Putting Okinawa at the Center
Lonny Carlile
Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus
Course Reader no. #12
2014

Putting Okinawa at the Center

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VOLUME EDITORLONNY CARLILE
University of Hawaii

SERIES EDITORLAURA HEIN
Northwestern University

EDITORIAL BOARD
Mark Caprio
Lonny Carlile
Parks Coble
Sabine Frühstück
Tom Grunfeld
Laura HeinJames Huffman
Jeffrey Kingston
Susan Long
Laura Miller
Mark Ravina
Mark Selden
Stephen Vlastos

Putting Okinawa at the Center

The copyright of all material in this course reader is held by the respective authors, except
where otherwise noted.

The volume editor can be contacted at lonny@hawaii.edu.
.

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Putting Okinawa at the Center

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Putting Okinawa at the Center
Introduction
Gavan McCormack and Satoko Norimatsu

7

Gavan McCormack and Satoko Norimatsu, “Ryukyu/Okinawa, From
Disposal to Resistance,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 10.38.1, September 17,
2012.

Part I: Historical Vignettes
Gregory Smits

18

Gregory Smits, "Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism," The AsiaPacific Journal 37.3.10, September 13, 2010.

Tze M. Loo

36

Tze M. Loo, "Shuri Castle's Other History: Architecture and Empire in
Okinawa," The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol. 41.1.09, October 12, 2009.

ANIYA Masaaki

59

Aniya Masaaki, “The Group Suicides (Coerced Death Groups) of the Battleof Okinawa,” Asia Pacific Journal January 6, 2008.

Matthew R. Augustine

71

Matthew R. Augustine, “Border-Crossers and Resistance to US Military
Rule in the Ryukyus, 1945-1953,” The Asia-Pacific Journal September 23,
2008.

Pedro Iacobelli
Pedro Iacobelli, "The Limits of Sovereigny and Post-War Okinawan
Migrants in Bolivia," The Asia-Pacific Journal 11.34.2, August 26, 2013.

102

Putting Okinawa at the Center

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Part II: Contemporary Okinawan Society and Culture
Steve Rabson

124

Steve Rabson, “Memories of Okinawa: Life and Times in the Greater Osaka
Diaspora” from Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., Islands of Discontent:
Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power (2003).

Patrick Heinrich

151

Patrick Heinrich, “Language Loss and Revitalization in the Ryukyu
Islands,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, November 10, 2005.

SHIMOJI Yoshio

165

Yoshio Shimoji, 'Futenma: Tip of the Iceberg in Okinawa’s Agony,” The
Asia-Pacific Journal 9.43.3, October 24, 2011.

James E. Roberson

173

James E. Roberson, "Songs of War and Peace: Music and Memory in
Okinawa," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 31.3.10, August 2, 2010.

Christopher T. Nelson

196

Christopher T Nelson, "Dances of Memory, Dances of Oblivion: The
Politics of Performance in Contemporary Okinawa," The Asia-Pacific
Journal 11.11.2, March 18, 2013.

Gavan McCormack

216

Gavan McCormack, "Much Ado over Small Islands: The Sino-Japanese
Confrontation over Senkaku/Diaoyu," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 11.21.3,
May 27, 2013.

Recommended Further Reading

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Putting Okinawa at the Center

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Introduction
Most Americans know of Okinawa only as a forward Pacific outpost in the networkof U.S. military bases that span the globe. Surprisingly, the situation is not all that different
for the average Japanese, once we add an image of Okinawa as a ”tropical” resort area filledwith easy-going locals (a Japanese Hawaii, as it were) and a prolific producer of talented
entertainers. Both Americans and Japanese mainlanders are taken aback when confronted
with news reports of uncharacteristically prickly, and at times highly emotional, reactions
by supposedly laid back Okinawans to such seemingly insignificant matters as how theBattle of Okinawa is portrayed in history textbooks, allegations of discrimination andsecond class status, and above all, the presence of the U.S. military bases on the island(ergo: that’s where they are and somebody has to host them so get real and do your part for
the greater good!). Japanese mainlanders specifically are mystified by what at times seems
like a sense of entitlement among Okinawans toward mainlanders’ hard-earned tax
contributions that get channeled into Okinawa in the form of extra-generous public works,
construction projects, central government subsidies, and so on that well exceed the normon the mainland. A fundamental reason for these perplexities is that for Americans andmainland Japanese, Okinawa is peripheral and as such the situation of Okinawans and their
distinctive concerns and perspectives are not well understood or taken account of when
decisions are made that affect the vital interests of Okinawans. From the distant vantage
point of most Americans and Japanese mainlanders it is difficult to see clearly the historical,
geopolitical and sociological forces that are at work in Okinawa. As such it is difficult toimagine how differently things might appear from an Okinawan perspective and from there
to conceive of truly just and effective resolutions to issues of mutual concern.
This apparent peripheral status, however, is deceiving. Although Okinawa might
appear peripheral from an American and Japanese (one could also add, Chinese)
perspective, it is in fact quite central from a geostrategic perspective due the fact that it islocated at a point where the boundaries and interests of the great powers of East Asia andthe Pacific intersect. It is precisely for this reason that throughout its history Okinawa has
been regularly buffeted, and periodically overwhelmed, by the actions of the greater
powers that are its neighbors, as the articles in this collection amply demonstrate. It is thiscentrality of Okinawa in the region, in short, that is the root cause of the contestation in theinternational arena, and the reason why minor developments in this seemingly minor
peripheral entity can have such a profound global impact.
With these thoughts in mind, the following collection of essays from Asia-Pacific
Journal: Japan Focus “puts Okinawa at the center” and provides a vehicle through which tobetter understand how the world might look from an Okinawan perspective. The articles
are grouped into three broad sections. First, the introduction provides a bird’s eye
overview of Okinawa’s geography and its history from ancient times to the present. The
next set of articles looks in more detail at specific developments in Ryukyuan/Okinawa
history. The final six articles zero in on specific aspects of contemporary Okinawan society.
It should be noted that most of the articles in the collection went through a substantial
amount of editing in order to enhance the overall coherence of the reader as a whole, toeliminate duplicate content and to keep the collection at a manageable size. As such,Putting Okinawa at the Center
readers who seek a fuller discussion of the topics covered in the articles in the collection
are encouraged to read the originals which are readily accessible on the Japan Focus web
site. Additionally, it should be noted that there is minimal discussion in this course reader
devoted specifically to the military base issue, a subject on which there is a tremendous
amount of material in Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. This omission was deliberate since
it is anticipated that a course reader devoted to that topic will be compiled in the near
future.

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McCormack and Norimatsu: Ryukyu/ Okinawa

7“Ryukyu/Okinawa, From Disposal to Resistance”
Gavan McCormack and Satoko NORIMATSU
September 17, 2012
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Satoko-NORIMATSU/3828

Introduction
Gavan McCormack and Satoko Norimatsu’s broad survey of Okinawan geography andhistory is intended to provide a frame of reference for contextualizing the articles that
follow. They begin by locating Okinawa in its East Asian geographic context, identifying theclimatic, social and cultural factors that set Okinawa apart from mainland Japan. They
follow with a historical overview, beginning with a discussion of what Okinawans today
remember as the “glory days” of the Ryukyu Kingdom in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, when the monarchy held the island chain together and prospered as acommercial entrepot and trading power. They then discuss the first major historicaltransformation of Okinawa’s political status wrought by the unilateral actions of an
external power, namely the 1609 invasion of the Ryukyu Kingdom by Satsuma, thesouthern-most domain of feudalistic Edo Period Japan (1603-1867). The invasion set thestage for a peculiar dual vassalage arrangement in which the Kingdom maintained its
formal status as an independent tributary state of the Chinese Empire while under the tightbehind-the-scenes control of Satsuma, which benefited from maintaining the fiction that
Okinawa was politically closer to China than to Japan. For MacCormack and Norimatsu, the1609 political structure is the first instance of a recurring, “theatrical” pattern in which astaged outward equality of status very thinly veils a real structure of differential treatment
and subordination. They go on to trace this pattern through its various manifestations in
Okinawa’s subsequent history via a series of shobun (punishment or, alternatively,
disposals): namely, (a) the original Ryukyu disposal of 1872-79, (b) the post-World War II“disposal” that began with the 1945 Battle of Okinawa and culminated in Japan’s ceding
sovereignty over Okinawa to the United States, (c) the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to Japan,and (d) the post-Cold War restructuring of the U.S. bases in Okinawa within the context of aredefined U.S.-Japan Security relationship. They thereby shed light on the sources of
Okinawa’s “difference” from the rest of Japan and its ambiguous status of being
simultaneously incorporated into, but never fully integrated with, mainstream
contemporary Japanese society and culture.
It should be noted that the extensive discussion in McCormack and Norimatsu’s originalarticle of the anti-U.S. base resistance movement were edited out and readers interested inthat topic are strongly urged to read the article in its original form.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

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Ryukyu/Okinawa, From Disposal to Resistance
Gavan McCormack and Satoko Norimatsu
In May 1972, following twenty-seven years of direct American military rule, the Ryukyu
Islands reverted to being a Japanese prefecture under the name “Okinawa.” The year 2012
therefore marks its fortieth anniversary.
These islands have a complex history and every year is punctuated by anniversaries, manywith painful associations. Okinawa today looks back upon a history as an independent
kingdom, enjoying close affiliation with Ming and then Qing dynasty China (1372–1874); asemi-independent kingdom affiliated with both China and Japan but effectively ruled from
Satsuma in southern Japan (1609–1874); a modern Japanese prefecture (1872–1945); a US
military colony, first as conquered territory and from 1952 subject to the determination of
the San Francisco treaty (1945–1972); and then, from 1972 to today, once again as aJapanese prefecture but still occupied by US forces. Before the recent and contemporary
disputes that are at the center of the US-Japan relationship can be understood, somethingof this checkered history as a region alternately in and out of “Japan” has to be recounted.
***(Map by Executive Office of the Governor, Okinawa Prefecture)

Okinawa's chain of islands—around sixty of them inhabited and many more not—stretch
for 1,100 kilometers (683 miles) along the Western Pacific between Japan's Kagoshima

McCormack and Norimatsu: Ryukyu/ Okinawa

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prefecture and Taiwan. The largest and most populated island is about one hundred
kilometers long and between four and twenty-eight kilometers wide, and the islands as awhole are about one-seventh the area of Hawaii. Linked to the Asian continental landmass
until a million or so years ago, the islands have long been separated from it by a gulf
sufficiently deep and dangerous to have allowed the emergence in relative isolation of arich and distinctive human as well as botanical and zoological environment. Today its
people are both “Japanese,” speaking more-or-less standard Japanese and constituting partof the Japanese nation-state, but also “non- Japanese,” whose ancestors a century ago spoke
languages distinct from Japanese, that is, separate languages rather than dialects, and fiveof which, still spoken today, especially on the outlying islands, are recognized by UNESCO
as either “endangered” or “severely endangered.” 1***
The islands enjoy a mild subtropical climate and good rainfall with a rich marine reef
environment. From the fifteenth century a flourishing autonomous state, the Ryukyuan
Kingdom, trading along the China coast and as far south as Vietnam and Siam, formed partof the East Asian tribute world centering on Ming China. Though virtually obliterated fromconventional historical memory, premodern Okinawa was a vigorous, independent
economic, cultural, and political system, flourishing on the frontiers of the early modern
Asia-Pacific. Its music and performing arts and its crafts, including lacquerware, dyed
textiles, and pottery, were widely known and appreciated. However, the island kingdom
that flourished in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was profoundly affected by major
shifts in the global geopolitical balance starting in the late sixteenth century and continuing
into the mid-twentieth century.
***
Both the early and then the mature phases of European maritime expansion, in theseventeenth and nineteenth centuries, opened new routes of commerce, spread new ideas
and technologies, and helped dissolve and reform states. In the seventeenth century, as
European capitalism and nationalism, underpinned by war and its technologies, despoiled
Africa, colonized the Americas, and encroached on Asia, Japan, emerging from a long periodof chronic civil war and failed attempts (in the 1590s) to subject Asia to Japanese rule,
retreated to concentrate on developing its so-called closed country (sakoku) polity. But it
first launched in 1609 one last expansionary thrust: an invasion force of three thousandmusket-bearing samurai to conquer the Ryukyu Kingdom, punishing it for its recalcitrant
attitude toward Hideyoshi's grand continental invasion plan. Within days, the court
submitted and King Sho Nei (1564–1620) and his entourage were carried off toKagoshima.2
The new order that was imposed was more “modern,” rationalized and bureaucratic than
the shamanistic, ritual court world it displaced. It was also often harsh, with basic policy
decided from Kagoshima (capital of the Satsuma domain), 660 kilometers away. The kingand court continued, but the kings were no longer sovereign. Okinawa/Ryukyu became a
Potemkin-like theater state: Okinawans had to hide the fact that they were incorporated
into the Japanese system in order to sustain the tribute relationship to China, thosePutting Okinawa at the Center

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involved in missions to and from China were ordered to hide all things Japanese, and thoseon embassies to Edo (Tokyo) were required to wear distinctive, non-Japanese clothing.
Thus the façade of independence was preserved, a trading window between Japan and
China kept open through Japanese-controlled Ryukyuan tributary missions to China, andthe prestige of the Bakufu heightened by the appearance of a foreign mission pledging
fealty to it. Ryukyu became in effect Japan's colony, its kings tied to the Japanese domain of
Satsuma, and through it to the Edo Japanese state, while maintaining all the appearances ofcontinuing attachment to the Chinese court in Beijing. Dual vassalage characterized thenext several centuries. It meant that Okinawan officials were required to perform theater
designed to conceal the locus and nature of political authority, and Shuri Castle, the site of
the Ryukyu kings, was a carefully constructed stage.
***

Images of Ryukyu Tributary relationship with China.

The curtain did not ring down on this peculiar state till the mid-nineteenth century. For abrief period then, the omens for Ryukyu seemed good. Left more than usual to its own
devices as the crisis in the Japanese Edo order deepened, Ryukyu courts negotiated modern“opening” treaties, as an independent kingdom, with the Americans, French, and Dutch (in1854, 1855, and 1850).3
Visitors were impressed. When the US Navy's Commodore Perry sailed into what was
known as the Loochoos on his Black Ships en route to open Japan in 1853, his scientificadvisers reported on a fertile, friendly, and prosperous state, a “most rich and highly
cultivated rural landscape,” with an agriculture more akin to horticulture, in a “system
which could scarcely be improved” and its villages quite romantic, and more beautiful thanany of like pretensions I have ever seen.” 4However, Ryukyu's ambiguous, dual-sovereignty status was incompatible with the “newworld order” of expansive, rapacious, and militarized modern states and competing
empires. While the island elite debated possible responses to Commodore Perry on his

McCormack and Norimatsu: Ryukyu/ Okinawa

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1853 visit and struggled to explain their island's status as a dual attachment, the governing
elite of the new modern Japanese nation-state in Tokyo adopted a strict modern, legalist
view of the world, in which sovereignty was absolute and indivisible and frontiers had tobe secured. The Japanese flag was first raised over the main island of the Ryukyus in 1872
and in 1873 over the outlying islands of Kume, Ishigaki, Miyako, Iriomote, and Yonaguni.
The Ryukyu court faced an impossible dilemma. The dual fiefdom status quo was
unsustainable however much they clung to it. The Qing court could not come to their aid
with the Chinese “world order” under siege from central Asia to Indochina and Korea andmuch of the country only slowly recovering from the calamity of the Taiping rebellion andcivil war. Beijing viewed Ryukyu as of relatively minor significance, just a “small kingdom
in the sea.”5 The Shuri court, after much agonizing, ended its feeble resistance in 1879.7
Submitting to the “punishment” from Tokyo over its lukewarm response to the new Meiji
state order, in the first of the series of modern shobun or “disposals,” it handed over the
castle and sent the king, Sho Tai (1843–1901), into exile. Its incorporation into the modern
Japanese state is unique in having been accomplished as part of a punishment (shobun),“unilaterally and by force,” thus becoming an “unrecognized colony,” and its subsequent
status within the state was marked by persistent suspicion, discrimination, and forced
assimilation. According to one story, probably apocryphal, as King Sho Tai in 1879
surrendered Shuri Castle to the superior force of the Meiji government, he uttered thewords “Life is precious” (nuchi du takara). These words later came to be understood as acore statement of Okinawan moral value, In the face of oppression, militarism, andcolonialism the Okinawan people struggled to preserve the ideal of the supremacy of life
over death, peace over war, the sanshin (samisen = a banjo-like musical instrument) overthe gun.6
Thus Okinawa was incorporated in a subordinate status within the Japanese state. The newnational government in Tokyo regarded the islands as crucial to state defense rather thanas integral elements of any national community. This was clear from the readiness they
showed, in negotiations with China from 1879, to split the islands into two, ceding thefarthest islands, Miyako and Yaeyama, to China in return for the grant of “most favorednation” trading rights within China itself. China in response, proposed a three-way split,
south to China, north to Japan, with a reinstated Ryukyu Kingdom in the main island. In theend, no agreement was reached.7 China only formally acknowledged Japanese sovereignty
over the Ryukyu Islands under the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, as part of the settlementof the Sino-Japanese War, which also ceded Taiwan to Japan.
***
Belatedly incorporated within the modern Japanese state, Okinawans were pressed tofollow a path of self-negation, casting aside their distinctive language and culture, their“Okinawan-ness,” in order to become “Japanese.” Less than seven decades after being
launched on this process of identity change, in 1945 Okinawa was to be sacrificed in orderto stave off attack on the “mainland” and preserve the emperor system in the cataclysmic
Battle of Okinawa, when more than 120,000 Okinawans, between one-quarter and onethird of the population, died. These months, March to June 1945, marked the islands as
nothing before or since has.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

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From the onset of the Battle of Okinawa in late March 1945, Okinawa and the surrounding(Nansei) islands were severed from Japan by order of the commander of the US PacificFleet, Admiral C. W. Nimitz8. Months later, the thirtieth parallel was defined as the dividing
line. Separated from Japan, when the catastrophe of the war ended, Okinawa wastransformed into the American “Keystone of the Pacific.” The Japanese emperor himself,
Hirohito (1901–1989), gave his blessing to the separation and long-term militaryoccupation. In an arrangement thus blessed at the highest level, mainland Japan became aconstitutional “peace state” and Okinawa a “war state,” both tied symbiotically within the
US Pacific and Asian Cold War empire of bases. In mainland Japan, the US occupation ended
in 1952; in Amami, the most northerly of the major Ryukyu Islands in December of thefollowing year; but in Okinawa itself and its adjacent islands, and in Miyako and Yaeyama
Islands, US occupation lasted until 1972.
***

1832 Ryukyu mission to Edo

Perry's ships in Naha, Ryukyus in 1853

As the islands reverted from direct American military control to Japanese administration,
the curtain rose over a different kind of “theater state.” Nothing on stage was quite what it
seemed. First, the reversion was not so much a “handing back,” as implied by the words,
but actually a “purchase.”9 Second, the “return” was a “nonreturn” since the US militarycontinued to occupy and enjoy free use of much of the most fertile agricultural lands and tocontrol the seas and skies. And third, following this strange transaction in which roles ofbuyer and seller were reversed, Japan adopted as national policy the retention of a

McCormack and Norimatsu: Ryukyu/ Okinawa

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substantial US military presence in Okinawa. To prevent any significant reduction of US
forces ever taking place, it began to pay a sum that steadily increased over the years.

Americans landing in the Battle of Okinawa

Okinawans had sought a reversion that would release them from the parameters of force,
return their most fertile lands, and restore something of their ancient ideal of demilitarized,
peaceful islands. The 1972 terms thus disappointed and angered many. On the actual day of
the reversion ceremony, none of Okinawa's seven recently elected members of the National
Diet attended the Tokyo ceremony, and in Naha far more gathered in Yogi Park to protest
the terms of reversion than attended the official ceremony. For them, May 15 was a day of
humiliation.
The formal documents and instruments of power were therefore as deceptive andmisleading as the Ryukyu expressions of tribute fealty to China and Japan in theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Post-1972 Okinawa performed Japanese sovereignty,
constitutional pacifism, prefectural self-government, and regional autonomy while inreality sovereignty was only partially returned. The US-Japan security treaty continued toserve as Okinawa's key charter, in effect transcending and negating the constitution, and allimportant decisions were reserved to Tokyo and Washington. Despite nominal
incorporation in the constitutional pacifist Japanese state, the American military colony of
Okinawa became the militarized, dual-colonial dependency of Japan and the United States.

Putting Okinawa at the Center14

Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako in Tokyo look on as US Vice President Spiro Agnew presents
Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato with documents returning Okinawa to Japan.

***
Two decades after “reversion,” the Cold War ended. The enemy against whom the basestructure had been directed collapsed, but the base complex remained. The bases did notjust remain, but to the bitter disappointment of Okinawans, both governments insisted they
be reinforced. In the Gulf, Iraq, and Afghan wars, the United States called on Japan to play a
stepped-up military role, and governments in Tokyo did their best to comply, with Okinawa
remaining pivotal. As of 2012, nearly 20 percent of the total area of Okinawa Island is
occupied by US bases. Okinawa prefecture, which is only 0.6 percent of the total area ofJapan, hosts 75 percent of the US military bases in Japan. This means that the density of US
bases in Okinawa is about five hundred times that of the mainland.
Okinawans who aspired to a reversion that would transform their islands from themilitarism of war and occupation to the peace-centered values of the constitution of Japan
found that the role assigned them in the post–Cold War order was to be that of bastion forthe projection of force to maintain a US-dictated order from the Western Pacific to Central
Asia. As after the reversion in 1972 and after the end of the Cold War in 1990, the military
relationship with the United States, not the constitution, was to be Okinawa's key charter.
When mass discontent at these arrangements threatened to boil over, especially following
the rape of a schoolgirl by three US servicemen in 1995, a new round of “reversion” waspromised; but again deception was the keynote. Where “reversion” in 1972 meant
retention (and purchase), so in 1996 it came to mean substitution, modernization, andexpansion of US military bases. Of the dense web of bases across the main island of
Okinawa, the return of none was more urgently sought than that of Futenma Marine Air
Station, which sat uncomfortably in the midst of the bustling city of Ginowan. While the two
governments sought to contain the 1995 crisis by promising Futenma's return, they did soonly by attaching the condition that an alternative facility would first be constructed. They
assumed it would be possible to impose such a solution on the people of Okinawa. As theMcCormack and Norimatsu: Ryukyu/ Okinawa

15

nature of the process was obfuscated by calling it reversion, so its scale too was concealed
by calling the projected new base a “heliport” and by using the expression seiri shukushō(base reduction) to try to convey the impression that overall that was what was happening.
For the most part, clientelism and the Japanese state priority to military ties to the UnitedStates could be ignored by people in mainland Japan because it impinged little on theireveryday lives; but in Okinawa it weighed heavily and was felt intolerable. While protest
elsewhere was scattered and easily contained, in Okinawa it grew steadily.
Today, as in the late sixteenth to early seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, the old orderis again breaking down. The global coalition of US-led, militarized, and alliance- supported
neoliberal states confront uneasily the crumbling of an order that once they believed to beunshakable. For Okinawa, geopolitical and economic flux constitutes threat andopportunity: to be swallowed again into an exploited and manipulated status, or to assert adistinctive role as a historical actor. Alternately “in” and “out” of Japan over four centuries,
and an integral member of the China-centered “tribute world” for a similar period before
that (and partly coinciding with it), Okinawans sense the opportunity encased in thepresent crisis: to formulate a way beyond nation-states and military blocs and toreconstitute itself at the center of the process of evolution of an East Asian or Northeast
Asian community, as a bridge linking Japan, China, Korea, and the Asia-Pacific.
***
Okinawans tend to look back and see the four hundred years of their troubled premodern
and modern history in terms of successive shobun, or “disposals,” by superior, external
forces depriving them of their subjectivity, with militarism their peculiar bane—under
Satsuma from 1609, the modern Japanese state from 1879 to 1945, direct US military rulefrom 1945 to 1972, and nominal Japanese rule after 1972. Though helpless to avoid orresist past disposals, from 1996 the balance shifted. Okinawa gradually has come to play amajor, if rarely acknowledged, role in the regional and global system. It became a state ofresistance.

(Struggle between government survey ship and protesters in canoes, November 2004. Photo by
Toyozato Tomoyuki)

Putting Okinawa at the Center

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In the centuries before 1609, Okinawa's smallness of scale and its relative geographic
isolation from major powers were its strengths. After 1609, in the Westphalian era ofnation-states contesting and prevailing by force, they became its weaknesses. The Japanesenation-state (and its American patron) continue today to see Okinawa's location as crucial
for the defense of “Japan proper” and for the regional and global projection of military force
to advance their interests. Okinawans know from their history that armies do not defend
people and that security in real terms depends on the forging of close, friendly, andcooperative ties with neighbor countries. To attain such security, Okinawa's “warpreparation” functions designed to secure American power throughout the Asia-Pacifichave to be converted into “peace-building” functions. Okinawa's geographical location andmulticultural history suit it well to serve in the future as a peace center, a Sino-Japanesebridge, and an obvious candidate to house some of the core institutions of a Northeast
Asian concert of states, as an Asian Luxemburg or Brussels.

Gavan McCormack is emeritus professor at the Australian National University and author of anumber of studies of modern and contemporary East Asia. He is a graduate of the Universityof Melbourne (law) and University of London (Chinese), with a PhD from University of London
in 1974. He has been a regular visitor to Japan over half a century since 1962 and has been avisiting professor at a number of Japanese universities. His most recent book, Client State:
Japan in the American Embrace (2007), was translated and published in Japanese, Korean,
and Chinese.
Satoko Oka Norimatsu is director of the Peace Philosophy
Centre (www.peacephilosophy.com), based in Vancouver, Canada. She is a graduate of Keio
University (BA in literature, 1990) and the University of British Columbia (MBA, 2001). Afterteaching at UBC Centre for Intercultural Communication, she established her peace education
organization in 2007. She writes, speaks, and teaches on issues such as the US military bases
in Okinawa and the WWII history and memory, and coordinates peace study tours, including
an annual North American and Japanese students' trip to Hiroshima andNagasaki. (Twitter: @PeacePhilosophy; Facebook: Peace Philosophy Centre)
Both authors are coordinators of the Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, which in 2008 wasawarded the Inaugural Ikemiyagi Shui Prize (by the Okinawan daily Ryukyu Shimpō) for the
dissemination of issues surrounding Okinawa to the world.

1 Kunigami, Miyako, Okinawa, Yaeyama, and Yonaguni. Christopher Moseley (ed.), Atlas of

the World's Languages in Danger. 3rd ed. (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2010)
2 The Ryukyu resistance was overwhelmed by superior force, especially forearms. Gregory
Smits, “Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism,” Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus(September 13, 2010), http://japanfocus.org/-Gregory-Smits/3409. After the initialhostilities and surrender, resistance ceased, but one prominent member of the Ryukyu
nobility, Jana Teido (a.k.a. Jana Uekata Rizan) (1549–1611), was summarily executed in
Kagoshima because of his refusal to swear allegiance to the new Satsuma overlord.

McCormack and Norimatsu: Ryukyu/ Okinawa
3 Nishizato Kiko, “Higashi Ajia shi ni okeru Ryukyu shobun,” Keizaishi Kenkyū, no. 13

17(February 2010): 74.
4 J. Morrow, “Observations on the Agriculture, Etc, of Lew Chew,” in Narrative of the
Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the Years
1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M. C. Perry, United States Navy
(Washington: A.O.P. Nicholson, 1856), 15; and D. S. Green, “Report on the Medical
Topography and Agriculture of the Island of Great Lew Chew,” in ibid., 26, 36.
5 Li Hongzhang, quoted in Nishizato, “Higashi Ajia,” 99.
6 Hideaki Uemura, “The Colonial Annexation of Okinawa and the Logic of International
Law: The Formation of an Indigenous People,” Japanese Studies 23, no. 2 (September 2003):
107–124: 122.
7 Nishizato, “Higashi Ajia,” 107–8.
8 “Proclamation No. 1 (The Nimitz Proclamation), 5 April 1945,” Gekkan Okinawa Sha,
Laws and Regulations during the U.S. Administration of Okinawa, 1945–1972 (Naha: Ikemiya
Shōkai, 1983), 38.
9 See Chapters 3 and 4 of Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu, Resistant Islands:
Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States (Lanham and Boulder: Rowman andLittlefield, 2012).

Putting Okinawa at the Center

18

Part I: Historical Vignettes
Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism
Gregory Smits
September 13, 2010
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gregory-Smits/3409
History is, in many ways, a product of the present, meaning that contemporary myths andcircumstances have a way of shaping how we understand the past. As Gregory Smits makes
clear, this is no less true of contemporary Okinawa than it is elsewhere. Both at home andabroad, a widely held image of Okinawa presents it as possessing a timeless “peace culture”
that contrasts with the warrior culture-infused history of mainland Japan. Smits
demonstrates that this is a myth, and that the establishment of the Ryukyu Kingdom (14291879), which united what had previously been separate island kingdoms, involved military
violence. He reviews the evolution of the military aspect of governance of the Ryukyu
Kingdom period. From there, he discusses what he sees as the roots of the pacifism myth,
which he claims began with nineteenth century accounts by Western visitors to Okinawa.
Smits’ debunking of the peace culture myth, in turn, highlights the effects on Okinawan
discourse of the more recent experiences of war and subordination that are discussed insubsequent articles in this collection.

Smits: Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism

19

Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism
Gregory Smits
Introduction
This paper has four interrelated goals. First, I survey the contemporary myth of Okinawan
pacifism. Second, I explain the structure, weapons, and select battles of the Ryukyu
Kingdom’s military forces, mainly to make it clear that the myth of Ryukyuan pacifism isindeed a myth. Next, I discuss the nineteenth and early twentieth-century development of
this myth. Finally, I examine the recent and contemporary situation and draw some brief
conclusions about Okinawa or Ryukyu as an imaginary construct. My basic argument is that
Ryukyu has long functioned as a blank screen upon which to project fantasies and desires.
The Contemporary Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism
Searching the Web using combinations of terms pairing “Okinawa,” or “Ryukyu” withwords such as “peace,” “weapons,” and “rape” reveals a large number of sites, whose topics
include the problem of U.S. military bases, the infamous 1995 rape of a twelve-year-old girl,Okinawan martial arts, other Okinawan arts and crafts, and Okinawan history. The content
of these sites ranges widely in quality, and some include essays by scholars or others
claiming familiarity with some aspect of Okinawan history or culture. Despite diverse
content, what many of these sites have in common is the perpetuation of a romantic mythof Okinawan or Ryukyuan pacifism, typically in the service of a contemporary political
agenda.
Active or passive acceptance of the myth of Ryukyuan pacifism is common even among
historians and other scholars. The usual approach is to juxtapose an alleged pacifistic pastwith a militarized present. For example, Gavan McCormack characterizes the 400-year
period of 1609-2009, in terms of two sets of contradictions, one of which is “between
Okinawan deep-seated peace orientation and the imposed priority to war and subjection
by force.” One way in which this alleged deep-seated orientation toward peace manifested
itself was this:According to one story, probably apocryphal, as King Sho Nei in 1609 chose nonresistance to the superior force of Satsuma, he uttered the words Nuchi du takara.
Whether or not he ever spoke them, these words have come to be understood as astatement of Okinawan value. Sho Nei’s submission did not mean surrender. Facing
physically superior opponents, submission was unavoidable, but conscience andvalue were not to be appropriated by force.1
The ascription of this utterance, meaning “Life is a treasure,” to Shō Nei (r. 1587-1620) is
but one item in a rich apocryphal lore that has developed about certain events in Okinawan
history. McCormack, like many other writers, suggests that peacefulness is an engrained
characteristic of Okinawa, now or in centuries past. Let us consider, however, a very
different account of Shō Nei’s surrender to Satsuma.
In a recent book on the 1609 war between Satsuma and Ryukyu, Stephen Turnbull explainsthat the Satsuma invasion force of 3,000 soldiers (plus 5,000 sailors and laborers)

Putting Okinawa at the Center

20

performed very well, but the fighting was not without problems for the invaders. One
reason was that:. . . only the island of Okinoerabujima surrendered meekly. Resistance on AmamiOshima, Tokunoshima and Okinawa itself was fierce, but it was the Shimazu
superiority in firearms, and their readiness to use both fire and sword in a ruthlessmanner against soldiers and non-combatants alike, that finally decided the matter.2

Map of the Ryukyu Islands and nearby areas.

As for the fall of Shuri castle, organized volleys of gunfire pinned down the Ryukyuan
defenders long enough to permit the attackers to scale the walls of Shuri Castle usingladders. After capturing the ramparts and breaking down the castle gates:
In no time at all the vanguard of the Shimazu army was standing in the main
courtyard outside the seiden [main palace]. It would appear that throughout theattack, King Shō Nei had courageously remained at his post but, seeing that thecause was hopeless, he surrendered to avoid further bloodshed. His three sanshikanSmits: Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism

21[members of the kingdom’s highest governing body], Jana Teidō, Nago Ryōhō, andUrasoe Chōshi, all of whom had fought bravely at Naha and Shuri, went voluntarily
as hostages . . . .3
When the Satsuma fleet tried to enter Naha Harbor, the Ryukyuan defenders repulsed it.
Had the Ryukyuan military forces been able to perform a similar feat vis-à-vis the overland
attack on Shuri Castle, the king might well have been able to negotiate an end to the war
more favorable to Ryukyu. The key point here is that neither the king, nor his generals, nor
his military forces “chose non-resistance.” They resisted vigorously until the invaders had
fought their way to the king’s front door. Only at that point did the treasure of life become
apparent to the kingdom’s top leadership.
As is well known, approximately one-fifth of the land of contemporary Okinawa consists ofmilitary bases, whose presence is a source of noise, other forms of environmental
degradation, a variety of dangers including sexual assaults by military personnel, and otherproblems. When deployed skillfully, the juxtaposition of a peaceful Ryukyuan past versus amilitarized Okinawan present suggests that, in addition to the obvious problems associatedwith the military bases, their presence violates the very spirit or soul of the peaceful
Okinawan people. Among other functions, such a rhetorical strategy thereby enhances thepoignancy of the image of Okinawans as victims. It is also appealing in a more general way
to Okinawans and others who yearn for a more peaceful world and look to the past forsome indication that a state based on peaceful foundations is possible. Indeed, as we willsee, it was precisely such a yearning on the part of some Europeans in the wake of the
Napoleonic Wars that created the myth of Ryukyuan pacifism.
Given Okinawa’s recent past, it is understandable that many of the island’s residents mightfind comfort in the image of their home as the center of a pacifistic kingdom. Moresubstantially, the legacy of a peaceful Ryukyu Kingdom might contain lessons from which
all of humanity might benefit. McCormack, for example, concludes his survey of Okinawa’s
past four centuries by stating that in “the early 21st century, humanity’s best hope is for arecovery of Okinawa’s Nuchi du takara values. Okinawa’s anti-base and anti environmental
destruction struggles are central to the global struggle for peace and sustainability.”4 There
are problems, however, with this approach. First, it relies on questionable assumptions that
Okinawa’s people are and have been a singular entity in terms of culture and viewpoint andthat conditions obtaining in the rather distant past (the Ryukyu Kingdom ended in 1879)
necessarily apply—or presumably should apply—in the present. Next, it is simply wrong.
The Ryukyu Kingdom was a normal state in that it was based ultimately on coercive
force—as we will see in some detail. Some might wonder whether, even if Ryukyu was nota pacifist state, what is the harm in presenting it as such? My simple answer is that if we areindeed to achieve a recovery of humanity along the lines McCormack suggests, then weneed to be realistic about humanity’s capacity for violence and the inherent roles thatcoercive power has historically played in human societies.
While there are many good arguments for eliminating or reducing the U.S. militarypresence on Okinawa, the rhetorical strategy of invoking contrast with an allegedly
peaceful kingdom of centuries past is not only based on dubious assumptions about thenormative force of history and the social and cultural coherency of “Okinawa” across time,Putting Okinawa at the Center22

but it is simply incorrect. The Ryukyuan state, like all states, relied ultimately on coercive
force—or the threat of it—to maintain order. This coercive force not only unified the islandof Okinawa, but through the conquest of other islands, it created the Ryukyu Kingdom.
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Ryukyu functioned as a small-scale empire. In
consolidating its empire and maintaining it, the Okinawan polity in Shuri sometimes
clashed militarily with southward-expanding polities based in the province of Satsuma. To
the south, pirates often attacked Ryukyuan or Chinese ships engaged in trade or diplomacy,and pirates even attacked the port of Naha on occasion. In short, the Ryukyu kingdom did
not lack police and military forces or occasions to use them.
Military Affairs in the Ryukyu Kingdom
Soon after military force placed Okinawa under one ruler in 1429, the conquest of the other
Ryukyu Islands began. Let us consider the example of Amami-Ōshima and nearby Kikaijima.
In 1450 (1451 in some accounts), six shipwrecked Koreans drifted to Gajashima, a small
island in the Satsunan chain. They reported that the island was half under the control of
Satsuma and half under the control of Okinawa. Later, four of these Koreans were taken to
Sasari at the northern end of Amami-Ōshima. The local Okinawan military commander
there sent the Koreans on to Shuri, where they met with the king and other officials. Fromtheir account, we know that Amami-Ōshima was under Okinawan military control by thattime but that the fight to control Kikaijima was still in progress. Several Korean accounts
point to the 1440s as the time Okinawan forces conquered Amami-Ōshima. On nearby
Kikaijima, residents resisted the Okinawan invaders vigorously, finally causing King ShōToku personally to lead an invasion of the island in 1466.5
The observations of the Koreans in 1450 are significant in several respects. Notice, forexample, that at this time Okinawans controlled half of Gajashima, an island very close toSatsuma. The many islands between Satsuma and Okinawa served as potential objects ofconflict between a northward-expanding Ryukyu Kingdom and the southward-expanding
ambitions of some of the warlords who controlled Satsuma. Gajashima seems to have been
the all-time northernmost limit of Shuri’s military control. The Chikama family, retainers ofthe Hōjō, controlled Satsuma at the turn of the fourteenth century, and they forged a
network of trade routes throughout the northern Ryukyu Islands. In 1493, a force from
Satsuma invaded Amami-Ōshima and clashed with an army under Shuri’s command. In a
bloody battle, the Ryukyuans drove off the Satsuma invaders.6 In 1537, King Shō Shin (r.
1477-1527), often credited by modern myth-makers with creating the “peaceful kingdom”
by confiscating and locking up all weapons, led an invasion force of Okinawan soldiers toquell a rebellious Amami-Ōshima. The Kyūyō, an official history, states that Shō Sei
dispatched soldiers to Ōshima in 1538. Some accounts record King Shō Gen as leading aninvasion of Amami-Ōshima in 1571, though there is some debate among historians
regarding the veracity of the 1571 campaign.6 Invasions of Miyako, Yaeyama, and otherislands also took place during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In short, the Ryukyu
Kingdom became a small-scale empire, created, expanded, and sustained by the use of
military force.
From the Koreans who drifted to Gajashima in 1450 we know that Ryukyuan firearms(hand cannon) at this time were of advanced design, “similar to those of our own country.”Smits: Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism

23

The Koreans reported that they studied these weapons with the aid of a royal official
charged with the oversight of firearms. Such firearms almost certainly came from China.
Ming court records include a 1452 decree by the Board of Justice forbidding the practice byresidents of the Fujian coast of conveying military hardware to Ryukyuans in private tradedeals. The inhabitants of coastal areas of Fujian often stockpiled these weapons torepel wakō pirate attacks.7

Other shipwrecked
military affairs in anddetail in a 1462 account.
perimeter of the castle
duty, with a member of
appointed to train andconscripts. The basic unit
man group, several of
When the king ventured
contingent of mounted
him. Within the castle,in five-day rotations
forces and madeOutside of Shuri, a local
stone fortress in each of
Korean account did notthese fortresses, butof them in addition to
A Ming-vintage Chinese artillery piece(bottom) called a futsurōki in Japanese.
Ryukyu was an early adopter of such
weapons during fifteenth century.

Koreans describedaround Shuri castle in
The soldiers guarding theserved yearly tours of
the royal family
oversee each year’s newof the army was a 100whom guarded the castle.
out, a 300-man
soldiers accompanied
about 100 people serving
administered the military
logistical arrangements.
warlord administered a
the nearby districts. The
specify the number ofother sources list sixteen
Shuri.8

Putting Okinawa at the Center

24

This early system of militaryorganization was almost
certainly the direct
predecessor of the hiki systemestablished by Shō Shin, apivotal monarch in Ryukyuan
history. Throughout his long
reign, he strove, withconsiderable success, tostrengthen the power of theking vis-à-vis the hereditarywarlords (aji), to enhance theideological and symbolic
authority of the king, and tobuild a centralized, efficient
military system. It is therefore
ironic that Shō Shin figures
prominently in one strand of
Ruins of an Okinawan stone fortress (J.gusuku, O. gushiku).
the myth of Ryukyuan
pacifism: the story of karate.
Because the king confiscated weapons and forbade their use, the basic story line goes,
Okinawans became adept at fighting with their empty hands or using farm implements as
weapons.9 Modern myth making notwithstanding, Shō Shin pursued two basic strategies
with respect to military affairs. On the one hand, he sought to place all Ryukyuan military
power under direct royal command. On the other, he sought to strengthen Ryukyu’s
military by implementing a more efficient organization and improved infrastructure.
Shō Shin required all local warlords to reside in Shuri, bestowing great social prestige onthem while eliminating their military power. To fill the local power gap thus created, theking implemented the so-called magiri-shima system. “Magiri” were local administrative
districts, and the term “shima” refers to villages within the districts (probably relying on
the metaphor of villages as “islands” within districts). Shō Shin and his successors
appointed non-warlord officials to oversee the districts, and the former warlords involved
themselves with the aristocratic society of the capital and central government politics.
Significantly, references to local military forces in monuments erected between 1522 and1554 used the term “magiri gun” (district forces) instead of aji gun (warlord forces). We do
not know the details of the composition of these forces, but they were all under Shuri’s
direct command by the end of Shō Shin’s reign.10
The hiki system was the core of Shō Shin’s new military organization. Perhaps the easiest
way to grasp the logic of this arrangement is to think of “hiki” rather literally as meaning“to pull together.” Each hiki pulled together various officials and military forces into
networks capable of dealing with emergencies. The hiki combined in one organization bothmilitary and police functions, including guard duty, administration of government, andadministration of trade. Ryukyuan ships were the governing metaphor of the hiki.
The hiki were led by officials with the title sedo (O. shiidu), a variant of sentō, ship’s captain.

Smits: Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism

25

The names of the hiki all ended with –tomi, which was also the suffix for the names of large
ships (like –maru for Japanese vessels). This terminology is indicative of the central
importance of oceanic trade, a royal monopoly, for Ryukyu’s prosperity. Takara Kurayoshi
has characterized the hiki as “overland ships” (chijō no kaisen) and ocean-going vessels as“floating hiki” (umi ni ukanda hiki). Not surprisingly, the hiki also provided shipboard
military forces for Ryukyuan trade vessels, all of which were armed from 1421 onward.
The hiki were grouped into three watches (ban), each of which contained four hiki. It is
likely that the heads of these three watches evolved into the Sanshikan (O. Yoasutabe), thehighest organ of government in Ryukyu from the sixteenth century until the end of the
kingdom.11 In modern military terminology, one might characterize the hiki as rapid
deployment forces.
In conjunction with these networks of rapid deployment forces, Shō Shin sought tostrengthen the underlying infrastructure of the military, a policy continued by his
immediate successors. A famous 1509 monument inscription at Urasoe tells of the king’s
storing weapons there to reduce the need to obtain them from outlying areas. It is thisinscription that is typically cited in connection with claims that Ryukyu became a society
without weapons because of Shō Shin’s policies. The king also walled in the northern faceof Shuri Castle and in 1522 built a road for military use between Shuri and Naha. In 1546,
Shō Sei extended the network of defensive walls around Shuri Castle and constructed
Yarazamori Fortress to defend the entrance into Naha Harbor. Shō Shin also established an
official to oversee artillery deployment and technology.12 As we will see, the combination of
the Yarazamori Fortress and effective cannon served the kingdom very well when an
invasion force from Satsuma attempted to enter Naha Harbor in 1609. It also helped repel
major attacks by pirates in 1556 and 1606.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

26

By the middle of the sixteenth century, Ryukyu’s military had reached its full development,
and Figure 4 illustrates its basic organization. One general point reflected in this diagram isthat Shō Shin designed his military reforms in part to focus the kingdom’s resources on
guarding the central organs of state, namely the port of Naha and Shuri Castle. A network of
fortresses and roads throughout the Shuri-Naha area supported this military organization.
Yarazamori Fortress and Mie Fortress were on opposite sides of the narrow entrance toNaha Harbor. An iron chain boom could be drawn between the two castles to close off theentrance to ships. Large-bore artillery pieces were concentrated in this area as well.

Smits: Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism

27

Iō Fortress, nearby but further into the harbor,
functioned as the main arsenal, distributing
weapons to thehiki soldiers as they assembled attheir defensive positions. Tomi Fortress, deep
inside the harbor, was the command and control
center. The Pearl Road, built explicitly for military
purposes, connected these fortresses to each otherand to Shuri Castle.13

A large-bore artillery piece called a hiya,
which would have been deployed as part ofthe defense of Naha Harbor.

In terms of the size of
Ryukyuan armies, documents
connected with Okinawan
invasions of other Ryukyu
Islands, mobilizations to
defend against pirates, and themobilization to defend against
the Satsuma invasion of 1609
indicate a range of between
1000 and 3000 soldiers, withnaval flotillas ranging in size
from 46 to 100 ships.14 Ryukyu
manufactured some of its own
weapons and acquired othersfrom China and Japan. There isabundant evidence that
Ryukyuans traded in weapons
The location of major defense centers and the Pearl Road
between these places, mostconnecting them. Shō Shin initiated this structure and later kings commonly bringing Japaneseenhanced it.
swords to Ming China, where
they were in great
demand.15 Ryukuans often made adaptations to foreign weapons. For example, many
sword blades came from Japan, but the handles were of Ryukyuan design to facilitate
wielding them with one hand.16 On the eve of the Satsuma invasion, the kingdom’s major
port was well fortified and defended with large-bore artillery pieces (shot with a diameterof 7-9 cm was most common). The hiki in Okinawa were able to muster an army of about
3,000 soldiers on relatively short notice. Ryukyuan swords and bows were of effective
design. Small-bore personal firearms, however, while abundant, were not on a par with

Putting Okinawa at the Center

28

Satsuma’s muskets. Superior muskets, and the concentration of Ryukyuan defense
resources in the port of Naha contributed to the kingdom’s eventual defeat, as did thebattle-hardened quality of the Satsuma invaders.17
Although Ryukyu’s defeat by Satsuma is well known, there are surprisingly few details on
battle statistics. We do know, however, that Satsuma’s attempt to enter Naha Harbor was a
failure. The 3,000 defenders, the two castles, the boom across the harbor, and the
Ryukyuan artillery inflicted damage on the Satsuma forces and caused them to retreat.
Although the Naha port defenses were effective, the overland approaches to Shuri Castle
were not well defended. After a Satsuma force broke through Ryukyuan defenses at Urasoe,
it quickly surrounded Shuri Castle, cutting it off from the vast defense network that
extended around Naha Harbor.18
After 1609, Ryukyu came under Satsuma’s domination. The new political orderundoubtedly resulted in changes to the kingdom’s military affairs, but many details of thisperiod await further research. Overall, however, it is important to stress that post 1609
Ryukyu was not without armed military and police forces. Pirate attacks on Ryukyuan
shipping remained a common problem, and Satsuma occasionally complained that
Ryukyuan sailors did not defend their ships vigorously enough (Satsuma typically put up
most of the capital for Ryukyu’s tribute trade after 1609).19 Ryukyuan ships sailing to China
continued to be armed for their voyages and to need those arms. Seventeenth-century
bureaucratic reforms reduced the status of the hiki but did not eliminate them. One
document points out that in response to the appearance of a foreign ship at Yaeyama in
1640, “soldiers from Satsuma and several hundred Ryukyuan soldiers” were dispatched.20
After 1609, Ryukyu’s tributary relations with China became crucially important for the
kingdom’s political autonomy. Ryukyu’s greatest military challenge, therefore, was toensure that tribute relations and trade took place without incident. Numerous accounts of
Ryukyuan tribute ships battling pirates appear in the Kyūyō, an official history. An entry for
1672 describes Ryukyuan tribute ships surrounded by pirates who attacked with flaming
arrows. After a “bloody battle,” the Ryukyuan ships broke through the ring of pirate boats,at a cost of six sailors killed and twenty-four wounded.21 In another incident during thereign of Shō On (r. 1795-1803), two Ryukyuan ships on their way to China fought a pitchedovernight battle with three pirate ships. The Ryukyuan crew brandished weapons (heiki)and used “a new type of cannon” (ifū no teppō) in their defense, which was ultimately
successful—at least according to the official version of events.22 Apparently, these sameships were attacked again near Fujian, and the Kyūyō explains that the Ryukyuans manned
their battle stations and defended themselves with cannon and pikes. The pirates sent out
smaller boats that surrounded the tribute ships, and the battle took many twists and turns
before the damaged Ryukyuan ships were able to enter Fujian.23
The importance of trade and diplomacy for the kingdom’s prosperity both before and after
1609 required it to maintain naval forces capable of repelling the pirate attacks that wereendemic in the South China seas. Moreover, the post-1609 Ryukyuan state sometimes
wielded coercive force vis-à-vis internal dissenters. For example in 1632, King Shō Hōpunished a number of allegedly derelict officials who oversaw the China trade bybanishment to remote islands. One was even sentenced to death, but Satsuma intervened toSmits: Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism

29

reduce that sentence to banishment.24 Other well-known cases include the execution of
Heshikiya Chōbin, Tomoyose Anjō, and fifteen of their supporters in 1734, following afailed bid to topple Sai On’s (1682-1761) administration, and the severe punishment ofsome prominent residents of Kumemura who protested the 1802 change in how Ryukyuan
students sent to Beijing were selected (the kanshō sōdō). In short, even after 1609, Ryukyu
was a normal country, and this normalcy included, for better or worse, state deployment of
coercive force for political and economic ends.
Origins and Development of the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism
One general point to bear in mind regarding the image of Ryukyu as a pacifist kingdom isthat by the nineteenth century Ryukyuan officials had become extremely adept atmanipulating the kingdom’s image vis-à-vis outsiders. The most important group ofoutsiders was Chinese investiture envoys (sakuhōshi).25 Let us consider the case of viceenvoy Li Dingyuan in 1800. In Shi Ryūkyū ki, Li’s detailed record of his stay in Ryukyu, hedescribed with much enthusiasm the plot of the kumiodori play Kōkō no maki (Tale of filial
piety) and concluded with an exclamation that heaven greatly rewards those who give theirlives for filial piety.26 During the eighteenth century, Ryukyuan officials began the practiceof entertaining Chinese envoys with kumiodori designed to impress upon them the image ofa refined and virtuous kingdom.Kōkō no maki, based on a legend from the time of King
Gihon (r. 1249-1259), features a daughter who offers her life for the good of society andher impoverished mother, only to be saved by miraculous cosmic intervention. She ends up
marrying the king’s son. The play was first shown to Chinese envoys in 1756.
In Li’s case, just before his departure, royal envoys unexpectedly showed up with fans,incense, and other gifts. It was the birthday of his mother in China, but Li had not told
anyone in Ryukyu about it. Ryukyuan officials had done their research well, and Li wasmost impressed by this display of filial consciousness on their part.27 My point inmentioning Li’s experience in Ryukyu is simply to emphasize the skill with which
Ryukyuan officials worked to portray positive images to foreign visitors. In classic
Confucian values, a state governed by virtue would have little or no need for coercive force.
Ryukyuans presented this same general image to European visitors as well as Chinese.
Starting in the early nineteenth century, European ships made their way to Naha withincreasing frequency. These visits produced a variety of reports about the inhabitants of
Okinawa and other Ryukyu Islands, some of which were published and reached an
audience of armchair travelers. The relative obscurity of Ryukyu added to its exotic appeal
in such contexts. According to a summary of these accounts by George H. Kerr, “The visitor
was invariably struck by the absence of arms or incidents of violence, by the unfailingcourtesy and friendliness of all classes, by the intelligence of the gentry, and by the absenceof thievery among the common people.”28 Kerr’s general history of Ryukyu, the only suchwork available in English, quotes these European writings at great length, without any
serious critique of their contents. Because he did not read Japanese, Kerr depended on
assistants to translate or summarize Japanese materials into English. His book, though well
written and intelligent, did not reflect the state of Japanese or Ryukyuan scholarship on
Ryukyu circa the 1950s. The hiki system, for example, a foundational institution inpremodern Ryukyu, receives no mention even though Iha Fuyū had already published anPutting Okinawa at the Center

30

analysis on this topic some two decades earlier. In short, Kerr seems to have had noknowledge of Ryukyuan military affairs and took the nineteenth-century European reports
of a pacifist society at face value. I make these points not to criticize Kerr, who did a superb
job given the limitations of his circumstances. His book, however, has been and continues
to be, a prominent vehicle for perpetuating the myth of Ryukyuan pacifism.
A major development of myth of Ryukyuan pacifism came from the visit to Naha in 1816 of
two British ships, the Lyra and Alceste. The ships were on a mission to survey parts of the
Korean coast and the Ryukyu Islands, and they stayed at Naha from September 15 throughOctober 27. Several members of the crew noted their observations of Okinawa, but Basil
Hall, captain of the Lyra, and John M’Leod, physician on board the Alceste wrote lengthy
accounts that were later published and widely read. These accounts gushed with praiseover the kindness, gentleness, and intelligence of the Okinawans, whose behavior
compared especially well with the alleged boorishness and arrogance of “the Chinese.”
According to Hall and M’Leod, Okinawa was a land of peace and serenity. Its residents bore
no weapons and its people committed no crimes. According to Hall: “We never saw any
punishment inflicted at Loochoo; a tap with a fan, or an angry look, was the severest
chastisement ever resorted to, as far as we could discover.”29 Hall’s account of social orderenforced by fan taps was destined to be repeated many times and remains a potent image
to this day.
It is perfectly likely that Hall’s account is accurate as far as it goes. Why would Hall and theother crew members, whose movements were restricted to a small area, ever have had
occasion to observe police and judicial activities during their short stay? Obviously, Hall
was unaware of the kingdom’s law court, the hirajo or with the Ryukyu’s two detailed law
codes. Likewise, he was unaware of the offenders against these laws, who had beenarrested, tortured, fined, exiled, had their property confiscated, or faced the death
penalty.30 It is hardly surprising that the accounts of Hall and M’Leod describing an idyllic
Oriental land of peace and tranquility, free of the scourges of war, weapons and animosity,
would have appealed to Europeans in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars. Interestingly, Hall
discussed Okinawa with Napoleon himself when the Lyra put in at St. Helena, and reported
in his account that:
Several circumstances . . . respecting the Loo-Choo people surprised even him agood deal; and I had the satisfaction of seeing him more than once completely
perplexed, and unable to account for the phenomena I related. Nothing struck him
so much as their having no arms. “Point d’armes!” he exclaimed; . . . “Mais, sansarmes, comment se bat-on?”
I could only reply, that as far as we had been able to discover, they had never had any war,
but remained in a state of internal and external peace. “No wars!” cried he, with a scornful
and incredulous expression, as if the existence of any people under the sun without wars
was a monstrous anomaly.31
One striking thing about this passage is the implication of superior moral virtue for those
who hold to a belief in Ryukyuan pacifism, in contrast to a rogue Napoleon who scoffed at it.
In any case, given the degree of ignorance of Ryukyu and other parts of East Asia thatprevailed in 1816, it is conceivable that even thoughtful or worldly people might have

Smits: Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism

31

believed Hall’s tale, though Napoleon did not. Certainly many of them would have wanted
to believe in a country without weapons. Similarly, after experiencing the harrowing Battleof Okinawa in 1945 and decades of U.S. occupation thereafter, many contemporary
Okinawans would surely find the idea appealing.
At the end of the nineteenth century Basil Hall Chamberlain, a relative of Captain Hall andnoted authority on Japan, visited Okinawa Prefecture briefly and published a lengthy
analysis in The Geographic Journal. His account vigorously endorsed the myth of Ryukyuan
pacifism. Part of Chamberlain’s account of Ryukyuan history reads:
In some important respects the country really deserved the title bestowed upon it
by a Chinese emperor in 1579, and is still proudly inscribed on the gate of its capitalcity, the title of “The Land of Propriety.” There were no lethal weapons in Luchu, no
feudal factions, few if any crimes of violence. . . . Confucius’ ideal was carried out—agovernment purely civil, at once absolute and patriarchal, resting not on any armed
force, but on the theory that subjects owe unqualified obedience to their rulers . . .32
Here, of course, Chamberlain takes the descriptions of Hall and M’Leod and explains themin terms of classical Confucian values. In Chamberlain’s version, Ryukyu was not only a rareor unique example of a society without war, weapons or aggression, but also a rare or
unique instance of a Confucian paradise.
Later in his account, Chamberlain restates the matter in terms of the prevailing tenets ofracial science. After discussing the physical qualities of Ryukyuans in some detail andcomparing them with the qualities of Japanese, Chamberlain states:
The most prominent race-characteristic of the Luchuans is not a physical, but amoral one. It is their gentleness of spirit, their yielding and submissive disposition,
their hospitality and kindness, their aversion to violence and crime. Every visitor
has come away with the same favourable impression—Captain Broughton, whomthey treated so hospitably on the occasion of his shipwreck in 1797; Captain Basil
Hall, Dr McLeod, Dr, Guillemard—even the missionaries, poor as was their success,and all the Japanese. For myself, I met with nothing but kindness from high and low
alike.33
Today’s advocates of the myth of Ryukyuan pacifism similarly tend to speak of “the”
Okinawans as if they are and were a singular entity. Instead of relying on crude notions ofracial characteristics, of course, the contemporary preference is to rely on a romantic
version of history.
The famous scholar of Ryukyu Iha Fuyū (1876-1947) is the final link between more recent
conveyors of the pacifist myth like Kerr, Lebra, and Ōta and the original nineteenth century
European myth-makers. Iha is a more ambivalent figure in this respect because some of his
writing does acknowledge Ryukyu’s military past. For example, in the 1930s he analyzed
accounts of military affairs in the Omoro sōshi, discussing weapons, defense works, themilitary character of the hiki, and related topics.34 Elsewhere, however, Iha argued that Shō
Shin enforced a policy of pacifism (hisen shugi) by confiscating weapons and prohibiting
their use. He did acknowledge, though, that these moves were also aimed at suppressing
internal rebellions and defending against pirates. As Uezato points out, in part owing to anPutting Okinawa at the Center

32

imprecise conception of key concepts such as “defense” or “pacifism” Iha’s exact stance ishard to discern.35
Conclusion
Among scholars of Ryukyuan history in the early twentieth century, there were explicit
critics of the notion of a pacifist Ryukyu kingdom. Yokoyama Shigeru, for example,
vigorously criticized Basil Hall’s assertion of a land without weapons. Among postwar
scholars, Nakahara Zenchū criticized Iha’s portrayal of a pacifist Shō Shin, arguing that Shō
Shin’s policies were moves intended to strengthen the kingdom’s military capabilities.
Nakahara also argued that it was not the case that the Shimazu confiscated the kingdom’s
weapons after 1609. In recent decades, scholars such as Takara Kurayoshi, Maehira
Fusaaki, Teruya Masayoshi, Tomiyama Kazuyuki, and Uezato Takashi have confirmed andfurther developed the arguments of Yokoyama and Nakahara, shedding much light on thedetails of Ryukyuan military organization, equipment, and tactics.36 Abundant evidence of
the Ryukyu Kingdom’s military and police structures and capabilities is available foranyone who cares to take a close look the academic literature. A glance at the headlines ofthe entries in the Kyūyō should be sufficient to dispel the notion that Ryukyu was a land
without weapons, crime or conflict.
Why, then, does the myth of Ryukyuan pacifism find continue to find such fertile ground on
which to thrive? There is no single or simple answer. Certain habits of thought that assume
enduring qualities among groups of people over time facilitate uncritical extrapolating theprevailing anti-base, anti-military sentiment in Okinawa backward in time. The basic
institutions, issues and events of Ryukyuan history prior to 1879 are not widely known
among non-specialists. This situation means that relatively few people are able or willing tocall the myth into question. More generally a lack of detailed knowledge of Ryukyuan
history enables Ryukyu to function as a blank screen onto which contemporary people canproject desires such as de-militarization. Perhaps the most important contributing factor is
the trauma of Okinawa’s recent past. Although not necessarily accurate across large spansof time, McCormack’s characterization of Okinawa as a place that has suffered theimposition of war and violence upon it by outside forces is surely accurate from 1879 to
the present. A large percentage of Okinawans yearn for a de-militarization of their island,
and it is only natural to project this image onto past ages to provide inspiration and hopefor the future.
If Orientalism is the process of Europeans projecting desires or fantasies onto distant“eastern” lands, then the nineteenth-century version of the myth of Ryukyuan pacifism
might accurately be regarded as a variety of Orientalism, albeit one abetted by Ryukyuan
officials and researchers. Indeed, all parties were involved in conjuring up a Ryukyu thatsuited their purposes. The modern and contemporary manifestations of the myth now
include a substantial number of residents of Okinawa among its proponents. The details of
the Ryukyuan past are sufficiently remote that Ryukyu’s history can be molded to serve
contemporary agendas with relative ease. Obviously, interpreting the past is always acontentious issue, and many aspects of Okinawa and Ryukyuan history remain the subjectof scholarly debate and disagreement. That said, however, the effacing of all forms of
coercive activity on the part of Ryukyuans throughout history goes beyond the usualSmits: Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism

33

boundaries of academic debate. It is a remarkable propaganda accomplishment, one firstseriously attempted by eighteenth-century Ryukyuan officials.
It is understandable, of course, that thoughtful people would be distressed by thepropensity of humans to behave badly. The myth of Ryukyuan pacifism undoubtedlyresonates with a deep and widespread desire among many of us to believe that humannature is potentially good enough that societies free of coercive force are possible, while
also adding poignancy to the narrative of modern Okinawan suffering. This psychologicalmix is powerful enough to anesthetize the critical thinking function that should be part ofany scholarly or journalistic endeavor. I am not convinced, however, that a fairy taleversion of Ryukyuan history has much to offer by way of practical benefits. Insofar as the
U.S. military presence has been a corrosive force in Okinawan society, then the relevant
arguments for eliminating or correcting it should be made in the context of the present andrecent past without recourse to an impossible version of history.
Gregory Smits is an Associate Professor of History at Pennsylvania State University. He is asocial and cultural historian of Japan, whose interests range from the fifteenth through theearly twentieth centuries. A specialist in the history of the Ryukyu Kingdom, he is the author of
Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought and Politics and coeditor with Bettina Gramlich-Oka of Economic Thought in Early-Modern Japan.
This is a revised and expanded version of an article that appeared in the inaugural issue of
The International Journal of Okinawan Studies.

