Shipborne drugtrafficking in Brazil

Praticai GuidanceShipborne drug trafficking in Brazil
Practical GuidanceContent

4. Shipborne drug trafficking ............. 15

4.1. Relevance of maritime transport ... 15
4.2. Ships as drug conveyances ............ 15
4.3. Maritime trafficking routes ............. 16
4.4. Maritime trafficking trends ............. 17

5. Drug smuggling methods .............. 18
5.1. Change of modus operandi ............ 18
5.2. Transfer of risk ................................ 18
5.3. Drugs inside containers .................. 19
5.3.1. Rip-on/rip-off method ........................... 19
5.3.2. Switch .................................................... 20
5.3.3. Within legitimate goods........................ 20
5.3.4. In container structure ........................... 20

Foreword ................................................ 3
1. The drug problem ............................. 4
1.1. Increased drug use ........................... 4
1.2. Brazil as a cocaine trade hub ........... 4
1.3. Drug trafficking violence .................. 55.4. Drugs on board ships ...................... 21
5.5. Drugs under the vessel ................... 22
5.5.1. Sea chest as a drug cache .................. 23
5.5.2. Underwater drug packaging ............... 23
5.5.3. Narco-divers .......................................... 24

6. Drug seizures in Brazil ................... 25

1.3.1. Escalating crimes ................................... 5
1.3.2. Intersection with other crimes .............. 6
1.3.3. Rise of organised crime groups............ 7

6.1. Official statistics .............................. 25

2. Legal framework ............................... 9

6.2.1. Customs statistics ................................. 29
6.2.2. Seizures from sea chests .................... 29

2.1. International treaties......................... 92.2. National drug policy .......................... 9
2.2.1. Federal Constitution ............................... 9
2.2.2. Anti-Drug Law ....................................... 10
2.2.3. Drug policymaking ............................... 10

2.3. Law enforcement agencies ............ 10
2.4. Drug crimes ..................................... 10
2.4.1. Definition of drug .................................. 10
2.4.2. Punishment ........................................... 11
2.4.3. Drug abuse and trafficking .................. 11
2.4.4. Legislative developments .................... 11

3. Port security arrangements ........... 12

6.1.1. Drug trafficking offences...................... 25
6.1.2. Drug seizure cases ............................... 27

6.2. Seizures in ports and ships ............ 28
6.3. Consequences to the crew ............. 30

7. Prevention and response ............... 31

7.1. Basic preventive measures ............ 31
7.1.1. Before arrival ......................................... 31
7.1.2. At anchorage ......................................... 31
7.1.3. Alongside ............................................... 32
7.1.4. During cargo operations ...................... 32
7.1.5. Before departure .................................. 33

7.2. Basic responsive measures ............ 33
7.2.1. Drug discovery ...................................... 33
7.2.2. Threat or actual assault ....................... 34

3.1. Maritime safety authority ............... 123.2. Maritime security authority ............ 123.3. Customs authority ........................... 123.4. Port security guard ......................... 123.5. ISPS Code enforcement ................. 13

7.3. Counter-drug measures ................. 34

3.6. Port security deficiencies ............... 13

7.4. Source of information ..................... 39

3.5.1. National Port Security Commission ... 13
3.5.2. State Port Security Commission ........ 13
3.6.1. Breach of regulation ............................. 13
3.6.2. Poor performance ................................ 13
3.6.3. Unbalance of resources....................... 14

7.3.1. Confidentiality ....................................... 34
7.3.2. Effective access control ....................... 35
7.3.3. Shipboard search ................................. 36
7.3.4. Underwater inspection ......................... 36
7.3.5. Canine inspections ............................... 37
7.3.6. Private security guards ........................ 38

7.4.1. International Organisations ................. 39
7.4.2. Brazilian legislation ............................... 39

8. Conclusion ...................................... 40

Disclaimer
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© Proinde 2024. All rights reserved.

Shipborne Drug Trafficking in Brazil – Practical Guidance

Page 2Foreword
Brazil is a strategic drug transhipment hub,offering extensive road infrastructure and vast
networks of airports and ports that connect thecountry to the rest of the world. Unfortunately,
powerful criminal groups have taken control ofthe profitable drug trade in many of the country’s
ports, the Amazon region, and along the borders
with the leading producers, Colombia, Bolivia
and Peru, as well as with Paraguay, a significant
transit country for drug smuggling.
The global rise in the consumption andwidespread availability of cocaine and otherdrugs over the past decade poses a significant
threat to health and safety and an overwhelming
challenge to law enforcement communities
around the world.
To varying degrees, the problem affects theentire world, whether as a region of source,transit or destination of drugs. It has adverse
effects on people’s health, overburdens publichealthcare and welfare systems, and leads to anincrease in convergent crimes, intimidation,
corruption, and, ultimately, violence andmurders, markedly in producing and transit
countries. In poorer regions, drug abuse andtrafficking further undermine already struggling
political, cultural and socioeconomic structures.
As shipborne drug trafficking intensifies,
with no sign that illegal drug markets will saturate
any time soon, it increasingly affects international
maritime trade, threatening the safe operation ofships and the well-being of seafarers, who may
face prosecution and have to prove theirinnocence
inoften
unfriendly
foreignjurisdictions, some of which have harshpunishments like the death penalty for drugrelated crimes.

In the wake of COVID-19, criminalorganisations have come up with innovative
ways to continue shipping growing amounts ofdrugs, notably cocaine. They use intricate andless conspicuous techniques and routes,
enlisting skilled professionals on demand. Thesemethods have been developed from the lessons
learned during the pandemic.
While parcels hidden within containers arestill the preferred method of maritime drugtrafficking, there has been a surge in the numberof cargo vessels unwittingly employed to conceal
drugs, especially bulkers and containerships.
This publication consolidates previously
published materials on drug trafficking
prevention. It features the latest statistics on drug
seizures, local developments, and trends.
Drawing on practical experience assisting
carriers and liability insurers, it provides
guidance on the regulatory framework andrecommendations to help commercial ships takesteps to avoid drug contamination and criminal
prosecution of innocent seafarers, which could
ultimately result in reputational, commercial, andfinancial losses for the ship owners andoperators.

REPRESENTAÇÕES PROINDE LTDA.
April 2024

www.proinde.com.br
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1. The drug problem
1.1. Increased drug use
In its latest reports1, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) points to a steady rise in
the world's consumption of illicit substances (cocaine, cannabis, opiates, and synthetic drugs in general)by over 30% in the past decade. Global demand for these substances remains high, and the drug supply
chain responds swiftly, enhancing productivity and expanding distribution channels around the world.
Drug use remains prevalent in North America (primarily the United States), Western and Central Europe(including Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), and Oceania (chiefly Australia). Notable
growths in demand have been detected in Asian and African countries, and interceptions by law
enforcement authorities are also on the rise worldwide, indicating increased drug availability.

1.2. Brazil as a cocaine trade hub
Cocaine is the second most commonly used and trafficked illicit drug after cannabis. The drug trade isan unfortunate element intrinsically associated with Latin America. Colombia is the world’s top producer
and supplier of this popular stimulant drug, followed by Bolivia and Peru. At the same time, Brazil is thesecond-largest consumer market, behind the United States, and plays a significant role as a strategic
hub to sustain international drug trafficking.

Picture 1: main countries identified as source and transit of cocaine shipments. Source: UN/UNODC

Although the continental-sized country does not grow raw coca plants and is not a significant producerof this narcotic substance, it features well-developed road infrastructure, seaports and airports to outflow
illegal substances. To the north and west, Brazil shares extensive, largely unguarded borders in the
Amazon along the three largest cocaine-producing countries. To the south, it borders landlocked
Paraguay, another critical drug transit country in South America.
Cocaine is smuggled into Brazil from the Andean producers in the form of raw base paste extracted
from coca leaves or processed cocaine hydrochloride. It arrives by land in cars, trucks and buses, byriver in small boats and barges down the Amazon waterways, and by air through clandestine flights on
small planes and drug couriers on commercial flights. Pictures 1 & 2

1“World Drug Report 2023” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime publication, 2023)

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Drugs are also intensely smuggled on the so-called Southern Cone route through Paraguay down the
Paraná-Paraguay waterway, as well as across air and land borders with Brazil.
A portion of the cocaine shipments that arrive in Brazil remain in the country to supply the substantial
domestic market, while another portion is further trafficked to foreign markets. The drug is transported
abroad either on a piecemeal basis using couriers or “drug mules” or, in larger parcels, inside shipping
containers or directly onto merchant ships.

Picture 2: cocaine and cannabis trafficking routes and the number of route mentions. Source: UN/UNODC

While cocaine producers themselves supply most of the North American and Asian markets, Brazilian
ports in the Amazon and along the East Coast and its vast airport network that connects the country toevery continent constitute strategic and convenient points for transhipping large volumes of illegal drugs
to destinations in Europe, Africa and, more recently, Asia and Oceania. Pictures 1 to 3

1.3. Drug trafficking violence
1.3.1. Escalating crimes
Despite progressive socioeconomic improvements for the past three decades, Brazil is still a violent
country, featuring one of the highest intentional homicide rates in the world, primarily associatedwith the drug trade and drug-related crimes2.
In large Brazilian cities like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, with an alarmingly increasing frequency,
crossfire between law enforcement forces and gang members – or between rival criminal groups –takes thousands on both sides of the conflict and often claims innocent lives with stray bullets.
Indeed, conflicts between criminal groups over drug entry and distribution points in large urban
centres are also a significant source of violent crimes in Brazil3.

2“The Global Study on Homicide 2023” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime publication, 2024)“UNODC Global Report on Cocaine 2023 – Local Dymanics, Global Challenges” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime publication, 2023);“Global Organized Crime Index - Brazil” (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime publication, 2023)
3

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1.3.2. Intersection with other crimes
Sophisticated and agile drug trafficking networks continue expanding and developing their
methods, shipping record-breaking quantities of illegal drugs to established and new consumer
markets, generating formidable profits for the cartels and gangs that control and cooperate ininternational drug smuggling.

Picture 3: main drug trafficking routes in Brazil. Source: UN/UNODC/CdE

Invariably, this complex criminal activity often converges with other offences, such as corruption,
extortion, and money laundering, besides violence and crimes against life.

