Ars Vivendi Journal No.6 (March 2014): 12-28

Complementarity of Resource and Capability: Economic
Philosophical Discussions about Distribution Rule in Global
Justice
Shinji MURAKAMI**The Health Care Science Institute Research Fellow, Tokyo, Japan

1. Introduction
This paper discusses the complementarity of the resource concept referred to inpolitical philosophy and capability. The concept of capability indicates an individual’s
actual ability to achieve various valuable doing or being. This discussion aims toprovide preliminary consideration for designing distribution rules in global justice. In
particular, the central idea of complementarity is motivated by how the computational
complexity of information processing of needs evaluation can be reduced from acapability perspective.
As revealed by philosopher Martha Nussbaum, the unsolved problem of global
justice is a frontier for theories of justice (Nussbaum 2006). Indeed, theories of global
justice play important roles when we consider world poverty and the global burden of
disease.
This study does not comprehensively examine theories of global justice, but
limits the discussion to distribution rules, regarded as part of global justice. The term
distribution rule is defined here as follows: Given initial endowment such as goods orresources in a society, distribution rule is a correspondence that assigns a domain
comprising some informational basis to the range of profiles distributed to eachindividual. Moreover, this study does not discuss the productive economic model inwhich each individual utilizes initial endowment for production. Instead, the argument
concerns how fixed initial endowment can be distributed to people at a point in time.
First, this study draws attention to the following problem: What do we choose
from informational bases, for example, welfare, resource, and capability? The choice of
informational basis is studied in the field of normative theories that address thefollowing questions, “Equality of What?” and “What is the right measure of justice?”(e.g., Sen 1980; Brighouse and Robeyns 2010).
Regarding the problem of choice of informational basis, this study exclusively
examines resources including income and capability. The concept of resource heresuggests John Rawls’s social primary goods and Ronald Dworkin’s resource (Rawls
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Ars Vivendi Journal No.6 (March 2014): 12-28

1971; Dworkin 2000). Capability, as suggested by Amartya Sen who criticized theconcept of resource for distribution, has become an important new paradigm ineconomics, philosophy, and other disciplines.
However, despite its theoretical and practical attractiveness, there has been
skepticism about the usefulness or justification of capability. One of most crucial
criticisms of capability is Thomas Pogge’s argument (Pogge 2002, 2010). Pogge claims
advantages of resource or “resourcism” as alternative capability. Furthermore, hesuggests Global Resources Divided (hereafter GRD) for eradicating world poverty. We
may interpret GRD as a distribution rule based on the concept of resource (Pogge 2008,
ch. 8).
Some studies, for example, Berges (2007) criticize the advantage of resource
suggested by Pogge (2002, 2010). [1] This study scrutinizes the dichotomous idea of“resource versus capability,” and indicates the importance and difficulty of converting
resource into individual well-being. With this background, this paper raises a strong
possibility of the complementarity between capability and resource by referring to Van
Parijs (1995), Robeyns (2005), and Gotoh (2009).
Through the argument of complementarity, this study aims to design twolayered-distribution rules. The first layered-distribution rule is GRD, and the second is
the Application of Capability Theory to Needs Based Equitable Distribution Rule
(hereafter ACTNBEDR). ACTNBEDR is similar to Japanese public assistanceadditional payments. However, in ACTNBEDR, the concept of needs is judged by thecapability theory that reflects public reasoning, and is related to the concept ofthreshold in Nussbaum (2000).
Let us discuss these distribution rules from the perspective of economic
philosophy. In this study, the term economic philosophy is defined as the method that
explicates the concepts behind fundamental theories, current institutions and policies,
and alternative conceptions regarding the economic phenomenon in the broad sense.
There are two main merits of being-based economic philosophy for considering these
problems in this paper. Economic thinking is effective for utilizing the fruit of
normative theory discussion for creating real institutions and policies. One merit is thatthe discussion from normative theory to economics is easily translated into economic
philosophy. Another merit is that we can consider the design concepts of distribution
rule through philosophically reexamined ideas premised in economics, normative
theories, and real/alternative institutions.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews capability andresource. In section 3, the complementary of basic income and undominated diversity,
suggested by Van Parijs (1995), is critically examined for clues to the complementarity
between resource and capability. Section 4 discusses the complementarity between
GRD and ACTNBEDR derived from scrutiny of the Japanese public assistanceadditional payment.
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2. Resource and capability: A short review
First, this section scrutinizes the definition of capability and resource. The
capability of a person reflects an alternative combinations of functionings that theperson can achieve (Sen 1985a). Furthermore, functionings represent parts of the stateof a person, in particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be inleading a life. Some functionings are very elementary, such as being adequately
nourished or being in good health. Other functionings may be more complex, such as
achieving self-respect or being socially integrated (Sen 1993, p. 31). For example, let us
consider a commodity such as bread. It has some functionings, for example, providing
nutrition, aiding gatherings over food and drinks, and meeting the demand of social
conventions or festivities (Sen 1985a, p. 17). Therefore, the conversion of a commodity
into personal achievements of functionings depends on a variety of factors—both
personal (internal) and social. This is a crucial point for special needs such as those of
disabled persons, children, and elderly persons.
The concept of resource is referred to in several academic papers. For example,
Dworkin (1981b) composed one of the most famous concepts. He defined a suitableconcept for equality of “resource” as alternative equality of welfare, which is discussedin Dworkin (1981a). Dworkinian resource includes a person’s physical and mental traits.
Therefore, a person who is born handicapped begins with less by way of resources thanothers (Dworkin 1981b). Five types, including the Dworkinian resource, are mentioned
by Robeyns (2005, pp. 35-36). Type 1 is gross national product (GNP) per capita, andtype 2 is individual disposable income; these ideas are very easy to understand. Type 3
is individual entitlement for material goods; this idea extends individual disposable
income by including an estimate for non-market production and the provision of public
goods. Type 4 is the Dworkinian resource, and type 5 is Rawlsian social primary goods.
The difference between Dworkinian resource and Rawlsian social primary goods isclear. Rawlsian social primary goods include income, wealth, liberties, opportunities,
and the social basis of self-respect, namely, social resource (Rawls 1971). However,social primary goods do not include a person’s physical and mental traits, namely,internal resource (endowment). Dworkinian resource includes social/internal resource;
therefore, Dworkinian resource is, in a sense, closed to capability (Dworkin 2000, ch.
7).
Rawlsian social primary goods are criticized by Sen (1980, 1992, 1999). The
critical point is expressed by the following:
Since the conversion of these primary goods and resources into freedom of choiceover alternative combinations of functionings and other achievements may vary fromperson to person, equality holdings of primary goods or of resources can go hand in
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Ars Vivendi Journal No.6 (March 2014): 12-28

