MOTOR VEHICLE MFRS. ASSN. v. STATE FARM MUT.

29

Syllabus

MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
OF THE UNITED STATES, INC., ET AL. V.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE CO. ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 82-354.

Argued April 26, 1983-Decided June 24, 1983*

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act) directs the
Secretary of Transportation to issue motor vehicle safety standards that"shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, andshall be stated in objective terms." In issuing these standards, the Secretary is directed to consider "relevant available motor vehicle safety
data," whether the proposed standard is "reasonable, practicable andappropriate" for the particular type of motor vehicle for which it is prescribed, and "the extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes" of the Act. The Act authorizes judicial review,
under the Administrative Procedure Act, of "all orders establishing,amending, or revoking" a motor vehicle safety standard. The National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), to which the Secretary
has delegated his authority to promulgate safety standards, rescinded
the requirement of Modified Standard 208 that new motor vehicles
produced after September 1982 be equipped with passive restraints(automatic seatbelts or airbags) to protect the safety of the occupants ofthe vehicle in the event of a collision. In explaining the rescission,
NHTSA maintained that it was no longer able to find, as it had in 1977
when Modified Standard 208 was issued, that the automatic restraint
requirement would produce significant safety benefits. In 1977, NHTSA
had assumed that airbags would be installed in 60% of all new cars andautomatic seatbelts in 40%. But by 1981 it became apparent that automobile manufacturers planned to install automatic seatbelts in approximately 99% of the new cars and that the overwhelming majority of suchseatbelts could be easily detached and left that way permanently, thus
precluding the realization of the lifesaving potential of airbags and requiring the same type of affirmative action that was the stumbling block*Together with No. 82-355, ConsumerAlert et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al.; and No. 82-398, United States
Department of Transportationet al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

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Syllabus

463 U. S.

to achieving high usage of manual belts. For this reason, NHTSA
concluded that there was no longer a basis for reliably predicting that
Modified Standard 208 would lead to any significant increased usage ofrestraints. Hence, in NHTSA's view, the automatic restraint requirement was no longer reasonable or practicable. Moreover, given the highexpense of implementing such a requirement and the limited benefits
arising therefrom, NHTSA feared that many consumers would regard
Modified Standard 208 as an instance of ineffective regulation. On
petitions for review of NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint requirement, the Court of Appeals held that the rescission was arbitrary
and capricious on the grounds that NHTSA's conclusion that it could notreliably predict an increase in belt usage under the Standard was an insufficient basis for the rescission, that NHTSA inadequately considered
the possibility of requiring manufacturers to install nondetachable rather
than detachable passive belts, and that the agency failed to give any consideration to requiring compliance with the Standard by the installationof airbags. The court found that congressional reaction to various versions of the Standard "raised doubts" that NHTSA's rescission "necessarily demonstrates an effort to fulfill its statutory mandate" and that
therefore the agency was obligated to provide "increasingly clear andconvincing reasons" for its action.
Held: NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint requirement in Modified Standard 208 was arbitrary and capricious; the agency failed topresent an adequate basis and explanation for rescinding the requirement and must either consider the matter further or adhere to or amend
the Standard along lines which its analysis supports. Pp. 40-57.
(a) The rescission of an occupant crash protection standard is subject
to the same standard of judicial review-the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard-as is the promulgation of such a standard, and should not be
judged by, as petitioner Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association contends, the standard used to judge an agency's refusal to promulgate arule in the first place. The Act expressly equates orders "revoking" and"establishing" safety standards. The Association's view would rendermeaningless Congress' authorization for judicial review of orders revoking safety standards. An agency changing its course by rescinding arule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond thatwhich may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.
While the scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of theagency, the agency nevertheless must examine the relevant data andarticulate a satisfactory explanation for its action. In reviewing that
explanation, a court must consider whether the decision was based on a

MOTOR VEHICLE MFRS. ASSN. v. STATE FARM MUT.

31

Syllabus

29

consideration of the relevant factors and whether there was a clear errorof judgment. Pp. 40-44.
(b) The Court of Appeals correctly found that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of judicial review applied to rescission of agency regulations, but erred in intensifying the scope of its review based upon its
reading of legislative events. While an agency's interpretation of astatute may be confirmed or ratified by subsequent congressional failure tochange that interpretation, here, even an unequivocal ratification of thepassive restraint requirement would not connote approval or disapprovalof NHTSA's later decision to rescind the requirement. That decision
remains subject to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Pp. 44-46.
(c) The first reason for finding NHTSA's rescission of Modified Standard 208 was arbitrary and capricious is that it apparently gave no consideration to modifying the Standard to require that airbag technology be
utilized. Even if NHTSA's conclusion that detachable automatic seatbelts will not attain anticipated safety benefits because so many individuals will detach the mechanism were acceptable in its entirety, standing
alone it would not justify any more than an amendment of the Standard
to disallow compliance by means of one technology which will not provide
effective passenger protection. It does not cast doubt on the need for apassive restraint requirement or upon the efficacy of airbag technology.
The airbag is more than a policy alternative to the passive restraint requirement; it is a technology alternative within the ambit of the existing
standard. Pp. 46-51.
(d) NHTSA was too quick to dismiss the safety benefits of automatic
seatbelts. Its explanation for rescission of the passive restraint requirement is not sufficient to enable this Court to conclude that the rescission
was the product ofreasoned decisionmaking. The agency took no accountof the critical difference between detachable automatic seatbelts andcurrent manual seatbelts, failed to articulate a basis for not requiring
nondetachable belts, and thus failed to offer the rational connection
between facts and judgment required to pass muster under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Pp. 51-57.
220 U. S. App. D. C. 170, 680 F. 2d 206, vacated and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN,

and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in all but Parts

V-B and VI of which BURGER, C. J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST, andO'CONNOR, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurringin part and dissenting in part, in which BURGER, C. J., and POWELL
and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 57.

