No.861-16/12/07
To the Members
Dear Sirs,
Southeast Asia － Increasing Cases of Abduction of Crew
from Ships in the Sulu-Celebes Sea and eastern Sabah region
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
in Asia (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre (ISC) has issued an Incident Alert on the above
matter, as attached.
According to the Incident Alert, since March 2016 there have been nine actual and two
attempted incidents of abduction of crew from ships while underway in the Sulu-Celebes Sea
and eastern Sabah region. Please refer to the location map of the incidents in the Alert. Mostof the incidents were claimed by the Philippines terrorist group Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
ReCAAP ISC praises the vigilance of the crew and the effective activation of anti-piracy
measures which, it says, successfully prevented boarding by the perpetrators in the latest
attempted incidents.
The ReCAAP ISC advises all ships to re-route from the area where possible, and otherwise
strongly urges ship masters and crew to exercise extra vigilance there and to report immediately
to relevant organisations on transiting it (contacts of which appear in the attached Incident
Alert).
The ReCAAP ISC also refers to their “Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships in Asia” and advises the shipping industry to adopt relevant preventive measures.
We hope this will be of help to you with regard to the safe voyaging.
Yours faithfully,
The Japan Ship Owners' Mutual Protection & Indemnity Association
Attachments: Incident Alert dated 21 November 2016 issued by ReCAAP ISC“Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia”
issued by ReCAAP ISC

21 November 2016---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Incident Alerton Increasing Cases of
Abduction of Crew from
Ships---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre
21 Media Circle, #05-04
Singapore 138562
Tel : (65) 6376 3091
Fax : (65) 6376 3066
Web : http://www.recaap.org

Brief extracts from the report may be reproduced for non-commercial use provided thesource is acknowledged. Request for extensive reproduction should be made to
ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC), who owns the copyright of this document.

1

The ReCAAP ISC is deeply concerned about the situation of abduction of crew from ships
while underway in the Sulu-Celebes Sea and eastern Sabah region. Since March 2016,
there has been 11 incidents with nine actual incidents and two attempted incidents
occurred in the area. Most of the incidents are claimed by the terrorist group of thePhilippines Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). 44 crew were abducted and 11 crew among them
are still in captive.
Since October 2016, the perpetrators have begun to target ships of larger tonnage (Dong
Bang Giant 2, Royal 16, Southern Falcon and Kumiai Shagang). Nonetheless, the latest
attempted incidents of Southern Falcon and Kumiai Shagang show the vigilance of thecrew and effective activation of anti-piracy measures had successfully prevented boardingby the perpetrators.
The ReCAAP ISC reiterates its advisory to all ships to re-route from the area, where
possible. Otherwise, ship masters and crew are strongly urged to exercise extra vigilance
while transiting the area and report immediately to the following Centres:(1) Operation Centre in the Philippine Coast Guard District Southwestern
Mindanao for monitoring and immediate responses in any eventualities.
(Sat phones: +63 929686 4129/+63 916626 0689, VHF: Channel 16 with callsign "ENVY", Email: hcgdswm@yahoo.com)(2) Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) when transiting nearer to eastern
Sabah.
(Tel: +60 89863181/016, Fax: +60 89863182,VHF: Channel 16 with call-sign“ESSCOM”, Email: bilikgerakanesscom@jpm.gov.my)

Shipping industry is advised to adopt relevant preventive measures taking reference fromthe “Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia”.
Please see below the location map of the consolidated incidents occurred from March to
November 2016 in the Sulu-Celebes Seas and eastern Sabah region.

Page 2
Monday, 21 November 2016

Page 3
Monday, 21 November 2016

REGIONAL GUIDETO COUNTER PIRACY AND
ARMED ROBBERY AGAINSTSHIPS IN ASIA

Working Group:CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This guide was produced by the ReCAAP ISC in collaboration with the Asian Shipowners’ Forum(ASF), Federation of ASEAN Shipowners’ Associations (FASA), Information Fusion Centre (IFC),
INTERTANKO, Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), S. Rajaratnam School ofInternational Studies (RSIS) and Singapore Shipping Association (SSA), in the desire to promote safe
and secure seas for the shipping community. The authors also acknowledge the use of BMP4 in the
production of this guide.
DISCLAIMER
This Guide, compiled for the Asian region, has been prepared for general advisory purpose. This Guide
does not and shall not be construed to impose any obligation or requirement on ship owners or managers
to implement any of the measures or advice therein, and any person or entity who wishes to implement
the same is advised to exercise due care and discretion in doing so, having due regard to their own
requirements and resource capabilities. Further, whilst due care and diligence has been exercised by the
publishers, authors, their employers, employees and all persons or entities involved in the preparation,
publication, supply, and dissemination of this Guide is provided without any representation or warranty
whatsoever, including any as to its suitability for implementation by any person or entity.

Section 1
Section 2
Section 3
Section 4
Section 4A
Section 4B
Section 5
Section 6
Section 7
Section 8
Section 9
Section 10
Section 10A
Section 10B
Section 11
Section 12
Section 13
Section 14
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C
Annex D
Annex E
Annex F

Introduction
Aim
Geographical location
Modus operandi
Underway
Ports, anchorages and Ship to Ship Transfer (STS)
Risk assessment
Company planning
Master’s planning
Ship protection measures
Routine ship security reporting
Ships under attack
Immediate actions
Incident reporting
Actions following boarding
Preserving evidence
Post-incident reporting
Other considerations
Definitions
Voluntary Community Reporting
IMO CircularContact details
Piracy attack report
Working Group
List of abbreviations and acronyms

1
2
3
4
4
6
7
13
15
17
27
28
28
30
31
32
35
36
37
38
42
44
48
49
57

SECTION 1

SECTION 2

INTRODUCTION

AIM

Piracy and armed robbery in the Asian region has been evolving over time. The
definitions of ‘piracy’ (in accordance with UNCLOS) and ‘armed robbery against
ships’ (in accordance with IMO) can be found in Annex A. The Asian region inthis guide refers to the area as marked on Marsec Charts Q6112 and Q6113(Annex B).

The purpose of this guide is to assist those responsible for the operationof ships trading in Asia including companies, owners, masters, agents andseafarers in avoiding attacks, deterring attacks and delaying attacks, actions
when attacked and evidence preservation.

It should be noted that piracy and armed robbery in Asia differs significantly
from that of Somalia-based piracy. While Somalian-based pirates generally
attacked ships in order to hijack them and then hold the crew for ransom, thetype of criminal activity occurring in Asian waters generally revolves aroundtheft of personal property and hijacking of ships for the purpose of cargotheft. Although the common modus operandi in the region has not changed
significantly in the last decade, there were some trends in recent years whichhave attracted attention. The Tug Boats and Barges (TaB) Guide Against Piracy
and Sea Robbery launched in January 2013 was a response to the increase in
number of incidents involving tug boats and barges between 2008 and 2012.
A spike in the number of incidents involving oil cargo theft from 2014-2015
prompted the release of the Guide for Tankers Operating in Asia against Piracy
and Armed Robbery Involving Oil Cargo Theft in November 2015.

This guide complements information provided by the relevant resolutions
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the relevant resolutions
and recommendations adopted by the International Maritime Organization(IMO) as in updated MSC Circular 1333/1334 (refer to Annex C) and should
be read with reference to updated assessments of activity produced by the
ReCAAP ISC, the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) and incidents reported by theInternational Maritime Bureau (IMB).

Beyond the more specific trends involving particular types of ships, it is notablethat the last four years (2012-2015) has witnessed a general increase in thenumber of boardings involving all types of ship while underway and at certain
ports and anchorages in Asia. Refer to Regional Cooperation Agreement
on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Information
Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC)’s website (www.recaap.org) for updates on
incidents and trends.
With attacks becoming more widespread and in some cases violent, themaritime community has requested a comprehensive guide which covers all
types of ships operating in Asian waters. This guide encompasses the TaB
Guide Against Piracy and Sea Robbery and Guide for Tankers Operating in
Asia against Piracy and Sea Robbery Involving Oil Cargo Theft; and will take
into consideration the occurrence of incidents involving all types of ship while
underway and at ports and anchorages in Asian waters.
1

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

2

SECTION 3

SECTION 4

GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

MODUS OPERANDI

Piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia varies in approach, so it isdifficult to predict the area where a ship might fall victim to piracy or armed
robbery. The IFC Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is a clearly defined voluntary
reporting area, so ship operators and ships transiting, trading or operating in
Asia can join a trusted reporting scheme. The IFC encourages ships in the VRA
to report to IFC using the reporting format described in Marsec Charts Q6112
and Q6113 when entering the VRA. Please refer to Annex B.

A. UNDERWAY

Acts of piracy and armed robbery have occurred in the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore (SOMS), the southern portion of the South China Sea, within
the Indonesia archipelago and at certain ports and anchorages in Asia. For
incidents involving tankers for theft of oil cargo, the majority of these occurred
within the southern portion of the South China Sea.

