats.

129

B. In time of emergency

1. Soft measures

2. Hard measures(1) Report and share accurate information
related to trouble.

(1) Mobilize personnel from otherdepartments in time of emergency.

(2) Establish a common understanding andrecognition of the situation. Promptly instructregarding recovery work procedures.

(2) Operation of emergency generator andbackup alternative power supply.

(3) Status report on recovery prospects.
(4) Cooperate with other departments. Propose
a special system for emergency anchor andcargo management.

(3) Prevent engine room from overheating.
Repair defective machinery. Rescue andnurse injured persons.
(4) Secure a means of contact with the head
office.

(5) Provide any other information to reassure
everyone.

Table: Reference 12 Preparation for panic prevention measures for loss of power130References
Chapter

Page No.

Corresponding
sectionReferences

Chapter 2

P. 5

The standards of navigational watchkeeping

Web site of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism, Japan
Kokai tochoku kijyun (heisei 8 nen unyusho
kokuji dai 704 go) (saishu kaisei heisei 25 nen
3 gatsu 1hi kokudo kotsu sho kokuji dai 158go), (in Japanese),
URL http://www.mlit.go.jp/notice/noticedata/
pdf/201703/00006415.pdf

Chapter 2

P. 8

6 capabilities"Boueidai ryu saikyo no rida",
Yoshifuru Hamagata, Gentosha Inc.,(in Japanese)

A seminar on the humanfactors of aeronauticalengineers

Chapter 2
Reference
Material

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

P. 11/108

Reference Material 02
Under what circumstances does an error
occur?

"Koku seibi niokeru hyuman fakuta semina(1nichi kosu)" Japan Aeronautial Engineers'
Association, (in Japanese),
URL https://www.jaea.or.jp/

P. 22

Managing Maintenance
Error"Managing maintenance error : a practicalguide" James Reason, Alan Hobbs,
Ashgate Publishing Company (Kenichi Takanotranslated into Japanese, JUSE Press. Ltd.)

P. 34

3-2-1
Incident case of loss of
propulsion in the US:
Incorrect operation of
the main engine at thewheelhouse

Investigation report of U.S. National
Transportation Safety Board, NTSB/MAR-11/04,
PB2011-916404, "Tankship Eagle Otome"
URL https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/MAR1104.pdf

131ChapterPage No.

Chapter 3
Reference
Material

P. 35/116

Corresponding
section3-2-2
Incident case of loss of
power in Norway: Inadequate replenishingof system lubricating oil
to diesel generators onelectric propulsion vessel
Reference Material 04:
Details of Power Loss
Accident in Norway

References

Investigation report of Accident Investigation
Board Norway -Interim Report 12 November
2019 On the investigation into the loss of
propusion and near grounding of Viking Sky, 23
March 2019
URL https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2019/mair/me-2019005/
URL https://www.aibn.no/Marine/
Undersokelser/19-262"
The investigation reports of the Japan Transport
Safety Board; cases of loss of power, (inJapanese),
Accident1 URL http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/ship/
rep-inci/2019/keibi2019-63_2018hd0069.pdf

3-2-3
Transport Safety Board
investigation reports forJapan; cases of loss of
power

Chapter 3
Reference
Material

P. 38/119
Reference Material 05:
Transport Safety Board
investigation reports forJapan; cases of loss ofpower

Accident2 URL http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/ship/
rep-inci/2018/keibi2018-117_2018yh0029.pdf
Accident3 URL http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/ship/
rep-inci/2016/keibi2016-39_2015yh0132.pdf
Accident4 URL http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/ship/
rep-inci/2015/keibi2015-49_2014yh0152.pdf
Accident5 URL http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/ship/
rep-inci/2015/keibi2015-919_2015yh0029.pdf
Accident6 URL http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/
ship/rep-inci/2019/MI2019-32_2018tk0008.pdf
Accident7 URL http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/
ship/rep-inci/2013/MI2013-111_2013tk0012.pdf
Accident8 URL http://www.mlit.go.jp/jtsb/ship/
rep-inci/2012/keibi2012-1047_2012mj0062.pdf

Chapter3

132

P. 45

Photograph 3-11

DVD "Ship Handling in Restricted Waters Anchoring -", Japan Captains' Association

Chapter

Chapter 4

Page No.