OCTOBER TERM, 1982
Opinion of the Court

463 U. S.

Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for petitioners in
No. 82-398. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, Edwin S. Kneedler, Robert E. Kopp, Michael F. Hertz, Frank
Berndt, David W. Allen, Enid Rubenstein, and Eileen T.
Leahy. Lloyd N. Cutler argued the cause for petitioners in
No. 82-354. With him on the briefs were John H. Pickering, William R. Perlik, Andrew B. Weissman, William R.
Richardson,Jr., Milton D. Andrews, Lance E. Tunick, William H. Crabtree, Edward P. Good, Henry R. Nolte, Jr.,
Otis M. Smith, Charles R. Sharp, and William L. Weber, Jr.
Raymond M. Momboisse, Sam Kazman, and Ronald A.
Zumbrun filed briefs for petitioners in No. 82-355.
James F. Fitzpatrick argued the cause for respondents inall cases. With him on the brief for respondents State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al. were Michael N.
Sohn, John M. Quinn, and Merrick B. Garland. Robert
Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Robert S. Hammer, Assistant Attorney General, Peter H. Schiff, Martin
Minkowitz, and Milton L. Freedman ified a brief for respondent Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New
York. Raymond J. Rasenberger, Lawrence C. Merthan,
Jerry W. Cox, and Lowell R. Beck filed a brief for respondents National Association of Independent Insurers et al.t
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The development of the automobile gave Americans unprecedented freedom to travel, but exacted a high price fortBriefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Dennis J.
Barbour for the American College of Preventive Medicine et al.; by Nathan Lewin for the American Insurance Association; by Philip R. Collins
and Thomas C. McGrath, Jr., for the Automotive Occupant Protection Association; by Alexandra K. Finucane for the Epilepsy Foundation ofAmerica et al.; by Katherine I. Hall for the Center for Auto Safety et al.;by Simon LazarusIII for Mothers Against Drunk Drivers; and by John H.
Quinn, Jr., and John Hardin Young for the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.

MOTOR VEHICLE MFRS. ASSN. v. STATE FARM MUT.
29

33

Opinion of the Courtenhanced mobility. Since 1929, motor vehicles have been
the leading cause of accidental deaths and injuries in the
United States. In 1982, 46,300 Americans died in motor vehicle accidents and hundreds of thousands more were maimed
and injured.' While a consensus exists that the current lossof life on our highways is unacceptably high, improving
safety does not admit to easy solution. In 1966, Congress
decided that at least part of the answer lies in improving thedesign and safety features of the vehicle itself.2 But much of
the technology for building safer cars was undeveloped oruntested. Before changes in automobile design could be
mandated, the effectiveness of these changes had to be studied, their costs examined, and public acceptance considered.
This task called for considerable expertise and Congress
responded by enacting the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act), 80 Stat. 718, as amended,
15 U. S. C. § 1381 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V). The Act,
created for the purpose of "reduc[ing] traffic accidents anddeaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents," 15 U. S. C. § 1381, directs the Secretary of Transportation or his delegate to issue motor vehicle safety standards
that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need for motor
vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms." 15
U. S. C. § 1392(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). In issuing thesestandards, the Secretary is directed to consider "relevant
available motor vehicle safety data," whether the proposed
standard "is reasonable, practicable and appropriate" for theparticular type of motor vehicle, and the "extent to which'National Safety Council, 1982 Motor Vehicle Deaths By States (May 16,1983).
'The Senate Committee on Commerce reported:"The promotion of motor vehicle safety through voluntary standards haslargely failed. The unconditional imposition of mandatory standards atthe earliest practicable date is the only course commensurate with thehighway death and injury toll." S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 4(1966).

OCTOBER TERM, 1982
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463 U. S.

such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes"of the Act. 15 U. S. C. §§ 1392(f)(1), (3), (4). 3
The Act also authorizes judicial review under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C.
§ 706, of all "orders establishing, amending, or revoking aFederal motor vehicle safety standard," 15 U. S. C. § 1392(b).
Under this authority, we review today whether NHTSA
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in revoking the requirement in Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 that new motor
vehicles produced after September 1982 be equipped with
passive restraints to protect the safety of the occupants ofthe vehicle in the event of a collision. Briefly summarized,
we hold that the agency failed to present an adequate basis
and explanation for rescinding the passive restraint requirement and that the agency must either consider the matter
further or adhere to or amend Standard 208 along lines which
its analysis supports.
I
The regulation whose rescission is at issue bears a complex
and convoluted history. Over the course of approximately
60 rulemaking notices, the requirement has been imposed,
amended, rescinded, reimposed, and now rescinded again.
As originally issued by the Department of Transportationin 1967, Standard 208 simply required the installation of
seatbelts in all automobiles. 32 Fed. Reg. 2415. It soon
became apparent that the level of seatbelt use was too low to
reduce traffic injuries to an acceptable level. The Department therefore began consideration of "passive occupant
restraint systems"--devices that do not depend for their effec'The Secretary's general authority to promulgate safety standards
under the Act has been delegated to the Administrator of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 49 CFR § 1.50(a)(1982). This opinion will use the terms NHTSA and agency interchangeably when referring to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Department of Transportation, and the Secretary ofTransportation.

MOTOR VEHICLE MFRS. ASSN. v. STATE FARM MUT.
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Opinion of the Court

tiveness upon any action taken by the occupant except thatnecessary to operate the vehicle. Two types of automatic
crash protection emerged: automatic seatbelts and airbags.
The automatic seatbelt is a traditional safety belt, which
when fastened to the interior of the door remains attachedwithout impeding entry or exit from the vehicle, and deploys
automatically without any action on the part of the passenger. The airbag is an inflatable device concealed in the dashboard and steering column. It automatically inflates when asensor indicates that deceleration forces from an accident
have exceeded a preset minimum, then rapidly deflates todissipate those forces. The lifesaving potential of thesedevices was immediately recognized, and in 1977, after substantial on-the-road experience with both devices, it wasestimated by NHTSA that passive restraints could prevent approximately 12,000 deaths and over 100,000 serious
injuries annually. 42 Fed. Reg. 34298.
In 1969, the Department formally proposed a standard requiring the installation of passive restraints, 34 Fed. Reg.
11148, thereby commencing a lengthy series of proceedings.
In 1970, the agency revised Standard 208 to include passive
protection requirements, 35 Fed. Reg. 16927, and in 1972,
the agency amended the Standard to require full passive protection for all front seat occupants of vehicles manufactured
after August 15, 1975. 37 Fed. Reg. 3911. In the interim,
vehicles built between August 1973 and August 1975 were tocarry either passive restraints or lap and shoulder belts coupled with an "ignition interlock" that would prevent starting
the vehicle if the belts were not connected.4 On review, the' Early in the process, it was assumed that passive occupant protection
meant the installation of inflatable airbag restraint systems. See 34 Fed.
Reg. 11148 (1969). In 1971, however, the agency observed that "[s]ome
belt-based concepts have been advanced that appear to be capable of meeting the complete passive protection options," leading it to add a new section to the proposed standard "[t]o deal expressly with passive belts." 36
Fed. Reg. 12859.

