難民研究フォーラム COI クエリーサービス https://refugeestudies.jp
回答:アフガニスタン 2021 年 11 月 29 日

アフガニスタン：2007 年当時のロガール州 Baraki Baraku 地区でのタリバンによる強制徴募に関する情報
アフガニスタンの「2007 年当時のロガール〔Logar〕州 Baraki Baraku 地区でのタリバンによる強制徴募」に関する調査依頼に対し、難民研究フォーラムが規定の時間的制約の中で調査したところ、関連しうる情報として以下の情報が見つかりました。
略称： ........................................................................................................................................... 1
1.

2007 年頃のロガール州の状況‐タリバン勢力の再台頭 ................................................. 1

2.

タリバンによる強制徴募 ................................................................................................... 6(1)

タリバンによる民族マイノリティ構成員の勧誘 .................................................... 7(2)

タリバンによる子どもの強制徴募 ............................................................................ 7(3)

ロガール州におけるタリバンによる強制徴募 ........................................................ 9

参照： ......................................................................................................................................... 12
略称：
ACCORD オーストリア出身国・庇護研究ドキュメンテーションセンター

1.

ANSO

アフガニスタン NGO 安全室〔Afghanistan NGO Safety Office〕

ARC

難民調査センター〔Refugee Research Centre〕

BAMF

ドイツ連邦移民難民庁〔Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge〕

HRW

ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ〔Human Rights Watch〕

ICG

インターナショナル・クライシス・グループ〔International Crisis Group〕

IRBC

カナダ移民難民局〔Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada〕

IRDC

アイルランド難民ドキュメンテーションセンター〔Refugee Documentation
Centre (Ireland)〕Landinfo

ノルウェー政府出身国情報センター

2007 年頃のロガール州の状況‐タリバン勢力の再台頭
ア ACCORD 「 Country Report Afghanistan. 11th European Country of Origin
Information Seminar (Vienna, 21-22 June 2007)」米国司法省ウェブ（2007 年 11
月）
ACCORD は、2007 年頃までのアフガニスタン南東部のロガール〔Logar〕州におけるタリバン勢力の再台頭について、次のように記載しています。
5.1. Afghans Perceived as Critical of Factions or Individuals Exercising Control over1

難民研究フォーラム COI クエリーサービス https://refugeestudies.jp
回答:アフガニスタン 2021 年 11 月 29 日

an Area:…
The so called “night-letters” are letters distributed by the Taliban or other AGEs
requesting Afghans, for example, not to work with the government or with internationalorganisations. Recently, a UNHCR driver was killed two days after a night-letter was
distributed in the area. While in the period from 2002 to 2005, these night-letters were notconsidered particularly important, the situation has now changed. This is connected to the
expanded Taliban presence. They now even have presence in parts of Logar province, 20 to
40km from Kabul City. This risk of not following orders from the Taliban is now muchgreater than previously, because they now have direct access to more villages – if not during
daytime then at night.

同じく、ACCORD の同文書は、BBC の 2007 年 6 月 12 日付け記事を引用して、次のように記載しています。
8. Security Developments…
Right to Education
Due to security situation, schools remain inaccessible in many parts of the country. Thereare continuous threats and attacks on female teachers, girl’s schools and on families who
send their girls to school. In a Tajik valley at a 30 minutes distance from Kabul, no girl isallowed to attend school.
Case 3: June 12th: teacher and a girl killed when gunmen opened fire on girl’s school in
Logar

イ ANSO「Bi-Weekly Data Report, Issue 01; April 15 - May 01 2008」ecoi（2008 年
5 月）
ANSO は、2008 年 4 月頃のロガール州の Baraki Barak を含む地域の治安状況について、次のように述べています。
ロガール州
Logar is becoming increasingly risky for NGO operations. AOG incidents in the firstquarter of this year are nearly double that of the same time last year (15 vs. 8). There has
been no slowdown in April, and incidents can be expected to continue to climb in May.
While the predominant threat this year has been small arms, rocket, and RPG attacks on
security forces/police, this month saw several incidents that indicate a move toward more
direct threats to the general and NGO communities. These include the burning of threeschools, the surrounding of two INGO staff in Baraki Barak by gunmen, and the possible
kidnapping of two NGO workers by criminals.

