IS NAMIBIA A SIMMERING POT FOR TERRORISM AND WOULD
THE CURRENT STATUS QUO IN CORRECTIONS BE ABLE TO
DEAL WITH THE REHABILITATION OF POSSIBLE FUTURETERRORISTS?
Remona Visser＊This paper has two main parts. Firstly, it looks at Namibia as a possible “simmering pot” for terrorist
activities, and secondly it aims to see whether or not the current status quo in corrections will be able to deal
with the rehabilitation of possible future sentenced terrorists.
The sequence is as follows: First a definition of terrorist activities is provided. This will be followed byoutlining some of the key reasons why someone would engage in such terrorist activities and whether or not
those reasons are applicable to the Namibian situation. The supposition being that if these reasons areapplicable in the Namibian environment this will facilitate the increase of terrorism. At this point protective
factors that could inhibit the development of terrorist activities is also discussed.
This will be followed by what is currently happening in Namibia in terms of rehabilitation within acorrectional facility, and how this measures up to what is currently being done in other parts of the world inresponse to the rehabilitation of terrorists.

I. DEFINITIONS
Although defining of terrorist activity remains highly contested in the literature on the subject as well as
amongst countries, in Namibia it is defined in the Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and Proliferation
Activities Act, 2014 (Act No. 4 of 2014). The definition reads:(a) Any act committed by a person with the intention of instilling terror and which is a violation of thecriminal laws of Namibia and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, orcause serious injury or death to, any private property, natural resources, the environment or cultural
heritage and is the calculated or intended to(i) Intimidate, instil fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the generalpublic or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon aparticular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles;(ii) Disrupts any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public
emergency;(iii) Create general insurrection in the State; or(b) any act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in one of the following
treaties –(i) the Convention of the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970);(ii) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971);(iii) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973);(iv) the International Convention against Taking of Hostages (1979)(v) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980)(vi) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988)(vii) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation(2005);(viii) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on＊

Case Management Officer, Windhoek Correctional Facility, Namibian Correctional Service, Namibia.

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the Continental Shelf (2005);(ix) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) and(x) International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999);(xi) International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005)(xii) Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts relating to International Civil Aviation (2010)
and(xiii) Protocol Supplementary on the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(2010);(c) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt,
threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act
referred to in paragraph (a) and (b);(d) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not
taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act,by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an internationalorganisation to do or to abstain from doing any act; or(e) the payment of ransom to designated persons or organisations, except where such payment isapproved or authorised to secure the safety of a national of that country.

II. NAMIBIA AS A SIMMERING POT
A. Conditions That Foster Terrorism
Individuals are propelled to join terrorist organizations and / or to launch a terrorist attack due toprolonged unresolved conflicts; de-humanization and violation of human rights; lack of law; collective
grievance and victimization; intolerance or exclusion; lack of good governance; socio-economic marginalization; political discrimination; economic reasons including under/unemployment; lack of educational
opportunities, deprivation, attachment to people who are in terrorist organizations; personal experience with
unfair treatment; charismatic leaders of terrorist organizations that speak to the disenfranchised andglobalization to name a few. (The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); Kruglanski et al.).
In addition to this, Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) assert that terrorist behaviour can also be understoodas a form of psychopathology and/or as reflecting as a unique constellation of personality traits. Thus,
individuals who possess a specific problematic personality profile could also foster terrorism as the chances ofthem being recruited in terrorist organizations could not be overlooked.
It is difficult to establish if these factors prove true for Namibia, as at present there are no documented
cases for terrorist offenders in Namibia.
What is discussed above refers to conditions that foster terrorism. In the next section what will be
discussed is to what extent the conditions outlined above are relevant to the Namibian context.
B. Factors That Could Be Warning Signs for Namibia
Having looked at some of the basic conditions that foster terrorism one can assess if these conditions arepresent in Namibia. The author would like to reiterate that the path to offending is different for eachindividual. The factors and motivations that contribute to offending are unique to an individual, and greatcare should be taken not to generalize. Furthermore, the presence of the conditions that foster terrorism
mentioned under Section 2.1 should not be viewed as conclusive evidence of the presence of terrorism, but
merely as warning signs. Warning signs, which without intervention could escalate the current Namibian
situation.
From the writerʼs observation and experience, having worked at a Correctional Facility as a CaseManagement Officer, there are no known cases of offenders who have been incarcerated due to acts ofterrorism. This, however, is not an indication that it does not exist, or that there are no ongoing investigations
related to terrorism.
The biggest and longest trial in the history of Namibia took place from 2003-2015. This case was oftreason, and it started with the indictment of 132 people who attempted to secede (the Caprivi Strip) from
Namibia. Given the definition of terrorism as indicated in the Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and53

