JOINT RESEARCH CENTER FOR PANEL STUDIESDISCUSSION PAPER SERIES
DP2012-007
March, 2013

Measuring Japanese Constituency Preferences for Income
Redistribution Policy and Effects by the Great Earthquake ofEastern Japan in 2011

Tamaki Miyauchi*【Abstract】
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first purpose is to present features of Japaneseconstituency preferences for income redistribution policy as well as measured effects of
the aftermath of the Great Earthquake of Eastern Japan on these preferences. These
analyses exploited the results of the JHPS survey which was conducted in 2011 and2012. The second purpose is to present the advantages of the JHPS questionnaire on
constituency preference for income redistribution over the similar questionnaires inother surveys (the General Social Survey, European Social Survey and World Value
Survey) using the measurement results noted above.
The brief results can be summarized as follows.First, the analysis shows that
constituency preferences for tax and for social security benefits are not necessarily
symmetrical.The term ``symmetrical'' here means that the effects of certain observed
characteristics of each respondent's preference for tax and that for social security
benefits are opposite in direction to each other and that both effects are statisticallysignificant.This result shows advantage of surveying constituency preferences for tax
and for social security benefits separately.Second, the Difference in Differences (DID) --where the treatment group consists of respondents in the areas where the aftermath of
the Great Earthquake of Eastern Japan in 2011 was severe, and the control groupconsists of respondents in other areas --- shows no statistically significant difference inpreference between the two groups.

* Associate Professor, Keio University Department of Economics

Joint Research Center for Panel Studies
Keio University

Measuring Japanese Constituency Preferences for
Income Redistribution Policy and Eﬀects by theGreat Earthquake of Eastern Japan in 2011∗
Preliminary and Incomplete

Tamaki MIYAUCHI†First Draft: March 1, 2013; Revised March 22, 2013

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The ﬁrst purpose is to present
features of Japanese constituency preferences for income redistribution
policy as well as measured eﬀects of the aftermath of the Great Earthquake of Eastern Japan on these preferences. These analyses exploitedthe results of the JHPS survey which was conducted in 2011 and 2012.
The second purpose is to present the advantages of the JHPS questionnaire on constituency preference for income redistribution over the similar
questionnaires in other surveys (the General Social Survey, European Social Survey and World Value Survey) using the measurement results noted
above.
The brief results can be summarized as follows. First, the analysis
shows that constituency preferences for tax and for social security beneﬁts are not necessarily symmetrical. The term “symmetrical” here meansthat the eﬀects of certain observed characteristics of each respondent’s
preference for tax and that for social security beneﬁts are opposite in direction to each other and that both eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant.
This result shows advantage of surveying constituency preferences for tax
and for social security beneﬁts separately. Second, the Diﬀerence in Differences (DID) — where the treatment group consists of respondents inthe areas where the aftermath of the Great Earthquake of Eastern Japan∗ I would like to express my special thanks to Professor Kay Shimizu at Columbia University
Department of Political Science for her deliberate and precise comments on my research aswell as for her support in hosting me as a visiting research scholar at the Weatherhead East
Asian Institute (WEAI), Columbia University, while I devote myself to research as a visiting
research scholar at WEAI. I also thank Patricia Kuwayama for her reading through my paper
as well as for her precious comments. This paper utilizes the Japan Household Panel Survey(JHPS) data set, access to which was kindly granted by the Joint Research Center for Panel
Studies at Keio University in Tokyo, Japan. All errors are naturally mine.
† A Visiting Research Scholar at Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University,
Email:tm2610@columbia.edu ; Home Position: Associate Professor at Department of Economics, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, Email:miyauchi@econ.keio.ac.jp1

in 2011 was severe, and the control group consists of respondents in otherareas — shows no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in preference between
the two groups.

1

Introduction

Even in countries with a free market economy, people repeatedly argue about
the role of the government and the degree to which the government shouldintervene markets. The degree to which the government commits itself to income
redistribution policy varies across countries even in the western world, let alone
in case of planed economy systems. The second column of the Table 1 shows
national burden ratios of major OECD countries in 20101. The national burden
ratios is deﬁned as the shares in each country’s GDP of all taxes (personal andcorporate income taxes, social security contribution and payroll taxes, property
taxes, taxes on goods and services and other taxes) and social security. The
national burden ratios range from around 45% to 48%, with those of countries
in Northern Europe at the high end about 45%, Denmark’s ratio is the highest
at 47.6%. Elsewhere in the EU, the national burden ratios of France and Italy
are both 42.9%, and that of Germany is 36.1%, with those of the UK andSpain at 34.9% and 32.3% respectively. In North America, on the other hand,the national burden ratio of Canada is 31.0%, and that of the US is 24.8%,
the lowest among these countries. In Eastern Asia, the national burden ratio ofSouth Korea is 25.1%, the second lowest among these OECD member countries,
and that of Japan is almost as low at 27.6%.
The third and fourth columns of Table 1 show Gini coeﬃcients measuringincome inequality of each country, for pre-tax and those for post-tax income distribution respectively. The last row of Table 1 shows the correlation coeﬃcients
between the countries’ national burden ratios and the corresponding Gini coefﬁcients. The correlation coeﬃcient for post-tax income distribution is −0.748(fourth column). In contrast, the correlation coeﬃcient between national burden ratios and Gini coeﬃcients of pre-tax income distribution is 0.135 (thirdcolumn). It thus appears that a higher ratio of national burden is strongly
associated with the reduction of income inequality in each society.
These simple observation from Table 1 — the wide range of national burden
ratios and their strong negative correlation with after-tax income inequality —readily arises a question as to why national burden ratios and Gini coeﬃcientsvary across countries. This question has motivated researchers in the ﬁeld ofpolitical economics to investigate factors that bring about the variation of national burden ratios, and of income inequality as indexed by the Gini coeﬃcientor other indicators. This question has also motivated surveys to measure constituency preference for income redistribution policy.
In the US, the General Social Survey (GSS) has been conducted since 1972,
and contains some questions about preference for redistribution policy. The Eu1 Sources: OECD National Accounts Statistics, OECD Tax Policy Analysis - Revenue
Statistics 2012 Edition. Both are listed in reference.

2

Table 1: The National Burden Ratios and Gini Coeﬃcients in major OECD
countries
2010 National
Gini Coeﬃcient Gini Coeﬃcient
Gini CoeﬃcientCountry
Burden Ratio (%)
Pre-Tax
Post-Tax
Diﬀerence
Denmark
47.6
0.416
0.248
−0.168
Sweden
45.5
0.426
0.259
−0.167
Norway
42.9
0.410
0.250
−0.160
42.5
0.465
0.259
−0.206
FinlandFrance
42.9
0.483
0.293
−0.190
Italy
42.9
0.534
0.337
−0.197
36.1
0.504
0.295
−0.209Germany
UK
34.9
0.506
0.342
−0.164
32.3
0.461
0.317
−0.144
Spain
Greece
30.9
0.436
0.307
−0.129
31.0
0.441
0.324
−0.117
Canada
Japan
27.6
0.462
0.329
−0.133
Korea
25.1
0.344
0.314
−0.030
USA
24.8
0.486
0.378
−0.108Correlation Coef. with
National Burden Ratios
0.135−0.748−0.749Note1) National Burden Ratio: OECD National Accounts Statistics
Note2) Gini Coeﬃcients: OECD Tax Policy Analysis - Revenue Statistics 2012 Edition

ropean Social Survey (ESS) has been conducted since 2002 and it also contains
some questions about preference for social beneﬁts and services. The World
Value Survey (WVS) was conducted in its ﬁrst round of 1981-1984 wave covering twelve countries in Europe, the US and Canada in North America, andSouth Korea; the ﬁfth round of the WVS was recently conducted in 2005-2008
covering ﬁfty-six countries not only in Europe and North America but also inCentral and South America, Africa, Middle East, Oceania, and in Central andSouth East Asia as well as in East Asia. Questionnaires to survey preference
for redistribution (extracted from the websites of the GSS, ESS and WVS) are
shown in Appendix B, Appendix C and Appendix D respectively. The answeringformat of the questionnaires extracted here commonly feature one dimensional
scale, in which each respondent chooses a level expressing how strongly he or
she agrees or disagrees with the statements in the each question.
In Japan, a questionnaire to numerically measure constituency preference forincome redistribution was newly created and introduced in the Japan Household
Panel Survey (JHPS), which is conducted by the Joint Research Center for
Panel Studies at Keio University in Tokyo, in the year of 2011. Exactly thesame questionnaire was included in the JHPS conducted in 2012 as well. The
main feature of this questionnaire is as follows. This questionnaire shows each
respondent an imaginary society consisting only three households and the pretax income2 of each household is given there. Then the questionnaire asks the
2 In this paper, the phrase “pre-tax income” in the imaginary society means the income
distribution before any kind of income transfer is applied in the imaginary society as given in
JHPS questionnaire on preference for redistribution.

3

each respondent how much amount of tax and that of social security beneﬁt theeach respondent thinks should be for each household in the imaginary society.
The brief results of measuring the constituency preference for redistribution
using the outcomes of the JHPS questionnaire are as follows. First, analyses
on the relation between preference and characteristics of respondents show that
constituency preference for tax and that for social security beneﬁt are not necessarily symmetrical, in terms of Gini coeﬃcients, slope of tax and that of social
security beneﬁt over income as well as the amounts of tax and social security
beneﬁt. The term “symmetrical” here means that the eﬀects of observed certain characteristic of each respondent over the measure of preference for tax
and that for social security beneﬁt are opposite in direction to each other andthat both eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant. This result shows the advantage
of surveying preferable amount of tax and that of social security beneﬁt separately and numerically. Second, the Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences (DID), where
the treatment group consists of respondents in the areas of severe aftermath of
the Great Earthquake of Eastern Japan in 2011 and the control group consistsof other respondents, shows no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in preferences
between the two groups. This paper discusses these results in comparison withthe analyses in the literature using GSS, ESS and WVS in literature.
Section 2 gives a brief survey of the literature. Section 3 describes the JHPS
questionnaire to survey Japanese constituency preference for income redistribution. Section 4 summarizes outcomes of the JHPS questionnaire conducted in2011 and in 2012. Section 5 presents the analysis of the eﬀect by aftermathof the Great Earthquake of Eastern Japan on the preference for redistribution
using the Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences method. Section 6 shows features of preference for redistribution as related to characteristics of each respondent based oncross section analysis of 2011 JHPS data and 2012 JHPS data independently.
Section 7 concludes this paper.

2

Literature

In the literature on this subject, most researchers build their hypotheses, as
to why national burden ratios among countries vary so, on the following threepoints3 .
The ﬁrst point focuses on diﬀerences in social dynamism in terms of mobility among social or income classes in society as well as in terms of geographicalmobility within a society or across societies. Given human asset of ability andphysical and ﬁnancial assets owned by each agent, geographical mobility may
enable the agent to access richer variety of the choice set for participating job
market. Hence, the geographical mobility may cause mobility among social orincome classes. The mobility among social or income classes has function contributing to adjust or mitigate the state of income inequality in a society andthis function of social mobility substitutes the function of income redistribution
policy by the government. Hindriks(1999) argues in his theoretical analysis that
3 These three points are overlapping among them and not mutually exclusive.

