Accident 1: Navigating in stormy weather
Accident 2: Activation of over-speed protection device for diesel generator
Accident 3: Loss of control power source DC24V
Accident 4: Cooling fan control circuit failure
Accident 5: During port entry standby, crewmembers set the start switch forstandby diesel generators from “automatic” to “manual” to clean
the lubricating oil strainers of the diesel generators. After a while,
one of two diesel generators in operation stopped suddenly due
to an oil leakage from its load management governor. As a result,the automatic power backup sequence could not be engaged.
Accident 6: Activation of ACB safety protection devices of the diesel
generator during operation
Accident 7: Activation of safety protection device for the boiler and stopping
the main engine suddenly due to sensor failure
Accident 8: After switching the valve to the middle position to receive
marine diesel oil and heavy fuel oil, this caused heavy fuel oil ofhigher hydraulic head pressure to flow into the marine diesel oiltank. As a result, this caused the diesel generators (supplied by
the marine diesel oil tank) to stop.

For more details, please refer to “Reference Material 05: Details of The investigation reports of the Japan Transport Safety Board; cases of loss of power” (Page
119).

39

3-3 Response to be taken by a ship in theevent of an emergency
3-3-1 Diesel Engine Plant System
Before going on to talk about how a ship should respond in the case of an emergency,
we will first look at the layout of the engine room’s machinery and how each piece ofequipment is related. The purpose of each piece of machinery in the engine room is asfollows. Below is a Diesel Engine Plant System. Please see Figure 3-7.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Main engine & shaft system: Generating propulsion
Generator: Generating electric power
Boiler: Generating the heating source mainly for fuel oil or cargo
Emergency generator: Generating emergency electric power supply to theminimum critically important backup machinery when the generators cannot
supply electric power.
(5) Emergency battery: Supplying power to the control system and some lighting
when power cannot be supplied from an emergency generator.
Emergency DC 24V Battery(Control System Power Source & Emergency Lighting)EG
Fuel Oil Tank

EG Start
EG
Start Air HydraulicReservoir System

EG Start
Battery

Emergency
Generator:(EG)

Emergency
Switchboard

Heavy Fuel Oil
Service Tank

Main
Switchboard

Alternator

DieselGenerator

Alternator

BoilerEGE

Main Air
Reservoir

M/E
Remote Control
DeviceSPD

Main Engine(M/E)
CW Pump

LO Pump

HFO Pump

LO Sump Tank

40

Figure 3-7 Machinery layout in engine room (Diesel engine plant system)

Turbo
ChargerFuel OilIntake Air/
Scavenging Air

Stored energy for
Starting Prime Mover
・Starting Air
・Battery・Hydraulic Power etc.

Main Generator/
Emergency Generator

Power source
for Control System
Main Generator /Emergency Generator
Power Supply Device

Lubricating
Oil
Diesel Main Engine

Cooling
Water

・Air Circuit Breaker (ACB)・Switchboard
・Power Management System

Diesel Main Engine

Broken lines show the main engine system.

・Remote Control Device
・Speed Control Device

Solid lines show generator and emergency generator system.
Figure 3-8

Basic configuration diagram of diesel engine system

Assuming that fuel oil supplies, lubricating oil, cooling water, intake air/scavenging
air, a control device, a power supply device, or a power source for a control system is
disrupted, in such a case, a diesel engine such as the main engine, diesel generators,
and an emergency generator cannot operate in good order as designed. As a result, lossof propulsion or loss of power will take place. Figure 3-8 shows a basic configuration
diagram of a diesel engine system.

3-3-2 Analysis of loss of propulsion
It is necessary to analyze and understand the causes behind a loss of propulsion inorder to consider an appropriate response. Figure 3-9 is a diagram that breaks down the
problems into elements and shows us a causal relationship among the main causes, theirfactors, and their elements in a step by step format. This style of visual representation is
known as the Fishbone analysis.