OCTOBER TERM, 1982
Opinion of the Court

463 U. S.

agency's decision to require passive restraints was found tobe supported by "substantial evidence" and upheld. Chrysler Corp. v.5 Department of Transportation,472 F. 2d 659(CA6 1972).
In preparing for the upcoming model year, most car makers
chose the "ignition interlock" option, a decision which was
highly unpopular, and led Congress to amend the Act toprohibit a motor vehicle safety standard from requiring or
permitting compliance by means of an ignition interlock or acontinuous buzzer designed to indicate that safety belts were
not in use. Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-492, § 109, 88 Stat. 1482, 15
U. S. C. § 1410b(b). The 1974 Amendments also provided
that any safety standard that could be satisfied by a systemother than seatbelts would have to be submitted to Congress
where it could be vetoed by concurrent resolution of bothHouses. 15 U. S. C. § 1410b(b)(2).6
The effective date for mandatory passive restraint systems
was extended for a year until August 31, 1976. 40 Fed. Reg.
16217 (1975); id., at 33977. But in June 1976, Secretary ofTransportation William T. Coleman, Jr., initiated a newrulemaking on the issue, 41 Fed. Reg. 24070. After hearing testimony and reviewing written comments, Coleman
extended the optional alternatives indefinitely and suspended
the passive restraint requirement. Although he found pas' The court did hold that the testing procedures required of passive belts
did not satisfy the Act's requirement that standards be "objective." 472
F. 2d, at 675.
'Because such a passive restraint standard was not technically in effectat this time due to the Sixth Circuit's invalidation of the testing requirements, see n. 5, supra, the issue was not submitted to Congress until apassive restraint requirement was reimposed by Secretary Adams in 1977.
To comply with the Amendments, NHTSA proposed new warning systems
to replace the prohibited continuous buzzers. 39 Fed. Reg. 42692 (1974).
More significantly, NHTSA was forced to rethink an earlier decision which
contemplated use of the interlocks in tandem with detachable belts. See
n. 13, infra.

MOTOR VEHICLE MFRS. ASSN. v. STATE FARM MUT.
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Opinion of the Court

sive restraints technologically and economically feasible, theSecretary based his decision on the expectation that there
would be widespread public resistance to the new systems.
He instead proposed a demonstration project involving up to
500,000 cars installed with passive restraints, in order tosmooth the way for public acceptance of mandatory passive
restraints at a later date. Department of Transportation,
The Secretary's Decision Concerning Motor Vehicle Occupant Crash Protection (Dec. 6, 1976), App. 2068.
Coleman's successor as Secretary of Transportation disagreed. Within months of assuming office, Secretary Brock
Adams decided that the demonstration project was unnecessary. He issued a new mandatory passive restraint regulation, known as Modified Standard 208. 42 Fed. Reg. 34289(1977); 49 CFR §571.208 (1978). The Modified Standard
mandated the phasing in of passive restraints beginning withlarge cars in model year 1982 and extending to all cars bymodel year 1984. The two principal systems that would satisfy the Standard were airbags and passive belts; the choiceof which system to install was left to the manufacturers. In
Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department of Transportation,
193 U. S. App. D. C. 184, 593 F. 2d 1338, cert. denied, 444
U. S. 830 (1979), the Court of Appeals upheld Modified
Standard 208 as a rational, nonarbitrary regulation consistent with the agency's mandate under the Act. The Standard
also survived scrutiny by Congress, which did not exercise
its authority under the legislative veto provision of the 1974
Amendments.'
Over the next several years, the automobile industry
geared up to comply with Modified Standard 208. As late as
July 1980, NHTSA reported:
7No action was taken by the full House of Representatives. The Senate
Committee with jurisdiction over NHTSA affirmatively endorsed theStandard, S. Rep. No. 95-481 (1977), and a resolution of disapproval wastabled by the Senate. 123 Cong. Rec. 33332 (1977).

OCTOBER TERM, 1982
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463 U. S.

"On the road experience in thousands of vehicles
equipped with air bags and automatic safety belts has
confirmed agency estimates of the life-saving and injurypreventing benefits of such systems. When all cars areequipped with automatic crash protection systems, eachyear an estimated 9,000 more lives will be saved, andtens of thousands of serious injuries will be prevented."
NHTSA, Automobile Occupant Crash Protection, Progress Report No. 3, p. 4; App. in No. 81-2220 (CADC),
p. 1627 (hereinafter App.).
In February 1981, however, Secretary of Transportation
Andrew Lewis reopened the rulemaking due to changed economic circumstances and, in particular, the difficulties of theautomobile industry. 46 Fed. Reg. 12033. Two months
later, the agency ordered a one-year delay in the applicationof the Standard to large cars, extending the deadline to September 1982, id., at 21172, and at the same time, proposed
the possible rescission of the entire Standard. Id., at 21205.
After receiving written comments and holding public hearings, NHTSA issued a final rule (Notice 25) that rescinded
the passive restraint requirement contained in Modified
Standard 208.
II
In a statement explaining the rescission, NHTSA maintained that it was no longer able to find, as it had in 1977, thatthe automatic restraint requirement would produce significant safety benefits. Notice 25, id., at 53419. This judgment reflected not a change of opinion on the effectiveness ofthe technology, but a change in plans by the automobile industry. In 1977, the agency had assumed that airbags would
be installed in 60% of all new cars and automatic seatbelts in
40%. By 1981 it became apparent that automobile manufacturers planned to install the automatic seatbelts in approximately 99% of the new cars. For this reason, the lifesaving
potential of airbags would not be realized. Moreover, it now
appeared that the overwhelming majority of passive belts

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Opinion of the Court

planned to be installed by manufacturers could be detachedeasily and left that way permanently. Passive belts, once
detached, then required "the same type of affirmative actionthat is the stumbling block to obtaining high usage levels of
manual belts." Id., at 53421. For this reason, the agency
concluded that there was no longer a basis for reliably predicting that the Standard would lead to any significant increased usage of restraints at all.
In view of the possibly minimal safety benefits, the automatic restraint requirement no longer was reasonable orpracticable in the agency's view. The requirement would
require approximately $1 billion to implement and the agency
did not believe it would be reasonable to impose such substantial costs on manufacturers and consumers without more
adequate assurance that sufficient safety benefits would accrue. In addition, NHTSA concluded that automatic restraints might have an adverse effect on the public's attitude
toward safety. Given the high expense and limited benefitsof detachable belts, NHTSA feared that many consumers
would regard the Standard as an instance of ineffective regulation, adversely affecting the public's view of safety regulation and, in particular, "poisoning . . . popular sentimenttoward efforts to improve occupant restraint systems in the
future." Id., at 53424.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. and the National Association of Independent Insurers filed petitions forreview of NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint Standard. The United States Court of Appeals for the District ofColumbia Circuit held that the agency's rescission of thepassive restraint requirement was arbitrary and capricious.
220 U. S. App. D. C. 170, 680 F. 2d 206 (1982). While observing that rescission is not unrelated to an agency's refusal
to take action in the first instance, the court concluded that, in
this case, NHTSA's discretion to rescind the passive restraint
requirement had been restricted by various forms of congressional "reaction" to the passive restraint issue. It thenOCTOBER TERM, 1982
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463 U. S.