4

preference for redistribution depends on the situation of social mobility between
the rich and the poor. Cremer and Pestieau(2004) shows a theoretical framework where the social mobility as production factor mobility contributes theeﬃciency of the resource allocation in market. Gavilia(2007) shows empiricalevidence for relationship between social mobility and preference for income redistribution policy, arguing that the empirical survey in Latin America and in
the USA suggests the perception of diﬃculty in social mobility leads to aﬃrmative preference for income redistribution policy in Latin America in comparison
with the perception of social mobility and preference for redistribution in the
US.
The second point focuses on the diﬀerence in cultural background and structure of the social classes. The former focuses on the desert-sensitivity meaning
the degree of supporting an idea where individual eﬀort deserves deserts, andthe idea that success and failure in terms where the individual belongs to thespeciﬁc social class is attributed to individual eﬀorts but not luck, birth nor
connection etc. The term “the diﬀerence in cultural background” also means
the diﬀerence in social custom such as that of donating, which is sometimes
based on religious motivation. Luttens and Valfort(2012) performed comparative study on preferences for redistribution using WVS and European Value
Survey(EVS) and argues that desert-sensitive motivation plays a more signiﬁcant roll in the US than it does in Europe. The latter of the point, i.e. thestructure of the social classes, focuses on the diﬀerence in situation and structure of racial strata of society. Finseraas(2012) argues based on the analysisof the ESS that preference for redistribution among the rich gets lower when
proportion of ethnic minorities is higher. Based on the analysis on Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS), Lupu and Pontusson(2011) argues that the tendency ofthe middle-class to support redistribution policy is caused by, not the degree ofincome inequality of the society, but the structure of the inequality where themiddle and the poor are closer relative to the distance between the middle andthe rich. Using the ESS, Reeskens and Oorschot(2012) analyzes how strongly
or weakly the European voters support the immigrants’ access to social welfare.
They argue that voters who believe welfare beneﬁts should target the neediest
have tendency to restrict immigrants’ access to welfare beneﬁt.
The third point focuses on the diﬀerence in the personal factors which directly aﬀect the individual preference for redistribution. The personal factors
which aﬀect the preference for redistribution are the diﬀerence in the levels of
economic self-interest for family, that in parents’ political or social attitudes,that in personal experience of extreme misfortune and that in personal historyof growing up in a society of speciﬁc doctrine. Mehlkop and Neumann(2012),
using The Public Policy Acceptance Study(PPAS), argues that the diﬀerence insituation of intergenerational monetary transfers for family and children statistically accounts for the diﬀerence in preferences for redistribution policy. Benabou
and Tirole(2006) argues that parents intentionally convey their views about thestatus quo of inequality in the society along with views about social mobility totheir children to motivate them. Alesina and Giuliano(2010), using WVS, thestrong family ties account for the higher home production as well as the larger
5

size of family, and it also accounts for negative preference for redistribution
although it suppresses geographical mobility. Giuliano and Spilimbergo(2009)
argues that personal experience of growing up in recessions generates more pessimistic view about the future than that in economically good periods does.
Alesina and Angeletos(2005), focusing on the interrelationship between viewson whether social mobility depends on individual eﬀorts or it does on just luckand preferences for redistribution, argues that society where most people attribute economic success to their individual eﬀorts leads to negative preference
for both redistribution and taxes and this situation helps market to work fairly
well. They also argues that the society where most people, on the contrary,has view of economic success being attributed to luck, but not eﬀorts, leads
to strongly aﬃrmative preference for redistribution and taxation. Alesina andFuchs-Schundeln(2007), comparing preferences for redistribution between East
Germans and West Germans, argues that regime strongly aﬀects preference forredistribution policy.
Finally, Alesina and Giuliano(2011), giving comprehensive survey on vast
amount of literature in this ﬁeld, argues that their empirical study shows evidence that females are more favorable to redistribution policy. This point will
be examined in Section 6.
As far as positive analyses in literature noted above on preferences for redistribution are concerned, micro-data obtained by surveys of GSS, ESS, WVS
etc. are exploited to induce their analytical ﬁndings. As noted in the previous
section, these questionnaires commonly ask respondent to answer her or his preference for redistribution in format of one dimensional scale. The critical point
here is that, other factors being equal, how much strongly people support or
reject income redistribution policy depends on the state of income inequality ofstatus quo. In this sense, the preference for redistribution should be measured
under a speciﬁc circumstance where a typical pre-tax income distribution ofeach society is presented to each respondent, especially for the sake of preserving comparability among the outcomes of surveys. This implies that people’s
preference for redistribution can possibly be expressed in terms of “tolerable degree of inequality” which is technically expressed by indexes or parameters such
as Gini coeﬃcient, Thiel Index, diversity index of Generalized Entropy Index,
etc. If this is true, measuring the parameter distribution of people’s preference
for redistribution in terms of “tolerable degree of inequality” will help us toassess actual redistribution policy or to assess the state of income inequality or
equality in status quo4 .
Motivated to measure the parameter distribution of people’s preference for“tolerable degree of inequality” in income distribution, JHPS newly added a
set of questionnaire that asks respondents her or his preferable amount of tax
4 If the hypothesis of the “Median Voter Theorem” applies to the outcomes of actual voting,the voting itself will reveal the median value of the parameter distributed over the “tolerable
degree of inequality.” But in most cases, this hypothesis of the “Median Voter Theorem”
does not apply and actual voting does not reveal the median value of the parameter even if
parameter distribution exists, because income redistribution policy can rarely be a single issueof actual voting.

6

Table 2: Summary on Outcomes of JHPS Survey
Wave Date of Conducting Sample Size Attrition Rate (%)
1 February, 2009
4022
N/A
3470
13.7
2 February, 2010
3160
9.1
3 February, 2011
2821
10.9
4 February, 2012
N/A
N/A
5 February, 2013
Note1) The 5th wave of JHPS is in process.
Note2) The Great Earthquake of Eastern Japan occurred
between 3rd wave and 4th wave of JHPS.

and beneﬁt for each household in imaginary society5 . The survey including
this set of questionnaire was conducted in 2011 for the ﬁrst time6 and also
conducted in February, 2012. The next section will describe some features ofthis questionnaire.

3

Questionnaire on Preference for Redistribution in Japan Household Panel Survey(JHPS)

JHPS included a set of questionnaire to survey respondents’ preferable amountof tax and beneﬁt for households in imaginary society. (Please see Appendix A.)
The survey including this set of questionnaire was conducted in February, 2011
for the ﬁrst time and also conducted in February, 2012. This section describes
some features of this questionnaire.
JHPS started its ﬁrst survey in 2009, and the JHPS survey in 2011 is the
3rd wave. The brief summary of the outcomes of JHPS survey since it started
its survey in 2009 is described in Table 2.
Sampling design of JHPS is the two-stage stratiﬁed random sampling. Survey areas of the Population Census of Japan are sampled in the 1st stage, andindividuals are sampled in the 2nd stage. The JHPS questionnaire also includes
a set of questions to ask spouse of the individual respondent to answer, if heor she has the one. The set of questions on preference for redistribution is only
directed to respondents, but not to their spouses, in order to preserve randomness in sampling. Exactly the same set of the questions listed in Appendix A
in included in JHPS questionnaire in 2011 and 2012 as well, thus the outcomeof this set of questions can be used as panel data of two periods.
Features of the set of questions to survey preference for redistribution in
JHPS are as follows. First, it shows an imaginary society consisting of three
5 Appendix A shows this set of questionnaire.

6 Date of conducting JHPS in 2011 is February 2011. Soon after the JHPS started its
survey or while the survey was in process, the Great Earthquake of Eastern Japan occurredon March 11 in 2011.

7households, and each of household consists of four members. The tree households are named as “Household A,” “Household B” and “Household C.” It also
shows initial income of each household as 35 thousand USD, 70 thousand USD
and 125 thousand USD7 for Household A, Household B and Household C respectively. These initial income was obtained as the rounded mean of the lower
33%, middle 33% and higher 33% of the initial income distribution of re-sampled
households which consist of four members in JHPS 2009 survey8 .
The formula of calculating Gini coeﬃcient is formula (2.8.3) in Sen andFoster(1973). The Gini coeﬃcient of the initial income distribution in thisimaginary society is 0.2609, and this value is much smaller than the actual
Gini coeﬃcient of Japan, 0.462, listed in Table 1. Limiting the households inthe imaginary society to four-member household might have excluded the poor
households from the sample and this might have caused the gap between theGini coeﬃcient in the imaginary society and that of real society.
Given this initial income distribution in the imaginary society, the question(1) in the JHPS questionnaire asks each respondent to answer• the most preferable amounts of Tax and Social Security Contribution thateach household pays, and• the most preferable amounts of Social Security Beneﬁt that each household
receives.
The question (2) in the JHPS questionnaire asks the preferable amount of Social
Beneﬁt if the household income happens to be zero due to loosing job.
The way to ask the preferable amount of tax and that of social security
contribution has the following advantages.
1. Obtaining the tolerable measure of income inequality numerically, such as
Gini coeﬃcient, and this measure is comparable among diﬀerent societies
and countries. This type of numerical measure being comparable among
diﬀerent societies cannot be obtained by the answering format of one dimensional measure to questions such as how much each respondent thinks
the income inequality of the society is large9 . Plans for analyses using
the outcome of this JHPS questionnaire is discussed in Yamamoto andFukahori(2011).
2. Asking the preferable levy of tax and beneﬁt of social security enables
us to measure the preference for tax and beneﬁt separately, even if these
preferences are not symmetrical10 .
7 In original set of questionnaire, unit of the initial income of each household is yen, andthe amount in US dollars are converted from yen with the rate of 1USD= 100yen.
8 The reason why re-sampling of households were performed, not for JHPS 2011, but for
JHPS 2009 survey was to avoid sampling bias due to sample attrition.
9 See the item “INCGAP” in GSS questionnaire in Appendix B, for example.
10 The term “symmetrical” here means that the eﬀects of observed certain characteristic ofeach respondent over the measure of preference for tax and that for social security beneﬁt are
opposite in direction to each other and that both eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant.
See also the item Question D 34 in ESS questionnaire in Appendix C, for example.

8

3. The preferable amounts of tax and that of beneﬁt enables us to obtain thepreference for the size of government expenditure. This information cannot be obtained with questions asking whether or not the each respondent
thinks the government tax rate is too large or not11 .
4. The preferred slopes of tax and beneﬁt over the initial income distribution
are obtained. The slopes shows whether the preferences for tax and social
security beneﬁt are progressive or not over a speciﬁc pre-tax income distribution. The degree how much each respondent thinks the tax and beneﬁt
should be progressive over a given set of income distribution cannot be
obtained by the way of asking the preference for the statement such thatthe rich should pay more tax than the poor should12 .
The next section shows these advantages concretely with the results of analyses on the outcomes of the JHPS questionnaire to measure the preference forredistribution.

4

Summary of the Outcomes of JHPS Questionnaire on Preference for Redistribution

The Great Earthquake of Eastern Japan of 2011 (abbreviated as “GEEJ” inthis paper) occurred on March 11, 2011 between the JHPS surveys in 2011
and in 2012. This section summarizes the outcomes of JHPS questionnaire on
preference for tax and beneﬁt surveyed in 2011 and in 2012 with a setting oftreatment group and control group where the respondents in cities suﬀered fromsevere aftermath of GEEJ form the treatment group.
Table 3 summarizes the outcome in the form of the table in the questionnaireof Question (1) presented in the Appendix A. In this table, the outcomes of
respondents are divided into two groups, i.e. “Treatment Group” and ”Control
Group.” The “Treatment Group” consists of the outcomes of the respondents
who are in the areas that the “Disaster Relief Act” was applied for due to the
GEEJ 13 , and the “Control Group” consists of the outcomes of the respondents
11 See the item “TAXRICHI” in GSS questionnaire in Appendix B, for example.