2

難民研究フォーラム COI クエリーサービス https://refugeestudies.jp
回答:アフガニスタン 2021 年 11 月 29 日

Most incident areas are in the high traffic areas of Muhammad Agha and Puli Alam, but
the southern districts of Kwawar, Charkh, and Baraki Barak (which combined have borders
with Paktya, Ghazni, and Wardak) are likely the most heavily AOG infiltrated anddangerous areas for NGO.

ウ ICG「アフガニスタンの中心地の反政府武装勢力」ecoi（2011 年 6 月 27 日）
ICG は、ロガール州の Baraki Barak を含む地域におけるタリバン勢力の支配状
況について、次のように述べています。
Hekmatyar’s rival, Rabbani, who was eager to wrest control of central and south-eastern
provinces from Hizb-e Islami, secretly supported the Taliban push into Ghazni, Wardak andLogar provinces. Hekmatyar’s attack in Ghazni in 1995 forced a tenuous alliance between
the province’s governor Taj Mohammad Qari Baba21, a top Harakat-e Inqelab-e Islamicommander, and the Taliban, which led to the Taliban’s takeover of Wardak and Logar. In
May 1996, the Taliban drove the Northern Alliance’s Ahmad Shah Massoud out of Kabul.
Key to this pivotal offensive was the Taliban capture of Charasyab and Baraki Barak
districts in Logar and Chak, Sayadabad and Sheikhabad districts in Wardak, areas thatremain largely under insurgent control today.
…
Having consolidated their hold on the south-eastern provinces of Zabul and Uruzgan by
2006, the Taliban and other insurgent groups began to expand their presence along thewestern edge of Kabul province. The Taliban also officially announced the start of an
offensive against the capital the same year. In 2006 and 2007, armed groups proliferated in
Baraki Barak, Charkh and Puli Alam districts in Logar and in Chak, Nirkh, Sayadabad andJalrez in Wardak.49 Penetration of these areas provided access to the Kabul-Kandahar
highway, which allowed the insurgency greater mobility, augmenting its ability to attack
ISAF supply convoys and to collect taxes on goods on the route.…
…
An independent analysis of security incidents indicates that Logar province accounted for
one fifth of attacks by insurgents in the central region in 2010.135 The Taliban and the
Haqqani network maintain a strong presence in the districts of Kharwar, Baraki Barak,
Charkh and most recently Azrah. Because a number of Taliban shadow government officials
have been killed or captured since the surge began in 2009, it is difficult to identify current
provincial leaders and ascertain the current state of the leadership.136 Nonetheless, several
Taliban fighters from Logar are well known for having distinguished themselves on thebattlefield. In a departure from the norm, some Taliban commanders in Logar also oversee
groups that operate in both Logar and Ghazni.137…
The insurgency’s dependence on taxes, to some extent, dictates the tempo and scope of3

難民研究フォーラム COI クエリーサービス https://refugeestudies.jp
回答:アフガニスタン 2021 年 11 月 29 日

its territorial advances, as does its need for access to strategic areas and lines ofcommunication. Although insurgents have been careful to avoid setting up major bases, theTaliban and other groups have consolidated their hold in the areas surrounding Kabul byattempting to control mountain districts close to the ring road, the country’s main highway.
In areas such as Badpakh, Garouch and Alishang in Laghman, Qarabagh, Khogiyani andAndar in Ghazni and Charkh, Baraki Barak and Kharwar in Logar where there is little to nogovernment presence, access to the roads and the income gained from controlling them isimportant to the insurgency’s survival and growth. As discussed below, however, theTaliban, the Haqqani network and Hizb-e Islami also benefit from corrupt Afghan
government officials who frequently collaborate with local insurgent commanders in
schemes aimed at aimed at profiting from the conflict.