Notes
1 Gavan McCormack, “Okinawa’s Turbulent 400 Years” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 3-3-09,

January 12, 2009.

2 For a thorough account the Ryukyu-Satsuma war, see Stephen Turnbull, The Samurai

Capture a King: Okinawa 1609 (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2009). Despite being written
for non-specialists, this book is based on a close reading of the relevant primarysources.The Ryukyuan military was an early adopter of firearms, possessing them prior to1450. By 1609, however, Ryukyuan firearms, which were of Chinese design, were inferior
to the European-style guns of the invaders.
3 Turnbull, The Samurai Capture a King, p. 45.
4 Ishigami Eiichi, “Ryūkyū no Amami shotō tōchi no ahodankai,” Rekishi hyōron, No. 603(2000), pp. 5-9; and Uezato Takashi, “Ryūkyū no kaki ni tsuite,” Okinawa bunka, vol. 36, no.
91 (2000), p. 76. The Korean source on which these authors rely is the Joseon Wangjo Sillok.
See also Entry #115. Kyūyō kenkyūkai, eds., Kyūyō (Yomikudashi edition) (Kadokawa
shoten, 1974), p. 11.
5 Ishigami, “Amami,” pp. 3-4, 9; and Uezato Takashi, “Ko-Ryūkyū no guntai to sono

rekishiteki tenkai,” Ryūkyū Ajia shakai bunka kenkyūkai kiyō, no. 5 (October, 2002), pp. 113114.

Putting Okinawa at the Center34

6 Uezato,“Guntai,” p. 114 and entry #202 and #227. Kyūyō kenkyūkai, Kyūyō , p. 14.

Regardless of the details, it seems clear that Amami-Ōshima resented Shuri’s control andoften resisted with violence.
7 Uezato, “Ryūkyū no kaki,” pp. 76-78.
8 Uezato, “Guntai,” pp. 108-109.
9 Perhaps the most prominent example of this narrative is Nagamine Shoshin, “Okinawan

Karate and World Peace,” found at many web sites such as this (as of 11-7-2009). Althoughrare, some martial arts writers acknowledge a more realistic interpretation of Shō Shin’s
actions. For example: “Although it is documented that King Shoshin ordered his provincial
lords, or aji, to live near his castle in Shuri, many historians no longer believe that he totally
disarmed his ruling class. Although a famous stone monument, the Momo Urasoe Ran Kan
No Mei, which is inscribed with the highlights of King Shoshin's reign, tells of the King
seizing the aji's swords and how he amassed a supply of weapons in a warehouse near
Shuri castle, some Okinawan historians believe that King Shoshin was actually building anarmory to protect his ports and prepare for any potential invasion by wako, or pirates, notthat he was stripping the Okinawan samurai or the general population of their weaponry”(found here as of 3-21-2006).
10 These events are well documented in any general history of Okinawa. Uezato explains

their significance in the context of military affairs with great clarity. See “Guntai,” pp. 110112.
11 For a detailed analysis of the hiki, see Takara Kurayoshi, Ryūkyū ōkoku nokōzō (Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1987), pp. 103-119. See also Uezato, “Guntai,” p. 112, 118-119.
12 Uezato, “Guntai,” p. 113; and Uezato “Ryūkyū no kaki,” p. 78.
13 Uezato, “Guntai,” pp. 117-119; and Uezato “Ryūkyū no kaki,” pp. 82-87.
14 Uezato, “Guntai,” pp. 120-121; and Uezato, “Ryūkyū no kaki,” p. 84.
15 Uezato, “Guntai,” p. 124; and Uezato, “Ryūkyū no kaki,” pp. 82-83.
16 Uezato, “Guntai,” p. 123.
17 Uezato, “Guntai,” pp. 115-116, 121-124; Uezato, “Ryūkyū no kaki,” pp. 82-88; andTurnbull, The Samurai Capture a King.

18 Uezato, “Guntai,” pp. 115-116; and Uezato, “Ryūkyū no kaki,” pp. 82-88.
19 For example, in 1670 pirates connected with Ming loyalist forces captured a Ryukyuan

ship, and Satsuma criticized the Ryukyuans as “cowards in the extreme.” See, Tomiyama
Kazuyuki, Ryūkyū ōkoku no gaikō to ōken (Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2004), p. 80.
20 Uezato, “Guntai,” pp. 116-117.
21 Entry #464. Kyūyō kenkyūkai, Kyūyō, p. 211.
22 Entry #1465. Kyūyō kenkyūkai, Kyūyō, pp. 439-440.

Smits: Examining the Myth of Ryukyuan Pacifism

35

23 Entry #1487. Kyūyō kenkyūkai, Kyūyō, pp. 445-447.
24 Tomiyama , Ryūkyū ōkoku no gaikō to ōken, pp. 176-7.
25 Satsuma maintained only a small direct presence in Ryukyu precisely because Ryukyu’s

relationship with China was crucial both for Satsuma and Ryukyu. With Satsuma support,
Ryukyu devoted considerable resources to maintaining a good image vis-à-vis Chinese
officials.
26 Li Dingyuan, Shi Ryūkyū ki, Harada Nobuo, trans., ed. (Gensōsha, 1985), pp. 335-337.
27 Li, Shi Ryūkyū ki, pp. 407-408. See also Kakazu Takeshi, “Rikuyu engi: Tei Junsoku ga

fukkokushi fukyuu” Ryūkyū shinpō, 4-24-1993 (#17 in the series Ryūkyū kanshi no tabi).
28 George H. Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an Island People (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle

Company, 1958), pp. 250-251.
29 Kerr, Okinawa, p. 255. For extensive excerpts from the crew members of these two ships,

see pp. 249-260.

30 There are many accounts of Ryukyuan judicial proceedings and law codes. One excellent

source is Okinawa no hankachō, which details criminal cases before the Hirajo in the 1860s
and 70s. One case, for example, involves the investigation into the actions of police officials
who tortured a suspect excessively, thus causing his death. See Higa Shunchō and Sakihama
Shūmei, eds., trans., Okinawa no hankachō (Tōyō bunko 41) (Heibonsha, 1965), pp. 85-94.
See also “Satsuma-han shihaika no saibanken,” Chapter 3 of Tomiyama, Ryūkyū ōkoku nogaikō to ōken, pp. 170-197.
31 Kerr, Okinawa, p. 259.
32 Basil Hall Chamberlain, “The Luchu Islands and Their Inhabitants: I. Introductory

Remarks,” The Geographical Journal, vol. 5, no. 4 (April, 1895), pp. 310-311.
33 Chamberlain, “The Luchu Islands,” pp. 318-319.

34 Iha Fuyū, “Ko-Ryūkyū no bubi o kōsatsushite “karate” no hattatsu ni oyobu.” Hattori

Shirō, Nakasone Masayoshi, Hokama Shuzen, eds., Iha Fuyū zenshū, vol 5 (Heibonsha, 1974),
pp. 196-215 (originally published 1932); and “Ko-Ryūkyū no “hiki seido” ni tsuite—Ryūkyūbunka no ranjukuki ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu,” Zenshū, vol. 9, pp. 279-322 (originallypublished 1935). See also Uezato, “Guntai,” p. 105.
35 Uezato, “Guntai,” p. 105; and Iha Fuyū, “Ko-Ryūkyū no seiji,” Zenshū, Vol. 1, pp. 419-495,

esp. pp. 431-440.

36 For a concise summary of these arguments and a listing of the key essays, see Uezato,“Guntai,” pp. 105-106. In English the most comprehensive work is Turnbull, The Samurai
Capture a King.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

36

Shuri Castle’s Other Histories
Tze M. Loo
October 12, 2009http://www.japanfocus.org/-Tze_M_-Loo/3232
Like Smits’ article, the following piece by Tze M. Loo reveals a “forgotten” aspect of
Okinawan history; in this case the post-1879 history behind what is contemporary
Okinawa’s most iconic architectural structure --the reconstructed Shuri Castle that wascompleted in 1992. Shuri, which is currently the eastern portion of the city of Naha, was thecapital of the Ryukyu Kingdom and Shuri Castle its seat of government. Given thisbackground, it is not surprising that the reconstructed castle, a “must see” item on every
visitor’s checklist, has come to symbolize Okinawa’s past as an “independent” kingdom anda culture distinct from that of the mainland. Most Okinawans know that the castle wasdestroyed during the Battle of Okinawa in 1945 but are unfamiliar with or have “forgotten”
the castle’s convoluted trajectory in the wake of Okinawa’s absorption into Japan in 1879.
As Loo shows, in contrast to its current association with Ryukyuan independence anddistinctiveness, in the years preceding World War II, Shuri Castle was systematicallyincorporated into the Japanese Empire’s hierarchy of national symbols and placed in theservice of Japanese nationalism. In this way, the “other histories” of the castle that Loo
outlines reflect the process of Okinawa’s assimilation into the Japanese Empire from 1879
to 1945 and the ambiguous, liminal status of Okinawa that was its result.

Loo: Shuri Castle’s Other Histories

37

Shuri Castle's Other History: Architecture and Empire in Okinawa
Tze M. Loo
The Ryūkyū Kingdom Festival (Ryūkyū ōchō matsuri), organized and sponsored by the
Shuri Promotion Association (Shuri shinkōkai), is a fixture on Okinawa Prefecture’s culturaland tourist calendar.

2008 Shuri Castle Festival poster

This one-day festival is one part of the larger Shuri Castle Festival (Shurijō sai); together,
they celebrate the grandeur of the Ryūkyū Kingdom and its court traditions as a purecultural past for the prefecture.1 Of pivotal importance to these events is Shuri Castle itself.
Not merely the stage on which festivities unfold, Shuri Castle – with its vermillion
architecture epitomized by its main hall (seiden) and Shurei Gate (Shurei mon), and its high,imposing ishigaki stone walls – is cast as the very heart of Ryūkyūan culture. While thisrepresentation of the castle celebrates local culture, it is difficult to ignore the role it plays
in Japan’s continuing colonization of Okinawa. By suggesting that Ryūkyūan culture not
only exists, but flourishes within the framework of the Japanese nation state, thisrepresentation plays an important part in a narrative that obfuscates the rupture ofPutting Okinawa at the Center

38

Japanese colonization of the Ryūkyū Kingdom and naturalizes Okinawa’s inclusion into themodern Japanese nation state.2
Nowhere is the assimilative nature of cultural valuation more stark than in the Japanesestate’s 1925 designation of Shuri Castle’s main hall as a “national treasure” (kokuhō) ofJapan. This designation is often lauded in the postwar as a sign of the Japanese state’s earlyrecognition of the value of Ryūkyūan culture, but it also deftly transformed a marker of aprior independence into a marker of inclusion. The official text explaining the designation
reads:
This is the main hall of the former Shuri Castle, and it is the Ryūkyū’s mostimportant and largest piece of architecture … The current building was built in the
14th year of Kyōhō (1730) and underwent substantial repairs in the 3rd year of
Kōka (1837). It has a very large, multilayered hip-and-gabled roof, a step canopy(kōhai) in the front [and demonstrates] unique Ryūkyūan form and techniques.
Even though its large pillars and the decorative feature (fun) of the bargeboard(karahafū) resemble Chinese style (kan shiki), the frog-leg strut (kaerumata) anddragon carvings below the step canopy’s bargeboard carries the trace (obi) of thestyle of our Momoyama period [and is] extremely novel artisanship.3
Assimilation is performed in several ways here. First, Shuri Castle’s history is told in termsof Japanese reign names, mapping the castle’s history onto a regime of Japanese
temporality even though the Ryūkyū Kingdom at this time was, for all intents and purposes,
an independent political entity. Second, while the designation recognizes the uniqueness of
Ryūkyūan form and techniques and even acknowledges its resonance with continental
styles, the text – in the final analysis – folds these features into a narrative of Japanesearchitectural history. By discovering in these Ryūkyūan/continental features the “trace” of“our Momoyama” style, the designation skillfully sublimates any Ryūkyūan uniqueness intoa larger, encompassing, and original Japanese cultural universe, diffusing the criticalpotential in these markers of difference.
There was, however, another way in which this designation appropriated and assimilated
Shuri Castle into the Japanese national imaginary. In order for Shuri Castle’s main hall to be
designated a national treasure in 1925, it was converted into the worshipper’s hall of
Okinawa Shrine. This completed the layout for Okinawa Shrine, and Shuri Castle spent theperiod 1925 to 1945 as “Okinawa Shrine,” a functioning node in the ideological universe ofState Shinto, put into the service of the emperor-centered Japanese nation state. Thistransformation occurred in part because Japanese heritage preservation laws until 1932
stipulated that only Shinto shrine and Buddhist temple buildings could be designated“specially protected buildings” to receive state protection and funding as “nationaltreasures.” The problem is that the argument that the castle’s conversion was necessary for
its preservation was privileged, both at the time as well as in our present, such that Shuri
Castle’s tenure as a Shinto shrine is overlooked and its significance downplayed. This
article traces Shuri Castle’s other history, to tell the story of its transformation into
Okinawa Shrine in order to reveal the nakedness of the violence of Japanese colonialism as
it is embedded in Shuri Castle.
The Silence around Okinawa ShrineLoo: Shuri Castle’s Other Histories

39

People have generally expressed surprise when I’ve posed the question, “Did you know that
Shuri Castle used to be Okinawa Shrine?” This is not entirely surprising considering that
histories of the castle – including the castle’s “official history” as it is told at the Shurijō
Castle Park – do not reference its past as Okinawa Shrine. What is curious, however, is thatthe castle’s history as Okinawa Shrine is not exactly the object of a concerted campaign ofsilencing and obfuscation, with references to it readily available in the historical record. For
instance, in prewar official inventories of national treasures compiled by the Home
Ministry (Naimushō) which list all designated buildings and objects, Shuri Castle’s main hall
is listed as “the worshipper’s hall of Okinawa Shrine” (Okinawa jinja haiden).4 In a relatively
recent compilation by the Agency for Cultural Affairs (Bunkachō) of national treasures lost
to war and disaster in the prewar period, the entry for Shuri Castle’s main hall, razed to theground as a result of American bombardment, was similarly listed as the worshipper’s
hall.5 Thus as far as one version of the Japanese state’s official record is concerned, “Shuri
Castle” does not actually exist in the period between 1925 and 1945, replaced instead by“Okinawa Shrine.”
Two different treatments of a photograph in a recent volume about Okinawa demonstrate
what is at stake. The photograph in question dates from the 1920s and shows Yamazaki
Masatada, a medical professor from Kyushu in front of Okinawa Shrine’s main sanctuary(honden).

Yamazaki Masatada in front of Okinawa Shrine's main sanctuary. From Nonomura Takeo, Natsukashiki
Okinawa

In a comment on the photograph, Nonomura Takao writes:
Considering the situation at the time, there was no other method of rescue except
for the main hall to take on the name of Okinawa Shrine’s worshipper’s hall, thereby
receiving financial aid from the state in the form of a repair budget. This was aturnaround for a building that was destined to be demolished, and there was thegreat repair in the early Shōwa period. This ingenious plan (myōan) was thought up

Putting Okinawa at the Center40

by Itō Chūta, and was seen to extraordinary success by Sakatani Ryōnoshin. [Thecastle] was saved as Okinawa Shrine. As the worshipper’s hall attached to the main
sanctuary, Shuri Castle’s main hall sidestepped the big wave of the time.6
While all this is certainly true, this treatment deftly sublimates Shuri Castle’s becoming
Okinawa Shrine into the larger aim of preserving the main hall and effectively dismisses thetransformation of the castle into the shrine as a significant event in its own right. By
privileging a narrative of preservation, the meaning of the Shuri Castle’s transformation
into Okinawa Shrine is strait-jacketed into an argument in which the end (preservation)
justifies the means.
The second treatment of this photo is in an essay discussing the role of old photographs in
the restoration of Ryūkyūan architecture.7 While the author acknowledges that thephotograph is one of the few which exist of the shrine, he notes that the photograph’s value
lies in what it tells us of the area around the main sanctuary. He is interested in theinformation the photograph provides, but ignores the existence of the shrine itself. The
castle’s tenure as a Shinto shrine is present, even acknowledged when it surfaces, and yet
those who come into contact with it seem able to ignore its existence and its implications.
What was the reality of Okinawa Shrine, and what were the conditions of its emergence?
Shuri Castle in the early Meiji period
Until the early 15th century, the Ryūkyū Kingdom was divided into three competing powerblocks, Hokuzan, Chūzan, and Nanzan. In 1429, Shō Hashi completed the unification of the
kingdom and established Chuzan’s hegemony over the other centers. The seat of his power
was Shuri Castle, which remained the kingdom’s political and sacerdotal center until 1879.
Even before unification, the Ryūkyū Kingdom was already part of the Sinocentric worldorder as the lords of Hokuzan, Chūzan, and Nanzan sought political legitimacy and trading
rights from the Ming emperor. Upon achieving unification, Shō Hashi received the Chinese
court’s investiture as the “King of Ryūkyū” and the kingdom’s submission to the Chinese
empire (while maintaining political autonomy) became a dominant factor in Ryūkyūan life.
The tribute relation was not only political, but was also economically profitable andtransformed kingdom into a prosperous linchpin in an “intra-Asia trade system” (Ajia ikinai
kōei ken).8 The kingdom subscribed to Chinese influence in other ways too as Chinese
Confucianism became the dominant framework that governed political, social and ethicallife.9In 1609, Tokugawa Japan’s southernmost fief, Satsuma, invaded the Ryūkyū Kingdom as itsought to appropriate the profits from the kingdom’s lucrative tribute trade. Satsuma could
not impose its rule explicitly because it had to allow the kingdom to maintain an
appearance of independence in order for that trade with China to continue. This resulted in
the period of “dual tribute” – where the Ryūkyū Kingdom paid tribute to both China andJapan – which effectively reduced the kingdom to poverty.10 Despite its “non-explicit”
overlordship, Satsuma’s invasion marked the beginning of Japan’s gradual colonization of
the Ryūkyū Kingdom which culminated the Meiji state’s formal annexation in the 1870s.
The Meiji state began this process in 1872 by unilaterally converting the kingdom into
“Ryūkyū domain” (Ryūkyū han) and making Shō Tai (the last Ryūkyū king) into the “domainking” (han ō). In 1879, in what was termed the Ryūkyū Dispensation (Ryūkyū shobun), Meiji

Loo: Shuri Castle’s Other Histories

41

Japan annexed the Ryūkyū Kingdom, turning it into Japan’s southernmost prefecture,
Okinawa.
The imposition of Japanese colonial rule meant the absorption of the kingdom into Japan’s
administrative structure, a process which entailed the neutralization of the Ryūkyūan kingas a symbol of independence and autonomy. When the Meiji state formally annexed the
kingdom in 1879, it evicted Shō Tai from Shuri Castle and installed him as a member of theJapanese aristocracy in Tokyo. The seat of his power was not exempt from similarly radical
change. Immediately after the annexation, the castle was converted into barracks for the
Kumamoto Garrison (Kumamoto chindai bunkentai heiei), to become what Uemura Hideaki
has called “Ryūkyū/Okinawa’s first foreign military base” in 1876.11 It suffered muchdamage in this conversion as it was a process of displacement which broke existing
meanings and replaced them with new significations in both the physical and symbolic
registers. Maps of Shuri Castle from the 1880s demonstrate the symbolic violence of thisdisplacement in stark terms. The visual force in an 1893 map of the garrison, for instance,
lies in its demonstration of the garrison’s complete takeover and redefinition of the sitewhere even the buildings that were not in use were labeled “empty” (aki) or left shaded in
the stripes as the building under use.12

Map of the Garrison. From Okinawa hontō torishirabe sho (1893)

This conversion of the castle’s space to new uses coincided with its destruction as a palace.
During his visit in 1882, the traveler F.H.H. Guillemard noted that he thought that the main
hall was “a holy of holies” but upon entering,[a] more dismal sight could hardly have been imagined. We wandered through room
after room, through corridors, reception halls, women’s apartments, through theservant’s quarters, through a perfect labyrinth of buildings, which were in such astate of indescribable dilapidation. The place could not have been inhabited foryears. Every article of ornament had been removed; the paintings on the frieze – afavorite decoration with the Japanese and the Liu-kiuans have been torn down, orPutting Okinawa at the Center

42

were invisible from dust and age … In all directions the woodwork had been torn
away for firewood, and an occasional ray of light from above showed that the roof
was in no better condition than the rest of the building. From these damp anddismal memorials of past Liu-kiuan greatness it was a relief to emerge on an open
terrace on the summit of one of the great walls …13
For Guillemard, the castle, along with any greatness of civilization it marked, was a thing of
the past. His observation that “the place could not have been inhabited for years”
establishes the scale of the dilapidation, but also removes Shuri Castle even further fromthe present. The castle’s physical decline was tactile proof that the castle, and by extension,
the Ryūkyū Kingdom itself, belonged to a different time, out of sync with the present of
Meiji Japan. The castle became a double wound on the Okinawan landscape: its dilapidated
presence reminded Okinawans that the Ryūkyū Kingdom was now a thing of the past, andthat the eclipse of past greatness constituted the reality of the present.14
Shuri Castle’s physical decline created the conditions that broke the monopoly of meanings
as a royal palace and opened it to redefinition, demonstrated in the calls for the palace site
to be returned to the prefecture and converted into a site for popular pleasure. With thegarrison’s departure in 1896, Okinawans called for the return of the castle to local civilianuse. In 1899, Shuri ward petitioned the central government that notions of social progresscalled for the development leisure facilities in Shuri Ward for local use and to attract
visitors from other prefectures, but Okinawa Prefecture had not achieved this.15 The
solution, they proposed, lay with the castle site, arguing that it would be regrettable if thecastle site – “the beauty of the Ryūkyū Kingdom for several hundreds of years” – was lost
due to the current policy of abandonment.16 The petition asked the government to give thecastle site and its buildings to Shuri ward without cost. Tokyo denied this request. Shuri
ward tried again a year later, but this time requested the sale of the buildings which theHome Ministry approved but only allowed the use of the land for a thirty-year period.17 In
1909, Shuri ward petitioned the central government for the sale of the land andsucceeded.18 In this way, ownership of Shuri Castle and its land was returned to theprefecture thirty years after Shō Tai’s eviction. Unfortunately the prefecture’s poor finances
prevented any plans from coming to fruition. The castle’s main hall was so dilapidated that
substantial and expensive restoration work would have been necessary simply toguarantee its structural integrity. Before the prefecture could raise the money, plans werealready being made for the castle’s site to be used as the precincts of Okinawa Shrine.
Okinawa Shrine
Okinawa Prefecture first proposed the establishment of a prefectural shrine in April 1910
to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Meiji emperor’s ascension.19 The proposed
shrine would install Minamoto no Tametomo, Shunten, and Shō Tai as its resident deities,
selected because they were important historical figures (san dai ijin) for Okinawa
Prefecture who “made clear” (meiryō naru) Okinawa’s close relationship with mainland
Japan.20 However, the idea was abandoned because of the death of the Meiji emperor in
1912. The motion to establish a prefectural shrine resurfaced in 1914 and 1915, but wasdenied on both occasions. The 1914 proposal, which suggested establishing the prefectural
shrine within the grounds of Naminoue Shrine, was rejected as “impossible,” while theLoo: Shuri Castle’s Other Histories

43

1915 proposal was rejected because the deities the prefecture proposed –Amamiko and Shinireku, both of which were mythical figures in Ryūkyūan folk beliefs –were not recognized as part of the Shinto pantheon. The Home Ministry approved theestablishment of “Okinawa Shrine” in March 31, 1923 for reasons that remain unclear andShuri Castle was chosen as the site because it had been the historical center of Okinawa’s
politics and was intimately connected with the prefecture’s “cultural enlightenment.”21
It is also possible that the Shuri Castle site was selected for financial reasons. The 1915
proposal budgeted 10,000 yen for developing a 3,443 tsubo site (approximately 2.8 acres)in Mawashi-chō, out of which 4,250 yen was slated for roads and other infrastructural
costs.22 The proposed site was close to Shuri Castle, and maps from the period indicate adensely populated area interspersed with relatively large, aristocratic estates. That half thebudget was set aside for infrastructure and other costs suggests that the site was quite
costly to develop.23 By contrast, the Shuri Castle site was largely available, even though partof it was being used by the Shuri First Primary School and Shuri Girls’ Craft School.
Construction began in September 1923, and the shrine’s main sanctuary was constructedbehind the castle’s main hall. Given its poor condition, the decision was made to demolishthe castle’s main hall so that a new worshipper’s hall could be built on its site in order tocomplete the spatial layout of Okinawa Shrine.
It is at this moment on the brink of physical erasure that Shuri Castle’s fortunes turned,
almost entirely by chance. Kamakura Yoshitarō, a teacher who had spent some time in
Okinawa, was visiting with friends in Tokyo one day in early 1924 when he noticed anewspaper article reporting the main hall’s demolition.24 Kamakura recounts that herushed immediately to see Itō Chūta, the eminent architect with whom he was
acquainted.25 Itō had never seen the castle itself, but knew that it was an importantbuilding.26 Itō in turn called on the Home Ministry and succeeded in halting thedemolition.27 Concerned with securing both permanent protection for the main hall as well
as official funding for its repair, Itō set out with Kamakura in the summer of 1924 on amonth-long study trip to Okinawa.
In his account of his role in saving the main hall, Itō makes special mention of the main
hall’s dilapidated condition.28 He notes that Okinawan authorities were keen to repair thebuilding, even though the impoverished prefecture could not afford such a project. Unable
to bear the loss of this “enormous building with deep pedigree,” efforts to raise funds forthe building’s repairs continued even as the castle’s inner courtyard was slated to be given
over to the new Okinawa Shrine. Itō’s account stoked the drama of the moment:… it was a large sum of money, and there was no way to acquire it. With flowing
tears, there was the realization that there was nothing else that could be done
except to abandon (migoroshi suru) the main hall.29
From a photograph of the main hall, Itō said that he knew that it was a “representative
masterpiece of Ryūkyūan architecture,” and after succeeding in halting the demolition andsaving it from the “brink of death” (kyūshi ni isshō), Itō took it upon himself to see what hecould do to further preserve the main hall. He writes,Putting Okinawa at the Center44

I had to think of a concrete plan of how to save this almost dead (hinshi) patient.
Before doing anything, there was the urgent task (kyūmu) of diagnosing thepatient’s condition. One aspect of my research in Ryūkyū was this importantmission.30
Itō’s assessment of his position was twofold: “Aside from welcoming me as a researcher ofRyūkyū, many Okinawan officials and civilians also welcomed me as the doctor (ishi) of
Shuri Castle’s main hall.”31 Itō’s account conveys the urgency of his mission in which saving
the castle took top priority, but his claim that he was welcomed by Okinawa officials andcivilians adds an important dimension by implying the approval and support for his plansof Okinawans.
At the end of his study, Itō proposed that Shuri Castle’s main hall be used as theworshipper’s hall of Okinawa Shrine, thereby qualifying it for permanent state protection
under the 1897 Old Shrines and Temples Preservation Act. The local newspaper carried anarticle with the headline: “Shuri Castle’s Preservation, The main hall becoming theworshipper’s hall of Okinawa Shrine through the Shrine and Temple Preservation Law
after receiving recognition as a prefectural shrine and receiving the Home Ministry’s
support is a good plan in Professor Itō’s opinion.”32 The article noted that this was the best
way for the main hall to receive the repairs it badly needed, and thanks to “Professor Itō’sefforts (rō),” Okinawa’s famous site would now be preserved. A photograph of the repaired
main hall testifies to the castle’s new doubled reality: two plaques hang at the entrance tothe hall, mark it as both a “national treasure” and “worshipper’s hall”.

Loo: Shuri Castle’s Other Histories

45

Detail, Showing "kokuhō" plaque on left, and "haiden" plaque on right.

The significance of Okinawa Shrine
As Itō’s commentary and the treatments of the photograph with Yamazaki that I began thisessay with demonstrate, there is a strong desire to apprehend the moment of the castle’s
main hall’s designation in terms of its preservation while ignoring its incorporation as partof Okinawa Shrine. Through the use of medical tropes and the drama of the situation, Itō
successfully conveys that he was most concerned with the preservation the castle’s
buildings. My intention is not to challenge this; Itō certainly had a deep and abiding love forbuildings and spent his career committed to their preservation. However, to neglect thetransformation of the main hall into the shrine’s worshipper’s hall surely misses the pointat best. At worst, it marks the success of erasure in which the ideological machinations thatenable Shuri Castle’s transformation into Okinawa Shrine are misrecognized as
unimportant and regarded as irrelevant.33 To focus only on the preservation aspect of the1925 designation echoes the constitutive logic in colonial power that seeks to obfuscate thearbitrariness and violence of its rule. Here, the violence of transforming Shuri Castle into
Okinawa Shrine achieves the perfect cover behind the lofty goals of heritage preservation.
How then to read the moment of the 1925 designation, against the hegemonic desire to
render it a triumph for heritage preservation, in order to recover Okinawa Shrine as a siteof violence? The context of prewar State Shinto provides an important starting point. By
becoming a Shinto shrine, Shuri Castle’s space was absorbed into the ideological universeof State Shinto and disciplined by its particular logic. Following the Council of State’s(Dajōkan) declaration of “the unity of government and rites” (saisei icchi) on March 13,
1869, the Meiji state promulgated a decree stating that Shinto shrines “constitute[d] therites of the state” (jinja wa kokka no sōshi nari) on May 14, 1871.34 These measures defined
Shinto as the national religion and established Shinto shrines as privileged spaces in thepolitical life of the Japanese nation state. The role that the Grand Shrine of Ise played in the
prewar era exemplifies the effect of this configuration: worshipping at the specific site ofIse Shrine was a mode of conduct for loyal Japanese imperial subjects to contribute tomaintaining the health of the national polity.35
One of the most prolific theoreticians of the role of shrines in State Shinto and theirrelationship to Japanese national identity was none other than Itō Chūta, the “savior” of
Shuri Castle’s main hall. Beginning with his involvement in the construction of Heian Shrine
in Kyoto to commemorate the 1100th anniversary of transferring the capital to Kyoto, Itōdesigned and built a significant number of imperial Japan’s most important Shintō
shrines.36 Professionally, Itō was the Home Ministry’s special consultant for constructing
Shintō shrines from 1898, leading Maruyama Shigeru to observe that Itō’s official positionin the bureaucracy was a way in which architecture was placed in the service of the nation
state.37 Itō developed his ideas about Shintō shrines and their role in State Shinto in many
articles, regarding shrines as the physical representations of the link between the imperial
house and the Japanese nation state. He argued that while Shinto bore some similarities
with Chinese Taoism or Central Asian religions, Shinto shrines were uniquely “Japanese”
because they were for the worship of the Japanese imperial house and its imperial

Putting Okinawa at the Center

46

ancestors.38 Shinto shrines were, in other words, spaces that referenced the emperor andby extension, the imperial Japanese nation state.
Far from being simply a staging ground of Shinto, shrine buildings could channel individual
emotion and feeling to focus on the worship of the imperial house.39 Itō considered “ideal”(risō) shrine architecture to fulfill two different aims.40 The first, material aim wasfunctional: buildings and structures had to be easy to use in a practical sense. More
importantly however, was shrine architecture’s second, spiritual dimension, whichreferred to their ability to manifest the spirit that repaid one’s ancestors for their gratitude,
to return people’s hearts to the past, and to return to the fundamentals of thecountry.41 Itō’s ideas about the relationship of architecture and national identity, as well as
his position on Shinto shrines as a specific site of Japanese national identity means that hewas not a politically neutral actor when it came to Shinto shrines. Itō’s actions brought thecentral cultural symbol of the Ryūkyū Kingdom into State Shinto. This must in turn, at thevery least, raise questions about Itō’s intentions in proposing the transformation of Shuri
Castle’s main hall, and destabilize the comfortable narrative of salvation and preservationthat Itō and others have cast the process as.
The Home Ministry regulated Shinto shrines strictly: not only who could establish a shrine
and when, but also the very shape and content of shrine precincts. These regulations
applied to the top-ranking national and government shrines as well as the prefectural andvillage shrines at the bottom of the shrine hierarchy.42 The Home Ministry listed sevenstructures that a shrine would have to include: the main sanctuary (honden), its
surrounding fence, a torii, a worshipper’s hall (haiden), hall for food offerings(shinsenjo), temizuya, and shrine offices.43 These specifications constitute a set of rules by
the Japanese state to govern the space of Shinto shrines. Each of the seven structures
served a specific function and shrines without them were not recognized as shrines.44 The
radical alteration to Shuri Castle’s space that resulted from its use as Okinawa Shrine is
illustrated in a map titled “Old Shuri Castle” (Kyū Shurijō) which shows the castle’s original
buildings overlaid with the new shrine’s buildings, including the seven structures that theHome Ministry deemed necessary.

Loo: Shuri Castle’s Other Histories

47

Map of Okinawa Shrine precints, showing new and old buildings. Kyū Shurijō

Seen this way, it becomes clear that Shuri Castle’s transformation into a Shinto shrine was
not simply about the transformation of its physical space, but rather the transposition of
the castle into a spatial economy centered on the Japanese nation state.
This new configuration of space imposed a particular regime of bodily practices that
regulated the conduct of those who entered it.

The main hall as Okinawa Shrine's worshipper's hall. From Shashinshu Okinawa

Putting Okinawa at the Center48

A torii at the northwest corner of the courtyard demarcated the shrine’s precincts, a line in
the sand that marked the beginning of sacred space. In the courtyard, there was a small
structure on the left, stone lanterns at the bottom of the stairs, an offering box at theentrance to the hall, and a braided rope above it. The small structure is the temizuya, where
one washed one’s hands before approaching the worshipper’s hall. Going up the stairs, one
stopped in front of the offering box and threw in a coin. One then performed the proper
ritual combination of claps and bows to approach the gods deified in the main sanctuary.
The braided rope above the offering box marked off the space it encloses as sacred, the halland the area behind off limits to the profane masses.
Okinawa Shrine enshrined five deities: Minamoto no Tametomo, Shunten, Shō En, Shō Kei,and Shō Tai. As Torigoe has noted, the deification of Minamoto no Tametomo and his son
Shunten emphasized Okinawa’s ethnic and blood proximity to mainland Japan and thelegend of Tametomo and Shunten is worth recounting briefly here.45 After the Hōgen
Rebellion, Tametomo – a direct descendent of the 56th emperor Seiwa – supposedly fledfrom the victorious Heike and escaped to the Ryūkyū Islands. There he fathered a son,
Shunten, with the daughter of a local chief who rose to power as the island’s first king the12th century. Scholars like Hagashionna Kanjun have shown that the Tametomo story (andShunten’s reign, for that matter) have no documentary evidence, but note that they have along history of circulation as legends.46 Scholars agree that the first mention of the legend isin the Buddhist monk Taichū’s Ryūkyū shintō ki (1605), but was established as part of theofficial record of the Ryūkyū Kingdom by Shō Shōken in his Chusan seikan (1650) and inturn popularized in Japan by Arai Hakuseki in his Nantō shi.47 The political potential of thisnarrative – that casts the Ryūkyū royal family and the institution of Ryūkyūan kingship as
descendents of the Japanese imperial family – for assimilating Okinawa is obvious and it
was reproduced frequently in novels, school textbooks, and studies of Okinawa history in
the prewar period.48
What Torigoe does not discuss, however, is that the deification of the three Ryūkyūan kings
was a similarly powerful, politically inclusionary move on Japan’s part. Shō En (r. 14701476) founded the second Shō dynasty; under his rule the Ryūkyū Kingdom shifted fromgovernment by the individual monarch to an institutionally based rule which contributed
to its longevity.49 Shō Kei (r. 1713-1751) oversaw a cultural golden age in which the
kingdom’s best-known Confucian intellectual Sai On flourished.50 Shō Tai’s reign saw the
Ryūkyū Kingdom enter into formal Japanese control, cast in the prewar as opening the way
for the modernization of Okinawa. Taken together these five deities speak to theappropriation of both the Ryūkyū Kingdom’s legendary past (Minamoto and Shunten) and
its recorded history represented by the other three: Shō En founded the Second Shō
Dynasty in which Shō Kei’s reign marked its high point, with Shō Tai marking its end. The
deification of these five figures folds the beginning and the end of the Ryūkyū Kingdom’s
history into the frame of State Shinto, and by extension, into the frame of the Japanesenation state and national imaginary.
How important or effective was the Okinawa Shrine? Did it register in the minds of
Okinawan people as a site of State Shinto and what might this have meant to them? On the
one hand, a 1936 report by Shuri city noted that “the number of worshippers increased
every year, such that the sense of respect [for the national polity] has now gradually

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49

deepened.”51 On the other hand, Torigoe notes that worshippers were rarely seen at
Okinawa Shrine, and he sees this as evidence of the forced nature of the Okinawa Shrine’s
establishment and its disjuncture with what Okinawan popular religion.52 Okinawa
Shrine’s relative unpopularity seems to be borne out by records in the Okinawaken jinja
meisai cho, which lists the details of twelve shrines in Okinawa prefecture, including eachshrine’s history, acreage, number of buildings, and the number of registeredworshippers.53 Okinawa Shrine’s 4,914 ujiko households do not appear to be an
insignificant number, especially when compared to Sueyoshi Shrine’s mere
160 ujiko households.54 However, Okinawa Shrine’s numbers pale in comparison to
Yomochi Shrine’s 126,430 sūkeisha households.55 Given these numbers, it is likely that
Okinawa Shrine was hardly the most popular and most-visited of shrines, demonstrating
the distance that Okinawan people felt from State Shinto as a whole.
However, to assess Okinawa Shrine’s importance only in terms of the numbers ofworshippers misses out on an important way in which spaces operate, and neglects how
the particular space of the Shinto shrine functions. In particular, it misses how some spaces
affect their environment simply by virtue of their presence, regardless of how resident
populations feel about them. Overseas Shinto shrines (kaigai jinja), established in Japanesecolonies (colonized Korea, Taiwan) as well as in locales with significant Japanese
populations (Honolulu) illustrate this point. Overseas shrines were originally establishedfor Japanese nationals in foreign lands as sites to connect ideologically and spiritually with
the Japanese mainland, but many scholars have shown how overseas shrines also served asphysical reminders of Japanese state power in the colonies for local populations.56 In
addition to practices like compulsory visitations, which forced upon local populations a
consciousness of the presence and function of the shrines, these shrines, often in
geographically prominent sites (as in the case of Chosen Shrine, Taiwan Shrine, andOkinawa Shrine) were hard to ignore as sites on the landscape. A colonized population’s
participation at shrines allows us to comment on the role these shrines played in people’s
lives, but it is also important to pay attention to other reactions that local populations hadto the space. These include non-participation at the shrines (except under duress) or theiroutright rejection of State Shinto, both of which do not necessarily render the shrines as
unimportant or ineffective spaces.
Hildi Kang’s collection of oral histories from Korea under Japanese colonial rule includes
accounts by people who talk about how they rejected State Shintō, but were forced to visit
the shrines anyway. One of the most provocative vignettes however is a short account by ahousewife who recalled: “The Pusan Shrine stood on top of the hill near the pier. We
climbed up there many times, on holidays, but only for picnics. A beautiful view.” Even
though this individual did not visit Pusan shrine to worship, she was clearly aware of how
the space had been marked.57 Pusan Shrine existed as a place of worship even if peoplechoose not to enter it or to use for other purposes, a space that local populations wereforced to take into account, whether in confrontational ways or otherwise. In this sense, alack of visitors or worshippers to Okinawa Shrine because of resistance to State Shinto orfrom indifference does not necessarily render the space ineffective. Okinawans’ failure toembrace the castle site as “Okinawa Shrine,” while signifying their lack of interest inPutting Okinawa at the Center

50

participating in State Shinto, also reflects the success of that project in alienating the castle
as a site of meaning for Okinawan people.
Conclusion
Let me return to the photograph of the shrine’s main sanctuary with which I began thisessay and the question that it raised: what might account for this condition which allows
for one aspect of the photograph to be noticed and not the other? In other words, what
determines how historical materials and its “facts” are used? One possible explanation isthat this is another effect of the Battle of Okinawa, which resulted in the death of between aquarter and a third of Okinawa’s population and the total destruction of its capital, Nahaand much of the built environment of southern and central Okinawa. In addition to the lossof life, many of the materials that constitute a historical archive were lost. The result has
been a paucity of materials about Okinawa’s history, and this exerts a certain pressure onmaterials that do exist. While the prefectural and village governments, tertiary institutions,and libraries in Okinawa are involved in an ongoing effort to collect and inventory what
remains, the paucity of materials is a stark reality.58 In this context, the value of existingmaterials increases because they are (possibly) some of the only surviving traces of an“original” Okinawa. Alongside attempts to preserve what remains, there is a significant
preoccupation with recovering the Okinawan past that was lost as a result of the war. This
desire to recapture what was lost affects the treatment of historical materials from the
prewar period, and creates a tension that the project to rebuild Shuri Castle illustrates.
Calls for the castle’s rebuilding, which began in earnest in the 1970s, cast the rebuilding as
the recovery of an important piece of Ryūkyūan cultural heritage as well as the repaymentof a debt the mainland owed Okinawa for its sacrifices in WWII.59 Advocates for therebuilding appropriated then-prime minister Sato Eisaku’s proclamation that “Japan’s
postwar will not be over until Okinawa reverts to the mainland” and turned it into theslogan “Okinawa’s postwar will not be over until Shuri Castle is rebuilt.” This cleveradaptation intended to demonstrate how important the rebuilding was to Okinawans byinserting Shuri Castle into a larger discussion about Okinawa’s relationship with mainland
Japan and making the castle a symbol of that process. The push for the rebuilding gained
official sanction in 1982 in the Second Okinawa Development Plan. In 1984, Okinawa
Prefecture released the Shuri Castle Park Basic Plan (Shurijō kōen kihon keikaku) and acommittee under the auspices of the National Okinawa Commemorative Park Office tookcharge of Shuri Castle’s rebuilding.60
The committee’s first and most important task was the rebuilding of the castle’s main hall.
According to one of the architects involved in the rebuilding, the committee had very little
sense of what Shuri Castle looked like.61 The committee spent much of their first year
gathering materials – including Kamakura Yoshitarō’s photographs and notes, and Tanabe
Yasushi’s 1937 monograph Ryūkyū Kenchiku – and analyzing them in order to produce anaccurate model of the main hall. A significant body of materials were the project reports
from the castle’s/Okinawa Shrine’s 1932 restoration. Labeled “Worshipper’s Hall Okinawa
Shrine” [figs. 7 and 8], these were extensive plans of the main/worshipper’s hall structuraldetail. As a way to express their intentions for the project, the committee coined theLoo: Shuri Castle’s Other Histories

51

following motto: “To regenerate the main hall that had been rebuilt in 1712 and designateda national treasure in 1925.”62

Project reports from 1932 restoration of main hall/worshipper's hall. Labeled "National Treasure
Architecture Okinawa Shrine Worshipper's Hall" from Kokuhō jūyō bunkazai kenchikubutsu zushū

Project reports from 1932 restoration of main hall/worshipper's hall. Labeled "National Treasure
Architecture Okinawa Shrine Worshipper's Hall" from Kokuhō jūyō bunkazai kenchikubutsu zushū

This motto illustrates something of how present demands and desires to recover a lost
past impacts the treatment of historical materials related to that past, for what would itmean to take this motto seriously? The committee intended the motto to signal theircommitment to an authentic reconstruction of Shuri Castle – that is, the castle as it existed

Putting Okinawa at the Center

52

since its last rebuilding in 1712 after a fire, the same one recognized by the Japanese state
as culturally valuable in 1925.63 However, the motto actually exceeds these intentions
because it gestures at much more than the castle itself by invoking Japan’s colonial
encounter with the Ryūkyū Kingdom. The period from 1712 to 1925 in Ryūkyū-Japan
relations is dominated by the story of Japanese colonialism and the Ryūkyū Kingdom’s lossof autonomy, first through the system of dual tribute and then through formal Japaneseannexation that culminated in 1879. The nature of this relationship left its trace on Shuri
Castle too: because the Ryūkyū Kingdom did not have enough materials due to its increased
impoverishment, the 1712 rebuilding could proceed only after Satsuma fief presented the
kingdom with over 19,000 logs of wood. Many of materials the committee used from the
Meiji period and after – especially Kamakura’s photographs [figs. 9 and 10] – show not a
glorious architectural structure but are rather visual proof of the castle’s decay anddestruction. The materials from the restoration of “Okinawa Shrine’s Worshipper’s
Hall,” labeled as such, have the potential to raise difficult questions about thetransformation of the castle’s space into a Shinto shrine and the political aims this served.
One need only scratch the surface for the materials to tell a story of Japanese colonialism
and its damage to Shuri Castle. What is so interesting about this motto is that if we were to
take it seriously – that is, to engage with it in all its implications as a principle to produce
knowledge about Shuri Castle – is that it invites attention to the violence and arbitrarinessof Japanese colonialism, the very things that need to be managed if the narrative of
Okinawa’s inclusion into the Japanese nation state is to be cast as a natural, seamless, andbeneficial one.

Kamakura Yoshitarō's photograph of Shuri Castle's main hall. From Kamakura Yoshitarō, Okinawa Bunka
no ihoLoo: Shuri Castle’s Other Histories

53

Kamakura Yoshitarō's photograph of Shuri Castle courtyard in front of main hall. From Kamakura
Yoshitarō, Okinawa Bunka no iho

And yet, despite the motto’s potential to destabilize, the realities of the conditions of Shuri
Castle’s existence in the period between 1712 and 1925 slip from the committee’s view asthey made choices about what to recognize in the materials and what to ignore. Dominatedby the desire to regenerate the castle, Shuri Castle’s multiple histories entered into a
calculation where not all elements of the historical document are accorded equal value.
Instead they are subject to a certain “political arithmetic” based on the demands of thepresent. The treatments of the photograph of Yamazaki and the shrine’s main sanctuary areexamples of this: the photograph is valorized not for what it says about the shrine, but for
the information that it provides of the area around it. This is, of course, a reasonable use of
the photo, but in the process we see how Shuri Castle’s other history – which has thepotential to destabilize comfortable narratives about the castle’s cultural value and raisequestions about how the castle was used in schemes to naturalize Japanese colonialism – isquietly lost in the demands of the present.
Tze M. Loo is assistant professor of history at the University of Richmond. She wrote thisarticle for The Asia-Pacific Journal.
Notes
1 In 2005, the chairperson of the Shuri Castle Festival planning committee noted that “TheShuri Castle Festival is being fixed as the event that transmits (hasshin) the culture of the
Ryūkyū Kingdom. [We would like] through colorful events, to deepen understanding
towards Okinawan culture.” “Shurijō sai 10-gatsu 28-30 nichi ni kaisai kettei,” Ryūkyūshinpō, September 7, 2005.
2 This is similar to the observation that Laura Hein and Mark Selden make regarding theuse of Shurei Gate on the 2000-yen banknote. They suggest that “by appropriating Shuri

Putting Okinawa at the Center

54

Castle as a symbol of Japanese nationhood suitable to grace the currency, Tokyo is again
asserting control over Okinawans and subordinating them to the nation.” Laura Hein andMark Selden (eds.), Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American
Power (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003) 12. Gerald Figal has recently shown how
constructions of the Ryūkyūan past are part of a complicated recasting of Okinawa as a
tourist destination. See his “Between War and Tropics: Heritage Tourism in Postwar
Okinawa,” The Public Historian 30 (May 2008), 83-107.
3 “Shin shitei tokubetsu hogo kenzōbutsu gaisetsu,” Kenchiku zasshi, May 1925, No. 39, Vol.
470, 31.
4 Kuroita Katsumi, ed., Tokukenkokuhō mokuroku (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1927).
5 Bunkachō, Sensai tō ni yoru shōshitsu bunkazai: nijisseiki no bunkazai kakochō (Tokyo:
Ebisukosho shuppan, 2003).
6 Nonomura Takao (ed.), Shashinshū Natsukashiki Okinawa: Yamazaki Masatada ra ga
aruita Shōwa shoki no genfūkei (Naha: Ryūkyū shinpōsha, 2000), 14.
7 Taira Hiromu, “Ryūkyū kenchiku no fukkō to koshashin no yakuwari” in Nonomura
Takao, Natsukashiki Okinawa: Yamazaki Masatada ra ga aruita Shōwa shōki nogenfūkei (Naha: Ryūkyū shinpōsha, 2000), 44-47.
8 Hamashita Takeshi and Kawakatsu Heita (eds.), Ajia kōekiken to nihon kōgyōka, 15001900 (Tokyo: Riburo pōto, 1991) 9.
9 Gregory Smits has traced the way that Ryūkyūan court cultivated increasingly “Chinese”
and Confucian representations and practice of kingship of the sage king, which included thedecoupling of the Ryūkyūan king’s power from its historical relationship with the powerfulfemale priestesses in Ryūkyūan religion. Iyori Tsutomu has traced how the changes in thearchitecture of Shuri Castle’s main hall (specifically looking at the changes to thebargeboard above the main hall’s canopy) were part of this policy of suppression. Gregory
Smits, “Ambiguous Bounderies: Redefining Royal Authority in the Kingdom of
Ryukyu,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 60 (June 2000), 89-123; Iyori Tsutomu, “Ryūkyūōken no basho: Shurijō seiden karahafu no tanjō to sono kaishu ni tsuite,” Kenchikushi
gaku 31 (1998), 4-6
10 George Kerr suggests that the Ryūkyū Kingdom saw its income reduced by more thanhalf, from 200,000 koku to 80,000. George H. Kerr,Okinawa: The History of an Island People:
Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1975), 179.
11 Hideaki Uemura, “The Colonial Annexation of Okinawa and the Logic of International
Law: The formation of an ‘indigenous people’ in East Asia,” Japanese Studies 23 (2003), 120.
12 Okinawa ken (ed.), Okinawa hontō torishirabe sho meiji 26-nen, 1893.
13 F. H. H. Guillemard, The Cruise of the Marchesa to Kamschtka and New Guinea. With
notices of Formosa, Liu-kiu, and various islands of the Malay Archipelago (London: John
Murray, 1886), 58-59. Italics are mine.
14 This is perhaps not dissimilar form Orhan Pamuk’s exploration of the the effect ofOttoman ruins as reminders of past greatness on Turks today and the melancholy (hüzün)that results from it. Orhan Pamuk, Istanbul Memories of the City (New York: Knopf, 2006).
15 “Kyū Shurijōseki nami kenbutsu haraisage seigan no gi nitsuki ikensho” in Maehira Bōkei,“Kindai no Shurijō,” in Yomigaeru Shurijō: rekishi to fukugen Shurijō fukugen kinenshi (Naha:
Shurijō fukugen kiseikai, 1993), 276-277.
16 “We would like to use this land as a park, turn the buildings into a museum, establish anentertainment area displaying hundreds of things beginning with tropical plants that areLoo: Shuri Castle’s Other Histories

55

different from that of other prefectures, and historical treasures that are different fromplaces whose development is different. This is in planning for public leisure, but at thesame time, to encourage economic development through foreigners who visit, to start thedevelopment of [our] civilization.” “Kyu Shurijōseki nami kenbutsu haraisage seigan no gi
nitsuki ikensho.”17 “Kanyūchi kariuke oyobi kenbutsu kaishū no ken” in Ryūkyū shinpō, January 29, 1903.
Also in Maehira, “Kindai no Shurijō,”277. See also “Shurijō jisho taifu nami kenbutsu
haraisage no ken,” Rikugun sho dainikki meiji 38-nen, National Archives of Japan.
18 The land was sold for 1514 yen 15 sen. Maehira, “Kindai no Shurijō,” 278.
19 The information in this paragraph summarizes parts of Torigoe Kenzaburō’s Ryūkyū
shūkyōshi no kenkyū (Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten, 1965), esp. 655-660.
20 “Kensha sonsha kensetsu riyūsho” in Torigoe Kenzaburō, Ryūkyū shukyoshi no kenkyū,655. For the Minamoto’s relationship to the Ryūkyū islands, see George H. Kerr, Okinawa:
The History of an Island People: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1975).
21 Jinja kyōkai zasshi, 22:5 (1923), 34. Okinawa ken jinja meisai chō, Okinawa Prefectural
Library collection, publication date unknown.
22 Figures are given in Torigoe, Ryūkyū shūkyōshi no kenkyū, 659. He set the costs for theconstruction of the buildings at 5000 yen.
23 Torigoe notes that the prefecture’s attempt to raise funds from among Okinawans for theshrine in 1914 failed. He took this as an indicator of the shallowness of Okinawans’
civilization and cultural development (mindō), as well as a lack of interest in establishing
the prefectural shrine. Torigoe, Ryūkyū shūkyōshi no kenkyū, 659.
24 Kamakura Yoshitarō, Okinawa bunka no ihō (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1982), 61.
Kamakura does not note the title of the article he saw, but it was likely “Okinawa ōchō noShurijō wo torikowashi okinawa jinja konryū,” Kagoshima mainichi shimbun, 25 March
1924. See also Itō Chūta, “Ryūkyū kikō,” in Kengaku kikō (Tokyo: Ryūgin sha, 1936), 31.
25 Kamakura’s account can be found in his Okinawa bunka no ihō (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten,1982).
26 Itō Chūta, “Ryūkyū kikō,” Kagaku chishiki 5 (1925), 31.
27 He achieved this with an emergency provisional designation under the 1919 Historic
Sites, Places of Scenic Beauty, and Natural Monuments Preservation Law.
28 Itō, “Ryūkyū kikō,” 30.
29 Itō, “Ryūkyū kiko,” 31.
30 Itō, “Ryūkyū kikō,” 31.
31 Itō, “Ryūkyū kikō,” 31.
32 “Kensha no nintei wo etaru ato shajihozonhō ni yotte seiden wo okinawa jinja no haiden
tonashi naimushō no iji ni yoru no ga tokusaku Itō hakushi no iken,” Ryūkyū Shinpō, 9August 1924. The text of this article is reproduced in Yoshiike Fumie, “‘Firudo noto dai 22
kan ryukyi’ wo moto ni,” Masters thesis, Kyoto Institute of Technology, 2006, 177.
33 Ernesto Laclau’s observation that “[t]he ideological would not consist of themisrecognition of a positive essence, but exactly the opposite: it would consist of the nonrecognition of the precarious nature of any positivity, of the impossibility of any ultimate
suture” is theoretically instructive here. Ernesto Laclau, “The Impossibility of Society” in
his New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Times (London: Verso, 1997), 92.
34 Wilbur Fridell, “The establishment of Shrine Shinto in Meiji Japan,” Japanese Journal of
Religious Studies 2 (1975), 143. Helen Hardacre gives a slightly different translation of thisPutting Okinawa at the Center

56

phrase: “shrines as offering the rites of nation.” Hardacre, Shinto and the State 1868-1988,
97.
35 See for instance Hiroike Chikuro, Ise jingu to waga kokutai (Tokyo: Nichigetsusha, 1915).
36 These included the rebuilding of the Grand Shrine of Ise (1899 and 1909), Yahiko Shrine(Niigata, 1916), Meiji Shrine (1920), the expansion of Atami Shrine (1922), various parts ofYasukuni Shrine including the Yūshūkan, and the expansion of the Grand Shrine of Izumo.
Of these, Ise, Meiji, and Yasukuni shrines stand out as especially privileged sites as thenexus of sacral, imperial, and state power that State Shintō enabled. In addition, Itō was
also responsible for the design and construction of Shintō shrines in the Japanese empire’s
colonial possessions, beginning with the Grand Shrine of Taiwan in 1901, but also Karafuto
Shrine (1912), and the Grand Shrine of Chosen (1925).
37 Maruyama Shigeru, Nihon no kenchiku to shisō: Itō Chūta shoron (Tokyo: Dobun shoin,
1996), 121.
38 Itō, “Sekai kenchiku ni okeru nihon no shaji,”316-317
39 Itō Chūta, “Jinja kenchiku ni taisuru kōsatsu.”
40 Itō, “Jinja kenchiku ni taisuru kōsatsu,”17.
41 Itō, “Jinja kenchiku ni taisuru kōsatsu,”18-20.
42 These regulations start in the 1870s as the then Ministry of Doctrine (Kyobushō) issued
regulations on the size the format of national and government shrines. See also Yamauchi
Yasuaki, Jinja kenchiku (Tokyo: Jinja shinpōsha, 1972), 194-202 for some of theseregulations.
43 Optional structures were also recommended. See Kodama Kuichi, Jinja gyōsei (Tokyo:
Tokiwa shobō, 1934), 48.
44 Kodama, 54.
45 Torigoe, Ryūkyū shūkyōshi no kenkyū, 656. Also see note 37 above. George Kerr asks:“What better man to serve as a link between Okinawa and Japan than the legendary
Minamoto Tametomo?” Kerr, Okinawa, 50.
46 Higashionna Kanjun, Ryūkyū no rekishi (Tokyo: Shibundō, 1957), Textbooks on Okinawan
history today trace the beginnings of political history to the 13th century, and treat theperiod of Shunten’s reign as myth. See for instance Okinawaken kyoiku iinkai, Gaisetsu
okinawa no rekishi to bunka (Naha: Okinawaken kyoiku iinkai, 2000).
47 Shō Shōken was a pro-Japan, Ryūkyūan statesman who is credited with being the earliest
proponent of the theory of common Ryūkyūan and Japanese ancestry (nichi-ryū dōso ron)
who was writing from within a Ryūkyū Kingdom subdued by Satsuma.
48 Kikuchi Yūhō, Ryūkyū to Tametomo (Tokyo: Bunrokudō shoten, 1908); Bungakusha,ed., Shōgaku sakubun zensho (Tokyo: Bungakusha, 1883); Shimabukuro Genichiro, Okinawa
rekishi: densetsu hoi (Mawashison okinawaken: Shimabukuro genichiro, 1932).
49 Kerr, Okinawa, 102.
50 Gregory Smits, Visions of Ryūkyū: Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought andPolitics (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999).
51 “Shuri shi kinen shi” in Naha shishi, Vol. 2, No. 2, 374. Kaji Yorihito has also foundnewspaper reports on Okinawa Shrine’s vibrant and busy shrine days. Kaji, 100-101.
52 Torigoe, 660
53 Okinawa Prefectural Library collection. All the figures that follow come from thismaterial.
54 Ujiko refers to the group of people reside in an area around a shrine and who areLoo: Shuri Castle’s Other Histories

57

registered with it. They are somewhat analogous to the notion of “parishioners” in terms of
their relationship to the site of worship. Kokugakuin University’s online Shinto
glossary defines ujiko this way: “Generally, a group from the land surrounding the areas
dedicated to the belief in and worship of one shrine; or, the constituents of that group.”
55 Sūkeisha also refers to a shrine’s worshippers and is often used interchangeably
with ujiko. However, strictly speaking, where ujiko refers to worshippers who live within
the shrine’s defined district, sūkeisha refers to worshippers from outside that area.
Yomochi Shrine’s numbers are those for “Okinawa prefecture as a whole” (Okinawa ken ka
ichien). Yomochi Shrine was nevertheless a popular shrine and seems to have enjoyedsupport from the local population, in part because its resident deities were Ryūkyūan
heroes, rather than deities from the Shinto pantheon. For more on Yomochi Shrine, see Kaji
Yorihito, Okinawa no jinja (Naha: Okinawa bunko, 2000), 106-111. See also Kadena
City’swebsite on the shrine,
56 See for example Mitsuko Nitta, Dairen jinjashi: aru kaigai jinja no shakaishi (Tokyo: Ofu,
1997), Koji Suga, Nihon tochika no kaigai jinja: chosen jingu taiwan jinja to saijin (Tokyo:
Kobundo, 2004), and Akihito Aoi, Shokuminchi jinja to teikoku nihon (Tokyo: Yoshikawa
Kōbunkan, 2005). See also Minoru Tsushi’s Shinraku jinja: yasukuni shisō wo kangaeru
tameni (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2003). For compulsory visitations, see Takeshi Komagome,“Shokuminchi ni okeru jinja sanpai,” in Seikatsu no naka shokuminchi shugi (Kyoto:
Jinbunshoin, 2004), 105-129, Takeshi Komagome, Shokuminchi teikoku nihon no bunka
togo (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996).
57 Hildi Kang, Under the Black Umbrella: Voices from Colonial Korea, 1910-1945 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2005), esp. 114. See also pages 111-116.
58 The efforts of the Okinawa Prefecture Committee for the Promotion of Culture(Okinawaken bunka shinkōkai) and the Okinawa Prefectural Board of Education(Okinawaken kyōiku iinkai) to compile historical materials are exemplary. The
latter’s Okinawaken shiryō (Okinawa Prefecture Historical Materials) series is an importantcollection of primary source material from the prewar. This is reflected in the mission of
the Okinawa Prefectural Archives. In remarks commemorating the opening of the archives
on August 1, 1995, the then director Miyagi Etsujirō commented that “because almost all[of Okinawa’s] prewar records were lost in this past war, it was a situation where we had toput postwar documents at the center [of our efforts].” Okinawa Prefectural
Archives, ARCHIVES, vol. 1 (1996), 3. Photographs seem to receive special attention:
Ryūkyū shinpō sha, ed., Mukashi okinawa: shashinshu (Naha: Ryūkyū shinpôsha, 1978),Shuritsu hawaidaigaku horeisokan henshu iinkai, Bōkyō okinawa shashinshū (Tokyo:
Honpō shoseki, 1981), Okinawa terebi hoso kabushiki gaisha, ed., Yomigaeru senzen no
okinawa: shashinshu (Urasoe: Okinawa shuppan, 1995), Okinawa terebi hoso kabushiki
gaisha, ed., Yomigaeru senzen no okinawa: shashinshū(Urasoe: Okinawa shuppan, 1995).
59 Shurijō fukugen kisei kai kaihō 1, 1982, 3.
60 Okinawa kaihatsu chō, Okinawa shinkō kaihatsu keikaku. dai ni ji (Naha: Okinawa
kaihatsu chō, 1982).
61 Kiyoshi Fukushima, “Shurijō fukugen sekkei ni tsuite no zakkan,” Okinawa bunka
kenkyū 21 (1995), 40.
62 「1712 年に再建され、1925 年に国宝指定された正殿の復元を原則とする」,
Fukushima, “Shurijō fukugen sekkei ni tsuite no zakkan,” 46.