12 See the items “GOVEQINC” and “TAXSHARE” in GSS questionnaire in Appendix B,
the item “V152” in WVS questionnaire in Appendix D, the item “D23” in ESS questionnairein Appendix C, for examples.
13 As noted at the Note 1 in Table 3, although the Disaster Relief Act was applied for cities
in Tokyo as well as other cities suﬀered from sever aftermath of the earthquake, tsunami
and radiation emitted from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, the “Treatment
Group” excludes all the outcomes of the respondent in Tokyo, and they are included in the“Control Group.” The reason is the application for the Disaster Relief Act to cities in Tokyo
was mainly to supply food, water and blankets to workers who had diﬃculty in returning
their homes from their oﬃces in central Tokyo area due to the traﬃc turmoil soon after theearthquake occurred. Thus, the application of the Disaster Relief Act to cities in Tokyo ended
much sooner compared to other cities that suﬀered from sever aftermath of the GEEJ. See
also the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan Home Page “On application ofDisaster Relief Act for Earthquake in Paciﬁc Ocean along the coastal area of Tohoku(Report11)” in references.

9

Table 3: Summary Statistics of Outcomes of the Questionnaire; Treatment
Group of the GEEG vs. Control Group(JHPS2011,2012)

Panel I: Question(1); Outcomes on Tax and Social Security Beneﬁt in Imaginary Society
Amount of Tax and Social
Amount of Social
Security Contribution
Security Beneﬁt that
Government should collect
Government should expend
2011
2012
2011
2012
n
183
159
n
183
159
Treatment Group
(134)
(134)
(134)
(134)
mean
21.64
22.98
mean
58.93
73.84
(24.22)(23.51)(64.16)(67.96)
s.d.
26.79
23.02
s.d.
75.97
91.12
Household A(28.79)(23.58)(81.98)(85.04)(35 thousand USD）
n
2374
2137
n
2374
2137
(1942)(1942)(1942)(1942)
mean
23.12
21.66
mean
59.82
59.56
(23.48)(21.84)(58.76)(59.71)
Control Group s.d.
25.78
22.82
s.d.
77.40
82.66
(26.34)(23.09)(76.10)(81.89)
mean
68.93
68.60
mean
28.15
55.40
Treatment Group(74.08)(68.96)(35.28)(49.19)
s.d.
61.41
54.76
s.d.
75.87
115.58Household B(63.39)(54.66)(87.00)(106.70)(70 thousand USD）
mean
72.16
69.31
mean
37.06
46.87
(72.97)(69.78)(36.31)(47.53)Control Group s.d.
58.63
56.84
s.d.
90.21
106.11(57.02)(56.18)(88.08)(105.34)mean
168.62173.25
mean
33.92
62.08
Treatment Group(176.07) (170.64)(42.57)(55.53)s.d.
147.07137.23s.d.
125.18172.62
Household C(151.13) (134.92)(144.39)(159.48)(125 thousand USD） mean
176.74169.29
mean
41.45
45.73
(179.23) (170.97)(40.34)(46.06)
Control Group s.d.
139.54135.40s.d.
134.40144.30(137.74) (135.59)(132.89)(144.36)
Panel II: Question(2); Outcomes on Social Security for Loosing Job
2011
2012
n
183
159
(134)
(134)
Treatment Groupmean
192.53
199.36(193.97)(192.34)s.d.
119.32115.00(125.70)(107.81)
n
2374
2137
(1942)(1942)
Control Groupmean
204.35203.15(205.72)(204.02)s.d.
108.71109.51(107.36)(109.08)Note1) Outcomes of respondents in cities in Tokyo are classiﬁed into the Control Group.
Note2) Panel I: The sample size(n)’s for Household B and C are same as those for Household A in each corresponding
cell.
Note3) Each value outside the parentheses represents the statistic of independent sample of 2011 as well as 2012.
Note4) Each value inside the parentheses represents the statistic of panel sample of 2011 through 2012.

10

in other cities.
Panel I in Table 3 describes the sample size(n)’s, means and standard deviation(s.d.)’s of the outcomes for Question (1), which are divided into the“Treatment Group” and the “Control Group.” The each value in the parenthesis represents the outcomes for panel sample of 2011 through 2012 that excludes
the dropped records in the JHPS 2012 sample, and the each value outside theparenthesis represents the outcomes for each sample in JHPS 2011 and in JHPS
2012 independently.
The Panel I of Table 3 shows diﬀerent trends between outcomes on tax andthose on social security beneﬁt.
The s.d.’s of the outcomes on taxation tend to get smaller toward 2012both in Treatment Group and Control Group. This trend looks similar both inindependent samples for 2011 and 2012, as well as panel sample of 2011 through2012. On the other hand, the s.d.’s of the outcomes on social security beneﬁttend to get a little larger toward 2012.
As for the means of the outcomes on taxation, the trend toward 2012 looks
diﬀerent between these for independent samples and that for panel sample. Incase of Treatment Group, the means tend to get larger toward 2012 as for independent samples, while the means in the panel sample tend to get smaller
toward 2012. This implies sample attrition in such a way in which more respondents who prefer small amount of taxation dropped in 2012 survey than
the respondents who prefer larger amount of taxation did.

5

Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences: Measuring Eﬀect of
the Great Earthquake of Eastern Japan on
Preference for Redistribution

This section presents the results of measuring eﬀect of the GEEJ on preference
for redistribution by exploiting the outcomes of the panel sample of JHPS 2011
and 2012, with the method of the Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences(DID).
The DID was applied by Ashenfelter and Card(1985) to estimate the eﬀectof job training program on wage proﬁle using longitudinal data. Card(1990),
Card and Krueger(1994) also estimated the impact of policies on labor market
with this method. The GEEJ is considered absolutely exogenous to preference,
so that the problem of endogeneity discussed by Ashenfelter and Card(1985)
never arises in this DID analysis14 on the eﬀect of GEEJ over preference forredistribution.

14 The problem of sample bias due to the sample attrition between JHPS 2011 and 2012
might arise.

11

Table 4: Diﬀerence in Diﬀerences: Treatment Group of Cities where Disaster
Relief Act was Applied vs. Control Group
Panel I: Amount of Net Income Transfer (Social Security Beneﬁt minus Tax)
Diﬀ. in Treatment Gr.
Diﬀ. in Control Gr.
n
mean
s.d.
n
mean
s.d.
F
Pr.F
t
Pr.t
W
Hous. A
134
4.50
98.1
1942
2.58
98.4
1.01
0.496
0.22
0.827
0
134
19.04
126.0
1942
14.40
134.6
1.14
0.165
0.39
0.698
0
Hous. B
134
18.39
220.5
1942
13.97
216.5
1.04
0.371
0.23
0.820
0
Hous. C
Panel II: Outcomes on Tax and Social Security Beneﬁt(SSB) of Question(1)Diﬀ. in Treatment Gr.
Diﬀ. in Control Gr.
n
mean
s.d.
n
mean
s.d.
F
Pr.F
t
Pr.t
W
Tax
Hous. A
134
−0.70
28.8
1942
−1.64
30.4
1.11
0.211
0.35
0.729
0
134
−5.13
65.6
1942
−3.18
68.4
1.09
0.267
0.32
0.750
0
Tax
Hous. B
134
−5.43
164.1
1942
−8.26
151.4
1.18
0.090
0.21
0.835
0
Tax
Hous. C
134
3.80
99.6
1942
0.94
98.9
1.01
0.443
0.32
0.747
0
SSB
Hous. A
134
13.92
120.1
1942
11.22
124.8
1.08
0.285
0.24
0.808
0
SSB
Hous. B
134
12.96
187.8
1942
5.72
177.7
1.12
0.179
0.45
0.649
0
SSB
Hous. C
Panel III: Amount of Government Expenditure: Total Amount of Social Security Beneﬁt minus That of Tax
Diﬀ. in Treatment Gr.
Diﬀ. in Control Gr.
n
mean
s.d.
n
mean
s.d.
F
Pr.F
t
Pr.t
W
134
41.93
386.9
1942
30.96
384.9
1.01
0.453
0.32
0.750
0
Panel IV: Outcome on the Amount of Social Security Beneﬁt for Loosing Job of Question(2)Diﬀ. in Treatment Gr.
Diﬀ. in Control Gr.
n
mean
s.d.
n
mean
s.d.
F
Pr.F
t
Pr.t
W
134
−1.63
131.5
1942
−1.70
123.9
1.13
0.163
0.01
0.995
0
Panel V: Slope of Regression Line of Tax and SSB on the Pre-Tax IncomeDiﬀ. in Treatment Gr.
Diﬀ. in Control Gr.
n
mean
s.d.
n
mean
s.d.
F
Pr.F
t
Pr.t
W
Tax
Slope
134
−0.00483
0.1726
1942−0.00752
0.1600
1.16
0.103
0.19
0.852
0
134
0.009120.1705
1942
0.00394
0.1640
1.08
0.256
0.35
0.724
0
SSB
Slope
Panel VI: Slope of Regression Line of Net Income Transfer on the Pre-Tax IncomeDiﬀ. in Treatment Gr.
Diﬀ. in Control Gr.
n
mean
s.d.
n
mean
s.d.
F
Pr.F
t
Pr.t
W
Slope
134
0.01395
0.2333
1942
0.011460.2310
1.02
0.425
0.12
0.904
0
Panel VII: Gini Coeﬃcient of Income Distribution Caused by Taxation Only
Diﬀ. in Treatment Gr.
Diﬀ. in Control Gr.
n
mean
s.d.
n
mean
s.d.
F
Pr.F
t
Pr.t
W
134
0.000450.03071942
0.00063
0.0318
1.08
0.297
0.06
0.951
0
Panel VIII: Gini Coeﬃcient of Income Distribution Caused by Redistribution by Way of Social Security Beneﬁt Only
Diﬀ. in Treatment Gr.
Diﬀ. in Control Gr.
n
mean
s.d.
n
mean
s.d.
F
Pr.F
t
Pr.t
W
134
−0.00029
0.0303
1942−0.00032
0.0303
1.00
0.478
0.01
0.993
0
Panel IX: Gini Coeﬃcient of Income Distribution Caused by Net Income Transfer (Social Security Beneﬁt minus Tax)
Diﬀ. in Treatment Gr.
Diﬀ. in Control Gr.
n
mean
s.d.
n
mean
s.d.
F
Pr.F
t
Pr.t
W
134
0.000880.0482
1942
0.000710.0495
1.05
0.353
0.04
0.969
0
Note1) The Welch-Test is applied if the null hypothesis H0 is rejected for 5% signiﬁcant level in F -Test.
Note2) The 1 in the rightmost column means the Welch-Test is applied instead of t-Test.