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Drug trafficking organisations have infiltrated multiple illegal activities, not only in urban areas insouthern Brazil but also in the Amazon region, which is neighbour to the three Andean cocaineproducing countries and lies at intersections where, due to the limited presence of the State,numerous forms of crimes are widespread, particularly along the triple borders (Brazil-ColombiaPeru and Brazil-Peru-Bolivia). Picture 4

Picture 4: selected drug trafficking routes in the Amazon Basin. Source: UN/UNODC/CdE

Apart from crimes against human dignity and life, notably sexual exploitation and human smuggling,
drug trafficking in the Amazon exacerbates other criminal activities in the region. These include
armed robberies in the inland waterways, land-grabbing, illegal logging, illegal mining, andtrafficking in people, wildlife, precious metals, and minerals. Beyond environmental damage, thesecrimes lead to an escalation of drug-related violence, posing a threat to the security, health andwell-being of the socially vulnerable and impoverished riverside communities and indigenous
peoples4.

1.3.3. Rise of organised crime groups
International cocaine trafficking through Brazil has become more consolidated over the last few
decades. It has led to crime syndicates operating in the retail drug market taking a keen interest in
this lucrative unlawful business, which yields high profits at relatively low costs and risks for narcotraffickers.
The Primeiro Comando da Capital – PCC (First Capital Command) stands out among Brazilian
organised crime groups. Fostered in the harsh prison system of São Paulo from the 1990s onwards,
PCC evolved from a collective group that sought to fight against prisoner abuse and improve theenvironment of the penitentiary system into a full-fledged crime syndicate. Today, it is Brazil's
mightiest and most feared criminal outfit, made up of thousands of members, allies and connections
with criminal rings in Latin America and beyond5.

4“World Drug Report 2023: the Nexus Between Drugs and Crimes that Affect the Environment and Convergent Crime in the Amazon Basin” (United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime publication, 2023)
5“Atlantic Connections: the PCC and the Brazil-West Africa Cocaine Trade” (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime publication,2023); “World Drug Report 2023” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime publication, 2023)

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PCC has managed to infiltrate all levels of civil, business and political society and sustains a global
presence fueled by the drug trade and strategic alliances with other prominent criminal enterprises.
The São Paulo-based group is the only Brazilian crime syndicate that has made it to the US
Department of the Treasury’s sanctions list as an entity engaged in global illicit drug trafficking6. It
reportedly controls most of the country’s maritime drug smuggling routes.
The Comando Vermelho – CV (Red Command), a noteworthy rival organised crime group, emerged
from the prison system and favelas of Rio de Janeiro in the 1980s and is also involved in substantial
drug smuggling and related crimes, albeit seemingly on a smaller scale than the PCC.
Several smaller criminal groups, often specialised in maritime transport and logistics, also operate
in international drug trafficking either independently or in collaboration with other gangs.

6
In October 2021, the First Capital Command (PCC) entered the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (SDN list), administeredby the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). As of April 2024, the entity remained on the SDN list

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2. Legal framework
2.1. International treaties
Brazil has ratified and is bound by all three key conventions on drug regulation adopted by the United
Nations. The conventions seek to codify international control measures to ban the production, transportand supply of narcotics and psychotropic substances other than for medical or scientific purposes. They
also aim to prevent unlawful diversion and impose administrative and criminal sanctions for drug-related
offences7.
The principles outlined in the UN conventions are enshrined in the Brazilian Federal Constitution andthe domestic regulatory framework for controlling narcotic drugs, psychotropics, and chemical
precursors, as well as enforcing laws and public policies on preventing drug abuse and trafficking andrehabilitating drug dependents.
Brazil maintains bilateral drug control and law enforcementagreements with the United States and all South Americancountries. It has established partnerships and cooperates withseveral international organisations, including the UN Office on
Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), the Organization of American
States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission(OAS-CICAD), and the International Criminal Police
Organisation (Interpol). The country participates in the
CRIMJUST program, which aims to disrupt organised crime
networks along drug smuggling routes in Latin America.
As a member state of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), Brazil adopts various conventions,codes, and regulations from the specialised UN agency, including those addressing port and ship
security. Section 3.5

2.2. National drug policy
The earliest national statutes on illicit drugs were introduced in the first half of the last century, following
the Opium Conventions8, the first international treaty on drug control. Since then, domestic policies oncontrolled drugs have evolved into a complex and intricate set of laws and policies.

2.2.1. Federal Constitution
Brazil’s supreme law9 establishes that the trafficking of illicit drugs is a heinous crime, not subject
to bail, grace or amnesty. It empowers public security forces at the federal and state levels toprevent and repress drug trafficking and smuggling, ensuring due legal process and full defence inthe adversarial system for those accused of crimes.
The Constitution allows various forms of penalties for drug-related offences, such as deprivation or
restriction of freedom or rights, loss of assets, fines, and social service. However, it does not permit
the extradition of native Brazilian citizens10. Section 2.4

7
The 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, andthe 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
8
The first International Opium Convention was signed in 1912, and the second International Opium Convention (the International Convention
Relating to Dangerous Drugs), signed in 1925
9
The Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil was promulgated in 1988 and has been regularly amended since then
10
Art. 5, XLIII & LI, art. 243, sole paragraph of the Federal Constitutionexceptionally allows the government to extradite naturalised Brazilians who
have committed common crimes before completing the naturalisation process or have been found guilty of illicit drug trafficking at any time

Shipborne Drug Trafficking in Brazil – Practical Guidance

Page 92.2.2. Anti-Drug Law
Prior to 2006, drug smuggling was prosecuted under the Brazilian Criminal Code11, which outlawed
the possession, use and trade of illicit drugs. However, the enactment of Law 11,343/2006 marked
a significant change. For the first time in federal legislation, the so-called “Anti-Drug Law”
distinguished between drug users and drug dealers, offering a specific set of measures to deal witheach group. Under the law, drug addicts are provided with therapeutic assistance and rehabilitation,
while drug traffickers face criminal sanctions. Section 2.4.3

2.2.3. Drug policymaking
Brazil’s National Drug Policy12 establishes the underlying guidelines and objectives for
implementing drug-related legislation based on the principles outlined in the three UN Conventions,
the Federal Constitution and the Anti-Drug Law.
In 2023, the federal government restructured the National Council for Drugs Policies (CONAD)13
and placed it as the highest body of the National System for Public Policy on Drugs (SISNAD).
CONAD is responsible for formulating and enforcing Brazil’s National Drug Policy. The Minister ofJustice and Public Security (MJSP) chairs CONAD, which comprises representatives from cabinetlevel ministries, federal agencies, and civil society sectors.
The National Secretariat for Drug Policies and Asset Management (SENAD), within the structure of
the MJSP, coordinates drug policies within the SISNAD and administers the Anti-Drug Fund
(FUNAD)14. SENAD operates under the guidance and direction of the CONAD.

2.3. Law enforcement agencies
Drug-related crimes at the federal and interstate levels fall under the concurrent jurisdiction of theFederal Police (maritime police), Federal Highway Police, and Federal Railway Police. At the state level,
it is up to the Civil Police (judiciary police), the Military Police (law enforcement police) and the MilitaryFire Department to prevent and repress the use and trafficking of illicit or controlled drugs within thelimits of their respective jurisdictions, seeking to maintain public order and security15. Chapter 3

2.4. Drug crimes
2.4.1. Definition of drug
The Anti-Drug Law (Law 11,343/2006) defines a “drug” as a substance capable of causing
dependence, as specified by law or listed in the inventory of forbidden substances drawn up andregularly updated by the Ministry of Health through the National Health Surveillance Agency(ANVISA)16. In simpler terms, a substance is only considered a prohibited or controlled drug if it isexplicitly restricted by federal law or listed by ANVISA as such.
Currently, cocaine, its chemical precursors and by-products are forbidden, while ANVISA regulatescannabis products, allowing their use for medical and therapeutic purposes under control17.

11

Law-Decree 2,848 of 1940, as amended
Decree 9,761 of April 201913
Decree 11,480 of April 2023 regulates the National Council for Drugs Policies
14
The Anti-Drug Fund (FUNAD) is a fund made up of proceeds from assets forfeited from drug crimes and other sources regulated by Law
7,560/1986, as amended
15
Art. 144 of the Federal Constitution
16
Art. 1, sole paragraph, of Law 11,343/2006, as amended
17
ANVISA Ordinance 344 of May 1998 is the technical regulation on substances and medicines subject to special control. ANVISA RDC 835 ofDecember 2023 updated the Lists of Narcotic, Psychotropic, Precursor and other Substances under Special Control
12

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2.4.2. Punishment
According to the Anti-Drug Law, it is illegal to import, export, send, produce, manufacture, acquire,sell, offer for sale, transport, bring in, store, prescribe, administer, supply, or deliver illicit drugs, as
listed by ANVISA, even if they are free of charge. Additionally, planting, cultivating, harvesting, andexploiting plants and substrates from which drugs can be extracted or produced is prohibited in the
country, except when legal permission is obtained from the health or judiciary authorities.
The criminal penalties for drug trafficking range from five to fifteen years in prison, plus a fine, andcan be aggravated depending on the circumstances of the offence. In the case of interstate ortransnational drug trafficking, the penalty is increased by one-third to two-thirds18.

2.4.3. Drug abuse and trafficking
In practice, Law 11,343/2006 has decriminalised the possession of illicit drugs for personal use19.
However, it left a grey area when it comes to distinguishing between drug use and drug-related
criminal activity under the law, which does not set objective parameters for determining whether aparticular amount of drug is for personal use or not. Broad discretion is given to police authorities
and prosecution, who would qualify the nature of the accused’s conduct based on theirinterpretation of the circumstances surrounding the drug discovery and other subjective factors.
Critics argue that the statutory gap regarding drug possession violates fundamental rights and canlead to biased interpretations by law enforcement, potentially resulting in discrimination based on
race or socioeconomic status and, ultimately, corruption and extortion. The discretion afforded
under the law is identified as a factor contributing to an increase in the proportion of prisoners
charged with drug-related offences among the already overcrowded Brazilian prison population20.
Indeed, a significant number of small-time drug traffickers who are arrested and cannot afford
proper defence end up being recruited by organised crime groups while they are still in prison.