エ ACCORD「クエリー回答［a-7821-1 (ACC-AFG-7821-1)］」ecoi（2011 年 11 月
30 日）
ACCORD は、2011 年頃までのアフガニスタン南東部のロガール州におけるタリ
バン勢力の状況について、Landinfo と ICG の文書を引用して、次のように記載しています。
〔Google 訳（原文ドイツ語）〕
In a report from the Norwegian country of origin information center Landinfo from
September 2011, the Afghanistan expert Antonio Giustozzi discusses the conflict situationin the central region. It is mentioned that in the province of Logar only the strong presenceof international troops prevented the insurgents from gaining complete control. Support for
the government is particularly weak in Logar (Landinfo, September 9, 2011, p. 17).
The International Crisis Group (ICG) noted in a report from June 2011 an intensificationof insurgent activities in the provinces of Logar, Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan, Wardak, Laghman
and Ghazni. The Taliban would control large areas between the provinces of Logar andLaghman. In these central and eastern provinces, followers were mainly recruited throughreligious leaders and institutions. This central region around Kabul has the highest numberof madrassas and numerous mosques in the country, making the region a fertile breeding
ground for the spread of radical Islam, according to the ICG. Furthermore, ICG writes that,
according to the result of an independent analysis of security-related incidents, one fifth of
all attacks by insurgent groups that took place in the central region in 2010, perpetrated in
the province of Logar. The Taliban and the Haqqani network maintained a strong presencein the districts of Kharwar, Baraki Barak, Charkh and Azrah:“Insurgent activity in Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan, Logar, Wardak, Laghman and Ghazni
provinces has greatly intensified as the nexus between insurgent groups, political elites
and criminal networks solidifies in and around the capital.” (ICG, 27. Juni 2011, S. 1)“The Taliban control large swathes of territory stretching from Logar to Laghman; asof May 2011, shadow governors appointed by the Taliban’s Quetta Shura operate in 35
4

難民研究フォーラム COI クエリーサービス https://refugeestudies.jp
回答:アフガニスタン 2021 年 11 月 29 日

out of 62 districts in the seven provinces examined for this report. These mini-shadow
states operate as parallel governments, administering taxes, settling disputes anddistributing power through the appointment of local military commanders.” (ICG, 27.
Juni 2011, S. 8)“Notwithstanding the mix of motivations, religious leaders and institutions remain the
focal point for recruitment. The central region around Kabul has one of the highest
numbers of madrasas in Afghanistan, making it fertile ground for the spread of militant
Islam. Deobandi scholars and mullahs have extended their influence in the traditionallyconservative provinces bordering the capital such as Logar, Parwan and Wardak, making
these areas pivotal in terms of recruitment and operational support for the Taliban andother insurgent groups. This well-tended network of mosques, mullahs and madrasas inand around Kabul also provides the insurgency with a vital source of intelligence.” (ICG,
27. Juni 2011, S. 11)“A wide network of official and unofficial mosques in the central heartland, manyheaded by militant mullahs and imams, is as vital to the insurgency as the madrasas.
While the number of mosques registered with the government stood at 2,634 in March
2011, Afghan officials estimate that unregistered mosques number in the tens of
thousands. About one fifth or 554 of the country’s registered mosques are located in thecentral-eastern provinces of Kabul, Parwan, Kapisa, Logar, Wardak, Ghazni andLaghman. The government’s Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs has in recent years
tried to exert tighter control over mosques and mullahs, including through weekly
distribution of recommended sermon topics to registered mosques and an examination
process that tests mullahs on their level of competence in religious practices. Morerecently, the NDS has made an attempt to monitor mosque activities and mullahs’sermons. Afghan officials, while concerned that the militant message is resonating more
and more with the population, acknowledge that the government lacks the capacity toprovide any meaningful oversight.” (ICG, 27. Juni 2011, S. 12)“An independent analysis of security incidents indicates that Logar province accounted
for one fifth of attacks by insurgents in the central region in 2010. The Taliban and the
Haqqani network maintain a strong presence in the districts of Kharwar, Baraki Barak,
Charkh and most recently Azrah. Because a number of Taliban shadow government
officials have been killed or captured since the surge began in 2009, it is difficult to
identify current provincial leaders and ascertain the current state of the leadership.” (ICG,
27. Juni 2011, S. 17)

