Table of Contents
Preface 2Chapter 1. Eyes on a Decarbonised Society

9Section 1. Responding to the Climate Crisis 

9Section 2. Current Status and Challenges of Renewable Energy and Energy Policies



Chapter 2. Breaking Away from Overuse 

1114

Section 1. COVID-19 Measures and the Dangers Lurking Behind the Excessive Use of Chemicals and the Useof Harmful Chemicals 

14Section 2. Plastic Waste Issues in the Age of Infectious Diseases 

17

Chapter 3. Fukushima Today: Ten Years On 

20

Chapter 4. Current Situation and Challenges of Environmental NPOs/NGOs in Japan 

26Green Alliance Japan Members Involved in Authoring Green Watch 2021 (English Version) 

30Section Authors 

32

5Preface

Green Alliance Japan, established on 5 June 2015,
marked the start of its seventh year in June 2021.
This is the sixth issue of “Green Watch”, a civil society
environmental white paper published by Green
Alliance each year as part of our activities in analysing
the current state and problems of the environment
from the perspective of civil societ y— one that
often differs from that of government—and offeringsuggestions on charting a course of action for better
solutions.

of Environmental NPOs/NGOs in Japan” and provides
material for considering the future of civil society inthis country.
Editing the Japanese version of this white paper
was a fresh reminder of the fact that not only doenvironmental challenges and the spread of COVID-19
stem from the same root s, but there are alsosimilarities in the way the Japanese government has
responded to these problems, which have become aconsiderable barrier for Japanese society.

L ast year ’s white paper pointed out the close
connection of both environmental problems and
COVID-19 with the excessive pursuit of convenienceand comfort in how we live and with the globalisedsocio-economic systems. The paper also noted thatsolving these issues will require individual behaviourchange, as well as a major social transformation basedon scientifically-sound ethical and political decisions,and on the wisdom of humankind.

Fir st , the government ’s response focuses on
measures that prioritise the economy over sciencebased policies.
While efforts have been made at the international
level to link science to policy (for example, the
IPCC compiles a report every five to six years on
climate change and IPBES published a report on
the degradation of the ecosystem in 2019), in
the past, Japan has always prioritised immediate
economic performance over science-based policies.
Environmental policies have taken a back seat. The
Suga administration has announced that it aims todecarbonise by 2050 and reduce greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions by 46% to 50% by 2030; however,Japan’s energy policies, which are inextricably linked
to climate change, remain focused on continuing
to use coal-fired thermal power and nuclear power
rather than reducing GHG emissions, thus ensuring
the survival of major power companies and otherindustries. There is a strong tendency to avoid
pursuing and even covering up inconvenient truths,
such as the fact that no epidemiological investigations
were conducted at the time of initial exposure during
the nuclear accident, and that the government is
considering concluding the epidemiological studies
on thyroid cancer that have been carried out since theaccident.

As in previous years, this year’s edition of Green Watch
illustrates the current state and challenges of leading
environmental issues, as well as a course of action to
identify solutions, but it does so by also considering
the relationship between environmental problems andinfectious diseases. Examples include the relationshipbetween temperature rise due to climate change andthe risk of infectious diseases, energy policies thathinder the expansion of renewable energy, current
situations and measures to handle rapid increases
in the amount of single-use plastic waste due tothe spread of COVID-19, and health hazards andenvironmental impacts from the excessive use ofchemicals during the pandemic. As 2021 also marks adecade after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, this issue
also includes reflections 10 years on, the increasingly
difficult challenge of handling the accident, as wellas the current status of reconstruction efforts in theregion. This report also contains the results from the“Questionnaire Survey on Activities and Challenges
6

Also, during the spread of COVID-19 that has lingered
on for more than a year, epidemiological tests
have only been carried out on a limited scope, andeconomic and political considerations continue tobe prioritised over strengthening measures that arerooted in science.

not being used to its full potential.
Third, it is the deterioration of ethical standards ofpoliticians and bureaucrats that lies at the root ofthese problems.
Policies based on scientific perspectives, as well as
the wisdom and actions of civil society, are essential
for solving social issues, including environmental
problems. To encourage and enable this, the ethics of

The government’s prioritisation of the economy overscience not only fails to keep pace with the rest of
the world in terms of both environmental policy andinfectious disease control, but also slows the sounddevelopment of related industries and heightens
public distrust.

those in leadership roles are critical.

Politicians and bureaucrats have a role to play here.
However, demonstrated by inadequate explanations,evasive responses, fabrications and cover-ups at
the Diet, such displays of irresponsibility and lackof accountability call the ethics of politicians into
question. As the gap between the government andthe public further widens, political leaders seemto have forgotten their mission to protect the lives
and property of the people. For example, Japan’s
policies currently rely on uncertain technologies for
decarbonisation despite clear actions that can andmust be implemented immediately, demonstrating
no ethical sense of our responsibilit y to future
generations. Meanwhile, regarding nuclear power
policy, housing support has been discontinued for
persons who have evacuated outside Fukushima
Prefecture, and policies to maintain nuclear power
are being pursued even as issues with the disposal of
nuclear waste remain unsolved. In terms of COVID-19
countermeasures, the lack of urgency of politicians
and bureaucrats and their measures making light ofmedical care have only served to intensify the public’s
disappointment.

Second, the full potential of the wisdom andstrength of civil society has not been utilised, nor
has it spurred a drive for social transformation.
Since environmental and energy issues are closely
related to our own lifest yles as citizens, these
problems can only be solved with our understanding
and cooperation. To date, environmental policies inJapan have been formulated mainly by a small numberof people in industry, government and academia.
However, it has become clear that there are limits topast initiatives led by this small group of stakeholders.
By contrast, the number of environmental NPOs/
NGOs in Japan has increased in number since around2000, with some now engaged in exper t-based
policy recommendations and advocacy in addition to
ones focusing on local environmental conservation
activities. Moreover, af ter the Great East Japan
Earthquake and various other disasters, a spirit ofvolunteerism has taken hold around the country andbecome a major force.

Given that excessive globalisation and the underlying
unethical economy are two causes of environmental
and infectious disease crises, a fundamental shift inpolicy is needed in line with the concept of “green
recovery”. In Japan, however, there has traditionally

Regardless, there are no mechanisms in place in Japan
today that take advantage of the power of civil society
and autonomy in developing policies, resulting in asituation where the strength of the people of Japan is7been a strong tendenc y to simply “go back tobusiness-as-usual”, and it appears that the country haslearned little from its experience in this crisis.

where everyone can live well, able to withstand thevarious risks that are likely to last into the future,such as weather-related disasters and infectious
diseases, and leaving a better environment andsociety for future generations. We hope that this is
an opportunity to strengthen your connections withenvironmental NPOs in Japan.

In this English abridged version of the report, we tried
to convey a sense of the current situation in Japanthat we would like people around the world to know,rather than simply summarising the contents of theJapanese version. There may therefore be some partsof this report that require further elaboration.
Despite the differences between the two versions, weshare the same hope of seeing the truth and wisdomin this report used to build a safe and secure society

Konoe Fujimura
Editor-in-Chief, Green Watch 2021

8

Chapter 1
Eyes on a Decarbonised Society
Section 1. Responding to the Climate Crisis
1. Anticipated climate and energy policy shifts in Japan
2020 was expected to be a milestone year for changes
in Japan’s climate and energy policies for two reasons.
Firstly, greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets had
been kept to an extraordinarily modest level of 26%
by 2030 compared to FY2013 levels and 80% by 2050,
and ambitious reduction targets consistent with theParis Agreement had not been set, requiring more
extensive targets for COP26. Secondly, the time hadcome for the Strategic Energy Plan to be revised, as
required by law about every three years. In short,the cur tain closed on 2020 with Japan taking a
step forward, but with mounting challenges to beaddressed.

co-firing, and other technologies. The report also
contained the statement that Japan should pursue theuse of thermal power, including coal, even by 2050.
Instead of a fundamental shift in policy, nothing has
actually changed. Construction of coal-fired power
plants right at our doorstep is still going ahead,with fifteen new plants in Yokosuka, Kobe, and otherlocations expected to start operating in the future1.
In the following year, Prime Minister Suga spelled out
a “46% to 50% reduction” target for 2030 on 22 April
2021 to coincide with the US-hosted Leaders Summiton Climate. While the key point of debate was whether
Japan can set a reduction target that is commensuratewith an emission pathway to reduce global emissions
by 45% or more compared to 2010 levels by 2030, thisis not an exceptionally high target when looking at
historical emissions. A reduction rate of 60% or more
required from a fair and equitable perspective in theinternational community.

In his general policy speech at the start of the Diet
session on 26 October 2020, Prime Minister Yoshihide
Suga announced that Japan would set a target of zero
GHG emissions by 2050 and indicated a drastic change
in policy on coal-fired power. At last, Japan positioned
itself at the starting point for climate action by joining
the ranks of the rest of the world in announcing that
it would reduce GHG emissions to zero by 2050.
This was also the first announcement indicating afundamental shift in policy on coal-fired power.