Currently, pirates and armed robbers in Asia are operating for the purposes oftheft. Primarily they board ships in order to steal stores and engine spares aswell as personal possessions of seafarers. This type of attack affects all ships,
big and small, in the region. Hijacking of ships for the purposes of cargo thefthas been limited to small parcel tankers carrying refined products which canbe sold on various black markets. Attacks, both outside and inside territorial
waters, appear to be the result of intelligence-led planning by the pirates,with particular products such as gas oil or gasoline being targeted in wellco-ordinated and executed operations. At present, kidnapping of seafarers
has not been a major feature of piracy or armed robbery activity in this region.
Therefore, criminal activity within Asia can be split broadly into the following
categories:
Armed Robbery – In general this is opportunistic, sometimes violent, andoccurs where ships are in coastal waters. Ships are particularly vulnerable
when at anchor or when the bridge team are involved in navigating throughcongested waters and island groups. Theft whilst underway occurs in the
SOMS, particularly those in the eastern approaches in the Singapore Strait
and the South China Sea. The perpetrator’s primary aim is to board and leave
the ship without being seen and sometimes turn violent when sighted orconfronted.

In order to determine
areas of concern,
refer to ReCAAP ISC
website for quarterly
updates on the latest
situation.
Ships should be alert
when operating in areasof concern, particularly
when they slow down,stop or anchor in areas
where attacks are
known to occur.

Figure 1: Example of situation map (ReCAAP ISC)

3

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

4

Hijacking – The primary intent is the theft of oil cargo and it is noted that,
regionally, these attacks are often referred to as siphoning incidents. Attacks
have normally occurred during hours of darkness. They occur primarily in thesouthern region of the South China Sea; however, several attacks have occurredin the Malacca Strait. These attacks to date have been restricted to small
tankers especially those with low freeboard. However, larger tankers should
also take the appropriate precautionary measures. There is strong suspicion
that the ships are targeted for the specific grade of cargo and indicates thatthe pirates possess sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities. Ships canbe hijacked for several hours/days and cargo is transferred to a smaller ship
which comes alongside. There have been cases where the old identities of theships were disguised and the seafarers cast adrift in lifeboats, setting themashore in remote areas. Recent cargo thefts have demonstrated that pirates
have knowledge of ship operations allowing them to disable communications,navigate and operate the cargo system. Additionally, there have been a numberof incidents where tugs and smaller ships have been taken for resale.
Methodology – Unlike pirates in the Gulf of Aden and West Africa whom
are known to use high speed skiffs and long ladders in boarding ships, theperpetrators in Asia often adopt the profile of fishing boats to avoid being
noticed and use a variety of tools including poles, hooks and lines to board
ships. Additionally, due to the distances involved, the use of motherships has
not become widespread.

Simulation of boarding using knottedrope and grapnel hook by arrested
sea robbers.

B. PORTS, ANCHORAGES AND SHIP TO SHIP TRANSFERS (STS)In certain ports and anchorages, the risk of armed robbery is particularly highwhen the ship is at anchor or is drifting off a port for example close to pilot
station or conducting STS. Armed robbers often adopt the profile of fishingboats and use local traffic to disguise their approach to those on the bridgeof the targeted ship. Particular attention should be paid to any small boats
attempting to pass close to your ship. The robbers prefer darkness to maketheir attack.
STS Operations
The following precautions should be taken during STS operations:• Vary the location of STS (if operations permit) to avoid setting patterns
which can be exploited by criminals.
• Conduct STS transfer operations during daylight hours when possible.
• Ship operators should consider what security measures the STS Service
provider will have in place for the operation. The Risk Assessment of
the company providing the STS Service should be reviewed by the Ship
Security Officer (SSO) and the ship's Master.
• When STS operations are expected to be conducted, extra attention
should be paid to the use of physical protection measures. As razor wire
can potentially make it very difficult to complete a STS operation, otherprotection measures should be considered to protect the ship fromattack in these cases.
• During STS operations or when adrift, equipment such as fenders,anchor chains and hawse pipes can provide a vulnerable point of accessfor attackers, and entry should be physically blocked.

Simulation of how the loot is transferred.
(Courtesy of The Indonesian Navy)(Courtesy of The Indonesian Navy)

5

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

6

SECTION 5•

For the purpose of identifying suitable measures of prevention, mitigation andrecovery in case of piracy or armed robbery, a ship and voyage-specific risk
assessment should be carried out prior to entering the sea areas described in
Section 3 above to assess the likelihood and consequences of piracy and armed
robbery attacks to the ship, based on the latest available information.

•

RISK ASSESSMENT

Operating in the VRA requires thorough advanced planning, using all available
information. The maritime environment is dynamic, the risks and threats will
not remain constant for subsequent visits. It is essential that Masters, SSOs
and Company Security Officers (CSOs) carry out a detailed Risk Assessment foreach voyage to the region and for each activity within the region.
A Risk Assessment is a logical examination of the current situation to
identify the risks and threats likely to be encountered. It should examine theeffectiveness of security measures already in place and identify additional
self-protection measures available. Risk Assessment is a tool to support sounddecision making.
The output of this Risk Assessment should identify measures for prevention,
mitigation and recovery, combining statutory regulations with supplementarymeasures to combat piracy and armed robbery. It is important that the Risk
Assessment is ship and voyage specific, and not generic. Unlike the Ship
Security Assessment (SSA) described in the International Ship and Port Facility
Security (ISPS) Code, the Risk Assessment should include, but may not belimited to, the following:••

7

Crew safety (measures to prevent illegal boarding and external accessto the accommodation, whilst ensuring that crew members will not be
trapped inside and should be able to escape in the event of another typeof emergency, for example fire)
The specific threat on who are the pirates/armed robbers, what do theywant to achieve, how do they attack, how do they board, which weapons
do they use etc.

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia•••

Background factors shaping the situation (visibility, sea-state, speed,
wind, weather, swell, wave height, traffic density and local patterns ofactivity for example other commercial ships, fishing concentration areasetc.)
The ship’s characteristics/vulnerabilities/inherent capabilities towithstand the threat (freeboard, speed, general arrangement etc.)
Ship’s procedures (drills, watch rotation, routine maintenance andactivity etc.)
Planning and procedures (time/duration/season of transit/day/night)
Any statutory requirements, in particular those of the Flag State
and/or the coastal and Port State. Other requirements dictated bycompany, charterer and insurance policies should also be taken into
consideration.

In addition to the information found in this document, supplementary
information about the characteristics of the threat and regional backgroundfactors may be sought from the ReCAAP ISC, IFC, regional reporting centres,shipping association websites, IMB, commercial intelligence providers or local
sources e.g. ship’s agents.
Ship operators, Masters and CSOs should evaluate and review the effectivenessof the controls already in place to prevent illegal boarding and hijacking of aship. The evaluation of the effectiveness of the controls already in place andthose being implemented as mitigating measures following a voyage specificrisk assessment can be greatly assisted by the development of a ship specifichardening plan.
A ship specific hardening plan details the hardening measures being
implemented on board the ship including a list of all access routes to theaccommodation block and engine room detailing their securing arrangements
and status. This plan should be developed by the ship’s Master and CSO
following an on board security review.

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

8

Ship protection measures fall into two distinct categories:• Protection measures installed or provided by the company as part of the
Ship Security Plan (SSP).
• Additional measures that may be adopted when the risk of attack
increases.

The Risk Assessment Process
The risk being evaluated is the likelihood of harm to the crew or ship froma maritime security threat. Risk Assessment must reflect the prevailingcharacteristics of the specific voyage and ship, and not just be a repetition ofadvice relating to a different geographical region and a different pirate modus
operandi. Detailed guidance on preparing risk assessments can be found froma variety of sources including the ISPS code.
HAZARDMEASURES TO DELAY/DETER AN ATTACK

Protection measures discussed in this guidance are generic and designed
to promote thought for different ships and circumstances. To maximize
effectiveness, a range of tailored measures, most appropriate to the shipand situation in question should be identified and implemented. In order toaccurately conduct a risk assessment, the existing self-protection measures(controls) employed must be identified and evaluated. In order to gauge theeffectiveness of each measure employed it must be compared with the specificthreat it is designed to counter.

Monitorpiracy alerts/
notifications

Piracy drills/
crew training

CCTV

Reporting/ship position
monitoring

Dummies/mannequins

Secondarylayer ofdefence

Vigilant 360
deg look out
in place

SearchLightsDoorhardeningmeasuresin place

Early radar
detection

Razor wire rigged
around the fullproximity ofthe ship

Infra-redmotion sensors
early detection
systemAccessible
windows
hardened

MEASURES TO REDUCE THE CONSEQUENCEUNAUTHORISED BOARDING

VHF/MHF/
distress callInternal door
hardening

SSAS

Shore side
response

CitadelCitadelhardeningand supplies

CONSEQUENCE
Figure 2: Example of the steps that could be taken following risk assessment

9

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 10

Acceptability
Individual companies will set criteria for what is tolerable risk, and the
SSP should mitigate that risk to be as low as practicable. When conducting therisk assessment, it is recommended that risk factors such as freeboard, area,
type of ship and speed be taken into consideration.