オ EASO「COI レポート：アフガニスタン
る脅迫と標的暴力」（2012 年 12 月）

武装勢力の戦略‐アフガン人に対すEASO は、2007 年頃のロガール州におけるタリバン勢力の状況について、元タリバン政権時に閣僚をつとめたアフガン情勢専門家の研究を引用し、次のように

5

難民研究フォーラム COI クエリーサービス https://refugeestudies.jp
回答:アフガニスタン 2021 年 11 月 29 日

述べています。
1.1.4 Abduction…
Mohammad Osman Tariq Elias（脚注 51） mentioned in his study on the Taliban in
Logar and Wardak the kidnapping of people by the Taliban in order to receive ransom. He
refers to the Lahya of January 2007 in which it is stated that Taliban can ask for money forthe release of government, NGO and private company staff or truck drivers transporting
loads for foreign troops or the government. In some cases, the Taliban purchased kidnapped
victims from criminal elements when they expected political or financial gains. According
to Christophe Reuter and Borhan Younus, abductions in Ghazni started targeting suspected
Taliban opponents since 2007. Ghazni became one of the most dangerous kidnapping areasfor government workers and NGO staff. In April 2012, ANSO reported, for example, thatmost kidnappings along the Sar-e Pul to Shiberghan road in Sar-e Pul were targeted. The
targets were, for example, government employees.
…
（脚注 51）Tariq was a mujahideen fighter in the 1980s and worked as a development
worker afterwards. He worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Taliban’s
regime. After the fall of the regime, he assisted in the UN special mission in Afghanistan
in the south-east, was coordinator for the National Solidarity Programme in this region
and worked in the Asia Foundation Afghanistan. He has a master’s degree in governanceand development.

EASO の同じ文書は、2012 年頃までのロガール州におけるタリバン勢力の状況について、次のように述べています。
1.1.6 Taliban courts and death sentences…
An Afghan reporter trained by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) reported
in August 2012 that the Taliban’s control of the province of Logar was so complete that theirjustice system practically completely replaced the state courts: even government officials
turned to Taliban courts for dispute settlement（脚注 65）.
（脚注 65）Azizi, A. M., Taleban Justice dominant in Logar Province, Institute for War andPeace Reporting (IWPR), 2 August 2012 (http://iwpr.net/report-news/talebanjusticedominant-logar-province) (accessed 28 August 2012)

2.