Fur t h e r m o r e , in dis cu s si o n s o n t h e St r a te gic
Energy Plan, no major shifts in the government’s
current policies were presented, despite the targets
announced earlier. There have been no changes inpolicies on maintaining the current levels of nuclear
and coal-fired power with excessive expectations
placed on scientific and technological innovation. The
new Strategic Energy Plan is scheduled to be finalisedin the summer of 2021 and approved by the Cabinet
in the fall. However, if the current direction remains
unchanged, the Plan is likely to be compiled withinsubstantial content including maintaining the use ofcoal in the future.

Two months later, the Committee on the Growth
Strategy, established in the Cabinet Secretariat,
released Japan’s “Green Growth Strategy throughAchieving Carbon Neutrality in 2050”. However, thisreport stated that Japan would face difficulties incovering all electricity demand with 100% renewableenergy and recommended that the country pursue apath of expanding the introduction of thermal power
presupposing CO 2 recover y, hydrogen, ammonia
1: Japan Beyond Coal, 16 Feb 2021: https://beyond-coal.jp/ (in Japanese)92. Public Campaign: “Ato 4 Nen” (meaning “Only Four Years to Go” in Japanese)On 10 December 2020, Green Alliance Japan andother environmental NGOs launched a joint campaign
with civic and youth groups called “Ato 4 Nen”
(encompassing the idea that, with four years to go,
now is the time to protect our future). Using theopportunity of revisions to the Strategic Energy Plan
and the Plan for Global Warming Countermeasuresin 2021, this campaign calls for a review of reductiont a r g e t s to e n s u r e co n s i s t e n c y w i t h t h e Pa r i s
Agreement and energy policies. The following fiverecommendations were proposed in revising theStrategic Energy Plan:

4. The use of nuclear energy should be suspended,and the expansion of new facilities and development of new reactors should be halted.

1. Climate and energy policies should be reviewed
through a democratic and transparent process withthe participation of youth.

Unfortunately, despite demands from residents, theJapanese government has only taken feedback fromthe public on revisions to the Strategic Energy Plan in
the form of a “suggestion box”, while discussions aretaking place on a council composed of members who
mostly represent the vested interests of businesses.
Because of meetings held in such highly undemocraticmanner, the bold changes to energy policy that Ato 4
Nen has stressed are unlikely to materialise.

5. Japan should not depend on carbon capture andstorage technologies, which are unreliable and poseissues of concern for potential social and environmental impacts.
Around the country, this campaign has mobilised theparticipation of 242 supporting organisations and led
to 122 actions on the ground. 274,830 signatures havealso been collected (as of 10 June 2021).

2. GHG emission reduction targets for 2030 should be
at least 50% compared to 2010 levels.
3. By 2030, the energy mix should contain zero coalfired thermal power or nuclear power, with energy
conservation as the top priority, and should include
at least 50% renewable energy sources.

3. Local responses to the climate crisis and urban development
Meanwhile, due to impacts from climate change
in recent years, communities are becoming moreaware of the climate crisis. As the world moves closer
to decarbonisation, the number of municipalities
declaring their intentions to reach net-zero GHG
emissions by 2050 is on the rise, standing at 204 as of
8 January 2021. According to a report by the Ministryof the Environment, the population residing in areasthat have made these declarations is over 90 million,
with a GDP of over JPY 400 trillion.

in relatively small municipalities that are moving closer
to realising the goal of decarbonisation. One such
example that can serve as a guide is Nishiawakura
Village in Okayama Prefecture, which aims to createa sustainable “high-quality countryside” based on its“100-Year Forest Concept”. With a population of about
1,500, the village has taken the replacement of smallscale hydroelectric power as an opportunity to installrenewable energy facilities, engage in forestation
activities, utilise timber, support entrepreneurs, andrealise the development of district heating supply.
More young people are moving into the village, andnew local businesses are burgeoning. In areas withrich forest resources, it is possible to develop suchdecarbonised communities by taking a long-term
perspective.

However, there is a significant gap between expressedtargets and current conditions of local communities,
which are dependent on fossil fuels. As a result,measures and specif ic policies to achieve zero
emissions are inadequate. Although it is becoming
clearer which direction Tokyo, Nagano Prefecture andsome municipalities are heading, details are still toovague to guarantee that their targets will be realised.
However, some advanced cases are starting to emerge

Following the complete deregulation of the electricity
retail market in April 2016, new power companies havealso emerged that are working on finding solutions
10

to local issues. Minna-denryoku Inc. is involved inpromoting the local production of electricity for local
consumption and expanding the use of energy “witha face”. TERA Energy Co., Ltd. was set up by monks in
Kyoto, while Taiyo-Gas Co., Ltd. was established by alocal gas company. These companies are linking therevitalisation of local communities and solutions tosocial issues through the business of selling power.
Power producers and suppliers (PPS) are also being
established with investments from municipalities,
with the aim of contributing to local communities andpromoting regional economic cycles.

In addition to declarations on decarbonisation,municipalities are required to formulate ordinancesand policy plans that include reduction targets andpaths forward to achieve net-zero emissions. They
must also introduce specific policies and encourage
the use of budgets or funds from the private sector
to implement them. Given this, it is important forresidents, businesses and local organisations to takepart in this process from the stage of formulating
ordinances and plans and promote collaboration andpartnership with various stakeholders to implement
specific activities and projects.

Section 2. Current Status and Challenges of Renewable Energy and Energy
Policies
The share of electricity generated from renewableenergy sources annually in Japan has increased
substantially over the past 10 years, finally reaching
20% in FY2020.2 This progress is, however, insufficient.
T h e r e i s a n e e d to gr e a t l y r e v i s e t a r g e t s f o r
introducing renewable energy power by 2030 in the
country’s Strategic Energy Plan, which is currently
under review. The council at the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI) has proposed a renewableenergy target of 36% to 38%, but has left in place an
unrealistic target of 20% to 22% for nuclear power.
As a result, a number of environmental NGOs andcivil society are proposing to make the entire share of
non-fossil fuel energy (60%) powered by renewables,and going even further by proposing a renewable 3
energy target of 100% by 2050. The Japanese businesssector is also proposing a renewable energy target of
40% or higher by 2030, and there is a growing trend
by companies to aim for 100% renewable energy.

annually by photovoltaic power in FY2020 was about
9%, over 20 times higher than in FY2010. The shareof wind power was almost double that in FY2010,
eventually reaching only around 1%, or about onetenth of the share of photovoltaic power. Only about
4 GW has been installed however because of long,drawn-out procedures for environmental assessments
and delays in the development of power grids insuitable areas, such as Hokkaido, that have great
potential for renewable energy. Conversely, by the endof 2020, the installed capacity of wind power projects
that are undergoing environmental assessment
procedures, including offshore wind power, reachedor surpassed 30 GW. With the launch of the Act
on Promoting the Utilization of Sea Areas for theDevelopment of Marine Renewable Energy Power
Generation Facilities, under which the government
will coordinate areas where offshore wind power
will be installed, a collaborative vision between the
public and private sector has been formulated for theoffshore wind power industry. This vision shares theaim of developing projects that generate 10 GW ofpower by 2030. Meanwhile, biomass power rose toa 3.2% share of the amount of electricity generated

By the end of 2020, the total installed capacity ofphotovoltaic power in Japan was about 70 GW, thethird largest in the world after China and the U.S. 4
With this capacity, the amount of electricity generated

2: ISEP “Share of Electricity Generated from Renewable Energy in 2020 (Preliminary Report)” https://www.isep.or.jp/en/1075/
3: This target is based on the premise of reducing the share of nuclear and coal-fired thermal power to zero. Note that, if significant energy efficiency improvements are realised, civil society organisations propose a renewable energy target of at least 50%.

4: REN21 “Renewables 2021 Global Status Report” https://ren21.net/gsr/

11

annually, almost triple the amount generated in
FY2010. However, sustainability standards are being
established, as more than 70% of certified biomass
power generation facilities use wood and agriculturalresidue (PKS and palm oil) from overseas as fuel,raising sustainability concerns regarding imported
biomass fuel (especially liquid biomass such as palm
oil).

towards a renewable energy-oriented society, we findthat, in reality, the system of control has remained
mostly intact in the hands of major electric powercompanies (former general electric utilities) withtraditional centralised power supply systems at theircore. A number of challenges have emerged amid
the complete deregulation of the electricity market,
including the creation of new capacity markets to
support nuclear and coal-fired thermal power.