2.4.4. Legislative developments
Given the loophole in Law 11,343/2006, the Federal Supreme Court (STF) is currently assessing
the compatibility of the drug law, which imposes administrative sanctions for possessing drugs for
personal consumption, with the constitutional principles of intimacy and private life21. Eventually,
STF's upcoming ruling can effectively decriminalise drug possession (in principle, for marijuanaonly) under certain conditions.
However, the Federal Senate has taken issue with the involvement of the STF in this matter, arguingthat it is an attribution of the National Congress to legislate on drug policies. As such, the senators
have proposed a constitutional amendment to make the possession of illicit or controlled drugs
without authorisation a criminal offence, regardless of the amount possessed. One added-on
version of the proposal distinguishes between drug dealers and users, but it does not provide
specific criteria to differentiate between the two. This legal gap would, therefore, remain unbridged
if the proposed amendment were to pass in its current form22.

18Art. 33 & 40 of Law 11,343/2006, as amended. Combined penalties of drug trafficking, trafficking association and criminal organization can leadto 33 years in prison, in addition to payment of a fine19
Art. 28 of Law 11,343,2006 provides that anyone who acquires, keeps, stores, transports or brings with them illicit drugs for personal consumption
is subject to i) warning about the effects of drugs, ii) provision of services to the community, and iii) attendance to an education program or course
20
According to the statistical data from the Information System of the National Penitentiary Department (SISDEPEN) of the Ministry of Justice andPublic Security (MJSP), in 2023, there were 644,316 persons incarcerated, of which 168,021 (26% of all prisoners) convicted of drug trafficking,
25,529 (4%) of association for drug trafficking and 6,181 (1%) of international drug trafficking
21
Extraordinary Appeal RE 635659/SP running before the Federal Supreme Court since February 201122
Proposal of Constitutional Amendment (PEC) 45 of September 2023. PEC 45/2023 was approved in the first and second rounds by the Senate
and will now be considered by the Chamber of Deputies

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3. Port security arrangements
3.1. Maritime safety authority
The Navy Commander acts as maritime authority through the Directorate of Ports and Coasts (DPC),
headquartered in Rio de Janeiro.
Among other duties, DPC, via port captaincies and agencies throughout Brazilian ports, guides andcontrols commercial shipping, navigation safety, compliance with international conventions and national
standards on ship safety, prevention and control of marine pollution and investigation of maritime
casualties. DPC is the national maritime safety authority under the IMO International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code23. Section 3.5

3.2. Maritime security authority
Brazil does not have a coast guard, unlike other continental coastal countries. Instead, the Federal
Constitution empowers the Department of Federal Police (DPF) of the Ministry of Justice and Public
Security (MJSP) with the duties of immigration authority and maritime, airport, and border police. The
Federal Police are also tasked with combating illegal drug trafficking at interstate and federal levels,
working alongside and without prejudice to the actions of other law enforcement agencies.
To carry out their maritime police duties, the Federal Police have established Special Maritime Police
Units (NEPOM, in the Portuguese acronym) in the main Brazilian ports24.

Picture 5: logos of federal port security law enforcement (from left to right): Brazilian Navy (maritime authority), Federal Police (maritime
police), Federal Revenue Service (customs authority), and Port Guard (ostensive port security guard)

3.3. Customs authority
The Ministry of Economy’s Special Department of Federal Revenue of Brazil (RFB) is the federal revenue
service agency. It oversees federal tax collection and serves as Brazil’s customs authority. Along withother federal law enforcement agencies, it controls contraband, embezzlement, counterfeiting of goods
and illicit drug trafficking in ports, airports, borders and customs-bonded spaces.

3.4. Port security guard
The Port Guard (GPort) is a federal civil guard body subordinate to the Ministry of Ports and Airports. It
is a security force responsible for patrolling and supervising public ports, including anchorages andberthing areas. GPort is administered by public port authorities and controls access to people, vehicles,
and goods in and out of port facilities.

23

The IMO International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), 2004, is regulated in Brazil through Federal Decree 6,869 of June 2009
The duties of the Federal Police are outlined in Art. 144 of the Federal Constitution and regulated through Federal Police Normative Instruction IN
N° 2 of August 1999

24

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3.5. ISPS Code enforcement
As a contracting party to the IMO SOLAS Convention, Brazil is bound to comply with the ship and port
security requirements and guidelines under the ISPS Code25.

3.5.1. National Port Security Commission (Conportos)
The National Commission for Public Security in Ports, Terminals, andWaterways (Conportos) manages public security systems and policies innational ports, port facilities and territorial waters. It is Brazil’s port facility
security authority under the ISPS Code, comprising representatives fromdifferent federal agencies and ministries, including the superintendence of
the Federal Police in Brasilia, Customs and the National Waterway
Transport Agency (ANTAQ).
Among its functions, Conportos manages and enforces ISPS statutory requirements in Brazil,
including inspecting port facilities, approving and revising port facility security plans, issuingstatements of compliance, and keeping the ISPS Code database, the Global Integrated Shipping
Information System (GISIS), updated26.
Operating under the MJSP structure, this collegiate body monitors security threats and breaches
within its domains to report incidents to other authorities concerned with port security. It works incooperation with state port security commissions.

3.5.2. State Port Security Commission (Cesportos)
At the state level, port security is overseen by the State Commission for
Public Security at Ports, Terminals and Waterways (Cesportos), made up
of representatives from the Federal Police, customs, port captaincies,
ANTAQ, port authorities, and state secretariats of public security.
Cesportos is responsible for defining port security levels within its
jurisdiction, in coordination with Conportos and the maritime and port
authorities, following the instructions and guidelines of the ISPS Code.

3.6. Port security deficiencies
3.6.1. Breach of regulation
Although the ISPS Code has been regulated in Brazil since 2009, many port facilities have not yet
had an approved port facility security plan, or the existing plan has not been reviewed or tested
after many years since its first approval. This non-compliance is partly due to the poor maintenanceand updating of information on ports and port facilities in the ISPS Code database (GISIS). The
responsibility for maintaining and updating this information lies with Conportos, which has
consistently failed to do so.

3.6.2. Poor performance
In 2020, the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) initiated an audit to scrutinise the performance of theFederal Police and Conportos. The audit was launched in response to allegations that these federal
agencies did not effectively fulfil their duties and functional responsibilities in combating maritime
drug trafficking and enhancing public security in Brazilian ports and waterways27.

25

IMO International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended
The ISPS Code Database is part of the IMO Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS). It contains security information required
under SOLAS Regulation XI-2/13 and includes a section that lists ports and port facilities and whether they have approved port facility security plans
27
Proceeding TC 040.799/2020-4 by the Tribunal de Contas da União – TCU (Federal Court of Accounts)
26

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The conclusion drawn by TCU was that the maritime police function of the Federal Police's NEPOMs
was only partially fulfilled due to the lack of basic infrastructure and resources. They do not havesufficient workforce, equipment, and vehicles to patrol national ports and anchorages effectively.
When available, their small fleet of boats (many confiscated from drug traffickers and not designed
for maritime patrol) is often ageing, inadequate, and poorly maintained. Most Brazilian ports are notyet equipped with vessel traffic monitoring systems, and integrated CCTV systems are insufficient
or non-existent.
The audit court noted that port facilities generally do not fully comply with port security regulations.
It found that minimum standards were unmet, including missing risk assessments and port facility
security plans, failure to designate security officers, and failure to control unauthorised access toport areas. TCU also pointed out that Conportos has not adequately collected security data on port
facilities from state port security commissions (Cesportos) to feed the GISIS database.
In 2021, TCU ordered the Federal Police to draw up an action plan with measures to be adopted torestructure the functioning of the NEPOMs and Conportos to establish a scheduled timeline for all
ports and port facilities to comply with the ISPS Code regulations. Despite the ruling, the national
port security system has seen no noticeable improvements. Brazil remains a major cocaine transit
country, with a rising number of drug smuggling incidents and seizures.

3.6.3. Unbalance of resources
Apart from the struggle of the Federal Police to perform their duty as national maritime police, there
is a significant disparity in the budget and financial resources available to public security forcesamong Brazilian states. For instance, the southern and southeastern states, including the wealthy
São Paulo, have far more resources to combat crime than the underdeveloped northern states of
Amazonas and Pará combined. These two states in the Amazon are the largest federative units,
covering a third of the entire national territory. Yet, they are primary points of entry and transit ofillicit drugs in the country and are short-staffed and underfunded to deal with the various security
threats and harms posed by drug trafficking across that vast region.

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4. Shipborne drug trafficking
4.1. Relevance of maritime transport
Over 90% of all goods traded globally are transported by sea. To reach eager cocaine-consuming
markets outside the Americas, drug traffickers must inevitably resort to maritime transport if they want
to ship significant quantities of the drug abroad.
According to estimates, anywhere from 70% to 90% of the cocaine exported from South America iscarried across the ocean at some point before reaching the wholesale buyer at its destination. It is,therefore, not surprising that in most historic drug seizures around the world, maritime transport has
been the preferred mode of transportation28.