Putting Okinawa at the Center
63 Shuri Castle was rebuilt three times before after fires destroyed it in 1453, 1660, and

1709.

58

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59

The Group Suicides (Coerced Group Deaths) of the Battle of Okinawa
Aniya Masaaki
January 6, 2008
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Aniya-Masaaki/2629
The nearly three-month long Battle of Okinawa (April-June 1945) saw what was arguably
the most intense combat of the Asia-Pacific theater of World War II and marked the only
battle of that war that unfolded on Japanese soil. It is estimated that one in three residentsof Okinawa Island—mostly civilians-- lost their lives during the battle. It is readily
understandable to outside observers why this experience might generate a strong streak ofpacifism in contemporary Okinawan political culture. Less readily apparent to theuninformed observer is why the same experience would generate resentment against theJapanese military that was ostensibly defending compatriots from the American attack. Yet
the battle not only did so but has also become a source of recurrent conflict among
Okinawans themselves, and between Okinawans and the mainland government. Okinawa
International University professor emeritus Aniya Masaaki elucidates the historical reasons
behind the controversy by describing the circumstances surrounding the “group suicides”
of Okinawan civilians that occurred in various parts of the prefecture during the battle anda ground-level account of one such group suicide. It deserves note that this article waswritten just when controversy was coming to a head in 2007 over the depiction of these“group suicides” in Japan’s high school history textbooks. The article helps the reader makesense of the lingering emotional resentment toward the mainland government that many
Okinawans still harbor today.
This article was originally translated by the late Kyoko Selden and then modified by theeditor for this collection.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

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The Group Suicides (Coerced Group Deaths) of the Battle of Okinawa
Aniya Masaaki
Textbook Review Denies Historical Truth
On March 30, 2008, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology(Monbukagaskushō, hereafter Ministry of Education) announced the results of its review ofapproved high school textbooks to be used beginning in the 2008-2009 school year. With
respect to [passages in] history textbooks (7 different books published by 5 companies) on“group suicides” (shūdan jiketsu) during the Battle of Okinawa, it issued a judgment asking
for revisions of “statements purporting that there were Japanese military orders andcoercion [of civilians] to commit suicide.” The gist of the Ministry of Education’s
assessment was as follows: “It cannot be concluded that there were suicide orders from theJapanese military. To say that that [civilians] were driven by the Japanese military tocommit suicide invites misunderstanding of the Battle of Okinawa.” The people of Okinawa
responded very critically and protested that [the judgment] “distorts the truth about theBattle of Okinawa.” The Okinawa Prefectural Assembly and every municipal assembly inthe prefecture objected to the deletion of [passages regarding] the military’s involvementin “group suicides” during the textbook review and passed resolutions by unanimous votes
demanding a retraction of the judgment. However, the Ministry of Education rejected thedemands of Okinawan citizens and ignored their general will, stating merely that “such was
the decision of the textbook review council.”Aniya: The Group Suicides

61

Okinawan sculptor Kinjo Minoru’s relief depicting the horror of the Battle of Okinawa, during which
many Okinawans were killed or forced to commit
suicide after seeking refuge in the island's caves.

There are ongoing efforts in various parts of the country to distort the truth with respect tothe victimization of local residents during the Battle of Okinawa and to lead historical
understanding in a mistaken direction. One instance of these is the case of “group suicides”
on the islands of Tokashiki, Zamami and Kerama in the Kerama Islands group.
The Japanese forces garrisoned in the Kerama Islands consisted of a main force of 300
special attack boats and a roughly 300-member marine attack corps, along with anattached base force that included about 600 special marine labor corps (Korean workers).
A locally-drafted defense corps and volunteer corps were also incorporated into the islands’
defense force. The Kerama Island marine attack corps was an Army marine special attack
force that was to man small one-person boats loaded with 120 kilograms of depth charges
and destroy enemy vessels by smashing into them. Their effectiveness had been the subjectof exaggerated reports, and the local population met the “Army special marine attack corps”
with skepticism and doubt.
American forces began landing on the Kerama Islands on March 26, 1945, with the supportof artillery fire from both air and sea. By the 29th they had gained control of virtually theentire Kerama Island group. Not a single marine attack boat attack had been launched. The
Japanese Army had itself blown them up.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

62

Okinawa Battle map

It was amid this fighting that horrendous “mass deaths” by local residents who had been
driven to suicide as a result of coercion and incitement by the Japanese Army occurred on
Kerama, Zamami and Tokashiki Island. Against this, the commanders of the troops
garrisoned in these islands, contended that “there was no military order.” In fact, thesurviving families of Colonel Akamatsu Yoshitsugu, the leader of the forces on Tokashiki
Island, and Major Umezawa Yutaka, the leader of the troops on Zamami Island, launched aAniya: The Group Suicides

63

law suit in the Osaka district court against [the writer] Ōe Kenzaburo and his publisher
Iwanami Shoten, claiming that in his book Okinawa Notes [in which he reported on theseincidents] Ōe had “disparaged their reputations” and demanded compensation for damages.
Attaching the label “Okinawa Group Suicide Libel Suit” to the trial, they are [currently]
denouncing Ōe and Iwanami. The plaintiffs argue that “the group suicides on the part ofresidents of Tokashiki Island and Zamami Island were not the result of a military order but
rather of their choosing death in a sublime spirit of self-sacrifice.”
What we have here is not just an instance of “libel,” but a historical revisionist scheme tolegitimatize a war of aggression and to excuse atrocities committed by the Imperial (theEmperor’s) Army. Adding to the obfuscation are the statements of local Okinawan exsoldiers and government officials who are jumping on the bandwagon of the Liberal
Historical Perspectives Research Association. One can only conclude that in the recent
textbook review judgment the statements of the troop commanders that there were no
military orders was accepted without verification. It would appear that that the testimony
of island residents that family members were forced to kill one another was dismiseed as
unreliable and the commanding officers’ testimony accepted as credible. It is preposterous
that a textbook review decision has been issued based on the claims of Messrs. Akamatsu
and Umezawa and the group associated with them in the midst of litigation in Osaka
District Court.
Staking the National Polity on the Battle of Okinawa
The Battle of Okinawa, the last ground combat between Japan and the US in the Pacific War,was fought with the understanding that Japan’s defeat was inevitable. Maintaining thenational polity by preserving the Imperial institution was the Imperial government’s
highest priority objective and gaining time to prepare for a decisive battle on the mainland
and to negotiate a conclusion of the war were considered crucial for this purpose.
On January 14, 1945, shortly before the Battle of Okinawa, former prime minister Konoe
Fumimaro memorialized to the emperor that the war had reached a critical juncture:
Regrettably, defeat in the war is now virtually inevitable . . . . Defeat will bring shameto the national polity (kokutai). However, opinion in England and the US has not yet
reached the point where they are requiring a change (henkaku) of national polity . . .
I therefore do not think that we need to be concerned about the effect of defeat itself
on the national polity . . . What we do need to be concerned about from thestandpoint of preserving the national polity is not defeat but the communist
revolution that will accompany defeat . . . I am therefore convinced that we need tofind a way to end the war as soon as possible in order to preserve the national polity.
(Hosokawa Diary)
Former Prime Minister Konoe’s memorial is remarkable in that a member of Japan’s rulingstrata openly discussed before the Emperor the reason why the war needed to be brought
to an end. But the key point is that he was more concerned about the disintegration of thestructure of Imperial rule than he was about defeat. The Emperor responded to Konoe’s
recommendation by saying, "I do not think that that will work unless we achieve anotherPutting Okinawa at the Center

64

victory in the war." This shows how the Emperor remained committed to continuing the
war even at this late stage.
The Battle of Okinawa was thus a "battle on which the national polity was staked" and one
in which defeat was taken for granted. It is often said that “Okinawa was a pawn sacrificed
in order to defend the mainland,” but in fact it was a battle to buy time to prepare for thebattle on the mainland and to negotiate an end to the war. It was not a battle to protect thepeople but instead the precursor of a battle in which the lives of the entire nation were to
be sacrificed.
The Japanese imperial government intensified its total war mobilization system inpreparation for the last stand battle on the mainland. On May 22, 1945, the Wartime
Education Ordinance (senji kyōiku rei) was made public. Under it even elementary schools
and schools for the blind, deaf and dumb were ordered to organize students into military
units. On June 23, the day that the forces defending Okinawa (the 32nd Battalion)
disintegrated and organized resistance came to an end, a Volunteer Military Service Law
was promulgated and women, too, were now ordered to serve in national volunteer combat
units. On July 8, 1945, the paramilitary units of the Okinawa Normal School and the
Okinawan Prefectural First Middle School were honored in absentia in a ceremony inTokyo. Minister of Education Ōta Kōzō urged students throughout the country to follow theexample of Okinawa’s student military units and give their lives in the defense of thenational polity. (Asahi Shinbun July 9, 1945)
Maintenance of the national polity was the central concern when the Japanese imperial
government accepted the Potsdam Declaration. Atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, destroying these cities. The Japanese leadership, however,was more concerned about the threat posed by the Soviet Union’s entry into the war thanwith the destructiveness of the atomic bombs. The Soviet Union renounced the USSR-Japanneutrality pact and declared war against Japan on August 8. It then attacked Manchuria,
Sakhalin, and North Korea. Confronted with these developments, it was brought home to
the Japanese ruling strata that the fate of the imperial institution now hung in the balance.
They resolved to bring the war to a conclusion.
An Imperial conference was called in the middle of the night on August 9. At 2:30 a.m. on
the 10th the decision was made to accept the Potsdam Declaration on the condition that thenational polity be maintained. This was labeled a “sacred decision” (seidan), that is, apronouncement of the son of heaven. Army minister Anami Korechika wrote in his diary:
The Japanese government accepts the three countries’ combined declaration dated
from the 26th of last month with the understanding that the conditions stated in do
not include the demand to change the Emperor’s prerogative to state rule.
There are Japanese politicians who say that Japan’s defeat was hastened by the dropping
the atomic bombs and thus unavoidable [the reference is to former Defense Min. Kyuma
Fumio. Tr.] but this is an unreflective statement by someone who is subservient to US
policy and ignorant of the suffering of the citizenry.

Aniya: The Group Suicides

65

Consider why and how the US dropped the atomic bombs. Young people who have studied
the reality of the bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki offer the following clear explanation.
1. The US wanted to carry out attacks on the cities to test the bomb’s power: its
ability to destroy with shock waves and ultra-high heat, the effect of radiation on
the human body and the environment, the secondary effects of exposure on
internal organs (the bomb’s effect is not just that which occurs at that moment).
It was not just Japanese who were subjected to the bombings, as there were also
Koreans and Chinese forced laborers as well as allied POWs present.
2. Anticipating the postwar US-Soviet conflict, they wanted to demonstrate thepower of the atomic bomb to the Soviet leadership.
3. The B-29 which set out from Tinian in Micronesia at 2:49 a.m. on August 9
dropped the atomic bomb on Nagasaki at 11:02. That aircraft landed at Bolo
Airport in Yomitan on the main Okinawan island at 1:00 pm on the 9th. After
refueling, it returned to Tinian at 10:55 pm on the 9th. By that time, US forces in
Okinawa had set up an airfield with a 2,000 meter runway that could
accommodate B29s.

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66

Memorial for the Korean victims of atomic bombing in Hiroshima“Coerced Group Deaths” Under Imperial Army Compulsion and Incitement
The Okinawa Defense Force (the 32nd Battalion), addressing the citizens of Okinawa,proclaimed that “the Army, government and civilians live and die as one.” And saying“every single tree and blades of grass will be used to fight the battle,” they mobilized
everyone including the young, the old, women and children.
The military and paramilitary forces recruited locally in Okinawa numbered more than
25,000, and included active duty soldiers, newly drafted soldiers, defense units, student
units and volunteer units. It is important to stress that one fourth of the Okinawa Defense
Force was composed of “Japanese soldiers” coming out of Okinawa prefecture. Thus it is a
mistake to assume that the Japanese forces in the Battle of Okinawa were exclusively
officers and men from the mainland (Yamato troops).
During the last stages of the Battle of Okinawa between June and July, the American forces,
in an exercise they called “Jap hunting,” indiscriminately attacked Japanese soldiers andlocal civilians in the caves where they were hiding. The Imperial Army drove residents
from the caves in which they had taken shelter, took their food, prohibited them fromsurrendering, tortured and slaughtered them when they were suspected of spying, forced
family members to kill each other, and left the sick and handicapped on the battlefield. The
number of civilians who perished in the Battle of Okinawa is estimated at more than
150,000.

Aniya: The Group Suicides

67

A Marine guards Japanese prisoners of war after the Battle of Okinawa.
More than 148,000 civilians died in the campaign.

What stands out among the various ways in which civilians were victimized during theBattle of Okinawa is what has been called shūdan jiketsu or “group suicides.” First we mustclarify what is meant by the term. Normally, jiketsu (which is made up of the characters for“self” and “decision’) presumes individual choice and voluntariness on the part of those
who choose to die. Consequently it is not possible for infants and toddlers to engage injiketsu nor do people of their own accord choose to kill family members. Mutual killings ofclose relatives—meaning that “parents killed young children, children killed parents, bigbrothers killed little brothers and sisters, and husbands killed their wives,”—occurred on
battlefields where Imperial Army soldiers and citizens intermingled.
The book, Army Strategies in the Okinawa Area compiled by the War History Office of the
Ministry of Defense writes as follows: “They served the Empire in a sacrificial spirit byengaging in shūdan jiketsu and dying for the Empire so that they could alleviate thecomplications that combat personnel faced.” But such a claim goes against the facts.
Citizens on the battlefield did not choose death of their own accord. While there were anumber of interrelated factors involved, basically close relatives were compelled to kill one
another because the Imperial Army and local leaders who followed the Imperial Armycoerced them into doing so. To have compelled families to kill one another is tantamount to
the Imperial Army itself killing citizens. One cannot call the death of people who “wereforced” or “cornered” shūdan jiketsu. In fact, it is wrong to call what happened shūdan
jiketsu, and doing so hinders the accurate conveying of reality and invites
misunderstanding and confusion. The term itself has been used since the 1950s and someargue that it is now an established one. But using the term shūdan jiketsu without
explaining the reality behind it encourages misconstruction and mystification. It needs tobe re-emphasized that the true meaning of the term shūdan jiketsu is “en mass deaths of
local residents as a consequence of Imperial Army coercion and inducement.”
Behind the “residents’ mass deaths” in the Battle of Okinawa was the kōminka or imperial
subject education system [i.e., education to make everyone a loyal subject of the Emperor]
which pitched the act of dying for the Emperor as the most sublime expression of national
morality. The concept of “military, government, and civilians living and dying together asone” bred “a sense of solidarity in death” that was repeatedly emphasized during the battle.
The role of local Okinawan leaders, including those in the Association of Reservists, theSupport Group of Adult Men, police and military affairs, and chiefs of local and municipal
government, was most important. The islands’ leaders thought it to be perfectly naturalthat they would be given hand grenades so that all residents could be killed if the situation
demanded it. However, we cannot consider this a case of “spontaneous and voluntary”
shūdan jiketsu, for this was a time when it was not possible to refuse to carry out “deaths”
ordered by the Imperial Army.
The extreme fear of “the American and British brutes,” cultivated by the Japanese military,
became a factor that compelled people to choose death. The Japanese Army’s slaughter ofChinese on the continent following the “Manchurian Incident” was widely discussed; andpeople were in a state of despair as they anticipated plunder, assaults and massacres
carried out by Americans, which they accepted as their fate now that they were losing thePutting Okinawa at the Center

68

war. There were returned emigrants who did not believe that the Americans would kill
civilians but they could not openly express such an opinion because returnees weresuspected to be spies. To make such a statement was to court being labeled a spy andslaughtered. There were people who came to the twisted conclusion that it was an act oflove for them to kill their female siblings and wives with their own hands in order to sparethem from the shame of being abused and killed by the American and British brutes.
Fear of the Imperial Army’s spy hunts increased the level of despair among local civilians. It
was Imperial Army policy to never allow residents who had been exposed to military
secrets to be taken by the enemy. Those taken under the protection of the US military wereregarded as spies. Being trapped between the Japanese and American military under these
extreme conditions pushed local civilians to their deaths. One other reason for their “rushto death” was their loss of hope in their chances of surviving the shelling of an island fromwhich there was no way to escape and their picturing of their own deaths under the mostpitiful of circumstances. The “en masse deaths of residents” took place as these various
elements joined together, causing mass panics that led people to kill one another as acommunal activity. Fear and madness overtook the villages.

Thousands of protesters in Ginowan, Okinawa, demanded thatJapanese government drop plans to remove referencesin textbooks to the coerced mass suicides on their island in 1945.

“Group Deaths” in an Encircled Area

Aniya: The Group Suicides

69

By the time the Battle of Okinawa began, control of sea and air in the area of the Southwest[Ryukyu] Islands was entirely in the hands of the US military. Communication andtransportation with Kyushu and Taiwan were cut off and the islands were under siege. The
Okinawa Defense Force gave orders even on matters that were the jurisdiction of theprefectural and local governments and through this they imposed the concept of the “army,
government and civilians living and dying as one.” There was no civil government. All
activities of prefectural residents were regulated by the commanders of the garrisoned
forces. The military refered to combat zones of this kind as gōi chiiki or “encircled areas.”
Encircled areas were established through a “declaration of martial law” (kaigenrei)
whenever there was an encirclement of or an attack on an area.
In an encircled area the rule was that ranking military personnel of the garrisoned forces
would be granted supreme authority. The Constitution would be suspended and all or partof legislative, administrative and judicial authority would be exercised by the military.
Martial law was not declared during the Battle of Okinawa, but the entire Southwest
Islands area was a de facto encirclement area. This was the situation that led to theadministrative authority of the prefectural governor and village mayors being ignored andthe garrisoned forces issuing orders at will. Directives and orders to local residents werereceived as “military orders” even when they were conveyed by town and village
governments and local leaders.
[To take two examples,] On Tokashiki Island of the Keramas, Colonel Akamatsu Yoshitsugu
wielded total authority. On Zamami Island, Major Umezawa Yutaka held complete authority.
Village administration was placed under the control of the military; there was no civil
administration. Under this type of military rule, it was the military affairs directors of thevillage offices who played the critical role of communicating military orders.
These military affairs directors were the local officials who were in charge of mattersrelated to the military such as updating and confirming rosters of draft-age men and their
whereabouts, handling draft deferrals, transmitting orders to draftees to report for duty,
and providing assistance to families of the war dead and wounded soldiers. During theBattle of Okinawa, the primary duty of village military affairs directors was to round up anddeliver requested draftees to local military units, and to transmit to local residents militaryorders for the supply of labor power, evacuation, assembly and eviction.
Tōyama Majun, who was the chief of military affairs of the village of Tokashiki, testifiedthat:
1. On March 20, 1945, there was a message from the Akamastu Squad to the village
military affairs director Tōyama Majun ordering him to assemble the residents ofTokashiki hamlet in the village office. In accordance with this order he assembled
youths under age 18 and village office workers in the front garden of the village
office.
2. At that time, a lower ranking non-commissioned office known as the weapons
sergeant had a subordinate bring two boxes of grenades. The weapons sergeant
distributed two hand grenades each to the twenty-plus people gather there andinstructed them as follows: “It is now certain that US Forces will land and that

Putting Okinawa at the Center

70

everyone on Tokashiki Island will die an honorable death (gyokusai). If you
encounter the enemy toss one of these at the enemy. When it appears that you might
become a prisoner use the other one to kill yourself.”
3. There was a “group death” incident on March 28 at Fijiga located along the upper
reaches of the Onna River. On this occasion members of the Defense Force brought
hand grenades and induced residents to “commit suicide.”This testimony of a military affairs director conveys vividly the situation on the ground at
the time of “group deaths.” One can see that the military affairs directors who conveyed
military orders in an encirclement area bore a crucial responsibility. Japanese citizens were
taught that a military order was “an order from the Emperor.” Also people believed that“choosing death” rather than becoming a POWs was “the way of an imperial subject.” They
were thus compelled, under the direction of local leaders, to put into practice the provisionin the Field Service Code (Senjikun) that instructs one “not to suffer the humiliation of
becoming a prisoner of war.”
This article was published in Gunshuku mondai shiryō (Disarmament Review), December
2007. Aniya Masaaki is Professor emeritus of Modern Japanese History at Okinawa Kokusai
Daigaku, (Okinawa International University).

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Border-Crossers and Resistance to U.S. Military Rule in the Ryukyus, 1945-1953
Matthew R. Augustine
September 23, 2008
http://www.japanfocus.org/-matthew_r_-augustine/2906
Okinawa was administered by the United States military between the end of the Battle of
Okinawa in June 1945 and its reversion to Japan in May 1972. Matthew R. Augustine's
article covers the period stretching from the start of American military planning prior to
the Battle of Okinawa to the return of the Amami Islands, the northernmost portion of theoccupied Ryukyu Islands, in 1953. The article outlines the consequences of the American
decision to administratively separate the Ryukyu Islands from Japan proper, and allow themilitary to run it as a military colony, along with the social and political currents that were
set in motion as a result. As Augustine explains, this involved not only isolating Okinawa
from Japan, but also the different islands of the Ryukyus from one another, in the process
disrupting the economic, social, and political networks that had earlier sustained Okinawa’s
economy and society. However, as he details in the section that follows, Okinawans did not
accept these conditions passively, and in their struggle for survival revived earlier links
with Japan to the north and neighboring countries to the south through illicit smuggling
networks. From there, Augustine discusses how the Cold War confrontation of the late
1940s led to a partial re-establishment of economic links with the mainland while
rigorously continuing (or perhaps more accurately systematically monitoring) politicalseparation.
Augustine concludes by explaining how the San Francisco Peace Treaty of September 1951,
by restoring sovereignty to a newly democratized Japan while authorizing a potentiallypermanent foreign occupation of the Ryukyu Islands, made Okinawans conscious of theway in which the American occupation was frustrating their aspirations for full democratic
rights and economic opportunity. Their frustration about this divergence of fates spurred amovement that championed Okinawa's reversion to Japan. Fueled by various incidents thatgenerated grievances against American rule and by the counterexample of mainland
Japan’s economic prosperity in the late 1950s and 1960s, the movement intensified to sucha degree that American officials themselves were convinced by the latter half of the 1960s
that their interests would be better served by allowing reversion to happen. The U.S.
military continued to maintain bases on Okinawa, however.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

72

Border-Crossers and Resistance to US Military Rule in the Ryukyus, 1945-1953
Matthew R. Augustine
Sixty-six years after Japan’s annexation of the former Ryukyu Kingdom in 1879, in thewaning months of the Asia-Pacific War, the American military partitioned the Ryukyu
Islands from Japan. The replacement of Okinawa Prefecture by US military rule in the
Ryukyus from 1945 had profound implications, for residents of the occupied islands. A
major repercussion of the military government’s separation of the Ryukyus was theenforced isolation of the four main island groups from occupied Japan. The RyukyuanJapanese border severed long-standing administrative and economic links, while restrictive
border controls prohibited free travel and interaction between the two sides. Anotherconsequence of this imposed barrier was the socio-economic problem of how to provide
for the livelihood and welfare of the island residents, who thereby became entirely
dependent on the military government. These problems were compounded by the massive
destruction, loss of life, and overall displacement of residents in the wake of war, especiallyin Okinawa.
Residents of the Ryukyus responded by developing a thriving smuggling trade that
extended southwest from Okinawa to the Miyako and Yaeyama Islands, as well as to the
Amami Islands and Japan in the other direction. The illicit smuggling trade became so
rampant that in 1948 the military government responded by implementing measures topromote economic integration among the four main island groups. Trade barriers withJapan were relaxed in 1950, but the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed in 1951 reaffirmedthat the Ryukyus would remain under US military rule, divided from Japan. By this time, theincreasing cross-border interconnections between residents in the Ryukyus and Okinawan
and Amamian residents in Japan had already given rise to an organized movement calling
for reversion to Japanese sovereignty.
How did the establishment of the military government and new postwar borders actuallyaffect the movement of residents within and outside of the Ryukyu Islands? Conversely, towhat extent did the resistance of residents in the Ryukyus and their effort to overcome
their division and isolation influence the military government’s border controls and related
occupation policies? Most studies of migration and border controls focus exclusively on therole of the nation-state in answering such questions, although some recent scholarshipattempts to emphasize the agency of the migrants.1 I argue that what happened at the
territorial boundary between Japan and the Ryukyus was shaped by the interplay between
the national politics of border controls and the actions of those who transcended theseborders. This relationship was in turn strongly influenced by the emergence of the Cold
War conflict in Northeast Asia. This article will therefore examine the interplay between
these domestic and international forces.
A transnational history of border-crossings can best reveal the interlinked relationshipbetween the various movements of people and the border politics of the US-occupied
Ryukyu Islands. Weaving together the US occupation of the Ryukyus with that of Japan
proper will also help break down the barriers of national history, which have largely
ignored the Okinawan experience, beyond the realm of geopolitical issues relating to thelarge-scale US military presence. The politics of drawing and redrawing postwar borders as

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73

well as the cross-border networks within and beyond the Ryukyus developed in a relatively
short period of time. This study therefore focuses on the most fluid stage of US military rulein the Ryukyus, from the landing of Army forces on Okinawa in April 1945 until thereversion of the Amami Islands in December 1953.
Borders, Divisions, and the Isolation of the Ryukyus
Why were Okinawans arrested for illegal entry when they crossed into Japan after 1945?
This question cannot be answered without considering, briefly, how Okinawa Prefecture
was divided from Japan and renamed the Ryukyu Islands during the Asia-Pacific War.
Examining the wartime origins of Okinawa’s division from Japan in turn reveals thehistorical background behind the incorporation of the Ryukyus as a Japanese prefecture.
The US State Department first conceived the idea of separating Okinawa from Japan while
drafting the terms for Japan’s surrender. In advance of the Cairo Conference in July 1943,
the Territorial Subcommittee prepared a series of policy studies on various island groups
surrounding Japan, mapping out the territorial boundaries for postimperial Japan. 2 The
policy document on Okinawa began by stating that the “postwar territorial adjustments in
the Far East will involve the question of the possible detachment of the Liuchiu Islands
from the Japanese Empire.”3 Consciously referring to Okinawa by its ancient Chinese name,
Liuchiu, the document reminded the reader that the Ryukyus were stripped of sovereignty
when Japan forcibly annexed the islands in 1879. Considering the future disposition of the
Ryukyus, the document ended by outlining policy proposals primarily aimed at preventing
Japan from using these islands again for imperial expansion.4
While the State Department continued to shape American policy towards the Ryukyus, theUS military began producing detailed studies about the islands in preparation foroccupying and using them as stepping-stones in the military conquest of Japan. On June 1,
1944 the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) published a 147-page intelligence report entitled
The Okinawas of the Loochoo Islands: A Minority Group in Japan.5 This report found that,while the Japanese government implemented a heavy-handed assimilation policy,
Okinawans were simultaneously discriminated against for not being fully Japanese.
Consistently emphasizing the cleavage between the Japanese and Okinawans, the OSS
report suggested that US forces might utilize this in psychological warfare and in the
postwar occupation of Okinawa.6
Recognizing the geostrategic importance of the Ryukyus as a military base, the US Navy
employed this logic of differentiating between Japanese and Okinawans as a convenientjustification for advocating the separation of the islands. On November 15 the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations produced a longer report entitled Civil Affairs Handbook: Ryukyu(Loochoo) Islands. Although this 334-page report differed from the OSS report inmethodological approach and sources consulted, both concluded that the Ryukyu Islands
and its people were not innately part of Japan. Both texts also restored the former name,“Loo Choo” or “Ryukyu” in their titles, further emphasizing the identity gap between the
Ryukyus and Japan.7 Based on the premise that imperial Japan had forcibly assimilated
Okinawans, the two sources together raised the possibility of de-assimilation to justify theseparation and military rule over the Ryukyus.

Putting Okinawa at the Center74

Dismantling the Japanese ruling structure—politically and culturally—in the Ryukyus
emerged as one of the main objectives of the US military invasion and occupation. On
March 1, 1945 on the eve of the Battle of Okinawa, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz,
Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Fleet, issued a political and economic directive forthe prospective military government in the Ryukyus. This detailed directive plainly spelled
out that military occupation of the Ryukyus was necessary to destroy “Japan’s power ofaggression and the military class which controls the Japanese Empire.” The directive
granted the military governor the power to remove from office all high ranking or
policymaking officials, and to dissolve all Japanese patriotic or secret societies.8 Then on
April 1, 1945 Admiral Nimitz issued “United States Navy Military Government
Proclamation No. 1,” as the US Tenth Army combat units landed on Okinawa Island.
Declaring that “all powers of the Government of the Japanese Empire are hereby
suspended,” the so-called Nimitz Proclamation signaled the administrative detachment of
the Ryukyus from Japan. The newly established Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands
thus replaced imperial Japan’s control over Okinawa in what would subsequently bereferred to as the “disappearance of Okinawa Prefecture.”9The separation and military occupation of the Ryukyu Islands marked the beginning of ahistorical transformation from what Okinawans called the “Yamato (Japanese) period” tothe “American period.” The dawning of the American period represented not only a
psychological separation from Japan but also the subordination of the Ryukyus to the US
military. As soon as US military forces arrived in Okinawa, they began referring toOkinawans as “Ryukyuans” to discourage the islanders from identifying themselves withJapan.10 Then on July 3, 1945, the day after the Japanese surrender in Okinawa, Col. Charles
I. Murray became the Deputy Commander for military command and began immediately
cementing Okinawa’s political subordination. In a symbolic statement on the new status of
the Ryukyus, the military government formed the Okinawa Advisory Council on August 15,
the same day that Emperor Hirohito announced Japan’s surrender. The Council was thefirst political organization entirely consisting of Okinawans, thus breaking from the prewar
Japanese system of denying the local population political representation. Murray quickly
made it clear, however, that the fifteen members of the Council would be limited toassisting and advising military government officials.
While the Ryukyus were denied the far-reaching democratic reforms implemented in Japan,
Murray recognized the value of a limited form of self-government to win Okinawan
acquiescence to US military rule. As a result, on September 20, 1945 the military
government held elections for mayors and assemblymen in the sixteen military
government districts.11 Another major event in the political rehabilitation of the Ryukyus
was achieved on April 24, 1946 when Shikiya Kōshin, a respected local educator, wasappointed civilian governor – a post denied to Okinawans under Japanese rule. Governor
Shikiya expressed the hopes of many Okinawans when he stated in his inaugural speech
that, “in striving to build a better Okinawa than before, we will achieve the golden age for
Okinawa with our hands.”12 Such reform measures, however, masked the fact that mayors,assemblymen, and governors in the Ryukyus were directly under the control of the US
military government. The limits of political power in the Ryukyus were apparent incontrast to occupied Japan, where the local, regional, and central government exercised
greater authority in interactions with US occupation officials.

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Putting Okinawa at the Center

76

The Yamato period was thus giving way to the American period, but where did theterritorial boundaries of the Ryukyus end and those of Japan’s begin? The Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters inTokyo, pushed for the 30° North Latitude as the line of territorial demarcation between thetwo occupations in Japan and the Ryukyus. This proposed border, however, was highly
problematic for geopolitical and socioeconomic reasons. Most importantly, theestablishment of the 30th parallel border meant that territory in addition to Okinawa,
specifically the Amami Islands and part of the Tokara Islands, would be separated fromJapan.13 Although the US Navy’s command in the Ryukyus was interested in taking over theJapanese naval base in Amami Oshima, these islands continued politically and economicallyto function as an integral part of Kagoshima Prefecture after Japan’s military defeat. The
Amami Islands since the Meiji period had been sending elected representatives to theprefectural assembly in Kagoshima, where offices and records of all departments of local
government were located.14 The public finance system there also correlated with and wasdependent upon the larger financial structures in Kagoshima and in Tokyo. Furthermore,
not only were family registries (koseki) and other official records of residents kept in
Kagoshima, but Amamians strongly identified with Japan, rather than with the Ryukyus.
Despite such considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the highest echelon in the US
military command, decided in late December 1945 that an expanded command in the
Ryukyu Islands could better secure Okinawa. The JCS was also interested in Koniya Bay in
the Oshima Straits, where the former Japanese Navy had set up a deep-water base as a safe
retreat in battle and from typhoons. Rear Admiral John D. Price, who replaced Col. Murrayas the chief military government officer in September, initially resisted this decision,emphasizing the high cost of administering the Amami and Tokara Islands. However, Priceultimately agreed to incorporate these islands into the Ryukyus in exchange for additional
personnel, civilian and military supplies, and improvements in communication andtransportation facilities. Having secured Price’s consent, on January 29, 1946 SCAP sent a
directive to the Japanese government, officially separating the Amami and Tokara Islands
from Japan and adding them as a part of the Northern Ryukyus.15
The newly expanded Ryukyu Islands was initially marked by internal borders thatadministratively separated Okinawa from Amami and the other island groups. After
military government teams from Okinawa assumed control of the Miyako and Yaeyama
Islands in December 1945 and the Amami Islands in March 1946, autonomous governing
bodies were formed in each of the island groups. Like the Okinawa Advisory Council,
however, these so-called “provisional governments” were powerless and strictly controlled
by the military governments set up in each of these island groups. The military government
in Okinawa thus consciously divided the Ryukyu Islands geographically and politically into
four provisional governments, as can be seen in Figure 2: one in the Northern Ryukyus(Amami Islands), one in Okinawa, and two in the Southern Ryukyus (Miyako and Yaeyama
Islands).16 Under close guidance by the military government, these four separate island
districts established autonomous political structures as well as autonomous economies.
Furthermore, in an archipelago noted for its diversity of distinctive languages and cultures,the postwar divisions reinforced a strong sense of island and island group identities that
distinguished, for example, the Amamians from the Okinawans. These four island groups,

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77

collectively renamed the Ryukyu Islands, were thus marked by multiple lines of division,from Japan and from each other.17

As a result of the multiple divisions that characterized the Ryukyu Islands, residents began
their lives in the immediate postwar years cut off from long-established economic, cultural,and kinship bonds within the Ryukyus and beyond. The political and economic isolation,
which proved disastrous for many18, was intensified by the social isolation that resulted
from the imposition of stringent travel restrictions in Okinawa, then applied later to theother island groups. Such restrictions against population movements were first
implemented during the Battle of Okinawa when the Tenth Army herded local residents
into refugee camps. By the end of hostilities, most of the 320,000 Okinawans who survived
the war found themselves confined within one of twelve such district camps on the island.
Although the military government initiated the resettlement program in October 1945, inreality, much of Okinawa was still occupied by US Army units. Tens of thousands of
Okinawans were forced to relocate to one or more camps and to live in tents for months
and even years. In the face of US military bases with ubiquitous signs that read “OFF
LIMITS,” the number of civilians authorized to cross into and out of designated districts
was limited to a minimum.19 When permission was granted, Okinawans had to register andcarry with them special identification passes so that the military government could closely
monitor their movements. Okinawa had thus become an island off limits to its own native
inhabitants.20
Population control under American military rule extended to the rest of the Ryukyus which,unlike Okinawa, had experienced neither a ground invasion nor forced seizures of land foruse as military bases. The residents of Amami Oshima therefore were dismayed when rigid
travel restrictions were suddenly imposed. On February 4, 1946, the military government

Putting Okinawa at the Center

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ordered what amounted to a naval blockade of the Amami Islands, terminating allinteraction between Amami and mainland Japan. Specifically, this directive entailed that: 1)
unrestricted travel between Japan and Amami would no longer be permitted; 2) people
who desired to travel between Japan and Amami would be limited to those intending toestablish permanent domicile (eijū) in either place; 3) those granted permission to travel
had to follow provisions set up for the planned repatriation program. Shortly thereafter,
the free export and import of goods to and from Japan was also banned.21 Although Amami
was now reincorporated into the Ryukyus, similar restrictions applied to all forms ofinteractions with Okinawa.22 This was the beginning of what has been referred to as theisolation period in Amami’s postwar history.
The division and isolation of the Ryukyu Islands from Japan was enforced by the military
government’s strict border control policies. In the Ryukyus, as in Japan, the only bordercrossings permitted by the military government was the voluntary repatriation of people
displaced by the war. Thus, while the military government and SCAP both strongly
encouraged the two-way flow of homeward-bound repatriation, all other forms ofunauthorized immigration and emigration were deemed illegal.23 In July 1946, the Army
replaced the Navy in charge of the military government, and the newly reorganized
Ryukyus Command (RYCOM) improved joint border control measures with the Armycommand in Japan.24 For example, ships seized for unauthorized entry into Japan werereturned to the Ryukyus under escort of the US Eighth Army. Once deported to the Ryukyus,
the military government tried the crew, passengers, and owners of the confiscated vessels
in appropriate courts for unauthorized exit or illegal trafficking.25 Such restrictive bordercontrol measures were thus instituted by occupation authorities on either side of the 30th
parallel in large part to reinforce the separation of the Ryukyus from Japan.
Intra-Ryukyuan Smuggling and the “Yamato Trade”
The establishment of stringent border controls fundamentally transformed the socioeconomic foundations of the Ryukyu Islands, which had historically relied on maintaining
contact with the outside world. In modern times, one of the most prominent characteristics
of Okinawa Prefecture until the end of the Pacific War was large-scale international anddomestic migration. In the prewar period, between 40-60 percent of the average income of
Okinawans derived from remittances sent by international migrants. Through such
remittances, return migration, and by sending foreign-born children to be educated in theirnative villages, Okinawan immigrants established what Edith Kaneshiro has called“transnational families.”26 Networks of families and friends also spread to the majorindustrial centers in Japan, from where temporary migrants returned with their savings.
This system of transnational and domestic networks, however, ceased to function in thewake of the Battle of Okinawa and remained suspended throughout the initial years of US
military rule.27 By limiting contact with the outside world, the border controls of themilitary government thus severely disrupted everyday life within the Ryukyus.
The isolation of the US-occupied Ryukyu Islands compounded the residents’ daily struggle
for survival in the desolation left behind by the recent war. For example, food shortage
quickly emerged as an acute problem on Okinawa Island, where the bombardment of heavy
artillery reduced agricultural and fishing production to a bare minimum. Commercial

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livestock such as hogs, chickens and goats, constituting an integral part of the Okinawan
diet, had also been mostly slaughtered. Such total devastation left Okinawan residents in
refugee camps completely dependent upon the US military for food as well as clothing andshelter. In July 1945 the military government was feeding an average of 295,000
Okinawans every day, and by September seventy-five percent of the food supplied wascovered by rations. The military government was unable to support the growing demandfor imported rations, leading to a reduction in the rations allotted to each individual.28
Hungry Okinawans rummaged through cans of leftover food near US military bases,
watering down the collected contents to eat as soup. Desperate to supplement their foodwith cooking oils and fats, some Okinawans were even known to have used automobile oil
to deep-fry what was commonly referred to by locals as “Mobil tempura.”29
Okinawans continued to rely on rations even after they left the refugee camps, althoughmany also turned to the emerging black markets. The military government set up local
rationing boards in every community to receive all available agricultural products forredistribution on the basis of need. By early 1946, however, the communally grown foodand supplemental goods were no longer rationed for free but began to be sold as a part ofpostwar Okinawa’s transition back into a money economy. In May the military government
introduced a new monetary system, exchanging Japanese yen currency still in circulation to
the equivalent amount in Type “B” yen, a form of Occupation script printed by the US
military.30 This controlled economy, however, did little to prevent a virtual state ofbankruptcy from unfolding in the face of a growing black market trade. Stolen rations andsupplies from US military depots that flowed into the black markets were bartered or soldwith commodities smuggled into Okinawa to compensate for the shortage of sundries. A“double currency” thus emerged between the official price and the black market price,
resulting in rampant inflation that plagued the entire Ryukyuan economy.
While black markets became a ubiquitous part of everyday life throughout the Ryukyu
Islands, those in Okinawa boasted an abundance of US military supplies. In the waning
months of war, the US Tenth Army had unloaded large quantities of surplus goods in
Okinawa that could enable over a half-year of sustained battle against Japan. Since theanticipated ground warfare in mainland Japan did not materialize, these items were left
stockpiled inside the base camps. Okinawans employed by the military government towork inside the bases as construction workers, drivers, cooks, and housemaids discovered
bountiful goods that were denied to them. Inside the barb-wire fencing, they foundeverything from non-rationed foods such as meat, fish, canned fruit, and milk, to durable
clothing such as military fatigues, dress uniforms (HBTs), and shoes, as well as prized tools
such as nails, hammers, and shovels. Many Okinawans who had access inside the militarybases began taking small amounts of these surplus supplies, calling them senka, literally
meaning “fruits of war.” Before long, pilfering goods from US military depots became awidely practiced trade referred to as “winning senka,” as if they were engaging in a battle
for survival. In fact, winning senka was so common at the time that there was a saying,“men search for senka while women engage in prostitution,” reflecting local survival
strategies in response to the dire conditions in immediate postwar Okinawa.31
The appropriation of surplus supplies from US military depots was followed by its
redistribution in Okinawan society, usually through the black markets, but also throughPutting Okinawa at the Center

80

kinship networks. Okinawan employees at military bases often shared their hard-won
senka with their friends and family, but they sold the bulk of their goods to black market
brokers who traded them with other smuggled commodities for a profit. A popular
Ryukyuan poem captures the distribution of labor in this underground trade, reflecting
social conditions in Okinawa at the time: “best pickings at the top, black markets in the
middle, we at the bottom must win senka.” In other words, the upper class clung to the US
military for access to power and prestige, the middle class could secure a decent living bytrading black market goods, so the lower class was left to fend for themselves in pursuit ofsenka.32 In general, most of the senka was supplied by those who worked inside or lived
nearby the major military bases in central Okinawa, then flowed into the thriving black
markets in southern Okinawa. The emergence of new social classes in postwar Okinawa
thus developed simultaneously with the geographical distribution of the US military bases
and black markets.

The black market economy in Okinawa could not be contained within the artificial borders
set up by the military government, but extended to other parts of the Ryukyus and beyond.
According to Uehara Jingorō, a native of Itoman in southern Okinawa who was involved in
the thriving black market trade, three main smuggling routes linked the Ryukyus to the restof the region. One was the Taiwan route that spread from Miyako and Yaeyama, using
Yonaguni Island as a relay station. The Hong Kong route was a large-scale extension of thisTaiwan route. The third was the Japan route, otherwise known as the “Yamato trade,”spreading from Amami and Tokara with Kuchinoshima Island as its main base.33 In otherAugustine: Border Crossers and Resistance to U.S. Military Rule in the Ryukyus

81

words, Yonaguni, located on the southern border with Taiwan, and Kuchinoshima to thenorth along the 30th parallel border with Japan, prospered as the north-south relay
stations for smuggling in the Ryukyus.34 In defiance of the military government, residentsof the Ryukyus were thus re-inventing new domestic and transnational networks ofregional trade, this time based on a black market economy.
Before long a specialization of smuggled goods emerged in the Ryukyu Islands according to
the three main routes. Uehara Jingorō’s colorful description of the variety of goods barteredand sold along these routes provides a glimpse into the regional scale of the increasingly
well-organized networks of underground economic interaction. Uehara maintained that the
Taiwan route involving Miyako and Yaeyama islanders smuggled in large quantities of rice,sugar, and saccharine products. Sometimes foodstuff was supplemented by precious
materials such as tires and rubber tubing used for bicycles that were otherwise unavailable
in the Ryukyus. These goods were exchanged for senka such as military uniforms, wool
blankets, and rations of canned foods.35
While civil war raged in neighboring China, the Hong Kong route involved exporting
another form of senka – munitions such as cartridge cases, as well as motors, engine oil andgasoline – that were recycled for use on the battlefield. In exchange, British-made shoes,
hats, suits, as well as Hong Kong dollars were imported into the Ryukyus. Finally, American
medical supplies, especially new antibiotics like streptomycin for tuberculosis, sulfa drugs,
and morphine were in high demand on the Japan route. These were bartered for Japanesemade pots and pans, crockery, carpentry tools, and lumber for building houses. As Uehara
pointed out, the specialization of commodities traded along these routes reflected the early
postwar conditions in each of these places. The industriousness of the residents in the
Ryukyus can be observed here by their ability to turn senka, entirely consisting of the US
military imports to the islands, into a valuable export commodity.
The biggest reason that cross-border smuggling was a thriving business through the early
1950s was precisely because the Ryukyus were cut off and isolated, both from the outside
world and from each other. As a result, smuggling during this period can be broadly
distinguished between what might be called “international” smuggling involving Taiwan,
Hong Kong and even Japan, and “intra-Ryukyuan” smuggling involving the four main islandgroups. The latter in particular acted as a catalyst that helped economically reintegrate the
Ryukus at a time when inter-island trade was treated more like foreign trade. Those who
participated in the intra-Ryukyuan operations, such as Ibusuki Kenshichi from
Tokunoshima of the Amami Islands, believed they were promoting free trade, notsmuggling. Ibusuki was twenty-one years of age when he began buying goods from black
marketers in Amami and reselling them for a profit in Okinawa, among other places. On
several occasions, Ibusuki arranged with his friends who were employed as the crew
aboard the official ferry liner to assist him in loading on board black market goods that hewas sneaking into and out of Okinawa. Ibusuki claims that smugglers like himself“supported and reinvigorated the Amamian economy in the immediate postwar years.”36
Intra-Ryukyuan smuggling became so widespread that the military government introduced
a series of reform measures in 1948 to deal with the poor state of the economy. One of themain tasks was to fight rampant inflation, caused in part by large amounts of Japanese yenPutting Okinawa at the Center82

smuggled back into the Ryukyus by repatriates, thus further fueling the black markets. In
May the military government established the Bank of the Ryukyus, functioning as thecentral bank for the four main island groups and thus better regulating the flow of money.
Then in July the B-Yen currency became the unitary legal tender throughout the Ryukyus,
and all Japanese yen still in circulation was converted into this military scrip.37 In Octobermilitary government officials finally began to re-introduce a free enterprise system in the
Ryukyus. This meant eliminating price controls and rationing “in an attempt to transformthe black markets into a white market.”38 It also meant that businesses were permitted toengage in free trade, to a limited degree, and inter-island trade within the Ryukyus was
slowly reactivated. The material needs that drove so many residents to join the vast andgrowing smuggling networks at last convinced American authorities to dismantle some of
the internal barriers that debilitated the Ryukyuan economy.
Meanwhile, the international smuggling trade continued to expand through thedevelopment of tight-knit island networks. One outstanding example of such a smuggling
network was the Itoman fishing industry based on the southern tip of Okinawa. Before thewar, the Itoman fishermen were well known for establishing wide-ranging fishingcommunities as far north as Izu in Japan and the Ogasawara Islands, and as far south as thePhilippines, Micronesian islands, and Singapore.39 The Itoman fishermen utilized theseprewar networks to build smuggling bases not only within the Ryukyus but all along the
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan routes. Using profits made from the lucrative Hong Kongroute, the Itoman fishermen expanded their smuggling activities to Kikaijima in the Amami
Islands en route to Kagoshima, where they could obtain Japanese goods. In Kagoshima, theItoman community managed inconspicuous inns near the harbor for accommodating fellow
islanders, thus evading the watchful eyes of Japanese police. With money earned from rent,
the Itoman residents of Kagoshima obtained second-hand fishing boats that could be usedas smuggling ships.40 Kagoshima thus became the front gate of the so-called Yamato trade,which quickly extended to other major Japanese harbor cities such as Osaka, Kobe,
Hamamatsu, and Yokohama.
The large profits made by those engaged in the Yamato trade highlight the stark contrast
between occupied Japan and the Ryukyu Islands in their respective economies. An Asahi
Shinbun article dated December 31, 1949 reported that incidents of smuggling and themonetary value involved in the Hanshin area that year reached the highest levels since theend of the war. The goods seized included rubber, drugs, sugar, and machine parts worth
an estimated total of 73 million yen at market price, but which could have been sold on theblack market for as high as 500 million yen.41 Even though the overall pace of postwar
recovery was still sluggish at this point, Japan remained the land of economic opportunity
in the region, attracting smugglers from nearby territories. In contrast, the division andisolation of the Ryukyus, and US preoccupation with the islands as a military base, had leftthe entire archipelago a neglected wasteland with little prospect of economic growth. Four
years after the US military invasion the islands had not approached self-sufficiency in foodproduction, and the rationing system continued to feed a large portion of the population.42
The efforts of many residents to escape from such wretched circumstances lured them into
the profitable Yamato trade, thus building underground networks that linked them back toJapan again.