Although a review of the Strategic Energy Planraised the principle of making renewable energy a
top priority and established a direction positioning
renewables as the main power source, there are

The principle of free competition are expected tocome into play as electricity system reforms movefor ward, allowing for more economical power

many issues to be addressed. These issues include
individual measures (bidding systems for solar
power, requirements for the local utilization of selfconsumption, feed-in-Premium (FIP) schemes, etc.)
forming a patchwork response to the inadequacies
of initial policies that were exposed by the rapid
in cr eas e in ph otovolt aic p owe r follow in g the
introduction of feed-in tariffs (FIT). In the wake of
the Great East Japan Earthquake on 11 March 2011,
the transition to sustainable energy systems has
been in the pipeline, but despite addressing various
challenges with electricity systems and markets,
medium- to long-term targets and roadmaps have
not yet been set at the national or local levels. Still,
it is essential to make that shift to a decentralised
energy system with different local resources. The
government, with the Ministry of the Environment
in a key role, is working on drawing up a roadmap
for local decarbonisation and promoting actions tocreate “Regional Circulating and Ecological Spheres”5 .
There is an immediate need to develop roadmaps andmechanisms for the long-term use of 100% renewableenergy at the national and local levels and to viewthe development of infrastructure for this purpose
from a long-term perspective, including in theheating and transportation sectors, as well as tailoring
stakeholder-led initiatives to the characteristics ofeach area.

generation methods to be selected. Electricit ygenerated from renewable energy sources that do
not incur fuel costs are expected to be sold first in thewholesale electricity market, making it more difficultfor electricity generated from fossil fuels with highfuel costs (especially natural gas) to be sold. Coal-fired
thermal power are expected to become a “stranded
asset” in the future, pressed by international demandfor decarbonisation. Moreover, there is an assumption
for nuclear power that regional monopolies andrate of return regulations will guarantee a return on
investment; in other words, costs will be recoupedfrom all consumers in small amounts over a broad
scale. However, this premise has been undermined byreforms. Thus, nuclear power plants, which incur hugecosts for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and paying
for compensation for nuclear accidents, should also
become obsolete if left to economic principles.

However, contrary to this line of thinking, the national
government has actually positioned nuclear and coalfired thermal power as “important baseload powersources” and is in the process of developing systems
to protect these power sources financially even in thecompetitive environment resulting from electricity
system reforms. One such system that was decided
in 2017 is the use of a wheeling charge to recoversome of the costs involved in compensation for the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, as
well costs for decommissioning nuclear power plants
in different areas. This scheme is designed to force
the victims of nuclear accidents, consumers who do
not choose major electric power companies that

However, if we look at what has actually changed
as a result of reforms to electricity systems thathave taken place over the past six years since 2015,or whether there has been any progress in moving

5: Ministry of Environment “Annual report on the Environment, the Sound Material-Cycle Society and Biodiversity in Japan 2019” http://www.env.go.jp/en/wpaper/2019/index.
html

12

use nuclear power, and even future generations, toshoulder the burden of compensation that shouldbe paid by the power provider responsible for theplant, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). The
government arrived at a decision to start implementing
this system from October 2020, despite strong
opposition. The new electricity market introduced
between 2019 and 2020 is yet another measure put
in place to support major electric power companies.
Specifically, this entails the introduction of a “baseload
market” that prioritises nuclear and coal-fired thermal
power; the establishment of a “non-fossil fuel energy
value trading market” (where power sources otherthan fossil thermal power, such as nuclear power orrenewable energy via FIT and non-FIT schemes, arecertified as “non-fossil power sources” and “nonfossil energy value” is traded in the form of certificate
separately from electricity); and the formation of anominal “capacity market” to secure power capacity
in four years’ time. The capacity market in particular
is a mechanism where money is paid for the valueof installed capacity (kW) in the future (four years
from now), which is then recouped from retail electric
power providers. Even though major electric powercompanies pay for this in the retail sector, overall,
their burden is light because they can secure the samelevel of income as in the past in the power generation
sector, using the ageing, large-scale power plants they
already own. In contrast, new retail electric companies
that mainly provide renewable energy that do nothave large-scale power plants must pay and shoulder
a considerable load. Furthermore, these three newmarkets have caused more money to flow in theform of “maintenance and equipment replacement
costs” into ageing nuclear power, coal-fired thermal
power and large-scale hydroelectric power plants thatshould already have recouped their investments. A
considerable number of these ageing power plants

are owned by major electric power companies, so thisincreasingly strengthens the oligopoly of these large
companies and runs counter to both deregulating theelectricity market and introducing renewable energy.
With the complete deregulation of the electricity retailmarket in 2016, a number of retail electric companies
have entered the electric power retail business(approximately 700 companies as of February 2021).
With a looming sense of crisis, major electric powercompanies tried to recover lost ground by offering
substantial discounts, and as a result, local retailelectric companies aiming to supply renewable energy
found themselves under threat without exception,
forced to win back contracts and squeeze operations
in order to keep prices down as low as possible. The
comeback of major electric power companies between
FY2018 and FY2019 has been notable, particularly incontracts with well-established local companies, large
corporations and municipal public facilities. Startingwith how local retail electric companies will be able
to overcome the blow of a hike in electricity market
prices in the winter of 2021, the next few years willbe crucial in terms of whether local retail electriccompanies can survive with the difficulties they will
face, from how they can overcome the challenges of
the capacity market from FY2024 to how they canpromote local energy procurement and supply.

13

Chapter 2
Breaking Away from Overuse
Section 1. COVID-19 measures and the dangers lurking behind the excessive
use of chemicals and the use of harmful chemicals
1. Markets flooded with disinfectants, sanitisers, anti-bacterial and anti-viral products
Battered by the COVID-19 pandemic, 2020 was a year
spent taking measures to fight against the virus. The
Japanese government issued broad recommendations
to the public to wear masks, maintain a certain
distance away from other people, avoid the “ThreeCs” (closed spaces, crowded places, close-contact
settings), and disinfect their hands and objects. Even
before the public health emergency, many Japanesepeople, with attentiveness to hygiene and cleanliness,

had a habit of using a number of sterilising anddisinfecting products on a daily basis. However, theuse of these products has spiralled with the COVID-19
pandemic, the market now flooded with disinfectants,
sanitisers, and anti-bacterial and anti-viral products
claiming to be effective in preventing infection.
And yet, many of these products contain unknown
concentrations and ingredients, have not been provento be safe or effective, or contain harmful additives.

2. Defining disinfectants, sanitisers, anti-bacterial and anti-viral products and the current status oflaws and regulations
Disinfectants and other products are defined asfollows.

(Detergent and Soap Fair Trade Council).
Although there is no legal definition for these terms,“anti-bacterial” and “anti-viral” generally mean toinhibit the growth of bacteria and viruses.
With the exception of pharmaceuticals, quasipharmaceutical products, and designated quasipharmaceutical products under the Pharmaceuticals
and Medical Devices Act, products labelled with theabove descriptors are handled as “miscellaneous
products”, even though there are no legal regulations
in place to examine their efficacy and safety.

According to the Japanese Ministr y of Health,Labour and Welfare, “disinfecting” refers to the actof “inactivating bacteria and viruses”. When used asa descriptor for hand-sanitising products, the term
“disinfectants” can only be applied to pharmaceuticals,quasi-pharmaceutical products, or designated quasipharmaceutical products (all of which are regulated
under the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Act),according to the Act on Securing Quality, Efficacy
and Safety of Products Including Pharmaceuticals
and Medical Devices (hereinafter referred to as the“Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Act”, under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health, Labour andWelfare).

In addition to the Pharmaceuticals and Medical
Devices Act (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare),product labelling falls under the vertical jurisdictionof the Household Goods Qualit y Labelling Act(Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Consumer
Affairs Agency), Act against Unjustifiable Premiums
and Misleading Representations and the Health
Promotion Act (Ministr y of Health, Labour andWelfare, Consumer Affairs Agency). However, there are

Conversely, while not legally defined, “sanitising” iscommonly understood to be the act of reducing thenumber of microbes that can multiply from an object
through a physical, chemical, or biological action
14

quite a few products that are not required to specify
ingredients or contents on their labels. Worse yet,there is an innumerable number of products that arelabelled illegally, claiming to be effective in preventing
COVID-19 infections.

and possible violations of the provisions of the Act
against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading
Representations and the Health Promotion Act’s
provisions on grounds of false or exaggerated
representation on food labels. However, new andsimilar products continue to be launched on themarket. Fur ther, although announcements havebeen made about administrative guidance issued by
the Consumer Affairs Agency, the names of specificproducts and businesses have not been disclosed.
It is clear that information provided to consumers isinadequate.

On the matter of labelling of “healthful food” andsanitising products that claim to be effective inpreventing COVID-19 infections, the Consumer
Af fairs Agenc y has repeatedly issued warnings
to the general public and requests for revision tobusinesses, citing a lack of objectivity and rationality,

3. Problems with disinfectants, sanitisers, anti-bacterial and anti-viral products(1) New products other than soap and alcohol(ethanol) continue to be released on the market,
but the ingredients, efficacy and safety of many ofthese products are unknown
Simply washing your hands with soap is a good way tosanitise and eliminate viruses. If someone is not able
to wash their hands immediately, hand sanitiser withan alcohol concentration of 70% to 95% is effective.

any circumstance” by WHO. However, a considerable
number of sanitisers for spaces have recently beenreleased on the market and are being used in storesand homes. Some are deodorisers and air purifiers,
and there are concerns regarding the health effects ofprolonged inhalation of these products.
(3) Concerns about adverse effects on humanhealth and ecosystems from the excessive use of
disinfectants and other products
These and other disinfectants have been proven tobe effective in breaking down the lipid membranes
and proteins of viruses, but may also break downth e m e mbran e s an d pr otein s of human ce lls .
Excessively disinfecting and sanitising hands canlead to a change in skin microbiota – specifically, theloss of native bacteria that helps protect the skin,resulting in skin irritations and aggravations of atopic
dermatitis. Normally, bacterial and viral pathogens
are not transmitted through the skin, but there is arisk that viruses can infect a person by entering the
body through severe skin irritations and wounds.
Although there is a considerable number of beneficial
indigenous bacteria in the oral cavity, excessive
gargling with products containing disinfecting agentscan reduce the number of this indigenous bacteria
and damage the mucosal system, which in turn, canincrease the risk of infection.