12

Table 4 shows the results of the DID analysis. Each row of the table showsa test for a certain index in DID formula. The table shows the each diﬀerence
between the transitory diﬀerences of 2011 through 2012 in treatment groupfor certain speciﬁc index and the transitory diﬀerence of 2011 through 2012 incontrol group for the same index in the treatment group. The diﬀerences of 2011
through 2012 are obtained by panel sample. “F” in the table shows values of thetest statistic for testing the null hypothesis that states the variances of the twogroups are equal, and “Pr.P” represents the corresponding P-values. “t” in thetable shows values of the test statistic for testing the null hypothesis that states
the mean of the two groups are equal, and “Pr.t” in the table represents thecorresponding P-values. If the hypothesis is rejected in signiﬁcant level of 5% in
F-Test, the Welch-Test is applied instead of t-test. The “W” in the rightmost
column in the table indicates each ﬂag that shows whether or not the WelchTest was applied to an index of each row. The value 1 of the ﬂag means the
Welch-Test was applied, and 0 means not.
Indexes subject to statistical test in DID formula were as follows. (PanelI) indicates the test results for the amount of net income transfer, which isdeﬁned as the amount of beneﬁt minus the amount of tax in the outcomes of
Question(1), for each household. (Panel II) indicates the test results for the eachoutcome of Question (1), which decomposes the amount of net income transfer,listed in Panel I, into tax and social security beneﬁt. (Panel III) indicates thetest result for the amount of government expenditure, which is deﬁned as total
amount of beneﬁt minus total amount of tax. (Panel IV) indicates the test result
for the outcome of Question (2), where the respondent answers the preferable
amount of social security beneﬁt in case the household’s income happens to fallto zero due to loosing job. (Panel V) indicates the test results for the slope ofregression line, which is obtained by ﬁtting the line regressing the amount of
tax or that of social security beneﬁt of each household on the initial income15 .
(Panel VI) also indicates the test result for the slope of regression line, which is
obtained by ﬁtting the line regressing the amount of net income transfer (social
security beneﬁt minus tax) for each household on the initial income. This slope
aggregates the slopes for the Panel V and indicates whether or not the net
transfer is progressive to initial income. (Panel VII) indicates the test result
for Gini coeﬃcient obtained by the income distribution caused by taxation only
for each household. (Panel VIII) indicates the test result for Gini coeﬃcientobtained by the income distribution caused by redistribution by way of social
security beneﬁt only for each household. Finally, (Panel IX) indicates the test
result for Gini coeﬃcient obtained by the income distribution caused by net
transfer for each household.
Table 4 shows no evidence of signiﬁcant shift in preference for redistribution
in Treatment Group compared to that in Control Group. But this result does
not deny the possibility that the GEEJ shifted preference for redistribution ofJapanese constituency as a whole.
15 In this paper, the phrase “initial income” is solely deﬁned and used for the income distribution before any kind of income transfer is applied in the imaginary society given in JHPS
questionnaire on preference for redistribution.

13

6

Checking the Stability in Preference for Redistribution: Comparison of Cross-Section Analysis for JHPS 2011 and 2012

In the previous section, no signiﬁcant shift in preference for redistribution between the two groups was detected. This section discuss the stability in therelationship between each index obtained by outcomes of JHPS questionnaire
on preference for redistribution and the observed characteristics of the each respondent over the two periods of JHPS survey year, i.e. the year of 2011 and2012. In other words, this section presents the result of cross-section analysis
performed independently for JHPS 2011 outcomes and JHPS 2012 outcomes to
see what kind of observed characteristic systematically shifts the preference forredistribution.
Panel I of the Table 5 shows the summary statistics of the dependent variables. These dependent variables are classiﬁed into four groups.
First group is the diﬀerences in the value of Gini coeﬃcient, which are calculated for the income distribution after income transfer is performed by meansof tax, social security beneﬁt or both of them that each respondent prefers,
from the initial value of Gini coeﬃcient, 0.2609, which is also calculated for the
initial income distribution given in the imaginary society of the questionnaire of
JHPS16 . The diﬀerence in Gini coeﬃcient is calculated based on the outcomesof JHPS questionnaire, and three kinds of diﬀerences in Gini coeﬃcient are deﬁned. First, the diﬀerence caused by net income transfer by means of both tax
and social security beneﬁt. This diﬀerence is decomposed into the following two
kinds of diﬀerences. The one is the diﬀerence caused by altering the income
distribution solely by means of tax, and the other is the diﬀerence caused byaltering the income distribution solely by means of social security beneﬁt.
The second group is the slopes of the regression line, which is obtained byﬁtting the line regressing the amount of tax, that of social security beneﬁt,
or the amount of net income transfer of each household on the initial income.
Three kinds of the slopes are deﬁned, according to what amount to be regressedon the initial income. The ﬁrst slope is obtained by regressing the amountof net income transfer for each household on the initial income. This slope isdecomposed into the following two kinds of slopes. The one is the slope obtainedby regressing the amount of tax on the initial income, and the other is obtainedby regressing the amount of social security beneﬁt on the initial income.
The third group is the sums of the amount of tax, social security beneﬁt
and net income transfer across three households in the imaginary society. Thissum indicates the scale of the government budget or deﬁcit due to redistribution
policy of the government. Three kinds of sums are deﬁned, according to whatamount to be summed up. The ﬁrst is the sum of the each amount of the net
16 Because the value of Gini coeﬃcient is zero under the circumstance of perfectly equalincome distribution, the diﬀerence in the value of Gini coeﬃcient will be negative if theincome redistribution policy gets the distribution closer, in terms of Gini coeﬃcient, to theperfectly equalized income distribution than the initial income distribution is.

14

income transfer for each household. This sum is decomposed into the following
two kinds of sums. The one is the sum of the each amount of tax that eachhousehold pay, and the other is the sum of the each amount of social security
beneﬁt that each household receives.
The fourth group, although consisting of only one element, is the outcome of
Question (2) which asks the respondents how much amount of the social security
beneﬁt should be in case the household income falls to zero due to loosing job.
Independent variables are shown in Panel II in Table 5. Those independent
variables are classiﬁed into some groups in terms of the observed characteristics
of respondents. First, “Female” or gender, and “Age” represent demographicalstatus. Second, “Big City” and “Disaster Relief Act” represent geographicalstatus. Third, “Married” and “Change in Marital St.” represent marital status.
The variable “Change in Marital St.” represents change in marital status in thesurvey year compared to that in one year before, and takes the value of zero,1, −1 for the case of unchanged, married and divorced respectively. Fourth,“Time Preference” and “Risk Aversion” represent behavioral preference of each
respondent. The variable of “Time Preference” represents discounting and is calculated as the interest rate for the outcomes to the question how much amountof money satisﬁes you if you have to wait for 13 months instead of receiving 100
dollars one month from now. The variable of “Risk Aversion” takes the value ofminimum probability at which the respondent brings an umbrella when he or shegoes out for a place that he or she has never visited before. This variable takes
the value of zero, if the respondent answers that he or she always takes an umbrella unconditionally. Fifth, “Education: College,” “Graduate School,” “National School,” “Private School,” “School Overseas” and “High School: Night”
represent the educational background of each respondent. “National School,”“Private School” and “School Overseas” are dummy variables. Each takes avalue of one when the respondent went elementary school or high school of thatcategory, and zero otherwise. These three variables might reﬂect the parents’ (ofeach respondent) attitude toward society. “High School: Night” takes value of
one when respondent went night course of high school, and zero otherwise. Thisvariable also might reﬂect the situation of the respondent’s family backgroundbecause tuition fee of the night course is very cheap, and many students go tonight course while they work in daytime. This may imply that the family of
the respondent when he or she was about age of 15 years was relatively poor.
Sixth, “Mother: College” and “Mother: Self-Employed” represent the parents’(of the respondent) background and may represent the parents’ attitude toward
society. Seventh, “Unemployment,” “Slope of Income Trend,” “Slope of Wage
Rate Trend,” “Involuntary Part Time,” “Labor Union,” “Discretionary Work,”“Self-Employed,” “Stepping t Full-Time,” “Willing to Change Job” and “Quit
Job Unwillingly” represent employment status of each respondent. “InvoluntaryPart Time” takes a value of one when the respondent only has part time job
opportunity although he or she wants to have full time job opportunity, and zerootherwise. “Stepping to Full-Time” takes a value of one when the respondentis currently in a position of time job but the chance to step up to the position of full time job is open to the respondent at the establishment where the15respondent currently works, and zero otherwise. Eighth, “Freedom > Equality” represents the political attitude of each respondent, which takes a value of
one he or she believes freedom is more important than equality in this society.
Ninth, “Happy in Life” represents mental situation of each respondent, whichtakes a value of one when the respondent thinks he or she is happy in whole life.
Tenth, “Amount of Securities,” “Amount of Debt,” “Household Income After
Tax,” “Livelihood Protection” and “Home Ownership” represent economic situation of each respondent’s household. “Livelihood Protection” takes a value of
one if livelihood protection service by government is granted to the household ofeach respondent because the household suﬀers form an extreme poverty. “Home
Ownership” takes a value of one when the family of each respondent owns thedwelling. Finally, “Amount of Donation per Year” represents each respondent’s
attitude toward society. These variables are chosen according to hypotheses in
the literature.
Table 6 through Table 9 show the results of cross-section analysis for JHPS
2011 and 2012 separately and independently. Table 6 shows the results of regression analysis where the dependent variables of the group 1 are regressedon observed characteristics of the respondent. Table 7 shows the results of regression analysis where the dependent variables of the group 2 are regressedon observed characteristics of the respondent. Table 8 shows the results of regression analysis where the dependent variables of the group 3 are regressedon observed characteristics of the respondent. Table 9 shows the results of regression analysis where the dependent variable of the group 4 is regressed on
observed characteristics of the respondent.

16

Table 5: Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables and Independent Variables
Panel I: Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables

Dependent Variable
ΔGini Coef.: Overall
ΔGini Coef.: Levy
ΔGini Coef.: SSB
Slope on Initial Income: Overall
Slope on Initial Income: Levy
Slope on Initial Income: SSB
Gov. Expenditure(SSB−Levy)
Sum of Levy
Sum of SSB
Question(2): SSB for Loosing Job
Note) SSB: Social Security Beneﬁt