hand with serious inequalities in actual freedoms enjoyed by different persons (Sen
1992, p. 81).
Simple resources, which are classified into GNP per capita or individual disposal
income, cannot provide an answer to this problem about conversion. However,sophisticated resource, namely, Rawlsian social primary goods or Dworkinian resource,
can take account of conversion. Advocates of sophisticated resource adjust theconversion of a resource into an actual achievement by considering social factors. Thisis shown as the following:
Resourcists can recognize that a person’s mental and physical contribution is, to aconsiderable extent, shaped by social factors: by the locality and family in which one
is raised (which greatly influence one’s access to nutrition, medical care, physicalexercise, play, and educational opportunities during childhood and adolescence) andby the culture and institutional order of one’s society (which determines one’s
opportunities for social and political participation). Resourcists can recognize,
therefore, that a person’s developed capacities to derive benefit from resources are
co-determined by their prior access to resource (Pogge 2010, pp. 27-28).
Thus, Pogge defends Rawlsian social primary goods against Sen’s attack.
However, Berges (2007) reveals that even sophisticated “resource” cannot solve theproblem of conversion. The argument of Berges (2007) is contrary to those ofresourcists on two counts. The first is related to whether resource-based distribution
can just as effectively accommodate human diversity as capability-based distribution.
The second is related to concepts of compensation and stigma about naturaldisadvantage.
Regarding the first point, a sophisticated resourcist like Pogge defends
resource-based distribution on the ground of focusing on access to resources.
Referencing concrete examples, Berges’ view of this defense is that we need to enter thecapabilities discourse for sake of the girl who has access in practice to education in apart of the world where education for women is under-valued. However, there may also
be a rebuttal from the viewpoint of the resourcist who believes that resource-based
distribution deals sensitively with this case.
Regarding the second point, Pogge (2002, 2008) critically notes that acapability supporter claims that those with natural disadvantages should receive
compensation. Pogge attacks compensation that may stigmatize such persons. Berges(2007) counters that Nussbaum’s capability, affected by Aristotle’s view, is aboutsomething different from compensation. According to this conception, Berges mentions
that resources would be allocated by calculating, not how much each individual
deserves as compensation, but how much is required to bring a group of individuals
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above a certain threshold of capabilities. However, the question of whether we cansolve the stigma problem may be raised.
How do we think of a suitable solution for the problem of conversion of resource
into actual achievement and the stigma problem? First, to examine the conversion
problem, we confirm the view of Rawls, in particular, Rawls (2001).
Rawls (2001, p. 169) stresses that primary goods do consider basic capabilities.
However, in this statement, there is an important background assumption, namely,
people’ needs are sufficiently similar (Rawls 2001, p. 170). Certainly, in the real world,cases out of the norm exist. The matter of important here is how to treat people who fall,
for a time, below the minimum essentials because of illness and accident. In the
Rawlsian theory, special correctives for special needs, such as those of disabled persons,children, and elderly persons, should not be set up in the basic social structure at theconstitutional stage, but emerge later in the use of the institution set up, particularly at
the legislative stage.
This idea of combining social primary goods and the correspondence of needs
plays an important role in the discussions of complementarity between resource andcapability. To elaborate this idea, the next section examines the argument of Van Parijs(1995), which is influenced by Rawls’ and Dworkin’s theories.