However, as rubbing alcohol ran out of stock in theearly months of the COVID-19 pandemic, products
listing sodium hypochlorite and benzalkonium chloride
as active ingredients became available as substitutes.
This also led to a flood of new products containing
ingredients such as hypochlorous acid water, chlorine
dioxide, and chlorous acid water being released on
the market as hand sanitisers, as well as sanitisers
for objects and spaces. All are sold as “miscellaneous
products”, and therefore, are not required to list
their ingredients on labels, nor are they reviewed for
efficacy and safety. However, this makes it difficult
for consumers to make informed decisions whenchoosing products, as some are advertised industrywide on company websites as “scientifically-proven” towork. It is not uncommon to fall for advertising claims
and purchase products with unknown ingredients or
where efficacy and safety is uncertain.
(2) Considerable number of spray products forspaces
As is generally known, the efficacy of sanitisers
for spaces has not yet been confirmed. Spraying
sanitisers in spaces where people are present may be
harmful to health and is “not recommended underIn order to prevent the risk of infec tion fromCOVID-19, it is important not only to inactivate thevirus by disinfecting and sanitising, but to also boost
the immune system. The excessive use of disinfectants,
however, may actually alter intestinal flora and15

weaken the immune system. Interaction with wellbalanced intestinal flora must take place for immune
cells to work properly. According to a recent study in
China, faecal samples from individuals hospitalised
for COVID-19 were found to lack several species ofthe beneficial bacteria present in healthy people. In
particular, patients who lacked a certain species ofbeneficial bacteria that produce butyric acid havebeen reported to exhibit more severe symptoms.

hospitals and other facilities on ecosystems. Large
quantities of disinfectants and similar products
are now being used on a daily basis to prevent the
spread of COVID-19 not only in hospitals, but also in
stores, schools, and residences, and released into theenvironment. The serious impacts on ecosystems fromthe use of these products pose significant concerns.
From this perspective, it is important that proper
disinfectants are used correctly (in terms of amountand frequency). According to the WHO, the primarytransmission route of COVID-19 is via droplets oraerosols, not through contact. Therefore, the useof disinfectants and other products for objects andspaces should be kept to a minimum.

Furthermore, many of the active ingredients in these
disinfectants and other products are highly toxic toaquatic life. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic,
research papers had been published warning of
the adverse impacts of disinfectants released from

4. Recommendations to the government
In light of the points discussed above, we recommendthat the government take the following two actions assoon as possible.

government has set up a “Response Headquarters”
and established an expert panel to discuss COVID-19
countermeasures. A centralised system to disseminate
easy-to-understand information on disinfectants
and similar products should also be set up by the
Response Headquarters as soon as possible, following
discussions by the expert panel.

(1) Establish a centralised system to disseminate
information on disinfectants and other productsin the Novel Coronavirus Response Headquarters(at the Prime Minister’s Office)As already mentioned, disinfectants and similar
products are currently vertically segmented andcontrolled by several ministries and agencies. The
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Ministryof Economy, Trade and Industry and the Consumer
Affairs Agency have jointly set up a special website toprovide information on disinfection and sterilisation
methods for COVID-19. While the joint disseminationof information by the three ministries is in and of itself
admirable, the website contains no specific productinformation, and the content is not necessarily
easy for consumers to understand. Moreover, thedisclosure of information of products advertised andpromoted by businesses online and in TV commercials
is one-sided, with hardly any information on adverse
effects or risks. The reality is that the public chooses
and purchases products with little understanding of
the problems that can arise from their use.

(2) Quickly introduce centralised regulations on
the use of biocides
As mentioned above, disinfectants/sanitisers otherthan pharmaceuticals under the Pharmaceuticals andMedical Devices Act are handled as “miscellaneous
products”. Although there are regulations in place onlabelling such products, these are vertically segmented
and controlled by multiple ministries and agencies.
There is also no system in place to examine theefficacy and safety of these products. However, sincethese ingredients have the ability to kill, inactivate,
reduce or inhibit the growth of bacteria and viruses,
they may not only affect bacteria and viruses, but also
have impacts on human health and ecosystems. Given
these potential risks, it is advisable to manage them ina centralised and comprehensive manner.
Therefore, following a sweeping review of existinglegislation, a new centralised control system shouldbe established for these products so that they are notregulated simply by the type of application, but basecentralised and comprehensive control of substanceson their biocidal effects.

In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is crucial
to provide information that will help the publicchoose the correct methods of preventing infection
through the use of disinfectants and sanitisers. The
16

Section 2. Plastic Waste Issues in the Age of Infectious Diseases
In order to find solutions to the array of problems
associated with plastics, there is a need for consumers
who have the “right to choose” to take their own
initiatives in untangling these challenges, as well
as for public administration, including the national
government , to est ablish s ystems and for thebusinesses to innovate technologies. This chapter
will introduce examples of reusable containers andpackaging in Japan in light of the current stateof single-use plastics, which is on the rise due toconcerns regarding the spread of infectious diseases.

(2) Increased use of single-use plastics as aconsequence of infection prevention measures
Non-woven masks, gloves and gowns used to prevent
droplet infections are all plastic products that are
typically used once and then discarded. Partitions
used to reduce droplet infections are similarly madeof plastic.
According to the Ministry of Economy, Trade andIndustr y, domestic produc tion of plastic foam
products, including food trays, increased by 6.7%
in April 2020 compared to the same month of theprevious year. Additionally, domestic production offilm for packaging, such as plastic bags, increasedby 3.5% in April compared to the same month of theprevious year, marking an increase for the first time innine months8 . Just as a number of local governments
and businesses were starting to take steps to reduce
the amount of plastic in response to growing concerns
about plastic waste, demand for single-use plastic
products is rising in response to preventing the spreadof infectious diseases, thereby dampening reduction
efforts.

(1) Rapid increase in takeout and delivery
Our lives have been dramatically upended due tothe spread of COVID-19. The restaurant industry inparticular has seen a rapid increase in the number of
establishments that have started new takeout anddelivery services. In a survey, 54.7% of restaurants
responded that they have started to offer takeout
services because of the effects of COVID-196 , while inanother survey, 40.1% of users reported an increase in
their use of takeout services7.

Examples of reusing containers and packaging, and some recommendations(1) Consumer behaviours for a new age
In order to identify fundamental solutions to theincreasing amounts of waste, especially plastic, caused
by infection control measures, research on recycling
technologies and methods of utilising recycledresources are being examined. However, in tandemwith this, citizens must take concrete steps to reduceand reuse plastic at a speed that will likely outpace
such research and studies. Single-use containers,
which consumers generally consider to be hygienic,
can still be sources of infection among those
responsible for disposal, collection and treatment
processes if adequate care is not taken.

health experts from 18 countries stating that reusable
products (reusable containers and packaging, suchas personal tumblers and bags) are safe, even amidst
outbreaks of COVID-19. The statement indicated that,in order to prevent the transmission of infectious
diseases via objects and contact sur faces, it isimportant to consider any object or surface – reusableor disposable – in public spaces as potentiallycontaminated with the virus and that single-use plastic
may not be inherently safer than reusable products.
Even in this pandemic, there is room for innovating
responses to reducing the number of single-use
containers, and a properly-managed system for reusecan be viewed as an effective means of addressing
both plastic waste and infectious disease control.

The international environmental NGO, Greenpeace,
released a statement on 22 June 2020 signed by 119
6: https://prtimes.jp/main/html/rd/p/000000045.000014754.html (in Japanese)
7: https://corporate.gnavi.co.jp/release/2020/20200521-019310.html (in Japanese)

8: https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO62867880Q0A820C2EE8000/?unlock=1 (in Japanese)17(2) Examples of reuse
Reusable container sharing services have also started
up in Japan. Loop, a circular shopping platform
offered by TerraCycle in the US, is a system that sells
products in reusable containers, collects and cleans
these used containers, refills the products, and thenputs them back on the market. Sales started in March
2021 targeting 5,000 households, mainly in Tokyo, andat some AEON stores9. In December 2020, TerraCycle
also launched “Loop Takeout Bento”, a service sellingtakeout lunch boxes and prepared foods using
reusable containers10 .

(3) Recommendations: Taking a whole-of-society
approach to solving challenges
Although some measures provide clues to solving
challenges, the following measures in eachstakeholder must be taken to expand these trends toall of society.
(1) Public administration and municipalities
It is impor tant to reduce the amount of waste
generate d in communities b efor e developing
infrastructure that may put pressure on financesand cause social problems, such as ageing waste
disposal (incineration) facilities and strains on final
disposal sites, in the future. Therefore, economic andinstitutional support must be provided to encourage
local shops and other establishments to be proactive
in using reusable containers. Mobility services mustalso be involved to handle collection, as well as
facilities in the community, if any, that may be able toserve as cleaning sources for reusable containers.

Meanwhile, “Re&Go” is a sharing and multi-use
container service jointly developed by Nissha and
NEC Solution Innovators. A demonstration project for“Re&Go” was conducted in Okinawa Prefecture (fromDecember 2020 to February 2021). After registering
for the service on the social media application LINE,
users can purchase takeout in reusable containers
from participating stores and return the containers tothese stores. In addition to local cafes and restaurants,
Starbucks Coffee Okinawa Yomitan store is also taking
part in this initiative11.