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83

Okinawa: ‘Keystone of the Pacific’ and America’s Cold War Boundaries
After years of apathy and neglect that earned US-occupied Okinawa the nickname, the“forgotten island,” the Cold War unfolding in the Asia-Pacific region helped determine thefuture political disposition of the Ryukyu Islands. US policy towards the Ryukyus wasoverhauled in October 1948 when the National Security Council (NSC) decided to develop
the archipelago as a strategic base for containing the spread of communism in the region.
This fateful decision meant that the Ryukyus were soon included in the American defense
perimeter, thus militarily linking the islands to Japan. In March 1949 General MacArthur
referred to the Asia-Pacific as “an Anglo-Saxon lake” in which the US line of defense “starts
from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu archipelago . . . then it bends backthrough Japan and the Aleutian island chain to Alaska.”43 The delineation of America’s new
Cold War boundaries in the region also signaled an end to the isolation of the Ryukyus andthe beginning of militarization there. Nowhere was this more dramatically effected than in
Okinawa, which was transformed into a huge military base complex that would soon be
dubbed the “Keystone of the Pacific.”
The internal and external boundaries of the Ryukyus had to be reconfigured after the NSC
in early May 1949 called for maximizing political and economic security in the islands. Maj.
Gen. Joseph R. Sheetz began spearheading a comprehensive set of reform measures as soon
as he arrived in Okinawa as the new Commanding General of RYCOM. On October 1, Sheetz
issued a directive to establish a centralized Ryukyuan government in order to reduce theautonomous power of local civilian governments in the four main island groups.44 The
Provisional Government Assembly called for in this directive eventually paved the way forthe federal system embodied in the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, which gathered
representatives from the four guntō [island group] governments.45 Sheetz also called for areorganization of the military government along the lines of SCAP’s “indirect”
administration in Japan, so that American civil administrators could operate throughRyukyuan governmental authorities. As a result, when the United States Civil
Administration for the Ryukyus (USCAR) replaced the military government in December
1950, it provided counterparts for subordinate departments in the Ryukyuan
government.46 Furthermore, Sheetz implemented new economic regulations aimed atstabilizing inflation and eliminating smuggling and black market activities. In February
1950 the Ryukyu-Japan Commercial Trade Agreement was signed, resulting in the lawful
circulation of daily convenience goods and thus decreasing the significance of smuggling
among residents.47
Although residents of the Ryukyus welcomed what they called “the just governance ofSheetz” (Shiitsu zensei),48 in reality the groundwork for the development of a military baseeconomy in Okinawa was being laid. Starting with Sheetz, to the extent that American
policies were directed toward economic growth and welfare, they pivoted on theconstruction of US military bases and their related industries. Americans first beganpouring money into Okinawa shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in
October 1949. Not only did Okinawa receive the Pentagon’s $58 million program forstrengthening its military reservations but also increased appropriations authorized by the
US Congress in the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) funds.49 The newly
brokered Ryukyu-Japan Commercial Trade Agreement secured the GARIOA funds for thePutting Okinawa at the Center

84

construction of military bases in Okinawa, much of which was spent on importing large
amounts of Japanese products. This carefully crafted appropriation of government funds
was dubbed the “double usage of the dollar,” aimed at boosting both Okinawa’s and Japan’srecovery, with Japanese industry providing the engine of growth.50
The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 accelerated the militarization of Okinawa
and the re-integration of the Ryukyu Islands into the Japanese economy, two policies thatwent hand-in-hand. Both the Ryukyus and Japan immediately became an integral part of
the American war effort as forward deployment bases for B-29 bombers and new F-61s
and F-80s taking off for the Korean peninsula. Although both occupied areas also provided
goods and services called tokujū (“special procurements”) for US military forces, economic
recovery based on the resulting war boom developed unevenly in each place. Most
industrial sectors in Japan greatly benefited from American dollars spent on these tokujū,
such as manufactured metal products and finished textile goods, as well as services such as
repairs on US tanks and aircraft.51 This accounted for what were called the “textile industry
boom” and the “metal industry boom” in Japan where standards of living gradually
increased.
The Ryukyu Islands also experienced a war boom, especially in the form of a “construction
boom,” albeit with a catch. Construction of US military bases in Okinawa was mostly
contracted out to mainland Japanese companies as well as those from the United States.
The Japanese government aggressively financed Japanese construction companies, which
accounted for more than half of those doing the construction, reaping great profits. The
local population primarily benefited from the construction boom beginning in November
1951, when thousands of Okinawan laborers were hired for construction projects.52 The
low cost of local labor was the most valuable commodity in the Ryukyus as far as theAmerican military was concerned. By one measure, Japanese laborers on US military bases
in Okinawa earned, at a minimum, five times more than Okinawan laborers.53 In contrast to
the revival of the Japanese economic powerhouse, Okinawa was thus being rebuilt within
the framework of an economy centered and dependent on the US military bases.
Besides their labor power, Okinawans had one other distinctive commodity for export –scrap metal – which accounted for the so-called “scrap boom.” The Battle of Okinawa,otherwise known as the “storm of steel,” had left behind the rusting skeletons of countless
American tanks, jeeps, combat planes, and half-sunken vessels.54 RYCOM initially offered
Nationalist China these rusted relics of war machines so that they could be recycled andused against the Communists in the Chinese civil war. Enterprising Okinawans profited
from smuggling out their share of scrap metals through the Hong Kong route. The Korean
War then replaced the Chinese civil war as a greater source of profit, as Japanese industries
were willing to pay a high price for scrap that could be converted into their own
tokujū industry.55 Before long, entire families of Okinawans left home together to gather
this valuable commodity, this time smuggling it via the Japan route. Although USCAR
strictly prohibited smuggling what they claimed was the property of the US military,
residents continued to dig up scrap metal wherever they could find it and sold it on theblack market.56
The US military redoubled its efforts to stamp out smuggling during the Korean War,Augustine: Border Crossers and Resistance to U.S. Military Rule in the Ryukyus

85

especially after valuable scrap metals and even senka such as pistols, machine guns, andgrenades began to be stolen and smuggled out of Okinawa.57 Just four days after theoutbreak of the Korean War, the military government announced new regulations against
local residents leaving the Ryukyu Islands without permission. The announcement
reflected US concerns that non-ferrous metals such as bombshells and other ammunition
smuggled out of their military bases might end up in enemy hands. On August 31, 1950 the
military government ordered all local newspapers such as the Uruma Shinpō (later,
the Ryukyu Shimpō) to publish warnings against smugglers, illegal entrants, and owners
and crew of unregistered ships.58 In addition, the US Navy periodically mobilized landing
ships (LSTs) – pilot ships of over 15,000-ton class – for apprehending smugglers. The
defense perimeter of these ships covered Kuchinoshima to the north to the shores of
Yonaguni to the south.59 In fact, maintaining strict control over these islands on thenorthern and southern borders of the Ryukyu Islands emerged as a top priority for the
military government during the Korean War.
From about 1948, military government and SCAP officials alike became increasingly
concerned with another element in illegal border-crossings; namely, what they perceived
to be “communist infiltration” into their respective zones of occupation. SCAP’s Civil
Intelligence Section, established in early 1948, functioned like the CIA in occupied Japan. 60
The primary responsibility of its Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) was to identify andmonitor “subversive elements” who might commit “acts prejudicial to the Occupation.” The
CIC in the Ryukyu Islands was under the control of RYCOM. Like the Far East Command
based in Japan, RYCOM was thoroughly committed to the containment of “communism”
while preventing political activists from infiltrating its command. According to Kinjō Ryōan,
who was employed by the CIC, “the CIC was not interested in smuggling per se. Instead, it
was concerned with people who entered [the Ryukyus] from the outside, since spies wereusing smuggling ships to move about.”61 The military government lent the four Guntō
police patrol cruisers to apprehend smugglers, while replacing ineffective civilian policewith American Military Police and CIC personnel. As a result of these stepped-up measures,
an Okinawa Times article quoted official figures of captured smuggling vessels jumping
from 19 in 1949 to 109 ships just through August of 1950.62
In the midst of growing concern over “communist infiltration,” a new set of travel
regulations euphemistically called the “passport system” replaced repatriation between
Japan and the Ryukyu Islands. Allegedly granting special permission to a limited number of
temporary visitors “for compassionate reasons,” in reality SCAP and military government
authorities began screening out political activists branded as agitators. Starting in August1949 travel from Japan to the Ryukyus was permitted to individuals who were not deemeda security risk, based on lengthy investigations into their backgrounds. In order to obtain a
travel permit, a police report had to be filed to determine whether or not the applicant had
any political affiliations deemed detrimental to American interests. Upon receiving thesecurity clearance, applicants were required to sign an oath swearing that they wereentering the Ryukyus for legitimate purposes such as visiting family members. In order toemphasize this point, travelers were warned that they would be under constantsurveillance, and that any violations would receive immediate punishment.63 SimilarPutting Okinawa at the Center86

regulations were adopted in December 1949 for residents of the Ryukyus requesting
special permission to travel to Japan.
The passport system highlighted unresolved questions regarding the legal status ofresidents in the Ryukyus. When Okinawan and Amamian residents of Japan traveled totheir home islands, they were required to go through immigration procedures. A Ryukyuan
immigration official inspected their passports issued by the Japanese government, which
listed them as Japanese nationals. On the other hand, when Ryukyuan residents traveled toJapan, they carried passports issued by USCAR that listed each individual as a “Resident of
the Ryukyus,” without reference to their nationality. Although the Japanese government
pushed to have residents in the Ryukyus recognized as Japanese nationals,64 SCAP and
USCAR avoided addressing complicated legal questions surrounding nationality andcitizenship. Furthermore, CIC agents monitoring immigration procedures were moreconcerned about the political orientation and activities of border-crossers, including those
who espoused reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan.
Cross-Border Reversion Movements in Okinawa and Amami
The incorporation of the Ryukyu Islands into America’s Cold War boundaries meant closer
ties and greater access to Japan, but the border at the 30th parallel still separated the twosides. The possibility of the Ryukyus’ return to Japanese sovereignty was anathema to the
US military, which aimed to retain the chain of islands as a valuable strategic asset. In theimmediate postwar years, most residents in the Ryukyus were too preoccupied withrebuilding their lives to give much thought to political issues, and the few who did
endorsed autonomy and independence from Japan. Nevertheless, by the early 1950s thereversion issue rapidly emerged to the forefront of public debate in Okinawa, and those
who had journeyed to Japan, legally or otherwise, helped spur on this process.
Some of the earliest border-crossers were actually political activists who later became
influential figures in the reversion movement. Yoshida Shien, for example, was working for
the Okinawa Prefectural Office in Fukuoka, Japan, when he illegally entered Okinawa in late
July 1946.65 The Prefectural Office entrusted Yoshida to embark on a secret mission toinvestigate postwar conditions in Okinawa, since little information was available in Japan
about what had transpired since the Battle of Okinawa. Entering Okinawa aboard a small
steam-engine boat disguised as a fishing vessel, Yoshida attempted to meet Shikiya Kōshin,his prewar colleague and then-Governor of Okinawa. Although Shikiya declined to be seen
publicly with a “stowaway” like Yoshida, other Okinawan officials secretly exchanged
information about existing conditions in Okinawa and Japan.66 Upon his return to Japan,
Yoshida was appointed as the new director of the Tokyo Office of Okinawa Prefecture.
Having witnessed firsthand the devastation and poor living conditions in Okinawa under
US military rule, Yoshida soon became an enthusiastic supporter of reversion to Japan.
Yoshida Shien was one of the few Okinawan residents in Japan who advocated reversion in
the early postwar years, but hardly any individual or organization within the Ryukyu
Islands did so.67 Instead, the Navy’s initial policy of dismantling Japanese institutions won
the support of many Okinawans, as reflected in Governor Shikiya’s inaugural address
promising to replace Japanese rule by building a “golden age for Okinawa.” However, as
Okinawans eager for self-government began to criticize Shikiya for failing to deliver on thisAugustine: Border Crossers and Resistance to U.S. Military Rule in the Ryukyus

87

promise, the growing opposition against him led to the formation of the first politicalparties in 1947. On June 15, Nakasone Genwa founded the Okinawa Democratic Alliance(Minshu Dōmei), advocating greater autonomy for Okinawa, independent from Japan. On
July 20, Senaga Kamejirō founded the Okinawa People’s Party (Jinmintō), which was evenmore explicit about the need to “destroy Japan’s military clique,” “establish populargovernment,” and “liberate the Okinawan race.”68 These and other political parties initiallyshunned Japan while welcoming American-style democracy, although their quest forautonomy would later put them on a collision course with the military government.
The repatriation of progressive Okinawans who were politically active in Japan proved
instrumental in the formation of opposition parties. In particular, members of the League of
Okinawans (Okinawajin Renmei) in Japan who repatriated after mid-1946 lentorganizational experience to emerging local political figures like Nakasone Genwa informing the Democratic Alliance.69 The League was formed on November 11, 1945 toprotect the livelihood of Okinawan residents throughout Japan, and soon espoused politicalindependence for Okinawa. The League was also closely associated with the Japan
Communist Party (JCP), which was reemerging as a powerful political force under theleadership of Tokuda Kyūichi, himself an Okinawan who supported independence. At
Tokuda’s initiative, in February 1946 the JCP sent a message to the League of Okinawans inTokyo celebrating the detachment of the Ryukyus from Japan. Okinawans who either
worked together with Tokuda or were otherwise involved in the socialist movement andunion activism in prewar Japan also repatriated to Okinawa. Many joined forces with
Senaga Kamejirō and the People’s Party.70 As a result, CIC officials subjected the People’s
Party to constant surveillance, although no evidence was uncovered at the time that
directly linked the Party to the JCP.
Repatriation produced even more direct political links between progressive forces in the
Amami Islands and Japan, leading to Amamian support for reversion long before any
political organization did so in Okinawa. In December 1946, for example, JCP member andAmami native Kuru Gizō repatriated from Japan, after receiving Tokuda Kyūichi’s blessing
to establish a communist party in Amami.71 The following April Kuru formed theunderground Amami Communist Party (ACP) with the help of Nakamura Yasutarō, editorof Amami Times and a Marxist who had endured years of incarceration for his beliefs in
prewar Japan. Nakamura subsequently managed to smuggle in official publications of the
JCP, such as Zen’ei and Akahata, aboard repatriation ships coming into Amami.72 Although
the JCP officially advocated independence for Okinawa and Amami, the ACP came out insupport of reversion, due to the strong sense of identification with Japan it shared with the
majority of fellow islanders. In response to the news of a possible early peace treaty
between the Allied Powers and Japan in mid-1947, an ACP-affiliated youth organization
helped organize a public rally where many endorsed Amami’s return to Japan.73
Several years later, the ACP joined other political and social organizations in Amami thatpushed forward the reversion issue to the forefront of their common agenda.
Popular resistance against the military government’s empty promises of democratization,
coupled with poor economic conditions, led to protests in 1948-49 that evolved into thereversion movement of the early 1950s.74 In August 1948, for example, Okinawa
dockworkers at the US Navy port in Naha organized a general strike to protest against

Putting Okinawa at the Center88

harsh labor conditions and low wages. When RYCOM responded by closing all community
ration stores and threatened to cut off food rations, the labor strike quickly transformed
into a food ration struggle (shokuryō tōsō) throughout Okinawa.75 Although the ration
stores were eventually reopened, RYCOM announced in January 1949 that the price ofrationed food would be increased by three times in order to reign in chronic inflation.
Nakasone Genwa and Senaga Kamejirō immediately formed a popular front, organizing
mass meetings and circulating petitions. They ultimately convinced all twenty-threemembers of the Okinawa Assembly to resign in protest.76 The resulting food price crisis
transcended not only class and politics but also geographical boundaries among the fourmain island groups, affecting residents throughout the Ryukyus. In Amami Oshima, public
officials who could no longer afford to live off of their low salaries resigned and joined theblack market, and some police officers even reportedly walked off of their job to become
captains of smuggling boats.77
While the majority of those who engaged in smuggling were motivated by economic
reasons, increasing numbers did so as a form of political and social protest. For example,
the military government’s neglect of basic educational needs drove teachers to join the
Yamato trade route to smuggle in teaching materials. In Amami Oshima, an incident
involving two schoolteachers who smuggled back Japanese textbooks in October 1948
received an outpouring of public sympathy when they were fired from their jobs forillegally entering Japan.78 Then in December 1949, a member of the Okinawa Youth Alliancein Japan smuggled into Okinawa sixty copies of Iha Fuyū’s Okinawa Rekishi
Monogatari (The Tale of Okinawan History). Known as the “father of Okinawans studies,”
this book was the culmination of Iha’s lifelong work on Okinawa.79 At a time when Okinawa
lay in ruins and under US military rule, these smuggled books served as history textbooks
for teachers and a source of pride and inspiration for Okinawan activists. Often becoming
teachers upon illegally entering Okinawa, members of the Youth Alliance and the League of
Okinawans smuggled in copies of the new pacifist and democratic Constitution of Japan.80
Thus finding a way to keep one another informed, schoolteachers soon emerged as central
figures in the reversion movement.
As Okinawan sociologist Ishihara Masaie demonstrated in his seminal work on senka andsmuggling, the Yamato trade evolved into social and political networks between residents
in the Ryukyus and Okinawan residents in Japan.81 Countering the censorship imposed by
U.S military authorities on either side of the 30th parallel, Okinawan smugglers broughtback uncensored information about Japan, both in print and by word of mouth. These
returning border-crossers spread the news, based on their first-hand accounts, of SCAP’s
democratization as well as the economic recovery of Japan that benefited Okinawan
residents there but which was denied in the Ryukyus under US military rule. They
particularly noted the booming Japanese economy during the Korean War, making
Okinawans aware of the widening gap between Japan proper and the Ryukyuan economy.
Once local residents recognized that US policy towards the Ryukyus was centered
overwhelmingly on protecting its military assets, they began voicing their desire forreversion in order to gain political rights and economic aid from the Japanese government.
Although a few individuals in Japan had been advocating the return of the Ryukyu Islands
to Japan, Amamian organizations were the first to lead a sustained reversion movement. As

Augustine: Border Crossers and Resistance to U.S. Military Rule in the Ryukyus

89soon as news broke in late 1949 that the Allied powers were engaged in peace treaty
negotiations with the Japanese government, Amami residents and those in Japan beganorganizing to support reversion. Shortly after an Amami youth group in Miyazaki
Prefecture publicly appealed for reversion in mid-February 1950, a student association inTokyo and a youth group in Naze, Amami Oshima responded by holding similar rallies.82
These groups also initiated petition drives that were soon adopted by the Zenkoku Amami
Rengō Sōhonbu (Federation of Amami Islanders’ Association), or Amami Rengō. On
November 15 the Amami Rengō sent a four-page petition to General MacArthur explainingthat Amamians were Japanese nationals, not Ryukyuans, and that they opposed theindefinite continuation of US military rule. The Amami Ōshima Nihon Fukki Kyōgikai(Amami Oshima Reversion Council), or Fukkyō, formed on February 14, 1951, immediatelybegan collecting signatures of all residents over the age of fourteen calling for the return of
the islands to Japan. By April 10, Fukkyo had collected 139,348 signatures, or 99.8 percentof Amamians, who supported the early return to Japan.83
Just as the underground flow of people and information between Japan and Amami helped
unite the cross-border reversion movement, a similar strategy was soon adopted in
Okinawa. More than a month after the Fukkyō was formed in Amami, the first organized
reversion movement was launched in Okinawa on March 29 with the formation of the
Okinawa Nihon Fukki Sokushin Kiseikai (Association for the Promotion of Reversion to
Japan), or Fukki Kiseikai. Following the example set by Fukkyō in Amami, the Fukki
Kiseikai circulated petitions throughout Okinawa calling for reversion to Japan. By July
1951, 199,000 people, roughly 72 percent of the electorate in Okinawa had signed thesepetitions, which were sent to Japanese and American delegates attending the San Francisco
Peace Conference.84
Although Okinawan activists harnessed their own cross-border networks with proreversion forces in Japan, they were also spurred on by the surging momentum of thereversion movement in neighboring Amami. News of the latest developments in Amami
was readily accessible, since as many as 50,000 Amamians entered Okinawa between 1950
and 1953 to work as laborers on the expanding US military bases.
Political activists from Amami as well as from Japan often disguised themselves as militarybase laborers in order to enter Okinawa, thus helping to spread the reversion movement
throughout the Ryukyus.85 The defiant act of crossing the 30th parallel border once again
served an important role in the Amami reversion movement after the radio broadcast on
July 10, 1951 detailed the final draft of the Peace Treaty. According to Article 3 of the draft,the United States sought the right to place the Ryukyu Islands under American trusteeship,
implying that the islands’ executive, legislative, and judiciary powers could indefinitely becontrolled by the US. Upon organizing two large-scale citizen rallies, Fukkyō began
conducting island-wide hunger strikes and decided to send delegates to Japan to make one
final appeal for reversion directly to Prime Minister Yoshida. On August 10, eleven Fukkyō
delegates from Amami illegally entered Japan to join hands with Amami Rengō, capturing
national attention at this critical stage in the reversion movement.86 One group wasarrested and imprisoned for illegal entry, while the others managed to reach the Fukkyō
office in Kagoshima, from where they found safe passage through Osaka before arriving at
the Amami Rengō’s Tokyo headquarters. In the meantime, members of the Fukkyō andPutting Okinawa at the Center

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Amami Rengō contacted major Japanese news agencies such as Asahi and Mainichi, whichgave extensive and sympathetic coverage to these delegates.87 Riding a wave of increasing
public support, the delegates from Amami were able to meet with Prime Minister Yoshida,
Japanese Diet members, and SCAP officials, making a strong case for the reversion of theirislands when Japan regained its sovereignty.
Conclusions: The Ryukyu Islands Re-divided
The San Francisco Peace Treaty signed on September 8, 1951 spelled the end of the Allied
Occupation of Japan, and its Article 3 legitimated the division between postwar Japan andthe Ryukyu Islands. Although most residents of the Ryukyus were disillusioned by theprospects of indefinite American military rule, the reversion movement in Amami Oshima
only intensified as a result. In fact, the on-going Amami reversion movement was receivingsuch sympathetic media coverage in Japan and abroad that it prompted the US government
to conduct two investigative studies of the Amami Islands. The first was a public opinion
survey compiled by USCAR’s Civil Information and Education (CI&E) office, which foundthat the overwhelming support for reversion was due to a combination of: a) feelings ofclose affinity and identification with the Japanese people and culture; b) a tendency todissociate Amami from Okinawa and other Guntos; c) a belief that a trusteeshipadministration for Amami Oshima would be unsatisfactory. The survey concluded thatfavorable attitudes toward reversion “seem to be too intense and deep-seated to bechanged overnight by any feasible information program.”88 Instead of launching a
propaganda campaign in favor of trusteeship, the second investigative report compiled byanthropologist Douglas Haring recommended returning the islands to Japan. Detailing his
findings that the people of the Amami Islands were “culturally more Japanese than
Okinawans,” Haring suggested that the reunion of the islands to Japan could help win backthe hearts and minds of Amamians.89 Unbeknownst to Amamians at the time, these reports
would soon convince US policymakers to readjust the territorial boundaries of the
Ryukyus.
Seven and a half years after the detachment of the Amami Islands from Kagoshima
Prefecture, the US government in August 1953 declared its intention to return the islandgroup to Japan. By then the Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that the Northern Ryukyus
were of minor strategic value, especially in contrast to Okinawa, the “keystone of the
Pacific.” The US military’s initial interest in the deep-water base at Koniya Bay in the
Oshima Straits was ultimately deemed irrelevant. On the other hand, RYCOM from late1949 put more value in the airfields that were being developed in central and southern
Okinawa. The fact that the rugged and mountainous terrain of Amami Oshima wasunsuitable for airfields made it easier for the US military to dispense with the territory.
When the Amami Islands finally reverted to Japan on December 25, 1953, the externalboundary of the Ryukyu Islands retracted to the archipelago south of 27° North Latitude.90
The Amami Islands were thus transferred across the new borderline and back to Japan,
while the Ryukyus remained under American military rule. Although the US military’s
strategic and security policies were paramount, the Amami reversion movement wasnevertheless one of the most successful sociopolitical movements in postwar Japan.91
The effectiveness of the Amami reversion movement can be characterized by its
unwavering dedication, high level of organization and, most importantly, the strong

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identification with Japan and the cross-border unity with Amami residents in Japan. These
traits rested on firm historical ties between Amami and Japan, as well as cultural bondsthat simultaneously distanced Amamians from Okinawans. Douglas Haring found that
Amamians themselves were often “too close to the issues to see them in perspective, butthere is no question about their basic loyalties and complete psychological identification
with Japan.”92 Haring also observed that throughout the prewar period, Amamians seekingsocial mobility moved to Kagoshima and beyond until nearly every Amami family was said
to have a close relative living in Japan. In the early 1950s, the Amami residents in Japan,
estimated at a population of 200,000, was nearly the same size as the 219,000 people
residing in the Amami Islands. These large and active Amami communities in Kagoshima,
Hanshin, and Tokyo succeeded in linking their reversion movement with the one unfolding
within Amami. In this process, those conducting hunger strikes in Amami also received
strong support from the authorities in Kagoshima Prefecture, which lobbied the central
government for Amami’s re-incorporation into Japan.93
In contrast to Amami, US military authorities exploited Okinawa’s ambivalent identification
with Japan in its reversion movement. While support for reversion was strong in Okinawa,
those with bitter memories of Japanese prejudice and discriminatory treatment towards
them had mixed feelings. For example, a newspaper report on public opinion concerning
reversion captures this ambivalence. As one Okinawan explained, “those who oppose
American rule talk about racial prejudice and other related problems, but I believe thatsuch things will be much worse under the Japanese.”94 Ever since the OSS report in 1944
recommended utilizing cleavages between Okinawans and Japanese in psychological
warfare, the military government attempted to foster a “Ryukyuan” identity to justify theseparation and military rule in the islands. Although most residents may not haveperceived themselves as “Ryukyuan,” the promise of American-style democracy and selfgovernment in the immediate aftermath of war contributed to the wavering identity of
Okinawans.95 The Democratic Alliance thus continued to champion independence while theSocialist Party called for an American trusteeship going into the elections in March 1951.
Even the pro-reversion coalition in Okinawa, the Fukki Kiseikai, split up shortly after thesigning of the Peace Treaty in September, as the movement came to a standstill at a time
when it was gaining momentum in Amami.
The fact that the reversion movement did not emerge in either Okinawa or Amami until theearly 1950s demonstrates that questions of identity alone fail to capture the full range ofmotivations behind its supporters. Residents in the Ryukyu Islands expected and actively
demanded greater political autonomy only to be disillusioned by details of the peace treaty
negotiations, which revealed that the United States planned to continue its militaryoccupation. The petitions circulated throughout the Ryukyus in 1951 were essentially areferendum against US military rule and its draconian ordinances, which convinced
residents that indefinite occupation was actually akin to colonial rule. Reversion to Japan,
on the other hand, promised democratic rights enshrined in the new Japanese Constitution,
as well as the full benefits of citizenship. Pragmatic considerations of how to access
Japanese health insurance, postal savings, pensions, and old-age benefits – all of which
residents of the former Okinawa Prefecture were legally entitled to before 1945 – werecrucial for supporters of the reversion movement.

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Economic considerations also motivated residents in the Ryukyu Islands to support
reversion, as many hoped to reap the benefits of the resurgent Japanese economy rather
than remain a ward of the US military base economy. The political and economic barriers
erected by the military government after the Pacific War suffocated the island economy, atleast until the emergence of the intra-Ryukyuan smuggling trade. Against all odds, isolatedislanders transformed a fledgling barter trade into a thriving cross-border black market
trade, spurring economic interaction among the four island groups. The military
government was forced to respond by introducing economic reform measures in 1948 and1949 that included re-introducing a free enterprise system and inter-island trade. On theother hand, those engaged in the Yamato smuggling trade returned with news of just how
much the Japanese economy was benefiting from the Korean War, as evidenced by the large
profits some of them made in Japan. The widening gap between the burgeoning Japanese
economy and the military base economy in Okinawa, in turn, led many residents to support
reversion. As one Okinawan economist bluntly explained, instead of advocating reversion
because “Okinawans are Japanese,” he supported reversion because “economic
rehabilitation in Okinawa can be sped up by reuniting with Japan.”96
The Yamato trade route between the Ryukyu Islands and Japan once dominated bysmuggling thus began to share the scene with the cross-border reversion movement thatbegan in the early 1950s. This indicated that the local residents’ economic struggle forsurvival through smuggling was replaced by a socio-political resistance manifested by theunfolding reversion movement. Political activists were now illegally traveling between
Japan and Okinawa, and between Japan and Amami, often on the same route and sameboats as those who were smuggling black market goods. Just as smugglers in the Ryukyus
utilized their contacts with the Okinawan and Amamian communities in Japan, thoseresidents in Japan also sneaked into the Ryukyus to investigate conditions in their homeislands. This two-way flow of people, goods, and information enabled reversion activists inJapan and in Okinawa/Amami to coordinate their activities. Smuggling and the reversion
movement were two forms of resistance against USCAR’s tight border controls and travel
restrictions, as well as an overall resistance against the policy of separation between Japanand the Ryukyus.
Even after the reversion of the Amami Islands in 1953, residents in the Ryukyus continued
to challenge the external boundaries that denied them free passage into Japan. Ishihara
Masaie has keenly observed that the annual “4.28 rally at sea” (4.28 kaijō shūkai) held
during the height of the Okinawa reversion movement in the 1960s was reminiscent ofearlier smuggling operations.97

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Boats carrying Okinawan and Japanese activists convened at sea on the 27th parallel on
April 28, the “day of humiliation,” when Japan regained its sovereignty, divided from
Okinawa. Many of these activists also protested the continuing US military presence inJapan and Okinawa, both of which served as forward deployment bases for the Americanled war that was then raging in Vietnam. These actions at sea can be seen as an extension of
the earlier period of economic and political resistance. The demonstrations at sea
symbolized their rejection of the border, the division from Japan, and continuing US
military rule in the Ryukyus.
Matthew Augustine is a Ph.D. candidate in history at Columbia University completing a
dissertation on the transnational history of border-crossers and decolonization in Japan
during the Allied occupation period. His article on the repatriation of Korean residents andtheir illegal entry into occupied Japan appears in Zainichi Chosenjinshi Kenkyu. He can bereached at mra2002@columbia.edu

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Notes
1 For recent scholarship on the subject, see Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “The Frontiers of

Democracy: Migration, Border Controls, and Citizenship in Postwar Japan,” JCAS
Symposium Series 22 (2005).
2 Separate policy studies were prepared for such Japanese-held island territories as the
Kurile Islands, Bonin Islands, and the Spratly Islands.
3 This introduction to the Territorial Subcommittee’s report, “T-343 Liuchiu (Ryukyu)
Islands,” is cited from Robert D. Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem:
Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations (New York: Garland, 2001), p. 52.
4 The report ended by considering three policy proposals for the Ryukyu Islands: 1)
transfer to China; 2) international administration; and 3) conditional retention by Japan.
For further details, see Ota Masahide, “The U.S. Occupation of Okinawa and Postwar
Reforms in Japan Proper.” In Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (eds.),
Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp. 296-297.
5 The OSS, which was the predecessor of what later became the CIA, had been conducting
ethnographic research on the large immigrant Okinawan community in Hawaii since thespring of 1944. A copy of the final report by the OSS can be found in Okinawa kenritsu
toshokan shiryō henshūhitsu (ed.), Okinawa kenshi shiryō hen 2, The Okinawas of the Loo
Choo Islands (Yūgen gaisha san insatsu, 1996).
6 According to the OSS report, “Psychological Warfare in its various aspects might well be
brought to bear upon the cleavage . . . between the two Japanese groups, each with its own
physical type, its own history, its own dynasties, mores and attitudes.” The Okinawas of the
Loo Choo Islands, p. 122.
7 David John Obermiller, “The U.S. Occupation of Okinawa: Politicizing and Contesting
Okinawan Identity, 1945-1955” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Iowa, 2006), pp. 87-89.
8 The directive also stated that all property belonging to the Japanese government andmilitary was to be treated as public property and controlled as military requirements
dictated. Directive from CINCPAC-CINCPOA to CG Tenth U.S. Field Army, subject: “Political,
Economic and Financial Directive for Military Government in the Occupied Islands of the
Nansei Shoto and Adjacent Waters,” March 1, 1945. A copy of this directive can be found in
Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950 (Center of Military
History, United States Army, 1987), pp. 262-271.
9 This is the title of a book written by Urasaki Jun, who was an official employed by
Okinawa Prefecture. Urasaki Jun, Kieta Okinawaken (Okinawa jiji shuppansha, 1965). The
division between Japan and the Ryukyus was actually formalized on July 2, 1945 when
Japanese military officials signed surrender documents at Kadena, Okinawa.
10 Okinawans hardly ever referred to themselves as “Ryukyuan,” many having seen throughthe US military’s adoption of this name as part of a heavy-handed effort to separate themfrom Japan. Furthermore, Okinawans were disinclined to identify themselves as “Ryukyuan”
because mainland Japanese since the prewar era had used the name, Ryukyu-jin, as apejorative term implying that they were inferior to the Japanese. The indigenous name for
Okinawans is Uchinaachu, a term that was discouraged from usage by those who advocatedassimilation to Japan before the war, but is used today by Okinawans who are proud of
their distinctive identity. I would like to thank Steve Rabson for this clarification.
11 Okinawan men and women over twenty-five years of age were eligible to vote, aAugustine: Border Crossers and Resistance to U.S. Military Rule in the Ryukyus

95

historical event that preceded universal suffrage in Japan by three months, as enfranchised
women turned out to vote in high numbers.
12 Quoted from Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa
and U.S.-Japanese Relations (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2000), p. 34.
13 Geographically speaking, as shown in Figure 1, Okinawa and Amami Oshima are the twolargest islands among what the Japanese refer to as the Nansei Islands; the former belongs
to the subgroup called Okinawa Islands while the latter are referred to as the Satsunan
Islands.The Nansei Islands consist of the entire island chain southwest of Kagoshima
Prefecture in Kyushu, Japan. The Amami Islands are located approximately halfway
between Kagoshima and Okinawa, while the Tokara Islands are closer to Kagoshima thanthey are to the Amami Islands.
14 In fact, the Amami and Tokara Islands had not been a part of the Ryukyus since 1609. As
a result of a military expedition led by Shimazu Iehisa against the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1609,
the Amami and Tokara Islands were incorporated into the Satsuma domain. From 1609
until shortly after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Amami and Tokara Islands remained apart of the Satsuma domain, which also dominated the Ryukyu Kingdom. When the Meiji
government established modern-day prefectures in 1871, the Amami and Tokara Islands
were included in Kagoshima Prefecture while the Ryukyu Islands south of 27° North
Latitude became known as Okinawa Prefecture in 1879.
15 This SCAP directive, “Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying
Areas from Japan” (SCAPIN 677), formally separated the Ryukyus, the Ogasawaras andother former Japanese territories.
16 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, pp. 111-112.
17 Namihira Tsuneo, “Amerika gunseika no sengo fukkō: 1950 nen zengo no okinawa,
soshite amami.” In Nakano Toshio and Yakabi Osamu (eds.), Okinawa no senryō to Nihon nofukkō: shokuminchishugi wa ikani keizoku shitaka (Seikyūsha, 2006), pp. 221-223.
18 Following the Nimitz Proclamation that administratively separated the Ryukyus fromJapan, Navy Military Government Proclamation No. 4 prohibited foreign trade and financialtransactions.
19 The free movement of residents in Okinawa during daytime was first permitted in March
1947, and the curfew at night was finally lifted in March 1948. Until then, even local
residents traveling to a neighboring district without permission from the police werearrested for trespassing. Miyagi Etsujirō, Okinawa senryōo no 27-nenkan: Amerika gunsei tobunka no henyō (Iwanami Shoten, 1992), pp. 11-17.
20 According to Wakabayashi Chiyo, the expression “off-limits” held two meanings insymbolizing the American occupation of Okinawa. One was an Okinawa under the exclusive
control of the US military, cut off from international society. Another aspect referred to theinternal manifestations of this condition by which people were driven out and swept out of
their villages, and which became off-limits in their own native island. See Wakabayashi
Chiyo, “’Ofu-rimittsu’ no shima,” Gendai shisō, March edition (Seidosha, 1999), p. 24.
21 Murayama Iekuni, Amami fukkishi (Nankai Nichinichi Shinbunsha, 2006), p. 50.
22 According to a military government proclamation on February 3, 1947, unauthorized
travel between Okinawa and Amami became a punishable offense. Satake Kyōko, Gunseika
amami no mikkō, mitsubōeki (Nanpō shinsha, 2003), p. 222.
23 SCAP explicitly prohibited unauthorized immigration and directed the JapanesePutting Okinawa at the Center

96

government to mobilize its police force to be on guard against illegal border-crossers.
SCAPIN 244, November 8, 1945.
24 According to Arnold Fisch, by early 1946 the Navy found that the anchorages in Buckner
Bay, Okinawa, were “not as desirable as originally thought,” and subsequently “lost interestin the Ryukyus except as a location for minor facilities.” Military Government in the Ryukyu
Islands, p. 174. On January 1, 1947, the Army’s command in the Pacific was reorganized as
the Far East Command (FECOM). RYCOM was placed under the jurisdiction of the general
headquarters of FECOM in Tokyo.
25 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, “Treatment of
Foreign Nationals,” History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan, 1945
through 1950. Volume VI, Part 4, pp. 133-134.
26 Edith Kaneshiro, “Our Home Will Be the Five Continents”: Okinawan Migration to Hawaii,
California, and the Philippines, 1899-1941” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at
Berkeley, 1999).
27 Wakabayashi Chiyo convincingly argues that one of the major transformations of
postwar Okinawan society was that residents were prevented from maintaining suchtransnational links with overseas Okinawans. Wakabayashi Chiyo, “Jeepu to sajin:
senryōshoki okinawa shakai no henyō to hen’i,” Okinawa bunka kenkyū, vol. 29 (March
2003), pp. 244-45, 254.
28 The amount of rations authorized to Okinawans was initially set at 1990 calories per day,but was later reduced to 1530 calories per day due to food shortage. From the Deputy
Commander for Military Government to the Commander, NOB Okinawa and Chief MG
Officer, “Final Report of Military Government Activities for Period from 1 April 1945 to 1
July 1946.” Dated July 1, 1946. Found in Military Archives Division, National Archives andRecords Service, RG 260, Box 25.
29 Okinawa Taimusu (ed.), Shomin ga tsuzuru okinawa sengo seikatsu-shi (Okinawa
Taimusu-sha, 1998), pp. 32-38.
30 For a short time after the war this currency was used simultaneously with the new yen
being circulated in Japan proper. From 1948, however, the circulation of the new Japanese
yen was prohibited and the B yen became the only legal currency used in Okinawa.
31 Okuno Shūji, Natsuko: Okinawa mitsubōeki no jō’ō (Bungei shunjū, 2005), pp. 138-139.
Trafficking senka was so common that from February to September 1946, 1200 out of the1260 cases handled by the Okinawa civil courts involved senka and trespassing. Namihira,“Amerika gunseika no sengo fukkō,” p. 221.
32 This Ryukyuan poem, or Ryūka, and its explanation can be found in Yakabi Osamu,“Ekkyō suru okinawa: Amerikanizumu to bunka hen’yō,” Kindai nihon no bunka-shi, vol. 9(Iwanami Shoten, 2002). p. 249.
33 Okinawa Taimusu, Okinawa no shōgen: gekidō 25-nenshi, vol. 1 (Okinawa Taimusu-sha,1971), pp. 205-206.
34 By the time the Chinese Communists drove the Nationalists into Taiwan in 1949, thesmuggling activities in the Taiwan and Hong Kong routes gradually came to a halt, replacedby the Japan route via Kuchinoshima. Yakabi Osamu, “Kokkyō no kengen: Okinawa
yonaguni no mitsubōeki shūsoku no haikei,” Gendai shisō, vol. 31, no. 11 (September 2003),
pp. 187-188.
35 Okinawa Taimusu, Okinawa no shōgen, pp. 205-206.

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36 “Round-table discussion on the age of smuggling,” Satake, Gunseika amami no mikkō,

mitsubōeki, pp. 209-233.
37 Military Government Special Proclamations No. 29 and 30, dated July 21, 1948,
stipulated that Japanese yen had to be converted to the Type “B” military yen under penalty
of law.
38 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, pp. 149-150.
39 For more details, see Itoman City’s official website, “The Development of Itoman’s
Fishing Industry.”
40 Ishihara Masaie, Kūhaku no okinawa shakai-shi: senka to mitsubōeki no jidai (Banseisha,
2000), p. 239. Itoman residents in Kagoshima often came in contact with Amami residents,
who had an equally well-organized base for their smuggling network.
41 Asahi shinbun, December 31, 1949. The editorial section of the Asahi shinbun on March
18, 1950 carried another article describing a high-profile arrest of nineteen people
involved in the Ryukyus-Japan trade based in the Hanshin area. The authorities in this caseestimated that the total amount of trade was worth anywhere between 200 to 500 million
yen.
42 The apathy and neglect that characterized U.S. military rule helped Okinawa earn the
nickname, the “forgotten island,” during the early postwar years. This nickname was coinedby journalist Frank Gibney after his visit to Okinawa in 1949. See Frank Gibney, “Forgotten
Island,” Time. November 28, 1949.
43 MacArthur’s quotation is from The New York Times, March 2, 1949.
44 U.S. Military Government, Ryukyu Islands, Directive No. 30, October 1, 1949.
45 The four guntō, literally meaning island group) governments, with directly elected
governors and assemblymen, were inaugurated in November 1950. The Provisional
Government Assembly, made up of representatives hand-picked by U.S. authorities fromthroughout the Ryukyus, was inaugurated in April 1951. Both were replaced by theestablishment of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands in April 1952.
46 For further details, see Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, p. 128.
47 Yakabi, “Kokkyō no kengen,” pp. 193-194.
48 Namihira, “Amerika gunseika no sengo fukkō,” p. 237. The Japanese word, zensei means“good governance.”
49 Takemae Eiji, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and its Legacy (Continuum,2002), p. 513.
50 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, pp. 162-163.
51 John Dower provides a more detailed list of these tokujū, which he estimates brought anestimated $2.3 billion into Japan between June 1950 and the end of 1953. See John W.
Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II (W. W. Norton: New Press,
1999), pp. 541-542.
52 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, pp. 144-145; 164-165.
53 Another figure showed that Japanese laborers at military bases earned, at the minimum,$0.83 (99.6), which was eight to nine times more than Okinawan laborers who earned$0.10 (11.0). Obermiller, “The U.S. Occupation of Okinawa,” pp. 216-217.
54 Further destruction caused by strong typhoons as well as other war-damaged military
vehicles from the Far East Command dumped in Okinawa resulted in an estimated 2.5
million metric tons of available scrap iron, copper, brass, and other non-ferrous metals.

Putting Okinawa at the Center98

55 Ishihara, Kūhaku no okinawa shakai-shi, pp. 234-235.

56 In the meantime RYCOM’s export of scrap metals increased dramatically until it

surpassed sugar as the number one export from Okinawa in 1951. Okuno, Natsuko, pp. 337338.
57 American G.I.’s also sold military-issued supplies to civilians on the black market. The
Military Police were on guard against such illicit transactions, especially when they
involved the loss of US munitions.
58 Yakabi, “Kokkyō no kengen,” pp. 195-196.
59 Ishihara, Kūhaku no okinawa shakai-shi, pp. 236-238.
60 SCAP’s Civil Intelligence Section included the Public Safety Division, the Civil Censorship
Detachment, and the 441st Counter-Intelligence Corps. See Takemae, Inside GHQ, p. 167.
61 Okuno, Natsuko, pp. 87-88.
62 Okinawa Times, December 13, 1951. Cited in Okuno, Natsuko, p. 271.
63 Violators were imprisoned or fined 30,000 Yen. For further details, see Edith Kaneshiro,“‘For Compassionate Reasons’: Okinawan Repatriations during American Occupation ofJapan.” In Ryukyu University, Kenkyū seika hōkokusho, sengo okinawa to amerika: ibunka
sesshoku no sōgōteki kenkyū (Ryukyu University, 2005), pp. 330-331.
64 The Japanese government’s ordinance (seirei) no. 85 issued on April 27, 1947 recognized
the family registries (koseki) in Okinawa as Japanese family registries. The possession of aJapanese family registry has been the basis for Japanese citizenship both in the prewar andpostwar eras.
65 Yoshida Shien was a public official for Okinawa Prefectural Government before the war.
With the “disappearance of Okinawa Prefecture” after the war, he was employed by the
Okinawa Prefectural Office in Fukuoka.
66 Governor Shikiya did not meet with Yoshida out of fear of potential repercussions if themilitary government discovered that Yoshida had illegally entered Okinawa. Matayoshi
Hirokazu, the Vice Governor, was among seven or eight people who met with Yoshida Shien.
This episode of illegal entry into Okinawa was retold by Zukemura Tomonobu, who
accompanied Yoshida Shien on the journey. See “Hikiagesha no kikan to mikkō,” Yonabaruchōshi, shiryō-hen, 1, Imin (Yonabaru-chō kyōiku iinkai, 2006), pp. 217-228.
67 One exception was Nakayoshi Ryōkō, former mayor of Shuri, who submitted a petition to
the military government on August 4, 1945, requesting that Okinawa be reunited withJapan. Realizing that his repeated appeals were falling on deaf ears, however, he left
Okinawa on July 23, 1946 and moved to Tokyo where he took his case directly to SCAP and
the Japanese government.
68 Ota Masahide, “The American Occupation of Okinawa and Postwar Reforms in Mainland
Japan,” Essays on Okinawa Problems (Yui shuppan, 2000), pp. 191-192.
69 Yamashiro Zenkō and Kuwae Chōkō, for example, were a part of the League’s leadership
before repatriating from Tokyo, and soon thereafter became actively involved in the
Democratic Alliance.
70 Aharen Yukitomo, for example, was a labor union organizer and member of the leftist
Okinawan organization called the Sekiryūkai in the Kansai region in the 1920s. He
repatriated to Okinawa in 1946 and was subsequently selected as a central committee
member of the People’s Party.
71 Kuru returned to Japan in June to become a liaison between the ACP and the JCP
headquarters in Tokyo. For further details, see Kato Tetsuro, “Aratani hakken sareta

Augustine: Border Crossers and Resistance to U.S. Military Rule in the Ryukyus

99‘Okinawa/Amami higōhō kyōsantō bunsho’ ni tsuite,” Okinawa no higōhō kyōsantō shiryō(Fuji shuppan, 2004).
72 In August 1948 Nakamura was arrested for being in possession of Communist Party
journals and other materials that had been smuggled into Amami Oshima. See Nakamura
Yasutaro, Sokoku e no michi: Kōbei 8 nen Amami no fukki undōshi (Tosho shuppan, 1984).
pp. 164-176.
73 Tokuda Toyomi was one of Nakamura Yasutarō’s former students and a member of the
youth organization who made a speech at the rally calling for reversion. See Nankai
Nichinichi Shimbun (ed.), Gojūnenshi, p. 117. Cited in Robert D. Eldridge, The Return of theAmami Islands: The Reversion Movement and U.S.-Japan Relations (Lexington Books, 2004),
p. 35.
74 As David Obermiller argues, the protest movements that preceded the reversion
movement reveals the core impulse that propelled the reversion movement; namely,“popular resistance to foreign occupation and Okinawa’s neo-colonial status.” See
Obermiller, “The U.S. Occupation of Okinawa,” p. 201.
75 Miyume Tanji, Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa (Routledge, 2006), p. 58.
76 After the Okinawa Assembly resigned en masse on March 2, 1949, Senaga and Nakasone
conducted a public meeting on May 1, 1949. At the May Day demonstration, the popular
front adopted the following three slogans aimed at obtaining greater democracy andeconomic relief: 1) direct elections for governor and assemblymen; 2) rollback of the 1948
income taxes; and 3) increase rations of supplementary military goods. For more details,
see Obermiller, “The U.S. Occupation of Okinawa,” pp. 226-235.
77 Nankai Nichinichi Shimbun (ed.), Gojūnenshi, p. 109. Citation found in Eldridge, The
Return of the Amami Islands, p. 67, footnote 29.
78 Fukasa Genzō and Morita Tadamitsu entered Japan by sneaking aboard the Kanato Maru,a ferry liner which was to be docked in Kobe for repairs from June 1948. For a full
treatment of this incident, see Satake, “Kanato Maru to kyokasho mikkō jiken,” pp. 87-133.
79 The Okinawa Youth Alliance published the original version of this book in November
1946. Shinmon Minoru, a full-time member of the Okinawan Youth Alliance in Kanagawa
Prefecture, smuggled in Iha Fuyū’s books. Ishihara, Kūhaku no Okinawa shakai-shi, pp. 219228.
80 See Ishihara, Kūhaku no Okinawa shakai-shi, pp. 218.
81 Based on his groundbreaking book, Kūhaku no Okinawa shakai-shi, I was able to confirm
with Ishihara Masaie that the Ryukyuan residents’ economic struggle for survival throughsmuggling in the early postwar years was later replaced by a more socio-politicalresistance as witnessed by the reversion movement. Author’s interview with Ishihara
Masaie, September 26, 2006.
82 Nankai Nichinichi Shimbun (ed.), Gojūnenshi, p. 125. For further details, see Eldridge, The
Return of the Amami Islands, p. 41.
83 Murayama, Amami fukkishi, p. 248. According to Eldridge, while this figure was probably
exaggerated, it nevertheless shows the residents’ overwhelming support for returning theislands to Japan. Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands, p. 71, footnote 88.
84 In addition, 88 percent of those in Miyako signed similar petitions. See Takemae, Inside
GHQ, p. 514.
85 One such activist was Hayashi Yoshimi, an Amami native and member of theunderground Amami Communist Party, who entered Okinawa in March 1952 as a laborer

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while mobilizing Okinawan laborers to form a united front in the reversion movement. For
a comprehensive treatment on Hayashi’s underground political activities in Okinawa, see
Mori Yoshio, “Ekkyō no zen’ei, Hayashi Yoshimi to ‘fukki undō no rekishi,” in Nishi
Masahiko and Hara Takehiko (eds.), Fukusū no okinawa: Diaspora kara kibō e (Jinbun shoin,2003), pp. 311-347.
86 After the announcement on July 10 that the trusteeship clause in Article 3 could
indefinitely isolate the Ryukyus from Japan, over 200 households are said to have similarly
departed illegally from the Amami Islands between August 1 – 20. See Satake, Gunseika
amami no mikkō mitsubōeki, pp. 137-144.
87 As a result of the deluge of appeals that poured in from the Japanese public, the police
eventually released the arrested the men, who were allowed to join the rest of the Amami
delegates in Tokyo. Satake, Gunseika amami no mikkō mitsubōeki, pp. 144-145.
88 USCAR, CI&E Department, “The Reversion Movement on Amami Oshima, Final Report,”
Scientific Investigations in the Ryukyu Islands (SIRI), March 1952. Copy of this report isavailable in the Amami Branch of the Kagoshima Prefectural Library in Naze City.
89 Douglas G. Haring, “The Island of Amami Oshima in the Northern Ryukyus,” SIRI
(Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, October 1952), p. 86. A copy of this report isalso available in the Amami Branch of the Kagoshima Prefectural Library.
90 USCAR Proclamation No. 27, dated December 25, 1953, subject: “Geographical
Boundaries of the Ryukyu Islands.”
91 Robert Eldridge demonstrates that the Amami reversion movement not only exercised “aclear influence on the policies of the Japanese government, but also had a significant impact
on the decision making process of the US government . . .” The Return of the Amami Islands,
p. 31.
92 Haring, “The Island of Amami Oshima in the Northern Ryukyus,” pp. 17-18. The CI&E
Department’s public opinion survey found that 89 percent of respondents never identified
themselves as Ryukyuan because Amami was historically an integral part of Kagoshima
Prefecture. CI&E Department, “The Reversion Movement on Amami Oshima, Final Report,”
p. 8.
[93] Eldridge argues that the support and lobbying that the Governor of Kagoshima
Prefecture, Shigenari Kaku, undertook would prove critical in raising awareness of theissue throughout the prefecture and Japan. Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands, p. 32.
94 “Kizoku mondai meguri machi no koe wo kiku,” Uruma shimpō, dated April 23, 1951.
Cited from Naha shishi: Shiryō-hen, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 435-437. This quotation is evidence
that the Japanese military’s enforcement of collective suicide and false accusations of
Okinawans as “spies” during the Battle of Okinawa weighed heavily on the minds ofordinary people when thinking about their future political disposition.
95 Koji Taira has argued that the U.S. effort to force Okinawans to choose a semi-colonial,
marginalized Ryukyuan identity over a Japanese identity was “a thinly veiled racist
contempt for Okinawans as an inferior people.” For further details, see Koji Taira,“Troubled National Identity: The Ryukyuans/Okinawans,” in Michael Weiner (ed.), Japan’s
Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity (Routledge, 1997), pp. 160-161.
96 This quotation from Okinawan economist, Takamine Akitada, can be found in
Ikemiyagusuku Shūi, Okinawa hankotsu no jyānarisuto: Ikemiyagusuku Shūi serekushon(Niraisha, 1996), p. 22.
97 Ishihara, Kūhaku no Okinawa shakai-shi, p. 243.

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The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Migrants in Bolivia
Pedro Iacobelli
August 26, 2013
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Pedro-Iacobelli/3989
Pedro Iacobelli's essay also elucidates some of the less immediately obvious consequencesof the U.S.’s administration of Okinawa, in his case focusing on Okinawa’s international
legal status during the American occupation. As he details, under the terms of the 1951 San
Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan in theory retained "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa's
population. Iacobelli, after discussing in some detail the historical circumstances that gave
rise to this status, traces its practical consequences for a Ryukyu Government-sponsoredemigration program to South America.
On May 15, 1972 Okinawa formally reverted to its presurrender status as the forty-seventh
prefecture of Japan. At that point full Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa was restored,
thereby eliminating the ambiguous nationality status on the part of Okinawans that
Iocobelli describes. Taken together, the articles by Augustine and Iacobelli highlight how
between 1945 and 1972 Okinawa and mainland Japan evolved along different economic
and political trajectories, and help the reader understand not only why many Okinawans
today believe that they were abandoned by Japan, but also why their political and economic
institutions differ significantly. The effective integration of the Okinawan and mainland
economies was a critical topic at the time of reversion and a number of special economic
programs were set up then with the ostensible goal of helping Okinawa “catch up” to themainland. These programs clearly did not attain this goal, as even today Okinawa lags
behind the mainland economically. As Japan’s poorest prefecture, Okinawa continues to be
subject to special economic development programs.

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The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Okinawan Migrants in Bolivia
Pedro Iacobelli
The post-war United States occupation and administration of the Ryukyu Islands posed aseries of questions regarding both Japanese sovereignty of its former prefecture and thelegal status of the Okinawan people abroad.1 The U.S. military administratively severed theislands from mainland Japan during the U.S. led post-war occupation of Japan (1945-1952)
while garrisoning the islands. As former enemy territory and the main military hub for U.S.
forces in the Western Pacific, the U.S. military government closely watched the Ryukyu
Islands territory and discouraged border crossing.
The flow of migration to South America, once buoyant, became an option that only a few
people could afford. In the penurious time of post-war Okinawa, international migration
was only possible for those who had been “called” by relatives to join them in SouthAmerica (yobiyose) and could pay the fees involved.2 The San Francisco Peace Treaty(1951) did not substantially change the daily circumstances of people living in Okinawa.
Unlike the rest of Japan, the islands remained under direct U.S. control. However, theprospects for migration did change; from 1954 Okinawans without family members abroad
could migrate via one of the state-led migration programs to South America, one of the few
regions in the world open to accept Japanese migrants after the war. First Bolivia, next
Brazil, and finally Argentina became host nations for post-war Okinawan migrants.
Between 1954 and 1967 over fourteen thousand Okinawans migrated to the Americas,
including three thousand people who went to Bolivia.3
In this article, I show that the legal situation of overseas Okinawan individuals was left
unresolved by the creators of the peace treaty, led by John Foster Dulles. As a result, theinternational status of Ryukyuans in South America was subject to regional power plays
involving Japan and the U.S., rather than the rules of international law. In particular, I
evaluate the role of the Japanese state in overseeing Ryukyuan migrants in the 1950s. I
argue that the Japanese government had sufficient legal grounds to claim that the
Okinawan people were Japanese nationals and were thus entitled to the Japanese passportand Japanese consular protection. However, due to pressure from the U.S., the Japanese
government did not honor its obligations toward Okinawan migrants. This is clear in thecase of the post-war Okinawan community in Santa Cruz, Bolivia where a Ryukyuan colony
was established in 1954 and became a site of great symbolic production of the politicalpressures at play in the region.9 Since the Japanese government encouraged emigration to
Bolivia, it had the responsibility to look after both emigré communities: those thatoriginated in mainland Japanese and those from the Ryukyu Islands. But due to U.S.
pressures, it failed to assist the latter. In other words, the case of the Okinawan emigration
to Bolivia, the first U.S.-endorsed emigration program in the Ryukyu Islands, highlights theasymmetries of power between Japan and the U.S. in a non-Asian regional context.10
I begin this article by contextualizing U.S. post-war control of Okinawa Prefecture. I willthen present the position of Japanese scholars who eloquently expressed concerns about
the legal position of Okinawa under international law. Next, I will analyze the presentations
on the “Okinawan problem” at the Annual Conference of Japanese International Law
Scholars in 1954. Finally, I will examine the consequences of the SFPT for Okinawan

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communities living outside of Japan. In order to do this I will use the case of the “protection
problem” (hogo mondai) and the Ryukyuans in the Department of Santa Cruz in east Bolivia.
From enemy territory to “our territory”
Japan lost control of Okinawan prefecture when United States forces captured the islands
in June 1945.12 The Battle of Okinawa, the bloodiest battle fought in the Pacific, marked theend of Japan’s direct control over the Ryukyu Islands and initiated long-term U.S.
administration of Okinawa.13
Like mainland Japan, the Ryukyu Islands remained ‘occupied enemy territory’ from the endof hostilities until the peace treaty came into operation in April 1952.14 This meant that
Okinawa and its destiny would be determined by the wartime agreements. The Cairo
Communiqué (1943) had stated that Japan would be “expelled from all other territory
which she has taken by violence or greed”. This cast a cloud of uncertainty over the futureof the Ryukyus. Similarly, the Potsdam Declaration (1945) failed to state whether Okinawa
was to be included in the territory that Japan would keep.16 Indeed, the wartime
agreements inconclusively referred to the status of the Ryukyu Islands. The American
government, particularly the State Department, wished to avoid violating the U.S. declaredprinciple of “no territorial aggrandizement” (Atlantic Charter, 1941).17 In the end, thefuture of the U.S. position in the Ryukyus (and that of the Okinawan people) would bedetermined by the terms of a peace treaty between Japan and the Allies.18
Okinawa was an important part of the U.S. defense line in the Pacific. It was from the
beginning placed under U.S. military government.19 While mainland Japan, with its pacifist
constitution, was (in theory at least) made a zone of “peace”, Okinawa was explicitlytransformed into a zone of “war”.20 As result, the U.S. State Department concurred with the
Defense Department on the necessity to secure long-term control of the islands.21 The
future of Okinawa and its people was thus defined by its strategic location. The U.S.
National Security Council (NSC), the highest defense entity in the U.S., framed U.S. national
policy with regard to the possession of Okinawa in memorandum NSC 13/3 of 1949.22 In
these documents the NSC emphasized that any peace treaty with Japan had to include
certain security requirements. Among them, NSC 13/3 stated that the U.S. had to “retain on
a long-term basis the facilities at Okinawa and such other facilities as are deemed by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to be necessary in the Ryukyu Islands […] the military bases at or near
Okinawa should be developed accordingly.” From the American perspective, Okinawa had
to remain under U.S. control after a peace treaty with Japan was signed.23 NSC 49 and theSeptember 1950 NSC 60/1 complemented the objectives of NSC 13/3 by expressing theview that any future treaty with Japan must guarantee the U.S “exclusive strategic controlof the Ryukyus”.24
Trust the Trusteeship System
The retention of Okinawa became one of the main issues during the peace treaty
negotiations. John F. Dulles (1888 – 1959), Consultant to the Secretary of State, had the
difficult task of putting together numerous interests, including the NSC plan for de facto
military appropriation of the Ryukyu Islands, into the peace treaty. In Japan, Prime Minister
Yoshida Shigeru’s calculated efforts to work a deal with the U.S. to reduce as much as

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possible the duration and scope of the U.S. presence in the Ryukyus were systematicallycrushed by American officials.25 In addition, Japanese authorities, including the Showaemperor, expressed in private their willingness to exchange Okinawa for U.S.
protection.26 Some of the Allied Powers such as New Zealand and Canada supported theidea of full U.S. dominion in the Ryukyu Islands. However, annexation would violate the U.S.
declaration that it would not seek aggrandizement and risked provoking the opposition of
the other Allied Powers and United Nations members generally.27 Thus, Dulles sought asystem that would facilitate U.S. control without annexation.
John Foster Dulles decided to obtain in the peace treaty with Japan an option to seek
trusteeship if desired by the U.S., but in the meantime the U.S. would retain full control of
Okinawa. This meant that the U.S. military could remain in the island and avoid
international scrutiny. As Senator Howard Alexander Smith noted in a meeting with Dullesin the Far East Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the draft would“permit the United States to retain control of the Ryukyus indefinitely if a trusteeship were
not secured” and inquired whether this “would not lay us open to charges ofimperialism”.33 Dulles reportedly suggested that “the provision be allowed to stand until
the attitude of other countries could be ascertained”.34
In order to retain Okinawa, as required in the NSC documents, the U.S. opted for a formulathat separated the sovereign from the administrator. Article 3 of the Treaty of San
Francisco stipulated that “Japan will accept any proposal to put the Ryukyu Islands under
the U.N. trusteeship system”.35 Futhermore it stated the following:
Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will
have the right to exercise all and any power of administration, legislation and jurisdiction
over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.36
Okinawa remained under Japanese sovereignty since it was not severed by the SFPT but
the United States controlled all rights of its administration.37 Before and during the 1951
Peace Conference John Foster Dulles clarified the meaning of the legal wording. He
explained that although the U.S. had the rights of administration, Japan exercised “residual
sovereignty” (zanryūshuken) over the territory.38 The Office of Legal Adviser of the
Department of State explained that:

The phrase [residual sovereignty] expresses the idea that, far from being a cession ofsovereignty, Article 3 of the Peace Treaty contains provision only for the broad exercise of therights and powers of sovereignty by the United States. Thus the United States has not annexed
the islands or claimed sovereignty over them; sovereignty remains in Japan –even though in a
latent or residual form. But the right to exercise the rights and powers usually associated withsovereignty has been given to the United States.39
The wording and explanation given for Article 3 served U.S. strategic interests in the region,
but did little to make it comprehensible. The American control was Janus-faced; on the one
hand it sought to control population, territory and military bases; on the other, it sought toavoid specifying the precise nature of U.S. power in the Ryukyus in the peace covenant.