3. Complementary of basic income and undominated diversity: criticalexamination
Van Parijs (1995) discusses basic income, which is distribution based on theconcept of resource, from the perspective of normative theory. Basic income means “anincome paid by the government to each full member of society (1) even if she is notwilling to work, (2) irrespective of her being rich or poor, (3) whoever she lives with, (4)no matter which part of the country she lives in” (Van Parijs 1995, p. 35). Since a basic
income obviates the need for collecting private information required to conduct ameans test, it decreases administrative costs and avoids stigma resulting fromselectivism. However, basic income has been criticized for not requiring any
responsibilities, for example, paid employment, care work, or education and training.
Moreover, there is the difficult problem of how to raise the large amounts of money
required for maintaining a basic income system (e.g., Fitzpatrick 1999; Murakami,
forthcoming).
This section does not discuss these problems, but focuses on another problem:
people who have serious physical or mental disabilities will not have enough money tolive on under a uniform basic income system. Namely, this is the problem ofcorrespondence of needs.
As a solution to this problem, Van Parijs (1995, ch. 3) proposes a scheme inwhich disabled people are compensated using undominated diversity as the16Ars Vivendi Journal No.6 (March 2014): 12-28

distribution rule before the uniform basic income is paid out for all.
Undominated diversity is a distribution idea originally proposed by Bruce
Ackerman (Ackerman 1980, ch. 4). Ackerman discusses this idea in regard to genetic
engineering; his formula is as follows:
Pick any two people out of the population. Compare their genetic endowments. In
principle, two―and only two―conclusions are possible. Either A geneticallydominates B and B may properly demand compensatory assistance; or A and B standin a relation of undominated equality, and B gains no relief―no matter how enviousof A’s talents he may be (Ackerman 1980, p. 132).
Van Parijs (1995, p. 73) reveals that this idea roughly coincides with the standard
distinction between “normal” and “handicapped.”
While Ackerman’s idea of undominated diversity focuses only on genes asinternal endowments, Van Parijs defines it as a distribution rule regarding
comprehensive endowment, which combines internal endowments that are nottransferable, such as genes, physical ability, and appearance, with external
endowments that are transferable, such as money and goods.
Van Parijs’s idea of undominated diversity is based on subjective preference
over comprehensive endowment and justifies the transfer of external endowments todisabled people without using arbitrary judgment from outside. However, there aresome problems with undominated diversity.
In an effort to grapple with these problems, this section attempts to analyze
undominated diversity in terms of economic philosophy. To begin with, let us introduce
some symbols. E i represents the comprehensive endowment of individual i. Ri
represents preference order over the comprehensive endowment of individual i, and Pi
represents strict preference order. Undominated diversity is defined as follows:
Definition 1

Undominated Diversity (Van Parijs 1995, p. 87)(i)(j )(k )( Ei Rk E j )  ((i)(j )(k )( E j Pk Ei ))This suggests that all individuals (k) do not strictly prefer the comprehensive
endowment of one individual (j) to that of another individual (i). Redistribution is
performed until undominated diversity is satisfied. To make it clear, let us consider
dominance when undominated diversity is not satisfied. In this case, the negation ofdefinition 1 is as follows:17