P. 57

Corresponding
sectionPhotograph 4-1 (a), (b)References"07 August 2018 Contaminated Bunkers
damage hundreds of ships Do authorities
really care? Prelude to 1 January 2020 safety
problems? ", An INTERTANKO Critical Review(INTERTANKO) ,URL https://www.intertanko.com/topicsissues/issuearticle/contaminated-fuels-anintertanko-critical-review?topicID=115

Chaper 4

P. 58

Law Officesof Toda & Co.

"Importance of Preservation of Evidence in Bad
Bunker Issue", Lawyer Mr.Aoki, Marine Proctor
Mr. Yamatani, Law Offices of Toda & Co.
URL http://www.todalaw.co.jp/index.html

Chapter 4
Chapter 5

Chapter 5

P. 60/61
/99

P. 65

Photograph 4-2 (a), (b)Table 4-3
Photograph 5-33 (b)Figure 5-1

Text Book "BUNKERING" published by JSU,IMMAJ, MOL Engineering.
URL http://www.immaj.jp/

Web site of U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA)"Coming changes in marine fuel sulfur limits willaffect global oil markets DECEMBER 14, 2018(based on International Marine Organization,
European Union, and China’s Ministry ofTransport)"
URL https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
php?id=37793

Figure 5-2
Chapter 5

P. 66/67

5-1-1
Production of marine
fuel oils"2020nen no IMO kisoku tekigouyu nitsuite",
Manabu watanabe, JXTG Nippon Oil & Energy
Corporation, Japan Ship Machinery andEquipment Association, dai 27kai hakuyo
gijyutsu foram, September 19th 2019, (inJapanese)133ChapterPage No.

Corresponding
sectionReferences

5-1
IMO 2020 compliant fueloil concerns

Chapter 5

P. 66/69/97

5-2
Precautions andcountermeasures forsafe usage of 2020 IMO
compliant fuel oil

2019 ClassNK Technical Seminars,(in Japanese)(Tokyo June 6th , Kobe June 12th ,Imabari June
13th , Hiroshima June 14th ),URL https://www.classnk.or.jp/classnk-rd/
seminar/2019/0606.html

5-3
Countermeasures for thesafe use of cylinder oil

5-1
IMO 2020 compliant
fuel oil concerns

Chapter 5

P. 66/69/97

5-2
Precautions andcountermeasures forsafe usage of 2020 IMO
compliant fuel oil
5-3Countermeasures for thesafe use of cylinder oil

ClassNK “Guidance for onboard use ofCompliant Fuel Oil with SOx regulation from2020” (March 2019)
Guidance is available to download free ofcharge via ClassNK’s website www.classnk.com
for those who have registered for the ClassNK
My Page” service.
URL http://www.classnk.or.jp

5-1
IMO 2020 compliant fueloil concerns

Chapter 5

P. 66/69/101

5-2
Precautions and countermeasures for safe usageof 2020 IMO compliant
fuel oil
5-4-2
Diagnosis of cold flow
properties

134

ClassNK “Booklet for ship crew members:
Precautions concerning change-over to 0.50%
sulphur compliant fuel oils”,（September 2019),
URL https://www.classnk.or.jp/hp/pdf/activities/
statutory/soxpm/soxbooklet201909en.pdf

Chapter

Chapter 5

Page No.

P. 66/67

Corresponding
sectionReferences

5-1-1
Production of marine
fuel oils"Sekiyu seihin no dekirumade", Petroleum
Association of Japan, June 2010, (in Japanese),