(2) Businesses
With the design of highly recyclable products andreplicable business models expected in ar terial
industries, the manufacturing industry should not
limit its consideration to products, but should extend
it to containers, packaging, wrapping, and otheritems that can become waste after use, requiring that
distribution be “optimised” in the true sense of theword by utilising reuse systems.

Municipalities are also making efforts to reduce andreuse the single-use plastics that have multiplied overthe course of the pandemic. In May 2020, Maniwa
City in Okayama Prefecture launched an “Eco-Takeout
Promotion Project”, in which reusable tablewarefrom city facilities that are closed because of thepandemic is provided to restaurants to be used for
takeout services. Kyoto City also offered subsidies
for switching to reusable tableware for delivery andtakeout containers.

(3) Civil society
In a circular economy model, the consumer is not
the final destination of a product (including its
accompanying container, packaging and wrapping),
but is the star ting point of a new cycle. We as
consumers must fully understand the intentions of
the measures taken by the public administration
and businesses, and shift to lifestyles and ethicalconsumption patterns that fulfil our responsibilities.

9: https://s3.amazonaws.com/tc-global-prod/download_resources/jp/downloads/14242/Loop_Loop_Website_Launch_20201229.pdf (in Japanese)
10: https://s3.amazonaws.com/tc-global-prod/download_resources/jp/downloads/13784/Loop_ObentoProjectStart_Press_Release_20200928.pdf (in Japanese)
11: https://www.nissha.com/news/2020/11/24_024.html (in Japanese)18Column: NGO proposal on creating a social system independent of plastic
The “Act on Promotion of Resource Circulation
for Plastics” was enacted in June 2021 and isscheduled to take effect in April 2022. This Act sets
out the following three basic policies in order tocomprehensively strengthen resource circulation
systems for plastics and to take measures forpromoting efforts for resource circulation forplastics targeting all entities involved in the entire
lifecycle of plastic-containing products ranging
from design to waste disposal.

This NGO proposal first calls for a drastic reductionin the total production of plastic products, mainlycontainers and packaging. It emphasises that asystem guaranteeing recycling, which includes
the reuse of those products that cannot be
immediately reduced, will be essential. To that
end, it will be necessary to create a socioeconomic
system based on strengthening the concept ofextended producer responsibility.
The government’s enacted legislation is based on“thorough reduction through the active use ofalternative products” and “promoting collection
and recycling based on the premise of massdisposal”, both of which pose risks that could leadto new environmental problems. The concern isthat the legislation does not require a shift awayfrom a “mass production, mass consumption
and mass disposal” model of society, which liesat the heart of this issue. In addition, the current
government Act does not address the introductionof measures to prevent adverse effects caused
by toxic chemicals or the establishment of aframework for global-level solutions, both of which
are needed. Therefore, it is necessary to keep acautious and close watch on future developments.

(1) Plastic waste reduction and design of plasticcontaining products contributing to recycling12(2) Rational use of single-use plastic(3) Sorted collection, voluntary collection andrecycling of plastic waste
On the other hand, civil society groups, including
member s of the NGO Net work “Realizing a
Reduced Plastic Society” announced their draft
proposal on the “Basic Act for Promoting a
Plastic-Free Strategy” to promote strategies
for achieving zero leakage of plastics into thenatural environment and zero single-use plastics
in principle by 2030, with the aim of building asociety that is not dependent on newly-produced
virgin plastics by 205013 .

12: https://www.env.go.jp/press/109195.html (in Japanese)
13: https://www.wbsj.org/press/img/pla-gaiyou210212.pdf (in Japanese)

19Chapter 3
Fukushima Today: Ten Years On

It has been ten years since the explosion at the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Although
work to decommission the ravaged power plantpresses on, the more time passes, the more apparent
the dif ficulties in the decommissioning process
become. Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings Inc.
(TEPCO) revised its “Mid- to Long-term Roadmap” fordecommissioning the plant in December 2019, andin this fifth revision, the period for completing theremoval of spent fuel from fuel pools was extended
by 10 years to 2031. The plan is to complete theremoval of fuel from fuel pools in Units 1 through6 by this time. So far, the process of removing fuelhas been completed in Units 3 and 4. Moreover, theplan called for fuel debris14 to start being removed
in 2021; however, due to manufacturing delays in
the UK caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, this wasdelayed until 2022. The “Mid- to Long-term Roadmap”
only specifies a starting date; no completion date ismentioned. Difficulties in removing fuel debris andCorium stem from the fact that the details on theirlocation and their chemical form in the plant are
still unknown, and survey equipment with strong
resistance to high radiation levels is still being
developed. In light of this, with no foreseeable
date for completion, it is not hard to imagine that
this process will take even more time. Despite this,decommissioning measures are set to finish between
2041 and 2051 because Fukushima Prefecture has
determined that drawn-out decommissioning plans,
including the construc tion of a sarcophagus 15 ,is inconsistent with reconstruction as set out inthe prefecture’s basic principle of a “coexistenceo f r e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g ”. I nconsequence, the ending period for decommissioning
cannot be formally delayed.
On a related note, the Roadmap does not specify
the state in which decommissioning measures willend. While reactor buildings are expected to be
dismantled, it is not clear how the estimated 780,000
tonnes of radioactive waste 16 will be handled, norhave discussions on these points moved forward.
Fukushima Prefecture is on a quest to clear the landso that no radiation remains, requiring the site to
be renovated and radioactive waste to be removed
from the site (outside the prefecture). However,realistically, it is unlikely that other municipalities willtake in this radioactive waste. Given these challenges
among others, discussions on the final structureof the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant siteshould take place with the participation of various
stakeholders.

1. Problems with releasing contaminated water into the ocean
From the Roadmap, which presumes a maximum of
40 years to complete the decommissioning process,it is clear that the continued storage of contaminatedwater is seen as being problematic. TEPCO and theMinistry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) claimthat there is scant space available for the installationof additional storage tanks for contaminated water
when considering the difficulties of long-term storage
and waste storage buildings and other facilities thatwill be required in the future for decommissioning theplant.

14: According to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), “During the accident at the NPS in March, 2011, nuclear fuel melted down and mixed with various pieces
from structures which solidified inside the reactor. This is referred to as “fuel debris.” See https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/special/article/fukushima.html.

15: A stone coffin around the reactor buildings, as seen in Chernobyl.
16: “Waste Management from the Perspective of International Standards”, Review Committee on Decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Atomic
Energy Society of Japan, July 2020.

20

The national government announced a Cabinet
decision on its long-standing policy of releasing
contaminated water into the ocean on 13 April 2021,
positioning it as a clear-cut basic policy. This has
also been inserted into the draft of the 6th Strategic
Energy Plan that is currently being formulated.
The national government does not use the term
“contaminated water” and has used “treated water” torefer to water stored in tanks that exceeds regulatory
standards and that will be treated again by ALPS
(Advanced Liquid Processing System). Only water thathas been subjected to secondary treatment is referred
to as “ALPS treated water”17.

was the exact opposite of what had been promised,leaving the government open to criticism for violating
their commitment.
Information on the implementation of releasing water
into the ocean is slowly coming to light. According
to TEPCO, roughly 140 m3 of contaminated water isgenerated per day (as of 2020), depending on theamount of rainfall19 . If this continues, storage tanks
will reach full capacity of 137 million m3 in about two
years. After a second round of treatment, nuclides
other than tritium will fall below regulatory standards,
and tritium can also be released after it is diluted
from the post-treatment level of 730,000 becquerels
per litre to 1,500 becquerels per litre. TEPCO has alsoannounced that the volume of tritium to be released
annually will be 22 trillion becquerels or less, and theamount of water discharged daily shall be 500 m3 orless. On 25 August 2021, TEPCO announced that it
would release the treated water from locations 1 km
offshore through installing a drainage pipe20 . Details
are not yet known because TEPCO has not applied fora permit to the Nuclear Regulation Authority.

Unsurprisingly, fishermen and other agriculturaland forestr y groups oppose the release of thiswater into the ocean. To date, TEPCO and METI havecommunicated a written statement with fishermengroups in Fukushima Prefecture, informing them that“no action would be taken without the understandingof all involved”. However, the Cabinet decision wasreached without the consent of these stakeholders,and opposition has grown even stronger since, notonly from the Fukushima Prefectural Federation ofFisheries Co-operative Associations (JF Fukushima)
but also from a nationwide federation of Japan
Fisheries Co-operatives (JF Zengyoren) and Fukushima
Cooperative Council for the Promotion of Local
Production for Local Consumption (which is madeup of 22 organisations including JF Fukushima,
Japan Agricultural Co-operative (JA) Fukushima, andJapanese Consumers’ Co-operative Union (Co-op)
Fukushima) .

Based on the logic that ocean water will dilute theconcentration of radioactive substances released,
TEPCO and METI reiterate that this practice is safe
and that the risk of radiation exposure is minimal.
However, citizens have expressed concern that, since
all of the radioactive material found in the treatedwater is released, this practice will lead to radiation
pollution of the marine environment. To date, theauthorities have not released any information on how
much of each nuclide will be released.