2011
sample size
1736
mean
s.d.
min.
−0.0370.043−0.42−0.0170.027−0.26−0.0180.024−0.17−0.188
0.201
−1.44
0.172
0.145
0.00
−0.0170.127−0.51−136.49302.22−1535.0
270.23200.340.0
133.74270.720.0
203.31
107.80
0.0

max.
0.09
0.10
0.05
0.79
1.00
0.84
1838.01600.02000.0999.0

2012
sample size
1376
mean
s.d.
min.
−0.0370.040−0.29−0.0170.025−0.17−0.0180.024−0.17−0.185
0.195
−1.12
0.171
0.144
−0.06
−0.0140.124−0.52−123.95
310.28−1020.0
267.48
194.830.0
143.53281.080.0
201.96103.84
0.0

max.
0.07
0.05
0.07
0.71
0.81
0.73
1975.01150.02100.0800.0

Panel II: Summary Statistics of Independent Variables
2011
2012
sample size
1736
sample size
1376
Independent Variable
mean
s.d.
min.
max.
mean
s.d.
min.
Female(=1)
0.460
0.499
0
1
0.467
0.499
0
50.50
15.09
22.0
90.0
50.50
14.81
23.0
Age
0.278
0.448
0
1
0.289
0.454
0
Big City(=1)
0.070
0.256
0.00
1.00
0.065
0.246
0.00
Disaster Relief Act(=1)
0.771
0.420
0
1
0.767
0.423
0
Married(=1)
0.001
0.107
−1.00
1.00
0.000
0.121
−1.00
Change in Marital St.(M.=1,D.=-1)
0.225
0.131
−0.05
0.95
0.210
0.116
−0.03
Time Preference
0.423
0.148
0.00
1.00
0.413
0.155
0.00
Risk Aversion
0.290
0.454
0
1
0.298
0.458
0
Education: College(=1)
0.022
0.146
0
1
0.025
0.155
0
Graduate School(=1)
0.003
0.059
0
1
0.004
0.066
0
National School(=1)
0.011
0.104
0
1
0.009
0.097
0
Private School(=1)
0.001
0.024
0
1
0.001
0.027
0
School Overseas(=1)
0.039
0.193
0
1
0.038
0.191
0
High School: Night(=1)
0.079
0.271
0
1
0.085
0.279
0
Mother: College(=1)
0.119
0.324
0
1
0.118
0.322
0
Mother; Self-Employed(=1)
0.270
0.444
0
1
0.270
0.444
0
Unemployed(=1)
0.07
0.25
−2.3
3.0
0.07
0.25
−1.1
Slope of Income Trend
24.18
787.45−6636.5
6870.024.72
514.58−3475.2
Slope of Wage Rate Trend
0.027
0.162
0
1
0.030
0.170
0
Involuntary Part Time(=1)
0.136
0.343
0
1
0.136
0.343
0
Labor Union(=1)
0.093
0.291
0
1
0.105
0.307
0
Discretionary Work(=1)
0.090
0.286
0
1
0.079
0.270
0
Self-Employed(=1)
0.078
0.269
0
1
0.068
0.252
0
Stepping to Full-Time(=1)
0.043
0.203
0
1
0.041
0.198
0
Willing to Change Job(=1)
0.032
0.175
0
1
0.036
0.187
0
Quit Job Unwillingly(=1)
0.334
0.472
0
1
0.337
0.473
0
Freedom > Equality(=1)
0.547
0.498
0
1
0.525
0.500
0
Happy in Life(=1)
227.18866.720.0
24000.0
235.25998.040.0
Amount of Securities
604.71
1283.640.0
20000.0
672.951458.54
0.0
Amount of Debt
506.34295.990.0
3500.0509.94304.590.0
Household Income After Tax
0.004
0.063
0
1
0.002
0.047
0
Livelihood Protection(=1)
1604.010731.20.
320000.
1256.35874.70.
Amount of Donation per Year
0.770
0.421
0
1
0.767
0.423
0
Home Ownership(=1)Note) “(=1)” after the variable name indicates that the variable is a dummy variable.

17

max.
1
91.0
1
1.00
1
1.00
0.78
1.00
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2.9
3329.4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
24000.018000.0
3000.01
100000.
1

Table 6: Δ Gini Coeﬃcients

Sample Size (n)Adjusted R2
Female(=1)
Age
Big City(=1)
Disaster Relief Act(=1)
Married(=1)
Change in Marital St.(M.=1,D.=-1)
Time Preference
Risk Aversion
Education: College(=1)
Graduate School(=1)
National School(=1)ΔGini Coef.
Overall
2011
2012
1736
1376
0.02360.02230.006775
0.003831(2.93)∗∗∗(1.58)−0.000086−0.000132(−0.95)(−1.36)−0.000798−0.002975(−0.34)(−1.21)−0.001564−0.005011(−0.39)(−1.12)−0.002866−0.001675(−1.08)(−0.60)0.006866
0.000603(0.70)(0.07)−0.014782
0.001378(−1.85)∗(0.15)
0.013095
0.011412(1.80)∗(1.56)−0.005587−0.004605(−2.23)∗∗(−1.76)∗0.000079(0.01)
0.034695(1.89)∗−0.002585(−0.35)−0.038151(−2.32)∗∗

Private School(=1)

0.013232
0.018312(1.33)(1.61)−0.010989
0.031711(−0.26)(0.79)High School: Night(=1)
0.004685
0.002237(0.86)(0.38)
Mother: College(=1)−0.003001
0.006902(−0.75)(1.68)∗
Mother; Self-Employed(=1)−0.003716−0.001545(−1.15)(−0.45)
Unemployed(=1)
0.002981
0.001823(0.99)(0.58)
Slope of Income Trend
0.000986−0.008138(0.23)(−1.77)∗
Slope of Wage Rate Trend−0.000002
0.000000(−1.71)∗(0.14)
Involuntary Part Time(=1)−0.006428−0.001070(−0.98)(−0.16)
Labor Union(=1)−0.004120−0.000451(−1.28)(−0.13)Discretionary Work(=1)−0.005855−0.008936(−1.53)(−2.32)∗∗
Self-Employed(=1)
0.010835
0.006683(2.69)∗∗∗(1.50)
Stepping to Full-Time(=1)−0.001530−0.004363(−0.38)(−0.96)
Willing to Change Job(=1)−0.012591−0.017363(−2.43)∗∗(−3.06)∗∗∗
Quit Job Unwillingly(=1)−0.000203−0.006723(−0.03)(−1.13)
Freedom > Equality(=1)
0.004243
0.007037(1.92)∗(3.03)∗∗∗
Happy in Life(=1)
0.000794
0.000567(0.37)(0.25)
Amount of Securities−0.000001
0.000001(−0.87)(1.02)
Amount of Debt
0.000000−0.000001(0.48)(−0.84)
Household Income After Tax
0.000003−0.000001(0.79)(−0.33)
Livelihood Protection(=1)−0.001012
0.023542(−0.06)(1.01)
Amount of Donation per Year
0.000000
0.000000(−0.65)(−1.92)∗Home Ownership(=1)
0.007093−0.002635(2.66)∗∗∗(−0.94)
Constant−0.042447−0.031445(−6.09)∗∗∗(−4.31)∗∗∗
Note1) Significance Level: ∗ ∗ ∗ = 1%, ∗∗ = 5%, ∗ = 10%
Note2) Values in parentheses are t-values.
Note3) SSB: Social Security Benefit
School Overseas(=1)

18ΔGini Coef.
Levy
2011
2012
1736
1376
0.01570.01750.003625
0.004751(2.51)∗∗(3.19)∗∗∗−0.000086(−1.51)−0.000101(−0.07)0.000977(0.39)−0.001850(−1.11)0.001657(0.27)−0.008506(−1.70)∗0.011014(2.42)∗∗−0.002388(−1.52)−0.002640(−0.57)0.013736(1.20)
0.007088(1.14)−0.021209(−0.79)0.003449(1.01)−0.002893(−1.15)−0.004611(−2.27)∗∗0.002959(1.56)−0.001042(−0.38)−0.000001(−0.75)−0.006149(−1.49)0.000472(0.23)−0.001580(−0.66)0.005211(2.07)∗∗−0.000506(−0.20)−0.004344(−1.34)0.002570(0.69)
0.001965(1.42)−0.000003(0.00)−0.000001(−0.70)0.000000(0.29)
0.000005(2.11)∗∗−0.003670(−0.36)0.000000(−0.13)0.003411(2.04)∗∗−0.021134(−4.84)∗∗∗−0.000101(−1.68)∗−0.002365(−1.56)0.000756(0.28)−0.001826(−1.06)0.002882(0.51)−0.000965(−0.17)0.001669(0.37)−0.000786(−0.49)0.003053(0.68)−0.005256(−0.52)0.004074(0.58)
0.019241(0.78)
0.005952(1.66)∗−0.000482(−0.19)−0.001356(−0.64)−0.001267(−0.66)−0.000184(−0.06)0.000000(0.34)
0.001820(0.45)
0.001796(0.86)−0.006465(−2.72)∗∗∗0.004626(1.69)∗−0.005136(−1.84)∗−0.003747(−1.07)−0.006717(−1.83)∗0.004161(2.91)∗∗∗
0.001007(0.72)
0.000000(0.61)
0.000000(−0.76)0.000002(1.02)
0.008220(0.57)
0.000000(−0.69)−0.002398(−1.39)−0.012780(−2.85)∗∗∗

ΔGini Coef.
SSB
2011
2012
1736
1376
0.01540.02730.002769−0.000634(2.18)∗∗(−0.45)−0.000016−0.000063(−0.32)(−1.12)−0.000834−0.000817(−0.65)(−0.57)−0.002553−0.005916(−1.15)(−2.27)∗∗−0.000401(−0.27)0.004718(0.88)−0.005985(−1.36)0.001896(0.48)−0.002989(−2.17)∗∗−0.002895(−1.89)∗0.002465(0.61)
0.018970(1.88)∗−0.003269(−0.76)−0.028337(−2.95)∗∗∗0.003805(0.70)
0.009517(0.40)
0.001233(0.41)−0.000075(−0.03)0.000631(0.35)−0.000300(−0.18)0.001319(0.55)−0.000001(−2.01)∗∗−0.000509(−0.14)−0.004262(−2.40)∗∗−0.003749(−1.78)∗0.005059(2.29)∗∗−0.000609(−0.27)−0.006315(−2.21)∗∗−0.001957(−0.60)0.002292(1.88)∗
0.000600(0.51)
0.000000(−0.56)0.000000(0.36)−0.000002(−0.88)0.002987(0.33)
0.000000(−0.88)0.003307(2.26)∗∗−0.018855(−4.92)∗∗∗0.012207(1.84)∗

0.000167(0.10)−0.002229(−0.41)0.001941(0.35)
0.008888(2.08)∗∗

0.011349(0.48)−0.002998(−0.88)0.006084(2.54)∗∗−0.000106(−0.05)0.002930(1.61)−0.006412(−2.38)∗∗0.000000(−0.14)−0.002190(−0.57)−0.002264(−1.15)−0.002117(−0.94)0.001661(0.64)
0.000461(0.17)−0.011983(−3.61)∗∗∗−0.001110(−0.32)0.002764(2.04)∗∗−0.000700(−0.53)0.000001(1.13)
0.000000(−0.54)−0.000003(−1.31)0.012590(0.93)
0.000000(−2.00)∗∗−0.000692(−0.42)−0.015543(−3.65)∗∗∗

Table 7: Slopes on the Initial Income

Sample Size (n)Adjusted R2
Female(=1)
Age
Big City(=1)
Disaster Relief Act(=1)
Married(=1)
Change in Marital St.(M.=1,D.=-1)
Time Preference
Risk Aversion

Slope on Initial
Income: Overall
2011
2012
1736
1376
0.02380.01930.032226
0.026080(2.98)∗∗∗(2.23)∗∗

Slope on Initial
Income: Levy
2011
2012
1736
1376
0.02150.0189−0.025738−0.031991(−3.30)∗∗∗(−3.71)∗∗∗0.000550(1.30)−0.006229(−0.57)−0.011705(−0.62)−0.017637(−1.42)−0.015404(−0.34)−0.029442(−0.79)0.070839(2.09)∗∗−0.000015(−0.05)0.002612(0.33)−0.008973(−0.66)0.012248(1.36)−0.014320(−0.44)0.012262(0.45)−0.063168(−2.58)∗∗

Education: College(=1)−0.024967(−2.13)∗∗

Graduate School(=1)−0.033963(−0.98)0.143627(1.68)∗

National School(=1)
Private School(=1)

0.000434(0.92)−0.014503(−1.22)−0.009828(−0.46)−0.011444(−0.85)0.008222(0.18)
0.025273(0.55)
0.037675(1.07)−0.026199(−2.06)∗∗−0.039359(−1.11)−0.078234(−0.98)0.079474(1.45)
0.151068(0.78)
0.007407(0.26)
0.046012(2.32)∗∗