Figure 5-3

Chapter 5

P. 66/67

5-1-1
Production of marine
fuel oils
Figure 5-3

Chapter 5

P. 66/67

5-1-1
Production of marine
fuel oils
Figure 5-3

Chapter 5

P. 66/67

5-1-1
Production of marine
fuel oils
Figure 5-3

URL https://www.paj.gr.jp/about/publications/"Hakuyo teiiou nenryoyu no seizo houho tokyokyu taisei", Toshiaki Hayashi, Journal of
the Japan Institute of Marine Engineering,
Vol.43No.2 (2008), (in Japanese),
URL https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/
jime2001/43/2/43_2_164/_pdf/-char/ja"Production Method and Quality of Low Sulfur
Fuels", Toshiaki Hayash, Journal of the Japan
Institute of Marine Engineering, Vol.50No.3(2015), (in Japanese),
URL https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/
jime/50/3/50_341/_pdf"Ippan kaiki 2020nen tekigoyu no seizo
houho to hinshitsu nitsuite" Toshiaki Hayashi,
National Institute of Maritime, Port andAviation Technology, Japan Marine Engineers’
Association, Technical lecture, November 15th
2019, (in Japanese),
URL http://www.marine-engineer.or.jp/keihin/

135Chapter

Chapter 5

Page No.

P. 66/67

Corresponding
section

5-1-1
Production of marine
fuel oils
Figure 5-3

Chapter 5

P. 66/70/82

5-1-1
Production of marine
fuel oils
Figure 5-5

References"Banker jyuyu no tyakkasei hyoka", Yuta Mitsui,
JXTG central technical research laboratory.
JXTGTechnical Review Vol.55No.3 (October2013), (in Japanese),
URL https://www.eneos.co.jp/company/rd/
technical_review/pdf/vol55_no03_07.pdf"Fuel oils", Nobuyuki Awai, Osamu Hanashima,
Saiji Yokosawa, Sankaido Publising Co.,Ltd.,
1994, (in Japanese)

Graph in Figure 5-15

Chapter 5

P. 68

Figure 5-4

Web site of U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA)"Crude oils have different quality characteristics
JULY 16, 2012 (international crude oil handbook
density and sulphur content of selected crudeoil)",
URL https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
php?id=7110#

Chapter 5

136

P. 74/83/87/91/94

Photograph 5-9
Photograph 5-17
Figure 5-18
Photograph 5-22
Photograph 5-25
Photograph 5-29

"Sulphur Cap 2020 Tackling a Paradigm Shift in
the Shipping Industry 6 sept 2018"
Kjeld Aabo (Director New Technologies, MAN
Energy Solutions),
Charlotte Rojgaard (Bureau Veritas),
Fuel 2020 Circle SMM in Hamburg Sep. 2018
CIMAC Circle at SMM,
URL https://www.cimac.com/cms/upload/
events/circles/circle_2018_SMM/CIMAC_
Circle_SMM_2018.pdf

Chapter

Chapter 5

Page No.

P. 75/86

Corresponding
sectionPhotograph 5-10
Photograph 5-20

References
Web site of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism, Japan
Guide for use of 2020 SOx regulation compliant
fuel oils ver.2, (Maritime Bureau of the Ministryof Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism),
Oct 2019, (in Japanese),
URL https://www.mlit.go.jp/common/0013074
84 .pdf

Chapter 5

P. 77

Table 5-11

“Summary of Damage” ClassNK Technical
Review (Kaishi), (No312, No316)

CIMAC Guideline "Cold flow properties ofmarine fuel oils" CIMAC WG7 Fuels. 2015,
Chapter 5

P. 86

Photograph 5-20

URL https://www.cimac.com/cms/upload/
workinggroups/WG7/CIMAC_WG7_2015_01_Guideline_Cold__Flow_Properties_
Marine_Fuel_Oils_final.pdf

Guidance for shipowners and operators on
MARPOL Annex VI Sulphur Regulation [Sulphur
2020: What’s your plan?] Lloyd’s Register
Chapter 5

P. 87

Photograph 5-23
URL https://info.lr.org/l/12702/2018-06-04/4yx
18k/12702/188510/mo_sulphur_2020_
guidance_document_201805.pdf
Table 5-24

Chapter 5

P. 90/92/102

5-2-5 ⑤
Ignition and combustion
quality
5-4-3
Assessment of ignition
quality

ISO 8217:2017 Petroleum products — Fuels(class F) — Specifications of marine fuels,International Organization for Standardization
URL https://www.iso.org/home.html (in English),Japanese Standards Association
URL https://www.jsa.or.jp/ (In Japanese)137Chapter

Chapter 5

Chapter 5

Page No.