41

Main Engine Failure

Engine System

・Main engine failure whilst
using shaft generator
・Fuel problems
・Human error

・Failure of electric
control devices

・Failure of Mechanical system
Loss of Power(Blackout)

・Failure ofControl Devices

Electric Power
System・Other causes
・Failure of Automation system

・Inadequate care of fuel oil changeover procedurewhen entering or leaving SOx Emission Control Area
・Contamination or poor quality of Fuel Oil・Failure to engage compressed air
・,QVXIĺFLHQWRULQHIIHFWLYHPDLQWHQDQFHRIFRQWUROV\VWHPV(electronic and pneumatic)・Loss of control air pressure
・Loss of Lubricating Oil

Loss ofPropulsion
・Failure of Automatic
Voltage Regulators

・Lack of Fuel Oil (starvation)・Contamination or poor
quality of Fuel Oil

・Loss of exciter voltage due
WRIDLOXUHRIGLRGHV UHFWLĺHUV

・Load share problems

Alternator Failure

Electric Power
System・Generator Switchboard
Selector Switch not set to“Auto” start position
・Poor condition of Batteries

Failure of Emergency
Generator

Electric Power
SystemFigure 3-9 Overview of loss of propulsion and power: Fishbone analysis

As can be seen above, engine crewmembers need to manage the fuel oil, lubricating
oil, cooling water, intake air/scavenging air, control devices, power supply devices,
power sources, and so on, in order to maintain main engine propulsion. Furthermore,42

as described in the Japan Transport Safety Board’s investigation reports, we must takeextreme care and understand that the failure of the electric power system deeply aﬀects
the maintenance of propulsion. Therefore, it is recommended that the company and theship review power supply system maintenance planning and an emergency response
procedure to maintain the reliable operation of the main engine.

3-3-3 Emergency response when loss of power occurs(blackout)
Loss of power aﬀects the various operations in the engine room and the entire ship. So,
engine crewmembers need to take this into account and understand & respond with arecovery procedure.
It is necessary to work on an emergency response and recovery operation together withthe cooperation of the entire team on board: not only the engine department alone but
also the deck department, the cargo department, the passenger department, the catering
department, and so on. See Figure 3-10 “ Recovery flowchart for loss of power (Blackout)(Diesel Engine Plant System)”.
In particular, close information sharing is required between the deck department andthe engine department that is directly involved in the ship manoeuvring operation. The
crewmembers need to understand that the procedure will differ depending on eachpower supply pattern, such as (a) successful start of diesel generator, (b) successful startof emergency generator only, and (c) only battery.
Furthermore, it is necessary to take action appropriately in accordance with theprocedures specified in the SMS (Safety Management System).

43

Loss of power(blackout)

Deck Dept.

Take appropriate action to prevent manoeuvringrisk (to ensure safety): Collision/Stranding/Damage to Harbor Facilities and Fishing Facilities

Cargo Dept.

Take appropriate action to protect against cargo damage

Pssenger Dept.

Maintain Passenger Safety

Cater. Dept.

Food Service at an allotted time/manage provisions

Engine Dept.

Recover loss of propulsion and power

Reporting of situation report
to Parties concerned

Both onboard and those externally:・ship management company,
・insurance company,

D/G
Initial Start

E/G
Initial Start

Start machinery “Auto sequence”.
or “Manual sequence” dependingon the situation.

Electriic supply only from ESB.
Start steering gear and Radar.

Change M/E manoeuvring position"W/H->ECR" & M/E manoeuvring
handle "Stop" position.
Start turning "Steam turbine
generators (Other steam driven
devices).

Recover and maintain various
operating orders andconditions step by step.

Set M/E manoeuvring
position "W/H->ECR" &M/E manoeuvring handle"Stop"position.

Set M/E manoeuvring position"W/H->ECR" & M/E manoeuvring
handle "Stop" position.

Start turning "Steam turbine
generators (Other steam
driven machinery).

Start turning "Steam turbine
generators (Other steam
driven devices).

Investigate start fail of DG& troubleshoot the causes.

D/G
Re-start
Feedback Power

Start Auxiliary Machinery
manually.

Battery electric power suppy

Investigate start fail of DG& troubleshoot the causes.

Restart "Firing FO burner" mainboiler and steam it up.
Reset "M/E" control system &Restart M/E.

・authorities,
・salvage, so on

D/G
Re-start<Feedback Power >If possible, supply “Feedback Power”
from ESB to MSB so as to start auxiliarymachinery manually. (Turn off all NFB of
GSP under MSB to avoid “Auto sequence”
start before feedback.)