0.084565(1.82)∗−0.092190(−0.46)
High School: Night(=1)
0.011032(0.43)
Mother: College(=1)−0.000602(−0.03)
Mother; Self-Employed(=1)−0.018682
0.000097(−1.23)(0.01)
Unemployed(=1)
0.012770−0.001191(0.90)(−0.08)Slope of Income Trend
0.008005−0.017277(0.40)(−0.77)
Slope of Wage Rate Trend−0.000008−0.000003(−1.36)(−0.29)Involuntary Part Time(=1)−0.028259−0.006895(−0.92)(−0.22)
Labor Union(=1)−0.015400
0.001287(−1.02)(0.08)
Discretionary Work(=1)−0.030742−0.037227(−1.72)∗(−1.99)∗∗Self-Employed(=1)
0.036207
0.033410(1.93)∗(1.55)
Stepping to Full-Time(=1)−0.015922−0.006468(−0.84)(−0.29)Willing to Change Job(=1)−0.067499−0.071096(−2.78)∗∗∗(−2.59)∗∗Quit Job Unwillingly(=1)
0.020331−0.020933(0.73)(−0.73)
Freedom > Equality(=1)
0.014951
0.018782(1.44)(1.67)∗
Happy in Life(=1)
0.002089
0.012709(0.21)(1.16)
Amount of Securities−0.000009
0.000001(−1.63)(0.13)
Amount of Debt
0.000003−0.000004(0.74)(−1.05)
Household Income After Tax
0.000022−0.000013(1.26)(−0.70)
Livelihood Protection(=1)−0.035870
0.339327(−0.47)(3.01)∗∗∗
Amount of Donation per Year
0.000000−0.000002(−0.34)(−1.67)∗
Home Ownership(=1)
0.017201−0.006128(1.38)(−0.45)Constant−0.257265−0.213226(−7.90)∗∗∗(−6.04)∗∗∗Note1) Significance Level: ∗ ∗ ∗ = 1%, ∗∗ = 5%, ∗ = 10%
Note2) Values in parentheses are t-values.
Note3) SSB: Social Security Benefit
School Overseas(=1)

190.023537(2.78)∗∗∗
0.020369(0.82)−0.113501(−1.83)∗−0.048541(−1.45)0.078839(0.55)−0.014252(−0.78)0.001298(0.10)
0.023496(2.15)∗∗−0.009315(−0.91)0.002087(0.14)
0.000003(0.74)
0.032379(1.46)−0.002975(−0.27)0.017160(1.33)−0.030525(−2.25)∗∗0.000206(0.02)
0.034673(1.98)∗∗
0.002900(0.14)−0.007619(−1.02)−0.000976(−0.14)0.000005(1.16)−0.000002(−0.63)−0.000022(−1.74)∗0.015204(0.28)
0.000000(−0.33)−0.010675(−1.19)0.213836(9.09)∗∗∗

0.000160(0.46)
0.012984(1.48)
0.002684(0.17)
0.014513(1.45)−0.021462(−0.65)−0.034172(−1.01)−0.026109(−1.00)0.013827(1.48)
0.020643(0.79)
0.040585(0.69)−0.019990(−0.49)−0.155144(−1.08)−0.023860(−1.15)−0.009264(−0.63)0.004351(0.35)
0.012571(1.13)−0.010448(−0.64)0.000000(0.00)−0.015754(−0.67)−0.008074(−0.67)0.029996(2.18)∗∗−0.026741(−1.68)∗0.025495(1.58)
0.024775(1.22)
0.030988(1.46)−0.020437(−2.47)∗∗−0.009994(−1.23)−0.000002(−0.60)0.000001(0.28)−0.000011(−0.82)−0.084283(−1.02)0.000001(1.00)
0.015069(1.50)
0.177056(6.81)∗∗∗

Slope on Initial
Income: SSB
2011
2012
1736
1376
0.00510.02600.006487−0.005905(0.94)(−0.79)0.000534
0.000594(1.97)∗∗(1.99)∗∗−0.003618(−0.51)−0.020678(−1.71)∗−0.005386(−0.68)−0.029739(−1.02)−0.017187(−0.72)0.007666(0.35)−0.001433(−0.19)−0.013600(−0.62)0.030122(0.55)
0.036012(1.22)−0.013350(−0.10)−0.003221(−0.20)0.000695(0.06)
0.004811(0.50)
0.003455(0.38)
0.010091(0.78)−0.000005(−1.29)0.004116(0.21)−0.018374(−1.91)∗−0.013581(−1.19)0.005679(0.47)−0.015710(−1.30)−0.032827(−2.12)∗∗0.023228(1.31)
0.007330(1.11)
0.001113(0.17)−0.000005(−1.24)0.000001(0.45)
0.000000(0.00)−0.020669(−0.43)0.000000(−0.90)0.006523(0.82)−0.043424(−2.09)∗∗−0.001522(−0.20)−0.007149(−0.52)0.003068(0.36)−0.013236(−0.47)−0.008908(−0.31)0.011579(0.52)−0.012369(−1.53)−0.018728(−0.83)−0.037637(−0.74)0.059508(1.71)∗−0.003978(−0.03)−0.016453(−0.92)0.036747(2.92)∗∗∗
0.004450(0.42)
0.011373(1.19)−0.027724(−1.96)∗−0.000003(−0.46)−0.022646(−1.12)−0.006787(−0.65)−0.007227(−0.61)0.006661(0.49)
0.019027(1.37)−0.046309(−2.65)∗∗∗0.010063(0.55)−0.001658(−0.23)0.002719(0.39)−0.000002(−0.49)−0.000003(−1.33)−0.000024(−2.05)∗∗0.255041(3.57)∗∗∗−0.000001(−1.46)0.008942(1.04)−0.036167(−1.61)

Table 8: Sums of Levy, Social Security Beneﬁt(SSB)

Sample Size (n)Adjusted R2
Female(=1)

Gov. Expenditure(SSB−Levy)
2011
2012
1736
1376
0.00880.016922.845500
37.352870(1.40)(2.01)∗∗

Sum of
Levy
2011
2012
1736
1376
0.02120.0155−37.047980−42.646340(−3.44)∗∗∗(−3.65)∗∗∗Age−0.851056(−2.02)∗∗

Big City(=1)

4.384887(0.40)−18.285420(−0.97)14.343070(1.16)−27.102290(−0.60)−17.558690(−0.47)−77.017710(−2.28)∗∗2.404752
2.699255(3.75)∗∗∗(3.61)∗∗∗−4.253183−12.053150(−0.26)(−0.64)
Disaster Relief Act(=1)−7.590143
31.738050(−0.26)(0.92)
Married(=1)−24.882160−15.643120(−1.32)(−0.73)
Change in Marital St.(M.=1,D.=-1)−89.252570
0.590533(−1.30)(0.01)
Time Preference
41.075650
50.277890(0.73)(0.69)
Risk Aversion
81.558210−18.779030(1.59)(−0.33)
Education: College(=1)−9.110619−22.958090(−0.51)(−1.14)
Graduate School(=1)−74.924440−66.347640(−1.44)(−1.18)National School(=1)
56.839700
168.825300(0.44)(1.33)
Private School(=1)
130.189300
14.906880(1.86)∗(0.17)
School Overseas(=1)−115.195600
88.757400(−0.38)(0.29)High School: Night(=1)−7.694786
7.202059(−0.20)(0.16)
Mother: College(=1)
16.368580
57.523140(0.58)(1.82)∗
Mother; Self-Employed(=1)−24.118450
15.449160(−1.05)(0.58)
Unemployed(=1)
15.592590−27.653030(0.73)(−1.15)
Slope of Income Trend
9.314555
26.053480(0.30)(0.73)
Slope of Wage Rate Trend
0.001044−0.008777(0.11)(−0.53)Involuntary Part Time(=1)−26.931580−15.703930(−0.58)(−0.31)
Labor Union(=1)
4.708416
5.470091(0.21)(0.21)
Discretionary Work(=1)−24.263310−25.422790(−0.90)(−0.86)
Self-Employed(=1)−8.308748
33.852500(−0.29)(0.99)
Stepping to Full-Time(=1)−22.889070
19.526220(−0.80)(0.56)
Willing to Change Job(=1)−69.490670−24.696410(−1.89)∗(−0.57)
Quit Job Unwillingly(=1)
46.592710
4.953875(1.11)(0.11)
Freedom > Equality(=1)−1.435208−9.847683(−0.09)(−0.55)Happy in Life(=1)
1.385938
34.827010(0.09)(1.99)∗∗
Amount of Securities−0.014391−0.009564∗(−1.66)(−1.09)Amount of Debt
0.004912−0.004378(0.81)(−0.72)
Household Income After Tax
0.043499−0.017370(1.63)(−0.58)Livelihood Protection(=1)−81.517860
638.456200(−0.71)(3.57)∗∗∗
Amount of Donation per Year
0.000151−0.000854(0.21)(−0.59)Home Ownership(=1)−11.236790
13.485160(−0.60)(0.62)
Constant−298.299800−272.922800(−6.05)∗∗∗(−4.86)∗∗∗Note1) Significance Level: ∗ ∗ ∗ = 1%, ∗∗ = 5%, ∗ = 10%
Note2) Values in parentheses are t-values.
Note3) SSB: Social Security Benefit

20

33.746660(2.89)∗∗∗
19.277720(0.56)−168.056300(−1.97)∗∗−65.652460(−1.42)−24.842460(−0.12)−15.517690(−0.61)−14.607440(−0.78)30.089710(1.99)∗∗−3.867621(−0.27)1.388988(0.07)
0.001646(0.27)
36.310610(1.19)−6.768567(−0.45)24.063560(1.35)−28.753680(−1.53)−5.808254(−0.31)56.827960(2.35)∗∗
25.635710(0.92)−3.838546(−0.37)−2.768309(−0.28)0.007554(1.32)−0.003789(−0.95)−0.025446(−1.45)−1.168334(−0.02)−0.000329(−0.70)−4.498409(−0.36)363.684200(11.20)∗∗∗−0.488465(−1.04)14.243620(1.20)
9.569878(0.44)
17.969690(1.33)−14.641330(−0.33)−90.098850(−1.97)∗∗−49.127100(−1.39)22.587860(1.78)∗
62.562150(1.76)∗
45.489520(0.57)−12.832970(−0.23)−207.931000(−1.07)−13.233600(−0.47)−24.571110(−1.24)2.627769(0.16)
26.128390(1.73)∗−27.784580(−1.25)0.000378(0.04)−20.083350(−0.63)−3.015100(−0.18)27.164670(1.46)−28.465360(−1.32)26.219110(1.20)
31.741760(1.16)
23.665630(0.82)−18.637260(−1.66)∗−15.312810(−1.39)−0.002222(−0.40)−0.000473(−0.12)−0.013407(−0.71)−144.425500(−1.28)0.001056(1.17)
18.872630(1.39)
324.539800(9.20)∗∗∗

Sum of
SSB
2011
2012
1736
1376
0.00030.0141−14.202480−5.293473(−0.97)(−0.31)1.553696
2.210790(2.69)∗∗∗(3.26)∗∗∗
0.131704(0.01)−25.875570(−1.00)−10.539090(−0.62)−116.354900(−1.88)∗23.516960(0.46)
4.540495(0.10)
24.636040(1.54)−55.646730(−1.19)−111.216600(−0.95)64.536800(1.02)−140.038100(−0.51)−23.212480(−0.67)1.761137(0.07)
5.971256(0.29)
11.724970(0.61)
10.703540(0.39)
0.002691(0.32)
9.379031(0.22)−2.060151(−0.10)−0.199750(−0.01)−37.062430(−1.45)−28.697320(−1.11)−12.662710(−0.38)72.228410(1.91)∗−5.273754(−0.37)−1.382371(−0.10)−0.006836(−0.87)0.001123(0.21)
0.018053(0.75)−82.686200(−0.80)−0.000177(−0.28)−15.735190(−0.93)65.384390(1.48)