Ars Vivendi Journal No.6 (March 2014): 12-28

Definition 2

Dominance(i)(j )(k )( E j Pk Ei )This suggests that all individuals (k) strictly prefer the comprehensive
endowment of one individual (j) to that of another individual (i). Then, the dominatedindividual (i) is a target for compensation. Van Parijs’s discussion supposes that
disabled people are always dominated individuals. Let us explain this through thefollowing example.
Suppose a society consists of individuals 1, 2, and 3. Individual 1 has a high levelof physical ability, but prefers, to his ability, the comprehensive endowment of
individual 2, who has excellent intelligence. Conversely, individual 2 prefers thecomprehensive endowments of individual 1 to her abilities. Individual 3, who has aphysical disability, prefers the comprehensive endowments of both individuals 1 and 2
to his abilities. Furthermore, all individuals least prefer individual 3’s endowments. In
this case, each individual’s preference order profile is as follows:

E2 P1 E1 P1 E3

E1 P2 E2 P2 E3
E2 R3 E1P3 E3 .
Dominated individual 3 is therefore a target for compensation. Individual 3 receives
some external endowments and overcomes his handicap by using them. Then,
individual 3’s preference order changes as follows:

E '2 R3 E '3 P3 E '1 .
To satisfy undominated diversity after this change, the compensation for individual 3
stops.
Undominated diversity justifies the transfer of comprehensive endowments tothe disabled on the grounds of unanimous subjective preference. Thus, it does not use
judgment from an ethical observer or a social planner. However, there are someproblems with undominated diversity, as Van Parijs himself admits.
First are the well-known difficulties, that is to say, false preference
representation (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975), offensive tastes (Rawls 1971, pp.
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30-31), expensive tastes (Dworkin 1981a; 1981b), and adaptive preference formations(Elster 1982; Sen 1985a)—all derived from subjective preference. In answer to these
problems, Van Parijs requires that the preference be genuine, in other words, people
must be fully aware of what life is like when one is crippled and not pretend to preferbeing crippled to block redistribution, and available—not restricted—for example, tomembers of a small sect whose outlook is totally unknown or unintelligible to the restof society. However, it is thought that these requirements are not sufficient. Whojudges and how is that judgment done to justify the genuineness and availability ofpreference?
The second problem is that a unanimous agreement is required in dominance,
which is a condition regarding redistribution. If conditions other than unanimity were
accepted, it would generate the cycle exemplified by the so-called “paradox of voting”
between partial agreement groups (Van Parijs 1995, p. 80). Consider that eachindividual’s preference order profile is as follows:

E1P1E2 P1E3

E2 P2 E3P2 E1
E3 P3 E1P3 E2 .

It is confirmed that E1 can defeat E 2

by two votes to one, and E 2 can defeat E 3

by the same margin, so that transitivity requires that E1 should defeat E 3 in a vetotoo. However, in fact, E 3 defeats E1 by two votes to one. The method of majority
decisions leads to this cycle.
This study regards unanimous agreement as a strong condition. Should we
examine justifications other than unanimity to solve this problem?
The third problem is that comprehensive endowment is based on a dichotomy
between internal and external endowments. Is this distinction useful from a practicalperspective? Some individual valuations of a handicap that belong to internal
endowments would inevitably connect to a person’s external endowments. Perhaps, aninformational basis, which unifies internal and external endowments, is more suitablefor evaluating the individual situation.
To solve these problems, let us examine undominated diversity in terms ofAmartya Sen’s capability theory, which is reflected in public reasoning. Sen admits that
undominated diversity is an attractive approach in many ways (Sen 1990, pp. 461-462).
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Furthermore, he describes his position as close to that of Van Parijs in regard to theconcept of freedom (Sen 1990, footnote 16, p. 468). Both interpret freedom as not only
reducing the set of alternatives or choosing the best element in it but also leaving
people with room to judge their advantage. Later, Van Parijs formulates the idea of
freedom as doing whatever one might want to do (Van Parijs 1995, ch. 1). The
important issue is who judges this potential desire and how to judge it. Undominateddiversity, which is closely concerned with this concept of freedom, is judged byunanimous subjective preference.
However, as Arrow (1951) has claimed, the distribution problem regarding
social welfare is based on an individual valuation that differs from subjective
preference. Additionally, Sen emphasizes that valuation is characterized by critical andreflective aspects, and considers that valuation is at the core of capability (Sen 1985a).
The reason this study does not call it the “capability approach” but “capability theory” isthat capability is publicly reasoned.
This study proposes that functionings can unify internal and external
endowments, and can appropriately value the person’s situation better thancomprehensive endowment. These individual values might achieve public judgmentsthat are beyond self-interest. Here is a possibility for solving the problem of
genuineness of preference.
Next, let us consider the following about the problems of availability ofpreference and unanimity. In Sen’s proposal, people make social choices identifying
functionings (available functionings). It is assumed that social choice, which is basedon public reasoning, cannot be reduced to unanimity or majority. This suggests thatreasonable minority opinions can possibly be adopted.
From this critical discussion of undominated diversity, the next section showsan alternative distribution rule about needs from the capability theory, referring toJapanese public assistance additional payments.