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Proliferation Activities Act, 2014 (Act No. 4 of 2014) it is highly likely that had the Act been in place in 2003
some if not all of the accused would have been tried under the Prevention and Combating of Terrorist andProliferation Activities Act, 2014 (Act No. 4 of 2014).
In recent years there have also been newspaper articles related to terrorist organizations such as AlQaeda and Al-Shabaab using Namibia as a springboard for their terrorist activities. (The Namibian 14.08.
2015). In the last couple of months there have been newspaper reports of a group of young people who callthemselves Boko Haram terrorising the streets of Katutura (The Namibian 24.03.2017). What is worthy ofnote about this case is not only the name choice for the group, but also that witnesses described the youth asangry and having no regard for other people. At the very least this indicates that Namibia is not immune tointernational influence. This influence is made more readily available to people through the easy access to theinternet.
Globalization therefore increases the likelihood of Namibia becoming a fertile ground for terrorism.
Technology has made it easy to get news as it is developing from around the world. As Namibians we can see
what is happening in other countries, the demonstrations, the violence, the tactics used by extremist
organizations to get what they want. We are not immune to this information. This information can affect us in
two primary ways. Firstly, it can cause Namibians to use those tactics in pursuit of what we want. This hascome out in some of the actions of the people who are in pursuit of acquiring land as well as recent activities
by the children of the liberation struggle. Secondly, Namibians can view the footage of what is happeningaround the world and endeavour to take up the fight for those who seemingly cannot fight for themselves.
Namibia has one of the biggest gaps between the rich and the poor (UNDP Income Inequality Report,
2013). According to the last Namibian Housing and Population Census of 2011 the unemployment rate of
Namibia is at 37 %. This gap is conducive to the fostering of terrorist activities because the poor which is the
majority could feel as if the government is not responsive to their needs, making them fertile to being incited
to anarchy. The high unemployment rate, particularly amongst the youth, is significant in three key ways.
Firstly, it leads to idleness. If time is not used productively, it creates an opportunity for offending especiallywhen individuals are not able to afford or provide their basic needs or let alone have access to services andresources (Mehlum, Moene & Torvik 2004). This is especially telling as in the last number of years there has
been an increase in the number of instances of “land grabbing”, which is the illegal occupation andappropriation of land. Making this portion of the population susceptible to recruitment into terrorist activities.
Secondly, unemployment can make the youth vulnerable to recruitment, particularly if they are offeredfinancial or material compensation for their efforts (Kruglanski and Fishman, 2009). Thirdly, it can lead to anincrease in anger or feelings of being disenfranchised. These feelings could be exploited by terrorist
recruitment officers that aim to direct these feelings of anger at, for example, the government. Terrorists arenotorious for distorting or misusing cultural, political or religious beliefs in an attempt to garner support for
their nefarious activities (Kruglanski and Fishman, 2009).
The children of the liberation struggle are another group of people vulnerable to recruitment into
terrorist activities. As a group these individuals have a collective memory of feeling victimized. They havebeen airing their grievances over the last couple of years in a variety of ways. They are not above using
violence to get their point across. Last year in a struggle between the children of the liberation struggle andthe police, shooting broke out where one protestor died. This collective memory of grievance, or sense of
feeling oppressed or victimized could easily be exploited by a terrorist organization who might look to recruitin an attempt to cause civil unrest, or to overthrow the government. This group is worth looking into further
as they have shown to be both willing and able to use violence in pursuit of their agenda and have beenrelentless and steadfast in that pursuit.
C. Protective Factors
Namibia is run as a secular state where people are free from discrimination based on religion, culture andethnicity. The Constitution protects peopleʼs right to life, education, to own property, to a fair trial to name afew. People have under the Constitution some inalienable freedoms such as the freedom of speech andexpression, freedom of peaceable assembly, freedom of movement and freedom of association. Namibians
vote in free and fair elections for their representatives in government including the president, who can servea maximum of two terms. Added to this is the establishment and running of the Office of the Ombudsman.
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One of the key roles of this office is to investigate all violations of the rights and freedoms afforded to the
Namibian people under the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. Since independence, Namibia has also
enjoyed relative peace and stability in the country, free from civil war and lawlessness. These factors could
be viewed as protective factors against the likelihood of Namibia becoming a fertile ground for terrorism.