Freeboard• If a ship is attacked, attackers will often try to board the ship at the sternor the lowest point above the waterline, making it easier for them toclimb on board. Additional protective measures should be considered(see section 8).

Record the Assessment
Records of risk assessments should be maintained both by the CSO and on
board the ship. These should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis tocapture lessons learnt and to highlight gaps. This will generate improvements
and provide examples of best practice. Using this experience to educate staff
and enhance training aids preparation and readiness. As more people read andunderstand the risk assessment the greater the level of preparedness becomes
and the likelihood of spotting omissions and suggesting improvements
increases. The mitigations identified in the risk assessment process should berecorded on the ship specific hardening plan for reference in conjunction withthe current voyages risk assessment.

During the voyage
Speed• Ships are most vulnerable when stopped in the water, drifting, at anchor
or carrying out STS transfer, Single Buoy Mooring (SBM) operations or
slowing down for pilot transfer.
• Increase speed to make it difficult for an attacker to board.
• Get underway and/or increase to a maximum safe speed as quickly as
possible when a suspicious ship is identified. This will open the distancefrom any possible attack and make the ship more difficult to board.

Self-Protection Measures
When the threat level is elevated either by prior warning, intelligence,
information from the regional reporting centres, the onset of calm weather
conditions or threat detection; additional control measures need to bepredefined and quickly applied to maintain or reduce the risk to an acceptablelevel.
Considerations for the Master of a Ship:
Before the voyage
Crew Safety• Ensure that crew members will not be trapped inside the ship, during an
attack or during an emergency by the implementation of the hardening
measures. All life-saving and fire-fighting appliances must be available
for immediate use and emergency escapes must be accessible by thecrew.
• Ensure the location of a Safe Muster Point and Citadel, if used, isidentified and known to all crew members.
• Attackers may fire weapons at the bridge to force the ship to stop if
underway and/or to gain access to the bridge once aboard and to forcecrew compliance. Consider providing protection around areas of thebridge where bridge team may be required to remain during an attack.
11 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Location and Time at Anchor• Keep time at anchor to a minimum when in area of risk.
• Avoid setting patterns.
• The location of the chosen anchorage position is an important factor in
mitigating risks against attacks on the ship.
Sea State• Ships commonly used by the perpetrators in attacks are usually limited
to fair and moderate sea states. It is likely to be more difficult to operatesmall craft and board an identified ship in sea state three and above.
Reporting• It is strongly recommended that ships participate in the Voluntary
Community Reporting (VCR) scheme when in VRA as per Marsec Charts
Q6112 and Q6113.
• Maintain regular contact with the CSO and report suspicious activity to
the IFC and relevant ReCAAP Focal Point. This will give Masters greater
situational awareness.
• Reports provided by ships operating in the VRA will give regional
authorities and agencies greater knowledge of activities in their areas ofinterest.

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 12

SECTION 6

COMPANY PLANNING
It is strongly recommended that ship operators adopt the following company
planning procedures when operating in the region. Prior to entering the area:• Jointly conduct risk assessment with the Master.
• Obtain the latest information from the ReCAAP ISC, IFC, IMB, IMO andother relevant regional agencies. Great care should be taken in voyageplanning given the difficulty in predicting an area where a ship might fallvictim to piracy or armed robbery. Information from shipping association
websites, commercial intelligence providers or local sources may also
be useful in voyage planning.
• Review the SSA and SSP. Review the SSA and implementation of the
SSP, as required by the ISPS Code.
• Put SSP in place. The CSO is encouraged to ensure that a SSP is
in place for a passage through the area of concern, and that this is
exercised, briefed and discussed with the Master and the SSO.
• Monitor piracy related websites on specific threats. Ensure that ships
are aware of any specific threats that have been promulgated.
• Offer guidance to Master with regard to the recommended route.
Offer the ship’s Master guidance with regard to the recommended
routing through the area of concern and details of the piracy threat.
• Plan and install Ship Protection Measures. The provision of carefullyplanned and installed Ship Protection Measures prior to transiting an
area of concern is strongly recommended. Suggested Ship Protection
Measures are set out within this booklet – see Section 8. It has been
proven that the use of Ship Protection Measures significantly increases
the prospects of a ship resisting an attack.
• Tracking. Owners should consider the placement of hidden positiontransmitting devices as one of the first actions of hijackers is to disable
all visible communication and tracking devices and aerials.
• Conduct crew training. Conduct crew training sessions (including
Citadel drills where utilised) prior to transits with ship protection
measures in place.
• Obtain contact details. Ensure that contact details of nearest coastal
states are readily available and easily accessible. Refer to Annex D.
• Participate in the VCR scheme. It is strongly recommended that ship
operators register with IFC before entering the VRA. Refer to Section 7.
13 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

The following important advice should be noted:• Communications with external parties should be kept to a minimum,with close attention paid to organising rendezvous points and waiting
positions. For e-mail correspondence to Agents, Charterers, Chandlers
etc. it is strongly recommended that address lists are controlled andthat information within the e-mail is concise, containing the minimumthat is legally required in order to fulfil requirements or contractual
obligations.
• Know your agents and avoid or minimize requirements where possible.
Unnecessary interaction with other parties creates opportunities for
information regarding the ship’s position to be compromised.
• If the ship trades regularly in the region it is recommended to makevaried arrangements whenever possible to make it difficult for criminals
to predict where operations or voyage might take place.
Private Maritime Security Contractors (PMSCs)
Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) are prohibited by law
from operating inside territorial waters of coastal States in the region, andauthorities are known to enforce these regulations vigorously.
Unarmed PMSCs are a matter for individual ship operators following their own
voyage risk assessment. Consideration should be given to the relevant laws ofboth Flag States and coastal/Port States in the region. Companies are advised
to check with the regional State agencies on PMSC so as not to violate any
regional/customary laws/regulations.

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 14

SECTION 7

MASTER’S PLANNING•

It is recommended that Ship Masters plan according to the following prior toentering an area of concern:••

Conduct risk assessment. The Master (and Company) should
appreciate that the voyage routing may need to be reviewed in lightof updated information received. Given the modus operandi of theperpetrators operating in Asia, the Master should plan according to thefollowing:оо Where possible, drifting, waiting and slow steaming should be
avoided.
оо Where practicable, a prolonged stay at anchorage is to be
avoided. Anchoring within designated anchorage area is strongly
encouraged as it deters unauthorised boarding.
оо Minimize use of VHF and use e-mail or secure satellite telephone
instead. Where possible only answer known or legitimate callers on
the VHF, bearing in mind that imposters are possible.
оо The greatest risks of piracy and armed robbery are during hoursof darkness and needs to be factored into all planning. Where
possible, operations should start and end during daylight hours.
оо Constant radio watch.
оо Latest NAVAREA warnings and Alerts.
оо Heightened state of readiness during passage through areas ofconcern.
Brief crew and conduct drill. Prior to entry into an area of concern it isrecommended that the crew should be fully briefed on the preparations
and a drill conducted with the ship protection measures in place. The
plan should be reviewed and all personnel briefed on their duties,
including familiarity with the alarm which signals an attack, an all-clear
situation and the appropriate response to each. The drill should also
consider the following:оо Testing the ship’s Protection Measures, including testing of the
security of all access points.
оо The SSP should be thoroughly reviewed (see Section 6).
оо Lock down conditions, including crew safety considerations.
оо Passage plan should incorporate security considerations.
оо Guidance to bridge team on vigilance stated in night orders.

15 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia•

Prepare and Test of Emergency Communication Plan. Masters areadvised to prepare an Emergency Communication Plan, to include all
essential emergency contact numbers and prepared messages, whichshould be ready at hand or permanently displayed near all external
communications stations including Safe Muster Point or Citadel (see listof Contacts at Annex D). Communication devices and Ship Security Alert
System (SSAS) should be tested.
Define the ship’s Automatic Identification System (AIS) policy. It is
recommended that in an area of concern AIS status be restricted toship’s identity, position, course, speed, navigational status and safetyrelated information.

Upon entering an area of concern:• Reduce maintenance and engineering work to minimum:
оо Ensure all access points are limited and controlled.
оо All essential equipment is immediately available – appropriate
consideration on risk should be given when considering
maintenance on essential equipment.

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 16

SECTION 8

оо

The guidance within this section primarily focuses on preparations that might
be within the capability of the ship’s crew, or with some external assistance.

оо
оо
оо

SHIP PROTECTION MEASURESThe guidance is based on experience and may require amendment over time if
the perpetrators change their modus operandi.

ооThe Ship Protection Measures described have been effective, however layered
protection is recommended to help deter and delay unauthorised boarding.