タリバンによる強制徴募

6

難民研究フォーラム COI クエリーサービス https://refugeestudies.jp
回答:アフガニスタン 2021 年 11 月 29 日

(1) タリバンによる民族マイノリティ構成員の勧誘
ア EASO「COI レポート：アフガニスタン
月）

タリバンの戦略‐勧誘」（2012 年 7

EASO は、タリバンによるタジク人やウズベク人などの非パシュトゥン民族の勧誘について、次のように述べています。
3.5 Recruitment of different ethnicities
In the early years of the Insurgency the recruitment among non-Pashtun groups was
negligible (see Section 2.5). Some exceptions were reported, such as the Nuristani and the
Pashai in the east of Afghanistan. Starting in 2006, the Taliban’s attitude changed. They
infiltrated new areas in the west and the north and they accessed non-Pashtun regions.
Giustozzi and Ibrahimi indicate that there is growing evidence of the Taliban trying torecruit nonPashtun ethnicities. In 2009, the Taliban recruited among some non-Pashtun
groups in Takhar and Baghlan (e.g. Uzbeks and Tajiks). Uzbeks appear to be the largest
group of recruits in the Insurgency in the north apart from the Pashtun. Turkmen have also
been recruited in the north. Since the spring of 2010, ethnically mixed Taliban fronts havebeen seen. Non-Pashtuns are appointed as local commanders, in order to be able to connect
to non-Pashtun village elders. In early 2010, the Taliban leadership for the north decided
that the fronts and shadow government should be ethnically mixed.
…
During the Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission in Afghanistan, 25
February to 4 March 2012, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission(AIHRC) stated that in non-Pashtun areas, the Taliban would often ask the community tojoin them or in poor areas individuals would be offered money to fulfil tasks for them. A
contact in Afghanistan pointed out that where other ethnicities than the Pashtun wererecruited, financial incentives are often key. When insurgents try to reach out to otherethnicities than the Pashtun, religious motives as well are important as a mobilising factor.

(2) タリバンによる子どもの強制徴募
ア IRDC「調査回答」ecoi（2011 年 9 月 12 日）
IRDC の調査回答は、タリバンによる子どもの強制徴募について、米国国務省人
権報告 2010 年版等を引用し、次のように述べています。
The US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices published in
April 2011 notes under the heading Child Soldiers:…
The previous years report states:“Anecdotal evidence suggests that insurgent recruitment of underage soldiers was on
the rise. There were numerous credible reports that the Taliban and other insurgent forces7難民研究フォーラム COI クエリーサービス https://refugeestudies.jp
回答:アフガニスタン 2021 年 11 月 29 日

recruited children younger than 18, in some cases as suicide bombers and in other cases
to assist with their work. For example, in Uruzgan the Taliban reportedly used children
to dig hiding places for IEDs. There were many reports of insurgents using minor teenage
boys as combatants in Paktya province. In July in Helmand province, authorities
apprehended a child before he allegedly would have been equipped to become a suicide
bomber. NDS officials held several children in the juvenile detention facility in Helmand
on insurgency-related charges. Although most of the children were 15 or 16 years old,reports from Ghazni province indicated that insurgents recruited children as young as 12,
particularly if they already owned motorbikes and weapons. NGOs and UN agencies
reported that the Taliban tricked, promised money to children, or forced them to becomesuicide bombers.” (US Department of State (11 March 2010) Afghanistan: Country
Report on Human Rights Practices 2009 )A report from Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict states on page 32 under theheading ‘Recruitment by the Taliban and Other Armed Opposition Groups’:“The Taliban, Haqqani network, Hezbi-i-Islami, Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia andother armed groups have recruited children to be used as fighters, camp guards or suicide
bombers, particularly along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In some cases, children had
been trained in foreign countries to undertake suicide missions. In other cases, children
have been involuntarily involved in the insurgency as explosives were hidden in theirbags or clothing unbeknownst to them.177 For example, on April 12, 2009, a young boy
was killed when a bomb planted in his wheelbarrow exploded 50 feet from a governmentbuilding in Aybak city, in Samangan. The boy was not aware that he was carrying the
explosive device, according to UNAMA.
There are no precise figures on child soldiers in Afghanistan but several reports attest
to the severity of the concern. In particular, widespread displacement and the consequent
absence of protective community structures have increased the vulnerability of children
to recruitment. The March 2009 Secretary-General’s report on Children and Armed
Conflict noted that forced recruitment of children by armed groups is “prevalent in areas
with high concentrations of returnees or internally displaced persons, particularly in thesouth and southeastern provinces.” The surge in international armed forces is feared totrigger a new rise in the recruitment and use of child soldiers by armed opposition groups
as part of new large-scale recruitment drives.” (Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict(14 June 2010) Afghanistan: "Setting the Right Priorities: Protecting Children Affectedby Armed Conflict in Afghanistan")

イ HRW「今がタリバンの児童兵使用を止めるチャンスだ」（2021 年 9 月 20 日）
For more than two decades, the Taliban have put children on the front lines of
Afghanistan’s armed conflicts. They have used children as fighters, to plant and detonate
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and as suicide bombers. Thousands of children may