P. 97

P. 97

Corresponding
section

5-3
Countermeasures for thesafe use of cylinder oil

5-3Countermeasures for thesafe use of cylinder oil

References"Performance of Marine Lubricants", Shigeki
Takeshima, Journal of the Japan Institute ofMarine Engineering, Vol.45 No.1（2010）,(inJapanese),
URL https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jime/
45/1/45_44/_pdf/-char/ja"Kinnen no hakuyo enjinyu wo torimaku
kankyo to taio gijyutsu" Yoko Morita, ENEOS
Technical Review, Vol.54No.1(February 2012),(inJapanese),
URL https://www.noe.jxtg-group.co.jp/
company/rd/technical_review/pdf/vol54_
no01_07.pdf
CIMAC Recommendation 31 "The Lubricationof Two-Stroke Crosshead Diesel Engines"
CIMAC WG8 Marine Lubricants 2017

Chapter 5

Chapter 5

Reference
Material

138

P. 97

5-3
Countermeasures for thesafe use of cylinder oil

P. 100Spot test kit
Photograph 5-34
Photograph 5-35

P. 111/114

Reference Material 03:
Problem Solving Method(1) Logic tree
(2) Fishbone

URL https://www.cimac.com/cms/upload/
Publication_Press/Recommendations/Final_
Draft_Recommendation_31_2017-06-23_
CIMAC_WG8-SG4_2-Stroke_Lubrication.
pdf

Nippon Yuka Kogyo Co., Ltd. Onboard test kit:
fuel oil spot test
URL https://www.nipponyuka.jp/products08.
html"Jyoho wo shunji ni seiri shite aidhia wo
umidasu! Noto ・ Memo furu katsuyo jyutsu"
Nagaokashoten Henshu-bu, (in Japanese)Chapter

Reference
Material

Reference
Material

Page No.

Corresponding
sectionP. 127

Reference Material 07:(1) Inability to move or
think

P. 128Reference Material 07:(2) Preventive measuresagainst panic

References"The Unthinkable: Who Survives When Disaster
Strikes – and Why" Amanda Ripley, Random
House Audio (Machiko Oka translated inJapanese, Kobunsha Co., Ltd.)"Anzen. kikikanri ni kansuru kosatsu (sono2)
Kinkyuji no ningen kodo tokusei""Tomihiko
Furuta, Kokusai chiikigaku kenkyu, No.6
March 2003 Faculty of Regional Development
Studies Toyo University (in Japanese),
URL https://toyo.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=
repository_uri&item_id=3884&file_id=22&
file_no=1

Reference
MaterialP. 128Reference Material 07:(2) Preventive measuresagainst panic"Natural Disaster and Panic" Shunji Mikami,
Fukumura Shuppan Inc., (in Japanese)

Acknowledgment:
The author sincerely thanks everyone for their precious contributions
and advice. Extended thanks also go out to colleagues and those who
kindly allowed us use of their reference materials.

139

Author
Chief Engineer, Marine Proctor, Keishi Kuwada
The Japan Ship Owners’ Mutual Protection & Indemnity Association

Websitewww.piclub.or.jp● Principal Office（Tokyo）
2-15-14, Nihonbashi-Ningyocho Chuo-ku, Tokyo 103-0013, Japan
Tel：03-3662-7229 Fax：03-3662-7107● Kobe Branch
6th Floor Shosen-Mitsui Bldg. 5, Kaigandori Chuo-ku, Kobe, Hyogo 650-0024, Japan
Tel：078-321-6886 Fax：078-332-6519● Fukuoka Branch
6th Floor Meiji-Dori Business Center 1-1, Shimokawabata-machi, Hakata-ku, Fukuoka 812-0027, Japan
Tel：092-272-1215 Fax：092-281-3317● Imabari Branch
2-2-1, Kitahorai-cho, Imabari, Ehime 794-0028, Japan
Tel：0898-33-1117 Fax：0898-33-1251● Singapore Branch
80 Robinson Road #14-01B SINGAPORE 068898
Tel：65-6224-6451 Fax：65-6224-1476● Japan P&I Club (UK) Services Ltd
5th Floor, 38 Lombard Street, London EC3V 9BS U.K.
Tel：44-20-7929-3633 Fax：44-20-7929-7557