ооPrimary layer of defence• Good look out/ vigilance• Razor wire
• Manoeuvring• Speed/ freeboard

Secondary layer of defence• Door hardening• Window hardening• Gate / grate• Motion sensor/ CCTV

Last layer of defence• Internal door hardening• Citadel• Communication

Figure 3: Example of layered protection

Owners may wish to consider making further alterations to the ship beyond thescope of this booklet, and/or provide additional equipment and/or manpower
as a means of further reducing the risk of attack. If perpetrators are unable toboard a ship they cannot hijack it.

Ensure that there are sufficientbinoculars for the enhanced Bridge
Team, preferably anti-glare type.
Consider use of night vision optics.
Maintain a careful radar watch.
Watch for the approaches of small
boat from the stern.
Consider enhancing technology
where possible, such as monitoringof CCTV.
Whilst underway, consider the use of
downward facing lighting around thestern. The ship search light has also
proved to be effective in enhancing
the lookout for any suspicious ships
approaching from the stern.

Enhanced Bridge Protection• The bridge is usually the focus for any attack. If they are able to board
the ship, the perpetrators usually try to go to the bridge to enable themto take control. The following protection enhancements should beconsidered:оо While most bridge windows are laminated, further protection
against flying glass can be provided by the application of security
glass film, often called Blast Resistant Film.
оо Fabricated metal (steel/aluminium), hardening for the side and rearbridge windows (for example, consider metal grills or window bars)
and the bridge wing door windows, which may be permanently
installed or rapidly secured in place in the event of an attack.

Watchkeeping and Enhanced Vigilance• Prior to entering an area of concern, it is recommended that
preparations as directed by the risk assessment are made:оо Consider a shorter rotation of the Watch period in order tomaximise alertness of the lookouts, and ensuring that lookouts are
fully briefed and trained.
17 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 18

Control of Access to Bridge, Accommodation and Machinery Spaces• It is very important to control the access routes to deter or delay
perpetrators who managed to board a ship and are trying to enteraccommodation or machinery spaces. It is very important to recognisethat if the perpetrators managed to gain access to the upper deckof a ship, they will be tenacious in their efforts to gain access to theaccommodation section and in particular the bridge. It is strongly
recommended that significant effort is expended prior to entry into thearea of concern to deny perpetrators’ access to the accommodationand the bridge. However escape routes must be easily accessible toseafarers in event of an emergency.
оо All doors and hatches providing access to the bridge,
accommodation and machinery spaces should be properly secured
to prevent them being opened by perpetrators.

оо

Where the door or hatch is located on an escape route from amanned compartment, it is essential that it can be opened quickly
and easily by a seafarer trying to exit by that route. Where the dooror hatch is locked it is essential that a key is available, in a clearlyvisible position by the door or hatch.

оо

It is recommended that once doors and hatches are secured, adesignated and limited number are used for routine access whenrequired, with their use being strictly controlled.
Where doors and hatches are required to be closed for watertightintegrity, ensure all clips are fully dogged down in addition to any
locks. Where possible, additional securing such as with wire strops
may enhance hatch security.

оо

оо
оо

Careful consideration should be given to the means of securing
doors and hatches in order to afford the ship maximum protection
possible.
Consideration to installing gates/grates on external stairways.

оо

19 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Internal door hardening on the bridge has proven to be effective
in allowing the bridge team more time to make their way to the
Citadel or Safe Muster Point.

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 20ооPerpetrators have been known to gain access through portholes
and windows. The fitting of steel bars to windows will deterand delay this even if they manage to shatter the window. Dueconsideration should be given for windows that are emergency
escapes.

•ооооPrior to entering the area of concern, procedures for controlling
access to accommodation, machinery spaces and store rooms
should be set out and practised.
Ensure that tools on deck are properly stored away and secured.

Physical Barriers
Perpetrators typically use long lightweight hooked ladders, grappling hooks
with rope attached and long hooked poles with a climbing rope attached toboard ships underway. Physical barriers should be used to make it as difficult
as possible to gain access to the ship.
Before constructing any physical barriers it is recommended that a thoroughsurvey is conducted to identify areas vulnerable to perpetrators trying to gain
access. Razor wire, gates, barriers, fences or their combination have proved
to be effective to prevent or delay unauthorized boarding. Due consideration
should also be given to the safety of the crew in the event of an emergency.
Razor Wire
When deploying razor wire, personal protective equipment to protect hands,
arms and faces must be used. Moving razor wire using wire hooks (likemeat hooks) rather than by gloved hands reduces the risk of injury. It is
recommended that razor wire is provided in shorter sections (e.g. 10 metre
section) as it is significantly easier and safer to use than larger sections which
can be heavier and unwieldy.
21 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia••

A robust razor wire barrier is particularly effective if it is:оо Constructed outboard of the ship’s structure (i.e. overhanging) to
make it more difficult for perpetrators to hook on their boarding
ladder/grappling hooks to the ship’s structure.
оо Constructed of a double roll of concertina wire around the proximityof the ship - some ships use a treble roll of concertina razor wire
which is even more effective.
оо When rigging razor wire, care must be taken not to overstretch thewire in order to reduce the amount needed as it becomes		
ineffective.
It is recommend that when rigging razor wire, a steel cable is run throughthe centre in order to offer additional strength and reduce the ability of
the hostile attacker being able to pull it down. The added advantage of
having the steel cable is for ease of rigging/removal particularly for ships
operating on short voyages.
Although preferably razor wire should be rigged around the full proximityof the ship with a minimum of two layers, this may not be ideal for ships
with a low freeboard. To that end, an alternate solution would be toconsider using razor wire in front of accommodation in at least 3 layers inorder to delay or deter a hostile attacker. If this method is being adopted,
due consideration should be given to the security of deck stores and theequipments forward of the barrier.

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 22

Water Spray and Foam Monitors
The use of water can make it difficult for a suspicious boat to remain alongside
and makes it significantly more difficult for a perpetrator to climb on board.
Gates
An alternative option to secure the superstructure from a hostile attacker
can be by means of a gate system securely rigged on the main deck in
conjunction with accessible window hardening. This configuration will not
only provide substantial protection but it will also save time on hardening the
ship's perimeter. However, gates should be used in conjunction with razor
wires to prevent perpetrators going around the sides or climbing above thegates which are in place. Again ships must be aware this will help protect theaccommodation. If this method is being adopted, due consideration should begiven to the security of deck stores and the equipment forward of the barrier.

Manoeuvring Practice
Where navigationally safe to do so, Masters are encouraged to practisemanoeuvring their ships to establish which series of helm orders produce themost difficult sea conditions to disrupt a perpetrator’s boat in getting closeenough to execute an attack, without causing a significant reduction in the
ship’s speed. Anti-piracy manoeuvres are an option when it is navigationallysafe to do so.
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
CCTV is not a substitute for a physical lookout. However:•••Consider positioning CCTV monitors in a protected position.
Further CCTV monitors could be located at the Safe Muster Point/
Citadel and engine control room.
Recorded CCTV footage may provide useful evidence after an attack.

Lighting
It is recommended that the following lights are available and tested:•
AlarmsWhen operating in an area of concern, procedures should be in place to ensurethat crew muster in a safe location and the crew are made aware about thenature of emergency.
Sounding the ship’s alarms/whistle serves to inform the ship’s crew thatan attack has commenced and, importantly, demonstrate to any potential
attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it. If approached,continuous sounding of the ship’s foghorn/whistle distracts the perpetrators
and as above lets them know that they have been seen. It is important to:
•
•

•
•
•

Weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing
lighting on the poop deck, consistent with Rule 20(b) of the International
Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea.
Search lights for immediate use when required.
Once perpetrators have been identified or an attack commences
whilst the ship is underway, illuminating the ship as described above
demonstrates to the perpetrators that they have been sighted.
At anchorage, it is recommended lights are left on as well-lit ships areless likely to be attacked.
In compliance with international regulation,navigation lights should not be switched off at night.

Sound the emergency alarm and make anannouncement that the ship is under attack.
Conduct exercises prior to entering the area ofconcern.

23 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 24

Deny Use of Ship’s Tools and Equipment
Perpetrators generally boarded ships with little in the way of equipment otherthan personal weaponry. It is important to try to deny them the use of ship’s
tools or equipment that may be used to gain entry into the ship. Tools andequipment that may be of use to the perpetrators should be stored in a secure
location.
Safe Muster Points / Citadels
Any decision to evacuate the bridge when in congested waters when the ship’s
security is threatened requires careful consideration. Consideration must be
given to establishing a Safe Muster Point. Consideration should also be given to
establishing a Citadel. An explanation of each follows:
Safe Muster Point
A Safe Muster Point is a designated area chosen to provide maximum physicalprotection to the crew, preferably lower down within the ship. The designated
Muster Point should not be on the bridge.
In the event of a suspicious approach, crew not required on the Bridge or theEngine Room Control Room will muster at the Safe Muster Point.
• A Safe Muster Point should be fortified to delay external entry.
• A Safe Muster Point should have access to independentcommunications such as portable VHF/satellite communications.
• A Safe Muster Point should be located whereby the crew is not visible tothe perpetrators and vulnerable to attack.