4. Complementarity of global resources divided and application of capability
theory to a needs-based equitable distribution rule
Capability is more sensitive to people’s differences and various needs thanresource. However, evaluation of capability must collect and process a huge amount ofrelevant information about differences and needs. There is a trade-off between thefeasibility of information processing and the sensitivity to various needs. Thus, todesign distribution rules for eradicating world poverty, this study tries a combination of
resource and capability. The first layered-distribution rule is GRD:This proposal envisions that states and their governments shall not have full
libertarian property rights with respect to the natural resources in their territory, but
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Ars Vivendi Journal No.6 (March 2014): 12-28

can be required to share a small part of the value of any resources they decide to use
or sell. This payment they must make is called a dividend because it is based on theidea that the global poor own an inalienable stake in all limited natural resources.
[…]
Proceeds from the GRD are to be used toward ensuring that all human beings canmeet their own basic needs with dignity (Pogge, ch. 8, pp. 202-203).
However, this study suggests a version simpler than Pogge’s. Because the fullmeeting of basic needs with dignity requires sensitivity to various needs, including
physical and mental diversity, this study assigns the role of first approximation to GRD.
This simpler version guarantees feasibility of distribution rules for eradicating world
poverty. Furthermore, this study suggests another distribution rule: ACTNBEDR. It
provides sensitivity to needs and diversity, and resembles Japanese public assistanceadditional payments.
Japanese public assistance has some additional payments that respond to
special needs in some social categories. The capability theory is more useful for
capturing and measuring these special needs than current Japanese public assistance.
Let us consider some questions raised by applying the capability theory to Japanesepublic assistance in terms of needs and agency freedom. [2]There are several concepts of needs in various fields, and Japanese public
assistance supposes a certain concept of needs. First, this study explains the concept ofneed among the Japanese public. Next, it stipulates needs using the capability theory
and the idea of threshold (Nussbaum 2000), and elucidates ACTNBEDR.
Japanese public assistance has two purposes; one is the guarantee of aminimum standard of living, and another is the promotion of self-reliance. The former
is directly relevant to the concept of needs. Depending on the level of needs, thegovernment provides public assistance for those who have trouble making a living
despite utilizing all their assets, ability, and family support. The standard amount forJapanese public assistance, based on a careful study of various circumstances such as
the recipients’ age, sex, household composition, inhabited area, and eight types ofpublic assistance (livelihood assistance, housing assistance, education assistance,
medical assistance, long-term care assistance, maternity assistance, occupational
assistance, and funeral assistance), should be sufficient to ensure the minimum
standard of living but should not exceed it (Figures 1 and 2):

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Figure 1 [3]22Ars Vivendi Journal No.6 (March 2014): 12-28

Figure 2 [4]The additional payments come from livelihood assistance for the minimum
standard of living; these are not excessive, but requisite elements.
In this study, needs are defined as the insufficiency of the individual’s capability
in a social category to the reference capability. The reference capability indicates thethreshold over which a person is not enabled to live in a truly human way at this level ofcapability (Nussbaum 2000). Moreover, this definition of needs relies on theconceptual formulation by Gotoh (2001). In Japanese public assistance, this reference
capability corresponds to the minimum standard of living, which is judged by the levelof consumption and finally decided on by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
As opposed to these standards, the reference capability constitutes an evaluation
system based on agency freedom.
The needs advocated by this study are based on capability. The person
concerned about needs exercises agency freedom and participates in an argument todiscuss needs. The argument to discuss needs or capability is interpreted as animportant role of public reasoning, and this participation by the recipient provides thepossibility of solving the stigma problem.
Let us give an explanation of agency freedom and public reasoning before
discussing relations of needs. In a preceding study on the practice of capability (Sen23Ars Vivendi Journal No.6 (March 2014): 12-28