Investigate start fail of EG& troubleshoot the causes.
E/G Re-start

Secure Boiler

Abbrebiations
M/E: Main Engine D/G: Deisel Generator E/G: Emergency Generator MSB: Main Switch Board
ESB: Emergency Switch Board W/H: Wheel House ECR: Engine Control Room FO: Fuel Oil Dept.: Department
NFB: No Fuse Breaker: Yes ×: No

Figure 3-10 Recovery flowchart for loss of power (Blackout) (Diesel Engine Plant System)

44

Furthermore, it is also important that the crewmembers properly utilize thechecklist, and conﬁrm everything on it using the pointing and calling method toprevent the overlooking of a work procedure. Please refer to “Reference Material
06: Emergency response checklist immediately after loss of propulsion and lossof power” (Page 125).
Please confirm your department’s appropriate response.

1

Recovery work in the Deck department= Control action for voyage risk (collision, stranding, etc.)

The first action of manoeuvring in the wheelhouse isto grasp the circumstances surrounding the ship and to
appropriately take collision avoidance actions. The next
thing the officer on watch needs to do is to issue safety
notifications to surrounding areas by VHF and report thesituation to the Maritime Safety Authority and the company. Furthermore, in the caseof loss of propulsion and loss of power in coastal waters, it is necessary to consider
dropping an emergency anchor as appropriate.

    

          
Photograph 3-11 Chain stopper

45

In particular, there are set precautions that need to be taken regarding emergency
anchoring. Normally, the anchor chain is stopped using the windlass brake. The anchor
must always be securely held by the force of the brake, and a gap between the chain
stopper and the anchor chain must be provided, so that the chain stopper and the anchor
chain do not come into contact, as shown in Photograph 3-11. If the anchor chain slips
and comes into contact with the stopper, the stopper cannot be removed. In case of lossof power, the ship will not be able to operate the windlass and hence be unable to drop
an emergency anchor.
Therefore, the chief oﬃcer and technical superintendent must observe and inspect the
gap as mentioned above as an important item to be confirmed for Chief Oﬃcer’s ondeck rounds and the Superintendent’s ship visit.

2

Recovery work in the Engine department

1) Report to the Master
The Chief Engineer should precisely identify the power supply source at that time fromand distribution destination as shown in Table 3-12 “Recovery procedures for engine
department (Diesel engine plant system)”, and report this so that the Master can get acomplete picture of the current situation, when first reporting the loss of power to theship and the company.
Furthermore, it is easy to clarify and understand the relationship between the power
supply source and the power supply destination using the “Schematic diagram of thepower supply system,” as shown in Figure 3-13 as a supportive aid.

46

Recovery procedures for the engine department(1) Report power supply source and its destination① Diesel generator:
Nautical instruments, communication equipment, lighting, Main engine(high power device), auxiliary machinery (boiler), ﬁre pump, etc.
② Emergency generator:
Nautical instruments, lighting, emergency ﬁre pumps, etc.
③ Battery only:
DC 24V control system power source, radio communication devices, etc.

(2) Recovery work
① Initial response:
Keep calm, check the current situation, share information with Wheel
House.
② Second:
Pay attention to heated steam drain returning to the drain tank.
③ Sequentially:
Work on ﬁxing the causes and restart the engine plant systemsimultaneously.
1) Change the manoeuvring position "W/H->ECR" of the main engine's
remote control system, and set the maneuvering handle to the "Stop"
position.
2) Start turning steam turbine driven machinery such as steam turbine
generators if necessary.
3) Conﬁrm that the emergency generator started and that ACB closed
automatically.
4) Conﬁrm the direct cause.
Check whether each ACB can close in order to restart the generators.
5) Automatically or manually start the standby generator and close its ACB.
Alternatively, restart the generator that was running and re-close ACB.
6) Pay attention to the electric load. Start important auxiliary machinery with
"Auto sequence," or "Manual sequence "depending on the situation.
7) Start up other auxiliary machinery.
8) Restart the main engine and check that each operation is fully functional
step by step.
9) Investigate the root cause and establish preventive countermeasures.