Following the Cabinet decision, the governmenthas been working on initiatives to strengthen
understanding af ter the fact, investing JPY 280
billion over the next two years 18 into awarenessraising. Efforts should have been made to gain theunderstanding of stakeholders before the Cabinet
decision was reached. The procedure for deciding thisGiven these concerns and contrary to TEPCO and thegovernment, citizens’ groups are proposing that thecontaminated water be solidified into cement, as wellas continuing to be stored in additional tanks for theforeseeable future21.

17: https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2021/0413_004.html
18: https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat1/sub-cat1-4/20210422-30_san-yosan.pdf (in Japanese only)
19: https://www.tepco.co.jp/decommission/progress/watermanagement/ (in Japanese only)
20: https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/hd/newsroom/press/archives/2021/pdf/210825e0101.pdf
21: “Statement: The national government should not release ALPS treated/contaminated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the ocean. The contaminated water should be managed and disposed of responsibly on land over the long term”, Citizens' Commission on Nuclear Energy, October 20, 2020. http://www.ccnejapan.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/20201020_CCNE.pdf

21

2. No progress on the return of young people and the fragile future of municipalities
A lth o ugh th e national gove r nm e nt ha s lif te devacuation orders and is encouraging people to returnto their homes, the rate of return is low because
too much time has passed and concerns regarding
exposure to widespread radioactive materials remain.
Notably, the rate of return is even lower among theyounger generation, as many have started new lives in
the areas where they had evacuated.

moved towards the cultivation of edible plants, suchas cabbage, potatoes and beans under the pretextof experimentation. Speculating that few residents
would return to the village to farm, then Mayor of
the village, Norio Kanno (who retired on 19 October
2020; hereafter referred to as Former Mayor), pushedahead with the project by establishing an agricultural
corporation.

Restrictions have been lifted gradually in hazardous
zones (those within a 20-km radius from the power
plant) and areas under evacuation orders set as of 1
April 2011, with the towns of Okuma, Futaba, most ofNamie and parts of Iitate Village currently designatedas “difficult-to-return zones”. The following conditions
must be met for evacuation orders to be lifted: (1) the
annual cumulative dose as estimated by the air dose
rate is confirmed to be 20 millisieverts (mSv) or less;(2) infrastructure required for daily life and lifestylerelated services (medical and nursing care, postal
services, etc.) have mostly been restored, and there
has been sufficient progress in decontamination work
primarily in environments where children live; and(3) there has been adequate consultation with theprefecture, municipalities and residents.

Former Mayor Kanno also laid out plans for thedevelopment of cultural facilities, including theestablishment of new parks outside of the designatedr e con s tr uc tion an d r ev it alis ation zon e in th e
Nagadoro district, and requested that the national
government lift the designation as a difficult-to-returnzone, even without decontamination. In response tothis request, the national government decided on 25
December 2020 to lift restrictions without requiring
decontamination to be completed as a special
measure to allow the land to be used as long as there
are no residents. The current Mayor of the village,
Makoto Sugioka, however, has maintained a cautious
stance on lifting restrictions, saying that he wants to“confirm the intentions of residents with his own eyes
and ears before making a decision”23 .

In difficult-to-return zones, it is only designated areas
with specific reconstruction and revitalisation plansthat are targeted for decontamination. Evacuation
orders for these areas will be lifted five years after
this designation, after which these areas are deemed
habitable.

In this way, evacuation orders have been lifted for theentire village of Iitate, but as of 1 November 2020,
only about 20% of the population has returned to thevillage.
The Reconstruction Agency conducts an annual
survey to gauge local sentiment. However, the survey
has not been carried out in Iitate Village since 2017,
and Kawamata Town, Tamura City, Kawauchi Village
and Naraha Town, where evacuation orders havebeen lifted for all areas, have not been surveyed
since restrictions have been removed. Questionnaires
for this survey are distributed to households andanswered by the representatives of those households,
so the exact number of people who have returned tothese areas is not known.

In Iitate Village, the distric t of Nagadoro had
lingered on as a difficult-to-return zone. Underthe reconstruction and revitalisation plan for thisarea, farmland is covered with contaminated soil
generated by decontamination work in the village 22
and overlaid with non-contaminated soil to revive
farming. Contaminated soil containing up to 5,000
Bq/kg of Cesium is already being used in Iitate Village.
Initially, the plan was to grow non-edible flowering
plants, but as farmland became available, plans

22: For reference, radiation levels in Chiba Prefecture, which has remained relatively unaffected by the nuclear disaster, remain much lower than 1,000 Bq/kg. https://www.
affrc.maff.go.jp/docs/press/pdf/110830-22.pdf (in Japanese only)

23: Tokyo Shimbun, 9 February 2021. https://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/84857 (in Japanese only)

22

Aggregated data from six towns and villages (Tomioka,
Futaba, Katsurao, Namie, Okuma and Kawamata) arehighlighted below, based on survey results released
on 19 March 2020. Of 23,817 households acrossthe six jurisdictions, responses were received from
10,591 for a response rate of 44.5%. Approximately
662 households returned to their original areas ofresidence for a return rate of 6.2%. These towns andvillages contain difficult-to-return areas, with large
swaths of land unavailable in Futaba, Namie andOkuma in particular, so it is not surprising that thepercentage of people returning to these areas is low.
This rate is even lower for those under 40; overall,members in that age group, while an overwhelming
majority of households (72%) included someone aged
60 or older24 .
Efforts continue to help residents return to theirhomes, but with so few young people, what will towns
and villages look like 10 years down the line? At its
peak, the number of evacuees from the nuclear power
plant accident exceeded 160,000, but according todata from the Reconstruction Agency, that number
now stands at 36,722 (note that, in some cases, people
who evacuated without a change of address are notincluded in the statistics). Of this number, 7,415 people

60% to 70% of the population that has returned is
60 or older. Haramachi ward and one part of Odaka
ward in Minamisoma City were also under evacuation
orders, which were lifted in July 2016. At 37%, therate of return to these wards in Minamisoma City was
higher than those in the six towns and villages, andthe percentage of people under 40 returning to theseareas was also high at 65%. Nevertheless, only 2.9% ofhouseholds that responded to this survey had family(~20%) evacuated to other areas within the prefecture,
while 29,307 (~80%) evacuated to locations outside
the prefecture. Of those who evacuated outside
the prefecture, about 15,338 evacuated to public
housing. However, this has become a social problem,as evacuees are being forced to leave in various ways,
including by the discontinuation of support from
Fukushima Prefecture and rental increases.

Table 1: Conditions at Iitate Village (as of 1 November 2020)
Evacuation orders lifted on 31 March 2017
No. of people

No. of households

No. of people
per Household

Pre-accident (1 January 2011)

6,544

1,716

3.81

Immediately after the accident

6,544

3,200

2.05

Consequence of evacuation(in which household members were separated)

As of 1 November 2020

5,282

2,265

2.33

No. of registered residents

Returning residents

1,254

643

1.95

Those who have officially reported
that they live in the village

184

90

2.04

Items

Relocation

Notes

Births6

Evacuation within the village

4

3

1.33

Nagadoro district residents

Not evacuated

6

3

2.00

People who have never evacuatedTook up residence in Iitate Home

31

31

1.00

1,485

770

1.93

Residents of Iitate Village(Created by Nobuyoshi Ito, Iitate Village / Source: Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center Report No. 559)

24: https://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat1/sub-cat1-4/ikoucyousa/r1_houkokusyo_zentai.pdf (in Japanese only)23

3. Causal relationship with an increase in thyroid cancer
The Fukushima Health Management Survey, a periodic
survey including thyroid examinations that follows
children aged 18 and under at the time of the accident
and babies born in the same year. The study population
receives regular ultrasounds, with the second andsubsequent examinations being conducted every
two years. To date, four rounds of examinations havebeen completed (Table 2), and the fifth round is being
conducted from 2020. The decrease in the numberof people in the study population is due to more
people becoming over 25 years of age (as screening is
conducted every five years from this age), although adownward trend is also being observed in the numberof people examined compared to the target population.

acknowledge the existence of a causal relationship withradiation exposure.

After the primary examination, people who werediagnosed with no malignancies or suspec ted
malignancies in the previous round of examinations
are candidates for follow-up. The prevalence rate per
100,000 people, using the number of confirmed cases
as a parameter, is 26.2, 9.7, and 14.9 for the second,
third and fourth examinations, respectively, all of which
are significantly higher than the national average of 1.

As for the causal relationship with radiation exposure,
the Oversight Committee reasoned that this trend
is due to the screening effect in the preliminary test
(i.e. the argument that the act of screening leads to ahigher number of diagnoses). However, it was foundthat, when the degree of contamination in each area isconsidered, the prevalence of cancer is higher in highlycontaminated areas (i.e. a dose-response), which does
not support the screening effect hypothesis25.

It can be argued that the government intentionally did
not assess the initial exposure dose. Screening was
conducted only at particular locations. In addition, thenumber of counts measured in the thyroid gland, whichis the standard for determining decontamination in the
body and on clothing, eased to more than double at
100,000 counts per minute. In some cases, counts were
not recorded. The government has not published or
conducted surveys on initial exposure doses (especiallyinternal exposure doses from radioactive materials withshort half-lives).

