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国際問題 INTERNATIONAL
No. 705, February 2022

Focus: Current Situation and Challenges of the Xi Jinping Regime（Summary）

Essay: The Chinese Communist Party’s Historical Resolution at its Centenary
Yoshihiro Ishikawa（Professor, Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto University）
The resolution on the history of the Communist Party of China adopted on the occasion of the 100year anniversary of the Party’s founding was issued with a strong awareness of the historical resolutions that had been formulated under the leadership of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping,respectively. Having twice become the subject of resolutions, history has been “politically caged”
under the Party’s exclusive control. The option not to issue a resolution on history to correct the distorted relationship between politics（the Party）and history was available. However, in anticipationof an extraordinary extension of his term, General Secretary Xi Jinping issued a resolution in which
his achievements were written large. Through the adoption of this new historical resoution, history
will continue to be tied to the Party’s yoke, but this does not guarantee that the achievements of theXi administration will long be remembered. Using the resolution to record history could pave theway for another historical resolution in future to deny Xi’s achievements. To issue a resolution onhistory for one’s own sake means that one must be prepared for the revenge of history that maycome.

1 Xi Jinping Aims to Become the ‘Godfather of the Chinese Nation’:
Political Developments Based on Changes in Priority Policies and Leadership Style
Takashi Suzuki（Associate Professor, Faculty of Foreign Studies, Aichi Prefectural University）
This article examines the nature and future direction of the “stability” of the Xi Jinping regime fromthe following aspects:（1）changes in Xi Jinping's power within the ruling system; and（2）changes
in the relationship between the ruling system and society as seen in the important policies promotedby the leadership.
With respect to（1）, Xi Jinping's unchallenged power and authority have already been established. From a short- to medium-term perspective, there are no political opponents or factions capable of overturning Xi Jinping's status as supreme leader. Regarding（2）, however, there are tworisks that could destabilize Xi Jinping's personal power and the rule of the Chinese Communist
Party: Xi's political orientation and leadership style, and the growing nationalistic mentality of theChinese people.
Moreover, the political iconography that has been emerging when assembling pieces like a jigsaw
puzzle is the image of Xi Jinping as the “godfather” of the Chinese people who, by maintaining along-term government, is striving for a fairer distribution of wealth among his “children” of the next
generation, at times nipping the rebellious bud of democratization and at other times spurring on aspirit of competition through school education and home discipline training to achieve the “GreatRejuvenation of the Chinese Nation”.

2 The Xi Jinping Administration’s Growth Strategy:
Are “Domestic Circulation” and “Common Prosperity” Compatible?
Kai Kajitani（Professor, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University）
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This paper regards the “domestic circulation” that the Chinese government has been trying toadvance to be continuation of its earlier “supply-side reforms” that encourage the mobilization ofproduction elements and aim for growth patterns different from those under extensive growth, andpositions China’s innovation-driven industrial policy as a growth strategy to support this. On theother hand, concerns in promoting China’s “domestic circulation” include the corporate sector’sdebt problems caused by excessive monetary easing in the process of recovering from the COVID19 pandemic, growing financial insecurity among real estate companies, and the tightening ofrestrictions on platform companies in the name of “common prosperity,” an idea brought up in thesummer of 2021. Still, Beijing will almost certainly focus on improving supply-side efficiency as its
growth strategy going forward. Under the slogan of “common prosperity,” the Communist Party istrying to allay the resentment of the working class by hitting certain “celebrities” without improving
the fundamental causes of economic disparities.

3 The Present State of the Belt and Road Initiative
Shino Watanabe（Professor, Faculty of Global Studies, Sophia University）
China’s Belt and Road Initiative（BRI）, proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in the fall of2013, was originally conceived as a gigantic economic zone that would construct a Silk Road
Economic Belt and a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. However, the plan was not clearly defined atthe outset as a national strategy. Over the past eight years, the BRI’s layout has been completed andits details fleshed out as it has been flexibly adapted to the environment surrounding China and to
China’s diplomatic challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic has been forcing further changes to theBRI since the end of 2019. This article analyzes the discourse of Chinese leaders and official documents to clarify the history of the BRI. It will then demonstrate that the implementation of the BRI
has been unfolding in the direction in which China tries to realize the “democratization of international relations” vis-a-vis its BRI partner countries as a way for reforming the global governancesystem, and that the focus in the future will be on constructing a Health Silk Road, a Green Silk
Road, a Digital Silk Road, and Roads on Poverty Reduction.

4 China as a Hegemonic Power over Advanced Technology
Atsushi Sunami（President, Sasakawa Peace Foundation / Director of the SciREX center and theExecutive Advisor to the President and adjunct professor at the National Graduate Institute forPolicy Studies）
The Biden administration in the United States has launched a series of economic security policies
that include reorganizing the semiconductor supply chain. In particular, the US Innovation andCompetition Act was designed to enable the US to compete with China for supremacy overadvanced technologies. The United States has expressed a clear sense of crisis over China’s
expanded presence in the international community as a “great power” that has enhanced its national
power at a faster pace than expected. What has made China’s rise a reality is the remarkable
improvement in China’s ability to innovate in science and technology.
Since the founding of the PRC, China has been steadily driving science and technology innovation and focusing on the development of core technologies by implementing stable policies from along-term perspective under the strong leadership of national leaders. The country is currently aiming to realize President Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” of building a “independent innovative country” and becoming the world’s leading science and technology powerhouse. “Made in China 2025,”
which aims to make China the world’s top manufacturing power by the PRC’s centennial anniversary in 2049, will be a driving force for new economic growth to realize the Chinese Dream. China
is scrambling to build a civil-military fusion innovation system to survive the battle for supremacy
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with the United States in the areas of AI and quantum technology as well.
As a neighbor to China, a major economic power in a new big data-based era, Japan is now at acrossroads in determining what position it will assume in addressing the competition for hegemony
over core technologies.

5 The Ideological Background of China’s “Digital Leninism”:
Focusing on “Social Governance” and “Security Perspectives”
Junko Oikawa（Associate Professor, Chuo University）
This essay seeks to decipher China’s “digital Leninism” and analyze its ideological background.
While mainly discussing “social governance” and “security perspectives,” it points out that the Xi
Jinping administration’s social governance is big data governance that utilizes cutting-edge digitaltechnology. It will then examine the “security perspectives” based on “Resolution of the CPC
Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the PastCentury” in 2021. The top priority of Xi’s administration is to maintain the current system andensure the Party’s security.
The big data dictatorship based on digital Leninism has been strengthened under the “social governance community” advocated by the Xi administration since the COVID-19 pandemic began. This
trend is expected to continue and gain further momentum in future with the prolongation of the Xi
regime. The impact of “digital Leninism” on not only China but also the international community
needs to be critically examined, and serious reflection on democracy is also required.

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