Table 3-12 Recovery procedures for engine department (Diesel engine plant system)47

〈 Schematic diagram of power supply system 〉
#1 DG

#2 DG

#3 DG

#4 DG

G

G

G

G

ACB

ACB

ACB

ACB

MSB 440V

MSB
NC

EG
440V

ACB

GSP

440V/110V

440V/110V

G

GSP

DB

DB
M

M

ESB

M

FP

GSP
Each most important
auxiliary machines

Abbreviations
DG: Diesel Generator
EG: Emergency Generator
ACB: Air Circuit Breaker
MSB: Main Switch Board
ESB: Emergency Switch Board
GSP: Group Starter Panel
DB: Distribution Board
FP: Feeder Panel
NC: Normally Closed (Connected)
M: Motor-driven Auxiliary Machinery
G: Alternator

440V/110V

Each general device

FP

M

BatteryFP

Each most importantdeviceThe most important device and auxiliarymachines that feed from emergency
generators
/LJKWLQJVWHHULQJJHDUHPHUJHQF\ĺUHSXPSQDYLJDWLRQHTXLSPHQW J\URFRPSDVVUDGDUDQGRWKHUV EDWWHU\FKDUJHUVRRQ

Figure 3-13 Schematic diagram of power supply system48

DC 24V system(Control System Power
Source & Emergency Lighting)

Each general device

110V/24V
M

M

Figure 3-14 shows the recovery work cycle. Recovery work in the engine department
consists of repeating the following: “investigating causes in the engine room”,“establishing common understanding and recognition of the situation”, “repairingdamage”, “trialing a test run for restart”, “understanding the stoppage/failure”, and“investigating causes”. If the recovery work is deemed to take a long time, from theperspective of fatigue, the Chief Engineer may need to consider shifting from an all-out
staﬃng arrangement to the mobilization of a split work rotation with a second shift or athird shift and arrange for shore support if necessary.

〈 Recovery work cycle 〉

Establish common understanding
and recognition of the situation
Report progress/ request support

Investigate causes

・Clarify recovery target
・Allot roles

Stoppage / Failure

Recovery damage

Trial test run for restart

Recovery / SuccessFigure 3-14 Recovery work cycle2) Precautions for recovery work
Regarding “②Second” in “(2) Recovery work” shown in Table 3-12, even if the boiler
or pump is stopped due to loss of power, the liquid (steam) may flow downstream (lowpressure) due to its physical properties. Therefore please pay close attention to the water49

level and temperature in the atmospheric drain tank.
Regarding the recovery response pattern, in Figure “3-10 Recovery flowchart for lossof power (Blackout) (Diesel Engine Plant System)”, “blue” represents the successful
start of the diesel generator, “yellow” is the successful start of the emergency generator
only, and “red” is battery only. The recovery procedure differs depending on thecircumstances of each power supply source.
Especially when it takes a considerable amount of time to restart the diesel generator, if
the ship is equipped with a switching system that allows feedback power supply fromthe emergency generator to the main switchboard, the ship may take advantage of it.
However, caution must be exercised when using the feedback power supply, if engine
crewmembers do not have such dry docking experience, they will be unfamiliar withthe operation of switching from the emergency switchboard to the main switchboard
using the feedback power supply, which may lead to an insuﬃcient emergency response.
Therefore, it is recommended that the engine department carry out onboard training of
the feedback power supply system when time permits, along with opportunities suchas any drills necessary for an emergency response and start-up test/load test run of theemergency generator.

3) Elimination of causes
Table 3-15 shows the typical causes behind the failure of an engine system and electrical
power system. Past cases from the current ship and from other similar ships will be
indispensable in investigating any future cause and help build countermeasures. Engine
department crewmembers must utilize such information to promptly establish theabnormality and eliminate causes during the recovery process.

50

Engine System(1) Engine failure① Diesel Generator(a) Fuel issue
・Blocked strainer
・Blocked fuel oil supply systembecause of Vapor Lock(b) Overspeed trip
・Malfunction of speed sensor(c) Trip due to Loss of Lubricating
Oil Pressure
・Blocked strainer
・Malfunction of a Pressure switch(d) Trip due to Overtemperature of
Cooling fresh water
・Malfunction of a Temperature control
valve or a thermocouple sensor② Steam turbine generator(a) Excessive shaft vibration,
movement of shaft position,
High exhaust pressure, Overspeed,
Loss of Lubricating Oil Pressure, etc.

Electric Power System(2) Electrical failure① Air Circuit Breaker(ACB: Circuit breaker between
generator and bus)
・Over current
・Under voltage
・Reverse power trip・Mechanical defect② Switchboard bus
・Voltage: Over or under・Frequency: Over or under③ Control power supply
・Voltage drop・Fuse blown, etc.

Past Cases(3) Check and study "Analysis and Lessons
learned" of past accident cases
encountered.