Picture 6: main cocaine trafficking flows as described by reported seizures, 2018-2021. Source: UN/UNODC

4.2. Ships as drug conveyances
Commercial vessels of all sizes and types have become major conduits for the international drug trade,
unwittingly carrying large volumes of illegal substances overseas at relatively low costs and risks for
drug traffickers. Although all types of illicit drugs can be smuggled inside shipping containers or directly
onto cargo ships in varying shapes, sizes and weights, the most common drug shipped from Brazilian
ports is cocaine, typically in its purest form to optimise portability and profitability per shipment.
The global expansion of cocaine demand and supply poses a hazard to public security and health anda challenge to law enforcement. It is a significant threat to international maritime trade, the safe operationof ships, and the safety and well-being of seafarers, who may face criminal prosecution andimprisonment in foreign jurisdictions, some of which punish drug offences with castigation and even thedeath penalty. Sections 2.4 & 6.3

28“Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse on Board Ship – Guidelines for Owners and Masters on Preparation, Prevention, Protection and Response,2023-2024 Edition” (International Chamber of Shipping publication, 2023); “World Drug Report 2023” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
publication, 2023)

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4.3. Maritime trafficking routes
Reports from the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and statistics from the United Nations Officeon Drug and Crime (UNODC) show that the primary flow of cocaine trafficking in the Americas is from
Colombia to the United States. The drug is usually transported up the Pacific Coast or via the Panama
Canal or overland, through Central America, and then from Mexico to the United States over thesouthwest border. The second busiest drug traffic flow originates from ports in Colombia, Peru andEcuador across the Atlantic to various ports in Southern and Western Europe and beyond. Picture 6

Picture 7: cocaine shipment routes and prices in USD (2020-2023). Source: UN/UNODC

Brazil has become an increasingly relevant player in maritime cocaine trafficking to Europe, either
directly or through transit sub-regions such as West, Central, and Southern Africa. Cocaine shippedfrom Brazilian ports usually enters Europe via Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and France, although all
EU ports are potential drug entry points. Picture 7
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4.4. Maritime trafficking trends
Besides collaborating with other federal law enforcement agencies to gather and share risk assessmentand management information, the Federal Revenue of Brazil (RFB) participate in international initiatives
to tackle maritime trafficking, including the Container Control Programme (CCP)29 for detecting
emerging drug trafficking patterns and sharing information globally.
In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, relevant changes in maritime drug trafficking tendencies
have been identified by the customs authorities and remain30, namely:

Growth in the proportion of shipborne drug smuggling compared to other modalities due topandemic-related travel restrictions;Migration of organised crime groups to less busy ports in the North and Northeast regions wheresecurity is weaker;
Increased use of smaller ships and boats outside customs-bonded commercial ports and traditionalcommercial shipping lanes; andChanges in the modus operandi of drug concealment, with large volumes of cocaine smuggled in
the underwater structures of cargo ships, especially in sea chests out of crew’s reach. Section 5.1

29
The Container Control Programme (CCP) was launched by the UNODC and the World Customs Organization (WCO) to address the exploitationof international maritime container traffic by drug traffickers and other smugglers and assist governments in establishing effective container sections
and controls to prevent drug smuggling and other cross-border crimes
30“Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse on Board Ship – Guidelines for Owners and Masters on Preparation, Prevention, Protection and Response,2023-2024 Edition” (International Chamber of Shipping publication, 2023); “World Drug Report 2023” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
publication, 2023); “Balanço Aduaneiro 2023 – Janeiro a Dezembro” (Customs Balance Report 2023 – January to December) (Special Department
of Federal Revenue of Brazil publication, 2024)

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5. Drug smuggling methods
5.1. Change of modus operandi
The coronavirus pandemic has triggered changes in maritime cocaine trafficking patterns, such as larger
drug shipments and greater use of inland waterways in the Amazon and the Southern Cone, along witha shift in smuggling techniques.
Containers remain the preferred method for transporting large amounts of cocaine from Brazil due totheir versatility, interchangeability and traceability. Nevertheless, the COVID-19 outbreak has led totravel bans, lockdowns, and other complications, such as global unavailability of containers, disruptionof supply chains, and heightened security measures at container terminals. As a result, resilient drugtraffickers have become more resourceful, developing inventive concealment methods and circuitousand unusual routes to evade law enforcement and keep their illegal activities going.

Picture 8: Customs sniffer dogs detect drug shipments. Source: DPF/RFB

Drug smugglers have come up with alternative and clever ways to adjust the flow and distribution of illicit
drugs to meet the growing demand. While containers are still a popular choice for smuggling drugs,
criminal groups went on to systematically smuggle drugs directly onto ships.
Indeed, even though seizures of cocaine shipments in containers are still rife in European ports, drugs
are being discovered in increasing volumes inside ships. They are found in cargo compartments, deck
spaces, or attached to hulls and structures below the waterline. This trend emerged during the pandemic
and remains intense.

5.2. Transfer of risk
It is uncommon for shipowners, masters or crews to face legal consequences when illicit drugs are
discovered in containers that were not packed or sealed by the carrier (FCL shipments31). The only
inconvenience they may face is the extra expenses associated with delays in official investigations if thecontaminated container was already stowed on board the vessel. However, should the illegal narcotic
be found in an LCL container32 or a container manifested as empty, the master and crew could eventually
be accused and prosecuted for cooperation with drug trafficking.

31

A ‘full container load’ (FCL) is a shipping term meaning an ISO container that is packed and sealed by the consignee and unsealed and unpacked
by the consignee without interference from the carrier
32
A ‘less-than-container load’ (LCL) is a shipping term meaning a shipment not large enough to fill an entire ISO container and carrier (or an NVOCC
or freight forwarder) picks up, coordinates, consolidates, packs, seals, transports and delivers the cargo parcels to respective consignees at theagreed port of discharge or place of delivery

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On the other hand, the concealment of drugs directly onto a vessel, even in places below the waterline
and physically inaccessible from inside the ship, puts the risk of detection on innocent third parties,
invariably the shipmaster and crew. They may face criminal persecution for drug trafficking or drugrelated crimes. Depending on the jurisdiction where the drugs are discovered, there may be severe
punishment, even in the absence of evidence of participation or collusion of the crew in the crime.
Sections 2.4 & 6.3

5.3. Drugs inside containers
Approximately three million laden TEUs33 are exported annually from Brazilian ports, primarily from
Santos, Navegantes/Itajaí, and Paranaguá. Despite the implementation of advanced security technology,
controls and detection tools, such as high-end scanners, sniffer dogs, and risk assessment systems,
cocaine is still smuggled in growing quantities in innovative ways within intermodal shipping containers
departing from Brazil. Pictures 9 & 10

Picture 9: Cocaine retrieved from the interior and structures of general cargo and reefers. Source: DPF/RFB

Given the high degree of sophistication and economic power of large criminal organisations, cocaine
traffickers flexibly rely on a wide range of inventive smuggling methods, which constantly evolve in
response to invariably lagging law enforcement efforts and other factors.

5.3.1. Rip-on/rip-off method
This method involves interferingwith the original security seal, either
by tampering with it and re-glueing
it back on or replacing it with aforged seal after concealing the
drug package inside a legitimately
stuffed and sealed container,
typically without the knowledge ofthe shipper, consignee or carrier.
Before cargo delivery, criminal
networks at destination retrieve thedrugs from within the cargo unit andaffix another seal, sometimes left
inside near the door end.

33

Twenty-feet equivalent unit (20’ ISO container)

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The “rip-on/rip-off” method is frequently used by Brazilian smugglers to secret illicit substances,typically cocaine, in shipping containers. This technique often involves corrupt individuals at
different points along the supply chain, usually truck drivers and port terminal workers.

5.3.2. Switch
A variation of the rip-on/rip-off
method, adopted mainly in EU ports
but also seen in Brazil, whereby the
drugs are stashed in an accessible
place within the container before it isinspected at destination; thereafter,
corrupt port workers retrieve thedrugs and switch them over toanother cargo unit that has either
already been customs-cleared ordoes not require inspection, such as
in-transit or empty containers.

5.3.3. Within legitimate goods
The drug can also be ingeniously
incorporated within legitimate goods ofdifferenttypes
andpackaging,rendering
non-intrusive
detectionmuch harder.
This method gives criminals more
control over the shipment until final
delivery.
When drugs are incorporated into
lawful goods, corrupt shipper officials,
packers, and cargo owners can also be
involved in the crime.

5.3.4. In container structure
illicit drugs can be concealed in the
structure of refrigerated containers,
hidden beneath the floor, or embedded inrails, corner posts and insulating material
behind the lining of inner walls and doors.
They are occasionally planted outside
reefer containers, behind the evaporator,
or in the space to stow the power cord
without interfering with the original seal.
While this makes recovery moreaccessible, there is a higher probability ofdetection by the crew during lashingchecking and temperature monitoringroutines.

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Picture 10: customs monitoring of container arrival at bonded terminal. Source: RFB

5.4. Drugs on board ships
Although drug shipments from Brazil are increasingly transported in containers, there is a notable risein the number of cases involving ships other than container carriers. These include bulk carriers loadedwith agricultural products, where the cocaine has been buried in the bulk cargo or concealed
somewhere on deck, as well as ro-ro ships, where the narcotics are hidden inside vehicles and on
multiple decks.
Small Items can be brought on board by corrupt shore workers, officers, and contractors, strapped totheir bodies or in bags, backpacks and briefcases, usually in the dead of night or before dawn, with orwithout crew collaboration. For larger volumes of drugs, port workers standing on the ship’s deck hoist
drug packages up from the quayside or a boat drifting on the seaward side of the vessel. The drugs arethen hidden in little-used compartments or difficult-to-access places, such as crane housings, stores,
and deck spaces.

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Traffickers take photographs of the drug cache with their smartphones to make it easier for theirassociates to locate and collect it at the destination port.
Once the ship reaches its destination, a port worker linked to the smugglers or a corrupt crewmember
takes the drugs off the ship down the gangway ladder and leaves the port. They often have the assistanceof bribed port workers and officials. Alternatively, in the “drop-off method”, smugglers throw waterproof
drug packages overboard at a specific location where boats are waiting to retrieve them. GPS trackers
are sometimes placed in the drug packages to help locate them.

Picture 11: cocaine smuggled within breakbulk and solid bulk cargoes. Source: DPF/RFB

Illicit drugs can be introduced onto all types of merchant ships in a variety of ways. The ingenuity ofcriminal networks should never be underestimated.

Picture 12: a cargo ship can be contaminated with varying amounts of illicit drugs in multiple locations. Source: UNODC/DPF/EMCDDA

5.5. Drugs under the vessel
In recent years, a significant amount of cocaine has been found inside cargo ships leaving Brazil. Often,
the narcotic is stashed in the hull, inside underwater compartments, particularly sea chests, accessible
only from the outside of the vessel with diving gear, in the so-called “parasite method”.
An advantage of this approach is that drugs can be cached in remote spaces without the knowledge orparticipation of the crew and with fewer partners in crime involved in the operation. Pictures 12 & 13

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5.5.1. Sea chest as a drug cacheThis secluded space is a cavity ona ship's hull below the waterline. It
can be found either under or on
the turn of the bilge (low sea chest)
or on the side of the ship hull (highsea chest). This reservoir is
typically fitted with an inlet to draw
seawater through the ballast
pumps for ballasting, engine
cooling,
firefighting,washingcargo holds, and other purposes,
as well as a strainer. Sea chests
usually feature removable intake
gratings for inspection andperiodic maintenance.