•

•

•

The use of Citadel must be
rehearsed to ensure theMaster is able to make thecorrect and timely decisionon whether to retreat into it
or not. The ship’s SSP should
define the conditions for useof the Citadel.
The whole concept of the
Citadel approach is lost if any
crew is left outside before it issecured.
The use of a Citadel cannot
guarantee a law enforcement/
military response. The crew
may have to make a decision
to end a Citadel situation
without the assistance oflaw enforcement/military
resources.

Additional protection measures may also include:• Independent tracking system with independent transmitters.
• Motion sensors.
• Door sensors.

Citadels
If Citadels are to be employed, they should be complementary to, rather than areplacement for, all other Ship Protection Measures set out in the guide.
The establishing of a Citadel may be beyond the capability of ship’s staff alone,
and may well require external technical advice and support.
••••

A Citadel is designed and constructed to resist a determined attack andprotect the crew.
The Citadel should be safe, secure and well ventilated in line with healthand safety regulations.
The successful use is predicated on intervention by maritime
enforcement agencies and all persons accounted for.
Provisions such as food, water, first aid and sanitation should be
provided for at least 72 hours.

25 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 26

SECTION 9SECTION 10

ROUTINE SHIP SECURITY REPORTINGSHIPS UNDER ATTACKThe Asian region is bounded by functioning States who apply the rule of law.
Also, naval forces operate openly in the region and in close cooperation witheach other. The IMO advocates reporting to the nearest coastal States as they
have the jurisdiction to respond. It also provides ownership to enforcement in
the region and prevention of the maritime crime.

A. IMMEDIATE ACTIONSThe VCR scheme has been established by the IFC for the purpose of enhancing
maritime security for all merchant ships operating in the IFC’s VRA.
Merchant ships operating in the VRA are strongly encouraged to reportmaritime security incidents or anomalous behaviour to the IFC. Participationin this reporting scheme is totally free and ships sailing under any flag arestrongly encouraged to participate. All information provided is treated with strict
commercial confidentiality and will be used within the military and maritime
enforcement agencies.
In return, IFC provides maritime security advisories to ships based on theirreported position and intended destinations where applicable and appropriate.
IFC will evaluate and monitor selected ships, sharing the information withother maritime enforcement agencies when required. Consistent reporting willallow IFC to pass on valuable information to the relevant maritime enforcement
agencies in the event of an incident and aid in their timely response to incidents.
Refer to Annex B for more details on the VCR scheme.
In the event of an attack, the procedure detailed in Section 10 should be strictly
followed.

27 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

If the crew of a ship suspects a robbery or attack is imminent or in progress
there are a number of actions that may be taken. However, the majority of
attacks in the region are conducted from small boats, at night and against
stationary ships, and potential for the attackers to get close to a ship prior todetection by the crew is high.
A ship could quickly come under attack with little or no warning. This reinforces
the need for vigilant lookouts, both visual and radar, to exploit the time taken for
the attackers to approach a ship. The time taken to approach a ship, however
short, is an important period to activate any protective measures and make it
clear to the attackers they have been seen, the ship is prepared and will resist
attempts to board.
In the event of an attack, the ship should activate the SSAS and additionallyraise the alarm by calling the nearest coastal state through its Maritime
Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) and IMB. Maintain contact with authorities
preferably by telephone for as long as it is safe to do so.
On receipt of information in relation to an attack, the MRCC will inform theregional security forces and ReCAAP Focal Point. IMB will also inform theappropriate national maritime operations centre and local authorities and will
alert other ships in the immediate vicinity of the event.
The crew should implement the Company’s security plan which isrecommended to include a detailed list of actions to be taken. The following
list of actions is among those which should be considered by the Master if asuspected attack is imminent or an actual attack is in progress:• Sound alarm which signals an attack.
• Activate the SSAS which will alert your CSO and Flag State.
• Make an announcement in accordance with the Ship’s Emergency Plan.
• The crew will then muster according to procedures.
• Place the ship’s whistle/foghorn/alarm on Auto mode to demonstrate

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 28

•
•
•
•
•

•
•

•
•

to any potential attacker that the crew is aware of the attack and isreacting to it.
Put out a distress alert.
Ensure that the AIS is switched ON.
Procedures should be in place to ensure safety of the crew.
Confirm designated entry point to the accommodation is fully secured.
Speed should be increased as much as possible to widen the
distance between the ship and the attackers. Try to steer a straightcourse to maintain maximum speed. Consider evasive actions if thecircumstances warrant it.
If possible, alter course away from the approaching craft. When sea
conditions allow, consider altering course to increase an approachingcraft’s exposure to wind/waves.
Confirm all doors are secured and all crew are mustered within the Safe
Muster Point or Citadel. Master to then make the final decision to leave
the bridge if safe to do so. Take all way off, stop engines and display Not
Under Command (NUC) lights.
Switch on additional lighting during the hours of darkness.
Report the attack as soon as possible to the nearest coastal Statethrough its MRCC. In addition, contact IMB by phone and follow up withcall to the CSO if the situation permits.

B. INCIDENT REPORTING

Appendix 2 of the IMO circular MSC.1/Circ. 1334 on ‘Revised Guidance to shipowner, ship operator, ship master and crew on preventing and suppressing actsof piracy and armed robbery against ships’ depicts the information sharing andincident reporting processes in the Asian region (Annex C). In the event of an
attempted attack or an actual attack, the Master should alert:
I. The nearest coastal State through its MRCC
II. the CSO
III. the IMB
The information of MRCC is available in the Admiralty List of Radio Signals
Maritime Radio, The Mariner’s handbook and Search and Rescue Contacts.
Ship master is advised to have the updated list readily available onboard.
You may refer to the following websites for more information:
I.

NP281 Admiralty List of Radio Signals Maritime Radio Stations Europe,
Africa and Asia 2015/16 Ed
II. NP 100 The Mariner’s Handbook
III. Search and Rescue Contacts
The CSO should alert:
I. The Flag State
II. ReCAAP Focal Point (Refer to Annex D)
And if possible alert:
I. IFC

29 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 30

SECTION 11

SECTION 12

ACTIONS FOLLOWING BOARDINGPRESERVING EVIDENCE

Although rare, there have been a limited number of cases in which pirates andarmed robbers operating in Asia have used violence in order to subdue thecrew. Therefore it is extremely important not to engage in a confrontation withthe attackers because this may put the crew at greater risk of getting hurt or in
extreme cases killed. Therefore:• Remain calm. Offer no resistance once attackers reach the bridge.
Compliance to attackers is essential once a ship has been taken. They
may be aggressive, highly agitated and armed. When directed, all
movement should be calm, slow and very deliberate. Crew should keep
their hands visible at all times and comply fully. This will greatly reduce
the risk of violence.
• If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated, the main engine should
be stopped and all way must be taken off the ship if possible (and if
navigationally safe to do so).

The period following an attack will be confusing as Companies, Masters andCrew are recovering from the ordeal. To give the investigating authorities thebest chance of apprehending the perpetrators it is important that evidence iscollected in the correct manner. Companies, Masters and Crew should refer to
IMO Guidelines on the Preservation of Evidence reference A28/Res. 1091 andother industry guidance.

Past incidents have shown that attackers will board a ship and loot the ship’s
stores and steal the crew's personal belongings, but fortunately, kidnappings
are rare. However, each company or organisation should have a policy in place
to cover the eventualities of kidnap.
In the event that enforcement agencies take action on board the ship, allpersonnel should keep low to the deck and cover their head with both hands,
with hands visible. On no account should personnel make movements which
could be misinterpreted as being aggressive. It is very important that nothingshould be pointed at military personnel and flash photography must not be
used.
Masters and CSOs should brief and prepare ship’s personnel to cooperate
fully during any enforcement agency action on board and prepare them to bechallenged on their identity.

31 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

By following some basic principles, the Master and Crew can ‘protect’ a crime
scene until the appointed law enforcement agency arrives:• Preserve the crime scene and all possible evidence as far as possible.
• Avoid contaminating or interfering with all possible evidence – if in
doubt, do not touch and leave items in situ.
• Do not clean up the area or throw anything away no matter how
unimportant it may seem.
• Take initial statements from the crew.
• Take photographs of the crime scene.
• Make a list of items taken (eg. mobile phones with numbers)• Facilitate access to the crime scene and relevant documentation for law
enforcement authorities.
• Make crew available for interview by law enforcement authorities.
Once appointed, the lead law enforcement agency will talk to the Master andCrew to understand the sequence and circumstances of the event. The processused is generally consistent and follows law enforcement practice.
Law enforcement authorities may request permission to conduct post-releasecrew debriefs and to collect evidence for investigations and prosecutions following captivity. A thorough investigation is critical to ensure that potential physicalevidence, including electronic evidence, such as CCTV footage and VDR data are
not destroyed or potential witnesses overlooked.