Table 3-15 Possible loss of power causes

4) Daily operation management as preventive measures
The Chief Engineer needs to encourage crewmembers in the engine department to carryout the management of preventive measures on a daily basis, as shown in Table 3-16, inorder to ensure safe and secure operation management.
In particular, it is recommended that crewmembers satisfy the following minimum
requirements.
① With reference to the countermeasures of cleaning a strainer in Accident 5 shownin Table: Reference 11 “Reference Material 05: The investigation reports of the Japan
Transport Safety Board; cases of loss of power”, crewmembers must never carryout maintenance of equipment on a fuel oil supply pipeline during manoeuvring
standby station.

51

② Engine crewmembers must secure adequate electrical capacity available before
starting large electric motors such as bow thrusters.

This is because the starting current of electric motors may be several times the fullamount of an “on load” current.
Furthermore, regarding engine operation management and emergency generator
management, assuming that the standby generating machinery cannot be started, theengine department must regularly carry out a start-up test/load test run of the standby
diesel generators and emergency generator.

Daily operation management for preventive measures(1) During manoeuvring operation on standby① Engine crewmembers must not carry out cleaning and maintenance ofstrainers or fuel supply systems.
② The watchkeeping engineers must monitor the starting air pressure.
The deck department's bridge team must know the limitations ofstarting air availability and operate the main engine appropriately. (12times for Single screw ships: Class Rule ).
③ Engine crewmembers must switch power supply from shaft generators
to Diesel generators well before entering restricted waters and wellbefore initiating a critical manoeuvring operation. They must follow the
manufacturer's guidelines.
④ The ship must test the astern operation of the main engine prior toboarding of pilot and before approaching berth.
⑤ Engine crewmembers must establish that there is suﬃcient electrical
capacity available before starting up the lateral thrusters, mooringmachinery, or other heavy load equipment. They must pay special
attention to the simultaneous starting of large electric motors that willlead to a large power surge and risk of overload.
⑥ The ship must test the lateral thrusters and mooring machinery well inadvance of entering restricted waters and starting critical manoeuvring
operations.
⑦ The ship runs two (or more) generators in parallel because Engine
crewmembers must ensure suﬃcient power availability even if one ofthem stops or trips.

52

(2) Sharing of power load and related training
All watchkeeping engineers must have training in manually operating load
share, putting generators on board, and taking generators oﬀ board.
(3) Engine operation management① All engineers must be fully familiar with all engine room systems andtheir pipelines.
・They must know how to isolate one cylinder of the main engine when it
fails so that the main engine can at least continue running until repair
has been completed.
・They must know all operation methods of the Main engine plant system.
② Engine crewmembers must know the cause of power loss and takepreventive measures.
・Fuel pressure control valve condition, a clogging strainer, damage tofuel supply piping, a lack of cooling water supply, etc.
③ Engine department must regularly carry out a start-up test/load test
run of the standby diesel generators under the following conditions.
・Weekly start-up test runs: prior to port arrival and narrow channel
entry.
・Load test: supply heavy fuel oil, and regular loads, for 30 minutes.
(4) Planned Maintenance System (PMS)① The ship carries out repair/inspection/maintenance regularly.
(5) Fuel oil management① Engine crewmembers must strictly ensure that the fuel oil viscosity andtemperature control devices work accurately.
② They must drain water regularly from fuel oil tanks because they must
prevent water build-up and carryover in the fuel and lower the risk ofbacterial contamination/microbial infestation.
(6) Emergency response① Engine Department must make manuals/procedures/checklists/work
instructions for emergency responses such as "standby machinery
failing to start".
・Engine Department must regularly conduct "Loss of Propulsion" and"Loss of Power" drills by carrying out simulations of the situations onboard.

53

・Additionally, they need to study and include them in the procedure
for supplying power via the feedback method from the emergency
switchboard to the main switchboard.
(7) Emergency generator management① Engine Crewmembers must disconnect the battery charger from themains when carrying out weekly tests for emergency generator with abattery charger.
② Engine department must also regularly carry out start-up tests/load test
runs on the emergency generator under the following conditions.
・Start-up test run: weekly.
・Load test: supplying on load as close to the maximum capacity as
possible, for 30 minutes.
・The Marine Safety Agency of the UK recommends weekly tests in the
Marine Guidance Note (MGN) 52, 1998.
(8) Others and incident investigations① Properly trained personnel must investigate any loss of propulsion orloss of power and determine the root cause.
② After analysing the incident and specifying the countermeasures, theship must work on them eﬀectively by comprehensively evaluating andprioritizing depending on their level of importance.