Sea
valve

Intake grate

Sea chest


Inlet pipe
to ship

Sea

Depending on the size and design of the ship, sea chests can provide plenty of room for smuggling
large illicit items undetected. Objects lodged within this compartment can only be detected throughan underwater inspection by scuba divers or remotely operated vehicles (ROV), the latter only
recently available to a few law enforcement agencies in Brazilian ports. Sections 6.2 & 7.3

Picture 13: (left) view of a sea chest grate. Cocaine package retrieved from sea chest. Source: Shutterstock/Hellenic Coast Guard

5.5.2. Underwater drug packaging
Cocaine tablets are typically packed in brick-shaped one-kilo packs containing high-purity cocaine.
These packages come in different shapes, sizes and materials, depending on the amount of drug
to be smuggled and where it will be hidden. Popular varieties include sports bags, duffel bags
(seabags), and sometimes small suitcases.
Watertight packaging made of plastic, rubber, or other water-repellent material is used for
smuggling cocaine below the hull’s load line. Drug packages are often ballasted with weight plates
or similar objects for buoyancy control. They are lashed with ropes or straps to prevent them frombursting open during the voyage, which could cause the inner cocaine packs to be sucked into thesea chest strainer or washed away. Narco-divers also attach carabiners and shackles to drug
packages for towing and driving underwater and, together with the ropes, securing or anchoring
the drug stash within the sea chest.

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Most of the cocaine shipments recovered from sea chests by Brazilian authorities were packed inrectangular cuboid sports bags weighing anywhere between 20 and 60 kg gross, excluding ballast.
Pictures 13 & 14

Picture 14: cocaine packages retrieved from sea chests of cargo ships. Source: DPF/RFB

5.5.3. Narco-divers
Organised crime groups often resort to the parasite smuggling method, which involves hiring
professional scuba divers with shipbuilding knowledge to stash cocaine in the hulls of cargo ships.
These narco-divers are very well-trained. They dive from the nearest shore or a small boat near thevessel, towing waterproof drug packages towards the bottom of cargo ships, lodging them into
underwater spaces such as sea chests, propeller shaft brackets, rudder trunking, and bow thruster
tunnels. In Brazil, the favourite place for drug divers to cache cocaine using the parasitic method is
the sea chest.
An associated dive team at the other end, or even the same divers who cached the drugs in Brazil,
would come to the port of destination to recover the items after receiving pictures or a sketch of
the drug stash. This method of concealment is undertaken at anchorage areas or alongside a berthduring cargo operations, ideally at night or in tranquil waters just before dawn.
Due to the high profitability of shipborne drug trafficking, many covert divers carry state-of-the-art
underwater gear, such as “rebreathers” (breathing apparatuses that eliminate telltale bubbles,
further hindering detection), diver propulsion vehicles (DPV) and high-definition underwater
cameras.
In recent years, the Federal Police have arrested dozens of narco-divers, some of whom were
foreigners employed by Brazilian drug trafficking gangs. Section 7.3.4

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6. Drug seizures in Brazil
6.1. Official statistics
In Brazil, each state organises and funds its law enforcement agencies and legislates on drug-related
matters within the limits imposed by federal laws and international conventions. However, due tosignificant variations in drug policymaking and incident reporting mechanisms among states, official
statistics on drugs may not accurately reflect the actual quantity of illegal substances forfeited or thecircumstances of seizures. As a result, federal or state government official statistics may eventually be
incomplete or discrepant to varying degrees.
To try to address this issue, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP), through the National
Secretariat of Public Security (SENASP), maintains the National Public Security Information System(SINESP). This platform allows Brazil’s 27 states and the Federal District to share public security data,
including information about drug busts. SINESP is supported by members of the Unified Public Security
System (SUSP), which includes federal and state police forces, municipal civil guards, port guards, andother law enforcement bodies.

6.1.1. Drug trafficking offences
Based on the latest reports from SINESP34, there have been significant fluctuations in reported drugtrafficking offences since the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, when the system began
gathering data across the country. In 2021, 197,033 events were recorded, which fell to 169,709
cases in 2022 and then picked up again to 180,881 cases the following year.

Drug trafficking and cocaine seized in Brazil 2020 - 2023
197,033
174,032

180,881

169,70960,5702020

91,7892021

128,660
2022

Drug trafficking offences (number of cases)

143,316
2023

Drug seizures (kg)

Picture 15: illicit drug trafficking cases (number of cases) and quantity of cocaine seized (kg). Source: MJSP/SINESP

Last year, notifications of drug-trafficking incidents increased by 6.6% compared to 2022, reaching
180,881 cases, meaning no less than 496 daily offences, almost 20 cases per hour. Picture 15
The country's most densely populated and developed area, the Southeast region, home to thestates of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Espirito Santo, recorded almost half of all
drug smuggling offences last year. The South region, which comprises Paraná, Santa Catarina, and
Rio Grande do Sul, came in second place with 19%, followed by the Northeast (16%), North (7%)
and Central-West (6.9%) regions. Picture 1634“Mapa da Segurança Pública 2024, Ano-base 2023 – SINESP” (Public Security Map 2024, Base Year 2023 - SINESP) (Brazilian Ministry ofJustice and Public Security publication, 2024)

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Drug trafficking offences in Brazil 2022 – 2023
(number of incidents)

Northeast (16.4%)

State
Alagoas (AL)
Bahia (BA)
Ceará (CE)
Maranhão (MA)Paraíba (PB)
Pernambuco (PE)
Piauí (PI)Rio Grande do Norte (RN)
Sergipe (SE)
Total

2022
2023
1,306
1,191
6,357
7,040
4,762
5,492
1,627
1,216
1,055
1,551
9,450
8,499
1,210
1,686
1,358
1,579
1,017
1,400
28,144 29,654
 5.37%

North (6.9%)
State
Acre (AC)Amazonas (AM)Amapá (AP)Pará (PA)Rondônia (RO)Roraima (RR)
Tocantins (TO)
Total

2022
2023
886
703
1,814
2,423
819
463
4,894
5,917
1,343
1,554
470
506
681
879
10,907 12,445
 14.10%Central-West (8.2%)
State
Distrito Federal (DF)Goiás (GO)Mato Grosso do Sul (MS)Mato Grosso (MT)
Total

South (18.7%)

State
Paraná (PR)Rio Grande do Sul (RS)Santa Catarina (SC)
Total

2022
2023
2,258
2,442
4,948
4,506
4,025
3,750
4,289
4,087
15,520 14,785
 4.74%2022
2023
10,118 12,262
16,290 15,887
5,838
5,682
32,246 33,831
 4.92%Southeast (49.8%)
State
Espirito Santo (ES)Minas Gerais (MG)Rio de Janeiro (RJ)São Paulo (SP)
Total

2022
2023
4,644
4,472
27,077 29,468
18,779 20,442
32,392 35,784
82,892 90,166
 8.78%Brazil (100%)
Total

2022
2023
169,709 180,881
 6.58%

Picture 16: illicit drug trafficking offences in Brazil in 2022 & 2023 (variation and state share in %). Source: MJSP/SINESPIn 2023, there was a noticeable rise in the number of reported drug offences in the North, Southeast
and Northeast regions. The Central-West region saw 4.7% fewer cases than in 2022.
The most significant increases were seen in the states of Paraíba (with a rise of 47%), Piauí (39%)
and Sergipe (37%). On the other hand, Amapá (- 43%), Maranhão (- 25%) and Acre (- 21%)experienced the most significant reductions in the number of reported drug-related offences.
Picture 17

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6.1.2. Drug seizure cases
Law enforcement forces across Brazil seized a record-high volume of cocaine products in 2023
due to the rise in drug trafficking cases35.

Cocaine seizures in Brazil 2022 – 2023(kg)

Northeast (4.2%)

State
Alagoas (AL)
Bahia (BA)
Ceará (CE)
Maranhão (MA)Paraíba (PB)
Pernambuco (PE)
Piauí (PI)Rio Grande do Norte (RN)
Sergipe (SE)
Total

2022
2023
7,186
1,717
n/a
904
2,254
879
236
443
634
279
191
592
6,433
240
1,067
451
547
521
18,5466,027
 67.50%

North (14.1%)
State
Acre (AC)Amazonas (AM)Amapá (AP)Pará (PA)Rondônia (RO)Roraima (RR)
Tocantins (TO)
Total

2022
2023
748
577
5,229
7,887
47
83
1,454
3,261
7,742
8,367
42
28
n/a
n/a
15,261 20,204
 32.39%

Central-West (39.2%)
State
Distrito Federal (DF)Goiás (GO)Mato Grosso do Sul (MS)Mato Grosso (MT)
Total

South (13.1%)

State
Paraná (PR)Rio Grande do Sul (RS)Santa Catarina (SC)
Total

2022
2023
429
518
4,414 6,027
16,696 29,799
23,255 19,822
44,795 56,166
 25.39%

2022
2023
9,704
6,682
3,071
4,937
1,794
7,137
14,569 18,757
 28.74%

Southeast (29.4%)
State
Espirito Santo (ES)Minas Gerais (MG)Rio de Janeiro (RJ)São Paulo (SP)Total

Brazil (100%)
Total

2022
2023
143
227
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
35,347 41,936
35,489 42,162
 18.80%

2022
2023
128,660 143,316
 11.39%

Picture 17: illicit drug seizures in Brazil in 2022 & 2023 in kilograms (variation and state share in %). Source: MJSP/SINESPIn 2020, Brazilian federal and state authorities confiscated 60.5 tonnes of cocaine in the country.
The following year, the quantity increased by an astounding 52%, reaching 92 tonnes. In 2022, 129
tonnes of cocaine were seized, 40% more than in 2021. Picture 15

35

Quantity may also comprise the sum of cocaine hydrochloride, raw base paste and crack cocaine

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According to the SINESP database, cocaine seizures in 2023 increased by 11% compared to theprevious year, with a record 143 tonnes of illegal narcotics seized by federal and state law
enforcement. This equates to 393 kg seized per day or 16.4 kg every hour.
The Central-West region, where the states of Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul share extensive
land borders with Bolivia and Paraguay, accounted for 56 tonnes of the cocaine confiscated in 2023,
representing 39% of all seizures reported last year. The North (32%) and South (29%) regions also
saw significant increases. The only reduction in the amount of cocaine seized was in the Northeast
region (down 68%), possibly due to underreporting. Figure 17
Notably, by the first quarter of 2024, relevant states had not reported their drug bust cases to the
SINESP database for one or more calendar years36. Therefore, it is highly likely that the actual
figures relating to drug trafficking offences and the amount of cocaine seized are considerably
higher than those officially published.