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Indeed, it obscured the legal position of the Ryukyu Islands, puzzling both American andJapanese legal experts.
Making sense of Article 3: How the SFPT was interpreted?
Olcott H. Deming, U.S. Consul General to Okinawa (1957-1959), said that then-Secretary ofState Dulles once asked him “what problems” he was having there. Deming responded that“the biggest one was continually trying to explain [to the locals] what residual sovereignty
means”.40 Article 3 and the concept of ‘residual sovereignty’ triggered a series of debates on
different aspects of U.S. - Ryukyu and Japan-Ryukyu legal relations. The legal conundrum
around the sovereignty of Okinawa increased as it became clear that the U.S. had nointention of making any proposal to put the Ryukyus under the Trusteeship System.
U.S. political advisors noted the issues not addressed in the Article 3. For example, Niles W.
Bond concluded in 1952 that, “as a beginning, it is believed that the legal status of theislands should be clarified, if feasible by formal recognition of the sovereignty of Japan and
the Japanese nationality of the inhabitants”.41 However, these problems were left
unresolved by U.S. government authorities. On the contrary, courts and judges settled
disputes related to the legal position of Okinawa. For instance, a tort involving a car
accident in Okinawa in 1951 raised the question of whether Okinawa was a foreign
territory or not.42 An American, employed by a contractor engaged in military construction
in Okinawa, sought compensation from the federal government in a Court District in
California. The appellant alleged that the accident resulted from the negligence of an
unknown employee of the U.S. in leaving an unlighted crane parked on the road after dark.
The judge in this case, before admitting to have no concluding answer, stated: “it cannot be
said that the loss of sovereignty over the island by Japan vests the ‘de jure sovereignty’ inthe traditional sense, in the native Okinawa” but since “the will of the United States is infact the supreme will on Okinawa, the United States has therefore acquired what may betermed a ‘de facto sovereignty’.43 Similarly, the question of whether or not native
Okinawans were nationals of the U.S. was brought to court in 1954. An Okinawan resident
in Hawaii claimed that since Okinawa was a possession of the U.S. he was not an alien but anational of the U.S.44 The court had to define where the sovereignty of Okinawa resided. It
finally concluded that “Japan, and not the United States, having the ‘de jure sovereignty’over Okinawa (…) the defendant [the Okinawan man] is not a national of the UnitedStates”.45
These examples illustrate how Article 3 of the SFPT temporarily blurred the limits ofJapanese/American sovereignty and confused the understanding of citizenship in the
Ryukyu Islands. Furthermore, it allowed legal organs of the U.S. to have a privileged
position to interpret matters of jurisdiction as they saw fit since the administration of theislands remained under U.S. military administration.
The Japanese juridical understanding of the Status of Okinawa
In Japan, jurists and academics from the country’s most prestigious universities met in
Kyoto at the autumn 1954 conference of the Society of International Law. Professor
Yamada Saburō (1869-1965) pointed out the aim of the Kyoto conference was to clarify theinternational position of Okinawa. They analyzed the “Okinawan problem” from threeIacobelli: The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Migrants in Bolivia

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perspectives: history, international law, and international economy. The conference’s
proceedings were published in a special edition of the Journal of International Law and
Diplomacy. Their views on the Okinawan problem allow us to highlight how the situation
was perceived in mainland Japan and to identify the legal, if not necessarily political, limitsof Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa after the SFPT.
For the Japanese jurists, it was important to confirm that Japan was entitled to claim fullsovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands in the future. This concern was triggered by the
obscure wording of the war covenants (e.g. Cairo Communiqué; Potsdam Declaration) as
seen above. It was also influenced by the ongoing process of emancipation and nation-statebuilding in several regions of the world (e.g. India, Indonesia, Philippines). The Ryukyu
Kingdom had controlled most of the area of Okinawan prefecture prior to its incorporation
within the modern Japanese state in 1879.46 For the Japanese jurists there was a possibility
that the territory under U.S. military control could be permanently severed from Japan.
Consequently, some Japanese scholars considered it necessary to stress the legality ofJapanese control over Okinawa from a historical point of view. For instance, Akiho Ichirō(1900-1988) emphasized that the Ryukyu kingdom’s almost three hundred years old
relationship with the Satsuma daimyo (vassals of the bakufu in Edo) was fundamental tojustifying Japanese ownership of Okinawa. “The status of the Ryukyus is one of the mostimportant matters. This problem could be clarified in the analysis of the Ryukyu Kingdom’s
status in relation to the Satsuma daimyo”.47 Similarly, Hanabusa Naoshi (1902-1994)
vindicated the Japanese position in Okinawa vis-à-vis the Chinese tributary state status of
the Ryukyu Kingdom. Hanabusa noted that in ultimate terms the government in Tokyo had
legally incorporated the Ryukyu Kingdom into the Okinawan prefecture in its 1879
annexation.48 For academics like Hanabusa, the Japanese claims to Okinawa were based on
the historical relations between the two territories.
Also, it was important for many Japanese scholars to confirm American academics’ thinking
on the Japanese claim of sovereignty in order to clarify the international position andfuture of the Ryukyu Islands. Ueda Toshio (1904-1975), in his review of twenty-three
American publications on the Okinawan question, concluded that scholars in the UnitedStates shared the view that Japan had historical rights over the Ryukyu Islands.49 In his
study, he mostly relied on Hyman Kublin’s article on the 1870s’ controversy between Japanand China concerning sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands.50 For Kublin (and Ueda) both
China and Japan had a long history of relations with the Ryukyu Islands, but China had lostits rights over the Ryukyus because the Qing government persistently used an old systemof traditions to sustain its claim rather than Western legal rationalism.51 The Japanese on
the contrary, as Kublin stated, “deemed the issue an affair of the first magnitude and,unshackled by tradition, quickly revealed how well Occidental diplomatic procedure had
been mastered”.52 In conclusion, Ueda´s position was that Japan’s legal rights over Okinawa
had strong historical and legal foundations recognized by the Western Powers.
A more pressing issue was how to interpret the Japanese position on Okinawa after the San
Francisco Peace Treaty. If put under the Trusteeship System, the Japanese jurists wereconfident that the Ryukyus would be initially severed (bunri) from Japan as a former
enemy territory but eventually would return to Japan. There were a few precedents ininternational law for comparable cases. For example, Irie Keishirō (1903-1978) mentioned

Putting Okinawa at the Center108

the case of Bessarabia, a region of Moldavia. Bessarabia was severed from Russia after the
Crimean War; but returned in the Berlin treaty of 1878.53 My impression is that, in general,
the Japanese scholars did not worry much about the future of the former Okinawan
prefecture as a trust territory. They were more concerned with defining where Japan stood
if the Ryukyu Islands were not put into the Trusteeship System.
As previously stated, the San Francisco Peace Treaty gave the U.S. the right to exercise all
and any power of administration, legislation and jurisdiction in the Ryukyu Islands. The
Japanese government endorsed this at the peace conference and reaffirmed its position inseveral bilateral treaties (e.g. The Aerial Navigation Service between Japan and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of 1952). However, the scope and durationof Japan’s “residual sovereignty” was not defined in the SFPT. The treaty did not make clear
to what rights Japan was entitled as holder of “residual sovereignty”; or how Japan was tofulfill its obligations towards the local Ryukyuans.54 For Irie, the U.S. was entitled to theadministration but not the disposal of the territory.
In relation to the southern territory, since Japan keeps residual sovereignty, America merely
received the rights of administration for an unspecified time; without Japan’s consent, itcannot change the territorial status. Even though Japan promised to agree to any American
proposal to the U.N. in relation to putting the southern territory under the Trusteeship system,
to which America is the sole administrating authority, it is not the case that the U.S. hasreceived carte blanche to propose a change in Japan’s vested territorial rights.55
Indeed, the transfer of authority did not mean dividing the country. It only meant transfer
of one section of the territory to the administration of another state.56 Irie asserted that the
Ryukyu Islands belonged to Japan, and not to the U.S. Thus, Japan had the right to expand
various legal prerogatives into the territory and to keep its own public institutions in
Okinawa. Moreover, he concluded that any institution established by the U.S.
administrative authority, including the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), could not
engage in foreign affairs as its authority came from the U.S. not from Japan.57 Like Irie,
Shinjō Toshihiko, asserted that Okinawa belonged to Japan. Indeed, he was morecategorical when it came to defining what kind of sovereignty remained with Japan. For
him, Okinawa’s legal position was best explained as a quasi-leased territory:
For the above points, today’s Okinawa is in a situation just like a leased territory. But because
it has not been furnished with the necessary formal conditions of a leased territory, theinternational legal position of Okinawa is in a ‘state of preparation to lease;’ in other words I
think is reasonable to understand it as a ‘quasi-leased territory’.58
Similarly, Kuwada Saburo considered that the transfer of administration did not cause achange in the nationality of the local population since “the administrator may not confer on
the inhabitants the nationality of the state; the power of the administrator is limited to
granting the inhabitants permission for permanent domicile”.59
Finally, Irie stressed that if the U.S. did not pursue the option of the Trust territory, Japan
could claim its “right of re-vindication (shicchi kaifukuken)”. Moreover, because the treaty
did not limit the scope of Japanese participation in Okinawa’s daily life, Irie called for amore active role by the Japanese government in Okinawa issues.

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Overseas Okinawans: Consular responsibility
The American and Japanese authorities did not discuss the legal status of overseas Ryukyu
migrants during the negotiations of the peace treaty.60 This is despite the ongoing flow of
self-funded Okinawan migrants to South America, mostly to Argentina, from 1948
onwards.61 By 1952 over one thousand Okinawans had migrated to South America. There is
no reference of their legal status in the peace covenant.

The first Japanese immigrants to South America disembark in
Brazil in 1908. Half were Okinawans.

Indeed, overseas Okinawans
were invisible to Japanese andAmerican negotiators.
Consequently, when migration
became a state effort in 1954,
questions such as how
Okinawan people could obtainlegal benefits from theirnationality, or what
government was responsible
for them abroad, emerged.
Following the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,
the Okinawan people had theright to a nationality (article
15[1]) and no one could
arbitrarily deprive them of it(article 15 [2]).62 However,cold war politics cast a shadowof ambiguity over thesefundamental human rights in
Okinawa. Both, the U.S. and theJapanese governments claimed
responsibility for the migrants
in the 1950s. So the questionthat arises from this situationis this: to what extent were theJapanese and the U.S.
governments responsible for
the Ryukyuan migrants?

From the American point of view, since the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands were under
U.S. authority the U.S. was the sole party responsible for their wellbeing. This was also
considered to be the case when outside Okinawa. The establishment of the United States
Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (hereafter USCAR) in 1950 and the Governmentof the Ryukyu Islands (hereafter GRI) in 1952 aimed to promote the development of
Okinawa and the betterment of living conditions in the islands.63 Since the migration
program, a policy to reduce population in a demographically constrained region, was one of
the joint-policies pursued by these two organizations, the U.S. authorities in Okinawa

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considered that the success of the emigration plan was connected with the development of
the Ryukyu Islands.64As Norman D. King, Chief of the Public Affairs Division, demanded:“The State Department must assume the responsibility of providing protection for theémigrés. Failure to do this will undoubtedly result in assumption of responsibility by aJapanese mission”.65 Outside the islands, the U.S Foreign Services was made responsible toassist the migrants.66 Initially the Foreign Operation Administration (FOA) was theAmerican agency in charge of the migrants.67
The Okinawan migrants had to apply for a travel permit and an identity document (mibunshōsho) at the USCAR offices.68 The latter document, in lieu of a passport, identified them as“Ryukyuan” and indicated neither Japanese nor American citizenship. In fact, it proved tobe more a cause of confusion than assurance for the travelers. For example, it made itdifficult for the Ryukyuans to obtain visas in the consulates and embassies in mainland
Japan. It also provoked constant misunderstandings at the port of entry in the country ofdestination.69 At the end of the day, the American position was that Okinawan migrants
were the inhabitants of a U.S. occupied territory. Consequently, they could travel and enter
into foreign countries as Ryukyuans, not as Japanese citizens, and thus, subject to the U.S.
consular services. On the other hand, the Japanese position called for the recognition of the
migrants as Japanese nationals (nihon kokumin toshite). If the SFPT prevented the
Okinawan people from enjoying the benefits of Japanese nationality in the Ryukyus, there
was no legal impediment to recognize their nationality beyond the islands. Irie Keishirō, aleading advocate for a greater involvement of the Japanese government in Okinawan affairs,
analyzed the legal position of Okinawan migrants in the Kyoto conference of 1954. Taking
the case of Cyprus in the nineteenth century as a precedent, he concluded that in a case oftransfer of authority the inhabitants keep their nationality.70 Since the Japaneseconstitution guarantees freedom to move and change residence (chapter 2, article 22) the
Okinawan people could maintain their Japanese nationality even if they migrated overseas.
Furthermore, for Irie the U.S. rights over the Ryukyus were geographically framed and thus
held no authority over the Okinawan people outside the Ryukyu Islands.71 Indeed, from aJapanese point of view, the nationality of the inhabitants of the southern territory had to beproperly specified in their travel documents: “The citizens of the Ryukyus, together withbeing ‘Ryukyuan’ are Japanese nationals. For this reason, the Certificate of Identity has tobe applicable to the Japanese and Ryukyuan laws”.72 Therefore, Irie concluded that the
Ryukyuans had no legal impediment to seek and receive assistance from the Japanese
consulates or embassies.
“Following the SFPT plan, even though all and any of the southern territories would become
part of a trust territory, as mentioned above, the status of Japanese nationals doesn’t change;
and in contrast with other trust territories’ inhabitants, in this case they keep Japanesenationality. Moreover, unless special regulations are set forth in the trust agreement theprotective authority of Japanese diplomacy continues to exist”.73
Japan was rightfully entitled to claim and take responsibility for the overseas Okinawans.
In the end Okinawa, as Prime Minister Yoshida had stated in the last stage of the peace
treaty negotiation, has “always been Japanese territory, inseparably tied to Japan proper;
and its inhabitants are Japanese”.74 Thus we could have expected a stronger commitment
from the Japanese government towards its overseas nationals. However, due to theIacobelli: The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Migrants in Bolivia

111

American pressure to keep the Okinawans under their control (and the prosaic Japanese
defense of their rights), the Ryukyuan migrants were kept in an ambiguous position. As
seen below, in some cases, post-war Okinawan migrants depended more on U.S. consulates
than on the nearby Japanese diplomatic offices in South America.75
The Hogo Mondai and the limits of Japanese nationality in Bolivia
The question of the status of the migrants and their nationality originated a debate which
was called “the protection problem” or Hogo Mondai.76 As explained in the Tokyo based
monthly-publication “Kaigai Ijū” (External Migration):
The beginning of the discussion on the Protection Problem was initiated when the GRI
requested to the Japanese government that the Okinawans overseas be treated as Japanesecitizens. The Japanese Foreign Ministry accepted the request and in the case of Bolivia
discussed sending a delegate from the embassy in Peru. However, the American[government](with the authority over Okinawa) felt uncomfortable that the GRI was asking
the Japanese government to protect the migrants so assistance for sending migrants overseas
is still at a standstill.79
The U.S. government had
allocated nearly one million
dollars to support the Ryukyu
migration program and wanted
to protect its investment.80
Moreover, in the case of the
Santa Cruz colony, it hadcompromised with the Bolivian
government to ensure thesustainability of thecolony.81 The U.S. thus had astake in the success of the
migrants in paving the way fora well-established community
which could host thousands of
Okinawans as well as
contribute to the prosperity of
the host society.

Okinawan migrants in Bolivia

The debate on the Hogo Mondai took a twist when natural disaster struck the newly
established Okinawan community “Uruma” in Santa Cruz. As told by Gushiken Kōtei, aleader within the local community, an unknown high fever disease ran wild throughout thecolony. “It was a disease which, within three days of getting the fever, determined whether
the patient dies or lives”.82 The unknown disease, at the time called “Uruma”, took the livesof fifteen migrants in six months. Shūzō Nishihira, leader of the Okinawan group in Bolivia,
urgently wrote to GRI’s Chief Executive requesting help.83 The GRI looked to the Americans
for help.84 First, Higa Shūhei, Chief Executive of the GRI, and Inamine Ichirō, chair of the
Ryukyu Emigration Association, wrote several letters to U.S. authorities and to their
American acquaintances to hasten aid.85 In reply, coordinated by Point 4, the U.S.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

112

dispatched a group of physicians from Foreign Operations Administration (hereafter FOA)
to the region.86 Together with Bolivian specialists, they treated the patients andinvestigated the disease.87 Higa, in February 1955 thanked them for the assistance: “It is
thanks to the great efforts made by both the U.S. Government and Bolivian Government toprotect against the disease that the patients seem [sic] to have recovered”.88 For the UnitedStates, the question of the success or failure of the Ryukyuan colony posed a grave problem
from the standpoint of public relations because it could serve as “an example of the U.S.
treatment and concern for the welfare of Ryukyuans”.89 Conversely, the Japanese
government did not show similar interest or readiness to get involved in the Uruma diseasecrisis. The Japanese upon hearing of the disease outbreak in Bolivia, while preparing for theincoming Japanese mainland settlers, secured a report from their Legation in Peru and, twomonths later, appointed a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a resident official in
Bolivia.90 However, the Japanese move did little to counterbalance U.S. control of andresponsibility for the Ryukyuan community in Bolivia.91
The Uruma disease crisis confirmed the dependent relationship between the Ryukyuan
community and the U.S. government. The case revealed that the Japanese government, farfrom Bolivia, did not challenge American primacy in Ryukyuan affairs in Bolivia. Indeed, intaking no action in a time of crisis, the Japanese government failed to establish a claim tosovereignty over Okinawa.
The Hogo Mondai entered a new stage when the Japanese government began its own
migration program in Bolivia. Less than a year after the first GRI-sponsored community
was established, a mainland Japanese community was created in Bolivia. There was thus
both an Okinawan colony and a Japanese colony in the region of Santa Cruz. For the benefitof mainly the latter, the Japanese government strengthened its diplomatic links in theregion by adding to the embassy in Lima, Peru a mission in La Paz, Bolivia. In addition, theOverseas Cooperation Office (Kaigai kyōkai rengokai) (aka. Kaikyōren) opened an office inSanta Cruz to assist the mainland Japan migrants in Bolivia. Technically both communities
were Japanese and all migrants were Japanese nationals.93 Japan confined its support toJapanese migrants.94 For instance, according to the Japanese Nationality Act of 1950, art. 9
and the Family Register Act of 1947, art. 104, if Japanese nationals wished to obtain
Japanese nationality for a new born child in Bolivia or elsewhere abroad, they wererequired to report the birth of the child to the nearest Japanese diplomatic office within 14
days of the birth. The Act also states that if the will to obtain Japanese nationality was notmade known within that period, the child would lose the privileges of obtaining Japanesenationality.95 Ryukyuans in other parts of South America outside Bolivia could register the
newborn in a Japanese embassy or consulate. The diplomatic service processed the
documents and sent them to the justice bureau in Fukuoka where a special Family
Registration Office exclusively for Okinawans operated. In Bolivia, as reported by Ken
Asato from the Economic Development Department of USCAR, all GRI-sponsored settlers
sought to obtain Japanese passports for their children, but:[U]nlike other Japanese diplomatic service offices in South America, the legation [inBolivia] does not register Ryukyuan settlers as Japanese nationals. Therefore, it does
not issue Japanese passports to them. The Japanese legation [in Bolivia] is afraid the
U.S. government will object to issuing passports to them for reason that emigration of

Iacobelli: The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Migrants in Bolivia

113

the Ryukyuans to Bolivia and their settlement have been co-sponsored by the U.S.
Government.96
Although the Japanese and GRI requested that the Ryukyuan migrants be placed under theprotection of the Japanese office in Bolivia, the U.S. rejected this petition, insisting rather
that Point 4’s office would carry on with that responsibility.97 The American authorities
held that a Japanese passport was not necessary for Ryukyuan migrants. Not having one
did not prevent settlers from pursuing “legitimate activities” or from receiving “lawfulprotection from the Bolivian government”.98 Besides, as stated by Lt. Col. C. I. Guida, fromthe Executive Office, “all U.S. embassies and consulates are prepared to assist people fromthe Ryukyu Islands”.99 Asato concluded that “the crux of the whole matter lies in the desire
to maintain a link between the place they left and the land they chose […] however theJapanese legation in Bolivia does not handle such matters of the settlers for the reason
stated [above]”.100
In other words, the hogo mondai was a conflict between Japan’s obligation to protect its
nationals, and the U.S. insistence on maintaining its guardianship over the migrantcommunity in Bolivia. It was not the case that the Ryukyuans desired to end theirconnection with the American government in Bolivia in favor of a closer relation with Japan.
Ota Sochi, Director of Social Affairs GRI, suggested that in order to provide complete
protection for the migrants, “(…) the emigrants carry the passport issued by the GOJ’s
resident office as well as the certificate of identification issued by the High Commissioner
so that they can receive protection from both the U.S. government and that ofJapan”.101 However, this idea was also rejected by the American authorities. The American
position in Bolivia created a Gordian Knot that the Japanese did not dare to cut. The result
was that Okinawans were deprived of their right to have a nationality and kept in an
ambiguous status (neither Japanese nor American).102 In short, the ambivalence of theirstatus overseas reflected the ambivalence of their status at home.
Conclusions
In this article we have analyzed some of the consequences of Article 3 of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty on Okinawan migrants, particularly to Bolivia. We observed that the U.S.
defense requirements were essentially territorial and that John Foster Dulles attempted tosatisfy the Department of Defense requirements by assuring that U.S. maintained control of
the island and the inhabitants. Article 3 sprang from an Asian cold war context and it wasmeant to be an instrument to be used in Asia, not in South America. However, Japan’s postwar territorial division was projected onto the overseas communities as we havedemonstrated for Bolivia and South America.
Article 3 gave the U.S. the right to control entry and exit from the Ryukyu Islands. In
addition, the American hegemonic reach enabled the U.S. to maintain responsibility for theislanders throughout South America. For the U.S. the most important Ryukyuan
communities were those which involved higher transfers of funds and also those for which
the U.S. entered into a formal agreement with the local government. Consequently, theOkinawan community in Bolivia, the first migration project since the U.S. took control of
the Ryukyus, was among all such communities in South America the most influenced byAmerican hegemony in terms of their Nationality.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

114

Although Article 3 separated the administration of the Japanese territory it did not legallyaffect the Okinawan people’s Japanese nationality. As shown by some of the Japanesejurists quoted in this study, the treaty neither hindered Japan from participating in
Okinawan daily life, nor prohibited it from taking responsibility for overseas Okinawans.
The Japanese government, however, failed to provide basic consular services such asprovision of identifying documents for Ryukyuans abroad, notably in Bolivia, as a result ofAmerican pressure to maintain control. If we understand a client state as a state that
conducts its foreign policy according to the dictates of a more powerful state, Japan
behaved as a client state in Bolivia in the 1950s.103 Where we could have expected astronger Japanese commitment from the Japanese government towards its overseas
nationals, we found a pragmatic nation reluctant to act against the U.S. will.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Prof Mark Selden, Prof Gavan McCormack, Prof Tessa Morris- Suzuki,
Prof Matt Allen and Prof Miyume Tanji for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
I would also like to thank Prof Sensui Hidekazu for the enthusiastic support I received
while visiting Okinawa.
About the author
Pedro Iacobelli is a PhD candidate at the Australian National University and Adjunct
Professor at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. His doctoral dissertation deals
with the postwar Japanese and Okinawan emigration programs to Bolivia.
Notes
1 I will use the terms Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands (or Ryukyus), and Nansei Shotōinterchangeably. The Nansei Islands are the entire island chain to which the Ryukyus
belong. In the San Francisco peace treaty the term Nansei Shotō (plus its bearings) wasused. Okinawa is the name of the largest island of the Ryukyu group, and “Okinawa” is often
used to designate all of the islands and the Japanese prefecture as well.
4 On the bilateral problem see Robert D. Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands: The

Reversion Movement and U.S. - Japan Relations(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), Robert D.
Eldridge, "The Revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and Okinawa," in Japanese
Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration, ed. Iokibe Makoto, et al. (London:
Routledge, 2008). Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, Keystone: The American Occupation of
Okinawa and U.S. - Japanese Relations (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University, 2000).
5 Ōta Masahide, Okinawa no tennō: Kōtōbenmukan (The Okinawan Emperor: The HighCommissioner) (Tokyo: Asahi bunko, 1996), Yoshida Kensei, Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa
under U.S. Occupation, ed. Edward H. Kaplan, vol. 23, Studies on East Asia (Bellingham:
Western Washington University, 2001). Arasaki Moriteru, Okinawa gendaishi(Contemporary History of Okinawa) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2005). Tanji Miyume, Myth,Protest and Struggle in Okinawa (London: Routledge, 2006). Gavan McCormack and Satoko
Oka Norimatsu, Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States (Lanham:
Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2012).

Iacobelli: The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Migrants in Bolivia

115

6 For instance the work of Watanabe Akio, The Okinawa Problem, a Chapter in Japan - U.S.

Relations (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1970).

7 For example Ōta Masahide, Kenshō: Shōwa no Okinawa (Inspection: Okinawa During the

Showa Period) (Naha: Naha shuppansha, 1990), Taira Koji, "Troubled National Identity:
The Ryukyuans/Okinawans," in Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity, ed. Michael
Weiner (London: Routledge, 1997). Oguma Eiji, 'Nihonjin' No Kyōkai - Okinawa, Ainu,
Taiwan, Chōsen, shokuminchi shihai kara fukki undō made (The Boundaries of the'Japanese': Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan and Korea. From Colonial Domination to the Return
Movement) (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1998).
8 There have been a few approaches to the topic from Kozy Amemiya and Taku Suzuki. See

Kozy Amemiya, "The Bolivian Connection: U.S. Bases and Okinawa Emigration," in JPRI
Working Paper (JPRI: Japan Policy Research Institute at the USF Center for the Pacific Rim,
1996). Suzuki Taku, "Becoming 'Japanese' in Bolivia: Okinawa-Bolivia Trans(National)
Formation in Colonia Okinawa," Identities 13, no. 3 (2006).
9 For a discussion on “corporal inscription” in the Ryūkyū islands see Suzuki

Taku, Embodying Belonging: Racializing Okinawa Diaspora in Bolivia and Japan (Honolulu:
University of Hawai'i Press, 2010). pp. 8-9.
10 The literature on this case has focused, mostly from an ethnographic perspective, on thelocal dynamics in the colonies in Bolivia and their relationship with the local Bolivian
community.

11 The JILD is the journal of the Japanese Society of International Law (est. 1897), based in

the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo. It has been published since 1902.

12 Ōta Masahide, "Re-Examining the History of the Battle of Okinawa," in Okinawa: Cold War

Island, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999). pp.13-14.
Most textbooks date the Battle of Okinawa between April 1st and June 23rd of 1945.

13 For testimonies of the battle of Okinawa see Yahara Hiromichi, The Battle for Okinawa,trans. Roger Pineau and Masatoshi Uehara (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995), p.
105. and George Feifer, Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb (New York:
Ticknor & Fields, 1992), p. 446. Also see chapter 2 of McCormack and Norimatsu, ResistantIslands. The Itoman Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum vividly illustrates the terrifying
situation experienced before, during and after the battle.
14 The main study on the first seven years of U.S. administration in Okinawa from a military

perspective is Arnold G. Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands. 1945 -1950, 2005
ed. (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 1988). p.4. For an Okinawan perspective, see
the first chapter of Arasaki, Okinawa gendaishi, pp.1-30. On the genealogy of the bilateral
problem see Robert D Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in
Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952 (New York: Garland Pub, 2001). It should be notedthat in December 1953, the Amami islands to the north reverted to Japan.
15 Although in the Cairo meeting Roosevelt intended to transfer the islands to China,

Department of State personnel were not aware of his intention. So when the Division ofPutting Okinawa at the Center

116

Political Studies, under Dr. Isaiah Bowman, interpreted the Cairo Declaration, it concluded
that the Ryukyus “did not appear to be of the type which fell within the meaning of thephrase in question (…)” quoted in Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa, p.57.
16 For the Cairo Communiqué see here; for the Potsdam declaration here. All sites visited on

April 7, 2010. The Yalta Agreement, the other main wartime agreement, did not address the
future of Japan’s territory. For a complete study on the wartime agreements and theposition of China towards Okinawa see Hara Kimie, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific:
Divided Territories in the San Francisco System (London: Routledge, 2007), pp.158-65.
17 As early as 1942 discussion was held on the status of Okinawa. In 1943 the State

Department recommended that the islands be returned to Japan following U.S. victory. See
Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, p.53.
18 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, p. 55. For a cultural approach to the U.S.

position in Okinawa see Pedro Iacobelli, "Orientalism, Mass Culture and the US
Administration in Okinawa," ANU Japanese Studies On-Line 1, no. 4 (2011).

19 Okinawa had a different administrative structure than mainland Japan. The Ryukyu

Islands were under the jurisdiction of the General Headquarters of the Far East Command
GHQ/FECOM from 1947. For a complete analysis of the chain of command in occupied
Japan and Okinawa see Takemae Eiji, Inside G.H.Q.:The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its
Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002). pp.121123.
20 Gavan McCormack, Client State: Japan in the American Embrace (London: Verso, 2007), p.

122. For an analysis of the “separation” of Okinawa from Japan and its contemporaryconsequences see particularly chapters six and seven.

21 Okinawa Policy within the State Department, illustrated by the 1943 Masland Paper,

1944 Borton Paper, 1945/1946 Emerson paper, and 1946/1948 Feary Paper, all envisaged
return of the Ryukyus to Japan. By 1949 that option was unthinkable. Eldridge, The Originsof the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, p.54.
22 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, vol. VII, The Far East

and Australasia (in two parts) Part 2. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976).
pp.730-736. Also see Hara Kimie description in Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific,
Chapter seven.
23 Initially the U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State aimed to retain“facilities” and develop the U.S. position in Okinawa. See Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1949, p. 655. In 1950, this came to mean control of the wholeterritory. Dean Acheson, "Crisis in Asia -an Examination of the U.S. Policy," The Departmentof State Bulletin XXII, no. 551 (1950). pp. 111-118.
24 Quoted in Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed, p.45.
25 Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, pp. 301-314.

Iacobelli: The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Migrants in Bolivia

117

26 For the official Japanese position on Okinawa, see Department of State, Foreign Relationsof the United States, 1951, vol. VI, Asia and the Pacific (in two parts) Part 1. (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 811; 833; 960-961; 1163. For comment on theso-called ‘Tenno message” see Ōta, Kenshō, pp. 314-329. Matsuoka Hiroshi, Hirose
Yoshikazu, and Takenaka Yorohiko, Reisenshi: Sono kigen, tenkai, shūen to Nihon (the Cold
War History) (Tokyo: Dōbunkan, 2003), pp. 84-85.

27 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. pp. 1057-1062. The U.S.

position in Okinawa was repeatedly criticized by the Soviet bloc following the peace treaty
meeting in San Francisco. See Nippon Times, "Excerpts from Gromyko Speech," Sept. 7 1951.
28 Edwin O Reischauer, one of the most influential academics in Japanese affairs, and later

U.S. ambassador to Japan, supported limiting the U.S. trusteeship on Okinawa as much as
possible and returning the rest of the territory to Japan. W.W. Butterworth, Director of the
Office of Far Easter Affairs, William Sebald and Douglas L. Oliver were cautious about
extending the occupation. And J.F. Dulles and John Allison supported the trusteeship option.
See respectively: Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1950). pp. 237-239; Department of State, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1949. p. 815; and Yoshida, Democracy Betrayed, p.45.
29 Under the Mandates System, the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League of

Nations was responsible for supervising the mandates territories but in the practice it did
not have real power. See George Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System: A Study of
Political Behavior in the United Nations (Geneve: Librairie Droz, 1964). p. 12, ibid. p.11. The
Trusteeship system has been inactive since 1994.
30 In the history of the Trusteeship System the only case of making an ex enemy territory atrust territory was when Somalia was trusted to Italy, its former colonial master. There areno cases in which states voluntarily placed a territory under the system. Chairmian
Edwards Toussaint, The Trusteeship System of the United Nations (London: Stevens & Sons,
1956). p. 40.
31 Ibid, pp. 39-42.
32 Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary andDocuments (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1946), pp. 359-60.

33 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. p. 933.
34 Ibid., p. 933. For another document stating Dulles’ position see ibid. p.841.
35 “Treaty of Peace with Japan” in UCLA East Asia Studies Documents at here accessed April

7, 2010.
36 Ibid.

37 The Peace treaty was signed by forty eight nations, including Bolivia. The USSR opposed

the “illegality” of transferring the Ryukyus to U.S. custody. Similarly the Gov. of India
rejected Article 3 and thus did not attend the SFP Conference. Nippon Times, "Excerpts

Putting Okinawa at the Center

118

from Gromyko Speech." For the Indian position see Department of State, Foreign Relationsof the United States, 1951. pp. 1062; 1269-70; 1288-1291.
38 The term was Dulles’ creation. Mikio Higa, Politics and Parties in Postwar

Okinawa (Vancouver University of British Columbia, 1963). pp. 10-12. Rosa Caroli suggeststhat the Ryukyu Islands became a “Land without status”. Rosa Caroli, Il Mito
Dell´Omogeneita Giapponese: Storia Di Okinawa (Rome: Franco Angelini, 1999). pp. 191-203.
39 Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 1 (Department of State

Publication 7403, 1963), p. 270.

40 Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, p. 359.
41 “The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Department of State” inDepartment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. 14,(in two parts)
Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985). p.1092.
42 Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604, N° 12746, (9th Cir, 1951) in here accessed April 10,2010.

43 Ibid.
44 The case’s description can be found in Whiteman, Digest of International Law. pp 268 –271.

45 Ibid. p.269.
46 The Ryukyu kingdom was a tributary state to China and since the seventeenth century to

the Satsuma daimyo. See George H. Kerr,Okinawa, the History of an Island People, 1969 ed.
(Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1958).
47 Akiho Ichirō, "Okinawa kizoku ni kansuru ichi shōsatsu," Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi (The

Journal of International Law and Diplomacy) LIV no. 1-3 (1955), p.57.

48 Hanabusa N., " Okinawa kizoku no enkaku” (Transitions About the Reversion of

Okinawa)," Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi LIV no. 1-3 (1955), p.38.

49 Ueda T., " “Amerika gakusha no mita Okinawa mondai” (Okinawa Question in the Eyes ofAmerican Scholars)," Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi LIV no. 1-3 (1955).
50 Ibid. pp. 40-46.

51 Ibid. p.46. Hyman Kublin, "The Attitude of China During the Liu-Ch'iu Controversy, 1871-

1881," Pacific Historical Review Vol. 18 no . 2 (1949).

52 Kublin, "The Attitude of China During the Liu-Ch'iu Controversy, 1871-1881." p.116.
53 Irie Keishirou, " Okinawa shotō no hōteki chii” (Legal Status of Okinawa) Kokusaihō gaikō

zasshi LIV no. 1-3 (1955), p.64.

54 Ashida Hitoshi, former Prime Minister and leader of the Democratic Party questioned

Yoshida on the contents of the treaty. The focus was the practical benefits of having“residual sovereignty” of the territory.

Iacobelli: The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Migrants in Bolivia

119

55 Irie, "Okinawa shotō no hōteki chii)," p.74.
56 Ibid,, p.77.
57 Ibid., pp.78-80.
58 Shinjō T., "Okinawa no kokusaihōjō no chii” (Status of Okinawa in InternationalLaw), Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi) LIV no. 1-3 (1955), p.107.

59 Kuwada Saburō, "Status of Okinawans under the Japanese Nationality Law," The JapaneseAnnual of International Law, no. 3 (1959). p.88.

60 Following the documents on the San Francisco Peace Treaty published in the FRUS

collection.

61 Source: JICA, Okinawaken to kaigai ijuu (Tokyo: JICA 1982) pp, 98 – 99. Cited in Toake

Endoh, Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration toward Latin America, p.164.

61 The declaration of Human Rights was ratified in 1948. Japan joined the United Nations in

1956.

62 The directives for USCAR were established in a memorandum approved by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in October 4, 1950. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1950, vol. VI, East Asia and the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,1976), pp. 1313-1319. For the GRI see Art. II, C.A. Proclamation No. 13, 29 February 1952;
in United States Civil Administration: 1950 - 1972, Laws and Regulations during the U.S.
Administration of Okinawa: 1945-1972, ed. Gekkan Okinawa sha, vol. Book 1 (n/d). p.112.
63 The U.S. supported the emigration program as a policy to reduce the levels of social

tension in an overpopulated area. See Kozy Amemiya, "The Bolivian Conection: U.S. Basesand Okinawa Emigration," in Okinawa: Cold War Island, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff:
Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999).
64 “FOA Report on Emigration Possibilities in Bolivia”, 3 September 1954, U.S. National

Archives, RG. 319, SA 270 R18 Ex60 Box 30.

65 In the preamble of the 1961 agreement between the Bolivian Government and the UnitedStates concerning the immigration of Ryukyuans, it is made clear that because the U.S.
exercises “all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the
territory and inhabitants” , it can act as responsible authority for the migrants in Bolivia.
See “Agreement between the Government of Bolivia and the Government of the UnitedStates of America Concerning the Immigration of the Ryukyuans” Draft 8/23/61. The
United States Administration Materials – The Ryukyu Islands: S 312 UN 19 (20), at the
Sengo Shiryō shitsu, Ryukyu University.

66 The FOA was part of the U.S. aid plan for friendly countries. In 1953 the role of FOA wasto assist the colonization plan by giving guidance. See “Memorandum for the Record” 10 Nov.
1953. At the U.S. National Archives, RG. 319, SA 270 R18 Ex60 Box 30. Still in late 1954
FOA’s role in the migration program was not all clear. Oscar Powell, Director of the FOA
office in Bolivia, was at loss about his duties toward the migrants, so he requested an
Airgram defining in general terms what they were expected to do. See “Letter to Marry W.

Putting Okinawa at the Center120

Yee (Director W.C. Division FOA)” December 22, 1954. U.S. National Archives, RG. 319, SA
270 R18 Ex60 Box 30.
67 Since there was no Japanese office in the Ryukyu Islands that could emit passports, they

had to apply for one of the Ryukyu-proof of citizenship.

68 For a complete description of the Visa application procedures see Tamashiro Migorō,"Okinawa kaigai ijū kankei kiroku (Records Related to Okinawan Overseas Migration)," Ijūkenkyū, no. 16 (1979).
69 Turkey agreed to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by Englandin the Berlin treaty (1878). England could control Cyprus though titular sovereignty would
remain in Turkey. See Thomas Ehrlich, "Cyprus, the "Warlike Isle": Origins and Elements of
the Current Crisis," Stanford Law Review 18, no. 6 (1966), pp. 1024-1025.
70 Irie, "Okinawa shotō no hōteki chii," p.86.
71 Ibid. p.86.
72 Ibid. p.88.
73 Quoted in Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem. It should be noted that

Yoshida’s “always” could not mean anything earlier than 1609.

74 In conversation with Ota Masahide, I learned about the case of Japanese and Okinawan

fishermen who were shipwrecked on the Indonesia coast in the 1950s. The Japanese
consular office in Indonesia promptly took care of the Japanese fishermen whereas the
Okinawans were left without assistance.
75 The term hogo, together with “protection”, can be translated also as “conservation”,“guardianship” or “patronage”.
76 Kaigai ijū, 20 July 1954, p.6.

77 “Summary of meeting held between Mr. Ishida and LO” 10 May 1954. In The United States

Administration Materials – The Ryukyu Islands: S 312 UN 11 (19), at the Sengo Shiryō
shitsua, Ryukyu University.

78 In Japan International Cooperation Agency’s Record Office (JICA), Kaigai ijū, edited by

Nihon kaigai kyōkai rengōkai, 20 July 1954, p.6.

79 The U.S government, through USCAR, invested US$160,000 for the first Bolivian group.

The U.S. Congress appropriated over US$800,000 to support migration. See Kaigai ijū, 20
June 1954, p.39. However, the latter sum was not used in fiscal year 1955. Also thecounterpart funds (from the Bolivian government), used to build housing, provide foodsupply for the first year and for road construction, was derived from the nine million
dollars in aid received from the U.S. government. Therefore, most of the money came from
U.S. appropriations. See “Memorandum for the Record” 10 Nov. 1953. U.S. National Archives,
RG. 319, SA 270 R18 Ex60 Box 30.
80 The U.S. Technical Assistance Program was called “Point Four”. Harry Truman’sinaugural address in 1949 proclaimed the Point Four Program, with the objective of

Iacobelli: The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Migrants in Bolivia

121“making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas”. See Ravi Kanbur, "The Economics ofInternational Aid," in Working Paper Department of Applied Economics andMangement (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2003).
81 Gushiken arrived in Bolivia a year after the disease was controlled. He quotes his brother,a member of the first group, to explain the tragedy. Kotei Gushiken, Okinawa ijyūchi :Boribia no daichi to tomoni (Okinawa’s Migration Land : Together in Bolivia's
Ground) (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu, 1998). p. 52.

82 “Letter from Shuzo Nishihira (Chairman Urgent Countermeasure) to Higa (6 January

1955)”. In U.S. National Archives, Registration Number 319, Stack Area 270 Room 18, ex.60
box 30.
83 Higa Shūhei, Chief Executive, wrote to J. Tigner requesting immediate dispatch of

government officials. He also called for an official investigation and necessary action.
Similarly, Inamine wrote to U.S. Senator W. Judd. Letters and related documents in
Okinawan Prefectural Archive (hereafter OPA), Cod. R 0053789B.
84 Many of Inamine’s letters were directed to Representative Walter Judd, who had

advocated and sponsored migration to Bolivia. See Walter Judd papers, Box 145, folder 2,
The Hoover Institution Archives (HIA), California.
85 JICA, Kaigai ijū, 20 March 1955, p.8. American specialists were interested in the disease

itself and ran a series of experiments. The treatment was mainly to immunize thepopulation against yellow fever with the first injection of diphtheria-tetanus-whooping
cough vaccine administered to all children. See “Letter to Harry W. Yoe (FOA) by O.Powell”,
February 1, 1955, U.S. National Archives R.G. 319 S.A. 270, R.18 Ex.60 Box 30.
86 Initially, it was thought to be malaria but the test failed to confirm it. JICA, Kaigai ijū, 20

March 1955, p.8. According to Kozy Amemiya, it could have being an outburst of Hanta
virus. Amemiya, "The Bolivian Connection: U.S. Bases and Okinawa Emigration."
87 “Remittance as medical expenses for the patients among emigrants”, OPA, Cod. R

00053789 B

88 “Current Status of Ryukyuan Colonization in Bolivia” 10 February 1955. U.S. National

Archives R.G. 319 S.A. 270, R.18 Ex.60 Box 30.

89 “GRI Mission to Bolivia” 23 March 1955. U.S. National Archives R.G. 319 S.A. 270, R.18

Ex.60 Box 30.

90 This doesn’t mean that the Japanese newspaper did not cover the event, but in theirreport there is no direct mention to any form of official aid.

91 “Report of the group condition”, OPA Cod. R00053789B. The official exchange rate was

one dollar for 100 bolivianos, but the free rate was one dollar for 1200 bolivianos. Finally,
at a different level, Nagayama Tetsu, chief of the Uruma Colony, reported that the Japanese
Association at La Paz “was kind enough to present us Bs. 1,074,000.00 in token of

Putting Okinawa at the Center

122

sympathy.” Ryukyuans were Japanese nationals even though Okinawa was under U.S.
military control.
93 This situation changed in the 1960s when the U.S. modified its position towards

Okinawan emigrants and allowed the Japanese agencies to gain control over all Okinawan
and Japanese colonies.
94 Acts quoted in “Excerpts of Provisions of Japanese Laws” OPA Cod. 0000011835.
95 “Status of Ryukyuan Emigrants in Bolivia” OPA, Cod. 0000011835, p.2. Italics mine.
96 Nihon Kaigai Kyokai Renairais, “Boribia no seikatsu to roudou”, 1956, p.84.
97 “Status of Ryukyuan Emigrants in Bolivia” OPA, Cod. 0000011835, p.2.
98 MOFA, 16 Kai, J’0079, folder 2. Lt. Col. Crescenzo I. Guida from the Executive Office

replied to the request to change the U.S.-issued Ryukyuan travel document for Japanesepassports.
99 “Status of Ryukyuan Emigrants in Bolivia” OPA, Cod. 0000011835, p.3.
100 “Letter to Byron E. Blankinship, office of HICOM” 21 April 1961. In The United States

Administration Materials – The Ryukyu Islands: S 312 UN 19 (7), in the Sengo Shiryō shitsu(Postwar Archives Room), Ryukyu University.
101 This situation affected the socioeconomic conditions of the community in the 1950s andearly 1960s. Years later the mainland Japanese community of San Juan in Bolivia
remembered this situation. JICA, Shinsaku Nanbo, in Nihonjin Borivia Ijyūshi (History of theJapanese Migration in Bolivia) (Tokyo: Nihonjin Borivia Ijyūshi Hensai iinkai, 1970). p.147.
102 See note 95.

Iacobelli: The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Migrants in Bolivia

123Part II: Contemporary Okinawan Society and Culture
Memories of Okinawa: Life and Times in the Greater Osaka Diaspora
Steve Rabson
2003
Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American PowerOut migration has long been a key component of the modern Okinawan experience. As thepoorest prefecture in the country with an extremely limited land supply, there were plentyof economic incentives for Okinawans to seek employment outside the prefecture, andlarge numbers traveled to such places as the sugar and pineapple fields of Hawaii, thecoffee plantations of Brazil, newly established colonies in Bolivia (see the Augustine
chapter) and many other places in North and South America, Asia and the Pacific Islands
region. As a consequence prewar Okinawa came to have the highest ratio of emigrants tototal population in pre-World War II Japan and it is virtually de riguer for families in
Okinawa to have relatives who live overseas. Although not as closely documented becauseof the absence of border control procedures (except for the period of U.S. occupation), evengreater numbers of Okinawans migrated to the cities of mainland Japan. Large numbers of
Okinawans still travel from job-scarce Okinawa to the mainland in search of economic
opportunities.
Steve Rabson has done extensive field work among Okinawans in the Greater Osaka area
and in his article mobilizes insights and interview responses he has gathered over the years
to provide an overview of the experiences of Okinawan emigrants to the main islands since
the early 20th Century. As he makes clear, Okinawans on the mainland were strong affectedby cross-pressures that, on the one hand, stemmed from real and imagined “differences”
between Okinawans and mainland Japanese as well as the complex and changing politicalstatus of Okinawa via-a-vis the rest of Japan that was discussed in earlier chapters of thisreader. In general, until recently few Japanese thought in terms of hyphenated identity,
such as “Okinawan-Japanese.” Perceived differences were readily manifested in unequal
treatment and created strong pressures for assimilation. Since the 1990s, however, a“boom” in mainlander interest in Okinawa and Okinawan culture—engendered mainly
through music and other popular cultural forms—has altered attitudes relating to“Okinawan-ness” somewhat among Japanese mainlanders and among mainland-based
Okinawans themselves. As he highlights the interplay of these various currents over time,
Rabson makes it amply clear that identity among Okinawans on the mainland is a complex,
shifting and multifaceted phenomenon.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

124

Memories of Okinawa: Life and Times in the Greater Osaka Diaspora
2003
Steve Rabson
Memories of Okinawa: Life and Times in the Greater Osaka Diaspora
Steve Rabson
This chapter is based on a study of people who have migrated from Okinawa to greater
Osaka and their descendants. Okinawans are defined as individuals with at least one
grandparent or two great-grandparents from Okinawa, including those who moved togreater Osaka between late 1945 and early 1972 when Okinawa was officially called “TheRyukyu Islands”1 by its American military occupiers.2 From July 1999 until June 2001, I
administered a survey questionnaire to 313 respondents, interviewed more than 100
individuals, collected writings by and about Okinawans in greater Osaka, and attended
their social functions, performance events, and informal gatherings. Throughout the twoyears of this study, I lived among Okinawan neighbors in the largest residential communityof Okinawans in greater Osaka which is located in Taishō Ward of Osaka City. This chapter
summarizes the history of Okinawan migration to greater Osaka; presents interviews andwritings that describe, in particular, their experiences residing in what Okinawan scholars
have called “ethnic communities”3; examines the role of prefectural associations and otherorganizations of Okinawans in greater Osaka; and discusses the ways in which individuals
in this diaspora remember Okinawa or view their relationship with an ancestral homeland
where many of them have never lived.
Why they came to greater Osaka
Okinawans started moving to greater Osaka in significant numbers, mostly for temporary
periods, around 1900, the same year commonly cited for the start of Okinawan emigration
abroad. Most came either to work in factories or to sell Okinawan products, such as sugar,
awamori, and textiles, after regular boat service was established between Naha and Osaka.
During this period, Osaka was becoming known as “the Manchester of the East” for its
many textile mills that recruited large numbers of workers, mostly women, including manyfrom Okinawa and Korea as well as rural areas on the mainland. Families in Okinawa
usually received a lump-sum payment for contracts negotiated through recruiters, and thefactories provided their children, often girls as young as thirteen, with gainful employment,
regular meals, dormitory lodging, and wages that helped support the household backhome.4For mainland Japan, World War I brought enormous economic benefits. Besides adding
former German concessions in China and German territories in the South Pacific to its
empire after Germany’s defeat, Japan gained a huge export market, which greatly
stimulated its domestic industries. Manufacturers were deluged with orders for munitions
and supplies as they displaced American and European manufacturers in large sectors bothof the domestic consumer market and Asian markets.
The rural economy in Okinawa, already languishing, was devastated by the collapse ofworld sugar prices in 1921, compelling more Okinawans to leave for South America, Hawaii,
and the Philippines, however, the largest number moved to mainland Japan. Meanwhile,Rabson: Memories of Okinawa

125

expansion of the industrial and consumer economy on the mainland that started during the“World War I boom” intensified competition for workers among recruiters and employers.
This resulted not only in better wages for women and men working in factories, but also
made possible access to more prestigious jobs, especially for women, some of whom were
now able to leave the spinning factories for work as department store clerks and telephone
operators.6 New factories in Osaka and its environs brought a rapid increase in the city’s
textile, construction, metal processing, and lumber industries. Shipbuilding firms also
opened assembly plants in what was then the city’s Minato (“Harbor”) Ward where Osaka’s
largest Okinawan community settled in the eastern portion that split off in 1932 to create
Taishō Ward.
By late 1914, when Okinawan communities had begun to form, two-fifths of the populationof Osaka’s Kita Okajima Precinct (part of Taishō Ward after 1932) was estimated to be from
Okinawa.7 Of the approximately 20,000 who came to the mainland from Okinawa every
year during the 1920s and 1930s, nearly half worked as manual laborers in the factories ofgreater Osaka. In 1925, for example, of 19,926 Okinawans moving to the mainland, 8,994
came to the Osaka-Kobe area. The recorded population of Okinawans residing there grewfrom 1,575 in 1920 to 8,994 in 1925 and 20,356 in 1930, declined to 16,929 in 1935, andgrew again to 53,678 in 1940. During this same period for the mainland as a whole, theresident population grew from 9,626 in 1920 to 19, 926 in 1925 and 43,150 in 1930,
declined to 32,335 in 1935, and grew again to 88,319 in 1940.8 By 1940, the population of
Okinawans on the mainland was approaching 15 percent of the total population of Okinawa
Prefecture itself, some 600,000 at the time.
In contrast to Osaka, known as a “labor market,” Okinawans thought of Tokyo as a “centerof arts and culture” where young people went to attend school and begin careers in suchfields as literature, journalism, and painting, as well as in business. A popular saying in
Okinawa at the turn of the twentieth century was “The rich emigrate abroad, the students
go to Tokyo, and the poor go to Osaka.”9 In reality, of course, students also went to schools
and colleges in Osaka and Kyoto. And, despite this “working-class” image of Osaka, many
Okinawans in professions such as medicine, pharmacy, law, and education settled there
after completing their schooling on the mainland. Okinawans in Osaka worked on theprefectural police force, in the city hall, on newspapers as reporters, and in local hospitals
as physicians. By 1910 Osaka had approximately sixty Okinawan schoolteachers and thirty
firefighters. Okinawans also worked in banks, shipping companies, and retail stores,
managed restaurants and clothing stores, and owned small businesses in the city.
When discussing Okinawan migration, mainlanders invariably refer to the “palm tree hell”(sotetsu jigoku). This ironic phrase is commonly used to describe economic conditions in
Okinawa during the years following the collapse of world sugar prices in 1921. The
devastating shock, felt first by farm families, spread rapidly to related businesses andbanks which failed one after another. Employers could not meet their payrolls, and even
the Okinawa Prefectural Government, unable to collect taxes, went bankrupt.10 As in times
of famine in the former Ryukyu Kingdom, people resorted to eating the seeds and lower
stalks of Japanese fern palm (cycad) plants that provided nourishment, but required careful
cooking to avoid food poisoning. Okinawans, however, criticize the term “palm tree hell,”noting that it sounds like some kind of natural disaster, obscuring the responsibility of thePutting Okinawa at the Center

126

Japanese government for its discriminatory policies toward Okinawa where, before WorldWar II, people paid higher taxes and received fewer social services than in any otherprefecture. Okinawans also note that, far from protecting the local sugar industry, theJapanese government abandoned it in favor of an intense program to develop sugar
plantations in Taiwan, Japan’s colony acquired as one of the spoils of victory in the SinoJapanese War of 1894-95.11
With Okinawan migration to greater Osaka increasing thirteen-fold between 1920 and theearly 1930s, the national government dealt with depression-era conditions in Okinawa by
rejecting proposals for relief and, instead, sending 56,000 Okinawans as emigrants toJapanese island territories in the South Pacific where by 1940 they outnumbered local
populations.12
Okinawan residents of greater Osaka today include people who came to rural areas of themainland initially in the massive evacuation that began in late 1944, and others who barely
survived the Battle in 1945. Memories of the evacuation, the Battle, and the firebombing of
Osaka in 1945 comprise an important legacy of the Pacific War in the Okinawan community.
When the war finally ended, many Okinawans who had lived on the mainland or evacuatedthere before the Battle were unable to return during the period Okinawans call “kaosu”(chaos) stretching into the aftermath of massive destruction in which whole families wereannihilated, villages obliterated, property demolished, and the landscape alteredirrevocably. Thousands were finally able to go back, at least temporarily, beginning in 1946,
but travel to and from Okinawa was strictly controlled under the U.S. “Military Government”
which began requiring that people wanting to return provide family registers that had also,
in many cases, been destroyed in the Battle. Those wanting to go to Okinawa included
Okinawan soldiers returning from military service abroad or from prisoner-of-war camps
in the U.S.S.R., as well as civilians. Occupation authorities on the mainland first established
an office in Fukuoka to provide alternative documents, but many people were unable toobtain them. Later, U.S. occupation authorities in Okinawa issued what were
euphemistically called “passports” for travel between the mainland and Okinawa, but werereally more like the old Soviet exit visas, obtainable only after what were sometimes
lengthy investigations. Those who did manage to return in the early postwar years often
arrived to find their families decimated, their homes in ruins, little prospect for
employment and, in some cases, their lands seized, without compensation, for U.S. militarybases. As a result, many had to make U-turns back to the mainland.
Where they settled: growth, movement, and changing conditions in the greater
Osaka diaspora
Kansai, the mainland region with the largest number of migrants, encompasses Osaka,
Hyōgo, and Kyoto Prefectures, but can also refer, along with Kinki, to a wider area including
Mie, Nara, Shiga and Wakayama Prefectures. Okinawans reside throughout this region, but
by far the largest numbers live in Osaka and Hyōgo, the only prefectures in Kansai with
Okinawan residential communities. This is why, for the sake of convenience, I refer to
Osaka and Hyōgo Prefectures as “greater Osaka.” Residential communities of Okinawans
can still be found elsewhere on the mainland in Yokohama and Kawasaki, while in Fukuoka,

Rabson: Memories of Okinawa

127

Nagoya, Hiroshima and other cities, where such neighborhoods existed in the past,
Okinawan migrants and their descendents have now largely dispersed.
Precise figures for Okinawans now residing on the mainland are not available. Until 1940
such statistics were compiled periodically from official family registers (koseki) by theprefectural police in Okinawa. However, since the war, family registers of most Okinawansborn in greater Osaka have indicated domiciles on the mainland, not in Okinawa. And many
migrants established new family registers on the mainland after their official records weredestroyed during the Battle of Okinawa. Prefectural associations have compiled estimates
based on their membership lists, but, until recently, these have enumerated households,
not individuals, and do not include non-member households. A more comprehensive,
though imprecise, mainland-wide survey was published by the Okinawa Prefectural
Association of Hyōgo (Okinawa Kenjin-kai Hyōgo-ken Honbu) in November of 2000 which
estimated that the two largest populations by far were 36,500 in Yokohama City and 70,
000 in Osaka Prefecture. Other sources estimate the population of Okinawans in Osaka
City’s Taishō Ward at 19,000,13 by far the largest in Kansai.14
Like migrant and immigrant communities elsewhere, Okinawan communities in greater
Osaka formed near where jobs were available and where other Okinawans already lived
who could provide support and contacts, especially important for newcomers. Many
Okinawans also preferred an environment for daily life where it was possible to speak the
dialects, eat the food, practice the religious observances, and maintain other social andcultural customs of the homeland to the extent possible in what were, for most, unfamiliar
urban conditions. And, like migrants and immigrants in many places, people from Okinawa
chose to live in such communities in order to cope with prejudice and discrimination,
including denial of lodging and employment, they encountered because societies at large
have often tended to look down on or exclude people with differences, real or imagined.
Relentless pressures to “assimilate” (dōka), coming both from mainlanders and from
Okinawans themselves, caused many to abandon much of what was distinctively Okinawan
when they stepped outside the community, but inside it people could still live, in many
ways, as they had before coming to the mainland. In 1996 Kinjō Isamu recalled his earlychildhood in Taishō Ward shortly after his family moved there from Okinawa in 1954. By
this time, Okinawans had been settling there for some three decades, and his childhood
memories are far more positive than those of people who had migrated in the 1920s when
the community was still going through its early growing pains.
My parents maintained our Okinawan lifestyle so completely that sometimes we forgot wewere in Osaka. We always spoke in Okinawa dialect and, since we were among many other
Okinawans in the Manzai-bashi section of Kita Okajima Precinct, it was easy to live this way.
My father raised pigs [for the many cuts of pork used in Okinawan cuisine] and grew gōyaa[bitter gourd] in a vacant lot, and he made brown sugar candy. My mother had her weaving
implements sent from Okinawa, and wove [Okinawan style] kasuri splash-patterned cloth.
We conducted all the annual religious observances strictly by the old lunar calendar,
including the spring shiimii festival of feast and prayer when relatives gather to honor
departed ancestors, and the summer o-bon festival [when spirits of the ancestors are said
to return to this world for a brief visit].