8難民研究フォーラム COI クエリーサービス https://refugeestudies.jp
回答:アフガニスタン 2021 年 11 月 29 日

remain in their ranks today.
…
The Taliban have denied that they use children in “jihadic operations” and their code of
conduct states that “boys without beards” are not allowed in military centers. Nevertheless,the U.N. has verified hundreds of individual cases in which the Taliban have recruited andused children in recent years, including a sharp spike in 2020, and warned that the true
figures are likely much higher.
…

(3) ロガール州におけるタリバンによる強制徴募
ア ACCORD「クエリー回答［a-7821-1 (ACC-AFG-7821-1)］」ecoi（2011 年 11 月
30 日）
ACCORD は、ロガール州の Baraki Barak を含む地域での強制徴募について、国連特別者の報告書や報道等を引用し、次のように述べています。
In a report on a mission to Afghanistan in February 2010, the UN Secretary-General'sSpecial Representative for Children and Armed Conflict stated that there had been reportsof recruitment from all parts of Afghanistan, including the eastern regions, where Logar
Province is also located given by children. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) andcommunities living in isolation are particularly at risk of recruitment by non-state armed
groups such as the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Hezb-i-Islami and the Jamat Sunat alDawa Salafia. Cases are documented in which the Taliban also used children as suicide
bombers. The children concerned were between 13 and 16 years old and they werereportedly misled, offered money or coercion, among other things,“Reports of recruitment and use of children have been received from all regions, andparticularly from the south, south-east and eastern regions, but the security environment
and the lack of human resources dedicated to monitoring and verifying cases has limited
reporting on these trends of abuse. Internally Displaced People (IDP) and isolated
populations in conflict-affected areas in particular are at risk of child recruitment into
non-state armed groups, including the Taliban, Haqqani network, Hezb-i-Islami and
Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia. […]Documented cases show that children are also used as suicide bombers by the Taliban.
Children involved range from 13-16 years of age and, according to testimonies of failed
bombers, have been tricked, promised money or otherwise forced to become suicide
bombers. However, some children who have attempted suicide attacks have been heavily
indoctrinated, many times in foreign countries, and efforts must be undertaken to combat
this practice. That said, some reports suggest that, in the latest incidents of children usedin bombings, they may not have been aware of what they were carrying, and explosives
were set off remotely without their knowledge.” (Office of the Special Representative of9

難民研究フォーラム COI クエリーサービス https://refugeestudies.jp
回答:アフガニスタン 2021 年 11 月 29 日

the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, Februar 2010, S. 5)
Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports that in early May 2011, five children, all under theage of 13, from Logar and Ghazni provinces and allegedly trained to be suicide bombers,
were arrested by the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) :„Recent incidents of suicide bombing involving children include: […]In early May, five children, all under age 13, from Logar and Ghazni provinces who
had allegedly been trained as suicide bombers were arrested by the National Directorateof Security.“ (HRW, 31. August 2011)
In a May 2011 report, Reuters reported on four boys, all of whom were under 13 years ofage, who said they had been forced by insurgents to become suicide bombers in Pakistan,where they lived. They would then have received instructions to carry out an attack in Logar
province:“Afghan authorities paraded four young Afghan boys on Saturday who they said had
been recruited as suicide bombers from homes in neighboring Pakistan and detained asthey came back across the border on a mission to attack foreign troops. The four boys, allunder 13, giggled and smiled shyly at one another as they were led on to a stage before
television cameras to tell how they were coerced by insurgent leaders into becoming
unwitting suicide attackers. ‘We were told to go and carry out a suicide attack in Logar
province. I was told to press the detonating button and they said the (infidels) will bekilled and you will live,’ said 13-year-old Fazil Rahman, who was dressed in bright green
Afghan shalwar kameez clothing.” (Reuters, 7. Mai 2011)
In November 2011, National Afghanistan TV reported the arrest of a 15-year-old youth
in Paktia province who had been prepared by the Taliban to commit a suicide attack. He isa resident of the Baraki Barak district of Logar province:“A 15-year-old child who was prepared by the Taleban to carry out a suicide attack has
been arrested by Ministry of Interior intelligence officials. Our colleague reports:[Correspondent] Sayed Zubair, son of Sayed Imam, a resident of Baraki Barak District ofLogar Province, recently travelled to Paktia Province under direct instructions from Qari
Ihsanollah, a local Taleban commander. He intended to go to a Taleban training facility
in Miramshah of Pakistan when he was arrested by detectives in Paktia Province.”(National Afghanistan TV, 14. November 2011)…