6.2. Seizures in ports and ships
Although the Federal Revenue Service (customs authority) and the Federal Police (maritime police
authority) have concurrent jurisdiction to tackle international drug trafficking and have been cooperatingin shared intelligence and joint repression actions in recent years, they do not have a common databaseto share information on drug busts in Brazilian anchorages, ports and port facilities.

Picture 18: Customs and Federal Police officers and divers seize cocaine from within cargo units and ships. Source: RFB/PFB

36
According to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP), until February 2024, The states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Maranhão,Roraima, Santa Catarina and Tocantins have reportedly not provided data on drug seizures for one or more calendar years

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6.2.1. Customs statistics
Last year, the Federal Revenue Service (RFB) intercepted nearly 16 tonnes of cocaine, with nineout of every ten customs seizures taking place in Brazilian ports and port facilities37.
As usual, the largest port complex in Latin America, Santos, located on the coast of São Paulo, andthe small neighbouring port of São Sebastião, recorded 7.1 tonnes of cocaine seized from withincargo units and ships in 2023.
In the southern ports of Paraná (Paranaguá and Antonina) and Santa Catarina (Navegantes, Itajaí,São Francisco do Sul, Imbituba and Itapoá), customs officials retrieved a total of 3.5 tonnes of
cocaine. Meanwhile, in the southeastern states of Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro, Itaguaí (SepetibaBay), Niterói and Angra dos Reis) and Espirito Santo (Vitória, Tubarão, Praia Mole, Ponta do Ubu
and Barra do Riacho (Portocel)), 3.3 tonnes of the drug were seized.
The Federal Police and the Federal Revenue Service do not disclose stratified statistics on where
precisely the drugs were found and how they were detected. For strategic reasons, the authorities
do not publicly provide information on profiling and objective criteria to assess and manage risks
or how they select ships or cargo units for inspection or monitoring.

6.2.2. Seizures from sea chests
The trafficking of cocaine in ports and terminals in Brazil is still mostly done inside shipping
containers. Nevertheless, due to the high risk of detection through scanning or inspection following
security risk assessment criteria (considering the type of cargo, shipper, destination, etc.) and theneed for a large number of associates and accomplices throughout the transport chain for the drugs
to be collected safety at the other end, organised crime groups are increasingly smuggling cocaine
directly onto ships, most often in the hull below the waterline, inside sea chests.
Following the upward trend arising during the COVID-19 pandemic, an increasing number of cargoships, primarily bulk carriers and containerships, are still leaving Brazilian ports with their sea chests
contaminated with cocaine, unknowingly to the crews.

Figure 19: Types of cargo ships with sea chests contaminated with cocaine in Brazil Jan 2020-December 2023 (in %).
Source: UNODC/Federal Police/CoE Brazil/independent consulting

Between January 2020 and December 2023, law enforcement agencies seized approximately 12
tonnes of cocaine from sea chests of 70 cargo vessels of various types, sizes, and flags, both in the
country and abroad. Nearly half of those ships were bulk carriers loading solid bulk commodities in
Brazilian ports. Other targeted vessels included general cargo ships and containerships. Figure 19

37“Balanço Aduaneiro 2023 – Janeiro a Dezembro” (Customs Balance Report 2023 – January to December) (Special Department of Federal
Revenue of Brazil publication, 2024)

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Last year in Brazil, at least 22 ships had their sea chests contaminated with cocaine, fifteen of them
being bulkers and seven being general cargo ships. The drugs were concealed in that underwatercompartment either while the vessel was lying at anchor or moored alongside a berth. Figure 20
Year

Number of incidents

Quantity seized (Kg)

Yearly variation

2020

9

893

-

2021

13

1,798

 101 %

2022

26

4,269

 137 %

2023

22

4,819

 9.1 %

Total:

70

11,779-Figure 20: Number of incidents of cargo ships with sea chests contaminated with cocaine in Brazil and quantity seized 2020-2023.
Source: UNODC/Federal Police/CoE Brazil/independent consultancy

More than half of the vessels with cocaine packages in their sea chests were caught in foreign ports.
Santos accounts for nearly one-third of all seizures in the country; however, even small andremotely located ports can be targeted by maritime drug traffickers. Figure 21

Port of seizure of cocaine cached in sea chests in Brazil (%)
Pecém
6%

Vitoria7%

Santos/S.Sebastião
23%

Others11%

Foreign ports
53%

Figure 21: Ports where cocaine shipments from Brazil were seized, 2022- 2023.
Source: Federal Police/Customs/CoE Brazil/independent consulting

While it is impossible to accurately quantify the amount of drugs that were hidden in sea chests andsuccessfully retrieved by criminals at the other end, it is undoubtedly much larger than the quantity
seized by law enforcement authorities. Section 5.5

6.3. Consequences to the crew
None of the seizures of cocaine cached in sea chests in Brazil resulted in crew arrest or vessel detention;
the loss was limited to time lost in decontaminating the ship and eventual official inquiries. Brazilian
authorities tend to consider that, in this smuggling method, where the drug is stashed under the vesselby covert divers, there is often no knowledge or connivance of the crew. Unfortunately, in some cases
where underwater drug packages were intercepted abroad, crew members were prosecuted, and ships
suffered extensive delays. Some seafarers who were victims of shipborne drug trafficking remain in
prison or face criminal prosecution far from their homes and families. Section 2.4
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7. Prevention and response
7.1. Basic preventive measures
Responsibility for the security of national ports, anchorages, and port facilities lies with port security
authorities, including the Federal Police and Port Guards. However, masters and crews should be awarethat all Brazilian ports are vulnerable to drug smuggling threats to varying degrees. They should
implement preventive measures based on the ship security plan (SSP), assuming low port security
standards and considering information provided by port authorities, shipping agents and P&I
correspondents on prevailing local risks and trends.

7.1.1. Before arrival
Before arriving at a Brazilian port to load cargo for overseas ports, it is essential to take specificsafety measures:








Contact local agents, port authorities, port facility security officer (PFSO) and P&I
correspondents at the intended port of loading to inquiry about any security concerns
Follow the SSP and ensure that security risks have been assessed and implement appropriate
mitigating measures
Establish and regularly test communication methods for external and in-vessel support toensure reliable communication channels in case of an emergency or security threat
Ensure crew are familiar with the company's standards and procedures regarding alcohol anddrug abuse (A&D policy). They must be aware of the risks and consequences associated withdrug trafficking and other drug-related crimes and receive regular safety training
Consider installing security equipment and systems, such as intrusion alarms and video
surveillance (CCTV), for monitoring high-risk areas within and around the ship
Keep sea chests and other underwater compartments accessible from the outside of the hullwith tamper-evident security seals.

7.1.2. At anchorage
Numerous vessels, especially bulk carriers, hadcocaine stashed into their sea chests while waiting atanchor to come alongside the berth.
Narco-divers exploit extensive, poorly patrolled
anchorage areas, like those in Santos, Rio de Janeiro,and Paranagua, where shipboard security tends to belax, and good visibility and under keel clearance provide
ideal conditions for scuba diving.
Therefore, staying alert and taking certain safety precautions while anchored in Brazilian anchorage
areas is important. These measures include:







Secure and lock portholes and accesses to the living quarters, engine room, and bridge
Maintain a permanent watch on the VHF channel 16
Keep the vessel’s deck, access points, and outer side well-lit, and ensure gangway ladders areraised and latched in place
Conduct regular rounds on deck, watch the anchor chain, monitor the approach of any
suspicious boats or underwater activities and alert other vessels in the vicinity
Look out for bubbles around the ship near the hull, indicating possible underwater activity
Illuminate approaching suspicious crafts and underwater activities around the ship withfloodlights.

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7.1.3. Alongside
Although ships are generally more secure when moored alongside a port facility, they are stillsusceptible to drug contamination, especially during cargo operations. Therefore, the crew should
remain vigilant and take basic safety precautions, including:







Secure and lock portholes and accesses to the living quarters, engine room, and bridge
Keep shoreside access ladder guarded at all times and seaside ladder stowed and latched
Learn from the PFSO about the level of security in place, video surveillance (CCTV) available,
local risks, and communication channels in case of emergency or security threats
Consider posting warning notices, ideally in Portuguese, on deck and at the foot of the gangway
ladder regarding strict enforcement of anti-drug policy on board
Demand good service from compulsory local watchmen and assign them to identify all
personnel entering and leaving the ship, regardless of access controls performed by the crew
Assign a crewmember to guard the gangway to control shore visitors’ access to the vessel andenforce safety rules and practices by:checking the identity of all persons seeking to board the ship and confirming theirlegitimate reason for boarding
keeping a detailed visitor logbook
conducting random bag checks in a sensitive and considerate manner at entry andwhenever there is a suspicion about the behaviour or items carried by visitors
denying access onboard for anyone unwilling to cooperate or to provide proof ofidentity and reason for boarding
ensuring visitors to the vessel wear suitable PPE while on board.