proceeded to find that the rescission of Standard 208 wasarbitrary and capricious for three reasons. First, the court
found insufficient as a basis for rescission NHTSA's conclusion that it could not reliably predict an increase in belt usage
under the Standard. The court held that there was insufficient evidence in the record to sustain NHTSA's position on
this issue, and that, "only a well justified refusal to seek moreevidence could render rescission non-arbitrary." Id., at 196,
680 F. 2d, at 232. Second, a majority of the panel 8 concluded
that NHTSA inadequately considered the possibility of requiring manufacturers to install nondetachable rather thandetachable passive belts. Third, the majority found that theagency acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to giveany consideration whatever to requiring compliance with
Modified Standard 208 by the installation of airbags.
The court allowed NHTSA 30 days in which to submit aschedule for "resolving the questions raised in th[e] opinion."Id., at 206, 680 F. 2d, at 242. Subsequently, the agency filed
a Notice of Proposed Supplemental Rulemaking setting fortha schedule for complying with the court's mandate. On August 4, 1982, the Court of Appeals issued an order staying
the compliance date for the passive restraint requirement
until September 1, 1983, and requested NHTSA to informthe court whether that compliance date was achievable.
NHTSA informed the court on October 1, 1982, that based on
representations by manufacturers, it did not appear thatpracticable compliance could be achieved before September
1985. On November 8, 1982, we granted certiorari, 459
U. S. 987, and on November 18, the Court of Appeals
entered an order recalling its mandate.
III
Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not find the appropriate scope of judicial review to be the "most troublesome'Judge Edwards did not join the majority's reasoning on these points.

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Opinion of the Court

question" in these cases. Both the Act and the 1974
Amendments concerning occupant crash protection standards indicate that motor vehicle safety standards are to be
promulgated under the informal rulemaking procedures of
the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. § 553. The
agency's action in promulgating such standards therefore
may be set aside if found to be "arbitrary, capricious, anabuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 414 (1971); Bowman Transportation,
Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281(1974). We believe that the rescission or modification of an
occupant-protection standard is subject to the same test.
Section 103(b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1392(b), states thatthe procedural and judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act "shall apply to all orders establishing,amending, or revoking a Federal motor vehicle safety standard," and suggests no difference in the scope ofjudicial review
depending upon the nature of the agency's action.
Petitioner Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association(MVMA) disagrees, contending that the rescission of anagency rule should be judged by the same standard a court
would use to judge an agency's refusal to promulgate a rule in
the first place-a standard petitioner believes considerably
narrower than the traditional arbitrary-and-capricious test.
We reject this view. The Act expressly equates orders "revoking" and "establishing" safety standards; neither that Act
nor the APA suggests that revocations are to be treated as
refusals to promulgate standards. Petitioner's view would
render meaningless Congress' authorization for judicial review of orders revoking safety rules. Moreover, the revocation of an extant regulation is substantially different than afailure to act. Revocation constitutes a reversal of theagency's former views as to the proper course. A "settled
course of behavior embodies the agency's informed judgment
that, by pursuing that course, it will carry out the policies

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463 U. S.

committed to it by Congress. There is, then, at least apresumption that those policies will be carried out best if
the settled rule is adhered to." Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.
v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U. S. 800, 807-808 (1973).
Accordingly, an agency changing its course by rescinding arule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change
beyond that which may be required when an agency does not
act in the first instance.
In so holding, we fully recognize that "[riegulatory agencies do not establish rules of conduct to last forever," American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.,
387 U. S. 397, 416 (1967), and that an agency must be given
ample latitude to "adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances." Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 784 (1968). But the forces ofchange do not always or necessarily point in the direction of
deregulation. In the abstract, there is no more reason to
presume that changing circumstances require the rescissionof prior action, instead of a revision in or even the extensionof current regulation. If Congress established a presumption from which judicial review should start, that presumption-contrary to petitioners' views-is not against safety
regulation, but against changes in current policy that are notjustified by the rulemaking record. While the removal of aregulation may not entail the monetary expenditures andother costs of enacting a new standard, and, accordingly, it
may be easier for an agency to justify a deregulatory action,
the direction in which an agency chooses to move does notalter the standard of judicial review established by law.
The Department of Transportation accepts the applicability of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. It argues
that under this standard, a reviewing court may not set aside
an agency rule that is rational, based on consideration of therelevant factors, and within the scope of the authority delegated to the agency by the statute. We do not disagree with

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Opinion of the Court

this formulation.9 The scope of review under the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless,the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate asatisfactory explanation for its action including a "rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made."
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S.
156, 168 (1962). In reviewing that explanation, we must"consider whether the decision was based on a considerationof the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment." Bowman Transportation,Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., supra, at 285; Citizens toNormally,
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, at 416.
if thecapricious
arbitrary
and
would
be
an agency rule
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended
it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspectof the problem, offered an explanation for its decision thatruns counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in viewor the product of agency expertise. The reviewing court
should not attempt itself to make up for such deficiencies; wemay not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action thatthe agency itself has not given. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U. S. 194, 196 (1947). We will, however, "uphold a decisionof less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably
be discerned." Bowman Transportation,Inc. v. ArkansasBest FreightSystem, Inc., supra, at 286. See also Camp v.
Pitts, 411 U. S. 138, 142-143 (1973) (per curiam). For purposes of these cases, it is also relevant that Congress required a record of the rulemaking proceedings to be compiled'The Department of Transportation suggests that the arbitrary-andcapricious standard requires no more than the minimum rationality a statute must bear in order to withstand analysis under the Due Process
Clause. We do not view as equivalent the presumption of constitutionality
afforded legislation drafted by Congress and the presumption of regularity
afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory mandate.