While the Prefectural Oversight Committee for the
Fukushima Health Management Survey has noted
the high disease prevalence in the area, it has yet toHence, evidence suggests that radiation exposure isassociated with thyroid cancer risk.

Table 2: Thyroid Cancer Examination Results
http://www.pref.fukushima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/423828.pdf

Period(years)No. ofsubjects

No. ofexaminees

No. ofconfirmed
assessments

Round 1

367,637

300,472

300,472

Round 2381,244

270,540

270,529

Round 3

336,669

217,676

217,530

294,240(Outside Fukushima:
10,068)

2011-20132014-20152016-2017

Round 42018-2019

181,005

Counts of Malignancies(incl. suspected malignancies)
116(100 cases of papillary carcinoma, 1 other)71
前回A−655252
乳頭51他1
男32女39

21

15

15
乳頭15

27

Total

101

(1 benign tumor)(11 males, 16 females)235(25-year-olds with malignancies/suspected malignancies: 2; surgeries: 0)

102

Cancer confirmed(39 males, 77 females)(8 males, 13 females)

180,978

No. ofsurgeries

16(Sex distribution unknown)

16
乳頭16

(Sex distribution unknown)

185

184

(As of 30 June 2020)(Created by the author with information from the Prefectural Oversight Committee for the Fukushima Health Management Survey)
25: Tsuda, Toshihide et al., 2016. https://journals.lww.com/epidem/Fulltext/2016/05000/Thyroid_Cancer_Detection_by_Ultrasound_Among.3.aspx

24

4. Current state of food contamination: Food exceeding standards on the market
According to media reports, wild koshiabura shoots(scientific name: Eleutherococcus sciadophylloides)that exceeds food standards (Caesium:100 Bq/kg)
are being sold on Yahoo! Auctions and Mercari, with
one case from Akita Prefecture (210 Bq/kg), threecases from Yamagata Prefecture and one from Miyagi
Prefecture (109 to 163 Bq/kg) exceeding standards.
This is the outcome of a study by Dr. Shinzo Kimura(Dokkyo Medical University) and the NPO “Fukushima
30-Year Project”. Dr. Kimura purchased koshiabura,kogomi (ostrich fern), and shiitake mushrooms at
direct sales points and roadside stations in Fukushima(Aizu region), Yamagata, Miyagi, Iwate Prefecturesand other places to study them. With the exception of
koshiabura, none exceeded standards, although tensof Bq/kg were detected.

on cases where koshiabura sold at roadside stations
and direct sales points were detected as being overthe standard.
The inadequacies of the measurement system areexposed by the fact that some products such as
those sold at direct sales points, roadside stations,and internet sites by individuals (all of which are notpart of the system), as well as some familiar local
foods that are not available at the market may failto meet regulatory standards. These inadequacies
can also encourage the spread of rumours, raisingquestions about food that has already been tested
and met standards. The above facts were discovered
because Dr. Kimura’s laboratory continued to takean interest in measurements. Without this initiative,these problems would have been overlooked andlargely ignored. To prevent this from happening, it isessential to strengthen monitoring by consumers andbuild up monitoring and measurement systems by thegovernment.

On 25 May 2020, Niigata Nippo repor ted thatkoshiabura collec te d in Uonuma Cit y, Minami
Uonuma City, Yuzawa Town and other areas in Niigata
Prefecture exceeded standards (110 to 240 Bq/kg).
Reports had also appeared earlier (in 2016 and 2018)25

Chapter 4
Current Situation and Challenges of Environmental NPOs/NGOs in JapanIn October 2020, Green Alliance Japan and the
National Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES)
j o int l y co n d u c te d a s ur ve y of e nv ir o n m e nt a l
NPOs/NGOs in Japan. Out of approximately 4,000
environmental NPOs/NGOs that have been publicisedin sur vey results previously conduc ted by theEnvironmental Restoration and Conservation Agency(ERCA), the survey targeted a total of around 1,750

organisations with contact information available in
the public domain and groups affiliated with Green
Alliance Japan. A total of 442 organisations responded
to the survey (response rate: 25.4%).
Based on the results of this sur vey, the current
situation and challenges of environmental NPOs/
NGOs in Japan are described in this section26 .

1. Overview and Current Situation of Surveyed Organisations
For some time, Japan’s environmental civil society
has been seen as being composed of numerous
small-scale organisations. This survey supports thisperception: 25% of respondents were voluntar ygroups with no legal status, while about 30% had
annual budgets of less than JPY 1 million, and 20%
had annual budgets between JPY 3 and 10 million.
Many of these organisations were established in the
2000s, triggered in part by the emergence of global
environmental issues on the international stage
and the enactment of the NPO Act in Japan in 1998.
The survey also found that a large number of theseorganisations are managed through “autonomous
ef for ts” by obtaining commissioned funds andgenerating income from internal sources such as theirown projects, rather than membership fees, grants,
subsidies, and other external sources.

At the same time, while some organisations were
found to be engaged in studies and research (44%)
and policy recommendations (25%), their numbers
were considerably less than those involved in practical(78%) or awareness-raising activities (79%). This is due
to limitations in human resources (lack of staff withexperience in developing policy recommendations,experts and other support capacity) and difficulties inacquiring effective channels for communicating theirpolicy recommendations and receiving support fromthe public.
On what Japanese societ y needs to do to help
develop and scale up the activities of NPOs/NGOs, amajority of respondents indicated that people must
be encouraged to think about environmental issues asa matter related to themselves (59%) and that systems
and mechanisms (including tax and budgets) must be
put in place to support NPO/NGO activities (56%).

Many activities are conducted at the local level, withthemes such as environmental education, community
development, and regional revitalisation, and mostare in the form of awareness-raising and practicalactivities. However, the survey also found that a wide
range of these activities are volunteer-based, with
about 70% of respondents stating that their activities
are “not at all” or “only a little” profitable.

Moreover, while 77% of respondents indicated theneed for solidarity among environmental NPOs/
NGOs, only a handful (17%) were aware of theexistence of Green Alliance Japan -- the first coalitionof environmental NPOs/NGOs in this country.

26: A detailed account of the results of the survey is available on the websites of the Japan Association of Environment and Society for the 21st Century and Green AllianceJapan (in Japanese only).

26

In addition to these points, challenges raised bymany of the organisations surveyed include weakfinancial bases, difficulty in securing human resources

to implement activities, and concerns that thesustainability of their activities might be jeopardised
because of ageing leadership.

2. Lack of Support from the Government and the Public for Environmental NPOs/NGOs in JapanT h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e r o l e s p l a ye d b y n o n governmental and civil society organisations in theenvironmental field has been recognised at the
global level, and a wide range of support measures
is available on both institutional and financial fronts.
The Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 adopted at the
Earth Summit in 1992 included a clear statement on
strengthening the roles of NGOs. The Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) adopted at the UN General
Assembly in 2015 also specified the role of civil society
organisations.

decarbonisation efforts. It is in stark contrast to thecomplete lack of support available for activities byenvironmental NPOs/NGOs, which serve the public
interest. In addition, since the culture of charitable
donations is not as well-established in Japan as it
is in Europe and the US, public donations to NPOs/
NGOs are limited, and many environmental groups
raise funds either through autonomous ef for ts(commissioned work and own projects, etc.) or carryout activities on a voluntary basis (i.e. self-financed
activities without any expectation of remuneration).

Back in 2002 in Japan, a study group of the Ministry of
the Environment identified the operational challenges
in promoting environmental conservation activities.
This survey reveals that the situation in Japan has not
improved at all even after 20 years, a clear indicationthat Japan is lagging behind.

Underlying this is the reality that environmental
NPOs/NGOs in Japan have yet to be recognised by
the government and civil society as vital organisations
that serve the public interest.
In the EU, which is considered to be an environmentallyprogressive region, environmental organisations are
positioned as partners integral to environmental
policy implementation, along with economic andlabour organisations. Ingrained in society is also thebelief that environmental organisations represent
environmental interests and have a role to serve
the public interest by filling the gaps of informationcollection left by governments, identifying issues at
an early stage, and engaging in advocacy. For thisreason, they are institutionally guaranteed and there
are systems in place that provide a range of public
support on the financial front.

For example, one of the issues raised both in thissurvey and by the Ministry of the Environment twenty
years ago was the need to strengthen financial basesof NPOs/NGOs.A strong financial base will helporganisations secure employees with planning skills
and maintain human resources, which will, in turn,stimulate their activities. However, the Japan Fund for
Global Environment administered by ERCA (roughly
JPY 600 to 700 million in total annually) is the only
public assistance available to environmental NPOs/
NGOs in the country (currently estimated at 10,000 to
20,000). Worse yet, there are no subsidies available
for network organisations striving to strengthen civilsociety, such as Green Alliance Japan. On the other
hand, private companies and corporations, whose
activities are motivated by profit, receive considerable
funding from the government in the name of researchand development. For example, each year, theMinistry of Economy, Trade and Industry provides
around JPY 1 billion in subsidies to automobilerelated private entities for developing technologies
for next-generation vehicles. Similarly, huge amountsof money are being invested in industries for ongoing

In contrast, environmental NPOs/NGOs in Japan areseen as groups of individuals who voluntarily carry out
activities related to environmental conservation. They
are categorised differently from economic and labour
organisations and are not positioned as key partners
in environmental policy making. While organisations
engaged in practical activities on a volunteer basis in
local communities are recognised for their work tosome extent, the same appreciation is not extended
to organisations such as Green Alliance Japan thatprovide policy recommendations based on principles
27

and scientific evidence. This is because there is a
deep-rooted sense that environmental policies should
be developed by bureaucrats and that the public’s
role is to simply follow those policies. Consequently,
no public support is available for activities to engage
in policy formulation, nor is there an adequate
system whereby such organisations can participate
in the policy formulation process. Moreover, because
the economy remains the highest political priority,
bureaucrats continue to formulate and decide on
environmental policies based on the opinions of only
a handful of industries and academic experts.

are vital, but local volunteer actions alone will not
ensure that environmental policies represent andreflect the voice of the voiceless, which includes thenext generation and the natural world. The various
issues that emerge from practical activities in local
communities are unlikely to be addressed if left only
to administrative agencies to resolve. Unfortunately,
we cannot say that non-profit and civil societ yorganisations are sufficiently fulfilling their role.