7.1.4. During cargo operations
While ships are docked, security measures to prevent drugtrafficking tend to be increased. Even so, they remain
vulnerable. Criminals exploit the distraction caused by the
crew's focus on cargo matters and other operational aspectsof the vessel to bring illicit drugs on board. They may also
stand on the deck and hoist drug packages from thequayside or a boat on the seaside or stash drugs into hullcompartments with the help of divers.
The crew need to remain vigilant during cargo loading routines and take precautions, such as:






Keep non-crew members away from accomodations, non-working holds, deck spaces, etc.
Keep hatch covers of non-working holds closed and seal or padlock associated manholes
Conduct thorough searches of breakbulk volumes, the interior of ro/ro cargoes and unsealed
empty containers, seal integrity of laden containers and structure of reefer units, including
accessible machinery spaces
Ensure that the duty officer and deck crew regularly:
check the mooring ropes, anchors and the outboard side of the ship, particularly atnight and dawn, and keep watch for any suspected activity around the vessel, including
bubbles on the surface near the hull, which could indicate covert divers below
keep a lookout on the working hold to ensure no objects are secretly loaded with thecargo, hidden in cargo spaces, or hoisted by shore workers from the quayside or
shipside. If this happens, the duty crew must immediately suspend the loading
operation and inform the SSO
record the activities of ship chandlers, service boats and cargo barges mooredalongside to supply bunkers, water, stores, or tranship cargo.

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In some situations, the security level of a ship may be higher than that of the port or port facility. Insuch cases, the SSO should seek advice from the CSO, who may eventually decide to lower the
ship’s security level without compromising any additional security measures already in place.

7.1.5. Before departure
Before departing from a port where solid bulks and general cargo have been loaded, the crew cantake some precautionary steps to mitigate the risk of drug contamination.
Take photos of the top of the stow of bulk cargo after loading and before closing the holdArrange the sealing of the holds and associated manholes certified by a reliable local surveyor
after loading of solid bulks (ideally in the presence of representatives of the shipper or thecharterer) and arrange the unsealing of these compartments by a reliable local surveyor at theport of discharge (ideally in the presence of representatives of the consignee or the charterer)
Before leaving a berth or anchorage, conduct a shipboard drug only if the master believes theship could have been contaminated with drugs or based on risk. Section 7.3.3

7.2. Basic responsive measures
7.2.1. Drug discovery
Following the emergency contingency plan or the SSP is
crucial if a suspicious package or object is found onboard
the vessel. If the plan does not provide specific guidelines,
the crew should take the following steps:











If the person who discovered the suspicious package isalone, he should call the nearest crewmember to witness
the location where the package was found and informthe SSO or the master immediately
Take pictures or videos showing where precisely the suspected packages were found and any
visible signs of breached entry
Notify local authorities (either directly or through the local agents), the company security officer(CSO), PFSO, flag State and P&I correspondent as soon as possible. The discovery andresponse should be thoroughly documented and entered in the vessel’s logbook
Keep the suspicious package where it was found under the watch of at least two crewmembers
until police arrive onboard the vessel
do not rub, touch or handle the package without wearing a glove and a face mask
do not pierce or open the package
under no circumstance should anyone smell, inhale, taste or ingest the contents of the
package to identify what substance it is
if the package needs to be moved before the arrival of local authorities, wear gloves
and handle it with care, mindful that it may contain fingerprint evidence on it
if the package is discovered at sea, keep it locked in a bonded store or inside themaster’s safe until arrival at the next port of call for handover to local authorities
Conduct a thorough shipboard search to verify if more suspicious items have been secreted
elsewhere and document it according to the SSP guidelines
If not required or undertaken by the local authority, arrange a thorough underwater search,
including videos and photographs, and invite the local authorities to attend
Cooperate fully with the local authorities in the relevant safety inquiries and investigations.

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7.2.2. Threat or actual assault
In case of a potential threat or actual attack on the ship, the crew must strictly adhere to the ship's
contingency and security plans. Crew safety must never be compromised.
Some countermeasures that can help ward off or control the attackers until the local authorities
arrive include:Sound the vessel’s general alarm to scare off the hostiles and muster the crew following theship security plan
Reach out to the local authorities and nearby ships via VHF channel 16 and emergency phone
numbers, including the CSO, PFSO, local agent, the flag State and P&I correspondent
If the master’s judgement, under guidance from theSSO, deems it safe, take measures to repel or deter
intruders, such as:
illuminating approaching or threatening boats
with floodlights
blowing the ship’s horn intermittently
in extreme situations, directing water jets ornautical flares against boarding areas

7.3. Counter-drug measures
Although they address port and ship security issues, neither the ISPS Code nor the ILO/IMO Code ofPractice on Security in Ports38 provides specific guidance on preventing and suppressing the threat ofmaritime drug smuggling. Instead, the IMO Revised Guidelines39 establish basic procedures for deterring
drug trafficking and identifying drug abuse by the crew.
In Brazilian ports, private security guards, drug-detection dogs and underwater inspections are notcompulsory as additional counter-drug preventive measures. However, depending on the trade andports involved, or whenever there is a well-founded suspicion or a piece of intelligence indicating thatdrugs may have been smuggled onto the vessel unknowingly to the crew, one or more of these measures
may be advisable and, at times, necessary.
Shipowners must exercise due diligence in selecting ship security contractors and ensure they arevetted and reliable. Ideally, approved alternative contractors should be available at each port of call sothey can be randomly assigned, preferably as close as possible to the deadline for procuring theappropriate permits from the authorities to perform their tasks.
7.3.1. Confidentiality
When shipowners consider arranging counter-drug measures at a given port, they must bear inmind that criminals interested in their ship may eventually become aware of these arrangements.
This prior knowledge can lead them to change their tactics and timings or even abort the attempt.
Drug traffickers seem to have little trouble gaining illegal access to ports to stash drugs on ships. In
contrast, legitimate visitors have to go through bureaucratic accreditation and clearance processes
to access customs-bonded areas and vessels in the port. Unfortunately, these processes usually
do not have effective mechanisms for protecting personal data and other sensitive information,
making it easy to leak such information.
38
The ILO/IMO Code of Practice on Security in Ports, 2004, was developed jointly by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the International
Maritime Organization (IMO). It provides guidelines on the reduction of the risk to ports from threats posed by unlawful acts
39
IMO Revised Guidelines for the Prevention and Suppression of the Smuggling of Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemicals on
Ships Engaged in International Maritime Traffic, 2006, as amended. IMO Revised Guidelines were adopted through Resolution MSC.228(82) of2006 to enhance safety and security measures and establish a comprehensive counter-drug approach balancing drug control and trade facilitation.
Its last version was issued in 2007 through resolution FAL.9(34), which is being revised by the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)

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Along with the multiple intervening authorities (Federal Police, Federal Revenue, and Port Guard),
other private entities, such as local agents and port operators, can legally access information about
expected visitors to the ship, including sniffer dogs and handlers, private security guards,
equipment and video surveillance crew, as well as planned underwater inspections. As a result,several dozen people may know about the contracted security arrangements. Among them, there
may be insiders who inform drug traffickers about the heightening of shipboard security and specificcounter-drug measures implemented on board.
Therefore, procuring additional security measures and vetting security contractors should be donewith the utmost discretion and confidentiality. It should be restricted to the fewest individuals in theprivate sector and, whenever possible, in the various public departments concerned.
7.3.2. Effective access control
Drug traffickers generally carry out a reconnaissance in the surroundings of the vessel or even on
board through associates and insiders. First, they would assess potential smuggling opportunities,
weaknesses, threat awareness, and physical security deterrents in place. Of course, ostensibly
more vigilant ships that effectively enforce access control and shipboard surveillance procedures
are less likely to be targeted for drug smuggling.
Therefore, effective enforcement of tested drug prevention
measures would, in most cases, afford reasonable protection tosecurity-conscious ships without escalating security measures,
which could be costly to the vessel's safe operation.
While the crew cannot physically control the outboard area ofthe ship, they can control access and prevent unauthorised
entry. Effective access control can also help inhibit illicit drug
introduction by genuine visitors and port workers.
Many of the vessels that left Brazil with deck and cargo spaces contaminated with cocaine did nothave effective gangway access control, an elementary measure preconised by the ISPS Code. In
such cases, visitor logs were incomplete or missing, or the visitor’s actual identity was not verified.
As a primary security measure, the gangway and all access points to the ship must be manned at
all times when the vessel is alongside, even when there are no cargo operations and regardless ofadditional security measures implemented onboard.
The gangway duty crew must maintain a detailed visitor logbook, including, as a minimum:









Date and time of arrival on board and departure
Full name and ID number
Company nameReason for boarding
Visitor control badge or card number (to be returned upon departure from the ship)
Whether bags were checked or ID photographed
Signature of the visitor at check-in (frequent visitors must be logged every time they check inand out of the vessel, regardless of any inconvenience this may cause)
Signature of the duty crew and verification by the SSO at the end of each shift

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Gangway watchkeepers should have a copy of the crew list
and a list of all local authorities, visitors, and vendors who are
expected to board the vessel. Additionally, regular shore
workers should be asked to provide proof of their status as
port workers, such as a valid port pass or badge. If they fail toprove their identity, they should not be permitted entry, andthe SSO should be notified immediately.
Shipowners may consider using electronic access control applications while being mindful of
personal data protection regulations.
7.3.3. Shipboard search
As drug smuggling threats are present across all Brazilian ports, the crew must conduct shipboard
searches before leaving a berth or anchorage in accordance with the SSP and IMO Revised
Guidelines. If time constraints make it unfeasible to perform the search before departure, it can bedone immediately after leaving the port and dropping off the pilot.
Should any suspicious packages or bags be found during the search, the SSO must immediately
report the findings to the master, CSO, local agents, authorities and P&I correspondents. Unlessotherwise directed by the competent authority, the ship must return to the last port so local
authorities can search and decontaminate it. Section 7.2.1
Regardless of whether the authorities have searched the vessel, removed the drugs and considered
her decontaminated, the authorities at the destination port must be informed about these facts
before arrival in their territorial waters.
7.3.4. Underwater inspection
Underwater inspections are not mandatory in Brazil. Nevertheless, they are recommended whenthe master suspects or has credible information that drugs may have been planted on the vessel
below the waterline at some point while at the anchorage or alongside a port facility.
In some remote ports, particularly those in the North and Northeast regions,arranging for underwater inspections can be expensive and demands
careful planning well before the vessel arrives.
Professional divers who meet the standards for underwater activities
established by the Directorate of Ports and Coasts (DPC) through
NORMAM-222/DPC40 can perform diving services in any Brazilian port oranchorage. The maritime authority requires diving safety management
systems to be certified under NORMAM-222/DPC and other relevantinternational standards, such as the IMO Dive Code41.
Despite holding professional certifications, some port authorities, such as the Santos Port
Authority42, require diving contractors to be pre-qualified to offer ship services within port limits andobtain specific work permits for every job they perform. Failure to comply may lead to fines anddisqualification by the local port authority.