イ EASO「COI レポート：アフガニスタン
月）

タリバンの戦略‐勧誘」（2012 年 7

ACCORD は、ロガール州でのタリバンによる勧誘について、報告書や記事等を引用し、金銭的なインセンティブによるものと述べつつ、ただしこれはタリバンの支配下にある地域では該当しないとして、次のように述べています。

10

難民研究フォーラム COI クエリーサービス https://refugeestudies.jp
回答:アフガニスタン 2021 年 11 月 29 日

3.2.1 Economic incentives…
A 22-year-old man from the district of Pushtrod in Farah testified about his work. He was
the sole breadwinner of his family and faced difficulties in finding work. Two friends
advised him to contact the local Taliban. He joined the insurgents and was involved indifferent operations. After an operation, he was paid, up to AFG400. He earned around AFG
1 000 each week. The rest of the week, he was a civilian and did not carry a weapon.
According to a Taliban commander in Logar, in 2011, their fighters were paid an average
income of USD 240 per month and an additional USD 170–240 for an attack on a school,
clinic or dam. Targeting ISAF troops was even better paid. A local Haqqani district
commander explained that his fighters were paid monthly salaries of USD 110–120. He, asa commander, received USD 170–220. Separately, a group received USD 4 000–5 000 foreach foreign soldier they killed.
…

Individual threats, the use of force and coercion by Taliban…
In April 2012, a local correspondent in Logar stated the following about Taliban
recruitment: “They did this by using religious persuasion rather than a political one. In
Logar, people are joining the Taliban ranks voluntarily. Coercion or other means are notused”.
…
A local source in Afghanistan stated in April 2012 that there has been greater use of
genuine persuasion and appeal to patriotic or religious duties to fight the ‘foreign invaders
and the puppet regime’ and much less coercion which is currently rarer than before.
According to the same source there are few recorded cases of actual violence against
individuals escaping recruitment and it would be against the Taliban’s stated aims of justiceand good governance and it would alienate communities.
According to Giustozzi and Ibrahimi, Taliban cadres suggested that the refugee camps
are the only locations where they have been able to forcibly recruit fighters. Families wereforced to contribute one man. Giustozzi states explicitly that forced recruitment has not beena salient characteristic of this conflict. The insurgents applied it very marginally. According
to Giustozzi, the use of direct coercion happened only in areas under their control to force
men to serve as porters. Since 2006, there have also been reports of forced recruitment by
the Taliban of medical staff in some areas for the treatment of wounded fighters.
During interviews conducted in the framework of a fact-finding mission in Kabul in
October 2011, Landinfo obtained information which corroborates the rare use of coercion
in recruitment. It was mentioned that the Taliban have enough volunteers, so they didn’t