1999, 2009), the importance of public reasoning is revealed. Referring to Sen (1992),
and Crocker and Robeyns (2010), this study tries to characterize agency freedom bypublic reasoning:
A person’s “agency freedom” refers to what the person is free to do and achieve inpursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as important. A person’s agency
aspect cannot be understood without taking note of his or her aims, objectives,
allegiances, obligations, and—in a broad sense—the person’s conception of the good(Sen 1985a, p. 203).
A person’s goals and values are closely related to his needs. However, personalneeds have aspects not limited only to individual well-being because personal needs
depend on the individual’s social category and also have common parts.
The public assistance additional payments discussed in this study respond to
special needs in a certain social category. The evaluation of such needs is the working of
public reasoning. Risks that reveal preferences to be adaptive and choice to be inhibited
are inherent. Therefore, the security of preference and choice is important, and thisexercise is related to public reasoning. In addition, some people require social support
in their assessment of needs. Such social support is not to inhibit agency freedom, but
to complement it.
The main conclusion of this argument is as follows. The government should
not change needs based on a standard level of consumption. Figure 3 shows
ACTNBEDR:

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Figure 3

ACTNBEDR is evaluated by exercise of agency freedom.
As shown here, the merit of capability is a powerful theory. However, thecapability theory has the disadvantage of computational complexity in information
processing of the evaluation of needs. In particular, when we consider the needs of the
global poor through the capability theory, this huge computational complexity hinders
the design of distribution rule in global justice.
To solve this problem, this paper suggests the complementarity of twolayered-distribution rules. By designing simple GRD, whose domain consists ofresource as the first layered-distribution rule, the number of concerned persons (thosetargeted by the ACTNBEDR that is the second layered-distribution rule) decreases, andthe domain of ACTNBEDR contracts. Thus, the computational complexity in
information processing of the evaluation of needs from the capability theory is reduced.

5. Conclusions
At the risk of oversimplification, Rawls’ and Pogge’s ideas are theories of justice,whereas Sen’s idea is a theory against injustice. Sen (2009) reasons to remove injustice,and GRD can remove sufficiently clear injustice. Certainly, in the real world, various
unclear injustices exist. Capability is a heuristic tool and an effective solution for these
unclear injustices.
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Ars Vivendi Journal No.6 (March 2014): 12-28

For realizing global justice, the complementarity of GRD and ACTNBEDR
comprise just one small step. To overcome the trade-off of feasibility and sensitivity
regarding needs, we must reflect on theories of global justice and take necessary action.

Acknowledgments
This paper is based on “On Undominated Diversity” in the Workshop with Professor
Philippe Van Parijs: Real Freedom for All! (July 7, 2006, Ritsumeikan University,
Kyoto, Japan), “An essay on the complementarity between capability and global
resource divided” in the Workshop with Professor Thomas Pogge (August 18, 2010,
Ritsumeikan University Kyoto, Japan), and “An application of capability to theJapanese public assistance additional payments: A study of needs and agency” in the
Human Development and Capability Association Conference 2012 (September 6, 2012,
Balai Karitini, Jakarta, Indonesia). I am particularly grateful to Professor Philippe Van
Parijs and Professor Thomas Pogge for their advice. I am also grateful to others who
participated in the article’s discussion; Associate Professor Akira Inoue, who provided
useful comments about this paper; and Akira Abe, who handled the completion of thispaper. Furthermore, I acknowledge the financial support from The Health Care Science
Institute, The Univers Foundation, MEXT KAKENHI Grant Number 21330135. Finally,
I would like to thank Enago (www.enago.jp), for the English language review.

Note[1] Pogge (2002) is an early version of Pogge (2010).
[2] “Agency freedom is freedom to achieve whatever the person, as a responsible agent,decides he or she should achieve”(Sen 1985b, p. 204). The role of this concept in this study is
explained later.
[3] Figure 1 is based on “Outline of the Public Assistance System” on the website of the
Public Assistance Division, Social Welfare and War Victims’ Relief Bureau, Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare(http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/social_welfare/dl/outline_of_the_public_assistance_sy
stem_20101004.pdf)[4] Figure 2 is the“Structure of minimum living expense” from the website of the Public
Assistance Division, Social Welfare and War Victims’ Relief Bureau, Ministry of Health,Labour and Welfare(http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/social_welfare/dl/outline_of_the_public_assistance_sy
stem_20101004.pdf).

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