The status of Japanese NPOs/NGOs in society reflects
the country’s distinctive bureaucracy (citizens’ lack ofaccess to policymaking and relegation to following
bureaucratic authority) , unseasoned democratic
practices, and the lack of civic and political educationin the education system. These systems form theperception shared by bureaucrats and administrative
agencies, which tend to view environmental NPOs/
NGOs as subordinate, in subsidiary or sub-contracted
positions. Meanwhile, the public, whose perception of
NPOs/NGO is shaped by the same bureaucratic andeducational systems, also have a deep-rooted sensethat they should “bow to authority” and leave mattersof public interest to government and administrative
agencies. As a result, NGOs/NPOs are not considered
to be entities serving the public interest.

much appreciate that environmental organisations
represent environmental interests and have a role toserve the public interest.

In shor t , unlike in the EU, government andadministrative agencies, the general public and even
NPOs/NGOs themselves in Japan generally do not

This lack of recognition has profound consequences.
If we look at Japan’s climate change and energy
measures, as well as its response to the country’s
nuclear power plant accident to date, it is clear that
there are limits to what can be done by the public
sector and only a few industries and academic
experts. These limited actors alone are unlikely to beable to resolve the mounting problems we face, suchas the climate crisis, the collapse of ecosystems, issues
concerning plastics and chemicals, and nuclear powerand energy challenges.
In order to avoid this situation in the future andpromote more effective environmental policies inJapan, it is important to improve the capacity ofenvironmental NPOs/NGOs, clarify their roles andpositions, and develop policies to promote theiractivities.

Unfortunately, the issue of perception also exists formany environmental NPOs/NGOs: many organisations
are satisfied with engaging in activities in local
communities on a voluntary basis, stopping shortof advocacy for change. It goes without saying thatpractical activities carried out in local communities

28

Green Alliance Japan Members Involved in Authoring Green Watch 2021
(English Version)
Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center
Website: http://cnic.jp/english/

Email: cnic@nifty.com

Activity Description: Positioned independently from the government or industry, the Citizens’ Nuclear Information
Center (CNIC) works towards building a society that is not dependent on nuclear power. CNIC collects documents
and other materials on a broad range of issues related to nuclear energy, especially the dangers and risks, as wellas conducting investigative research, and providing the resulting data and insights for use in movements working
on nuclear phase-out. CNIC also proactively disseminates comments on policy, and collaborates with groups within and outside of Japan to conduct research and organise international conferences.

FoE Japan

Website: https://www.foejapan.org/en/

Email: info@foejapan.org

Activity Description: FoE is an international environmental NGO focusing on environmental issues at the planetaryscale. Pulling from the support of two million members across 75 countries, FoE Japan began its work in 1980. The
organisation engages in a wide range of advocacy work in such fields as energy (energy transition and anti-nuclear movements), climate change and deforestation, and environmental and human rights issues arising from largescale development. Working towards the creation of a peaceful, sustainable society, FoE Japan envisions a world
where all life is respected, where humans and all other organisms can live in harmony.

Global Environmental Forum (GEF)
Website: https://www.gef.or.jp/en/

Email: contact@gef.or.jp

Activity Description: GEF works on disseminating information and raising awareness about global environmental
issues such as climate change, primarily through commissioned work from the Japanese Ministry of the Environment and the National Institute for Environmental Studies. GEF’s own initiatives include issuing its magazine,
launching campaigns to stop illegal logging, serving as the secretariat for the Reuse Food Containers Network,and serving as the secretariat for the MATAGI Project (a project that promotes the use of leather from wildlife). The
organisation is also working towards liaising between NGOs/NPOs for the Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics.

Japan Association of Environment and Society for the 21st Century (JAES21)
Website: http://www.kanbun.org/katudo_n/about_us.html

Email: info@kanbun.org

Activity Description: Acknowledging that ‘environmental problems are civilisation’s problems”, JAES21 was established in 1993. Through the mobilization of citizens’ power, JAES21 seeks to build a sustainable civilisation where
the environment, economy, human lives, and society are well-balanced, ensuring the health and wealth of the next
generation. With this mission in mind, JAES21 is exploring the vision of a new civilisation, and working toward thetransformation of lifestyles, values, and social systems to realise the new civilization. The organisation engages
in a wide range of activities, including: i) studies to develop a roadmap toward an environment-oriented society,identify a pathway toward a green economy, or investigate ways to utilise old Japanese wisdoms to build a sustainable society, ii) policy recommendations to advocate for the need to include an environmental clause in theJapanese Constitution or to enact legislation for environmental education, and iii) policy-making support for local
communities.

30

Japan Endocrine-Disruptor Preventive Action (JEPA)
Website: http://kokumin-kaigi.org/?page_id=168

Email: kokumin-kaigi@syd.odn.ne.jp

Activity Description: Environmental pollution by hazardous chemicals such as dioxins and other endocrine disruptors has dire implications not only for humankind, but also for all living creatures on the planet. In addition
to providing citizens with information related to chemical substances, JEPA communicates its stance on policies
regarding chemical substances to the national government, local governments, and businesses. JEPA also creates
pamphlets and reading materials to educate the public about various chemical substances and their adverse effects, while holding both domestic and international symposia. Since 2009, the organisation has also worked totackle the problem of neonicotinoid pesticide use in agriculture. Other initiatives include providing information
about the dangers of household chemicals. Ultimately, working to meet the WSSD 2020 Chemical Managementtarget, JEPA engages in various activities to protect future generations through hazardous chemical reduction.

Kiko Network

Website: https://www.kikonet.org/?cat=54

Email: kyoto@kikonet.org

Activity Description: Kiko Network is an NGO/NPO that proposes, comments, and acts on behalf of civil society tostop global warming. Rather than solely focusing on changing the behaviour of each individual, the organisation
strives to make all aspects of society (industry and economy, energy, lifestyle, localities, etc.) more sustainable.

Incorporating research on global warming mitigation, policy commentary, and information dissemination, Kiko
Network creates campaigns, strengthens networks, creates local global warming mitigation models, and engages
in human resources development and education. Envisioning a world where all can lead secure lives in a low-carbon and sustainable future, the organisation works to transform our current society and economy toward greater
fairness, peace, and prosperity. Furthermore, as a national network of civil society and environmental NGO/NPOsin the global warming mitigation space, Kiko Network also engages and cooperates with a wide range of organisations and sectors.

Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies (ISEP)
Website: https://www.isep.or.jp/en/

Email: https://isep.or.jp/en/about/contact

Activity Description: Working toward a society powered by renewable energy, ISEP produces energy policy research and commentary, as well as the development of renewable energy. This includes commentary and activities
regarding strategies for transformative energy policy as well as specific energy plans. ISEP’s four areas of utmost
importance are Energy Policy, Energy Business, Financing, and Community. Furthermore, the organisation capitalises on its networks with affiliated groups in and outside of Japan to share information and knowledge. ISEP alsouses its connections with prominent international renewable energy-related groups to engage in international
conferences and research activities.

31Section Authors
Preface

Konoe Fujimura (JAES21)

Responding to the Climate Crisis

Takako Momoi (Kiko Network)
Special thanks: Yasuko Suzuki (Kiko Network), Kenro Taura (Kiko Network)

Current Status and Challenges of Renewable Energy and Energy Policies
Hironao Matsubara (ISEP)
Special thanks: Akiko Yoshida (FoE Japan), Jusen Asuka (Tohoku University)

COVID-19 Measures and the Dangers Lurking Behind the Excessive Use of Chemicals and theUse of Harmful Chemicals
Junko Kimura-Kuroda (JEPA)Special thanks: Yuko Nakashita (JEPA)

Plastic Waste Issues in the Age of Infectious Diseases
Yuki Sakamoto (GEF)
Special thanks: Michiko Amano (GEF), Yukio Nakase (GEF)

Fukushima Today: Ten Years On
Hideyuki Ban (CNIC)

Current Situation and Challenges of Environmental NPOs/NGOs in Japan
Konoe Fujimura (JAES21)
Special Thanks: Tomohiro Tasaki (National Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan)

Green Alliance Japan would like to thank the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) for their support
in the creation of the English version of Green Watch 2021, which is based on the longer Japanese original Green
Watch 2021.

32