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 32

The quality of evidence provided and the availability of the crew to testify will
significantly help any following investigation or prosecution.
Following an incident, a witness statement from those affected is required.
Seafarers are encouraged to provide witness statements to Naval/Militaryforces or law enforcement officers as appropriate to enable suspects to be held
and handed over to prosecuting states. Without supporting evidence, including
witness statements from those affected by the incident, suspects are likely togo free.

Tools used by perpetrators

Tools used by perpetrators(Courtesy of MMEA)(Courtesy of MMEA)

Officer cabin being ransacked

Footprint on deck

(Courtesy of MMEA)(Courtesy of Thome Ship Management
Pte Ltd)

Hand-made cigarette bottle usedby perpetrators (Courtesy of

Ransack of crew cabin

ReCAAP Focal Point (Vietnam))

INTERPOL can provide support to ship operators who have had theirships hijacked. INTERPOL’s Maritime Security Unit can assist in taking theappropriate steps to preserve the integrity of the evidence left behind at thecrime scene. It is recommended that ship operators contact INTERPOL assoon as possible, ideally within 3 days of a hijacking of their ship. INTERPOL
may be consulted to discuss the recommended practices for the preservationof evidence that could be useful to law enforcement agents pursuing an
investigation.

(Courtesy of ReCAAP Focal Point(Thailand))33 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 34

SECTION 13

SECTION 14

POST-INCIDENT REPORTING

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Following an attack, it is vital that a detailed report of the event is provided to:Companies should consider helping the crew overcome trauma of attack.
There are a number of international programmes run by NGOs available who
can provide advice on the after-care and support of seafarers.

Flag State
Individual Flag States will require a detailed report on the incident. Reference
should be made to the relevant legislation.
ReCAAP Focal Point, IFC and IMB
It is important that a detailed report of the event is provided to the ReCAAP
Focal Points, IFC and IMB. This will enhance knowledge of activity in themaritime domain and better tailor future warnings or advice the regional
reporting centres issue to the maritime community. The report should follow
the format contained in the Annex E to this Guidance (for contact details, see
Annex D).
Coastal States
It is essential that each and every incident is reported to the relevant coastal
state to assist them in fulfilling their obligations under UNCLOS and toencourage the international community to support infrastructure and capacity
building in the region. The Asian region is bounded by functioning governments
who understand the maritime domain, operate Vessel Traffic Information
System (VTIS) and have naval assets to deploy for patrols and in response toreports of incidents of piracy and armed robbery.
INTERPOL
INTERPOL maintains an extensive database containing information about
pirates and their networks. The collection of information after an attack isvital to ensure that evidence can be gathered in order to support successfulprosecutions. Therefore, informing INTERPOL and allowing authorities tocollect evidence is of great importance in assisting the prosecuting authorities.

35 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 36

ANNEX A

ANNEX B

DEFINITIONSPiracy, in accordance with Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is defined as:
1. “Piracy” means any of the following acts:
A. any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
I. on the high seas, against another ship, or against persons or property
on board such ship;
II. against a ship, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of
any State;
B. any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of anaircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
C. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described insubparagraph (A) or (B).
Armed Robbery Against Ships, in accordance with the Code of Practice for
the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships of theInternational Maritime Organisation (IMO) Assembly Resolution A.1025(26), is
defined as:
2. “Armed robbery against ships” means any of the following acts:
A. any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, or
threat thereof, other than an act of “piracy”, committed for private ends
and directed against a ship, or against persons or property on board
such ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters andterritorial sea;
B. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above

37 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

VOLUNTARY COMMUNITY REPORTING
The VCR merchant ship voluntary reporting schemes as depicted on Marsec
Charts Q6112 and Q6113 has been established by the IFC for the purpose ofenhancing maritime security for all merchant ships operating in the IFC’s VRA.
Merchant ships operating in the VCR region are strongly encouraged to reportmaritime security incidents or anomalous behaviour to the IFC. The Owners/
Masters of the ships are encouraged to send regular reports of their position/
course/speed and other voyage information as well as report on anomalous
activities to the IFC. In return, IFC provides maritime security advisories tothe ships based on their reported position and intended destinations. IFC willrisk evaluate and monitor selected ships, sharing the information with othermaritime enforcement agencies when required. Ships are encouraged to reportunder the following conditions:
A.
B.
C.
D.

When transiting in Southeast Asia.
Any items changed from the initial report.
On the occurrence of a maritime security incident.
Observing any suspicious or anomalous behaviour.

Participation in this reporting scheme is totally free and ships sailing under any
flag are strongly encouraged to participate. All information provided is treatedwith strict commercial confidentiality and will be used within the military andmaritime enforcement agencies.
Anomalies are behaviours outside the normal expectations of shipping,commercial trade, or marine practice. They may be indicative of a maritime
security threat. These can include, but are not limited to, the following:• Unusual RVs of ships at sea including transfers of cargo or people• Darkened ships/not illuminating nav lights• Ships anchored in unusual locations• Ships not flying a flag/displaying a name• Ships navigating contrary to the ordinary practice of seamen• Ships outside of normal patterns/sea lanes

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 38

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Fishing boat without appropriate equipment
Overcrowded/unseaworthy/overloaded ships
Non-ocean going ships in the high seas
Abandoned ships
Unwarranted/unsolicited approaches by ships to your own ship or otherships in your vicinity
Non-military/government ships carrying arms
Ships carrying boarding equipment
Suspicious/unusual voice communications
Ships underway/making way without AIS transmission

It is recommended that the VCR reports consist of the following fields ofinformation and be sent to information_fusion_centre@defence.gov.sg.

Daily Position Report
01

Ship Name

02

International Radio Call Sign (IRCS)

03

IMO Number

04

Time of Report (UTC)05

Ship Position

06

Course / Speed07

Any Other Important Information

08

Company

Final Report
Initial Report
01

Ship Name

02

Flag

03

IMO Number

04

Inmarsat Telephone Number

05

Time & Position

06

Course07

Passage Speed

08

Freeboard

09

Cargo

10

Destination and Estimated Time of Arrival

11

Name and Contact of Company Security Officer

12

Nationality of Master and Crew

13

Armed/Unarmed Security Team Embarked

14

Company (Contact Details and Email)39 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

01

Ship Name

02

International Radio Call Sign (IRCS)

03

IMO Number

04

Time of Report (UTC)05

Port or Position

06

Company

Suspicious Activity Report
01

Ship Name

02

IMO Number

03

Type of suspicious activity

04

Position of incident

05

Details of incident

06

Inmarsat number

07

Email address to be contacted by

08

Date and Time of report (at GMT)

09

Company

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 40

ANNEX CIFC VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREAIMO CIRCULAR(Area as marked on Marsec Charts Q6112 and Q6113)

120º

13ºS

21 N

0º

º

Q6112

74ºE

90º

Q6113

IFC VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA

141ºN

The key principle of respecting a coastal State’s sovereignty takes precedence
over enforcement action in their area of jurisdiction. It also supports thereporting to the nearest coastal States as advocated by the IMO circular MSC.1/
Circ. 1334 on ‘Revised Guidance to ship owner, ship operator, ship master andcrew on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against
ships’. Refer to Appendix 2 of the circular on the flow diagram for reporting
incidents in Asia on page 43.

41 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 42

ANNEX DCONTACT DETAILS
Point of Contact

Country & Agency In Charge

Phone NoFax Number+61-2-6275-6000+61-2-6275-6275+88-02-9553584+88-02-9587301+673-2233751+673-2233753+85-5-2386-4110+85-5-2386-4110

Diagram I: Flow Diagram for Reporting Incidents in Asia

Australia (ReCAAP Focal Point)
Australian Maritime Border Operations Centre(AMBOC)
Maritime Border Command (MBC)
E-mail: amboc@border.gov.au
Bangladesh (ReCAAP Focal Point)
Department of Shipping
E-mail: cns@dos.gov.bd
Brunei (ReCAAP Focal Point)
National Maritime Coordination Centre Brunei
Email: p2mk@jpm.gov.bn
Cambodia (ReCAAP Focal Point)
Merchant Marine Department
E-mail: mmd@online.com.kh
China (ReCAAP Focal Point)
China Maritime Search and Rescue Centre(Beijing)
Email: cnmrcc@mot.gov.cn
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre(Hong Kong)
Email: hkmrcc@mardep.gov.hk+86-10-6529-2218+86-10-6529-2245+86-10-6529-2219+86-10-6529-2221+85-2-2233-7999+85-2-2233-7998+85-2-2541-7714+45-9137-6000+45-9137-6001

Denmark (ReCAAP Focal Point)
Danish Maritime Authority (DMA)
Email: ReCAAP-FP-DK@dma.dk

43 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 44

Point of Contact

Country & Agency In Charge

Phone NoFax Number

India (ReCAAP Focal Point)
MRCC (Mumbai)
Coast Guard Region (West)
Mumbai – India
Email: indsar@vsnl.net
icgmrcc_mumbai@mtnl.net.in
mrcc-west@indiancoastguard.nic.in