11

難民研究フォーラム COI クエリーサービス https://refugeestudies.jp
回答:アフガニスタン 2021 年 11 月 29 日

have to rely on this strategy. Exceptions might exist in areas under full control of the Taliban.
During the Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission in Afghanistan, 25
February to 4 March 2012, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission(AIHRC) stated that “there is no reporting of forced recruitment by the Taliban and thatmost recruits joined voluntarily”. The organisation mentioned Hazara communities inUruzgan, subject to intimidation by the Taliban in order to make them join their ranks. This
source explicitly added that this was exceptional. The Danish fact-finding mission reportmentions UNHCR’s statements about recruitment by the Taliban: ‘UNHCR referred to aleaked ISAF report on the state of the Taliban in relation to the change of strategy of the
Taliban. According to this report, the Taliban do not have difficulties in recruiting people
for their force. They have many volunteers and there is a willingness to join the movement.
The Taliban may recruit collectively in the villages by offering education to poor people’ssons and by brain washing people. Considering the acceptance by the local population of
the Taliban, it could be assumed that forceful recruitment is not widely taking place,
however, UNHCR added that very little is known on this at the present time.’ The
Cooperation for Peace and Unity confirmed that there is no need for the Taliban to forcibly
recruit. According to this source, they would rely on forced recruitment only in emergency
situations. The source explained that the Taliban visited villages in the south to request anumber of fighters, but that there was, in general, no need for them to recruit people byforce, since there were sufficient volunteers. The Civil Society and Human Rights
Organisation (CSHRO) stated that ‘the Taliban doesn’t have the possibility to approach
people at home and force them to join their ranks’. An independent research institute in
Kabul explained during the Danish fact-finding mission that the Taliban, in general, does
not recruit by using force. According to this source, it could happen that the Taliban demands
a number of fighters from a certain village, but they wouldn’t put a request to an individual
family.

参照：（報告書等）
ACCORD「Country Report Afghanistan. 11th European Country of Origin Information
Seminar (Vienna, 21-22 June 2007)」米国司法省ウェブ（2007 年 11 月）. 「クエリー回答［a-7821-1 (ACC-AFG-7821-1)］」ecoi（2011 年 11 月 30 日）
Afghanistan NGO Safety Office（ANSO）「Bi-Weekly Data Report, Issue 01; April 15 - May
01 2008」ecoi（2008 年 5 月）、オンライン：
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1331233/1002_1249209422_anso1.pdf
Asylum Research Centre（ARC）「Afghanistan COI Repository」ASYLOS（2021 年 11 月
25 日）、オンライン：https://www.asylos.eu/afghanistan
European Asylum Support Office（EASO）「EASO Country of Origin Information report:
Afghanistan - Taliban strategies — Recruitment（COI レポート：アフガニスタン
12難民研究フォーラム COI クエリーサービス https://refugeestudies.jp
回答:アフガニスタン 2021 年 11 月 29 日

タリバンの戦略‐勧誘）」（2012 年 7 月）
、オンライン：https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/EASO_COI_Report_AFG_Taliban_
Recruitment.pdf. 「EASO Country of Origin Information report: Afghanistan - Insurgent strategies —
intimidation and targeted violence against Afghans（COI レポート：アフガニスタン
武装勢力の戦略‐アフガン人に対する脅迫と標的暴力）」（2012 年 12 月）、オンライン：
https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/AFG_Insurgent_strategies_Intimidat
ion_and_targeted_violence.pdf
International Crisis Group（ICG）「The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland（アフガニス
タンの中心地の反政府武装勢力）」ecoi（2011 年 6 月 27 日）、オンライン：https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1265231/2016_1330940548_207-the-insurgency-inafghanistans-heartland.pdf
Refugee Documentation Centre (Ireland)（IRDC）「Afgganisutan : Research and compiled by
Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 12 September 2011（IRDC 調査回答）」
ecoi（2011 年 9 月 12 日）、オンライン：https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1094590/1226_1316700021_q14366-afghanistan.pdf（記事等）
BBC「Gunmen kill Afghan school girls」（2007 年 6 月 12 日）、オンライン：
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6744931.stm
Human Rights Watch（HRW）「This is our opportunity to end the Taliban’s use of child soldiers（今がタリバンの児童兵使用を止めるチャンスだ）」（2021 年 9 月 20 日）、オン
ライン：https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/20/our-opportunity-end-talibans-use-childsoldiers13