OCTOBER TERM, 1982
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463 U. S.

and submitted to a reviewing court, 15 U. S. C. § 1394, andintended that agency findings under the Act would be supported by "substantial evidence on the record considered as awhole." S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1966);
H. R. Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1966).
IV
The Court of Appeals correctly found that the arbitraryand-capricious test applied to rescissions of prior agency
regulations, but then erred in intensifying the scope of its
review based upon its reading of legislative events. It heldthat congressional reaction to various versions of Standard
208 "raise[d] doubts" that NHTSA's rescission "necessarily
demonstrates an effort to fulfill its statutory mandate," andtherefore the agency was obligated to provide "increasingly
clear and convincing reasons" for its action. 220 U. S.
App. D. C., at 186, 193, 680 F. 2d, at 222, 229. Specifically,
the Court of Appeals found significance in three legislative
occurrences:"In 1974, Congress banned the ignition interlock but did
not foreclose NHTSA's pursuit of a passive restraint
standard. In 1977, Congress allowed the standard to
take effect when neither of the concurrent resolutions
needed for disapproval was passed. In 1980, a majorityof each house indicated support for the concept of mandatory passive restraints and a majority of each housesupported the unprecedented attempt to require someinstallation of airbags." Id., at 192, 680 F. 2d, at 228.
From these legislative acts and nonacts the Court of Appeals
derived a "congressional commitment to the concept of automatic crash protection devices for vehicle occupants." Ibid.
This path of analysis was misguided and the inferences it
produced are questionable. It is noteworthy that in thisCourt respondent State Farm expressly agrees that the postenactment legislative history of the Act does not heighten theMOTOR VEHICLE MFRS. ASSN. v. STATE FARM MUT.
29

45

Opinion of the Court

standard of review of NHTSA's actions. Brief for Respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 13. State
Farm's concession is well taken for this Court has never suggested that the standardof review is enlarged or diminishedby subsequent congressional action. While an agency's interpretation of a statute may be confirmed or ratified by subsequent congressional failure to change that interpretation,
Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 599602 (1983); Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 291-300 (1981), in thecases before us, even an unequivocal ratification-short ofstatutory incorporation--of the passive restraint standard
would not connote approval or disapproval of an agency's
later decision to rescind the regulation. That decision remains subject to the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.
That we should not be so quick to infer a congressional
mandate for passive restraints is confirmed by examining
the postenactment legislative events cited by the Court ofAppeals. Even were we inclined to rely on inchoate legislative action, the inferences to be drawn fail to suggestthat NHTSA acted improperly in rescinding Standard 208.
First, in 1974 a mandatory passive restraint standard wastechnically not in effect, see n. 6, supra;Congress had no reason to foreclose that course. Moreover, one can hardly infersupport for a mandatory standard from Congress' decision toprovide that such a regulation would be subject to disapproval by resolutions of disapproval in both Houses. Similarly, no mandate can be divined from the tabling of resolutions of disapproval which were introduced in 1977. The
failure of Congress to exercise its veto might reflect legislative deference to the agency's expertise and does not indicatethat Congress would disapprove of the agency's action in
1981. And even if Congress favored the Standard in 1977,
it-like NHTSA-may well reach a different judgment, givenchanged circumstances four years later. Finally, the Courtof Appeals read too much into floor action on the 1980 authorization bill, a bill which was not enacted into law. OtherOCTOBER TERM, 1982
Opinion of the Court

463 U. S.

contemporaneous events could be read as showing equal congressional hostility to passive restraints."
V
The ultimate question before us is whether NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint requirement of Standard 208
was arbitrary and capricious. We conclude, as did the Courtof Appeals, that it was. We also conclude, but for somewhat
different reasons, that further consideration of the issue by
the agency is therefore required. We deal separately withthe rescission as it applies to airbags and as it applies toseatbelts.
A
The first and most obvious reason for finding the rescission
arbitrary and capricious is that NHTSA apparently gave no
consideration whatever to modifying the Standard to requirethat airbag technology be utilized. Standard 208 sought toachieve automatic crash protection by requiring automobile
manufacturers to install either of two passive restraint
devices: airbags or automatic seatbelts. There was no suggestion in the long rulemaking process that led to Standard
208 that if only one of these options were feasible, no passive restraint standard should be promulgated. Indeed, theagency's original proposed Standard contemplated the installation of inflatable restraints in all cars. 1 Automatic belts"oFor example, an overwhelming majority of the Members of the Houseof Representatives voted in favor of a proposal to bar NHTSA from spending funds to administer an occupant restraint standard unless the standard
permitted the purchaser of the vehicle to select manual rather than passive restraints. 125 Cong. Rec. 36926 (1979).
11While NHTSA's 1970 passive restraint requirement permitted compliance by means other than the airbag, 35 Fed. Reg. 16927, "[t]his rule wasa de facto air bag mandate since no other technologies were available tocomply with the standard." Graham & Gorham, NHTSA and Passive
Restraints: A Case of Arbitrary and Capricious Deregulation, 35 Ad. L.
Rev. 193, 197 (1983). See n. 4, supra.

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Opinion of the Court

were added as a means of complying with the Standard
because they were believed to be as effective as airbags inachieving the goal of occupant crash protection. 36 Fed.
Reg. 12859 (1971). At that time, the passive belt approvedby the agency could not be detached. 2 Only later, at a
manufacturer's behest, did the agency approve of the detachability feature-and only after assurances that the feature
would not compromise the safety benefits of the restraint. 3
Although it was then foreseen that 60% of the new cars would
contain airbags and 40% would have automatic seatbelts, theratio between the two was not significant as long as the passive belt would also assure greater passenger safety.
The agency has now determined that the detachable automatic belts will not attain anticipated safety benefits because
so many individuals will detach the mechanism. Even if thisconclusion were acceptable in its entirety, see infra, at
51-54, standing alone it would not justify any more than anamendment of Standard 208 to disallow compliance by meansof the one technology which will not provide effective passenger protection. It does not cast doubt on the need for apassive restraint standard or upon the efficacy of airbag technology. In its most recent rulemaking, the agency again
acknowledged the lifesaving potential of the airbag:"Although the agency suggested that passive restraint systems containan emergency release mechanism to allow easy extrication of passengers in
the event of an accident, the agency cautioned that "[iln the case of passive
safety belts, it would be required that the release not cause belt separation, and that the system be self-restoring after operation of the release."
36 Fed. Reg. 12866 (1971).
1"In April 1974, NHTSA adopted the suggestion of an automobile manufacturer that emergency release of passive belts be accomplished by a conventional latch-provided the restraint system was guarded by an ignitioninterlock and warning buzzer to encourage reattachment of the passive
belt. 39 Fed. Reg. 14593. When the 1974 Amendments prohibited thesedevices, the agency simply eliminated the interlock and buzzer requirements, but continued to allow compliance by a detachable passive belt.

OCTOBER TERM, 1982
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463 U. S.