Point of Contact

Country & Agency In Charge

Phone NoFax Number

Myanmar (ReCAAP Focal Point)+91-22-2431-6558 +91-22-2433-3727+91-22-2438-8065 +91-22-2431-6558

Dutch Coastguard
Maritime Information Centre (MIK-NL)
Email: mik-nl@kustwacht.nl

Norwegian Maritime Authority
Email: morten.alsaker.lossius@sjofartsdir.no+81-3-3581-2853+82-44-200-5895
to 98+82-44-200-5886
to 88+85-6-2121-2505+85-6-2121-2505+85-6-2121-2547

Philippine Coast Guard
PCG Action Centre-MRCC (Manila)
Email: pcg_cg2@yahoo.com
cg2@coastguard.gov.ph
isc.cg2@coastguard.gov.ph

Laos (ReCAAP Focal Point)
International Relation Department
Ministry of Public Security
Email: keo_kkk@hotmail.com+31-223-658-382+31-223-658-358+47-5274-5000+47-5274-5130+47-5274-5001

Philippines (ReCAAP Focal Point)+81-3-3591-9812+81-3-3591-6361

Republic of Korea (ReCAAP Focal Point)
Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries
Operations Centre
Email: piracy@gicoms.go.kr+95-1202-417

Norway (ReCAAP Focal Point)

021 - 1500500
021 - 127

Japan (ReCAAP Focal Point)
Japan Coast Guard (JCG) Ops Centre
Email : jcg-op@mlit.go.jp+95-313-1650

Netherlands (ReCAAP Focal Point)

Indonesia
Badan Keamanan Laut Republic Indonesia(BAKAMLA)
www.bakamla.go.id

MRCC Ayeyarwaddy (Myanmar Navy)
Email: mrcc.yangon@mptmail.com.mm

Malaysia
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA)
www.mmea.gov.my+63-2-527-3877+63-2-527-8481
to 89(ext: 6136/6137)+63-917-724-3682(Text Hotline)+63-2-527-8481
loc6122+63-2-527-3877

Singapore (ReCAAP Focal Point)
Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore
Port Operations Control Centre (POCC)
Email: pocc@mpa.gov.sg+65-6226-5539
65-6325-2493+65-6227-9971+65-6224-5776+94-11-244 5368

+94-11-244 9718

+66-2475-4532+66-2475-4577

Sri Lanka (ReCAAP Focal Point)

Northern Region604-9669800

604-9660542

Southern Region607-2199400

607-2236101

Eastern Region609-5717300

609-5733569

Sri Lanka Navy Operations Room /MRCC (Colombo)
Email: nhqdno@navy.lk
nhqdno@yahoo.com

Sabah Region608-838 5000
608-8524600

608-838 4161

Thailand (ReCAAP Focal Point)

Sarawak Region608-2432553
608-2432544

608-2432502

Royal Thai Navy
Maritime Information Sharing Centre (MISC)
Email: miscdutyofficer@misc.go.th

45 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 46

Point of Contact

Country & Agency In Charge

Phone NoFax Number

ANNEX EPIRACY ATTACK REPORT

United Kingdom (ReCAAP Focal Point)
National Maritime Information Centre
Operations Centre
Email: nmic-group@mod.uk+44 2392-211951+44 2392-212024
Please indicate“FAO NMIC – Aleg” if send via fax

ATTACK REPORT SHIP PARTICULARS/DETAILS

United States (ReCAAP Focal Point)
USCG Rescue Coordination Center Alameda(RCCAlameda)
Email: rccalameda@uscg.mil+1-510-437-3701

General Details

Vietnam (ReCAAP Focal Point)
Vietnam Coast Guard
Email: vietnamcoastguard@gmail.com
vietnamfocalpoint@yahoo.com.vn+84-4-3355-4378+84-4-3355-4378

Information Fusion Centre (IFC)
Information Fusion Centre (IFC)
Email: ifc_do@defence.gov.sg

65-6594-5728(During officehours)+65-9626-8965(After officehours)+65-6594-5734+603 2031 0014

+603 2078 5769

International Maritime Bureau (IMB)IMB Piracy Reporting Centre
24 Hrs Anti Piracy Helpline
General Email: imbkl@icc-ccs.org
Piracy Email: Piracy@icc-ccs.org(Please refer to the ReCAAP ISC Mobile App for the updated contact details of the ReCAAP
Focal Points and Contact Point.)
ReCAAP Focal Points

Following any attack or sighting of suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed
report of the event is sent to IMB, ReCAAP and/or IFC via e-mail or fax. The
appropriate and relevant information from an incident will be used to support
INTERPOL and regional law enforcement investigations.

Other Agencies

Correct as at 16 February 2016

47 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

01

Ship Name

02

IMO No03

Type of Ship

04

Flag

05

Gross Tonnage

06

Date and Time07

Latitude / Longtitude

08

Name of the area

09

While sailing, at anchor or at berth?

10

Method of attack

11

Description / Number of suspect craft

12

Number and brief description of pirates/robbers

13

What kind of weapons did the pirates/robbers carry?

14

Any other information (e.g., language spoken)

15

Injuries to crew and passengers

16

Damage to ship (Which part of the ship was attacked?)

17

Brief details of stolen property/cargo

18

Action taken by the master and crew

19

Was incident reported to the coastal authority and to whom?

20

Reporting State or international organisation

21

Action taken by the coastal State

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 48

ANNEX F

WORKING GROUPReCAAP ISC
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is the first regional government-togovernment agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy
and armed robbery in Asia. It was finalized on 11 November 2004 and enteredinto force on 4 September 2006. To date, 20 States have become Contracting
Parties to ReCAAP.
The 20 Contracting Parties to ReCAAP are Australia, the People’s Republicof Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s
Republic of China, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of India, Japan, theRepublic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Republic of theUnion of Myanmar, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway,
the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand, the United Kingdom,
the Unites States of America and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.
The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) was established underthe Agreement, and was officially launched in Singapore on 29 November 2006.
The roles of the ReCAAP ISC are to:• serve as a platform for information exchange with the ReCAAP
Focal Points via the Information Network System (IFN); facilitatecommunications and information exchange among participating
governments to improve incident response by member countries;
analyse and provide accurate statistics of the piracy and armed robbery
incidents to foster better understanding of the situation in Asia;• facilitate capacity building efforts that help improve the capability ofmember countries in combating piracy and armed robbery in the region;and• cooperate with organizations and like-minded parties on joint exercises,
information sharing, capacity building programme, or other forms ofcooperation, as appropriate, and agreed upon among the Contracting
Parties.
The ReCAAP ISC facilitates exchange of information among the ReCAAP
Focal Points through a secure web-based Information Network System (IFN).
49 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Through this network, the ReCAAP Focal Points are linked to each other aswell as the ReCAAP ISC on a 24/7 basis, and are able to facilitate appropriate
responses to incident. The agency receiving the incident report will manage theincident in accordance with its national policies and response procedures, andprovide assistance to the victim ship where possible. The agency will in turn,inform their ReCAAP Focal Point which will submit an incident report to the
ReCAAP ISC and its neighbouring Focal Points.
www.recaap.org
IFC
The Information Fusion Centre or IFC is a 24/7 regional Maritime Security(MARSEC) information-sharing centre. It was inaugurated on 27 Apr 2009 andaims to facilitate information-sharing and collaboration between partners toenhance maritime security. Through the speedy sharing of information, we
facilitate timely responses with our partner countries on maritime incidents.
We also aim to achieve early warning of maritime security threats by building acommon maritime situation picture and acting as a maritime information hub
for the region.
The IFC is manned by an integrated team of International Liaison Officers(ILO) from various navies/coastguards, and RSN personnel. We have wideand extensive linkages with more than 65 agencies in 35 countries. The ILOs
serve as the conduit to their respective countries’ various agencies’ operation
centres in facilitating the seamless sharing of information between their parent
agencies and the IFC.
The IFC works with the shipping community to enhance maritime security
through regular activities such as the Shared Awareness Meeting (SAM) and
Tiger Team Visits (TTV) to companies. The Voluntary Community Reporting(VCR) is one of the initiatives by IFC to engage the shipping community throughinformation sharing and reporting. In return, IFC shares shipping advisories tothe VCR members through its weekly reports, monthly maps and SMS alerts
warning mariners about the situation at sea. The IFC also conducts capacitybuilding activities on international information-sharing exercises and MARSEC
workshops such as the biennial Maritime Information Sharing Exercise(MARISX) and the annual Regional Maritime Security Practitioner Programme(RMPP). The IFC also hosts maritime information sharing portals such as theASEAN Information Sharing Portal and the Regional Maritime Informationexchange (ReMIX), which facilitates information sharing among ASEAN navies
and Western Pacific Naval Symposium members.
www.infofusioncentre.gov.sg
Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 50

RSIS
The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in
January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological
University. Known earlier as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies when
it was established in July 1996, RSIS’ mission is to be a leading research andgraduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia
Pacific.