Table 3-16 Daily operation management for preventive measures54

3-4 Summary
According to the accident investigation report of the Maritime Safety Authorities, thefollowing points of caution are often introduced because accidents, such as loss of
propulsion and loss of power, have occurred in the world.
(1) What daily operation management of preventive measures are
required onboard?
(2) How effective is the sharing of information and collaboration
among related parties when a recovery operation is to be carriedout together as one team on board, following the occurrence ofan accident?
(3) How should the engine department establish causes, eliminate
them, and work on recovery procedures, taking into account otherdepartments’ work?

While these may be understood in theory, in practice it is difficult for many to take
immediate action appropriately right after a marine casualty has occurred.
Therefore, parties concerned need to prepare measures on a regular basis that deal withboth the soft aspects and hard aspects of engine room management in preparation for
an actual situation. It is recommended that crewmembers properly prepare and repeat
practical training onboard. Please refer to “Reference Material 07: How to prevent
panic” (Page 127).

55

Prepare for Bunker Trouble
Chapter

4(Engine accident due to poor fueloil quality)

When engine troubles occur due to the properties of fuel oil, the causal relationshipbetween the cause and the result becomes a moot point when it comes to claims. The
ship summarizes the facts recognized as phenomena related to troubles in chronologicalorder and prepares a statement of facts. Its purpose is to explain the situation
surrounding the trouble and where the problems lie to relevant parties such as charterers.
Furthermore, the ship also needs to thoroughly collect supporting documentation
simultaneously.
For continued safe operation, it is essential to secure fuel oil of stable quality. However,the ship sometimes faces bunker trouble (engine accidents caused by bunkering fueloil). Therefore, in order to take precautions against bunker trouble, it is also necessary
to reconfirm the preventive measures that engine crew members must adhere to daily
and be well versed in methods for preserving evidence, a must when it comes to bunker
trouble.

4-1 Importance of preserving evidence intime of bunker trouble
In 2018, hundreds of accidents related to severe technical problems and mechanicaldamage on ships due to contaminated fuel oils delivered in the Houston (USA) area andCaribbean ports such as Panama occurred.

56

HFO separator damaged gear due tooverload caused by heavy sludge
HFO separator after one hour of operation: blocked by heavy, hard sludge

Fuel injection pump :the plunger was found completely seized in the barrel

Fuel booster plunger stuck in the barrel

Photograph 4-1 (a) An INTERTANKO Critical Review（An INTERTANKO Critical Review）

HFO separator :completely blocked by heavy, hard sludge

Sludge particles%TDKjKSDQUHRHAKDGD@UXRKTCFD 
VGHBGAKNBJDCSGDjKSDQBNLOKDSDKXPhotograph 4-1 (b) An INTERTANKO Critical Review（An INTERTANKO Critical Review）

57

The statement that the international association of independent tanker owners(INTERTANKO) issued concerning issues that the industry needs to be aware ofincludes Photographs 4-1 (a) and (b).
Typical situations related to engine accidents are as follows.
① The fuel injection pump’s plunger was seized due to chemical contaminants,
which made the main engine and generator inoperable.
② The oil purifier became blocked due to the accumulation of a large amountof sludge, thus becoming inoperable.

When an engine accident occurs on board, engine crewmembers rush to respond to therecovery on site. So evidence of bunker trouble is prone to being misplaced or even lost.
However, it is diﬃcult to establish a causal relationship if there is insuﬃcient evidence
in the subsequent stakeholder dispute. Focusing on the seriousness of the accident, LawOﬃces of Toda & Co. (experts in various shipping cases) proposed the following issues
and countermeasures to legally resolve an engine accident caused by bunkering fuel oil.