2.190472(0.13)
41.307930(1.33)
2.326564(0.12)−14.050800(−0.22)−39.820960(−0.60)−67.906130(−1.33)−0.370226(−0.02)−3.785482(−0.07)214.314800(1.86)∗
2.073907(0.03)−119.173600(−0.42)−6.031537(−0.15)32.952040(1.15)
18.076930(0.75)−1.524637(−0.07)−1.731100(−0.05)−0.008399(−0.56)−35.787280(−0.78)2.454991(0.10)
1.741874(0.06)
5.387132(0.17)
45.745330(1.45)
7.045355(0.18)
28.619510(0.69)−28.484950(−1.76)∗19.514200(1.23)−0.011787(−1.49)−0.004851(−0.88)−0.030777(−1.14)494.030700(3.04)∗∗∗
0.000202(0.15)
32.357790(1.65)∗
51.616960(1.01)

Table 9: Question(2): SSB for Loosing Jobs

Sample Size (n)Adjusted R2
Female(=1)
Age
Big City(=1)
Disaster Relief Act(=1)
Married(=1)
Change in Marital St.(M.=1,D.=-1)
Time Preference
Risk Aversion
Education: College(=1)
Graduate School(=1)
National School(=1)
Private School(=1)
School Overseas(=1)
High School: Night(=1)
Mother: College(=1)
Mother; Self-Employed(=1)
Unemployed(=1)
Slope of Income Trend
Slope of Wage Rate Trend
Involuntary Part Time(=1)
Labor Union(=1)

Question(2): SSB
for Loosing Job
2011
2012
1736
1376
0.0274−0.0028−3.816189
1.691630(−0.66)(0.27)
0.023238
0.128991(0.10)(0.51)
9.468455−5.670283(1.61)(−0.89)−11.500090−1.231610(−1.14)(−0.11)0.420870
10.403270(0.06)(1.43)−26.409230−17.224210(−1.08)(−0.72)41.995170
5.875826(2.10)∗∗(0.24)−23.494410−14.301240(−1.30)(−0.75)7.716900
2.860046(1.23)(0.42)
22.124010−2.298464(1.20)(−0.12)−128.075800
19.446510(−2.80)∗∗∗(0.45)−14.004330−27.469730(−0.56)(−0.93)−106.673900
33.817630(−1.00)(0.32)
7.440215−4.734281(0.55)(−0.31)−31.011160−6.201883(−3.09)∗∗∗(−0.58)−0.248770
4.168009(−0.03)(0.46)
7.392139−5.344905(0.98)(−0.66)−19.553450
9.557889(−1.81)∗(0.80)
0.005529−0.001705(1.68)∗(−0.31)34.397890−28.764740(2.09)∗∗(−1.67)∗−8.396716(−0.96)24.459360(2.44)∗∗

20.145270(2.50)∗∗

Discretionary Work(=1)

11.726060(1.22)−22.440870(−2.23)∗∗Self-Employed(=1)
Stepping to Full-Time(=1)

11.537910(1.14)
12.292820(0.95)
10.083320(0.68)−6.155181(−1.11)−8.914464(−1.67)∗

Willing to Change Job(=1)
Quit Job Unwillingly(=1)
Freedom > Equality(=1)
Happy in Life(=1)−0.002416(−0.79)0.000115(0.05)
0.031993(3.40)∗∗∗

Amount of Securities
Amount of Debt
Household Income After Tax
Livelihood Protection(=1)

10.895390(0.27)
0.000160(0.63)−10.942320(−1.64)
196.474200(11.29)∗∗∗Amount of Donation per Year
Home Ownership(=1)
Constant−15.612020(−1.35)−6.215403(−0.53)14.519530(0.98)
5.519197(0.36)−6.904162(−1.14)−2.047641(−0.35)−0.003625(−1.23)0.001036(0.50)
0.015388(1.52)−27.812560(−0.46)−0.000769(−1.58)−8.185059(−1.12)
196.785000(10.37)∗∗∗Note1) Significance Level: ∗ ∗ ∗ = 1%, ∗∗ = 5%, ∗ = 10%
Note2) Values in parentheses are t-values.
Note3) SSB: Social Security Benefit

21Summary of the results is as follows. First, female shows negative preference
for redistribution by means of taxation than male dose. This ﬁnding gives a clear
contradiction to the ﬁnding by Alesina and Giuliano(2011) that shows females
tend to be more favorable to redistribution than males, “after controlling for avariety of individual characteristics.”
Second, in many cases in the Table 6 through Table 9, coeﬃcients for the
independent variable related to tax and those for the independent variable related to social security beneﬁt do not necessarily have the opposite sign and are
not necessarily statistically signiﬁcant simultaneously. This result shows thatthe preference for tax and that for social security beneﬁt are not necessarily
symmetrical.
Third, age has positive eﬀect for the slope of social security beneﬁt on theinitial income as well as for the sum of social security beneﬁt. On the contrary,
the relationship between age and preference for taxation is neither systematic
nor evident.
Fourth, in the cities that the Disaster Relief Act was applied to, no systematic shift in preference is observed. This result is consistent with the result
given by the DID method described in Section 5.
Fifth, in the case where willing to change the current job is strong, Ginicoeﬃcient signiﬁcantly shifts downwards, which means equalized income distribution is more preferred.
Sixth, in the case where the employment status is self-employed, diﬀerence inGini coeﬃcient gets smaller, which means equalized income distribution is lesspreferred. In the case where the respondent believes freedom is more important
than equality, similar tendency is observed.

7

Conclusion

This paper presents the results of analyses on Japanese constituency preference for income redistribution based on the outcomes of JHPS questionnairethat aims to measure preference for tax and social security beneﬁt. The result of analysis seems to show the advantages of surveying the preference forredistribution by asking the preferable amount of tax and social security beneﬁt
separately. The advantages are as follows. First, the newly developed JHPS
questionnaire successfully showed constituency preference for redistribution numerically by various indexes such as Gini coeﬃcient, slopes of tax and social
security beneﬁt on initial income distribution as well as the size of income transfer in terms of the total amount of tax and that of social security beneﬁt. Second,
the analysis on the outcomes of the JHPS survey presented that the preference
for redistribution systematically shifts depending on some observed characteristics of the respondents such as gender, age and employment status. Third, theanalysis also shows the preference for tax and that for social security beneﬁt
are not necessarily symmetrical, which means the observed shifts in preference
for tax and that in preference for social security are not necessarily simultaneously signiﬁcant. Fourth, the eﬀect of the Great Earthquake of Eastern Japan22

on preference for redistribution in the areas where the aftermath of the earthquake is severe is not signiﬁcant compared with the eﬀect of the earthquake on
preference in other areas.
The method of surveying preference for redistribution numerically such that
the JHPS survey adopted may open a way to comparative studies on constituency preferences across diﬀerent societies or countries in more precise way,
because the method gives a certain image of income distribution in a concreteway.

A

Extract from Japan Household Panel Survey:
A Set of Questionnaire on Preference for Redistribution

The following questionnaire on preference for income redistribution is extracted fromquestionnaire on page 22 of JHPS 2011 survey, as well as questionnaire on page 23 of
JHPS 2012 survey. The original questionnaire is written in Japanese, and is translated
into English by the author. Unit of currency is also converted into USD from yen,where exchange rate of 1USD= 100yen is adopted.
Contact Information: Joint Research Center for Panel Studies, Keio University:
http://www.pdrc.keio.ac.jp/en/
Address: 2-15-45 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo 108-8345, JAPAN
Tel.: +81-3-5418-6456
Fax.: +81-3-5418-6458
Questionnaire on individual preference over tax burden and income redistribution
Question 1: Followings are the questions on the levy of tax and social security
contribution as well as on the beneﬁt of social securities by government. Answer what
you think is most appropriate policy of government in an imaginary society described
below.
An imaginary society：This society consists of only three households of A, B and C. Each household
consists of four household members. The government of the society collects tax
and social security contribution and expends it for social security beneﬁt. In
case the government collects neither tax nor social security contribution, each ofhousehold A, B and C earns 35 thousand USD per year, 70 thousand USD peryear and 125 thousand USD per year respectively.
(1) Answer the amount of tax and social security contribution that you think thegovernment should collect from each household. Similarly, answer the amount ofsocial security beneﬁt expenditure that you think the government should expend
to each household. Answer the each amount in the unit of hundred USD. As
for the amounts of tax and social security contribution, sum up both of theamounts. If you think government needs not to collect or expend any amountfor each, then put the number 0 in the corresponding ﬁelds of this answer sheet.

23

Amount of Tax and Social
Security Contribution
Government should collect

Amount of Social
Security Beneﬁt that
Government should expend

00USD

00USD

00USD

00USD

00USD

00USD

Household A(35 thousand USD）
of Annual Income
Household B(70 thousand USD)
of Annual Income
Household C(125 thousand USD)
of Annual Income(2) Suppose some households get to earn no income at all because the household
members of the household lost their job. Answer the amount of social security
beneﬁt that you think the government should pay to the household per year.
Answer the amount in the unit of hundred USD.
00USD

B

Extract from General Social Survey: A Set
of Questionnaire on Preference for Redistribution

The following questionnaire on preference for income redistribution is the extract fromdocumentation on Cross-Section, Ballot 2 (Ballot 2 XSEC English) in Section Name:
J-Social Inequality, listed in General Social Survey Home Page: GSS Questionnaires.
Document Ballot 2 XSEC English：pp.202-203

24

INCGAP: Categorical (Single)
Do you agree or disagree that diﬀerences in income in America are too large. Would you say...
1Strongly agree
2
Agree
3
Neither agree nor disagree
4
Disagree, or
5Strongly disagree？
DON’T KNOW
REFUSEDGOVEQINC: Categorical (Single)(Do you agree or disagree that)Is it the responsibility of the government to reduce diﬀerences inincome between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.
(Would you say...)1Strongly agree
2
Agree
3
Neither agree nor disagree
4
Disagree, or
5Strongly disagree？
DON’T KNOW
REFUSEDINEQUAL3: Categorical (Single)(Do you agree or disagree that)Inequality continues to exist because it beneﬁts the rich and powerful？
(Would you say...)1Strongly agree
2
Agree
3
Neither agree nor disagree
4
Disagree, or
5Strongly disagree？
DON’T KNOW
REFUSEDINEQUAL5: Categorical (Single)(Do you agree or disagree that)Large diﬀerences in income are necessary for American prosperity？
(Would you say...)1Strongly agree
2
Agree
3
Neither agree nor disagree
4
Disagree, or
5Strongly disagree？
DON’T KNOW
REFUSEDTAXRICH: Categorical (Single)
Generally, how would you describe taxes in America today, meaning all taxes together, such associal security, income tax, sales tax, and all the rest: First, for those with high incomes？
Would you say...
1
Much too high2
Too high3
About right4
Too low, or
5
Much too low？
DON’T KNOW
REFUSEDTAXSHARE: Categorical (Single)
Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes thanthose with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share？ Would you say...
1
Much larger share2
Larger share3
The same share
4
Smaller, or
5Much smaller share？
DON’T KNOW
REFUSED