III. CAN THE CURRENT STATUS QUO IN NAMIBIAN CORRECTIONALFACILITIES DEAL WITH THE REHABILITATION OF POSSIBLE FUTURETERRORISTS?
As stated earlier, at present there are no offenders in incarceration for offences related to terrorist
activities. This being said it is important to look at whether or not the Namibian Correctional Service (NCS)
will be able to effectively rehabilitate these offenders based solely on what is currently being done.
First the author will look at what has been identified as best practices in the rehabilitation of terrorists incorrectional facilities, followed by what is currently being done within correctional facilities in Namibia. The
aim is to see if we are on par with global trends and possible shortfalls that need to be ironed out before the
NCS is faced with terrorists to rehabilitate while in custody.
A. Global Trends
The UNODCʼs Handbook on the Management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention ofradicalization to violence in prisons, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the treatment of prisoners as wellas the Rome Memorandum on good practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of violent extremist
offenders jointly discuss various strategies or good practices for use in the rehabilitation of offenders while ina correctional facility. In a nutshell these include but are not limited to: Respect for human rights and nondiscrimination based on race, colour, sex, language, religious or political affiliation; housing offenders in safe,
secure and adequately resourced facilities (preventing overcrowding); rehabilitation that is dynamic byrelying on input from various disciplines such as social workers, religious leaders, and psychologists;
adequately trained and educated staff; effective intake, assessment and classification system; separation of
offenders (juveniles from adults, men from women, and tried from untried); medical service;, opportunity towork, improve their education and engage in recreation and sport. These are a few of the elements outlinedthat improve or foster rehabilitation of offenders.
B. The Namibian Situation
Namibia, as a member of the UN, has ratified all UN resolutions or guidelines including the UN Standard
Minimum Rules for the treatment of prisoners. Furthermore, the Namibian Constitution protects all humanlife and safeguards all offendersʼ inalienable rights and freedoms secured thereunder. This sentiment isevident in the Namibian Correctional Service Act, 2012 (Act No. 9 of 2012). Some of the key functions outlinedin the Act include: to ensure the secure, safe and humane custody of all inmates, rendering health care toinmates, applying rehabilitative programmes and other meaningful and constructive activities that contributeto their rehabilitation and successful reintegration as well as the supervision of offenders on conditional
release.
The structure of the Namibian Correctional Service (NCS) has provisions made to assist offenders in a
multi-faceted manner. There are Directorates for Rehabilitation and Re-integration (which includes
psychological services, educational services, conditional release, community corrections, programmes andresearch); Health Care; Inmate Affairs, Pastoral Care, Community Supervision and a separate division tasked
with female and juvenile offenders. The Government through the NCS provides an offender with their basic
needs such as bedding, food, clothing and cleaning materials. Correctional Officers also receive basic trainingof six months before starting to work with the NCS. This basic training is aimed at equipping correctional
officers with the necessary skills to work with offenders. It also provides them with skills to assess dangerous
situations and how to diffuse these using minimum force. This period is therefore aimed to relay skills
necessary for working in the NCS.
On the ground at present, correctional facilities have a total population size of 3,505 (as on 17.05.2017), andthe total capacity for all thirteen correctional facilities is 4,150. This indicates that at present as a whole there
is no overpopulation.

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NCS is fervent in its pursuit to use the period of incarceration as a means through which to rehabilitate
offenders. To this effect NCS has implemented the Offender Risk Management Correctional Strategy(ORMCS). This is a multi-faceted approach to incarceration, rehabilitation and reintegration. Although thesystem has not rolled out to all the facilities, it is envisioned to do so in the next couple of years.
C. The Offender Risk Management Correctional Strategy (ORMCS)The Offender Risk Management Correctional Strategy (ORMCS) at its core is a three-component-based
system that deals with offenders from admission to discharge. The three components are: The Offender DataManagement System (ODMS), the Unit Management System and Case Management System.
The ODMS is an electronic and automated data-capturing and management system that records all the
key and relevant information of the offender. This system captures the basic profile of offenders including but
not limited to their identity, offence, sentence, further charges, nationality and property booked in and kept
until their release.
Unit Management focuses on separating offenders based on their level of security risk. In order to manage
offenders, they are divided into four main categories (minimum, low-medium, medium and maximum
security) upon admission. Furthermore, a re-classification is done annually thereafter, or upon a breach insecurity. Each unit will therefore have different privileges and different security protocols. Unit management
also allows for offenders to be separated: males from females, juveniles from adults, and sentenced offenders
from non-sentenced offenders.
Case Management is the cornerstone for rehabilitation and reintegration. Different tasks are completed
from admission to discharge. Upon admission Case Management Officers (CMOs) at the Reception andAssessment (R&A) Unit are tasked to complete the tools that will put in process the path of the offenderʼsstay within the correctional facility. These tools are scientifically based. CMOs complete the initial security
classification that will determine the first security level of the offender, they complete a risk and needs
assessment that will outline what criminogenic factors (both internal and external factors) contributed to thecommission of the offence, and what needs need to be addressed during the period of incarceration. Based on
this they also complete a correctional treatment plan that aims to address these needs and criminogenic
factors. After this the offender is sent to the living units. The onus then rests on the CMOs of the living units
to make sure that the plan is followed and that the offenderʼs criminogenic factors are addressed. The CMO
does this in a number of ways. By referring the offender for education, to workshop to learn a marketableskill, or to Programmes where the offender is assisted with structured core programmes that are
cognitive‒behavioural in nature and attempt to address problematic thinking.
The above-mentioned indicates that Namibia is on par with what is expected for the rehabilitation of
offenders. The Unit Management and Case Management components of the ORMCS is still in the process of
being rolled out to all thirteen correctional facilities. Whether or not it is effective in the rehabilitation ofterrorists remains to be seen. At present there is not a programme tailor-made for the rehabilitation of people
sentenced for terrorist activities.

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