Putting Okinawa at the Center

128

The distribution of the Okinawan population in greater Osaka has changed over time withshifting labor and consumer demands as old factories closed and new ones opened. The
Okinawan community in Wakayama, a center of the prewar textile industry, virtuallydisappeared after World War II as many of its residents moved to the growing Okinawan
community in Amagasaki where small and medium-sized metalworking shops were
opening. Such shops can be found as well in Taishō Ward of Osaka, where community
residents also work in the two large metal-parts factories, Kubota and Nakayama. Other
Taishō residents work as proprietors or employees in stores, selling mostly consumer
goods and services, including those which line the three-block long shopping arcade(shōten-gai) in Hirao Precinct, and also as professionals in real estate, pharmacy, medicine,
dentistry, and teaching. Many single male residents in Taishō Ward work for local private
contractors at construction sites, while, as elsewhere in Japan, there is a large and growing
population of retirees.
Major movements of population have also occurred within localities, particularly startingin the late-1950s when families of Okinawans, as well as many mainland Japanese, moved
from houses or tenements to apartment blocks (danchi) being built in large numbers at thetime. This movement, however, was not always voluntary. In Taishō Ward, for example,
residents of make-shift houses and barrack-like tenements in a low and often-flooded
riverbank area of Kobayashi Precinct that Okinawans called “the hollows” (kubun-gwa in
Okinawa dialect) were relocated by the city of Osaka to newly constructed municipal
apartments nearby in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This was part of a citywide “slumclearance” plan that targeted this area of marshy, unclaimed land officially deemedunsanitary and unsafe. Okinawans had begun living there in the chaotic period just afterWorld War II, which had left much of greater Osaka devastated from fire-bombings. On
what had been unclaimed land they constructed dwellings from tarpaper, tin, cardboard,plywood, and scrap lumber without official building permits. Interviewed in 1999, a former
resident described the origins and growth of the hollows.
Many poor people began living there shortly after the war. When one person put up a
house, others followed, building houses, moving in, and starting families. In the aftermathof recent bombings, there were always big puddles everywhere. Around 1950 people began
putting up barrack-like tenements using lumber, tarpaper, and cement. Landlords living
elsewhere also built tenements they rented.
There was electricity in the hollows, but the puddles slopped over with what seemed likesewer water. They were pumped out occasionally, but most of the time people had to put
down boards for walk-paths to avoid sloshing through them.15
Kinjō Isamu recalled the hollows from the 1950s.
About one-third of the people there were Okinawans, with many of the others from Kyūshū
and Shikoku. When new people moved in from Okinawa, their friends and relatives would
come to help put up a house using discarded lumber and other materials. No one owned
most of the land, so it was squatters’ rights for the first to claim an open space. My father
built his first house this way with help from other Okinawans. Instead of paying them, heserved food and drink afterwards. This was one of the ways the yuimaru (cooperative

Rabson: Memories of Okinawa

129

labor) system, used in Okinawa for such hard work as cutting sugar cane, also came to be
applied in Osaka.16
Though called by the media at the time an “Okinawa slum,”17 some of the approximately
1500 Okinawan migrants and their descendants who lived there recall the hollows
wistfully as a place with “a spirit of community cooperation” (kyōdō-tai seishin) where
people helped build dwellings by yuimaru and loaned money to each other under the coopsystem, called “moai” in Okinawa, of pooling funds among relatives and close friends that is
also practiced elsewhere in Asia. In addition, they made room in their homes for displacedneighbors, especially during such troubled times as when “typhoon Jane” leveled manydwellings and flooded the area in 1950.18 But other former residents call nostalgia for thehollows a romanticization of the past, and recall freezing winters, sweltering summers,
flooding waters where sewage floated, swarming mosquitoes, devastating fires that fed ontar- paper, and taxi drivers who would refuse to take passengers to Taishō Ward for fear of
soiling their vehicles in mud puddles or damaging their tires in potholes.19 Kinjō Isamu
recalled that conditions there were much worse than in the neighborhoods of soggy oldhouses crammed together that we saw in a documentary film shown by one of our teachersat school with a passionate interest in the “Buraku problem.” I realized then that, like
Buraku people, many Okinawans were hired only for grueling, dirty jobs, but that, in a way,
we faced worse discrimination because, unlike them, we needed “passports” to visit our
hometowns [in Okinawa under U.S. military occupation].20
In 1996 Kakinohana Yoshimori remembered his first impression of the hollows from theearly 1970s, shortly after he had moved to Osaka from Miyako Island.
Now people in Taishō Ward dress neatly, wearing the latest fashions, but in those days
laborers walked the streets in baggy work fatigues. On the one hand, I was relieved to beamong other Okinawans, but the place was depressingly poor. When I first saw the hollows,
before the relocation, I was appalled, wondering if this was how Okinawans on themainland had to live. It truly was a slum, though people from there would be angry to hearme say that today. But it’s the truth. One glance at the outdoor sinks and toilets, the maze ofalleys, the houses patched together with boards and tin, and anyone would have to agree.21
The current fascination among mainland Japanese with things Okinawan, which includes
Okinawan communities on the mainland, could explain, in part, why a place commonly
called a “slum” in the past has become the object of recent nostalgia in Japan for the early
postwar period and of admiration for the resourcefulness of its residents in the face ofadversity. This trend could also explain why it has come to acquire a more positive image inthe current memories of some Okinawans, and why published interviews and writings havebeen appearing recently.
Still, whatever “narrative” of the hollows one accepts today, for most residents it was their
one and only home when Osaka City targeted it for “clearance” in 1969. Okinawan student
leaders organized protests, applying such tactics as sit-ins at municipal government officeslearned from local Buraku activists. Protracted negotiations with the city dragged on until
most residents agreed to move, with negotiated rent subsidies, to new municipally owned
apartment buildings (shi-ei danchi) in the early 1970s. The smaller number of people living

Putting Okinawa at the Center130in the hollows with deeds to their land were offered alternative lots, though of somewhat
smaller size, in nearby precincts.22 Interviewed in 1999, one former resident recalled that“the compensation money the city was offering us to evacuate didn’t amount to a sparrow’s
tear. They built fine apartments at the places we were relocated, but moving there put us
all deeply in debt. I can still remember how worn out with worry members of the tenants’
association were as they ran around every day trying to scrape up the money for moving
expenses.”23 The last tenant to hold out, an elderly woman, finally moved to a municipally
owned apartment in 1979.
After that, the hollows was sunk underwater, flooded deliberately for the artificial
expansion of Osaka Bay. Meanwhile, some mainland Japanese living elsewhere in TaishōWard voiced resentment because they were not offered relocation rent subsidies in the
new apartments or alternative parcels of land. Today, nothing of the hollows or anything
like it remains in Taishō Ward. Apartment buildings, large and small, and one-family
houses predominate, along with residences storekeepers have built above or behind their
shops. The Okinawan community there is now a modestly prospering, though far from
affluent, neighborhood of merchants and working people roughly comparable in cultural
distinctiveness and economic circumstances to Brooklyn’s ethnic neighborhoods in
Williamsburg (Italian) and Greenpoint (Polish). As for land, virtually no vacant lots or open
spaces remain today like those still available when Kinjō Isamu’s family moved to Taishō in1954, so Okinawans can no longer raise pigs. However, many families still maintain small
gardens of gōyaa that are so numerous on one street in Kobayashi Precinct that it has cometo be known as “gōyaa dōri.” Okinawan foodstuffs for preparation at home and inrestaurants are sold in many neighborhood stores, including some run by mainlanders.
46% of the respondents to my questionnaire indicated that they ate Okinawan foodregularly; 40% indicated that they observe Okinawan religious practices; and 60%
indicated that they perform or listen to Okinawan folk music, which one can often hearwalking along neighborhood streets in the evening.
How they coped: adjusting to differences and responding to prejudice anddiscrimination
People from Okinawa have encountered hardships on the mainland because of differencesthat are real, but more often imagined or exaggerated in the minds of mainlanders. A
proportionally larger population from Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands settled in the
Ryukyu Islands in prehistoric times than in what is now mainland Japan.24 As a result of
this early migration, physiological characteristics distinguishing Okinawans from mainland
Japanese include shorter average stature, darker skin, fuller chests, and rounder eyes. Yet
many Okinawans are physically indistinguishable from a majority of people on themainland where there is also significant individual and regional variation to the extent thatsome mainlanders are even said to “look Okinawan.” Mainlanders have tended to
exaggerate or invent “differences,” cultural as well as physiological, fostering stereotypes
which are likely to be activated when someone is thought to be Okinawan. Furthermore,
people who are said to “look Okinawan,” like Okinawans themselves, have been ridiculed
for features that are, in fact, envied by many on the mainland. In what is one of the mostpopular cosmetic surgical procedures in the country today, women have tissue removed toenlarge their eye openings. And the beaches in Okinawa are crowded year-round with

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women and men from the mainland assiduously darkening their skin, suntans acquired in
the pursuit of leisure being a mark of wealth and sophistication often associated with travel
abroad.
While their physical features have often attracted unwanted attention, language differences
have posed more serious problems for Okinawans on the mainland. Again, both real andimagined differences are involved. During the U.S. military occupation of Okinawa,
mainlanders sometimes asked people from Okinawa if they spoke English at home. As for
actual differences, the dialects of mainland Japan and the Ryukyus are closely related
structurally, and are said to have diverged from a single “mother dialect” in a process
thought to have occurred between the second and seventh centuries A.D.25 Today Ryukyu
dialects have come to be the most divergent among all local dialects in Japan, a distancewhich has been compared to the difference between French and Italian.26 And, like dialects
in northern Honshū and southern Kyūshū today, the dialects of the Ryukyu Islands, some ofwhich are mutually unintelligible, are not understood by people in other parts of thecountry unless they make a special point of studying them. On the other hand, for morethan a century, since the middle of the Meiji Period (1868-1912), “standard” Japanese has
been promoted by the media in Okinawa and required—at times punitively—in local
schools. With daily discourse among those under fifty now conducted almost entirely in“standard” Japanese, the dialects of Ryukyu are gradually dying out despite recent efforts atpreservation in the arts and education.
Nevertheless, many Okinawans on the mainland, especially those migrating after earlychildhood, have struggled, at least to some extent, with “standard” Japanese. Even younger
migrants who have mastered it in Okinawa as their first language often retain adistinctively “Okinawan accent” and may be unfamiliar with certain local idioms, resulting
in ridicule and a self-consciousness that hinders their ability to express themselves fully.
An “Okinawan accent” includes a more fluctuating intonation (as opposed to a flatter
mainland intonation) along with the occasional lengthening and shortening of vowels
contrary to the mainland standard (Amagasaki pronounced as “Amagasaaki” and Osakapronounced as “Osuka”).27 A woman in her late fifties who had come to Osaka in 1953
reported that one reason she had become active in the local Okinawa Prefectural
Association was so that “I could feel comfortable about speaking with others in an Okinawa
accent (Okinawa-namari).”28 When speaking to each other in Osaka, first generation
migrants from Okinawa often mix words and phrases from Okinawa dialect with Kansai
Japanese. In an ironic reversal, the recent “boom” of interest in Okinawan culture has given
the dialect a “trendy” status in Japan today so that mainlanders are now picking up
expressions like chura (pretty girl or handsome boy), waji-waji (angry), and kūsu (awamori
aged at least five years), as well as learning the words for such Okinawan cuisine as gōyaa(bitter gourd), mimi-gaa (pickled pigs’ ears), and saada-andagii (spherical donut).
Among Okinawans interviewed for this study who recalled struggles with language on themainland was a woman in her fifties who had moved to Osaka from Nago in the early 1960s.
After finally receiving her “passport,” she arrived in Osaka and was hired in an office where
she had to answer the telephone and take messages. She often needed to ask callers to
repeat information because she could not understand it the first time or worried that her

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reply was not being understood by the caller. At such times she would apologize, explainingthat she had arrived only recently from Okinawa.29
A woman in her mid-forties who had come to greater Osaka in the mid-1970s told in a June,
2001 interview of a co-worker from Okinawa at a supermarket who was harassed
relentlessly by his supervisors because he couldn’t adjust immediately to local customs of
repeatedly greeting and thanking customers with the correct phrases of Osaka dialect. And,in a case that became a “cause celebre” in the Taishō Ward community, a nurse trainee
from Okinawa was fired in 1977 by a local hospital for alleged “inefficiency” because, hersupervisor said, she spoke with an Okinawa accent. Despite intimidation by yakuza thugs,
her supporters lodged a formal protest with the hospital director and the young woman’s
dismissal was rescinded. She subsequently resigned her job, received compensation fromthe hospital as part of a settlement, and returned to her home on Iheya Island.30
Interviewed in April of 2000, a 48-year-old neighbor of mine who had migrated to Osaka inthe early 1970s and remains single gave struggles with language as the main reason henever dated women born and raised on the mainland, though he had been approached anumber of times over the years, including on two occasions during my residence there, bysuch women who said they found him attractive. And a woman from Nago in her early
thirties who had migrated as recently as 1985 reported that “I had real trouble withlanguage when I first arrived, especially because idioms and intonation was different. I felt
depressed because I was often unable to express myself or understand completely what
others said. Even today, I have occasional problems.”31
Aside from language, other differences exaggerated or invented have spawned prejudicesand discrimination in their most virulent forms. Japanese who traveled or worked in
Okinawa early in the Meiji Period initially conveyed stereotypes that were alreadywidespread and deeply rooted in Japan by the turn of the twentieth century. Perhaps themost blatant (and subsequently most studied) manifestation of these attitudes was thenotorious 1903 “human pavilion incident” at the Fifth World Trade and Industrial
Exhibition, held that year in Osaka. The so-called “scientific human pavilion” (gakujutsu
jinrui-kan) was not one of the official, government-sponsored exhibits, but was designed
and constructed as a private business venture in consultation with Tsuboi Seigorō,32 known
as “the founder of Japanese anthropology.” What has subsequently been described as a“freak show” was located just outside the main entrance to the exhibition grounds where it
could easily attract some of the estimated 5,300,000 visitors to what was Japan’s largest yet
international exhibition. Scheduled to open on March 10, it was to feature twenty-one
highly exoticized “representatives” of “eight peoples:” five Ainu, four Taiwanese, two
Koreans, three Chinese, three (Asian) Indians, one Javanese, one Bulgarian, and two
Okinawans, all dressed in their “native” (genjū-min) clothing and displayed in cubicles thatwere later compared to animal cages at circuses.33 Protests from the Chinese Embassy andfrom Koreans in Osaka led to cancellation of exhibits from these countries (Korea was“annexed” by Japan as a colony seven year later in 1910), and protests from Okinawa, suchas an angry editorial in the April 7, 1903 Ryūkyū Shinpō declaring “We must never toleratesuch humiliation,” led to removal of the “Ryukyu” exhibit in May after two months ofdisplay.

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Poet Yamanokuchi Baku (1903-1963), born in Naha, who spent virtually all of his adult lifeon the mainland, poignantly evoked mainland stereotypes of Okinawans. In his short story“Mr. Saitō of Heaven Building,”34 the narrator recalls the experience “of living in Tokyo as a
man from ‘Ryukyu’ for the past sixteen years. I’ve run into people wherever I go who…stareat me strangely—as if I’m not even human. And in those stares I can hear their questions. Is
Ryukyu in Okinawa Prefecture? Do the people there eat rice?”35 More recently, during the
U.S. military occupation when far fewer mainlanders than now made visits to Okinawa
which then required passports and entry permits, people from Okinawa on the mainland
were asked such questions as whether they lived in a jungle, wore grass skirts, or ate withknives and forks.36
Moving from Okinawa to Osaka in 1925 at the age of nine, Oyakawa Takayoshi recalls his
first few weeks in school on the mainland.
Some of the other students would look at me derisively, calling me “Ryukyuan.” …I wasshocked, having no idea why they made fun of me because I was from Okinawa. …It got so
bad I couldn’t stand it, and stopped going to school for about a week. My parents
understood what was happening, though, and didn’t scold me.37
Drafted into the Imperial Japanese Army in 1937, Oyakawa writes, “the first unit I was
assigned to was all Okinawans because, it was explained in the company briefing, soldiersfrom each prefecture were trained in separate units. But the company commander madefun of us, saying it was really because ‘Okinawa is thirty years behind the mainland.’”38
Okinawans have encountered prejudice on the mainland whether, like Oyakawa, they
settled there or came temporarily for “work away from home.” Kinjō Tsuru went to work in
1919 at the Fukushima Spinning Factory in Shikama, Hyōgo Prefecture.
My contract was for three years, but I ran away after working for only one. …I just couldn’t
stand it anymore, always being made fun of because I was from Okinawa.
I was taunted especially by the woman of about fifty who was in charge of our rooms in thedormitory. Whenever she talked to me, she would yell out scornfully, “Hey, you, Ryukyu” or“Listen here, Ryukyu.” I’m no weakling, though, and yelled back at her. …”So what’s wrong
with being from Okinawa?” or “Didn’t you also come out of a womb?” …
We Okinawan women formed a group that stood up to her, and there were a lot of big
arguments. I remember Ms. Yonamine especially. She was about forty and really told thatroom manager off. “We might be under contract here,” she said, “but we haven’t sold ourlives to you.” I’ll never forget how good that made me feel. …
If we were late getting back for the five-o’clock curfew, we’d be called into the office thenext day for a bawling out of “you Ryukyu girls.” Only one person there, a man working in
the kitchen, treated us well because, he said, we had come from so far away. We called him
Dad.39Besides barbs and insults, the problems people faced on the mainland simply because theycame from Okinawa manifested themselves in material ways that directly affected theirlives and livelihoods. Starting in the 1920s, some employers and landlords posted signs infront of factories, employment offices, and lodging houses announcing “Koreans andPutting Okinawa at the Center

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Okinawans prohibited” (Chōsen-jin Ryūkyū-jin o-kotowari). In explaining such exclusion,
employers sometimes complained that Okinawans tended to change jobs if they were
offered better conditions elsewhere, and landlords claimed that Okinawans tended to livewith too many relatives in lodgings meant for fewer tenants. It is true that people who
traveled long distances to “work away from home” often lived with relatives, at least
temporarily until they got settled. But Okinawans were certainly not the only ones comingfrom remote rural areas of Japan to lodge with relatives in cities like Osaka, especiallyduring the acute prewar housing shortage. Furthermore, large families that often included
in-laws and grandparents were still the norm in Japan at this time. And, while it is true that
Okinawans would change jobs for higher wages, especially since they had to send at least
part of their earnings back to their families, they were surely not the only workers in Japanleaving one workplace for better conditions at another.40
In fact, Okinawans might have been motivated, at least in part, to change jobs because
employers seem to have considered it smart business practice to offer them lower wages
and inferior working conditions. Extensive statistical records from the 1920s and 1930s
reveal a pattern of discrimination in employment contracts, housing, and even workplacesafety measures. Tomiyama quotes published interviews of company officials who recalled
that, seeking workers at low wages, “we made a special effort to recruit factory womenfrom among Koreans, Okinawans, and Burakumin.”41 Employers at mainland cotton
spinning factories in particular assumed that “Ryukyuans” could be paid lower wages,
would put up with abusive working conditions, and did not require compensation for fires
or accidents. This discriminatory attitude manifested itself in a number of management
policies, such as housing Okinawans separately and giving them different meals frommainland workers.42
Statistics also show that women from Okinawa were disproportionately assigned the mostdangerous and arduous jobs in spinning factories.43 Arakaki Kaeko, who worked in 1927 at
the Fukushima Spinning Factory, in Hyōgo Prefecture, describes one of several successfulprotests against discriminatory treatment of workers from Okinawa.
They deducted 15 sen from our monthly wages for meals, but served only leftovers to the
Okinawans. The mainland workers got warm rice, while ours was always cold. It was
clearly discrimination.
Finally, we couldn’t stand it anymore, and six of us Okinawan factory women decided totake action in protest. “The hell with this,” we told them. “You deduct all this money fromour pay, and give us nothing but leftovers.” Then, as soon as they served us the food, we
hurled it back in their faces and knocked the serving trays down on the floor.
This really shocked the company, and after that we got the same food as the mainland
workers.
Also, among other insults, our supervisors were always telling us that “Okinawans are dirty
because you eat garlic and pork, like Koreans who eat red pepper.”So one day all the Okinawans gathered for a protest in the factory yard. We sat down on the
ground and refused to work or eat in what today would be called a hunger strike. Then,maybe after the company contacted him, the president of the prefectural association, Mr.

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Kinjō, arrived in a hurry to check out the situation. “We can’t work any more in a place like
this,” we told him. “Please get us the money for our return fares.”At last the factory manager showed up and apologized to us, and since the supervisors had
to go along with him, our treatment suddenly improved.44
As recalled in interviews, these experiences from the spinning mills indicate, first, that
Okinawans did not necessarily accept prejudice and discrimination passively, and, second,that mainland co-workers and supervisors were responsive at times to their protests.
Blatant discrimination persisted well into the postwar years despite the fact that it was
now illegal. Two people I interviewed for this study reported seeing signs in front ofapartment buildings in Taishō Ward as late as 1973 announcing, “Okinawans and membersof Soka Gakkai not admitted” (Okinawa to Sōka Gakkai, nyūkyo o-kotowari), and a local
community leader reported in 1987 that some landlords in the city were still refusing torent to Okinawans.45 A woman interviewed in April of 2000 said she was told by landlords
that Okinawans tend to live with too many relatives, the same excuse given in earlier
decades, and that members of Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist sect that actively recruits andproselytizes, tend to hold crowded, noisy prayer meetings at night. Signs excluding
Okinawans on taverns and restaurants in Tokyo and Yokohama have been observed as lateas the mid-1980s, and were given by one interviewee in March of 2001 as a major reason
for moving from Yokohama to Osaka.
Protests by women mistreated in textile factories and by supporters of the nurse fired in1977 for speaking with an “Okinawan accent” represent some of the many ways Okinawans
on the mainland have responded to these injustices. Considering that the source of
prejudice and discrimination is often psychological—presumptions of superiority by amajority over a minority—many Okinawans have sought to associate themselves inmainland minds with the majority by undertaking prodigious efforts to “assimilate.”
Throughout the prewar and wartime years, and during the U.S. military occupation,
Okinawans have often identified themselves with this majority by vigorously emphasizing
their Japanese nationality. Published reaction from Okinawa in 1903 to the “humanpavilion” at the Fifth World Trade and Industrial Exhibition in Osaka did not criticize theinhumanity of such a display, but its inclusion of Okinawans with Ainu and Taiwanese. An
April 7 editorial in the Ryūkyū Shinpō objected, not to the exhibit in principle, but to its
inclusion of “Japanese citizens of Okinawa Prefecture,” and complained that “lining up
citizens of Okinawa Prefecture with Taiwanese barbarians (seiban) and Hokkaido Ainu is toview Okinawans…as one of these.” With heavy overtones of scapegoating, the editorialdescribed this “humiliation” as the result of “being portrayed as an ‘inferior race’ (rettō
shuzoku).”This attitude has been characterized as the victims of discrimination becoming its
perpetrators, and was also observed among women factory workers in Osaka from
Okinawa and Korea who are said to have hurled the derogatory epithets “Korean whore”(Chōsen pii) and “Ryukyu pig” (Ryūkyū buta) at each other during arguments.46
Furthermore, Okinawans sometimes assign high and low “status” among themselves. A
first-generation migrant from Miyako Island, interviewed in April of 2001, reported thatsome migrants to Osaka from Okinawa Main Island (hontō) have tended to look down on

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people from the outer islands (ritō). Protesting “the evils of discrimination” with a morepositive appeal to shared national identity, Okinawan novelist Kushi Fusako pointed out in
1932 that “Like mainlanders, Okinawans serve in the military and perform their otherduties as citizens.”47
Okinawans who emphasize their Japanese nationality have often, but not always, deemphasized their Okinawan ethnicity. Their efforts to “assimilate” culturally with majority
Japanese (Yamatun-chu) have included not only practicing mainland customs of dialect,diet, dress, inter-personal formalities, and religious observances, at least outside the homeor neighborhood, but also rejecting traditional Okinawan religious practices and such art
forms as classical dance (ryūbu) and folk songs (min’yō or shima-uta), or performing themin private, away from the eyes and ears of Yamatun-chu. Oyakawa Takayoshi recalled that,after moving to Osaka in 1925 as a child, he developed a strong aversion for things
distinctively Okinawan.
I hated Okinawan dance and sanshin [Okinawan shamisen] music…and despised the word
‘Ryukyu.” 48 …In Chitose Precinct there was an open field where performers erected a leanto stage, set up a booth for collecting admission, and put on Okinawan plays. Mainlanders
would gather to watch in fascination, but they made fun of Okinawans in loud voices and I
felt ashamed.
Another thing I hated was when people riding the trains or walking down the street spokein Okinawa dialect. I thought that in public they should always use standard Japanese or
Osaka dialect.49
Perhaps the most conspicuous way Okinawans on the mainland have sought to deemphasize or conceal their ethnicity has been changing the pronunciations, and sometimes
the Chinese characters, in their distinctive Okinawan names. This trend started in Okinawa
itself after Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 when more and more
Okinawans wanted to identify themselves with a nation rising in wealth, power, and status.
Name-changing is, of course, an expedient familiar to many Americans, like myself, whosenames were changed from those of recognizably Irish, Italian, or Jewish origin toinconspicuous “Anglo” alternatives. My grandfather, who emigrated from Russia to theLower East Side (then a Jewish ethnic community) of Manhattan in 1900, agreed somewhat
reluctantly when his children changed the legal family name from the obviously Jewish
Rabinowitz (meaning rabbi’s son) to “Rabson” during a time of widespread anti-Semitism
in the 1930s. (Despite the legal change, he never used “Rabson.”) Okinawans changed theirfamily names around the same time in mainland Japan so that Kinjō became “Kaneshiro,”
Higa became “Hiyoshi,” and Kabira became “Kawahira;” and men also changed theirpersonal names from, for example, Shin’yū to “Masahiro,” Ryōmei to “Yoshiaki,” andShōtoku to “Masanori.”50 In Japan before 1945, changing one’s name to characters or theirreadings more common on the mainland was a relatively easy procedure, and evenofficially encouraged at a time when the Japanese government was also endeavoring to“assimilate” residents of colonies in Taiwan and Korea as “imperial subjects.” In fact, suchchanges were made mandatory in Korea by the notorious “Name Order” of 1939 requiring
Koreans to adopt Japanese names.

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Yet even during the prewar years when pressures to assimilate were at their peak, some
Okinawans on the mainland opposed tendencies to reject their traditional culture,
vigorously asserting its value. In 1927 sanshin performer Fukuhara Chōki founded a record
company in Osaka devoted to Okinawan folk music; and Kushi Fusako wrote five years
later, “I do not believe that our customs that differ from those on the mainland should bedespised or discarded. [They] have deep roots in our culture [and] natural environment.”51
Interviewed in 1996, Kinjō Kaoru, who immigrated to greater Osaka as a small child in
1954, asserted that “people being different doesn’t make them better or worse. I think it’s
been a mistake for us to try to become Japanese to the extent of destroying our own
ethnicity.”52 Published in 1996 during a nationwide “boom” of interest in Okinawa, such
affirmations of the value of Okinawan ethnicity could well have had more resonance among
readers in contemporary Japan than Kushi’s affirmations would have had in 1932 when
government policy and popular trends for assimilation were intensifying after the
Manchurian Incident the previous year.
How they organized: changing forms and agendas of the Okinawa prefectural
associations
Along with the sometimes-painful efforts to “assimilate” with mainland Japanese, migrants
from Okinawa have had notable successes organizing for their mutual benefit and advocacy
as Okinawans. This organizing, crucial to survival for people dealing with poverty, culturaldifferences, and discrimination, began informally with the first “pioneer” migrants who
provided material assistance and networks of contacts for housing, employment, and evenmarriage, to friends, relatives, and fellow-villagers moving to the mainland. The first formalorganization in greater Osaka was the Kansai Okinawa Prefectural Association (Kansai
Okinawa Kenjin-kai), founded in 1924. The association’s newspaper Dōhō (Comrades)
explained:
Our prefecture is under the same government as the rest of Japan, but, because we are in aremote location and have a different history and economic structure, we encounterunexpected misunderstandings and insults from the people of other prefectures. If we areto overcome the many obstacles imposed only on our prefecture and advance, socially andeconomically, to the status of people in other prefectures, we cannot possibly rely on thestrength of disparate individuals. …It is through one organization that we must move into
society.53
The authors of this article go on to support their call for organizing with comparisons thatpose discrimination in global terms, but are sure to raise eyebrows today.
As individuals, the Jewish people have produced great numbers of outstanding individuals
compared with other peoples of the world, and, it is fair to say, have been praised andhonored since ancient times as being truly the highest among races in human society. Yet,the reality of their daily lives is precisely the opposite. In Europe and America today, Jews
are subjected to outrageous insults. This is because their strength as individuals isdispersed and they have not organized as a group. …In the reverse phenomenon, theBurakumin have not produced outstanding individuals of world-renown, but, in less than

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four years time, they have built an organization and forged an ethnic solidarity that havemade them the largest and most powerful social movement in Japan.54
Despite a founding statement that contained apparently unintended slights of Burakumin
and factual errors (there were numerous Jewish organizations in Europe and America inthe 1920s), the Kansai Okinawa Prefectural Association built on appeals for ethnic
solidarity to establish numerous local branches and subdivisions. The association has
subsequently gone through one dissolution and rebirth as well as several re-organizations.
Meanwhile, separate associations have been formed in the other prefectures of greater
Osaka, the largest and most active today being the Hyōgo Okinawa Prefectural Association(Okinawa Kenjin-kai, Hyōgo-ken Honbu), founded in 1946. People have also organized into
groups from local areas of Okinawa, and today there are hometown friendship associations(kyōyūkai) of migrants and their descendants for Nakijin, Haneji, Haibaru, Kochinda andother localities from which large numbers of people have moved to greater Osaka.
The roles of the prefectural associations have, of course, differed from each other andchanged over time. In the early years, they provided essential support systems, includingloans and temporary housing, to new arrivals and, unlike today, they led the movement for
improved conditions among Okinawan factory workers. While they have continued to aid
new arrivals from Okinawa, they function more as social and cultural facilitators today,
presenting concerts and Okinawan products expositions, arranging and providing venues
for classes in Okinawan performing and design arts, and organizing regular gatherings ofcommunity members. While they cooperate with each other in a wide range of ways,
disagreements have arisen from time to time within and among prefectural associations
over, for example, whether and how to become involved in political issues.
The first incarnation of the Kansai Okinawa Prefectural Association was led by activists
committed to Marxist ideals, and organized on the model of a political party. Established in
1924, it was deeply involved in labor-union efforts to improve the wages and working
conditions of factory workers in Osaka, many of whom came from Okinawa. However,within two years, this organization was virtually decimated by arrests of its leaders
following brutal government suppression in 1926 of a strike by Okinawan workers thatassociation leaders helped organize at the Tōyō Cotton Industries’ Sangenya factory,
located in the present Taishō Ward of Osaka. On August 11 union members submitted afifteen-point written petition to company officials seeking compliance with factory labor
laws, freedom to leave the company grounds, an end to mandatory transfers of workers’
earnings to their families in Okinawa, equalization of wages, and reforms of otherdiscriminatory practices. The company responded by firing forty of the petitioning union
members. A strike began in the early morning of August 14 with 200 factory women from
Okinawa leaving the dormitory. The police were quickly mobilized to drag them forcibly
back to the factory grounds where many were beaten, kicked, and thrown in the mud bycompany supervisors. Now the police arrested more than 50 labor activists in the Kansai
Okinawa Prefectural Association on charges of inciting a riot, and jailed many of them. Twoyears later the labor organizing activities of the association were effectively shut down by
the massive police round-ups of “leftists” and others viewed as dissidents on March 25 andApril 16, 1928, and continuing government suppression resulted in an end to all the
association’s activities in the late 1920s.55

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This experience has loomed large in the memories of older Okinawans in Osaka, and wascited by Okinawan sociologist Shingaki Masami as one reason that the current leadership of
the Osaka League of Okinawa Prefectural Associations (Osaka Okinawa Kenjin Rengō-kai),established in 1946, a successor organization to the Kansai Prefectural Association, hasbeen reluctant to pursue an active agenda on social and political issues today.56 When the
Kansai Okinawa Prefectural Association was re-established in 1931, the labor activists
were gone and its new leadership was comprised of professionals with university degrees
who turned away from labor activism.57 In place of the former political-party structure, theleaders re-centered the organization around the hometown friendship associations ofpeople from local areas of Okinawa. Though debate resumed over the relative merits ofassimilating or living as Okinawans, leaders called for Okinawans to speak “standard
Japanese,” associate more with people from other prefectures, minimize the practice of
Okinawan customs, and abandon Okinawan religious practices in favor of mainland Shintō.
This was, of course, a highly repressive period of growing militarism in Japan when thegovernment was compelling the worship of state Shinto and banning indigenous religious
practices as part of the “policy to make imperial subjects” (kōminka seisaku) in Okinawa, as
well as in Japan’s colonies and territories.
Since World War II the leaders of prefectural associations have continued to disagree on
how to respond to pressures for assimilation and whether or how to advocate on politicalissues. However, as in Okinawa itself, overwhelming support developed among members
for reversion, particularly after U.S. seizures of private land for military bases brought
many involuntary “migrants” to greater Osaka. Okinawans there felt increasingly cut off
from their homeland after what they called the “disappearance of Okinawa Prefecture” in1945 and the Japanese government’s agreement to a Peace Treaty that “severed Okinawa
from Japan” in 1952.58 Overcoming initial reluctance among leaders of the Osaka League,
prefectural associations in greater Osaka and elsewhere on the mainland went on to play amajor role in the reversion movement. They organized large demonstrations in 1956 whichfeatured speakers from Okinawa as part of the “land struggle” (tochi tōsō) protesting U.S.
seizures of land for military bases in Okinawa and occupation rule generally. Subsequent
protests calling for reversion drew many participants, including a demonstration by morethan 10,000 in Osaka City on October 1, 1966 during which a petition was presented tovisiting Prime Minister Satō Eisaku.
Large numbers of mainland Japanese joined the struggle for reversion, though Okinawans
sometimes complained about ulterior motives among those on the right who seemedinterested mostly in recovering territory lost in war and those on the left who seemed
intent on using “the Okinawa problem” as a political football to attack the conservative
government.59 Nevertheless, achieving reversion was crucial materially and psychologicallyfor the entire Okinawan diaspora, removing the stigma of Okinawans as “an occupied
people” and freeing the flow of communication, information, and travel.
Japanese citizens no longer needed “passports” to enter Okinawa, and published materials
from the mainland were no longer screened by military censors. However, as in Okinawa
itself, the terms of the reversion agreement provoked anger and a sense of betrayal
because U.S. bases remained virtually intact despite the Japanese government’s constantly
repeated promises to reduce the military presence in Okinawa to “mainland levels” (hondo-Putting Okinawa at the Center

140nami). As a result, the reversion agreement (henkan-kyōtei) came to be known sarcasticallyamong Okinawans as the “discriminatory agreement” (henken kyōtei).
While the Hyōgo Okinawa Prefectural Association has continued to advocate for removal of
the bases, including a petition drive in 2001, the Osaka League has been comparatively
quiet on the issue. Residents of the community in Taishō Ward explained to me that one
reason is that, since reversion, some community residents, including prominent League
members, have been receiving substantially increased “rental” payments from the Japanese
government for land seized from them by the U.S. government in the 1950s. In an effort to“stabilize” land-use for bases after reversion, the Japanese Defense Facilities Agency
immediately increased these payments to “military landowners” (gun-jinushi) by as muchas six times the pre-reversion rates paid by the U.S. government.60 During 2000 and 2001 I
met four individuals receiving such payments, including one interviewee in Taishō Ward
who showed me her contract from the Defense Facilities Agency that specified annual
payments of 12 million yen or about $100,000 in 2001. Her land in Oroku, seized originallyto build barracks for U.S. Naha Air Base, is now a dependents’ housing area for Japan’s Air
Self-Defense Forces which took over the base after reversion.
The Japanese government’s “hush money” strategy has not always worked, however, either
in Okinawa, where “antiwar landowners” (han-sen jinushi) have formed an active protest
organization, or on the mainland. Another interviewee in Taishō Ward told me in Februaryof 2000 that his family in Okinawa, whose land was confiscated in the 1950s to expand
Kadena Air Base, contributes these payments to support the anti-base movement while hepersonally devotes much of his time to organizing protests and speaking at rallies ingreater Osaka. Meanwhile, in another example of diverse opinions on this issue, not all
Okinawan residents of Hyōgo Prefecture agree with that association’s opposition tomilitary bases. One interviewee from the Hyōgo Okinawan community in Takarazuka City
told me in April of 2001 that her father, who also receives “rent” for land seized in the
1950s, gets angry whenever he reads about another protest demonstration, insisting that, if
the bases are to be removed, landowners should receive compensation for lost income.
Partly because of such diversity of views and circumstances among members, Osaka
League leaders have sometimes been hesitant to “lead” on other issues as well, taking up
the banner only after a clear membership consensus develops. Officials explain that theirorganization, descended from the second, less activist incarnation of the Kansai Okinawa
Prefectural Association, has a more conservative membership and is necessarily less“political” than the Hyōgo association, founded in 1946 during a time of vigorous activism
on issues such as reversion and military bases in Okinawa. League leaders in Osaka are still
haunted by memories of the brutal government suppression during and after the 1926
strike at the Tōyō Cotton Industries’ Sangenya factory, and see their most pressing issue as
maintaining their organization of an estimated 7,000 members of whom an increasing
proportion are elderly, first-generation migrants.61 This trend is borne out by results frommy survey which showed a 20% higher rate of prefectural association membership among
respondents in their 60s and 70s (53.6% and 51.5% respectively) as compared withrespondents in their 40s and 50s (35.7% and 30.4% respectively).

Rabson: Memories of Okinawa

141

Some League officials believe that elderly members would prefer not to be reminded ofhardships they have suffered simply for being Okinawan, or to attract too much attention.
In the years before Okinawan culture became trendy in the early 1990s, one official
discouraged a group of younger community residents in the mid-1970s from organizing
performances of eisa dances and presenting this annual Okinawan festival in theneighborhood because he feared that, for mainlanders to see these traditional dances incolorful costumes, would “embarrass” the Okinawan community. Another League official in
his late sixties has refused to acknowledge in interviews that there has been discrimination
against Okinawans in Osaka. Such denials contradict League publications which fully
document it,62 and interviews by me and others of League members who describeddiscrimination they have personally encountered.63
Nowadays, amidst the nationwide “Okinawa boom,” all the prefectural associations ingreater Osaka organize events to which the public is eagerly welcomed, where eisa-odori
and other traditional dances and music are performed. The Osaka League now actively
supports and promotes Okinawan culture in many ways, sponsoring concerts, offering
space for training studios in the performing arts, and inviting speakers in various fields
from Okinawa to lecture in the Osaka area. The most important functions of thisorganization today include providing space and organizational support for such social
occasions as banquets to celebrate the New Year, honor elderly members, andcommemorate such special occasions as the anniversary of the League’s founding, events at
which Okinawan music and dance are almost always performed. The League also organizes
the annual September “sports festival” in which local Okinawa prefectural associations ingreater Osaka and nearby prefectures compete in relay races and other events. In addition,
the League sells tickets and rents buses for the semi-annual pilgrimages to root for
Okinawa’s representative team in the National High School Baseball Tournament held at
Kōshien Stadium in Nishinomiya, an Osaka suburb, where officials from the Osaka League
and Hyōgo Association also distribute tickets, arrange bus transportation, help rooters findseats, and clean up discarded trash at the game’s conclusion.
Over the years, the prefectural associations have not only provided for survival-support,
advocated vigorously in the 1920s for labor reform and in the 1950s and 60s for reversion,
but have also contributed to postwar infrastructural and economic improvements in thecommunity. Prefectural associations in greater Osaka were crucial for the community
during the chaotic period immediately after World War II. They aided in the resettlement
both of Okinawa residents who had evacuated to rural areas on the mainland, but whose
status changed to “refugees” after their prefecture was devastated by the Battle; and, of
Okinawan soldiers and civilians who chose to be repatriated to greater Osaka from Taiwan,
Micronesia, the Philippines, and other areas formerly part of the Japanese empire because
many of them had nothing left to go back to in Okinawa. Prefectural associations continue
to assist new arrivals from Okinawa to settle in greater Osaka. The Osaka liaison office of
the Okinawa Prefectural Government also helps people from Okinawa to find jobs ingreater Osaka, and to secure housing. In the years following reversion, this office recruited
migrants to work mostly in factories, while in today’s economy they are more likely towork as nurse trainees, cooks, or waitresses. Approximately 260 young people each year
find jobs in greater Osaka through this office. Although some of these people settle in thePutting Okinawa at the Center

142

area, often becoming managers of stores, restaurants, or small factories, virtually nonechoose to live in Okinawan communities, preferring, like many other Okinawans coming to
the mainland today, to reside near the places where they work or study.64 In contrast, many
who migrated in the early 1970s before reversion in “group hirings” (shūdan-shūshoku)organized by commercial recruiters settled in Taishō Ward after their contract periods
ended.
Where things stand: lingering prejudice, a new pride in “roots,” and mixed blessingsof the “Okinawa boom”
From what were often troubled beginnings, life for most residents of the Okinawan
communities in greater Osaka has improved over the years as many migrants saved theirfactory wages, started businesses, bought property, and sent their children to colleges orprofessional schools. And, while their economic resources have not reached the averagelevel of Japanese “salarymen” in more upscale residential areas, many have enjoyedrelative prosperity in recent years.65 Mainlanders living in the more affluent areas ofgreater Osaka refer to these communities as “downtown” (shita-machi) or, in the case of
Taishō Ward in southwestern Osaka, somewhat disparagingly as “the deep south.” With thecurrently heightened interest in Okinawa throughout Japan, many mainland visitors havebeen attracted to the community where they shop in stores that sell Okinawan products,
eat in restaurants serving Okinawan cuisine where Okinawan music is often performed,
and learn to perform Okinawan dance and music themselves at the culture centers andstudios. This influx has provided relief for some in the community from the economic
doldrums that have been felt in Japan as a whole since the early 1990s.
In the year and a half between June of 1999 and December of 2000, a new store selling
Okinawan products and four new restaurants, one with nightly performances of music anddance, opened in a four-block area near the Taishō train station. There were already three
Okinawan restaurants, one offering live performances, making a current total of seven inthis area which is still three miles from the Okinawan neighborhoods in Kobayashi, Hirao,
and Okajima where such businesses can be fond in virtually every block. Community
residents often make fun of the Yamatun-chu tourists, and sometimes express regret forwhat they see as growing dilution (or “mainlandization”) of Okinawan arts and culture. But
most proprietors eagerly welcome the large crowds of visitors who regularly pack local
restaurants offering Okinawan cuisine and live music, especially on Saturday nights wheneven the local regulars (jōren) are turned away unless they have reservations.
Many Okinawans in greater Osaka today have themselves developed greater interest and
pride in their “roots” (rūtsu), using the English word in describing this trend.66 Today,
second and third-generation Okinawans, as well as mainlanders, are studying the
traditional performing arts, design arts, and cuisine, along with learning some Okinawa
dialect. Their motivations are many and varied. Interviewees cited the influence of parents
and grandparents, strong impressions from a visit to Okinawa, or the effects of aperformance they had attended. A professional writer in her late thirties said in Novemberof 2000 that she had never felt pride in her family’s origins, largely because she associatedbeing Okinawan with being poor, until Shō High School became the first team from
Okinawa to win the national high school baseball tournament in April of 1999. She felt

Rabson: Memories of Okinawa

143

proud, she said, because Okinawans had “finally beaten the Yamatun-chu at something.”
She is now writing her first novel which is based largely on her father’s experience as a
migrant from Okinawa living in Osaka. On the other hand, some second and thirdgeneration Okinawans in greater Osaka still seek to minimize their connections with
Okinawa, emphasizing, for example, that “I’m Osakan, though my father came from there.”67
Today, amidst the “Okinawa boom” and a popular trend for exploring one’s ethnic “roots,”
it is much too easy to look back with a smirk at people who never spoke their local dialect
or ate Okinawan foods in public, only practiced sanshin secretly in closets, and changed
their names. Yet it must be remembered that, during the years of malicious prejudice andblatant discrimination, for Okinawans living and working on the mainland, the issue wasoften physical and psychological survival. Though discrimination is now illegal, it has by nomeans disappeared (see interviews cited above). Today prejudices based on stereotypes
persist on the mainland despite—and to some extent because of—the recent fascination in
Japan with an exoticized and commercialized “Okinawa” that has made recordings of
Okinawan pop music into best sellers and singers from Okinawa into super-stars. A woman
in her mid-sixties who had migrated to greater Osaka in 1962 commented on her
questionnaire that “I was shocked when I first came at how many people were ignorant
about Okinawa, mostly because it wasn’t mentioned in school curriculums. But nowadays
everyone’s trying to ride the wave of interest in it.”68 Since reversion, community residents
are no longer asked if people in Okinawa speak English at home or use knives and forks fordaily meals, but they are still subjected to such double-edged praise of Okinawans as “sorelaxed and carefree” (implying a certain indolence and lack of responsibility) or “so casualand easy-going” (implying a lack of courtesy and diligence). Koreans and Chinese are also
subjected to such “praise” in Japan for being “clever” (implying wily or tricky). The
president of a loan agency in Taishō Ward told me he never lends money to Okinawans
because “they don’t pay it back.” And an executive of a manufacturing company in Osaka
told me his firm decided not to locate a factory in Okinawa because “people there can’t doquality work.”
In official ways, too, there are still problems, as when the All-Japan High School BaseballFederation banned the wearing of eisa robes by second-generation Okinawan rooters from
Amagasaki for the semi-annual national baseball tournament at Kōshien Stadium in
Nishinomiya, near Osaka. The Federation explained that its regulations forbid the wearingof “strange” (kii) garments, though the Okinawan rooters pointed out that fans from Kōchi
and Hiroshima Prefectures were allowed to wear their brightly colored local costumes.
Fans have defied this ban recently by carrying their packaged eisa robes in through thestadium entrances, then changing clothes in the rest rooms. In recent years, teams from
Okinawa have placed high in the tournament, regularly reaching the finals or semi-finals.
Then in the spring of 1999, when Okinawa Shō High School became the first team from
Okinawa in the tournament’s 55-year history to win the championship, residents of
Okinawan communities on the mainland, which always send bus-loads of rooters to theirgames, celebrated joyously. Savoring this victory of Uchinaan-chu over Yamatun-chu,
Okinawans commented that “the postwar period is finally over for us.” This is a mocking
reference to the phrase used by Prime Minister Satō Eisaku who negotiated the Okinawa
reversion agreement with U.S. President Richard Nixon in 1969, viewed by Okinawans asPutting Okinawa at the Center144

yet another mainland betrayal for failing to include promised reductions in the U.S. militarypresence.
In September of 1995, the movement among community activists opposing American
military bases in Okinawa shifted into high gear after the September, 1995 rape of a
twelve-year old elementary school girl in Kin by two U.S. marines and one sailor. Protest
marches were organized in Osaka to coincide with the massive demonstration of an
estimated 85,000 in Ginowan City, Okinawa. Subsequent marches and rallies drew large
numbers of participants in Osaka and Kyoto. In addition, regular information meetings(gakushū-kai) have been held in public auditoriums and university lecture halls withactivists and scholars from Okinawa as featured speakers. Former Okinawa Governor Ōta
Masahide has given a number of well-attended lectures recently in Osaka auditoriums. In
greater Osaka and elsewhere on the mainland, singers from Okinawa perform anti-war andanti-base protest songs at regular concerts. Yet, while members of the greater Osaka
Okinawan community often take the lead in organizing these events, the proportion ofcommunity residents who participate in political activism is comparatively small. Amongrespondents to survey questionnaires, only 6.8% of migrants and 4.5 of descendants
indicated such participation. Though many Okinawans in greater Osaka joined protests
against the military bases following the 1995 rape, most of the time one tends to notice thesame core of activists from the community turning out for events, which usually draw
larger numbers of mainlanders, and for organizational meetings.
The “Okinawa boom” has also made residents aware of the need to convey full and accurate
information about the communities to outsiders, especially to the media which is now
reporting on them frequently. To keep up with growing demands, the Kansai Okinawa
Bunko (Culture Center) has assumed what has become an increasingly heavy burden,offering written materials, recordings, video tapes, lectures, and guided tours to the public
at very low cost and with an extremely small, largely volunteer, staff. Groups of students
and teachers from public and private schools in greater Osaka and nearby prefectures
come regularly to the Bunko for “field work” seminars that include lectures and guided
tours as well as performances of Okinawan music. Demands on the Bunko for informationand interviews reached a fever pitch during the months leading up to the 2000 G-8 Summit
Conference held in Okinawa. Scholars from the Taishō Ward community and from Okinawa
have subsequently met there regularly to prepare fuller information and check existingmaterials for accuracy.
Though the influx of tourists and consumers has provided income for some, the greater
Osaka communities, where small and medium industries depend heavily on sub-contracts
from larger companies, have been hit hard by economic doldrums afflicting Japan as awhole in the 1990s and 2000s. Residents have suffered in the continuing series of lay-offs,
euphemistically called “restructuring” (risutora), at the medium-size metalworking
factories, and orders for extracted metal and molded metal parts have dwindled at thesmaller workshops. Local merchants often complain that business has fallen off sharply
since the “bubble burst” on Japan’s economy in 1990-91, and the incomes of construction
workers have dropped sharply with local labor agencies offering fewer jobs. A growing
number of homeless wander Osaka streets now, sleeping on sidewalks or in parks, asRabson: Memories of Okinawa

145

elsewhere in Japan’s cities. And, as elsewhere, the economy is the issue community
residents say is of the greatest concern to them.
Clearly, the “Okinawa boom” has brought mixed blessings to Okinawan communities ingreater Osaka as well as to Okinawa itself. Nowadays visitors from the mainland sometimes
comprise the majority in audiences at live performances there of Okinawan music and ahigh proportion of the participants in such anti-base demonstrations as the recent “humanchains” around Kadena Air Base. Okinawans themselves are divided over whether towelcome mainlanders to partake in the islands’ culture and politics, or to discourage their
participationn. At least one eisa performance group in Osaka bars mainlanders because, as
the director explains, eisa has special religious significance for Okinawans. (This groupdoes accept people with only partial Okinawan ancestry.) Okinawans inside and outside theprefecture are caught between a desire, on the one hand, to convey accurate information
about their culture and political oppression to mainlanders and non-Japanese, andfrustration, on the other, when these efforts result in a superficial fascination with
“Okinawa” that encourages dilettantism, stereotyping, and commercial exploitation.
Interviewed in April of 2000, a teacher at a local junior college in his early forties
complained that, for too many mainlanders, “Okinawa” has become a “tasty morsel” toconsume in the media and on forays to Okinawa or the greater Osaka community; and, that,for some academics, it has become a “hot topic” they can use to publish research which is
too often based on one-dimensional portrayals of Okinawans and the issues confronting
them. Perhaps the most important message conveyed in the interviews and questionnaires
collected for this study is that Okinawans in greater Osaka have responded in a wide
variety of ways to these challenges, and that their responses have frequently changed overtime to adjust to new conditions. What is often presented as a dichotomy of “assimilation
versus cultural preservation” is, more often today, a continuing series of choices made indaily life that depend on individual preferences rather than on decisions to take one side or
the other. An eighteen-year old musician interviewed in February of 2001 explained that,
although both her parents were from Okinawa, she had chosen to make her career
performing mainland folk music from northeastern Japan (tsugaru-jamisen) because she
was better able to express what she felt in its melodies and rhythms. At the same time, she
preferred Okinawan food which her mother cooked at home.
Nowhere is diversity more evident than in the ways Okinawans in greater Osaka remember
or conceptualize a “homeland” they might have left many years ago or where they neverlived at all. Among interviewees, several women who came originally to work in textile
factories before World War II said they had decided to remain in greater Osaka after theircontract periods ended because Okinawa did not offer comparable economic prospects forthem, their spouses, or their children. Other migrants from both the prewar and postwar
period cited limited social and cultural horizons in the rural Okinawan villages where they
grew up as reasons for remaining on the mainland. Descendents who had visited Okinawa
only during the U.S. occupation period described a place of natural beauty, but withwidespread poverty and an oppressive atmosphere under foreign military occupation.
Other descendents associated Okinawa with poverty on the mainland as well as withdiscrimination their parents experienced there, and tried to minimize their connections
with it. The magazine journalist quoted above, who came to appreciate her heritage afterPutting Okinawa at the Center

146

Shō High School won the national baseball tournament in 1999, had previously associatedOkinawa with her family’s poverty, employment discrimination her father had encountered,and teasing she had suffered in school for her parents’ origins. On the other hand, many
Okinawans in greater Osaka, migrants and descendents alike, have visited their “homeland”
regularly and describe highly positive memories, associating Okinawa with a congenial
natural and cultural environment, as well as a leisurely and healthy lifestyle, where people
suffer less stress and live longer. A number of individuals over 60 expressed a desire to
relocate to Okinawa when circumstances in their lives, such as family obligations, would
permit. In the case of one couple in their 70s, the husband had in fact returned in 1999 toenjoy his retirement years living in the family’s home on the seashore in a quiet village
north of Nago while his wife remained to live with their son’s family in Taishō Ward where
she preferred the urban life style. Such diverse responses, shared by people in many places
with memories of an ancestral “homeland,” should remind us that, far from being static andmonolithic, attitudes and choices vary widely among individuals in diaspora communities.
This essay is reprinted from Laura Hein and Mark Selden’s Islands of Discontent: Okinawan
Responses to Japanese and American Power, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, used withpermission.
Notes
1 “Ryukyu” never caught on as a place name during the U.S. occupation, either in Okinawa

or on the mainland. This was partly because the word “Ryukyu” evoked memories ofderogatory references by mainland Japanese who identified people from Okinawa
Prefecture with what had recently been a “foreign” kingdom. This implied that Okinawans
were not fully Japanese and, thus, “inferior” to mainlanders.
In addition, Okinawans at home and on the mainland easily saw through the U.S. military’s
insistence on calling Okinawa “The Ryukyu Islands” and the people there “Ryukyuans” aspart of a heavy-handed effort to separate them from from Japan. The failed American
attempt to re-”Ryukyuanize” Okinawans was undertaken in hopes of suppressing thereversion movement, which had gained support steadily since the early 1950s.
2 In a sense, I was one of those “occupiers,” though my job as a U.S. Army draftee in themaintenance platoon at an ammunition depot in Henoko from July, 1967 to June, 1968 had
nothing to do with administering the occupation.
3 Kaneshiro Munekazu,”Esunikku gurupu to shite no ‘Okinawa-jin” (Okinawans as an ethnic

group), Ningen Kagaku, no. 37, (1992): 29-57.

4 Fukuchi Hiroaki, ed., Okinawa jokō aishi (The tragic history of Okinawan factory women)(Haibaru, Okinawa: Naha Shuppan-sha, 1985), 18, 37.

6 Meiō University historian Higa Michiko, interview, November 2000.
7 Yūhi (Launching forth), Volume of essays and photographs commemorating the 40th

anniversary of the founding of the Osaka League of Okinawa Prefectural Associations(Osaka Okinawa Kenjin Rengo-kai, 1987), 40,47; Yūhi (Launching forth), Volume of essays
and photographs commemorating the 50th anniversary of the founding of the OsakaRabson: Memories of Okinawa

147

League of Okinawa Prefectural Associations (Osaka Okinawa Kenjin Rengo-kai, 1997), 50,
62.
8 Kaneshiro, 1992.
9 Yūhi, 50, 61.
10 Okinawa-ken heiwa kinen shiryō-kan: sōgō annai (Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial

Museum guidebook), (Okinawa: Itoman, 2001), 27.

11 Ryūkyū Shinpō-sha, ed., Okinawa: Nijū seiki no kōbō (Okinawa in the twentieth century),(Naha: Ryūkyū Shinpō-sha, 2000), 130-31.
12 Okinawa-ken Heiwa Shiryō-kan, 31.
13 Kaneshiro, 1995.

14 They are concentrated mostly in its Hirao, Kobayashi, Kitamura, Kita Okajima andMinami Okajima precincts, and comprise about one-fourth of the ward’s total population
officially listed at 75,043 for the year 2000 (Taishō Ward Office, General Affairs Section,2001). For the other communities in greater Osaka, unofficial and unpublished estimates
are that 7500 migrants and their descendents live in Osaka’s Nishinari Ward, next to Taishō
Ward, and approximately 10,000 live in or around the Tonouchi section of Amagasaki City,
just across the Kanzaki River from Osaka City in Hyōgo Prefecture where another 1500 are
estimated to live in the Takamatsu section of Takarazuka City and 900 in Itami City.
15 Mizuuchi Toshio, Ōsaka Okinawa Ajia: Ōsaka Shiritsu Daigaku Zengaku Kyōtsu Kyōiku

Sōgō Kyōiku Kamoku: Ajia no Chiiki to Bunka Enshū, Osaka: Osakai Shiritsu Daigku
Kyōomubu, 1999, 46-47.

16 Ōta Jun’ichi, Osaka no Uchinaan-chu (The Okinawans of Osaka) (Osaka: Burein Sentaa,

1996),, 89-90.

17 “Hōchi sareru Okinawa suramu” (Okinawa slum long-neglected), Asahi Shinbun (July 15,1968).

18 Mizuuchi, 1999, 47-48.
19 Interviews for this study conducted in September 1999.
20 Ōta, Osaka no Uchinaan-chu, 91.
21 Ōta, Osaka no Uchinaan-chu, 119.
22 Mizuuchi, 2000.
23 Mizuuchi, 1999, 52.
24 Arasaki Moriteru, 44.
25 Hokama Shuzen, Okinawa no rekishi to bunka (Okinawan history and culture) (Chūkō

Shinsho, 1989). 94-99.

Putting Okinawa at the Center148

26 Tomiyama Ichirō, Kindai Nihon shakai to “Okinawa-jin” (Modern Japanese society and“Okinawans”), (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōron-sha, 1990), 1.

27 Some Okinawans over fifty articulate the consonant “s” as “sh” in words like sensei(teacher), pronounced “shenshei,” or sensō (war), pronounced “shenshō.” Some of them also
articulate the vowel sounds “o” and “e” as “u” and “i,” respectively, in words like teiki(commuter pass), pronounced “tiiki,” and hako (box), pronounced “haku.”
28 Written comment on questionnaire, April 2001.
29 Interview, April 2000.
30 Uda Shigeki, Uwa- nu ukami-sama: Tokeshi Kōtoku no han-sei (The divine pig: The life ofTokeshi Kōtoku) (Nara: Uda Shuppan Kikaku, 1999), 173-96.
31 Written comment on questionnaire, December 2000.

32 Shinjō Eitoku, “Kansai ni okeru Uchinaanchu no ayumi” (The history of Okinawans in

Kansai), Jichi Okinawa, no. 353, (July 1996): 18.

33 Chinen Seishin’s acutely satirical stage play “Jinruikan” (Human pavilion, 1976) featuresa uniformed “trainer” brandishing a whip who barks commands at “male” and “female”
specimens.
34 Yamanokuchi Baku, “Mr. Saitō of Heaven Building” (Tengoku-biru no Saitō-san)(originally published in 1938) translated by Rie Takaki in Michael Molasky and Steve
Rabson, eds., Southern Exposure: Modern Japanese Literature from Okinawa, (University of
Hawaii Press, 2000).
35 Molasky and Rabson, Southern Exposure, 89.
36 Interviews, June and August 2000.
37 Oyakawa Takayoshi, Ashiato: Oyakawa Takayoshi no kaisōroku (Footprints: recollectionsof Oyakawa Takayoshi) (Matsuei Insatsu, 1995), 21-22.
38 Oyakawa, Ashiato, 26.
39 Fukuchi, Okinawa jokō aishi, 78-79.

40 Nakama Keiko, “1920, 1930 nendai ni okeru zai-Han Okinawa-jin no seikatsu ishiki” (Lifestyles among Okinawan residents of Osaka in the 1920s and 1930s), Osaka Jinken
Hakubutsu-kan Kiyo (Bulletin of the Osaka Human Rights Museum), no. 3, (1999): 61-74.
41 Tomiyama, Kindai Nihon, 130.
42 Tomiyama, Kindai Nihon, 111.
43 Higa, 6.
44 Fukuchi, Okinawa jokō aishi, 120.

Rabson: Memories of Okinawa

149

45 Kinjō Kaoru (March 20, 1987), “Osaka to Okinawa” (Osaka and Okinawa) month-longseries of interviews in Mainichi Shinbun March 9 to April 9, 1987. Mainichi Shinbun
interview, March 20, 1987.
46 Ryūkyū, Okinawa: Nijū seiki no kōbō, 52, 56.
47 Molasky and Rabson, Southern Exposure, 82.
48 Though references to the former Ryūkyū Kingdom and its cultural legacy were usually

free of negative connotations, calling someone “Ryūkyū” or “Ryūkyū-jin” was more
problematic. As in examples quoted above, mainlanders used the term “Ryūkyū” or“Ryūkyū-jin” derisively when scolding factory workers returning late for curfew; or, whenannouncing on signs in front of factories and rooming houses “Chōsen-jin, Ryūkyū-jin okotawari” (Koreans and Ryukyuans prohibited). Women from Okinawa who weredisplayed like circus animals in the notorious “Human Pavilion” at a 1903 international
exposition in Osaka were called “Ryūkyū-jin.” And Hirotsu Ryūrō’s 1926 novel, which hetitled “Samayoeru Ryūkyū-jin” (The vagabond Ryukyuan), was widely criticized by
Okinawans on the mainland for a protagonist caricatured from negative Okinawan
stereotypes. Its author subsequently made a public apology and canceled scheduled
reprintings.
Recently, however, the status of the word “Ryūkyū” seems to have improved among
Okinawans and mainlanders alike, though some connotations remain problematic.
Okinawans at home and in the diaspora express varying degrees of pride and nostalgia
from historical memories of the formerly independent Ryūkyū Kingdom, in part because
hopes have been unrealized for a significant reduction of the military presence and healthy
economic development in Okinawa after reversion. Furthermore, there is currently awidespread fascination among mainlanders with cultural manifestations of an often
exoticized “Ryūkyū,” which has been exploited commercially. N.H.K. television’s 1993 serial
historical drama, criticized by some Okinawans for stereotyped characterizations, wasentitled, like the book it was based on, “Ryūkyū no kaze” (The Winds of Ryukyu). The word
“Ryūkyū” now occurs frequently in the titles for recordings of widely popular Okinawan
folk and folk-rock music, such as the 1995 c.d. “Ryukyu Magic” (Air-4001, Tokyo).
Okinawans in the prefecture and on the mainland offer lessons in Ryūkyū buy ō (classicaldance), Ryūkyū ryōri (cuisine), and Ryūkyū min’yō (folk music) to a growing clientele.
49 Oyakawa, Ashiato, 2-22.
50 Chalmers Johnson, ed., Okinawa: Cold War, (Japan Policy Research Institute, 2000), 77.
51 Molasky and Rabson, Southern Exposure, 82.
52 Quoted in Ōta, Osaka no Uchinaan-chu, 97-98.
53 Quoted in Nakama, “1920, 1930 nendai,” 99.
54 Quoted in Nakama, “1920, 1930 nendai,” 99.
55 Tomiyama, Kindai Nihon, 164.

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56 Interviewed in September, 1999.
57 Miyawaki Yukio, “Kansai ni okeru Okinawa shusshin-sha dōkyō sōshiki no seiritsu totenkai” (The establishment and development of organizations of Okinawans in Kansai),Ningen Kagaku Ronshū, 28, (1997): 91; Oyakawa, Ashiato, 293.
58 Koko ni yōju ari (The banyan tree here) Volume of essays and photographs

commemorating the 35th anniversary of the founding of the Hyōgo Okinawa Prefectural
Association (Okinawa Kenjin-kai Hyōgo honbu, 1982), 145-216.
59 Koko ni Yōju ari, 94-95; Steve Rabson, Okinawa: Two Postwar Novellas, (Institute of East

Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1989) (reprinted 1996), xi-xii and 22-23.
60 Arasaki, 71-72.
61 Interview, November 2000.
62 See Yūhi, 1987 and 1997.
63 See Ota Jun’ichi.
64 Interviews of Yamashiro Kenkō, Osaka Office of Okinawa Prefecture, September 2000.
65 Johnson, Okinawa: Cold War, 88.
66 Published interview of Kinjō Kaoru, co-director of the Kansai Okinawa Bunko (Culture

Center), in Yomiuri Shinbun, May 13, 2001.