25

C

Extract from European Social Survey: A Set
of Questionnaire on Preference for Redistribution

The following questionnaire on preference for income redistribution is the extract from
APPENDIX A3, VARIABLES AND QUESTIONS, ESS4-2008 ed. 5.1 in documentation on ESS Round 4-2008 survey, listed in European Social Survey Home Page: ESS
DATA.
1. Document: ESS Round 4-2008, APPENDIX A3 (pp.69-70)
Question D21-26
Using this card please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree that social beneﬁts
and services in [country]...
Instruction(s): Pre: CARD 30
Post: READ OUT...
Values and categories
1
Agee strongly
2
Agee
3
Neither agree nor disagree
4
Disagree5
Disagree strongly
7
Refusal8
Don’t know
9
No answer
D22...prevent widespread poverty？
Variable name and label: SBPRVPV Social beneﬁts/services prevent widespread poverty
D23...lead to a more equal society？
Variable name and label: SBEQSOC Social beneﬁts/services leas to a more equal
society
Comment: INTRODUCTIONTO QUESTIONS D21-29: I am now going to ask you
about the eﬀect of social beneﬁts and services on diﬀerent areas of life in [country]. Bysocial beneﬁts and services we are thinking about things like health care, pensions andsocial security.
Question D 27-29
And to what extent do you agree or disagree that social beneﬁts and services in [country]...
Instruction(s): Pre: STILL CARD 30
Post: READ OUT...
Values and categories
1
Agee strongly
2
Agee
3
Neither agree nor disagree
4
Disagree5
Disagree strongly
7
Refusal8
Don’t know
9
No answer
D27...make people lazy？
Variable name and label: SBLAZY Social beneﬁts/services make people lazy
D28...make people less willing to care for one another？
Variable name and label: SBLWCOA Social beneﬁts/services make people less willingcare for one anotherD29...make people less willing to look after themselves and their family？
Variable name and label: SBLWLKA Social beneﬁts/services make people less willing
look after themselves/family26

2. Document: ESS Round 4-2008, APPENDIX A3 (pp.71-73)
Question D 34
Many social beneﬁts and services are paid by taxes. If the government had to choose between increasing taxes and spending more on social beneﬁts and services, or decreasing
taxes and spending less on social beneﬁts and services, which should they do？
Instruction(s): Pre: CARD 33
Post: Choose your answer from this card
Variable name and label: DITXSSP Government decrease/increase taxes and social
spending
Values and categories
Government should decrease taxes a lot and Government should increase taxes a lot
andspend much less on social beneﬁts and services
spend much more on social beneﬁts
and services
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
77 Refusal, 88 Don’t know, 99 No answer
Question D 38
Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you thinkthey should obtain the same rights to social beneﬁts and services as citizens alreadyliving here？Please choose the option on the card that comes closest to your view.
Instruction(s): Pre: CARD 37
Post: CODE ONE ANSWER ONLY
Variable name and label: IMSCLBN When should immigrants obtain rights to social
beneﬁts/services
Values and categories
1
Immediately on arrival
2
After living in [country] for a year, whether or not they have worked
3
Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year
4
Once they have become a [country] citizen
5
They should never get the same rights
7
Refusal8
Don’t know
9
No answer
Question D 39
A lot of people who come to live in [country] from other countries pay taxes andmake use of social beneﬁts and services. On balance, do you think people who cometo live in [country] receive more than they contribute or contribute more than theyreceive？Please use this card where 0 means they receive much more and 10 means they
contribute much more.
Instruction(s): Pre:CARD 38
Variable name and label: IMRCCON Immigrants receive more or less than they contribute
Values and categories
Receive much more than they contribute
Contribute much more than they receive
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
77 Refusal, 88 Don’t know, 99 No answer

27

D

Extract from World Value Survey: A Set of
Questionnaire on Preference for Redistribution

The following questionnaire on preference for income redistribution is the extract fromdocumentation on Study Description: [USA] of Unites States 2006 in Documentationof the Values Surveys for 2005-2008 Wave Survey, listed in World Value Survey Home
Page Documentation of the Values Surveys.
1. Document Study Description: [USA]：p.22
V116.Now please indicate your views on various issues. How would you place yourviews on this scale？1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left: 10
means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your view fall
somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.
We need larger income diﬀerences
Incomes should be made more equal
as incentives for individual eﬀort
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

How about these statements...
V118. [Left] The government should take more responsibility to ensure the everyone is provided for[Right] People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2. Document Study Description: [USA]：p.24
Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics ofdemocracy. Please indicate for each of the following things how essential you think it
is as characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential
characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it deﬁnitely is “an essential characteristicof democracy”[ L ] Not an essential characteristic of democracy[ R ] An essential characteristic of democracy
V152. Government tax the rich and subsidize the poor.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. Document Study Description: [USA]：pp.25-26
V166. In 2000, leaders representing almost all the world’s countries agreed to carryout a number of programs to improve the lives of the people of low-income countries.
These programs are known as the Millennium Development Goals. Here are some ofthe problems that these programs involve. Please indicate which of these problems
you consider most serious. Which of the following problems do you consider the mostserious on for the world as a whole？
People living in poverty and need.
Discrimination against girls and women.
Poor sanitation and infectious diseases.
Inadequate education.
Environmental pollution.
Here is a list of global problems, and goals that world leaders have set to reduce them.
Indicate for each of these goals how high a priority your own country’s leaders should
give to it.

28

8

9

10

V170.

V174.

About 25 percent of the world’s population
lives in extreme poverty-that is on less than
one dollar per day. The goal is to cut this percentage in half by 2015.
About 840 million people around the world live
in slums. The goal is to make a signiﬁcant improvement in the housing of at least 100 million people.

Top
priority
1Highpriority2

Mediumpriority3

Lowpriority
4

1

2

3

4

V175.

In 2003, this country’s government allocated a tenth of one
percent of the national income to foreign aid–that is $ 35.05
per person. Do you think this amount is too low, too high, orabout right？
1
Too low
2
About right3
Too high

V177.

Would you be willing to pay higher taxes in order to increase
your countries foreign aid to poor countries？
1
Yes
2
No

V178.

Thinking about your own country’s problems, should yourcountry’s leaders give top priority to help reduce poverty inthe world or should they give top priority to solve your own
country’s problems？Use this scale where 1 means “top priority to help reducing poverty in the world” and 10 means “toppriority to solve my own country’s problems.” ？
[L] Top priority to help reduce poverty in the world[R] Top priority to solve my own country’s problems
1
2 3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

References[1] Alesina, A. and G. Angeletos (2005) “Fairness and redistribution,” American Economic Association, 95(4), pp.960-980.
[2] Alesina, A. and N. Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) “Good-bye Lenin (or not？):
The eﬀect of communism on people’s preferences”, The American Economic
Review, 97, pp.1507-1528.
[3] Alesina, A. and E. Glaeser (2004) Fighting Poverty in The US and Europe:
A World of Diﬀerence, Oxford UK: Oxford University Press.
[4] Alesina, A. and P. Giuliano (2010) “The power of the family,” The Journalof Economic Growth, 15(2), pp.93-125.
[5] Alesina, A. and P. Giuliano (2011) “Preferences for redistribution,” in Benhabib, J et al., eds., Handbook of Social Economics, Volume 1A, Chapter
4, pp.93-131.

29

[6] Ashenfelter, O. and D. Card (1985) “Using the longitudinal structure of
earnings to estimate the eﬀect of training programs,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(4), pp.648-660.
[7] Benabou, R. and J. Tirole (2006) “Beliefs in a just world and redistributive
Politics,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2), pp.699-746.
[8] Card, D. (1990) “The Impact of the Mariel boatlift on the Miami labormarket,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43(2), pp.245-257.
[9] Card, D. and A. Krueger (1994) “Minimum wages and employment: A casestudy of the ﬁrst-food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania,” American
Economic Association, 84(4), pp.772-793.
[10] Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau (2004) “Factor mobility and redistribution,”in Henderson, H. and J. Thisse, eds., Handbook of Regional and Urban
Economics, Volume 4, Chapter 57, pp.2529-2560, Elsevier.
[11] European
SocialSurvey
Home
Page,
ESS
Round4-2008,
http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round4/ (Reference date: November 21, 2012)[12] Finseraas, H. (2012) “Poverty, ethnic minorities among the poor, and preferences for redistribution in European regions,” Journal of European Social
Policy, 22, pp.164-180.
[13] Gavilia, A. (2007) “Social mobility and preferences for redistribution in
Latin America,” EconomÃa, 8(1), pp.55-96.
[14] General Social Survey Home Page, GSS Questionnaires,
http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website/Publications/GSS+Questionnaires/(Reference date: November 21, 2012)[15] Giuliano, P. and A. Spilimbergo (2009) “Growing up in a recession: Beliefs
and the macroeconomy,” NBER Working Paper 15321.
[16] Hindriks, J. (1999) “The consequences of labor mobility for redistribution:
tax vs. transfer competition,” Journal of Public Economics, 74(2), pp.215234.
[17] Lupu, N. and J. Pontusson (2011) “The structure of inequality and the politics of redistribution,” American Political Science Review, 105(2), pp.316336.
[18] Luttens, R. and M. Valfort (2012) “Voting for redistribution under desertsensitive altruism,” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 114(3),pp.881-907.
[19] Mehlkop, G and R. Neumann (2012) “Explaining preferences for redistribution: A uniﬁed framework to account for institutional approaches andeconomic self-interest for the case of monetary transfers for families andchildren,” European Journal of Political Research, 51, pp.350-381.
30

[20] Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan Home Page
“On application of Disaster Relief Act for Earthquake in Paciﬁc
Ocean along the coastal area of Tohoku(Report 11)” (in Japanese:“Heisei 23 nen (2011 nen) Tohoku-chiho Taiheiyo-oki jishin ni
kakawaru Saigai-kyuujo-hou no tekiyou ni tsuite (Dai 11 hou)”),http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000014j2y.html(Reference date:
December 18, 2012)[21] OECD Home Page, OECD National Accounts Statistics,
http://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oecd_bv_id=na-data-en&doi=data-00369-en(Reference date: February 18, 2013)[22] OECD
Home
Page,
OECD
Tax
PolicyAnalysis
Revenue
Statistics
2012
Edition,http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxpolicyanalysis/revenuestatistics2012edition.htm(Reference date: February 18, 2013)[23] Reeskens, T. and W. Oorschot (2012) “Disentangling the ‘New Liberal
Dilemma’: On the relation between general welfare redistribution preferences and welfare chauvinism,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 53, pp.120-139.
[24] Sen, A. and J. Foster (1973) On Economic Inequality, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
[25] World Value Survey Home Page, Documentation of the Values Surveys, http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSDocumentation.jsp (Reference
date: November 21, 2012)[26] Yamamoto, K. and R. Fukahori (2011) “Measurement of attitudes forequalization policy and model building: An attempt toward establishingstandard of assessing policy in democratic way” (in Japanese: “Byodoka seisaku ni kansuru taido no keisoku to model ka: Minsyuteki na
seisaku hyouka kijun settei he no mosaku”) Joint Research Center for
Panel Studies Discussion Paper Series, DP2011-001, Keio University.
http://www.pdrc.keio.ac.jp/DP2011-001.pdf (Reference date: February 18,
2013)31