1.Issues:① When the ship (shipowner) disputes the claim
caused by poor quality bunkering fuel oil, thebackground of repair/inspection/maintenance,machinery operation, defective design, andso on is also an issue to be disputed. Since itis difficult to establish a causal relationship,
the timing of fuel oil switching, the history ofabnormal occurrence, and the preservation of evidence are extremely important.
② On the other hand, unfortunately, in quite a few cases, engine crewmembers
always give the highest priority to inspection/repair/maintenance work on board,
so they are prone to overlook the following:58a) The poor handling of damaged parts and extracted fuel oil/sludge etc.
b) The disposal of a piece of important evidence in error.
c) To put oﬀ reporting on the facts surrounding bunker trouble until later.
As a result, this only increases the risk of evidence getting misplaced or lost.
③ There have been many cases whereby evidence on board has been misplaced or
lost. (Engine crewmembers are likely to discard sludge and replaced parts during
onboard work.)
When engine crewmembers concentrate on their daily onboard
work, they are prone to forget many record-keeping tasks. As
Pointa countermeasure, if they become accustomed to recording,including date and time, work details, confirmation, and repair/inspection/maintenance, they can safeguard themselves.

2.Countermeasures:① To be able to take appropriate measures (following “3.Guidelines for thepreservation of evidence:”) in the event of an accident, the ship managementcompany must provide regular guidance to engine crewmembers based on theimportance of preserving evidence.
Point

Repeated “training”.

② When there is a problem reported from a ship, the ship management company
must promptly contact the charterer to cooperate with protesting against the fueloil supplier.
Point

Based on the designated response flow, parties perform “Report,
Inform, and Consult”.

59

Photograph 4-2(a) Bunkering work: Sounding tank level

Photograph 4-2(b) Bunkering work: Calculating tank volume60

3.Guidelines for the preservation of evidence:
Table 4-3 shows the steps for countermeasures in order to preserve evidence.
Procedure for preservation of evidence（1）Preservation of evidence to be carried out by ship/ship managementcompany (owner)① Engine crewmembers must precisely recordand retain Tank Sounding Records, the Oil
Record Book, and the Engine Log Book in casethe ship needs to ascertain if/when it started
using suspect bunker oil.
② Engine crewmembers must take photographsof unusual sludge with Date/Time taken, andsecurely retain them.
③ Engine crewmembers must take photographsof damaged parts with Date/Time taken, andsecurely retain them.
④ Engine crewmembers must report in detail on
Engine trouble and the sequence of events that
led to it.
They must also report any trouble and how it
was handled to the ship management company.
This goes especially for HFO.
⑤ The owner/ship management company must
prepare the Crewmembers Statement（This must include succinct details about theprocess leading up to the use of suspectbunker oil, damage status, and how to respondto trouble.)⑥ Engine crewmembers and ship managementcompany must check the accuracy of therecords of the Bunker Delivery Note (BDN)
every time(to especially, check the serial number ofsample bottles and the remarks.
Some supply barges try to avoid taking a
bunker sample at the vesselʼs manifold.)・Remarks must include the following

61

information:
・Where to take samples: from manifold?
・How to take samples: by way of continuous drips?
・How to witness sampling: attend bunker delivery?
※ 1 If there are inaccuracies or a lack of information in the BDN, correct it
and record the remarks into the BDN.
In case the crewmembers fail to correct the records in the BDN, please
immediately prepare the crewmembers statement for future reference.
※ 2 In case of inconsistency between the serial number of the sample bottle
and the record in the BDN, the sample's testing result may not be
trusted or ruled out due to it not being representative. In such a case,collect/keep the materials to prove that it is representative, such as
Landing Pass, Fuel Information Sheet of the bottle, Fuel analysis report,
etc.
⑦ Engine crewmembers are to safely retain the sample bottle after having
taken a sample of bunker.
They must also take/safely retain a sample bottle of suspect bunker oil in
the fuel tank before de-bunkering operation.
（Please pay attention not to take a biased sample when taking thesample.）（2）Preservation of evidence to be carried out by the owner (shipmanagement company) and charterer⑤ The owner/ship management company must
prepare the Crewmembers Statement as anoﬃcial document. (same as above (1) ⑤ )（This must include succinct details about theprocess leading up to the use of suspectbunker oil, damage status, and how to
respond to trouble.)⑧ The owner (ship management company) andcharterer must consider carrying out detailed
testing such as GC-MS analysis as soon as
possible. (CG-MS: Gas ChromatographyMass Spectrometry)(If necessary, they may consider ametallurgical analysis, too.)(a) The detailed testing shall be carried62