67 Comment from interview of descendant in his mid-30s, February 2001.
68 Questionnaire, March 2001.

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Language Loss and Revitalization in the Ryukyu Islands
Patrich Heinrich
November 10, 2005
http://japanfocus.org/-Patrick-Heinrich/1596
One element contributing to Okinawa’s “difference” from the Japanese mainland is theexistence in Okinawa of languages that are unintelligible to mainland Japanese. Paul
Heinrich takes up the topic of language in Okinawa and, as he makes amply clear, thesituation is complicated and, from the standpoint of language preservation, dire. In
Heinrich’s assessment, the Ryukyu Islands are home to five different, mutually
unintelligible language groups. However, since the Ryukyu Kingdom’s 1879 absorption into
the Japanese Empire, as a consequence of strong official and unofficial pressure to adopt
standard Japanese, which Heinrich details, these languages are disappearing rapidly.
Notwithstanding the efforts of groups today to revitalize local Ryukyuan languages,
Heinrich ultimately ends his piece on a pessimistic note. He claims that saving theendangered languages of the Ryukyus would require strong official support that is not
currently forthcoming.

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Language Loss and Revitalization in the Ryukyu Islands
By Patrick Heinrich
Every two weeks one of the world's estimated 6,000 languages dies. It appears inevitable tomany that the number of languages spoken throughout the world will have drasticallydiminished by the end of the 21st century. Pessimistic estimations consider that as many as
80% of the languages currently used will by then have vanished. The danger of such loss
does not go unnoticed. Many speakers of indigenous minority languages around the world
struggle to retain their mother tongues. This holds also true for the Ryukyu Islands, locatedbetween Kyushu and Taiwan. In the course of the nation building process since the Meiji
era, a language regime was established throughout Japan in which the language of Tokyo
came to serve as the means of inter-regional communication throughout Japan, including
the Ryukyu Islands. The spread of Standard Japanese led to re-negotiations of the languageidentity nexus in the Ryukyu Islands. As a matter of fact, so strong proved the idea of one
unitary Japanese national language to be in Japan that the Ryukyuan languages areseriously endangered today and conscious efforts of language revitalization are necessary
to ensure their future use. This is an account of how the Ryukyuan languages came to beendangered and of current efforts for their revitalization.
Modernist language ideology and the language – dialect question
The boundaries of languages and language varieties – a term linguists prefer to dialects
since it does not connote the idea of a deviation from a chosen standard – do not come into
existence by themselves. They reflect the interests of those responsible for drawing theseboundaries. The extension and the names of languages and language varieties are, more
often than not, influenced by nation imagining ideology.
The Ryukyuan languages, their classification and assessment are a case in point. During theforced assimilation of the Ryukyu Kingdom into the emerging Japanese nation state
between 1872 and 1879, the various language varieties of the Ryukyu Islands came to be
designated as Japanese dialects. The first such classification was made by a bureaucrat.
Matsuda Michiyuki, a high-ranking official in the Japanese foreign ministry, was the first to
stress linguistic correspondences between Japan and the Ryukyu Islands in the early 1870s.
He claimed that the varieties spoken in the Ryukyu Islands were part of the Japanese
language.
The first study on the Ryukyuan languages by a trained linguist was that of Basil Hall
Chamberlain in 1895. It successfully established evidences of a shared Ryukyuan-Japanese
genealogy. That is to say, Chamberlain proved that Japanese and the Ryukyuan language
family share the same ancestor language, similar to, say, French, Italian and Spanish. Today
we know that Japanese and the Ryukyuan languages must have split not long before thefirst written evidences of Japanese appeared, that is to say, at some point before the 7th
century. Chamberlain treated Ryukyuan as a set of languages distinct from Japanese.

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There are good reasons for doing so. The chain of mutual intelligibility is interrupted
several times in the Ryukyu Islands. The concept of mutual intelligibility serves linguists as
an etic tool, in other words, as a politically and culturally disinterested means for drawing
linguistic boundaries. In Japan, for instance, speakers of a Tohoku language variety and a
Kyushu variety might experience severe difficulties in understanding each other. However,the chain of mutual intelligibility is nowhere interrupted in the Japanese main islands as
mutual intelligibility to the neighbouring local variety is always possible.
On the basis of mutual unintelligibility, five different varieties of the Ryukyuan language
family can be ascertained. These are, from north to south, the varieties spoken on AmamiOshima, Okinawa, Miyako, Yaeyama and Yonaguni. These varieties form the Ryukyu
language family. Needless to say, none of these varieties allows for mutual intelligibility
with any Japanese variety. Following the conventions of comprehensive glossaries of world
languages, rather than Japanese national (identity) linguistics (kokugogaku), these varieties
will be treated as languages in the following. Since the Amami-Oshima island group is partof Kagoshima prefecture, the term Ryukyu is preferred over Okinawa.
The linguistic situation in the Ryukyu Islands is complex. The doyen of Ryukyuan
linguistics, Hokama Shuzen, proposes the following division of Ryukyuan varieties (fromsouth to north):
Yonaguni
Sakijima

YaeyamaIshigaki
Hateruma

MiyakoMiyakoIrabu
TamaraAmami-Okinawa North-Okinawa
South Okinawa
Yoron
Okinoerabu

East Okinoerabu
West Okinoerabu

Tokunoshima
Amami-Oshima North Amami-Oshima
South Amami-Oshima

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Kikai

The linguistic situation in the Ryukyu Islands is complex. All of the approximately 50
populated islands have distinctive language varieties which very often allow for many more
subdivisions within them. It is worthy of note in this context that the Okinawa Language
Research Centre (Okinawa gengo kenkyu sentā) has conducted phonological studies intosome 800 different local varieties.
The differences between the Ryukyuan varieties and Japanese are extensive. Tokyo
university professor Hattori Shirō demonstrated in the 1950s that the percentage of sharedcognates in the basic vocabulary between Tokyo and Shuri (Okinawa) stands at 66% and at
59% with regard to Miyako. The latter percentage is lower than that between German andEnglish. As an illustration of the differences in the lexicon and morphology, consider thefollowing sentence taken from a contemporary version of the Momotarō tale:
Okinawa: Sigu kadi nndandi ici hoocaasi taacinkai sakandi sakutu, naakakara
uziraasigisaru ufuwikiganu nziti caabitan.
Standard Japanese: Sugu tabete miyō to itte hōchō de futatsu ni sakō to shitara, nakakara kawairashii otoko no ko ga dete kimashita.
English: When he said that he wanted to eat it right away and was just about to cut it
into two pieces with his knife, a cute boy emerged from within (the peach).
Mutual unintelligibility notwithstanding, Japanese linguists of the Meiji period chose to relyon Matsuda Michiyuki's view according to which the Ryukyuan varieties were part of thesame language. They included both the Japanese and the Ryukyuan varieties in the newly
created concept of national language (kokugo). In so doing, they followed the model of mostWestern nation states which claimed that all language varieties within the boundaries ofthe state were part of one language, the national language. While dialectologists drew aclear line between the Ryukyuan varieties and those of the main islands, everyone elsecame to regard the Ryukyuan varieties simply as yet another Japanese dialect group.
Dialects, however, that deviated very strongly from Standard Japanese. This deviance fromStandard Japanese led to the view that these varieties presented an obstacle and should
best be done away with. The Ryukyu Islands were thus perceived to have a serious
language problem and, consequently, the view emerged that Ryukyuans had to be relievedof the ‘burden’ of their languages. This specific view of language, or language ideology as itis called in linguistics, was not limited to the Ryukyu Islands. It became widespread acrossthe world as an effect of the emergence of modern nation states. Such nation-imagining
language ideology is responsible for the fact that bilingualism in nation states is, more often
than not, unstable. Speakers of minority languages are often pressured to express theirloyalty to the state by abandoning their mother tongue. Exactly this happened in the
Ryukyu Islands after 1879.
Language shift before 1945

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During the first eight years of Japanese rule over the Ryukyu Islands a strict policy ofpreservation of ancient customs was implemented. It was only in 1879 that the first two
exceptions were made. The Meiji government ordered that this policy should not apply foreducation and industrial development. Starting in 1880, the view began to prevail thatJapanese language dissemination was unavoidable in order to gain control over the islands
and to govern them in the interests of mainland Japan. Following the reorganization of the
Ryukyu Domain into Okinawa Prefecture in 1879, Vice Minister of Education Tanaka
Fujimaro was dispatched to the archipelago with the objective of developing andimplementing an educational policy for the prefecture. In his history of Okinawa George H.
Kerr describes how Tanaka, upon visiting the prefecture, decided that Ryukyuans had tolearn Japanese and therefore ordered that a Conversation Training Centre be established.
Such training facilities had been founded throughout Japan prior to the implementation of
the 1872 educational system in order to provide for teacher training. In contrast to teacher
training facilities in mainland Japan, the Conversation Training Centre in Okinawa was also
responsible for the compilation of a bilingual Okinawa-Japanese language textbook titled‘Okinawa Conversation’ (Okinawa taiwa). It was written by mainland officials from the
Department of Education in collaboration with some Ryukyuan members of the premodern ruling class. The textbook was used from 1880 onwards in all schools of theprefecture.
The efforts to render Ryukyuans Japanese through language education became morecomprehensive after the proclamation of the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890.
Attention shifted from mere communicational needs to national citizen education andimperial subject education. These attempts grew more intense in Okinawa Prefecture
following Japan's 1895 victory in the Sino-Japanese War. Following the integration of
Taiwan into the Japanese empire in the same year, the greater differences between
Taiwanese and Japanese made policymakers and the local population aware of similarities
between Ryukyuans and mainland Japanese.
Starting in the first decade of the twentieth century, efforts to spread Japanese increasingly
employed coercive measures. Ryukyuan languages were banned from schools in the socalled Ordinance to Regulate the Dialect in 1907. When a Movement for the Enforcement of
the Standard Language was established in 1931, language dissemination activities attained
a new quality. Together with the Department of Education, the movement developed
schemes for Japanese language dissemination beyond the public domain. Japanese waspromoted through debate or presentation circles. In order to secure a thorough spread ofJapanese, relatives of school children were invited to participate. Speaking a Ryukyuan
language during such presentation circles was considered an unpatriotic act, and children
taking part in debate circles risked being penalized if they failed to speak Japanese.
Japanese language dissemination became increasingly seen as an important instrument for
forcing Ryukyuans to adapt to mainland customs and traditions. In accordance with the
National Spiritual Mobilization Movement, launched in 1937 after the outbreak of the SinoJapanese War, the local Department of Education and the Movement for Enforcement of theStandard Language compiled a policy platform called Programme for Education in Okinawa
Prefecture. The programme placed Japanese language dissemination high on its agenda. In
order to forcefully implement language policy measures, committees responsible for thePutting Okinawa at the Center

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supervision of language dissemination were set up in all local communities. An ordinanceproscribed the Ryukyuan languages at government offices and at various other public
institutions. People who addressed the staff of post offices or governmental offices in
Ryukyuan had to be refused service and employees caught using a Ryukyuan language
risked punishment.
In short, Japanese language dissemination at the time relied heavily on negative andcoercive measures. One of the most notorious forms of punishment was the so-called
dialect tag which had to be worn around the neck by the last pupil to have used Ryukyuan
in class. The pupil wearing it was then responsible for passing it on and therefore had tomonitor the language use of his fellow students. The use of the dialect tag increased
drastically in the 1920s and 1930s, peaking at the time of the general mobilization
campaign. The view prevailed that the perceived language problems of the Ryukyu Islands
were best solved by their eradication, by punitive means where necessary. It is worthy ofnote here that the use of the dialect tag was not exclusively confined to Okinawa Prefecture.
It included Kagoshima Prefecture and the entire Tohoku region, two regions with
distinctive local dialects. Nowhere, however, was the use of the dialect tag more prominent
than in the Ryukyu Islands and it was only there that attempts were made to ban the local
language varieties in private domains.
Language ideology, the determination of what language(s) ought to be, played a crucial rolein the language shift processes in the Ryukyu Islands. As an effect of language
modernization the national language, kokugo, became to be represented by, if not equatedwith, its standard variety. In addition, the view emerged that Standard Japanese was‘correct’ and that deviations from it were ‘wrong’. The ideology of linguistic nationalism
was furthermore based on the belief that all Japanese nationals had equal access to thenational language and hence should be equally proficient in it. Therefore, lack of respect forand proficiency in (Standard) Japanese became to be perceived as anomalous. The effects
of insufficient proficiency were embarrassment and the reasons for deviant language
attitudes and language behaviour were sought at the individual level.
As an effect of such ideological beliefs, the Ryukyu Islands thus stood out as the region inwhich (perceived) embarrassing language behaviour was most pronounced. There wasresistance against such views and the suppression of the Ryukyuan language and culture by
local activists and scholars of Okinawan studies. These included Jahana Noburo, Iha Fuyū,
Higashionna Kanjun and Kinjō Chōei as well as by mainland scholars of folklore studies
such as Yanagita Kunio, dialectologists such as Tōjō Misao and folk art scholars such as
Yanagi Muneyoshi, to mention only some of the more prominent. However, the endeavours
to end the oppression of Ryukyuan languages failed due to the growing pressure on
Ryukyuans to adapt to mainland Japan language and culture during the Sino-Japanese andlater the Pacific War.
The dissemination of Standard Japanese and the suppression of the Ryukyuan languages
had drastic effects on the language ecology of the Ryukyu Islands. Standard Japanese cameto be exclusively used in the public domain. It thus replaced the variety of Shuri (Okinawa),
the ancient capital of the Ryukyu Kingdom, which had previously served as the language of
official and inter-island communication. Due to further consequences of the modernization

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process such as an increasing mobility of the population, a growing rate of exogamy and an
extension of infrastructure, local language varieties also came under pressure and wereincreasingly often replaced by Standard Japanese in private domains too. Drasticallychanging political circumstances notwithstanding, language shift from the Ryukyuan
languages to Standard Japanese continued unremittingly after 1945.
Language shift after 1945
Circumstances for language planning could hardly be worse than they were in the Ryukyu
Islands immediately after 1945. With Okinawa Island being completely destroyed and the
population living in temporary camps, language planning was not a priority issue.
Provision of food for the population and reestablishment of infrastructure proved to be
more urgent tasks. In some cases, pupils learned writing by drawing script characters with
their fingers in the sand of nearby beaches. There was, in addition, a drastic shortage of
qualified teachers due to the fact that many teachers (and pupils) had been killed. Many of
the surviving teachers filled administrative positions left vacant by the departure of
mainland personnel, increasing thereby teacher shortage.
Two groups vied to dominate language planning activities between 1945 and 1972.
American military authorities sought to encourage the use of the Ryukyuan languages (andEnglish), while important Ryukyuan institutions promoted Standard Japanese. A reportcompiled in 1944 by anthropologists from Yale University for the preparation of a possible
occupation of Japan stressed exploitations of and discrimination against Ryukyuans by
mainland Japanese. On this basis, the American authorities developed a policy of
encouraging Ryukyuan autonomy. Such policy rested above all on US perceptions of thestrategically important location of the Ryukyu Archipelago. US authorities thus explored
the Yale report as a basis to legitimize their attempts to split Okinawa from Japan, that is, topreserve it within the orbit of American power as a bulwark with respect to US policies
toward China, Taiwan, and Korea.
Along the lines of a policy encouraging Ryukyuan independence, mainland Japaneseteaching materials were initially banned and American authorities called for thecompilation of Ryukyuan textbooks. A Textbook Compilation Office was set up. However,the prevailing view among its members was that the development of Ryukyuan textbooks
was unrealistic. Attempts at developing Ryukyuan teaching materials ran into several
problems, such as the absence of a modern written Ryukyuan style since official records
had been written in classical Chinese prior to the Japanese seizure of the Ryukyus and thefact that pre-modern literature had largely been composed in Chinese and Japanese written
styles. Furthermore, a fixed orthography did not exist, nor resources and materials on
which such textbooks could be based. As a result, the idea of Ryukyuan textbooks wasquickly abandoned. With American interest in language planning quickly declining as well,
Japanese textbooks were imported from mainland Japan after 1951.
In contrast to US postwar planning for Japan, development and strict implementation of a
far-reaching occupation policy for Okinawa, ‘the rock’ as GIs derogatively called it, had
never been high on the agenda in the early occupation years. It took until Communist
victory in China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in the following year before along term policy for the island was framed. By that time, however, a return to the pre-war

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policy of Japanese language spread had taken root. Thus, after a short period of uncertainty
about language education in school, the practices established before 1945 were continued.
The only difference was that Japanese language education was no longer called ‘national
language’ (kokugo) but ‘reading lessons’ (yomikata). A conference of school directors in1950 determined that school education should follow exactly the pattern of mainland Japan,
with Japanese as the language of instruction.
Whereas the first initiatives in language planning were taken by American occupation
authorities, the focus shifted soon to Ryukyuan educators. Standard Japanese served
Ryukyuans as a symbol of their struggle for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. Part of thereason was that the Americans were already using Ryukyuan languages as a means for
distancing the Ryukyus from Japan, and thereby, implicitly, for a continued affiliation with
the US. Ryukyuans were clearly aware that the US administration was trying to prolong theoccupation in their own interest by claiming that Ryukyuans were not Japanese. While the
US was thus trying to undo the effects of linguistic and cultural assimilation of the past 50
years, such language and identity planning was not supported by Ryukyuans. US language
policy only produced resistance which meant, with a view to language, continued Standard
Japanese language spread. Whereas the view that Ryukyuans were a different nation thanthe Japanese prevailed among the US authorities and, to a certain degree, also among
Ryukyuans in the early years of the occupation, political activities aiming at Ryukyuan
independence declined drastically after 1950. The presence of extensive military
infrastructure, land confiscation, noise pollution, crime, prostitution, poverty, all had theeffect of leading the overwhelming majority of Ryukyuans to favour immediate reversion to
Japan. US American occupation thus inadvertently reinforced Ryukyu Islands-mainland
Japan bonds. Promotion of Standard Japanese after 1945 thus continued to serve as ameans to foster a Japanese identity for the Ryukyuan population and a means of resisting
the unwelcome US occupation.
Due to the continued efforts to promote Standard Japanese after 1945, use of Ryukyuan
languages or Ryukyuan interference on Standard Japanese were again condemned as bad
language. Even the dialect tag saw a revival. Other oppressive measures against Ryukyuan
in schools included less drastic forms of punishment and admonition, such as counting the
instance of use of Ryukyuan words by individual pupils. Those found using such words too
frequently were requested to use only Standard Japanese in class or had their names
recorded in the class register. Local linguists such as Karimata Shigehisa and Takaesu
Yoriko reported to me that they had experienced such measures in their early schooldays
in the 1960s and 70s.
Natural intergenerational language transmission in the Ryukyuan languages wasinterrupted from the early years of the US occupation. The diverse mosaic of socioculturalcontexts and experiences makes it difficult to generalize a single, monolithic Ryukyuan
language situation. In most cases people born after 1950 no longer speak Ryukyuan
languages, particularly those living on Okinawa, the main island. Speakers of Ryukyuan
tend to include younger people in the outlying islands of the Okinawa Island group as wellas in the other island groups. It can be noted that there exist differences between local
communities within island groups which seem to reflect the various degrees of radicalismwith which Standard Japanese was spread. Furthermore, language shift occurred faster inHeinrich: Language Loss and Revitalization in the Ryukyu Islands

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the cities than in the countryside. As a result, the sociolinguistic situation is complex. In
addition to the older generation, usually proficient in a Ryukyuan language variety, themiddle generation often has passive skills and some of them can even be regarded as semispeakers. The young generation is overwhelmingly monolingual Japanese. In addition,
contact varieties of Standard Japanese and Ryukuyan varieties have emerged. Thesevarieties are summarized under the term Okinawan-Japanese (uchinaayamatoguchi). Theyshow strong variation according to region and age of its speakers. The study into thecurrent use of these contact varieties is still little developed, due to the fact that they are so
widely spread and considered to be of little prestige.
Attempts at language revitalization
In recognition of the endangerment of local cultures and languages several attempts havebeen made to revitalize languages at risk in the Ryukyu Islands. The early efforts initiallyconcentrated in the northern Amami-Oshima island group. The earliest language revivalorganizations on Okinawa Island is that of Okinawa City (formerly Koza City), establishedin 1955 as Koza Society of Culture. By the mid-1990s more than half of all local
communities in Okinawa Prefecture had societies devoted to the maintenance andpromotion of Ryukyuan culture. In 1995, the Prefectural Society of Okinawan Culture wasfounded as an association of these societies. It organizes the popular annual Ryukyuan
public speech event called Let's Speak the Island Languages Meeting. The threat oflanguage loss has led to numerous popular publications about Ryukyuan languages andvarious language textbooks. News in Okinawan is broadcast daily on local radio. In recent
years, presentation circles and plays in Ryukyuan languages have been incorporated in theschool curriculum as part of local culture classes. There are also a few language classes aspart of extracurricular activities. Furthermore, Ryukyuan language classes are offered in
tertiary education as part of general education where they enjoy huge popularity. Since all
five universities in the Ryukyus are located on Okinawa Island, the variety taught there isthat of Okinawa, more specifically Shuri/Naha.
The most important institution for the revival of a Ryukyuan language is the Society for
Spreading Okinawan (Uchinaguchi fukyū kyōgikai). At its constituting meeting, the society
formulated as its objectives the establishment of dialect classes at elementary and middle
schools, the organization of Okinawan teacher training, and the development of an
Okinawan standard orthography.
While a standard orthography has now been established for the language varieties of the
Okinawa Island group and teacher training is being held, Okinawan has not been
introduced in schools. In other words, education in both public and private schools is
conducted exclusively in Japanese and it is not possible to study Ryukyuan as a second
language in the schools. Introducing classes in Okinawan requires the approval of the
Okinawa Education Council, which has so far not been supportive of the scheme. Other
activities of the Society for Spreading Okinawan include the design and distribution of an
Okinawa language button. Wearing the button signals that the bearer wishes to beaddressed in Okinawan. Furthermore, the Society organized the first Island Language Day
which was held at the Naha community centre on September 18th this year. An estimated100 endorsed a declaration asking for the recognition of Okinawan, Miyako, Yaeyama andPutting Okinawa at the Center

160

Yonaguni as independent speech communities. (Note that the language varieties of AmamiOshima, which are located in Kagoshima Prefecture, are absent). The language declaration
claims the rights to use these languages in private and public domains, to receive language
instruction in order to develop language proficiency, and the right to receive public
services in these languages.
There are other research and speech circles in the Ryukyu Islands. On Okinawa Island
alone, I could trace such circles at community centres in Shuri, Naha, Urasoe, Tomigusuke,
Haebaru, Kochinda, Nishihara, Tamagusuke, Okinawa City, Ginowan, Chatan, Kadena and
Ginoza. With the exception of Chatan, where children are being taught Okinawan, thesecircles are usually visited by people over 50 who primarily look for opportunities to use
Okinawan. Participants do not actively endeavour to spread the language to new speakers
and domains of usage. These circles can therefore not be seen as language revival
institutions in the strict sense.
The future of the Ryukyuan languages
The most important measure of language revitalization is that of passing the retreating
language on to younger generations. This is of course easier said than done. The current
popularity of things Ryukyuan throughout Japan however offers opportunities for language
revitalization since it includes appreciation of the local languages. Two examples illustrate
both renewed interest in Okinawan languages and the difficulties in passing the languages
to new generations. In its issue of April 11th 2001, the Okinawa Times reported on a
student from Osaka who started studying Okinawan after starting his studies at the
University of the Ryukyus. He states that it struck him that there were language varieties inJapan which he could not understand at all. In a letter to the editor, published in Okinawa
Times on September 7th 2005, a 17 year old high school student from Uruma City on
Okinawa criticizes elderly speakers for not using the local language when talking to her andurges them to pass the languages down to younger generations. In concluding, she writes: ‘I,
who was born in Okinawa, feel ashamed for not even understanding jokes in the languageof Okinawa. Will the dialect really vanish just like this? Don't you have the impression thata great quality of Okinawa will be lost?’
The situation is difficult, but there is hope. In particular the current dialect boom in Japanmight be useful for Ryukyuan language revitalization. With Standard Japanese being
thoroughly spread among the young generation, varieties other than Standard Japanese areexperiencing a revaluation. It can be noted that in trend-spots such as Shibuya young
women, always quickest to set and respond to linguistic trends, are inserting as muchdialectal elements as possible in their speech. As an effect, the formerly ubiquitous shoutsof ‘totemo kawaii!’ (totally cute) are in the process of being replaced by their equivalentsfrom local varieties such as ‘namara!’ (Hokkaido) or ‘sekarashika!’ and ‘chikappomenkoi!’(Kyushu).
The dialect boom has been reinforced and picked up by Japanese mass media. One of thecurrent linguistic bestsellers is ‘Chikappomenkoi hōgen renshūchō’ (Totally cute dialect
exercise book). Many popular TV shows have dialect corners and the number of web-sites
on local varieties is constantly rising. Ryukyuan local varieties meet thereby with particularinterest. In the music industry, the case of Isamu Shimoji (35) is worth of note. OriginallyHeinrich: Language Loss and Revitalization in the Ryukyu Islands

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from Miyako, Shimoji was a company employee on Okinawa until a few years ago. When hethrew in some Miyako language into a karaoke rendition of an Eric Clapton song, friends
convinced him to give a concert of Miyako songs at a local community centre. Soon selfproduced tapes made it to the airwaves of the local radio station FM Okinawa. Shimoji went
on to produce a CD of contemporary popular music titled ‘Kaitakusha’ (Pioneer) which isalmost completely in the Miyako variety. The CD is selling very well throughout Japan.
The recent Japanese Okinawa boom notwithstanding, resistance against attempts torevitalize local languages are far from being unknown. For example, in a letter to the editor,
published in Okinawa Times on December 3rd 2004, a government official opposed the ideaof reviving the Ryukyuan languages and having them taught in school. She writes: ‘I havecome across the misunderstanding that the Okinawa dialects are believed to constitutelanguage systems of their own because terms such as Okinawan or island language and thelike exist. As a matter of fact, they are merely instances of corrupt accents and Old Japanesewords which have not vanished but continue to be used in Okinawa. (…) Although there
have recently been voices calling for teaching the dialects as languages to children, such apractice would be dreadful. What is the idea of teaching corrupt accents? If pupils are nottaught to speak proper Japanese they will face humiliation when grown up because of thelanguage barrier.’
In addition to resistance, many attempts at reviving the Ryukyuan languages simply fail.
For instance, a course on the language variety of Yoron Island started in 2004 only to becancelled after a few sessions because it failed to attract participants. As a rule, activists
aiming at language revival are left to rely on their own wits and funds. It seems that this is
not enough to achieve a broad-based revival.
There exists no language policy comprehensively addressing the linguistic situation in the
Ryukyu Islands. There is also a lack of professionally trained linguists. Several branches of
linguistics such as sociolinguistics or linguistic anthropology are absent. Much of thelinguistic research in the Ryukyu Islands is conducted by amateurs, who find support fromlinguistics professors at the local universities. A research grant of the Japanese Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology for a project called "Endangered
Languages of the Pacific Rim" which ran from 1999 to 2003 provided a much needed
impetus for professionally conducted research. In spite of the fact that the Ainu and the
Ryukyuan languages were recognized as endangered Japanese languages, however,research focused exclusively on language documentation.
While endangered languages require efforts with regard to description and language
planning, the latter point has so far been completely neglected. Literally no research has yet
been conducted on how the Ryukyuan languages can be revitalized. As it stands, there is no
reliable information on questions as fundamental as how many speakers of the different
language varieties exist, how old they are, where they are located, and what level ofproficiency they have. Furthermore, nothing is known about local awareness concerning
the possible loss of their languages in the speech communities themselves, the attitudes ofthe speech communities toward language endangerment, and, to be based on suchfundamental information, realistic goals for language revitalization have not yet been set.

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It is a sad fact that the local universities and the International Clearing House of
Endangered Languages at the University of Tokyo pay little attention to these aspects ofsociolinguistic research. As an effect of such neglect, both issues of the UNESCO Red Book of
Endangered Languages completely fail to mention the Ryukyu languages (and have grossly
optimistic views on the Ainu language situation). While concentrated efforts are being
made to document Ryukyuan language varieties, the greatest need seems to be for
language planning rather than on documentation. In particular, acquisition planning, that is
to say, the planning for new speakers, is an issue that can ill afford any further delay.
To be sure, the survival of the Ryukyuan languages hinges on language choices to be madeby the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands. Only they can choose to maintain and transmit
their languages. But while grassroots movements have sprung up and a wide-spreadappreciation of local culture and language can be noted, there is not such sentiment evident
in official institutions. As it stands, the most urgent task in language revitalization is tosecure support from local education boards, the prefectural governments at Okinawa andKagoshima as well as the Japanese state. Having the Ryukyuan languages supported bythese institutions would have a huge symbolic meaning, increasing their value andencouraging their future study and use. They could also provide the material andinstitutional support for a wider language acquisition program.
Thus far, however, it appears that the extent of language endangerment and its
consequences have not been fully realized by the Okinawan government, or, if realized, is
not perceived as a problem. There is also little awareness of the danger of language loss
even among those supportive of the local languages. When I interviewed the local
photographer and documentary filmmaker Higa Toyomitsu, who has made audiovisual
recordings in Okinawan of more than 500 survivors of the Battle of Okinawa, even Higa, atfirst, showed a lack of awareness about language endangerment. When I pointed out that
there was a need to find new domains of usage and new speakers of the language in order
to secure the future existence of the local languages, he answered:
Well, there are such places where you can use Ryukyuan languages. These places
exist and I make my recordings there. I myself am such a place. It doesn't matter
whether someone speaks well or not. As long as these people are there, the language
will be there as well. No worries (daijōbu)!
After I explained that the language would vanish with its present speakers if no countermeasures were taken, Higa lamented that too few people were getting involved in issues ofcultural and linguistic revitalization.
If you make attempts for revitalization, everybody says ‘great’. But when it comes tomaking an effort, they don't do anything. I mean, look, even the scholars here don't
do anything. They only care whether their own field of research is affected. But if
you say, let's do something for the revitalization of such and such island language,
they will do nothing. They only do something for their research. And if it is for somebigger issue, even they won't do anything. What I would like to see is scholars reallygetting involved. So what would you make out of something like that? [Laughs].

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The remarks by Higa point to the fact that it would be naïve to simply equate statements
about concern with evidence that people are really aware of what is at stake and/or thatthey are ready to get involved.
Language loss affects more than language use–it affects identities. To start with, theRyukyuan languages, or their absence, profoundly affect Ryukyuan identity. The collapse ofa language is always accompanied by thoroughgoing changes in local culture. Attempts torevitalize languages are therefore not purely linguistic endeavours. Leaving behindlanguages which have been passed on for hundreds of years inevitably constitutes adecisive break with the past. Powerful symbolic links to a shared culture and history are
forever lost.
Viewed from another angle, a further decline of the Ryukyuan languages would weaken themultilingual and multicultural bases of Japanese society. This is crucial, because the current
policy of ignoring linguistic and cultural diversity within the Japanese nation contradicts
and runs counter to other efforts aiming at internationalisation. The latter policy
appreciates and cherishes linguistic and cultural diversity on an international level while
the former ignores such diversity on the national level. While there has been an upsurge inliterature pointing out and describing Japan's multilingual tradition and heritage in recent
years many people and institutions continue to cling to the modernist paradigm according
to which there is a one-to-one congruence between the Japanese state, nation and language.
Producing evidence about Japan's multilingual and mulicultural past and present is one
thing, having it reflected in popular attitudes and in official policies quite another.
As it presently stands, modernist language ideology which claims linguistic homogeneity
across nation states continues to serve as self-fulfilling prophecy – in Japan as in manyother places across the world. Every two weeks a language dies while thousands of others
continue to decline. This reinforces the validity of modernist nation-imagining ideology. To
many the view of the linguistically homogenous nation appears to be more true, natural,
normal and historical day by day. This is one of the major reasons why it is so very difficult
to save a threatened language. With every day, it seems to become easier to perceive
language revitalization as an unfeasible endeavour. When I asked Shimoji Toshiyuki fromthe Local Research Society of Miyako (Miyako kyōdo kenkyūkai) whether there werepeople who would oppose language revitalization and whether he could imagine the local
language varieties being taught in school, he sounded first optimistic about the idea andthen, slowly, gave in to the view that prospects were rather bleak, enumerating, as he did,the difficulties involved:
If it were possible to save the dialects, and if one could get pupils to use them atschool, this would be good. I think that this would be really good. I don't think thatanyone would be against it. Well, I don't know, but I don't think that someone would
oppose the idea. [Pause] Dialect [pause] at school [pause]. Even if one wished toteach it at school, how should it be taught? To start with, there is the question
whether the teacher would be able to speak the dialect. People who speak the
dialect properly would need to train the teachers. One would need to incorporate it
into general education (sōgō gakushū). You know, the curriculum is already set andthere is the question to which extent the dialect can be incorporated into thePutting Okinawa at the Center

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curriculum. There is no need to do it in a half-hearted way like having two lessons ayear or so – if it is incorporated into school education, it would need to be done
properly. Even if you were to teach it, say one hour a week, I don't think that thiswould allow pupils to engage in conversations. And one would need a leader who
would pursue all these things [pause]. It's difficult, isn't it?
Shimoji is right. It is difficult and everything he mentioned indeed needs to be done. But
while that appeared to be almost insurmountable to him, it is most important to recognizethat it actually can be achieved. The Ryukyuan language might very well survive in theevent that such action is taken. It won’t happen, however, unless a growing number ofpeople become involved, readers of Japan Focus not excluded.
Patrick Heinrich studies and teaches Japanese culture and linguistics at Duisburg-Essen
University (Germany). His fields of research include history of linguistics, language ideology
and sociolinguistics. He is currently working on a monograph on reversing language shift in
the Ryukyu Islands. He wrote this article for Japan Focus. He can be contacted by email: patrick.heinrich@uni-duisburg.de The author would like to thank Matt Allen, Donald
Seekins, Jim Stanlaw, John Whitman and Mark Selden for comments which helped to improve
this article. Posted at Japan Focus, November 10, 2005.

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Futenma: Tip of the Iceberg in Okinawa’s Agony
Shimoji Yoshio
http://www.japanfocus.org/-yoshio-shimoji/3622
October 24, 2011
For the last twenty years the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma—or more precisely, its
relocation—has been at the epicenter of severely strained relations between local residentsof Okinawa and both the national government of Japan and the government of the UnitedStates. As Shimoji Yoshio points out in the following article, like other U.S. bases located on
the main island of Okinawa, Futenma was originally constructed on largely agriculturalland that was seized by the U.S. military during the Battle of Okinawa and not returned toits owners. In the subsequent decades, the surrounding area urbanized to the point where
the Futenma facility is now located in the center of a densely populated city. This has
generated problems for residents of neighboring areas ranging from noise andenvironmental pollution to crimes committed by US personnel along with frustrating
constraints on land use. Tensions were brought to a boil in 1995 when three servicemen
from another U.S. Marine base abducted and raped a 12 year-old girl and in 2004 when ahelicopter from Futenma crashed into neighboring Okinawa International University. Bothincidents ignited massive protest demonstrations against the U.S. military presence. In
1996, an agreement was reached between the U.S. and Japanese governments to relocate
the Futenma base to a proposed off-shore facility to be constructed off the coast of a lessdensely populated northeast area of the island. However, the relocation has been stalledever since over concerns about the environmental damage that the proposed facility would
do and resistance on the part of Okinawans, almost all of whom would prefer to see thefacility moved out of the prefecture entirely.
The controversy over Futenma’s relocation can be looked at as a distillation of the “baseissue” that has been at the center of Okinawan politics, Okinawa’s relations with the central
government in Tokyo, and U.S.-Japan relations since 1945. Seen in this light, Shimoji’s
review of the history of the Futenma facility and his contextualization of Futenma’s place inthe large set of issues associated with the U.S. military presence in Okinawa reveals what is
at stake in the multiple ways the U.S. military bases affect Okinawan society.

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Futenma: Tip of the Iceberg in Okinawa’s Agony
Yoshio Shimoji
Futenma's history
Futenma Air Base (official nomenclature: U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma) wasconstructed toward the end of World War II to transport troops, supplies and ammunitionin the forthcoming attack on mainland Japan (Operation Downfall). But the war ended
before that plan was executed. Futenma should then have been returned; but, instead, it
has remained in the firm grip of the U.S. military all these years to this day.
The U.S. military seized the land in clear violation of Article 46 of The Hague Convention,
which states: “Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as
religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be
confiscated.”
There are presently more than 3,000 so-called “military base landowners” for Futenma Air
Base alone and more than 40,000 for all bases and installations in Okinawa (Cf. Registeredmembers with the Federation of Military-Base Landowners Associations number 38,000 asof October 2011). These figures provide crucial information about how these bases cameinto being. For example, Futenma Air Base with a total land area of 4.806 square km, andwith private land accounting for 93%, was constructed during the Battle of Okinawa andafterwards, while area residents were herded into concentration camps.
When they were finally freed and allowed to return home, they found that their villages
and rich farmland had disappeared without a trace, incorporated within a vast air
base. Reluctantly, they settled down outside the fenced-off compound in areas designatedby the U.S. military as settlement areas with no regard to property rights of landowners.
Iha Yōichi, former Ginowan City Mayor and a native of Ginowan Village (now Ginowan City),
writes in his book (Futenma Air Base is in Your Neighborhood -- Let's Remove It Together,p.15), that "when the war was over and people were allowed to go home, they found theirvillages had disappeared completely, the area transformed into a vast base."
The area where the Futenma Air Base sits was an important traffic junction connecting thenorth and south of Okinawa. Along a beautiful pine tree-lined highway five settlements[alternatively, hamlets] formed Ginowan Village (now Ginowan City) with a total 1944
population of 12,994 -- Ginowan, Kamiyama, Nakahara, Maehara and Aragusuku. Ginowan
was the largest with numerous houses and stores, where public offices including a post
office, a school (Ginowan Elementary School) and the village hall, were located. They were
all swallowed up into the 2,400-meter runway (later extended to 2,700 meters) and otherfacilities and appurtenances.
Some of the other U.S. bases and facilities in Okinawa, officially totaling 33, have a more orless a similar history. Iha says that more than 60 villages disappeared into U.S. bases in thisway. Only Kadena Air Base has a somewhat different history in that it was initiallyconstructed by the Japanese Imperial Army just before the invasion of the Allied
Forces. After taking control of what the Imperial Japanese Army called Naka Hikōjō(Central Air Base), the U.S. forces expanded it sevenfold, expropriating land in theShimoji: Futenma

167

surrounding area encompassing Kadena, Chatan and Koza (later Okinawa City) andrenaming it Kadena Air Base (area: 19.9 square km). Adjoining the air base, just across the
Okinawa/Kadena Route, is the vast Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (26.6 square km).
Okinawa as a U.S. military colony
Before proceeding, let me present some data on the bases from Kichi no Gaiyōo ("Summaryof Bases") published by the Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Division.
As of March 2009, the total land area in the prefecture occupied by the 33 U.S. bases andinstallations was 229.2 square km. Since the area of exclusive U.S. military bases
nationwide is 310.1 square km, Okinawa's share accounts for 73.9%, nearly threefourths. In other words, U.S. military bases and installations predominantly concentrate in
Okinawa, whose land mass is only 0.6% of the whole of Japan.
The following are some of the major bases and installations for exclusive use by the U.S.
military (all in square km):Northern Training Area（78.2), Iejima Auxiliary Air Base (8.0), Camp Schwab (20.6),
Henoko Ordnance Ammunition Depot (1.2), Camp Hansen (51.2), Kadena
Ammunition Storage Area (26.6 ), Camp Courtney (1.3), U.S. Army Garrison Torii
Station (1.9), Kadena Air Base (19.9 ), Camp Zukeran including Camp Butler andCamp Foster (6.4), White Beach Naval Facility (1.6 ), USMC Air Station Futenma(4.8), Makiminato Service Area (2.7), US Army Fuel Storage Facility (1.6). [Subtotal:
225.8 square km]Camp Seals (0.7), Camp Kuwae (0.7), Ginbaru Training Area (0.6), Naha Military
Port (0.6), Awase Communications Facilities (0.6), Okuma Rest Center (0.5), Kin
Blue Beach Training Area (0.4), Camp McTureus (0.4). [Subtotal: 4.4 square km]
The remaining 11 installations consist of 8 firing ranges, among which are Kitadaito
Firing Range (1.1) in Kitadaito-Son and Kobisho Firing Range (0.9) in the Senkakus;
Kin Red Beach Training Area (0.17 km2), Tengan Pier (0.31 km2) and TsukenjimaTraining Area (0.2), etc., with the total area of 2.4 square km.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

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The grand total of the 33
installations used exclusively by the
U.S. military amounts to 229.2
square km. [The figure excludes 5
joint use areas with the SDF.]
However, U.S. military-only areas
are not limited to those 33.

According to Executive Response
No. 6 (October 10, 2008), in reply toinquiries submitted byRepresentative Kantoku Teruya,
there are 19 water areas reservedfor exclusive U.S. military use, somedirectly connected to installations
on coastal land and others locatedfarther offshore. There, according to
the Okinawa Prefecture Military
Base Affairs Division, commercial
fishing and mozuku seaweedfarming are prohibited and theareas are off limits during military
drills. The total area of these 19
coastal water areas is 1172.6
square km. The others are water
areas partially included ininternational waters with a total
US. military bases and installations on Okinawa. Areas inarea of 53,755 square km.
colors other than green are the sites of U.S. installations onland (red, orange, bright blue) and water (paleIn addition, there are 20 designatedblue). (Source:Beigun no Sugata (English title: "U.S. Military
Issues in Okinawa") published by Okinawa Prefecture Military areas of airspace, including some
exclusively for use by the USAF and
Affairs Division.
others for joint use by USAF and
JASDF. Executive Response No. 6 states that it is inappropriate as well as impossible tospecify their area. But the map prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see below)
shows approximate
sizes of the areas
designated as USAF
training airspaces.

Shimoji: Futenma

169

Okinawa is thus
contained andWater areas and air space for U.S. forces training around Okinawa. Air
spaces(pink) are reserved for exclusive use by the U.S. Air Force. Some air
encroached by the
spaces overlap with water areas.
U.S. military fromland, sea and sky to a degree that one can call virtual occupation. Of course, these bases
and installations were formally offered to the U.S. military under the bilateral agreement
called the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty. Yet the situation is nothing more nor less thanoccupation or pseudo-occupation.
This continued pseudo-occupation of post-war Okinawa by the U.S. military does not stopat the hardware aspects like military installations; it goes beyond to the software, as well.
The Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) stipulates that the Japanese authorities
cannot take a suspected U.S. service member into custody if he or she was "in the hands of
the United States" or succeeded in entering a US military base, as was often the case.
When a CH-53D helicopter crashed on the campus of Okinawa International University on
August 13, 2004, the crash site was immediately cordoned off by the Marines before
Japanese police and fire fighters could act. This incident, together with the crash landing ofa Kadena Aviation Club-owned small plane in a Nago sugarcane field in 2008, clearly attest
to the fact that Okinawa (or Japan) is still under practical U.S. military occupation. In bothcases, the area was cordoned off by the U.S. military and the wreckage was carried away
while the Japanese police stood idly by.
Land Struggles and their Consequences
The regional tensions created by the Korean War (1950-1953) may have been a motive forthe further expansion of the existing bases in the early 1950s. Land was requisitioned
forcefully, often at bayonet point and by bulldozer. Jon Mitchell writes about how land was
requisitioned in Iejima in 1953:
With all of Okinawa under U.S. administration, the authorities started by tricking thelandowners into signing voluntary evacuation papers… But then, when somefamilies refused to leave, 300 U.S. soldiers with rifles and bulldozers dragged
women and children from their beds, tore down their homes and slaughtered theirgoats.” (“Iejima: an island of resistance,” The Japan Times: May 22, 2011)
Isolated from the main island by the sea, Iejima islanders had no other means thanmarching across the length and breadth of Okinawa Island with straw mat placards inhands, appealing their plight, like a band of vagabonds.
The struggle in Iejima in 1953, however, was only one of numerous struggles against
forceful land requisitions by the U.S. military in those days. That year, multiple forcefulland expropriations were carried out by the U.S. military government (USCAR): first in Aja
and Mekaru districts (the current Shin-Toshin area) in Naha City (April), then in Mawashi(now part of Naha City, also in April), then in Iejima (July) and finally in Oroku (now part ofNaha City, in November). Two years later, in January 1955, the Isahama district in thenGinowan Village (now Ginowan City) experienced the same forced confiscation. All theseland requisitions were executed at bayonet-point and by bulldozer, leveling houses andPutting Okinawa at the Center

170

destroying farms in the face of protesting farmers, mothers, children and their supporters.
(See Supplement to OkinawaEncyclopedia, pp. 168-170.)
Attempts at forceful land expropriation were also made on several occasions in 1966 forthe expansion of the facility of Tengan Pier in Gushikawa (now part of Uruma City) but theplan failed in the face of a storm of local residents' life-risking protest.
On January 7, 1954, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower made it clear in his State of Union
Message that the U.S. intended to keep Okinawa indefinitely. Then, on March 17 of thatyear, Washington announced plans to make lump-sum payments to military baselandowners for the requisitioned lands. On April 30, the Legislature of the Ryukyu Islands
unanimously adopted a "Petition on Military Use of Land," setting forth the following four
principles: (1) no lump-sum payments, (2) appropriate compensation for lands taken, (3)compensation for damages, and (4) no new land expropriation.
Confronted with worsening public opinion on the land question, U.S. Congressman MelvinPrice led an investigation team from the U.S. House of Representatives to Okinawa during
October 23-26, 1955. In June 1956, the congressional team submitted their findings to the
U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, recommending that the U.S. acquire fee titles forthe land used for the military purposes in Okinawa, approving and supporting
Washington's plan for lump-sum payments and betraying the Okinawa people's highexpectations. It was the last straw. On July 28, 1956, a "Prefectural Rally to Win Four
Principles" was held in Naha with more than 100,000 angry participants from all over theisland.
All these events, unforgettable for prefectural residents, are recorded in Okinawan memory
as "Island-wide Struggles against Land Expropriation."
As a consequence of this prefecture-wide movement to secure land rights, in 1958, USCAR(US Civil Administration of the Ryukyus) finally agreed (1) to raise land rents to twice theappraisal values of 1956 and (2) make payments in annual installments or 10 years'
advance payments if so desired by individual owners.
Concurrent with recovering sovereignty over Okinawa in 1972, the Japanese government
took over responsibility for paying land rents to military base landowners for the U.S.
government. In response to the Federation of Military Base Landowners Associations'petition for a land rent increase, the Satō government raised payments 6.4 times to thesurprise and deep satisfaction of the landowners (Okinawa EncyclopediaVol. 1, p.
1014). Since then rents have been raised on a yearly basis, totaling 91 billion yen in 2011,
an increase of 31 times from 1972 (disregarding inflation).
The central administration in this way succeeded in quenching the flames of the land
struggle, thus guaranteeing the stable use of bases by the U.S. military as stipulated under
the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It goes without saying that Washington has been quitesatisfied and pleased with the measure with all payments by the Japanese government.
What then would become of military base landowners if the bases were completely
eliminated or moved out of Okinawa? Certainly, there are quite a number of landowners
who are uneasy about how the current Futenma problem will be resolved. I have theShimoji: Futenma

171

personal experience of being called by a Yomitan military base landowner, who loudly
criticized my call for the reduction of the U.S. military footprint. What he and others like
him ignore is the the fact that the military base landowners owe much to the general public,
which strongly supported their cause at the time of the 1956 prefecture-wide struggles,
making it possible for them to retain their property rights intact to today while receiving
extraordinary rent increases from the Japanese government.
Some military-base landowners call attention to economic ill effects that would result fromreduction or removal of military bases. Condoleeza Rice, former U.S. Secretary of State,echoed a similar caveat in the face of a mounting call for Futenma's unconditional
closure. There may be some truth in what they say. But it is worth noting that, since thetotal withdrawal of U.S. Navy and Air Force from the Philippines, the former sites of Subic
Bay Naval Station and Clark Air Base (both closed in 1991) have become thriving businesscenters (renovated as the Subic Bay Freeport Zone and Clark Special Economic Zone),creating far more jobs than when there were the bases. The return of Okinawa's mostfertile and central land areas could result in similar or greater gains that would not belimited to the military base landowners.
Indeed, some areas that were returned at the time of Okinawa's reversion to Japan havebecome thriving business districts: for example, the Shin-Toshin business center in Naha
the site of a sprawling U.S. military housing area until 1972. The areas, under the old namesof Aja and Mekaru, and Mihama District in Chatan-chō are now sites of recreation centers,
shopping malls and gourmet restaurants. Naturally, land prices there are now much higher
than before.
Futenma must be moved out of Okinawa immediately
For more than fifteen years Japan and the U.S. have agreed to close the Futenma base. Thebase must not only be closed, it cannot be transferred to Henoko or anywhere elsewhere in
Okinawa. On this point, the Okinawan people across party lines are unified and have madeplain in successive elections at every level and in repeated demonstrations of massive scale.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

172
It is up to
governments inTokyo andWashington torecognize thispolitical reality andsearch for analternative solution,
whether to move thebase to the Japan
mainland, Guam,elsewhere in the
Pacific, or, preferably,

Protesters link hands encircling Futenma Baseto the U.S. mainland.
U.S. Marine Corps Air
Station Futenma sits
dangerously in theheart of the crowded
housing area of
Ginowan City. The
Bushadministration's
Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld,
when he visited
Okinawa andobserved the basefrom a helicopter in November 2003, cautioned that "there's an accident waiting tohappen" there any time. His worry proved correct when the CH-53D helicopter crashed on
the nearby campus of Okinawa International University on August 13, 2004.
The time has come to close this hazardous base. Certainly, there is no basis for reclaiming
the pristine coastal waters off Henoko to construct a new fortified military complex that
includes port facilities for the U.S. Marines. The U.S. violated international law when its
military encroached upon private lands with impunity and built the base. On what legal
and moral basis, then, can it demand its replacement?
Yoshio Shimoji, born in Miyako Island, Okinawa, M.S. (Georgetown University), taught English
and linguistics at the University of the Ryukyus from 1966 until his retirement in 2003.

Roberson: Songs of War and Peace173

Songs of War and Peace: Music and Memory in Okinawa
James E. Roberson
http://japanfocus.org/-James_E_-Roberson/3394
August 2, 2010
This essay develops McCormack and Norimatsu’s point that memories of the past impact
contemporary Okinawa and shape the identities of Okinawans. Roberson shows how
memories of the Battle of Okinawa are a powerful presence in contemporary Okinawan
popular music. In Roberson’s words: “Early songs reflect the dynamics and contradictionsof assimilationist pressures and desires that led Okinawans to participate … in Japan’s wars
and empire building. Later songs give witness to personal and cultural ambivalences and to
the profound injuries suffered by Okinawans during the battle. As a result of theirexperiences in war, Okinawans have since that time sung of peace, first in terms of desiring
to return to what they think of as a long-ago peaceful homeland, and later imagined in
response to American military control and to the promise offered by Japan’s ‘Peace
Constitution.’” Popular songs in Okinawa, in short, can serve as a fascinating lens throughwhich to observe the way in which Okinawans’ historical experiences have shaped
contemporary Okinawan culture and politics.

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Songs of War and Peace: Music and Memory in Okinawa
James E. Roberson
I—Sengo Zero-Nen
Memories of the Battle of Okinawa are complexly interwoven with the past, the present andthe future. They are a vital force, in the sense of being both living and important, because of
the continuing everyday presences of the war in Okinawa, among Okinawans, who also
long for peace. These memories and their multiple inscriptions and engravings in
Okinawan places, bodies and minds can act, as Yelvington (2002) has elsewhere andsomewhat differently argued, as powerful resources in recollecting a past, in giving
cohesion to or in re-membering present collective identities, and in authenticating bothclaims to that past and legitimating current actions, claims and contestations. Thus, forexample, when the Japanese Ministry of Education attempted in 2007 to modify history
textbooks to downplay the involvement of the Japanese army in Okinawan civilians’ forced
suicides during the Battle of Okinawa [see the Aniya article in this volume], an estimated
110,000 people gathered in Ginowan to protest this rewriting of still vital memories.
This essay surveys the cultural politics of memory and music in Okinawa by situating someof the songs that mark Okinawans’ journeys through the landscapes and imaginaries of war
and peace. An abridged and revised version of my paper “Memory and Music in Okinawa:
The Cultural Politics of War and Peace” (Roberson 2009), it also draws from related work
(Roberson 2007, 2010a, 2010b). The songs I describe here are primarily though not
exclusively from the folk or new-folk (min’yō or shin-min’yō; also shima-uta) and “Uchinā
Pop” (see Roberson 2003) genres. Though for certain songs I also draw attention toparticular musical elements, my primary focus is on song lyrics.1 I first describe songs thatgive voice to Okinawans’ experiences of assimilation and mobilization in the period prior to
the 1945 Battle of Okinawa. I then describe songs which recount the world of war
experienced at home by Okinawans, and which sing of the sorrows of war and of thetreasure of life. I next describe songs from the long postwar period that sing of dreams forpeace and that protest the continuing presence of American military bases and armed
forces.
As recorded and recalled, these Okinawan songs comprise critical, contested, and at times
contradictory sites of historical memory and of continuing social dialogue. The
complexities of contemporary memory work in Okinawa involve both individual andcollective identities constructed within historical contexts framed and fragmented bycontending local, national, and international forces and influences, including those of(neo)colonialism and imperialism. Here, memories become “perilous” in the double sense
described by Fujitani, White, and Yoneyama as “memories in need of recuperation and as
memories that continue to generate a sense of danger” (2001:3). The perilousness ofmemory in Okinawa is related to processes of remembering and forgetting a war in which
nearly one third of the population on the main island perished but in which Okinawans
themselves were complexly participant, to continuing conditions of militarization by both
American and Japanese forces, and to strongly held yet fragile and contextually imagined
dreams of peace.

Roberson: Songs of War and Peace

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My goal here, then, is to consider how songs in Okinawa may be heard to constitutecomplex sites of cultural memory and resistance. I contend that regardless, or because, of
their minority voice, these songs need to be carefully listened to, especially by people from
American and Japanese centers of economic and political power and imperialism.
II—Becoming Japanese
In 1879, the Meiji Government of Japan unilaterally dissolved the Ryūkyūan Kingdom andestablished the Prefecture of Okinawa (see Kerr 1958). Invoking a modernist rhetoric ofprogressive “civilization,” Japan subsequently embarked on the political-economic andcultural assimilation of Okinawa, employing a “totalizing vision of ‘Japaneseness’” in theprocesses of making Ryūkyūans into proper Japanese imperial subjects (Morris-Suzuki
1998:26-8; Christy 1997:141-169). This assimilationist dynamic involved a dialectic in
which Japan was held up as the progressive model of civilized modernity to overcome
Okinawan backwardness. Japanese historian Tomiyama Ichirō’s (1995) important work on
war memory in Okinawa emphasizes the everyday aspects of assimilation and theconsequences of these for Okinawans. While language was in many ways the mostimportant and debated issue in Okinawan cultural assimilation, other cultural and religious
practices (including Okinawan folk music) were also targeted as backward and in need ofreform. Such assimilation also included the extension of the Japanese military draft to
Okinawa, which was welcomed by members of the Okinawan elite as a sign of Okinawa’s
equal inclusion in the Japanese state (Ōta 1996:56-7).
The everyday and ideological dilemmas and dynamics of Okinawa’s modernist/imperialist
assimilation are reflected and commented on in a number of prewar Okinawan folk songs.
One such song is Hadashi Kinrei no Uta (literally, Barefoot Prohibition Song), recorded in
1941, that sings of the prohibition on walking barefoot promulgated in early 1941 as partof the Movement for the Improvement of Manners and Customs (Fūzoku Kairyō Undō).
While ironically also referring to Okinawa as “Shūrei no Kuni” (Land of Propriety) and“Bunka Okinawa” (Cultural Okinawa), Hadashi Kinrei warns about possible fines and otherembarrassing consequences if found barefoot in Naha. In part it also reflects the (self-)
disciplining of, if not the attempt to eliminate, such everyday aspects of Okinawan“backwardness.” (see Arakawa 1982:7; Nakahodo 1988:166).
Hadashi Kinrei may be heard both to reflect and to resist prewar assimilationist processes
and practices. Okinawan writer and social critic Arakawa Akira contends that, sung in
Okinawan dialect and to sanshin2 accompaniment, Hadashi Kinrei uses music and thenuances of local language to indirectly invert the pro-Japanese denotations of the lyrics.
Such contradictions and inversions suggest the folk manipulation of music in expressing
ambivalence toward assimilationist programs, making music a subtle if contradictory
weapon of the weak (see Arakawa 1982:8; Tomiyama 1998).
Tsuyoi Nipponjin (Strong Japanese), also recorded in 1941, more clearly shows the strengthof Japanese control and influence as the embodiment of desirable modernity and the (self-)
inclusion of Okinawa(ns) in Japanese imperialism. Extending to seven verses, Tsuyoi
Nipponjin sings, in Japanese but to sanshin accompaniment, of Japan as the land of theemperor and gods, where strong and brave men are fighting a sacred war (seisen), andwhere the women are also strong, holy mothers (seibo) and angels caring for andPutting Okinawa at the Center

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supporting their men. The last verse is especially dense in the work it performs as a lyricalsite involved in the making of imperial subjects:3
Tsuyoi NipponjinMen going forthrightly to the sacred war
wives on the home front taking up hoes
Advance the building of Greater East Asiawith the latent power of 3000 years
Be Proud, Be Proud! Prospering for a Thousand Generations
For Eight Thousand Generations, Long Live the Japanese Empire!
Showing the attraction and allegiance of Okinawans as members of the Japanese nationstate, in what may be simultaneously heard as a song of professed patriotism and of
propaganda, Tsuyoi Nipponjin remains a site of memory marking Okinawan complicity inJapan’s militarist imperialism. As Michael Molasky points out, “Okinawans were not mere
victims of Japanese colonialism and imperialism, for many also aspired to be recognized as
fully fledged Japanese citizens and to partake of the fruits of Japanese power andprosperity” (Molasky 1999:14). Open recognition and critique of such complicity remains acontentious issue in postwar Okinawa (Molasky 2003:184; Medoruma 2005) (see Ishihara,
et al. 2002; Figal 1997:745-78; Yonetani 2000:145-68).
A number of other Okinawan folk songs similarly bearing the deep colorings of the wartime
system that appeared between 1939 and 1941, with titles such as: Wakare no
Sakazuki (Wine Cup of Parting), Jūgo no Mamori (Home Front Defense; literally, Defense
Behind the Guns),Jūgo no Tsuma (Wife Behind the Guns/Wife on the Home Front), SenshōBushi (War Victory Song), Nikudan (Human Bomb), and Mamore Nan’yō (Defend theSouthern Isles!). The gendered division of imperial subjecthood (Angst 2001:92-3) and of
Okinawan complicity in the Japanese imperialist project is given clear refrain in many suchsongs. While “for the sake of the country” Okinawan men went to the front lines, Okinawan
women struggled “behind the guns” to take care of family, farm and village. One of theearliest and the most re-recorded of such songs is Fukuhara Chōki’s 1933 Gunjin
Bushi (Soldier’s Song; see Arakawa 1982:6; Takaesu 1982:150-1). The first two verses are:
Gunjin Bushi4
Since I met and wed you, but few months have passed,
Now we must part, since it’s for the sake of the country
Do your utmost, my beloved wife

My husband, you are a soldier, so why do you cry?
I pray that you will return smiling,Roberson: Songs of War and Peace177

For the sake of the country, perform your public duty5
At the time of Gunjin Bushi’s composition and recording, Fukuhara lived in Osaka’s large
Okinawan community.6 Fukuhara was subject to investigation for Gunjin Bushi, since theJapanese authorities apparently felt it inappropriate to use the honorable JapaneseImperial soldier’s appellation “gunjin” in the title of a popular Ryūkyūan song. According to
one story line, Fukuhara renamed the song “Shussei Heishi o Okuru Uta” (Song to Send off a
Soldier Going to the Front) or, combined with “Kumamoto Bushi” as “Nyūei Defune no
Minato” (Harbor of a Boat Leaving for the Barracks), though he did not otherwise change
the music or lyrics (see Nakahodo 1988:152-5; Uehara 1982:207; Kamiya 1998:111).
While marking Okinawan complicity in Japanese imperialism, the conflicted nature of
Okinawan incorporation into the Japanese imperialist project may also be heard in many ofthese songs. Musical elements such as the use of local dialect, the Ryūkyūan musical scale
and instruments, most notably the sanshin, mark the celebration of Okinawan cultural
distinctiveness amid on-going pressures to become good imperial subjects. Thus,
that Tsuyoi Nipponjin is accompanied by music employing the Ryūkyūan scale may at once
be heard to lend local support to the nationalism of the mostly Japanese language lyrics,
and by, inserting Okinawan musical difference, qualify the full imperialistic thrust of thesong (Arakawa 1982:5). Similarly, that the wartime cooperation voiced in Wakare no
Sakazuki is shaded by a characteristic sadness in the sanshin-based music, may be heard to
render problematic any simple reading of Okinawan wartime complicity (Arakawa 1982:56; Nakahodo 1988:154-5).
Thus, while the Okinawan elite may have welcomed the Japanese state’s extension of thedraft to Okinawa, the subtexts of many prewar Okinawan may be heard to reflect
commoner Okinawans’ ambivalence about being so mobilized.7 This local Okinawan
ambivalence toward incorporation into Japan’s imperial project—compounded by laterreflections on the horrific outcomes of such mobilization—may in part account for the rerecording of songs such as Gunjin Bushi. What is signaled by the musical incongruity here isperhaps also similar to that in the recent performance piece based on this period ofmemory/history by Fujiki Hayato, wherein “Okinawan culture—the same culture thatsomehow articulated with Japanese militarism—also empowers the recognition of the perilof becoming Japanese” (Nelson 2003:219). However, it must also be remembered that the
Okinawan past as embodied action was constructed under historical conditions of unequal
power relations. In his liner notes to the 2002 CD re-release of Kinjō Minoru’s immediate
important post (1972) reversion LP, Jidai (which included versions of several prewar
songs), Okinawan writer, media personality and music expert Uehara Naohiko is thus
critical of the militarist, imperialist context in which the songs first appeared and suggeststhat many songs may now be listened to as anti-war songs.
These songs thus not only narrated experience to contemporary audiences but remain as(re-) recorded and archived sites of memories of Okinawans’ unequal encounters withassimilation policies, cultural reform movements, and military cooperation, service andsacrifice. They reveal the conflicted position of Okinawans and necessitate readings thatrecognize both Okinawans’ complicit participation in and implicit resistance to Japaneseimperialism. Furthermore, the critical or rehabilitating commentary of postwar writersPutting Okinawa at the Center

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such as Arakawa and Nakahodo must be seen as part of ongoing contemporary internal
debates about Okinawa’s “difficult past” (Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991:376-420) ofparticipation in Japanese assimilationist, militarist, and imperialist projects.
There are important historical and political reasons for the contemporary forgetting ofmany such songs beyond a mere denial of complicity in Japan’s imperialist aggression. Thatis, the cultural amnesia evident here must in part be understood in relationship with an
eclipsing focus on the suffering of Okinawans at home. And, such contemporary culturalamnesia regarding assimilationist, militarist, and imperialist complicity must be
understood within the context of the continuing American military presence in Okinawa,
and of related appeals for their removal and for the realization of local prayers for peace.
III—Ikusa-yu
The husbands, lovers, and sons departing for war in the songs described above were goingelsewhere, “a thousand ri away” according to the lyrics of Kuni nu Hana. These songs aremournful but often lack the grounded specificity of place, while death is primarily
portrayed only as a possibility facing the soldiers being sent off and requiring that thesurviving women carry bravely on. With the 1945 Battle of Okinawa, however, death
became an immediate and enduring reality for ordinary Okinawans.
The “typhoon of steel” produced by fighting between American and Japanese forces began
when American troops landed on the outlying Kerama Islands in late March and on themain island of Okinawa on April 1 of 1945, and then lasted through June 23, whenorganized Japanese resistance ended, and continuing until early September, when theJapanese military formally surrendered. Some 150,000 Okinawans died, approximately
one-fourth of the prefecture’s total and one-third of the main island’s prewar population.
Commonly given numbers for Okinawan deaths include some 38,754 common citizens andanother 55, 246 civilian combat participants. A further 28,228 deaths occurred amongsoldiers of Okinawan origin and Okinawan army employees, including student, nurse, andcivilian defense corps members who did not necessarily differ greatly from ordinary
citizens (see Okinawa Prefecture 1991; Ota 2000). Okinawan deaths during the Battle of
Okinawa embodied most devastatingly the disjunctures between Okinawan desires andeveryday actions to become modern imperial subjects versus Japanese discrimination
against and disregard for Okinawan culture and lives (Tomiyama 1995; Medoruma 2005;
Oshiro 2002:21-2; Ishihara 2001).
The horrifying realities of the Battle of Okinawa are remembered and reflected upon in a
number of postwar sanshin-based folk songs that narrate Okinawans’ direct experiences ofwartime suffering, (being) sacrifice(d), and survival. Kanpō nu Kuē Nukusā, for example,
graphically describes surviving Okinawans as the leftovers of the American warships’
cannons. Describing also the postwar hardships of impoverished Okinawans and their joys
at seeing their children born and grow, Kanpō nu Kuē Nukusā ends:8
Kanpō nu Kuē NukusāThat war which devoured my parents
Those cannons that devoured my homelandRoberson: Songs of War and Peace

179

Even if I’m reborn, I won’t be able to forget.
Just who was it that started these things?
My resentment and regret are endless.
Let us tell to all generations,That you and I, and I and you are all
But the leftovers of the warships’ cannons.