ReCAAP FOCAL POINTS / CONTACT POINT
ReCAAP Contracting Parties

Designated Agencies as Focal Points

Australia

Maritime Border Command (MBC)

Bangladesh

Department of Shipping

BruneiNational Maritime Coordination Centre

Cambodia

Merchant Marine Department

RSIS offers a challenging graduate education in international affairs through its
five Masters programmes, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers
and practitioners. A small but select PhD programme caters to advanced
students who are supervised by faculty members with matching interests.

China

China Maritime Search and Rescue Centre (Beijing)
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (Hong Kong)

Denmark

Danish Maritime Authority (DMA)

India

Indian Coast Guard (ICG)

Research takes place within RSIS’ five components: the Institute of Defence
and Strategic Studies (IDSS, 1996), the International Centre for Political
Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2004), the Centre of Excellence for
National Security (CENS, 2006), the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies(Centre for NTS Studies, 2008); and the Centre for Multilateralism Studies(CMS, 2011). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security andstability of the Asia Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and othercountries in the region.

Japan

Japan Coast Guard (JCG)

Republic of Korea

Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries

Laos

Ministry of Public Security

Myanmar

Myanmar Navy

Netherlands

Netherlands Coastguard

NorwayNorwegian Maritime Authority

Philippines

Philippines Coast Guard (PCG)

Collaboration with other professional schools of international affairs to form a
global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS maintains links with otherlike-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as wellas adopt the best practices of successful schools.
www.rsis.edu.sg

Singapore

Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA)

Sri Lank

Sri Lanka Navy

ThailandRoyal Thai Navy (RTN)

United Kingdom

National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC)

United States

US Coast Guard

VietnamVietnam Coast Guard (VCG)

51 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 52

ASF
The Asian Shipowners’ Forum (ASF) was founded in April 1992. There areeight members of the ASF, being the shipowner associations of Australia,
China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Chinese Taipei and the Federationof ASEAN Shipowners’ Associations (FASA), consisting of Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The ASF
membership is estimated to control about 50% of the world merchant fleet.
There are five standing committees of the ASF. These are the Seafarers
Committee (SC), Shipping Economics Review Committee (SERC), Ship Insurance& Liability Committee (SILC), Safe Navigation & Environment Committee (SNEC)
and Ship Recycling committee (SRC).
In view of the growing importance of the ASF, a secretariat office was openedin Singapore in November 2007. The ASF office acts as a channel to convey
Asian Shipowners’ voices to the international shipping community as well as toenhance and strengthen the ASF’s stature. At the same time, it is also a platform
for all ASF members to liaise with one another and to help promote cooperation,amity and friendship amongst its members.
www.asianshipowners.org
FASA
The Federation of ASEAN Shipowners’ Associations (FASA), a voluntary tradeorganisation, comprises the national shipowners’ associations from eight
ASEAN countries, namely Brunei,, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The members are strongly motivated by acommon desire for closer co-operation in order to increase the role of ASEAN
shipping in the carriage of the region’s cargoes as well as contribute to thedevelopment of intra-ASEAN trade. They also recognise the important need toadopt a common stand on regional and international shipping matters and thedevelopment of international trade.
FASA was approved as an ASEAN Non-Governmental Organisation at the 5th
Meeting of the 14th ASEAN Standing Committee which was held in Manila on
21 May 1981.
www.fasa.org.sg

53 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

INTERTANKOInternational Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) has
been the voice of independent tanker owners since 1970, ensuring that the oilthat keeps the world turning is shipped safely, responsibly and competitively.
INTERTANKO is a forum where the industry meets, policies are discussed
and statements are created. It is a valuable source of first-hand information,
opinions and guidance.
INTERTANKO contributes authoritatively and proactively at international,
national, regional and local levels on behalf of the tanker community.
INTERTANKO stands for safe transport, cleaner seas and free competition.
www.intertanko.com
OCIMF
Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) is a voluntary associationof oil companies having an interest in the shipment and terminalling of crude
oil and oil products. Our mission is to be the foremost authority on the safe andenvironmentally responsible operation of oil tankers, terminals and offshore
support ships, promoting continuous improvement in standards of design andoperation.
www.ocimf.org
SSA
The Singapore Shipping Association (SSA) represents a wide spectrum ofshipping companies and other businesses allied to the shipping industry. It isa national trade association formed in 1985 to serve and promote the interestsof its members and to enhance the competitiveness of Singapore as an
International Maritime Centre.
To achieve its objectives, the SSA plays an active role in promoting theinterests of shipping in Singapore and internationally, and co-operates withother regional and international shipping organisations to protect the marine
environment and promote freedom and safety at sea.
Currently SSA represents some 470 member companies; comprising
shipowners and operators, ship managers, ship agents and other ancillarycompanies such as shipbrokers, classification societies, marine insurers,
bunker suppliers, maritime lawyers, and shipping bankers amongst others.
www.ssa.org.sg
Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 54

SUPPORTING ORGANISATIONS:INTERPOL
INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police organization, with 190
member countries. Created in 1923, it facilitates cross-border police cooperation, and supports and assists all organizations, authorities and services
whose mission is to prevent or combat international crime. INTERPOL’s
Maritime Security Unit (MTS) was set up in January 2010 to co-ordinate theOrganization’s international response to the maritime piracy threat in its
various facets by:•

Improving the global collection, preservation, analysis and disseminationof piracy-related evidence and intelligence in aid of criminal
investigations and prosecutions by its member countries; and• Developing police and judicial investigative and prosecution capabilities
in Eastern Africa in partnership with key international actors anddonors.
www.interpol.int
MMEA
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) is the sole maritime law
enforcement agency in Malaysia established under the the enactment of the
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004 (Act 633) by the
Malaysian Parliament in May 2004. The roles & functions of MMEA includes
enforce law & order under any federal law in the Malaysian Maritime Zone;
conduct & coordinate maritime search & rescue; prevent & suppress thecommission of an offence; lend assistance in any criminal matters on request
by a foreign state (mutual assistance act 2002); carry out air & coastal
surveillance; provide platform services to any relevant agency; to ensure
maritime security and safety; control and prevention of maritime pollution in
the sea; prevent and suppress piracy and illicit trafficking of narcotic drug on
the high sea. During period of emergency MMEA will be placed under thecontrol of the Malaysian Armed Forces.
www.mmea.gov.mydemand more seafarers, the Association appealed to Marine Department for
conducting more marine modular courses and relevant examinations to train
and establish more capable local seafarers. In 1981, the Association rename
to “Sibu Coastal Shipowner Association” and continue to serve the shipping
community in Sibu.
Over the past 35 years, the Association has continuously organized dialog,
seminar and training. In year 2014, we celebrated 35th Anniversary and publish
the 2nd commemorative magazine. We will continue to voice out the needsof members, such as ship registration, ship survey, fuel subsidies, insurance
privileges and also assist with any problems from shipping community. The
association acts as bridge between shipowner and government to co-ordinate,develop and promote shipping and marine services.
Due to the over whelming respond from Shipowners in Sabah and Sarawak, theAssociation is renamed to “Sarawak and Sabah Shipowner Association” in 6th
May 2010. Currently, we have more than 130 registered members and there are
more than 2,500 ships under members’ fleet.
In order to allow member to gain more knowledge and assess into latest
maritime news, we established a website launching in 2011 and we started
to accept associate member such as maritime-related companies, schools,
individuals and association to join us as associate member. In the future, we
hope to work hand in hand with Shipowners and continue our service to theshipping community.
www.sssa.org.my

SSSA
90% of the transportation for East and West Malaysia depending on Sea
transport. In order to gather and unite all the Shipowner in Sibu, “Sarawak
United Coastal Shipowner Association” was established in 6th May 1979 forthese purposes. The demand of shipping in Sarawak continues increase and
55 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 56

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AIS
CSO
IMB
IMO
ISPS
MRCC
NUC
PCASP
PMSCs
SBM
SOMS
SSA
SSAS
SSO
SSP
STS
TaB Guide
UNCLOS
VCR
VRA
VTIS

NOTE
NOTE

Automatic Identification System
Company Security Officer
International Maritime Bureau
International Maritime Organization
International Ship and Port Facility Security
Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
Not Under Command
Private Contracted Armed Security Personnel
Private Maritime Security Contractors
Single Buoy Mooring
Straits of Malacca and Singapore
Ship Security Assessment
Ship Security Alert System
Ship Security Officer
Ship Security Plan
Ship to Ship
Tugs and Barges Guide
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
Voluntary Community Reporting
Voluntary Reporting Area
Vessel Traffic Information System

57 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 58

NOTE

59 Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia

NOTE

Regional guide to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia 60

Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robberyagainst Ships in Asia
21 Media Circle, #05-04, Singapore 138562
T +65 6376 3091 | F +65 6376 3066 | E info@recaap.org | W www.recaap.org