out jointly by an independent and neutral laboratory with theattendance of surveyors appointed by multiple parties.
(b) Please arrange a joint survey for the testing.
(c) Before testing, please inform the parties, including Suppliers of thedetailed information.
(Regarding the collection of the damaged parts, sludge, and the debunkered oil, it is desirable to appoint each party's surveyor toattend.)（3）Preservation of evidence to be carried out by the charterer⑨ The owner (ship management company) needs the Charterer's fullcooperation and support to immediately collect information relating to
the Supply chain (Who is the seller of the physical supplier? Who is thereﬁnery?, etc.) of suspect bunker oil.
*3 Since it is diﬃcult for the ship management company（owner) to
pursue the supply chain where the real fuel supplier procured thefuel oil from, we recommend the ship management company（owner)
ask of the Charterer's investigative cooperation to enable early
settlement.
Table 4-3 Procedure for preservation of evidence

4-2 Summary
Fuel oil is supplied from the charterer to the owner (the ship) under the charter party.
Safe navigation will always be guided by mutual trust which must be kept under thepromise of “Quality of Fuel Oil: the fuel oil shall not include that which jeopardizes thesafety of the ship or that which adversely aﬀects the performance of the machinery”,
Regulation 18 of Annex VI of “The International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (IMO MARPOL)”.

63

Example of records related to safety management
and repair/inspection/maintenance（1）Entries in Engine Log Book, and record books, etc.
（2）Maintenance of documents and ﬁles in accordance with the SMS manual（3）Storage of replaced damaged parts as evidence（4）Monitoring records of machinery status related to running hours（5）Records of damaged machinery, operating and running history,
lubricant management history, planned maintenance system (PMS)
documents, and inspection/repair/maintenance records（6）Ship-shore communication records (FAX, e-mail, etc.) about onboard
work management concerns（7）Memorandums of onboard discussions between the ship (Master &Chief Engineer) and the shoreside (person in charge at the company)
Table 4-4

On the other hand, it is difficult for insurance companies to confirm the accident’s
history and details even if insurance companies try to handle the claim unless records
such as the repair/inspection/maintenance shown in Table 4-4 are retained on the ship.
Please understand that the daily onboard work records are always important pieces ofevidence or records.

64Chapter

5 2020 IMO compliant fuel oil

In order to prevent any adverse eﬀects on human health and air pollution caused by ship
exhaust gas, worldwide controls were put in place to reduce the emission of Sulphur
Oxides (SOx) and Particulate Matter (PM) from ships in accordance with Regulation14,
Annex VI of the “International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships(IMO MARPOL)”.
Since January 1st, 2020, sulphur concentrations of any fuel oil used onboard have been
curtailed from 3.50% m/m to the current requirement of 0.50% m/m in open sea areas
outside Emission Control Areas (ECAs).
This chapter explains the precautions that crew members need to be aware of whenhandling low sulphur compliant fuel oil with a 0.5% m/m sulphur limit.

Marine sulphur Emission Control Areas

International Marine Organization Emission Control Areas
European Union Sulfur Directive

Chinese Emission Control Areas

Figure 5-1 Marine sulphur Emission Control Areas

65

*OREDOVXOSKXUFRQWHQWbOLPLWRIVHW
E\0(3& XQGHUUHPLWRI,02 LQ2FWREHU


Jul,2010

Open Sea Area

4.5%

Jan, 2012

Jan,2015

Jan,2020 +6+)2

(Low Sulphur Fuel Oil)

Designated Emission
Control Areas (ECA)
Abbreviations

％ 0*2

％ 8/6)2

HSHFO: High Sulphur Heavy Fuel Oil, MGO: Marine Gas Oil, ULSFO: Ultra-Low Sulphur Fuel Oil

Figure 5-2 Timeline of sulphur emission restrictions, prescribed under Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention(under remit of IMO)

5-1 IMO 2020 compliant fuel oil concerns
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (ClassNK) summarized the concerns
about IMO 2020 compliant fuel oil in its publication the“March 2019, ClassNK Guidance for onboard use ofCompliant Fuel Oil with Sox regulation from 2020”, at its
technical seminar held in June 2019.
This document is an amalgamation of material and guidelines
mainly taken from this seminar, and additional referencematerial taken from a variety of other technical documentsfrom the marine shipping industry.

5-1-1 Production of marine fuel oils
Figure 5-3 shows the manufacturing process at a typical petroleum reﬁnery, and theblending process required to produce marine fuel oils.
Crude oil is heated to 350°C or below and passed through an Atmospheric Distillation

66