"The agency has no basis at this time for changing
its earlier conclusions in 1976 and 1977 that basic air
bag technology is sound and has been sufficiently demonstrated to be effective in those vehicles in current
use .... ." NHTSA Final Regulatory Impact Analysis(RIA) XI-4 (Oct. 1981), App. 264.
Given the effectiveness ascribed to airbag technology by theagency, the mandate of the Act to achieve traffic safety
would suggest that the logical response to the faults ofdetachable seatbelts would be to require the installation of
airbags. At the very least this alternative way of achieving
the objectives of the Act should have been addressed andadequate reasons given for its abandonment. But the agency
not only did not require compliance through airbags, it also
did not even consider the possibility in its 1981 rulemaking.
Not one sentence of its rulemaking statement discusses the
airbags-only option. Because, as the Court of Appeals
stated, "NHTSA's... analysis of airbags was nonexistent,"
220 U. S. App. D. C., at 200, 680 F. 2d, at 236, what we saidin Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S.,
at 167, is apropos here:"There are no findings and no analysis here to justify
the choice made, no indication of the basis on which the[agency] exercised its expert discretion. We are notprepared to and the Administrative Procedure Act will
not permit us to accept such ... practice ....
Expertdiscretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process,but 'unless we make the requirements for administrative
action strict and demanding, expertise, the strength ofmodern government, can become a monster which ruleswith no practical limits on its discretion.' New York v.
United States, 342 U. S. 882, 884 (dissenting opinion)"(footnote omitted).
We have frequently reiterated that an agency must cogently
explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner,

MOTOR VEHICLE MFRS. ASSN. v. STATE FARM MUT.
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Opinion of the Court

Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412
U. S., at 806; FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U. S.
233, 249 (1972); NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380
U. S. 438, 443 (1965); and we reaffirm this principle again
today.
The automobile industry has opted for the passive belt
over the airbag, but surely it is not enough that the regulatedindustry has eschewed a given safety device. For nearly adecade, the automobile industry waged the regulatory equivalent of war against the airbag14 and lost-the inflatable
restraint was proved sufficiently effective. Now the automobile industry has decided to employ a seatbelt system which
will not meet the safety objectives of Standard 208. This
hardly constitutes cause to revoke the Standard itself. Indeed, the Act was necessary because the industry was not
sufficiently responsive to safety concerns. The Act intended
that safety standards not depend on current technology andcould be "technology-forcing" in the sense of inducing thedevelopment of superior safety design. See Chrysler Corp.
v. Department of Transportation,472 F. 2d, at 672-673. If,
under the statute, the agency should not defer to the industry's failure to develop safer cars, which it surely should not
do, afortioriit may not revoke a safety standard which canbe satisfied by current technology simply because the industry has opted for an ineffective seatbelt design.
Although the agency did not address the mandatory airbag option and the Court of Appeals noted that "airbags
seem to have none of the problems that NHTSA identified inpassive seatbelts," 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 201, 680 F. 2d, at
237, petitioners recite a number of difficulties that they
14See, e. g., Comments of Chrysler Corp., Docket No. 69-07, Notice 11(Aug. 5, 1971) (App. 2491); Chrysler Corp. Memorandum on Proposed
Alternative Changes to FMVSS 208, Docket No. 44, Notice 76-8 (1976)(App. 2241); General Motors Corp. Response to the Dept. of Transportation Proposal on Occupant Crash Protection, Docket No. 74-14, Notice 08(May 27, 1977) (App. 1745). See also Chrysler Corp. v. Department ofTransportation, 472 F. 2d 659 (CA6 1972).

OCTOBER TERM, 1982
Opinion of the Court

463 U. S.

believe would be posed by a mandatory airbag standard.
These range from questions concerning the installation of
airbags in small cars to that of adverse public reaction. But
these are not the agency's reasons for rejecting a mandatory
airbag standard. Not having discussed the possibility, theagency submitted no reasons at all. The short-and sufficient-answer to petitioners' submission is that the courts
may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations
for agency action. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. UnitedStates, 371 U. S., at 168. It is well established that anagency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself. Ibid.; SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U. S., at 196; American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v.
Donovan, 452 U. S. 490, 539 (1981). 15
Petitioners also invoke our decision in Vermont Yankee
NuclearPower Corp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U. S. 519 (1978), as though it were a talisman underwhich any agency decision is by definition unimpeachable.
Specifically, it is submitted that to require an agency to consider an airbags-only alternative is, in essence, to dictate to
the agency the procedures it is to follow. Petitioners bothmisread Vermont Yankee and misconstrue the nature of theremand that is in order. In Vermont Yankee, we held that a
court may not impose additional procedural requirements
upon an agency. We do not require today any specific proce5

The Department of Transportation expresses concern that adoption ofan airbags-only requirement would have required a new notice of proposed
rulemaking. Even if this were so, and we need not decide the question, it
would not constitute sufficient cause to rescind the passive restraint requirement. The Department also asserts that it was reasonable to withdraw the requirement as written to avoid forcing manufacturers to spend
resources to comply with an ineffective safety initiative. We think that it
would have been permissible for the agency to temporarily suspend thepassive restraint requirement or to delay its implementation date while
an airbag mandate was studied. But, as we explain in text, that option
had to be considered before the passive restraint requirement could be
revoked.

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Opinion of the Court

dures which NHTSA must follow. Nor do we broadly require an agency to consider all policy alternatives in reachingdecision. It is true that rulemaking "cannot be found wanting simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by the mind of man...
regardless of how uncommon or unknown that alternative
may have been. . . ." Id., at 551. But the airbag is morethan a policy alternative to the passive restraint Standard; it
is a technological alternative within the ambit of the existingStandard. We hold only that given the judgment made in1977 that airbags are an effective and cost-beneficial lifesaving technology, the mandatory passive restraint rule may
not be abandoned without any consideration whatsoever of an
airbags-only requirement.
B
Although the issue is closer, we also find that the agency
was too quick to dismiss the safety benefits of automatic
seatbelts. NHTSA's critical finding was that, in light of theindustry's plans to install readily detachable passive belts, it
could not reliably predict "even a 5 percentage point increaseas the minimum level of expected usage increase." 46 Fed.
Reg. 53423 (1981). The Court of Appeals rejected this finding because there is "not one iota" of evidence that Modified
Standard 208 will fail to increase nationwide seatbelt use byat least 13 percentage points, the level of increased usage
necessary for the Standard to justify its cost. Given the lackof probative evidence, the court held that "only a well justified refusal to seek more evidence could render rescission
non-arbitrary." 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 196, 680 F. 2d,
at 232.
Petitioners object to this conclusion. In their view, "substantial uncertainty" that a regulation will accomplish its intended purpose is sufficient reason, without more, to rescinda regulation. We agree with petitioners that just as anagency reasonably may decline to issue a safety standard if it
is uncertain about its efficacy, an agency may also revoke a