40“Normas da Autoridade Marítima para Atividades Subaquaticas” (Maritime Authrority Standards for Underwater Activites), 2023 - NORMAM222/DPC, issued by the Brazlian Navy’s Directorate of Ports and Coasts. NORMAM-222/DPC establishes standards for the qualification andregistration of professional divers and their employment by companies accredited by the maritime authority as providers of diving services
41
IMO International Code of Safety for Diving Operations, 2003 (2023 IMO Diving Code)42
Santos Port Authority (SPA)’s Norm NAP.SUMAS.POR.017/2022 regulates underwater services within the limits of the Port of Santos

Shipborne Drug Trafficking in Brazil – Practical Guidance

Page 36Therefore, shipowners and masters wishing to hire diving contractors for underwater inspections
must ensure that the relevant authorities recognise them as professional divers and certify that theymeet the legal requirements for such activity. At the very least, the diving company should provide
evidence of statutory compliance, including:Diving Company Registration Form (FCEM) and diving System Safety Certificate (CSSM)43
Work permit or similar clearance from local authorities, where required
Evidence of contract of employment between the attending dive team and the diving company
Proof of attending divers’ professional qualification and license

Vessels that undergo underwater inspections at anchorages should be aware of local restrictions
and consult with the authorities and pilot station to avoid fines for anchoring outside designatedareas.
There are concerns among some security experts that professional divers legally employed byapproved diving companies to perform legitimate ship services, such as hull cleaning, repairs, andother underwater activities, may also be providing freelance services to drug trafficking
organisations for a handsome fee or through coercion or threats. Consequently, shipowners who
rely on long-term contracts with diving service providers must require them to enforce strict
supervision and screening policies for their diving teams. It is also advisable to randomly rotate job
appointments between approved security service contractors to avoid the same group of
professionals working continuously for the same vessel or fleet.

Figure 21: Law enforcement drivers retrieve drug packages concealed in ship hulls below the waterline. Source: DPF/MB/RFB

It is important to note that underwater searches – and any other additional security measures – do
not guarantee that the ship will sail free of illicit drugs. In fact, there have been instances where
owners have organised thorough drug prevention measures, including underwater inspections andsniffer dogs, yet drugs were still found onboard and inside the sea chests of the ships.
7.3.5. Canine inspections
Customs authorities have used drug detection dogs for many years, particularly in busy container
terminals. This has led to significant seizures of cocaine. However, it is rare for port security
authorities to carry out preventive or surprise canine inspections aboard cargo ships.

43

Ficha de Cadastro de Empresa de Mergulho-FCEM (Diving Company Registration Form) is a document issued by an organisation recognised by
the local port captaincy or agency certifying the registration of professional diving companies with the maritime authority. Certificado de Segurançade Sistema de Mergulho-CSSM (Diving System Safety Certificate) is a document issued by an organisation accredited to the DPC certifying thatthe diving systems safety management, installations and other components, as well as their maintenance conditions, comply with the provisions of
NORMAM-222/DPC or the IMO Safety Code for Diving Systems. The CSSM establishes the operational limit of the certified diving system and isvalid for five years, with annual endorsements

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There are no official canine drug detection training and certification standards in Brazil. Still,
shipowners can contract these services directly from the dog handlers or through third-party
service providers.
Deploying drug-sniffing dogs can be an effective additional security measure alongside efficientgangway access controls, video surveillance systems, and underwater searches. Nonetheless, thisexercise can be utterly expensive due to the high degree of specialisation required. It often needs
to be arranged well in advance, especially in remote ports, which involve long mobilisation times
and exceptionally high travel costs.
Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, many cargo ships have been contaminated withcocaine in Brazil. This has led to significant demand for canine drug detection services in ports
known to be at risk of drug smuggling. Despite this increased demand, major canine drug detection
providers are only available in ports near metropolitan areas. Only a few providers have narcotic
detection dogs with training and practical experience in shipboard environments.
Canine inspections are not failproof. They alone cannot
guarantee that the vessel is free of illegal narcotics orthat the sniffer dogs have successfully detected all
drugs placed onboard. The effectiveness of suchinspections depends on several factors, including how
well and where the drug has been concealed andwhether it has been impregnated or mixed with
substances to disguise the distinctive odour of cocaine.
However, the mere presence of drug-detecting dogs onboard could be a sufficient deterrent for drug traffickers
attempting to smuggle drugs onto the vessel.
A bill aiming to make it mandatory for public security forces to employ drug-sniffing dogs in Brazilian
ports, airports, and border crossings has been slowly being processed in the National Congresssince 2018 44.
7.3.6. Private security guards
Under the so-called Law of the Ports45, basic port work, such as ship watchkeeping, is carried out
by port workers with an employment contract with the port operators or casual port workers. In
most public ports, hiring shore watchmen is mandatory when the ship is alongside, but it is optional
when it is in inner anchorages.
Regardless of the compulsory employment of shore watchkeepers, shipowners can contract private
security guards to assist the crew in controlling access and searching the ship.
Private security companies must be registered with the Federal Police and the State Secretariat of
Public Security to render private security services, even if the security guards do not carry lethal
weapons46. These companies can also arrange to deploy shipboard video surveillance andmonitoring systems to cover access points and sensitive areas within the vessel.

44
Draft Bill 10,742 of August 2018 establishes the mandatory use of sniffer dogs to combat the illicit entry of narcotics, related drugs and weapons
into national territory via airports, ports and land borders and provides other measures45
Law 12,815 of June 2023, as amended, regulates the direct and indirect exploitation by the Federal Union of ports and port facilities and theactivities performed by port operators
46
Law 7,102 of June 1983, as regulated by Decree 89,056/1983 and Federal Police Ordinance 18,045 of April 2023, regulates private security
activities in Brazil

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7.4. Source of information
7.4.1. International Organisations
The United Nations (UN) 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol
 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic SubstancesInternational Maritime Organization (IMO) The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974
 The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, 2004
 The ILO/IMO Code of Practice on Security in Ports, 2004
 IMO Revised Guidelines for the Prevention and Suppression of the Smuggling of Drugs,
Psychotropic Substances and Precursor Chemicals on Ships Engaged in International
Maritime Traffic, 2006
 IMO International Code of Safety for Diving Operations 2023 (2023 IMO Diving Code), 2023
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
 World Drug Report 2023, 2023
 World Drug Report 2023 Supplement: the Nexus Between Drugs and Crimes that Affect theEnvironment and Convergent Crimes in the Amazon Basin, 2023
 Global Report on Cocaine: Local Dynamics, Global Challenges, 2023
 The Global Study on Homicide 2023
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) Drug Trafficking and Drug Abuse on Board Ship – Guidelines for Owners and Masters on
Preparation, Prevention, Protection and Response, 2023-2024 Edition, 2024
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime Global Organized Crime Index: Brazil, 2023
 Atlantic Connections: the PCC and the Brazil-West Africa Cocaine Trade, 2023
7.4.2. Brazilian legislation
Federal laws and regulations
 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil
 Law-Decree 2,848/1940 (Brazilian Criminal Code) Law 7,102/1983 (private security law)
 Law 11,343/2006 (Anti-Drug Law)
 Law 12,815/2013 (Law of the Ports)
 Decree 9,761/2019 (Brazil National Drug Policy)
 Decree 11,480/2023 (National Council of Drug Policies – CONAD)
 ANVISA Ordinance 344/1998 (technical regulation on substances and medicines subject tospecial control) Directorate of Ports and Coasts’ Normas da Autoridade Marítima para Atividades
Subaquáticas – NORMAM-222/DPC (Maritime Authority Standards for Underwater Activities– NORMAM- 222/DPC), 2023
 Federal Police Ordinance 18,045/2023 (private security services regulation)
 Federal Revenue Service’s Balanço Aduaneiro 2024 – Janeiro a Dezembro (Customs
Balance Report 2023, January to December 2023, 2024)
 Ministry of Justice and Public Security’s Mapa da Segurança Pública 2024, Ano Base 2023
(Public Security Map 2024), SINESP, 2024

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8. Conclusion
The widespread availability and increasing consumption of illicit drugs, especially cocaine, pose aformidable threat to public health and security around the world. Brazil is a key cocaine transhipment
hub and has played an instrumental role in the growth of this illicit market in recent decades, even though
it does not produce the stimulant drug itself. Robust criminal networks have taken control of the highly
profitable international drug trade and have infiltrated all walks of society, fostering alliances withorganised crime groups worldwide.
Shipborne drug trafficking has intensified in recent years, with growing amounts of cocaine seized fromwithin ships and their hulls, in addition to shipping containers. New smuggling methods developed inrecent years not only defy law enforcement on both sides of the ocean but also expose innocent
seafarers to the risk of being criminally implicated and facing punishment, sometimes with their own life,
in jurisdictions far from their homes and loved ones.
When drugs are found inside sealed containers, it is generally assumed that the crew did not participate
in the smuggling attempt. However, if drugs are discovered inside a ship or its underwatercompartments, even in locations where the crew cannot physically reach, some law enforcement aroundthe world tend to assume there was crew conspiracy in some way, even without concrete evidence.
This publication aimed to provide practical insight based on firsthand experience as P&I correspondents,
claims and loss prevention advisors. It compiles recommendations from international and local
authorities to prevent and respond to drug trafficking, ultimately seeking to prevent innocent crews frombeing criminally prosecuted and shipowners from suffering financial, commercial, and reputational
damage. We hope you find this practical guide useful and welcome any feedback for future updates.
April 2024
Editor: Ricardo Martins
ricardo.martins@proinde.com.br© Proinde 2024

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Shipborne Drug Trafficking in Brazil – Practical Guidance

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