OCTOBER TERM, 1982
Opinion of the Court

463 U. S.

standard on the basis of serious uncertainties if supported by
the record and reasonably explained. Rescission of the passive restraint requirement would not be arbitrary and capricious simply because there was no evidence in direct supportof the agency's conclusion. It is not infrequent that theavailable data do not settle a regulatory issue, and the agency
must then exercise its judgment in moving from the facts andprobabilities on the record to a policy conclusion. Recognizing that policymaking in a complex society must account for
uncertainty, however, does not imply that it is sufficient foran agency to merely recite the terms "substantial uncertainty" as a justification for its actions. As previously noted,
the agency must explain the evidence which is available, andmust offer a "rational connection between the facts found andthe choice made." Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. UnitedStates, supra, at 168. Generally, one aspect of that explanation would be a justification for rescinding the regulation
before engaging in a search for further evidence.
In these cases, the agency's explanation for rescission of
the passive restraint requirement is not sufficient to enable
us to conclude that the rescission was the product of reasoned
decisionmaking. To reach this conclusion, we do not upset
the agency's view of the facts, but we do appreciate the limitations of this record in supporting the agency's decision.
We start with the accepted ground that if used, seatbelts
unquestionably would save many thousands of lives and would
prevent tens of thousands of crippling injuries. Unlike
recent regulatory decisions we have reviewed, Industrial
Union Dept. v. American PetroleumInstitute, 448 U. S. 607(1980); American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan,
452 U. S. 490 (1981), the safety benefits of wearing seatbelts
are not in doubt, and it is not challenged that were thosebenefits to accrue, the monetary costs of implementing theStandard would be easily justified. We move next to thefact that there is no direct evidence in support of the agency's
finding that detachable automatic belts cannot be predicted

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Opinion of the Court

to yield a substantial increase in usage. The empiricalevidence on the record, consisting of surveys of drivers ofautomobiles equipped with passive belts, reveals more than adoubling of the usage rate experienced with manual belts. 6
Much of the agency's rulemaking statement-and much of thecontroversy in these cases-centers on the conclusions thatshould be drawn from these studies. The agency maintainedthat the doubling of seatbelt usage in these studies could not
be extrapolated to an across-the-board mandatory standard
because the passive seatbelts were guarded by ignition interlocks and purchasers of the tested cars are somewhat atypical.' 7 Respondents insist these studies demonstrate that
Modified Standard 208 will substantially increase seatbelt
usage. We believe that it is within the agency's discretion topass upon the generalizability of these field studies. This isprecisely the type of issue which rests within the expertise of
NHTSA, and upon which a reviewing court must be mosthesitant to intrude.
But accepting the agency's view of the field tests on passive restraints indicates only that there is no reliable realworld experience that usage rates will substantially increase.
To be sure, NHTSA opines that "it cannot reliably predict
even a 5 percentage point increase as the minimum level of
I Between 1975 and 1980, Volkswagen sold approximately 350,000 Rabbits equipped with detachable passive seatbelts that were guarded by anignition interlock. General Motors sold 8,000 1978 and 1979 Chevettes
with a similar system, but eliminated the ignition interlock on the 13,000
Chevettes sold in 1980. NHTSA found that belt usage in the Rabbits
averaged 34% for manual belts and 84% for passive belts. RIA, at IV-52,
App. 108. For the 1978-1979 Chevettes, NHTSA calculated 34% usage
for manual belts and 72% for passive belts. On 1980 Chevettes, theagency found these figures to be 31% for manual belts and 70% for passive
belts. Ibid.
17,"NHTSA believes that the usage of automatic belts in Rabbits andChevettes would have been substantially lower if the automatic belts in
those cars were not equipped with a use-inducing device inhibiting detachment." Notice 25, 46 Fed. Reg. 53422 (1981).

OCTOBER TERM, 1982
Opinion of the Court

463 U. S.

expected increased usage." Notice 25, 46 Fed. Reg. 53423(1981). But this and other statements that passive belts will
not yield substantial increases in seatbelt usage apparently
take no account of the critical difference between detachable
automatic belts and current manual belts. A detached passive belt does require an affirmative act to reconnect it, butunlike a manual seatbelt-the passive belt, once reattached,will continue to function automatically unless again disconnected. Thus, inertia-a factor which the agency's own
studies have found significant in explaining the current low
usage rates for seatbelts "8 -works in favor of, not against,
use of the protective device. Since 20% to 50% of motorists
currently wear seatbelts on some occasions, 9 there would
seem to be grounds to believe that seatbelt use by occasional
users will be substantially increased by the detachable passive belts. Whether this is in fact the case is a matter for theagency to decide, but it must bring its expertise to bear on
the question.
The agency is correct to look at the costs as well as
the benefits of Standard 208. The agency's conclusion thatthe incremental costs of the requirements were no longer
reasonable was predicated on its prediction that the safety
benefits of the regulation might be minimal. Specifically, the" NHTSA commissioned a number of surveys of public attitudes in aneffort to better understand why people were not using manual belts and to
determine how they would react to passive restraints. The surveys revealthat while 20% to 40% of the public is opposed to wearing manual belts, thelarger proportion of the population does not wear belts because they forgot
or found manual belts inconvenient or bothersome. RIA, at IV-25, App.
81. In another survey, 38% of the surveyed group responded that theywould welcome automatic belts, and 25% would "tolerate" them. See
RIA, at IV-37, App. 93. NHTSA did not comment upon these attitude
surveys in its explanation accompanying the rescission of the passive restraint requirement.
" Four surveys of manual belt usage were conducted for NHTSA between 1978 and 1980, leading the agency to report that 40% to 50% of thepeople use their belts at least some of the time. RIA, at IV-25, App. 81.

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Opinion of the Court

agency's fears that the public may resent paying more forthe automatic belt systems is expressly dependent on theassumption that detachable automatic belts will not produce more than "negligible safety benefits." Id., at 53424.
When the agency reexamines its findings as to the likely increase in seatbelt usage, it must also reconsider its judgmentof the reasonableness of the monetary and other costs associated with the Standard. In reaching its judgment, NHTSA
should bear in mind that Congress intended safety to be thepre-eminent factor under the Act:
"The Committee intends that safety shall be the overriding consideration in the issuance of standards under
this bill. The Committee recognizes ... that the Secretary will necessarily consider reasonableness of cost,feasibility and adequate leadtime." S. Rep. No. 1301,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1966).
"In establishing standards the Secretary must conform to the requirement that the standard be practicable. This would require consideration of all relevant
factors, including technological ability to achieve the goalof a particular standard as well as consideration of economic factors.
"Motor vehicle safety is the paramount purpose of thisbill and each standard must be related thereto." H. R.
Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 16 (1966).
The agency also failed to articulate a basis for not requiring
nondetachable belts under Standard 208. It is argued thatthe concern of the agency with the easy detachability of thecurrently favored design would be readily solved by a continuous passive belt, which allows the occupant to "spool out"
the belt and create the necessary slack for easy extricationfrom the vehicle. The agency did not separately consider
the continuous belt option, but treated it together with theignition interlock device in a category it titled "Option of
Adopting Use-Compelling Features." 46 Fed. Reg. 53424

OCTOBER TERM, 1982
Opinion of the Court

463 U. S.

(1981). The agency was concerned that use-compelling devices would "complicate the extrication of [an] occupant fromhis or her car." Ibid. "[T]o require that passive belts contain use-compelling features," the agency observed, "could becounterproductive [, given] ... widespread, latent and irrational fear in many members of the public that they could betrapped by the seat belt after a crash." Ibid. In addition,
based on the experience with the ignition interlock, theagency feared that use-compelling features might trigger
adverse public reaction.
By failing to analyze the continuous seatbelts option in its
own right, the agency has failed to offer the rational connection between facts and judgment required to pass muster
under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. We agreewith the Court of Appeals that NHTSA did not suggest thatthe emergency release mechanisms used in nondetachable
belts are any less effective for emergency egress than thebuckle release system used in detachable belts. In 1978,
when General Motors obtained the agency's approval toinstall a continuous passive belt, it assured the agency that
nondetachable belts with spool releases were as safe asdetachable belts with buckle releases. 43 Fed. Reg. 21912,
21913-21914 (1978). NHTSA was satisfied that this belt design assured easy extricability: "[tihe agency does not believethat the use of [such] release mechanisms will cause serious
occupant egress problems . . . ." Id., at 52493, 52494.
While the agency is entitled to change its view on the acceptability of continuous passive belts, it is obligated to explain
its reasons for doing so.
The agency also failed to offer any explanation why a continuous passive belt would engender the same adverse public
reaction as the ignition interlock, and, as the Court ofAppeals concluded, "every indication in the record points theother way." 220 U. S. App. D. C., at 198, 680 F. 2d, at 234.2
The Court of Appeals noted previous agency statements distinguishinginterlocks from passive restraints. 42 Fed. Reg. 34290 (1977); 36 Fed.
Reg. 8296 (1971); RIA, at H-4, App. 30.

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Opinion of REHNQUIST, J.

We see no basis for equating the two devices: the continous
belt, unlike the ignition interlock, does not interfere withthe operation of the vehicle. More importantly, it is theagency's responsibility, not this Court's, to explain its
decision.
VI"An agency's view of what is in the public interest may
change, either with or without a change in circumstances.
But an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned
analysis.... " GreaterBoston Television Corp. v. FCC, 143

U. S. App. D. C. 383, 394, 444 F. 2d 841, 852 (1970) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 403 U. S. 923 (1971). We do
not accept all of the reasoning of the Court of Appeals but
we do conclude that the agency has failed to supply therequisite "reasoned analysis" in this case. Accordingly, wevacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand thecases to that court with directions to remand the matterto the NHTSA for further consideration consistent with thisopinion. 21
So ordered.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE,JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, concurring inpart and dissenting in part.

I join Parts I, II, III, IV, and V-A of the Court's opinion.
In particular, I agree that, since the airbag and continuous
Petitioners construe the Court of Appeals' order of August 4, 1982, assetting an implementation date for Standard 208, in violation of Vermont
Yankee's injunction against imposing such time constraints. Vermont
Yankee Nuclear PowerCorp. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U. S. 519, 544-545 (1978). Respondents maintain that the Court ofAppeals simply stayed the effective date of Standard 208, which, not having
been validly rescinded, would have required mandatory passive restraints
for new cars after September 1, 1982. We need not choose between theseviews because the agency had sufficient justification to suspend, although
not to rescind, Standard 208, pending the further consideration requiredby the Court of Appeals, and now, by us.

OCTOBER TERM, 1982

Opinion of REHNQUIST, J.

463 U. S.

spool automatic seatbelt were explicitly approved in theStandard the agency was rescinding, the agency should explain why it declined to leave those requirements intact. In
this case, the agency gave no explanation at all. Of course, if
the agency can provide a rational explanation, it may adhere
to its decision to rescind the entire Standard.
I do not believe, however, that NHTSA's view of detachable automatic seatbelts was arbitrary and capricious.
The agency adequately explained its decision to rescind theStandard insofar as it was satisfied by detachable belts.
The statute that requires the Secretary of Transportation to issue motor vehicle safety standards also requiresthat "[e]ach such . . . standard shall be practicable [and]shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety." 15 U. S. C.
§ 1392(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). The Court rejects the agency's
explanation for its conclusion that there is substantial uncertainty whether requiring installation of detachable automaticThe
belts would substantially increase seatbelt usage.
agency chose not to rely on a study showing a substantial increase in seatbelt usage in cars equipped with automatic
seatbelts and an ignition interlock to prevent the car frombeing operated when the belts were not in place and whichwere voluntarily purchased with this equipment by consumers. See ante, at 53, n. 16. It is reasonable for the agency
to decide that this study does not support any conclusion concerning the effect of automatic seatbelts that are installed in
all cars whether the consumer wants them or not and are notlinked to an ignition interlock system.
The Court rejects this explanation because "there would
seem to be grounds to believe that seatbelt use by occasional
users will be substantially increased by the detachable passive belts," ante, at 54, and the agency did not adequately
explain its rejection of these grounds. It seems to me thatthe agency's explanation, while by no means a model, isadequate. The agency acknowledged that there would probably be some increase in belt usage, but concluded that theincrease would be small and not worth the cost of manda-

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Opinion of REHNQUIST, J.

tory detachable automatic belts. 46 Fed. Reg. 53421-53423(1981). The agency's obligation is to articulate a "'rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made."'Ante, at 42, 52, quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 371 U. S. 156, 168 (1962). I believe it has met
this standard.
The agency explicitly stated that it will increase its educational efforts in an attempt to promote public understanding,
acceptance, and use of passenger restraint systems. 46 Fed.
Reg. 53425 (1981). It also stated that it will "initiate efforts
with automobile manufacturers to ensure that the public will
have [automatic crash protection] technology available. If
this does not succeed, the agency will consider regulatory
action to assure that the last decade's enormous advances incrash protection technology will not be lost." Id., at 53426.
The agency's changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new President of a different politicalparty. It is readily apparent that the responsible membersof one administration may consider public resistance and uncertainties to be more important than do their counterpartsin a previous administration. A change in administration
brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly
reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of thecosts and benefits of its programs and regulations. As longas the agency remains within the bounds established by
Congress,* it is entitled to assess administrative records
and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of theadministration.

*Of course, a new administration may not refuse to enforce laws of which
it does not approve, or to ignore statutory standards in carrying out its
regulatory functions. But in this case, as the Court correctly concludes,ante, at 44-46, Congress has not required the agency to require passive
restraints.