Another of these songs is Himeyuri no Uta, originally popular in 1967 (Takaesu 1982:158),
which portrays the fate of the Himeyuri Student Nurse Corps, composed of 219 female
higher school students who were drafted into service as nurses. Most died during the battle.
The lyrics to the first two and the last verses (of ten total) are:9
Himeyuri no Uta
It is widely known, the story
Of Okinawa’s Himeyuri Unit
Of Girl Students who were sacrificed
The two lines of loyalty and piety
They held in their breasts
Harder than iron, Japan’s yamato-damashi
Cherry blossoms….
At last, honorable deaths, the Himeyuri girls
Together in their graves, are they crying?
Sad and lonely crying, summer cicada(for a live recording by Kenbō with Bōchirāzu, set to photographic montage,
follow this link)
Linda Angst notes that for most Japanese and Okinawans the Himeyuri girls are the“primary (and conflicted) symbol of dual Okinawan wartime patriotism and victimhood”(2001:33; see also Angst 1997). The Japanese language lyrics of Himeyuri no Uta may beheard to simultaneously invoke and invert gendered and national symbols such as cherry
blossoms. Thus, like cinematic and other narratives regarding the Himeyuri students,10 thepolitical implications and meanings of Himeyuri no Uta are open to variously positioned
nostalgic and critical readings and acts of remembering. Okinawan folk-music researcher

Putting Okinawa at the Center

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Nakasone Kōichi critically writes that the use of militarist-era words such as “yamato
damashi” (Japanese soul) and “gyokusai” (honorable death—literally, shattered or crushed
jewel) beatify patriotic death. On the other hand, Uehara Naohiko argues that Himeyuri no
Uta should now be heard as a protest song that retrospectively, reflexively questions themeanings of “(for the sake of the) nation” and “honorable deaths” (Nakasone 1999:238;
Uehara 1986:127-8).
Such protesting political inversions—and the transformative potentialities enabled
thereby—are given further expression and force by the musical elements of the song, as toa certain extent was seen earlier in regard to Hadashi Kinrei no Uta. Thus, Himeyuri no
Uta is sung to plaintive sanshin accompaniment and uses the melody of Haisen KazoeUta (War Defeat Counting Song), a song composed in the aftermath of the war that recounts
the sorrows and losses of war and the futility of the battle, criticizes Japanese military
strategy, and calls on listeners to rebuild postwar Okinawa (Nakasone 1997:115-16). To
different musical accompaniment, I have also seen Okinawan singer-songwriter and folk
guitarist Sadoyama Yutaka perform Himeyuri no Uta at an event in Tokyo marking
Okinawa’s “Irei no Hi” memorial day for victims of the Battle of Okinawa, very clearly
evoking the protest potentials of the song. Thus, while I believe it would be a mistake toignore the cultural-political significance of lyrics, sometimes read against the grain, it also
is true that the performative dimensions and contexts of songs may carry or constitute,
sometimes alternative, forms of significance.
Another song that acts as a critical site of memory of the Battle of Okinawa is Tsukayama
Hiroyoshi’s Nuchi du Takara (Life is a Treasure). Sung in Okinawan dialect, this didactic
anti-war song calls, as does Kanpō nu Kuē Nukusā, for its listeners to keep memories of the
war alive, forever. The first two verses are:11

Nuchi du Takara
Forget, I can’t forget, the sorrows of the warring world
Every time I remember, my hair stands on end
Truly, we must tell of the war
Truly, life is a treasure

To survive the war, we hid in caves
But the caves also became hells, the houses of devils
Truly, we must tell of the war
Truly, life is a treasureRoberson: Songs of War and Peace181

By invoking the phrase “nuchi du takara,” Tsukayama embeds his song in complex webs ofcultural, historical and political reference. Thus, for example, anti-base activist Ahagon
Shōkō’s similarly titled book opens with the famous Ryūka (short Ryūkyūan poem)
attributed to King Shō Tai at the time of his forced abdication in 1879: “The Era of War has
ended// An era of peace has come// Do not grieve and moan, Life is a Treasure” (Ahagon
1992:2; my translation). Okinawan writer Shima Tsuyoshi (1997) has more broadly
suggested that the Battle of Okinawa has two faces, represented among other things by themain public and the lesser known war sites and memorials. Shima sees the phrases“honorable death” (gyokusai) written on war site epitaphs and “life is a treasure” (nuchi dutakara) spoken by Okinawans as representing opposing sets of values: gyokusai expressing
those of the imperialist military, and nuchi du takara expressing those of common
Okinawans in their will to live (1997:235-47).12 Songs such as Himeyuri no Uta and Nuchi
du Takara, Kanpō nu Kuē Nukusā and others give voice to “gyokusai” but especially convey“nuchi du takara” orientations.
These and other songs that recount local experiences related to the Battle of Okinawa act assites of memory available for re-excavation and embedded within other discourses anddebates. By focusing on Okinawan suffering these songs perhaps risk joining the “national
victimology” that Fujitani, White, and Yoneyama note as the product of “dominant modes ofremembering” in postwar Japan (2001:7; see also Orr 2001). As such, they threaten to sing
the forgetting of Okinawan complicity and responsibility in a complex contrapuntal similar
to that which Gerald Figal (1997) discusses in relation to the commemoration of the war
dead at the Cornerstone of Peace in the southern Mabuni area.
On the other hand, by singing of Okinawan sacrifice and suffering, these songs
simultaneously act as critiques of Japanese militarism, contributing to the broader“oppositional memory work”(Fujitani, White and Yoneyama 2001:13) going on in Okinawa.
As such, these songs allow for interpretations of their significance as musically composedsites of memory that critically invoke Okinawan suffering as the result of Japanese andAmerican militarized violence and of Okinawan complicity born of misguided
assimilationist loyalties. The protagonist of Kanpō nu Kuē Nukusā thus asks in critical,
challenging fashion: “Just who was it that started these things?” It is the nature of the Battleof Okinawa as a “difficult past” (Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991)—together with theintervention of peace activists and the existence of counter-narratives, including those insong—that helps preclude facile revisions to history and social memory in Okinawa.
Survivors of the Battle of Okinawa, including many civilians, were initially placed by theAmerican military into internment camps throughout Okinawa (Molasky 1999:17). Twowell-known songs recall life in these camps, PW Mujō (also, PW Bushi) and Yaka Bushi (Bise
1998:184). The lyrics of both songs largely overlap and were written in the POW camp at
Yaka. Both melancholic songs sing of sadness deepened by the harrowing experiences ofwar, by thoughts of homes and villages destroyed by fighting, by worries about the safety ofrelatives, and by personal troubles. The lyrics to the first verse of Yaka Bushi are:13
Yaka Bushi
Beloved Okinawa, turned into a battlefieldPutting Okinawa at the Center

182

Turned into a battlefield
All of the people, with flowing tears
With flowing tears
The final verse of PW Mujō laments:
PW MujōIf only there had not been this thing, warThis pitiful figure, I [we] would not have become
How pitiful is a PW
As Molasky similarly points out regarding other Okinawan narratives of the war andAmerican occupation, PW Mujō and Yaka Bushi mark the internment camp experience not
only as the end of the war but as the beginning of the postwar era of the American
Occupation (Molasky 1999:17). PW Mujō and Yaka Bushi are still recorded and performed.
Kina Shoukichi included Yaka Bushi on his 1998 CD Akainko, while Koja Misako
recorded PW Mujō on her anti-war 2005 CD Kuroi Ame.14 Kinjō Minoru, meanwhile, hasperformed in military olive green, playing PW Bushi on a kankara sanshin modeled on therustic instruments originally made in the camps from empty food ration cans and otherdiscarded American military materials (Bise 1998:184). For a recent video recording of PW
Mujō by young performer Uema Ayano, follow this link.
IV—Miruku-yu
That the end of the world of war (ikusa-yu) would lead to a world of peace (miruku-yu) has
been a long held hope among many Okinawans. In this section, I describe songs that overthe past half-century plus have narrated Okinawan dreams of peace. Here the politicalcontexts within and at times against which the songs are sung become critical inunderstanding the changes, continuities and complexities of such dreams.
A—Nuchi nu Sūji
While songs like Yaka Bushi describe the end of the war from the position of someone
having experienced the battle in Okinawa, there are a number of songs which describe the(desire to) return to Okinawa among people who were elsewhere at the war’s end. The
theme of separation that runs throughout many wartime songs becomes an inverse longing
to return in Fukuhara Chōki’s famous early postwar songNatsukashikiKokyō (or, Natsukashiki Furusato; Nostalgic Homeland). Written and first performed by
Fukuhara in Osaka in 1947, the first and last verses are:15
Natsukashiki Kōkyō
The Okinawa I see in dreams, is its original shape
But the Okinawa I hear of in rumor, has changed completely
Oh, I want to go! Back to the island of my birthRoberson: Songs of War and Peace

183….
When will it be that freely, with all my family
We will be able to live together smiling?
Oh, let us go! Back to Okinawa!

Though also reflecting general nostalgic desires and imaginaries among the Okinawan
diaspora (see Roberson 2010b), which in part account for its frequent rerecording, Natsukashiki Kokyō more directly portrays early postwar Okinawan concerns for
loved ones and dreams for peace given particularly sharp resonance by the then recent
Battle of Okinawa. While Natsukashiki Kokyō describes a yet unrealized desire to return toOkinawa and find family members safe and Okinawa at peace, Noborikawa Seijin’s Sengo
no Nageki (Postwar Lament) portrays the sadness of someone who has in fact returned to
Okinawa from Japan (Yamato) to find that Okinawa has been transformed by the war andthat his family are not there. Such is the teaching and fate of war, he laments, andprotests.16
In addition to such mournful laments, however, there are other songs that participate inwhat Chris Nelson refers to as the “politics of hope” found in the performances of Onaha
Buten and Teruya Rinsuke and more recently of Fujiki Hayato. Onaha and Teruya visitedthe interment camps and villages of central Okinawa in the immediate postwar period andthrough comedic performances that included music encouraged war weary Okinawans tocelebrate and enjoy life (Nelson 2003, 2008). Of similar sentiment is Hiyamikachi Bushi, asong from the early 1950s. Now commonly played up-tempo, this song calls on Okinawans
to stand up and be proud, even if they fall seven times and more (Nakasone 1997:1623.).17 For a version of Hiyamikachi Bushi performed by Noborikawa Seijin, follow this link.
Kadekaru Rinshō’s early 1960s Jidai no Nagare and Teruya Rinken’s 1993 Yu-Yu-Yu may
also be heard as satirically comical (Jidai no Nagare) or energetically optimistic (Yu-Yu-Yu)
calls to celebrate life, despite difficulties faced and changes in the world. The recent UchināPop songObā Jiman no Bakudan Nabe (Grandma’s Favorite Bombshell Cooking Pot), by thegroup Begin, may also be heard as a playful invocation of the same spirit.18 Optimistic, andoften comical songs of the “nuchi nu sūji” celebration of life give voice in a different key tothe “nuchi du takara” value orientation introduced above. Such celebrations of life,
furthermore, invoke celebrations of peace. As Teruya Rinken (Rinsuke’s son) has said: “Wesing about how wonderful it is being alive here and now. It’s the celebration of life like thiswhich negates war and other acts that involve violence and killing” (Barrell and Tanaka
1997:114).
B—Heiwa no Negai
In the long postwar period, the theme of peace has been taken up in a continuing series ofsongs. Peace appears to have become a more explicitly expressed theme from about themid 1960s. This, of course, was the time of the Vietnam War, when Okinawa was still under
US Occupation and used for American military operations in Southeast Asia. This is also,Putting Okinawa at the Center

184

however, a time during which Okinawans protested more vocally about their desire to
return to Japan and its “Peace Constitution.”Songs mapping Okinawan calls for reversion include Akogare no Uta (Song of Yearning),
which sang of the desire to return to Japan and the Japanese era (yu), and Okinawa oKaese (Return Okinawa; written in the 1950s) which became, as it remains, a movement
and protest song (see Arakawa 1982:10; for more on Okinawa o Kaese, see Roberson 2003).
Other songs combined dreams of peace with the desire to return to Japan, portrayed inpolitical rhetoric and in song lyrics as Okinawa’s ancestral homeland (sokoku; on Okinawa
protest movements, see Tanji 2006; Taira 1997). Heiwa no Kane (Bell of Peace), popular in
1966, and Heiwa no Negai (Prayer for Peace) are two such songs (Takaesu 1982:158). The
latter, re-recorded in 1997 by Tamaki Kazumi, combines a call like that in Nuchi du
Takara not to forget the sorrows of war with appeals for return to Japan and for a peaceful
Okinawa. The first and last verses are:19
Heiwa no Negai
This island Okinawa, always nothing but war
When will the time finally come that we can live in peace?
Ah, let us together, for this island Okinawa
Pray for Peace, for this Okinawa….
Our thoughts one, beloved Yamato
The happiness when finally we return20
Ah, let us together, for this island Okinawa
Pray for Peace, for this Okinawa
For a performance of Heiwa no Negai by Suzy (Sūjī [-gwa], a performer based in the
Yokohama-Kawasaki area, that was intended as part of an online sanshin lesson but
interestingly uses a type of kankara sanshin, follow this link.
A song such as this indexes complex ironies of history. Okinawans, discriminated against
and strategically sacrificed in war by the Japanese, seek to return to Japanese control andbenefit from its postwar Peace Constitution, which was a product of the American
occupation of Japan. The formal occupation of Japan, but not the withdrawal of US forces,
had ended in 1952 with Japanese agreement to continuing American occupation of
Okinawa. These ironies must be understood strategically and logistically, within thecontext of Okinawan attempts to free themselves from American military domination andracism. The prayer for peace is thus less ironic than multi-vocal, simultaneously recallingthe experiences of Okinawans during the Battle of Okinawa and restating Okinawan desires
for a peaceful home free of the American military.
However, despite Okinawans’ “prayers for peace,” close to 40 years after reversion, nearly
75 percent of the U.S. military bases and 60 percent of U.S. military personnel in Japan

Roberson: Songs of War and Peace185

remain concentrated in Okinawa. Symbolic here is the yet unrealized 1996 agreement to“return” Futenma Air Base, mentioned at the beginning of this essay, which has met with
continuing protest because of plans to relocate the base within Okinawa Prefecture near
the town of Henoko (see Inoue 2007). Furthermore, between reversion to Japan in 1972
and the end of 2003, there were some 5,269 reported crimes committed by US military andtheir dependents in Okinawa. These included 977 cases of aggravated assault and 540
violent crimes, the latter of which between 1972 and 1995 included 12 murders as well as
111 reported cases of violence (including rape) against women and girls (see Okinawa
Prefecture Military Base Affairs Division 2004; Arasaki 1996:204). There continue to be offbase automobile accidents, cases of environmental pollution, forest fires, stray bullets andother accidents and incidents related to the American military bases. In August 2004, forexample, a large CH-53D transport helicopter crashed onto the campus of Okinawa
International University, leading some 30,000 Okinawans to gather in September 2004 toprotest (Asahi Shinbun 2004a; Asahi Shinbun 2004b).
Singer Koja Misako, a former member of the Uchinā Pop group, the Nenes, released a miniCD in 2005 called Kuroi Ame (Black Rain), which includes PW Mujō and several versions of
the title track, Kuroi Ame. This song was originally composed by Sahara Kazuya, Koja’s
partner and producer, after joining a “Peace Festival” organized in Baghdad in 1990 by
wrestler-politician Antonio Inoki (Yoshizawa 2004). The black rain in the song thus
originally referred most directly to the missiles and bombs dropped during the first Gulf
War, but also offers ready allusion to the black rain that fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
after the atomic bombings of those cities.
Koja’s recordings and performances of Kuroi Ame, however, index as well the “typhoon ofsteel” that fell on Okinawa during WWII and the continuing crashes of American military
aircraft. The association of Kuroi Ame with the Battle of Okinawa is lyrically accomplishedby the insertion after the second verse of an interlude in which Koja sings the final verseof PW Mujō coupled with a Ryūka (8-8-8-6 syllable poem) of her own composition. The
lyrics to the first verse and interlude of Koja’s recording of Kuroi Ame are:Black Rain21
Rain keeps falling
Rain pours down
The sky is dark
Who knows where this rain is coming from
Hooy, hooy, hooy, hoo
Hooy, hooy, hooy, hoo….
If there was but not this war
This sad figure
I/we would not have become
By but the two characters of “war” [sensō, 戦争]
Life is taken
Those surviving left to cryPutting Okinawa at the Center186

Are the children
The intertwining of a more universally composed anti-war message with Okinawan
particularities is further enhanced when Koja has introduced or interlaced live
performances with personal comments referring to the crash of an American transport
helicopter into the campus of Okinawa International University in August 2004, to her own
childhood memories of witnessing the crash of an American B52 bomber, and to memories
of her father, who died while working on the U.S. Airbase at Kadena. Koja’s narration,acting as prelude and spoken interlude accompanying a live performance of Kuroi
Ame recorded on this CD, is roughly as follows:
Prelude:The song I’m about to sing is called Kuroi Ame. From the first time I sang on stage
until here today, how many years have passed? I first sang on stage when I was
about five years old and this year I’ll be fifty-one, so I’ve been singing for forty-plus
years. In that lifetime of singing, I’ve had lots of varied experiences. Today, during
this short time, there are lots of things that I can’t fully describe. In the town where I
live, Kadena, there is a large American military air base, called the largest in East
Asia. Inside that military base there are many people working, and outside, we areliving. American jets that had taken off have on a number of occasions crashed.
Among those times when planes have crashed, the most terrifying was when I was ayoung elementary school student, when a B52 with black wings crashed. At thattime, I remember thinking, even though I had not experienced war, ah, Kadena has
been hit. That frightening memory is, after all, impossible to forget no matter how
many years pass. This year, it makes 60 years that, throughout, we’ve been told of
how Okinawa suffered as the site of the sole land battle [on Japanese home soil]. It
might appear as though it is now [a time of] peace, but in Okinawa, [the war] hasn’t
ended. Inside the heart of Okinawa, paradise has yet to arrive. With my prayers
embraced in this song, Kuroi Ame.
Interlude:
My father worked inside of Kadena airbase. While on his way to work [one day], myfather was run over by a military truck and died instantly. At that time, my motherwas 28, my father was 30, I was four. My mother and I have both lived as best we
could. But, my mother passed away at 67. Now, I have a child and grandchild, andwhen I have the strength to look back and think about the past, my father[‘s death]is so mournfully regretful. I think, if there hadn’t been the war and Okinawa was as
it had been in the past, my father would surely even now have happily been taking
loving care of me. My most loved, most loved father’s memory only have I held in myheart and lived. Therefore, children like me will only have sad memories, so after all
having one’s parents healthy and happy is best.
Koja’s narrative here is many layered and multivocal, interweaving personal and Okinawan
cultural memory; intertwining past, present and future in criticism of war; and appealing
for peace both in Okinawa, where the war has not ended even after 60 years, and more
universally.

Roberson: Songs of War and Peace

187

There are a number of other recently produced songs that similarly recall Okinawan
experiences of war and repeat Okinawan desires for a peaceful existence at home andelsewhere, thereby also reminding us of the on-going local importance of such memories
and of struggles to achieve a less militarized and more peaceful present and future. In 2000,
Daiku Tetsuhiro recorded Okinawa Kagayake (Shining Okinawa; for more, see Roberson2009) that sings of a future, shining Okinawa, that has been able to put its past sorrows to
sleep and that will heal hearts and teach the world about peace. As the liner notes to thisCD point out, Okinawa Kagayake must be understood within, and as a positively phrased
and future-oriented statement of resistance against a political context in which the real,
foreseeable future of Okinawa as a “discarded stone” (sute-ishi) burdened with thecontinuing presence of American military bases appears likely to remain unchanged.
Although rarely overtly political the Nenes’ 1997 CD, Akemodoro Unai included a number ofsongs with peace as their theme. Among these were Heiwa no Ryūka (Ryūka of Peace; for avideo, look here) and Nasake Shirazuya (Heartless Bastards).22 The immediate context forthese songs includes the 1995 rape of a twelve-year old Okinawan girl by three US
servicemen and the renewed struggle in the 1990s to regain control of land occupied by U.S.
military bases (see Angst 2003; Inoue 2007). Sung in Japanese and set to a deceptively,
ironically, light electric guitar pop tune, Nasake Shirazuya calls on its listeners to live withmutually held compassion and excoriates Japanese politicians and America for forgetting
the past so easily and for being so uncaring about the lives of Okinawans, even fifty years
after the end of World War II. The refrain, repeated at the end, is: “50 years, 50 years// All
you who forget so quick and easy// You heartless bastards you.”
Like Kuroi Ame making reference to rain is Sora ga Shiranai Ame ga Futteita (A Rain the Sky
Knew Not Fell) included on a 2004 CD by Kamiya Chihiro.23 And, in 2001 the punk-rockband Mongol 800 recorded Song for You on their two million plus selling CD Message. Sung
in English, Song for You pleads for listeners not to repeat past mistakes and asks “howmany boys [will] be killed by fuckin’ wars.” It concludes with a positive vision not unlikethat in Okinawa Kagayake of Okinawa/the world as “Forever green. Forever blue/Neverend LOVE and PEACE and SONG.”24
The desires for peace sung of in these songs imagine Okinawa as a place where there are no
military bases and no crimes or accidents associated with them and their soldiers. Suchdesires make meaningful otherwise self-exoticizing, neo-romanticist recollections of ahalcyon Ryūkyūan past as well as dreams of a future Okinawa, which, sung of inuniversalistic terms, simultaneously allow for the creation of a space where it is possible toimagine peace in, of, and for Okinawa—and through Okinawa, the world. The particular,
obdurate histories and memories of war and military occupation in Okinawa are thus
related to future imaginings of a dreamlike, peaceful Okinawa. As such, while the shining
Okinawa that Daiku sings of may risk the construction of an Okinawa blind to its past, it
must simultaneously be heard as constituting a poetic site of resistance to experiences of
war and the continuing American military presence.
That such songs continue to be composed reflects (upon) the ongoing presence of the war
in Okinawa—in both individual and cultural memory, in physical marks left upon the land,
and in the continuing presence of the American military.25 Like other earlier songs, they notPutting Okinawa at the Center

188

only call for peace as a longed for future possibility or critically recollect past experiencesof war, but thereby also indict present conditions in Okinawa, whether indirectly, as
in Kuroi Ame or Okinawa Kagayake, or more forcefully as in Nasake Shirazuya or Song forYou. These songs thus act as sites of cultural resistance and by their continued creation,
recording and performance insert into the public sphere—both Okinawan and Japanese—
Okinawan memories of war and dreams of peace, significant because of the everyday traces
and presences of war, even after more than 60 years. As such, these songs require that welisten to them seriously.26
V—This Ain’t no Sideshow
Representing a larger corpus of songs in various musical genres, the songs introduced here
constitute a continuing feature of the Okinawan musical landscape. Viewed from thepresent, they may appear to compose a discordant set. Yet, as mnemonic sites and practices,
the creation and lyrical content of these songs reflect, resist and require an understandingof ongoing historical processes, contexts and events in Okinawa that compose fields ofexperience and identity characterized by unequal power relations.
Early songs reflect the dynamics and contradictions of assimilationist pressures anddesires that led Okinawans to participate, with whatever sadness on parting, in Japan’s
wars and empire building. Later songs give witness to personal and cultural ambivalences
and to the profound injuries suffered by Okinawans during the Battle of Okinawa. As aresult of their experiences in war, Okinawans have since that time sung of peace, first interms of a desired return to an originary peaceful homeland, then imagined in reference toreversion from American military control to the promise offered by Japan’s “Peace
Constitution.” More recent songs offer visions of a peaceful Okinawa shining for all togather warmth from or sharply criticize the powerful conjunction of self-serving Japaneseand American geo-politics in maintaining conditions in Okinawa that make such desired
peace a dream too long delayed by the everyday realities of continuing militarization.
Though as suggested by Kinjō Minoru’s LP/CD Jidai never complete, the postwar amnesia
constituted through the elision of wartime songs that index assimilationist Okinawancomplicity, like other forms of personal and cultural forgetting, is troubling. However, it
must also be understood in relation to the eclipsing, defining trauma of the Battle of
Okinawa and the continuing presence (with Japanese state support) of American militaryforces. While some might suggest that early wartime Okinawan songs that bear the lyricalmarkings of Japanese assimilationist and militarist control are largely and rightly forgotten(see Arakawa 1982: 7), this simultaneously reminds us that if social memories are“contextual, partial, and subject to self-interested manipulation and obfuscation” (Kenny
1999:425), they are also persistent and resistant to efforts at revision (Climo and Cattell
2002:5). There are, as Appadurai points out, limits to the debatability of the past, and this is
as true of Okinawan complicity as it is of the more pernicious attempts of the state to revise
if not falsify historical representations of the war (Appadurai 1981; see also Figal 1997;
Ishihara, et al. 2002; Yonetani 2000).
Furthermore, as Schwartz has pointed out in regard to contested Americancommemoration of the Vietnam War, “To remember is to place a part of the past in theservice of conceptions and needs of the present.” (Schwartz 1982:374). In Okinawa,Roberson: Songs of War and Peace

189

memories of the war given voice in song, like other practices and structures for meaning
making and in other contestations over commemoration, are part of ongoing struggles inwhich Okinawan identities are constructed in inter-relationship with Japanese andAmerican influences and forces. However, the needs of the present in Okinawa are here
also importantly composed with reference to visions of the future. Memories of the war,
including the dangers of memory undone, are thus linked both to present cultural andpolitical identity construction in Okinawa and to interrelated dreams of a future, peaceful
Okinawa free of wars and weapons.
Thus, while also speaking to historical complexities and contradictions, these Okinawan
songs of war and peace are important because—as George Lipsitz writes more broadly ofthe messages and products of popular culture in the introductory chapter to Time Passages,
entitled “Popular Culture: This Ain’t No Sideshow”—“[a]t their best…they retain memoriesof the past and contain hopes for the future that rebuke the injustices and inequities of thepresent” (1990:20).

James E. Roberson is Professor of Anthropology, Tokyo Jogakkan College. He is the authorof Japanese Working Class Lives: An Ethnographic Study of Factory Workers and (withNobue Suzuki) of Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan: Dislocating the Salaryman
Doxa. He wrote this article for The Asia-Pacific Journal.
Notes
1 Takahashi Miki (2010) has recently criticized Nakahodo Masanori, Kumada Susumu andme (Roberson 2003) for such focus. I make no apologies. I conversely suggest that atheoretical and a-political detailing of musical minutiae, however fascinating for fans andfetishists (including lay and academic “Okinawa freaks”), risks obscuring if not obfuscating
the broader cultural-political significance of musical production and practice, especially incomplexly contexted, marginalized and contested places such as Okinawa.
2 The key Ryūkyūan instrument, the sanshin is a three-stringed instrument derived fromthe Chinese sanxian and is a predecessor of the Japanese shamisen, see Kaneshiro (1997).
3 All translations into English are my own. Original lyrics from Kinjō Minoru, Jidai; Kinjō

Minoru: Senji-Sensō o Utau, BCY 20NCD-1002, 2002 (1981).

4 Translation based on Nakahodo 1988:152. Lyrics and music by Fukuhara Chōki. My

thanks to Fukuhara Ongaku Jimusho for permission to include this translation.

5 See: Chanpurū Shinguruzu Volume 2: (Sensō to Imin)—Heiwa no Negai, Toshiba EMI, TOCT

9552, 1996.

6 By 1940 some 42,252 Okinawans were resident in Osaka, another 11,426 in neighboring

Hyogo Prefecture. See Tomiyama (1990:254).

7 Such reluctance was also reflected in Okinawan migration abroad as a strategy not only to

improve their economic conditions but to avoid the military draft (Matsumura 2002:136;
on songs of Okinawan migration, see Roberson 2010b).

Putting Okinawa at the Center

190

8 Written by Higa Tsunetoshi and originally recorded in the mid 1970s. Translation basedon Matsumura (2002:162-6; see also “Okinawa o Dō Oshieru Ka” Henshūiinkai 2006:86-7;
Deigo Musume, Ketteiban: Deigo Musume Tokushū, Marufuku Records, ACD-3004, 1995.
9 Lyrics by Komune Saburō. Translation based on Radio Okinawa (1994:82).
10 There have been at least five major Japanese motion pictures about the Himeyuri

students, starting with Imai Tadashi’s 1953 Himeyuri no Tō (see: Nakae and Nakae
2000:154-75). Angst’s critique resonates with those of others: see Fujiwara (2001), Shima(1997).
11 Lyrics and music by Tsukayama Hiroyoshi. Tsukayama Hiroyoshi, Nuchi Du Takara—

Yomitansan Basha Muchā, Marufuku Records, CCF 83, 1995. My thanks to Bise Katsu ofCampus Records for permission to include this translation.
12 For more on sites of war memorialization, see Figal (2003).

13 This translation based on Yamazato Yuki Natsukashiki Kōkyō, Nafin VICG-6009, 1998.
14 Kina Shoukichi & Champloose, Akainko, Nippon Columbia, COCA-15326, 1998; Koja

Misako, Kuroi Ame, Disc Milk DM006, 2005.

15 Lyrics and music by Fukuhara Chōki. This translation based on Yamazato

Yuki Natsukashiki Kōkyō. My thanks to Fukuhara Ongaku Jimusho for permission to include
this translation.
16 Noborikawa Seijin, Howling Wolf, Omagatoki, OMCA-9001, 1998. For the story behind

this song, see Noborikawa (2002:194-7).

17 Versions may be found on Kina Shoukichi and Champloose, In Love, Toshiba EMI TOCT-

6688, 1992, and Noborikawa Seijin, Spiritual Unity, Respect Record RES-45, 2001.

18 For more on Yu-Yu-Yu see Roberson (2003:192-227). Begin, Begin no Shima-uta:

Omototakeo 2, Teichiku Entertainment TECN-20798, 2002. Thanks to Shirota Chika forreminding me of this song.
19 Tamaki Kazumi, Tinin, Akabana, APCD 1003, 1997. Lyrics by Heija Nami, music by

Fukuhara Tsuneo. My thanks to Fukuhara Ongaku Jimusho for permission to include thistranslation.
20 The original reads, “Yagati uhizamutu muduru urisa,” implying the return of a child to thesafety of a parent’s care.

21 Translation of main verses by Kurota Nagisa, included in liner notes to Koja

Misako, Kuroi Ame, Disk Milk DM006, 2005. Translation of interlude by the author.
22 Nenes, Akemodoro Unai, Antinos Records, ARCJ 69, 1997. The liner notes to the westernrelease of this CD weakly translate this as “You are Inhumane.” I prefer the more direct“Heartless Bastards,” though here “bastards” is conversely perhaps too strong for theJapanese “shirazuya.”
23 Kamiya Chihiro, Tinjāra, Campus, MYCD 35013, 2004.

Roberson: Songs of War and Peace

191

24 Mongol 800, Message, Highwave, HICC-1201, 2001.
25 Medoruma (2005) thus questions the correctness of talking about the “postwar” period

in Okinawa.

26 An anonymous reviewer of a prior version of this paper (Roberson 2009) objects that thesongs discussed in this paper must be seen as commodities produced by a massive musicindustry, and that their potential as vehicles of resistance is thus reduced to being “facile
deployments of cultural memory.” The reviewer is also “tired of every gesture being
valorized in cultural studies analyses as a form of resistance.” I understand the need to be
cautious about the culture industry and reading everything as resistance. However, I also
believe that it is dangerous to deny a priori the critical political significance of popular
cultural production, particularly that by people who have been or are subjects ofcolonialism and imperialism. This is especially true in the case of Okinawa, where such
resistance has been given voice for over 60 years in music and in other forms of culturaland political protest—including ongoing anti-war and anti-base movements andsentiments that in 2010 continue to intervene into US-Japan-Okinawan relationships andexercises of power.
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Tomiyama, Ichirō (1990) Kindai Nippon Shakai to “Okinawajin”: “Nipponjin” ni naru to iu
koto (Modern Japanese Society and “Okinawans”: Becoming “Japanese”). Tokyo: Nippon
Keizai Hyōronsha.
---- (1995) Senjō no Kioku (Memories of the Battlefield). Tokyo: Nippon Keizai Hyōronsha.

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195---- (1998) “The Critical Limits of the National Community: The Ryukyuan Subject.” Social
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---- (2005) On Becoming ‘a Japanese’: The Community of Oblivion and Memories of theBattlefield. The Asia-Pacific Journal.
Uehara, Naohiko (1982) “Shōwa ni Fukubaru Bushiari” (Fukubaru Songs in the Shōwa
Period). Aoi Umi 109:206-8.
---- (1986) Katayabira Shimauta (Talking about Folksongs). Naha: Naha Shuppansha.

---- (2005) "On Becoming 'a Japanese': The Community of Oblivion and Memories of theBattlefield." The Asia-Pacific Journal.
Wagner-Pacifici, Robin and Barry Schwartz (1991) “The Vietnam Veterans Memorial:
Commemorating a Difficult Past.” American Journal of Sociology 97(2):376-420.
Yelvington, Kevin A. (2002) “History, Memory and Identity: A Programmatic
Prolegomenon.” Critique of Anthropology 22(3): 227-56.
Yonetani, Julia (2000) “On the Battlefield of Mabuni: Struggles over Peace and the Past inContemporary Okinawa.” East Asian History20:145-68.
Yoshida, Kensei. (2010). Okinawa and Guam: In the Shadow of U.S. and Japanese. The AsiaPacific Journal.
Yoshizawa, Naomi (2004) “Watashi no Jōtō Yaibin Vol. 5 ‘Kuroi Ame’” The Bang 4:3.

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Dances of Memory, Dances of Oblivion: The Politics of Performance in Contemporary
Okinawa
Christopher T. Nelson
March 18, 2013
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Christopher_T_-Nelson/3916
As in Roberson’s analysis of popular songs, Christopher T. Nelson shows how memories of
war shape popular culture in Okinawa today—in Nelson’s case in the context ofcommunity-based dance performances known as eisā. Today eisā is the most widespread
and widely recognized community activity practiced in contemporary Okinawa. The Koza
Riot that Nelson refers to occurred during the evening of December 20-21, 1970, in what
was then a red light district caering primarily to American military personnel outside
Kadena Air Force Base. The rioting was precipitated by an incident in which a car driven by
an intoxicated American soldier struck an Okinawan man. Efforts by U.S. Military Police toextricate the soldier in question sparked eight hours of street fighting between hundreds of
MPs and thousands of local Okinawan residents, resulting in dozens of injuries and largescale property damage. Most observers interpreted the Koza Riot as an expression ofwidespread simmering resentment among the local population against the U.S. militarypresence.
Nelson teases out the sociocultural significance of eisā in Okinawa today using an interest
technique. Through observations and comments obtained as a participant the Sonoda
Seinenkai (literally, Sonoda youth association), an eisā group based in near the site of the1970 riot and through detailed descriptions of how the group performs eisā and what thisfeels like subjectively, Nelson is able to show how eisā performance constitutes a culturalprocess that connects history, social structure, and community. In Nelson’s interpretation
eisā performs a dual function in contemporary Okinawa. It serves as a communal
mechanism for transcending the pain caused by memories of war and it acts as a medium
for reproducing local community and local identity. In this sense, the dance form is both aproduct of Okinawa’s distinctive historical trajectory and reinforces and sustains that
trajectory into the future, making it difficult to overstate the significance of this now iconic
cultural form.

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Dances of Memory, Dances of Oblivion: The Politics of Performance in Contemporary
Okinawa
Christopher T. Nelson
The Burden of the Past
In Okinawa, as perhaps anywhere else, the past exists uneasily alongside the present. It canpass unnoticed, occasionally rising for a moment of recognition, slipping away again under
the weight of the routine tasks of daily life. And like the unexploded bombs that still lie
close to the surface of the Okinawan landscape, it can erupt into the present, casting its
shadow over a future not yet experienced. Memories, wrenching and traumatic, can tear
the fabric of the everyday, plunging those who experience them into despair and evenmadness. They haunt the present with their melancholy demands for repression, making
their presence known in the prohibitions that they have engendered.1

Photo 1: A Street in Koza

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Photo 2: New Shopping Center in Urasoe

Performing, Remembering, Becoming
I spent every evening during the summer of 1998 at the Sonda Community Center in
Okinawa City, about a mile or so south of the point where the Koza Riot began. As I had
done the summer before, I joined dozens of men and women [of the Sonda Seinenkai—theyouth group discussed in the pages that follow] in the pounded clay courtyard as they
prepared to dance eisā. I joined them as a visitor, a student and a friend, struggling to learnsomething of the way that Okinawans came to grips with a past that weighed so heavily on
the present. In fields and parking lots across central Okinawa, thousands of young
Okinawan men and women practice eisā throughout the summer, preparing for threenights of dancing during obon—the festival of the dead.

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In recent years, many scholars
have worked to understand thepolitics of remembrance in
Okinawa.2 However, little
attention has been paid to eisā,the most widespread modalityof public memorative practicein the islands. As my friends
often told me, eisā wasnecessary so that they could
respond to the demands anddesires of their ancestral
spirits, to the hundreds ofthousands who were killedduring the war. Eisā is danced
to escort the spirits of the deadfrom their tombs back to their
Photo 3: Sonda Community Center
homes and to entertain themduring obon. To narrate andembody the history of impoverished Okinawan courtiers sent down from the capital. To
express and sustain the pride and honor of these neighborhoods, the power and theartistry of the dancers. To create and share karī, the gift of happiness and belonging
produced in performance,
necessary for life.
Okinawa City was still abase town, its crowded
neighborhoods of concretebuildings clustered along
the fence of Kadena Air Baselike a coral reef. And yet, thenumbers of Marines andairmen in the streets havebeen reduced by new
regulations imposed by theircommands and others havebeen encouraged to stay onbase by the escalation inanti-base
Photo 4: Koza’s Sonda Street
demonstrations. In recent
years, the once-thriving baseeconomy has collapsed as a result of the loss of dollars spent by servicement on R&R
during or after combat in Korea or Vietnam, the long slide of the dollar against the yen, as
well as the construction of on-base communities that claim the GI dollars once spent in
Okinawa City. Row after row of buildings thrown up in the frenzy of a Vietnam era boom
are now falling to ruin, the bar district is quiet, prostitution has virtually disappeared—

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Filipina and Russian women are now working in the bars that remain. Most Japanese
tourists avoid Okinawa City, preferring the resort hotels of Onna and the southern islands,
the shopping malls and nightclubs in Mihama. The bases remain, dominating the Okinawanlandscape, a staging area for wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a beachhead held against
dreams of developing central Okinawa in other ways.3
After the Pacific War, this areaof uninhabited wooded hillocks
and swampy lowlands was
settled by impoverished
former Ryūkyūan courtiers
who had lived in Nishizato, afarming village several miles tothe west. Their homes had
been destroyed in the Battle of
Okinawa, their land confiscatedin the construction of Kadena
Air Base.4 They were joined bydisplaced or unemployedfarmers from all over central
and northern Okinawa,
workers from Kyûshû andAmami Ōshima, as well aslaborers from other outlying
islands. While they worked in
the American bases that now
dominated the island or in thecities that were quickly
constructed around them, theybuilt this crowded
neighborhood of narrow
streets and small wooden or concrete houses. At its center stood the community center,surrounded by a group of massive family tombs.
In many ways, the community center echoes the space of the tomb. Before the war,
dancers and musicians from Nishizato gathered on summer evenings in the courtyards ofthe crypts that lay on the edge of their hamlet. Night after night, they danced and sangbefore the spirits of their ancestors, practicing for the day that would bring eisā again to thestreets of their villages and the courtyards of their homes. Pleasurable and demanding,away from the fields where they labored each day, from the discipline of the home, fromthe regulation of the state, resisting the pressure and the lure of labor migration to themainland or the South Pacific. In the company of their friends and the spirits of theirancestors, farmers and laborers became dancers and musicians.
Those tombs and villages are gone. The material presence of the ancestors, so
painstakingly ordered and attended by their families, was fragmented and dispersed—
destroyed along with many of the lives of those who memorated them. For those who

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survived, relationships with ancestral spirits were too precious to lose, obligations to thedead too great to ignore. Rebuilding the tombs and recollecting the ancestors was one of
the first priories of Okinawan households in the postwar reconstruction. However, tombs
and household altars are not the only places in which the spatial fields of the ancestors
were reinstalled. The community center itself has been a site of repeated daily labor tosituate and recall the dead. It is a space that is filled with the creative activity of dancers
who struggle to express their desire to understand—and to change—the world aroundthem.
Virtually every inch of available wall space is covered with the graphic traces of Sonda’s
past. Banners commemorating their victories in competitions. Row after row of framed
photographs showing generations of dancers. Certificates noting the youth group’s
performances in decades of annual eisā competition in Okinawa City and their appearances
throughout Japan. Letters of appreciation from prominent Japanese politicians, performers
and admiring fans. Images that organize powerful constellations of gender, work andcreativity.
The oldest picture, a framed black and white group photograph above the door shows agroup of men, lean and sunburned, staring gravely at the camera. They are dressed in
short, working kimono and wearing farmers’ woven conical hats. One or two men
hold sanshin—the Okinawan shamisen—and several drums are lined up in theforeground. These are the first dancers to come together to dance eisā after the war. In theearly 1950s, Kohama Shuei, a well-known musician as well as a member of one of theleading families in the area, gathered the young men of the neighborhood together in theQuonset hut that served as their community center. Together they worked to master not
only the steps and the songs of the eisā, but the style that marked the performances during
the festival of the dead in the streets of Nishizato, their lost village. In central Okinawa,
only young men of noble ancestry had been allowed to participate in eisā, and then onlywith the groups from their natal communities. Until Shuei decided to resume the dance
after the war, it was inconceivable that outsiders would be allowed to join. Over theobjections of many of his neighbors, Shuei broke with tradition. He not only allowed but
encouraged all the young men to dance. If the disparate group that had come together in
his neighborhood were to survive the aftermath of the war, he was sure that they would
need eisā.

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Faded color photographs showthat women have joined thegroup by the late 1950s or
early 1960s. The decision toeliminate gender as well asclass restrictions seems to beboth principled andpragmatic. Kohama said that
he and his friends weregrateful for the contribution of
women to the life of thecommunity, their work andtheir sacrifice. At the same time,they thought that the additionof women would add to thecomplexity of the dance andwould certainly appeal to theaudiences at public
performances.

The clothing of the dancers
also changed. When they were
all déclassé nobles, they
proudly wore the modest
kimono of the farming village
where their families wereborn. When participation in
the seinenkai was opened toeveryone, noble or commoner,
native or outsider, men began
to wear the garb of a stylized
Photo 5: Kohama Shuei
Okinawan samurai, women theequally stylized kimono of rural
farmers. Kohama Shuei told me that he and his friends were inspired to select costumes
that would help the young men and women of the neighborhood to create a dramatic
impression on the audience and judges at performances. One cannot help but notice thepowerful representations of gender and class in these images, in contrast to the conditionsof Okinawan daily life. To imagine the attraction that representations of strong, handsome
Ryūkyūan warriors had for a cook at a base club or a servant in an American household; tothink of the possibilities that a graceful, laughing rural dancer presented to a maid at acheap hotel or a prostitute in a crowded club. What seems to be a gendered assignment ofclass also speaks to the history of the community: men’s martial attire evokes theremembered world of the Ryūkyūan Court; women’s simple yet elegant kimono references
the rural villages where déclassé nobles labored to build new lives.

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At the same time, these costumes were not simple representations of the Okinawan past;rather they were selected from the most popular plays and dances of the Okinawan
theater—the Uchinā Shibai. It was in Okinawan popular theater—a genre also suppressedby the Japanese colonial authorities—that performers could move effortlessly from a
tragedy depicting court intrigues and martial prowess to a romanticized peasant dance.
Thus, costumes not only referred to favorite images and idealized qualities of the past; theyalso suggested the protean expressiveness of theatrical performance. However, intransforming themselves, dancers also opened themselves to the judgment of the audiencegathered for performances: an appropriated image could only be maintained if the dancers
demonstrated that they were deserving of it.
The images displayed in the community center are important elements in mediating thetransmission of the varying versions of the seinenkai’s past. They provide visual linkages
between the interior space of the building and other people, places and events distributed
over space and time. Traces of other moments, graphic reminders that figure practices ofrecollection, for the storytelling that is as much a part of eisā as the dance.
Outside, the members of the seinenkai prepared for rehearsal—just as they did every
evening during the three months preceding obon. Most of the dancers came to practicedirectly from work. From the dress of the members of the youth group, it was clear that
Sonda was a working class neighborhood. A majority of the young men werein sagyōfuku. Baggy, calf-length trousers in vivid pastel colors, white t-shirts, towels
knotted around their heads. High school boys still in school uniforms: black trousers andwhite shirts. The remaining young men were dressed in current hip-hop fashion: shiny
sweats, baggy denim shorts or pants, large, blocky sneakers, oversized jerseys: Fubu,
Mecca, the Japanese National soccer team.
Young women in fashionably tight blouses with wide collars and flared pants. A few inmatching knee-length skirts and vests, the uniforms of local banks and offices. None of thehigh school girls still wore their school uniforms. Younger girls in wide-leg jeans, clunky,
thick-soled sneakers or sandals, undersized military T-shirts. Style means attention todetail: the right jewelry, wristwatch, hairstyle, colored contacts.
The jikata—sanshin musicians— sat at the front, tuning their instruments and warming up
their voices. Dancers removed their cellular phones, pagers, watches, lighters, cigarette
packs and wallets, leaving them on windowsills and along the steps. Everyone filed down
onto the watered clay surface of the courtyard.

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Dancers came to thecommunity center to play, but
it is a form of play that has its
costs. The dancers have
shrugged off many of the moreconventional chances forrecreation that contemporary
Japanese society offers, even in
Okinawa. They have—if only
for the moment—refused the
distractions of mass culture, of
television, bars, games, parks
and films. Although they may
dance side by side with theyoung men or women—neighbors, coworkers orclassmates—who they might
Photo 6: Jikata
otherwise date, they havedeferred the opportunity to doso.5 At the same time, they have refused certain kinds of work: more profitable
employment in the dense urban areas of Naha or Urasoe, mainland Japan or America; laborin the remaining bars or brothels, nightclubs and snacks of nearby Nakanomachi. They
cannot meet the demands of employers for overtime, for different hours, for selflessdevotion to their jobs. For the most part, they have also turned their backs on university
education and intellectual labor. The dancers have also sacrificed one of the most treasured
goals of a worker—sleep. The toll taken on laboring bodies is inescapable, but sleep offersa daily refuge from work, a chance to recover one’s strength, to heal. Perhaps even theopportunity to dream. Instead they commit themselves to hours of arduous anddemanding activity that, until the recent popularization of Okinawan performing arts,
marked them as hooligans and lowlifes.
Standing in the courtyard, the drummers—all men—adjusted the carriage of theirinstruments and dancers shifted their bodily hexis to that of the dance. The male dancers
lowered their hips, turned their knees out and sank into a wide stance. Head up, shoulders
back, hands on hips, a look of quiet confidence on their faces. Women stood, feet together,legs and back straight, hands at their hips, faintly smiling. The men’s position is hard; thewomen more relaxed.6 Older members moved through the formation, physically correcting
the dancers.
To the front, the jikata counted out the beat and drove into Nandaki Bushi—The Ballad of
the Southern Grove—the first song of the eleven pieces that make up their eisā. With thesimultaneous sound of fifty drums being struck, the dance began. The song is sung in
unison, the lyrics in Okinawan. For twenty minutes or more, the songs continue and thedancers dance. Women work to make the stately grace of the dance seem effortless. Alongwith the male dancers, their performance draws heavily on Okinawan folk and classicalgenres, creating the figure that organizes the eisā, elegant and controlled. The drummers

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dance a counterpoint to this. Leaping and turning, beating out a rhythm that is sometimes
straight, sometimes syncopated, they struggle to maintain Sonda’s reputation of speed andphysicality. Dancers whose bodies are already exhausted and injured from long hours ofharsh, physical labor. Dancers for whom this evening’s exertions are a respite before
another day of work. Sweat from the dancers splashes the ground—some people say that if
you scratch away the clay, it’s salt all the way down to the roofs of the tombs at the bottomof the hill.
A 2010 performance of Sonda Seinenkai:here.
Their performance conjures
the account of a journey,assembled and sung fromnarratives of the past. A
complex secondary genre, eisāis a cycle of narratives thatrecount the diaspora of the
Ryūkyūan nobility that began
in the 19th Century, their
impoverishment and exile tothe mountainous northern
forests, their struggle to returnto the capital once more. Eachof the songs narrates theexperiences of a particulartime and place where theformer nobles lived along their
Photo 8: Dancing at the Community Center
journey. Some are songs thatwere composed during theperiod that they represent; others are later representations of that time and place. With
their own particular chronotopes, their own narrative organization of space and time, thesongs are bound together by the formal structure and the performative production of thedance. All are woven together, harmonized in performance by the powerful rhythm of thedrums that opens the dance. Eisā’s heartbeat, say the dancers. These songs also fitted
together by the similar stylistics of the dance: stepping and spinning, first clockwise, thencounterclockwise. The understated, graceful movement of the women that demonstrates
the influence of Okinawan traditional dance. The way that shimedaiko—the small, handheld drums—are extended at arms length by the men, then swung in dramatic underhandarcs.
The initial songs are elegiac narratives of the past, narrating what could be called
Ryukyuan mythic time—a powerful fusion of time and space. Even the titles of the songs—
Nandaki Bushi, Chunjun Nagari and Kudaka7 rejecting dutiful labor and the submission toauthority in favor of creative performances, drinking and romantic celebrations. Dancers
create narratives of uncommodified sexuality and personal choice in the time that theymight otherwise spend in bars and clubs. Who is to say which is more real or more
fulfilling? At the same time, the moments recreated in the performance suggest that theirPutting Okinawa at the Center

206

determination has a cost. Autonomy has its bounds, and desire cannot always befulfilled. A powerful tension emerges in the performance—the tension between hope andloss.
Like the voices heard in thesesongs, the dancers face theconsequences of their dance—
fatigue, disappointment,
sacrifice of opportunities formaterial advancement. Still,they throw themselves into themoment. Determined to masterthe most forceful strikes, themost furious arcs of the drums,
the most spectacular spins.
Dreaming that they will equal
the forms of the past, adding
something new, something of
their own creation. Hence thelead jikata's comment, "Unless
you decide that you're going to
Photo 9: Women Dancing Eisaa
try to do this better thaneveryone else, your dancing
will never amount to anything!" Close to exhaustion, their voices hoarse, uniforms
dripping with sweat, they conclude the dance with an exultant burst of energy.
Eisā speaks in many voices. Of course, it calls out to the audience present—friends andfamily, ancestral spirits, tourists. It speaks to others as well, absent parents, companions
and lovers, drawing on the captured speech of singers represented by jikata of long ago. It
would also be possible to think of another level of address: the singer speaks to herself in
her words and her actions, repeating again and again these narratives of what she can do,of who she is. Through this repetition, the singers bring the world of eisā, the world of thework into themselves, into their everyday lives.
Dancers are determined to transform themselves from the young men and women whobegan learning the eisā together into those who are fully capable of the dance. To become
those who are able to produce karī. Describing it as a gift of happiness and belonging, myfriends have told me that karī is essential to life. As performers, it is their responsibility tocreate karī and “attach” it to their relatives, their friends and neighbors. Karī strengthens
and renews the bond between the living, the ancestral spirits, and those yet to be born. Ineisā, the dancers draw upon their aesthetic, productive powers to recollect and recreate thevery relationships that make life worth living, in which the living and the dead can join eachother in happiness. Chura nashun, people say—to make beautiful. In the moment of thedance, filled with the complex patterns described by their bodies in movement, their voices
raised in song, the rhythm measured out by their drums, they create place and a time ofbeauty.

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The cycle of songs eschews any direct reference to the abjection, the horror of the eras thatthey depict—although minyō [folk songs] that take up these themes certainly exist.
Nonetheless any reference to the past always carries the charged ambiguity of a beauty
underwritten by the memory of pain and loss, a joy tempered by sadness and despair. The
beauty of the performances begun by Kohama Shuei and his friends was driven by the needto renew life in a shattered world. The dancers who still gather to learn and to perform theeisā know this well. How can it be completely forgotten in the dance?
They demonstrate that they have the courage to put aside memories of horror andabjection, to allow these inescapable fears and anxieties to slip into a kind of oblivion
during the performance. In the courtyard of the community center, in the space soakedwith the sweat of generations of dancers, they create something of beauty in the shadow of
the horrors of the past. This is why today’s dancers no longer need to be of noble
ancestry. They have learned to do the things in practice that were once the exclusive
provenance of those of noble birth. Hour after hour, night after night, they have developed
the skill and artistry to dance the eisā, to create karī, to rebuild what has been broken, tomake a place for the living and the dead in the world that they have been given.
Dancing in the Street
It was the night of September 4, 1998—ūkui, the third and final night of obon. We hadalready been dancing through the narrow streets and alleys of Sonda for several hours.
Women in indigo kimono, men in the attire of Ryūkyūan warriors—dressed to convey theimages of generations of dancers lining the walls of the community center. For the last
three nights, we had covered what seemed to be every road, every path in theneighborhood. We had entertained the spirits of the dead who had returned to their homes
and accepted the hospitality and the gifts of the households and businesses that we visited.
I was exhausted. My left hand was stiff from carrying my drum and the heavy calluses
lining my fingers had begun to tear away. My right shoulder ached from an old injury. Toomuch drinking, too little sleep. It was much the same with everyone else. Around me,
dancers and drummers—particularly the veteran performers—favored damaged knees
and shoulders, struggled with increasingly painful back injuries. The everyday world oflabor exacts a price from those who struggle to escape its regulation; or perhaps I should
say that those who do so are painfully reminded of the price already paid by all who labor.
Although everyone was clearly exhausted, enthusiasm crackled through the formation. It
was nearly time for ōrāsē—a fight between neighboring seinenkai. Older members often
spoke of the violent clashes with other groups that marked the eisā of earlier years. Rocksand bottles were thrown from the audience; groups might even attack one another withheavy bamboo staffs or lash out with fists. Now the battle was waged with sanshin anddrums, with dancing bodies and raised voices.
Sonda Seinenkai street performance on the final day of Obon, August 2011 here
Soon, the long column of our dancers emerged into the brightly lit arc of a dingy bar district
just south of Sonda. Passing their open doors of a tiny club, I felt a sour blast of dank airfrom the air-conditioned interior. I was breathing hard, my chest pounding with fatigue,
feeling what I feared was my last surge of adrenaline. Far back in the formation, I couldPutting Okinawa at the Center

208

hear a muted call and response from the dancers. One of the men was shouting out
something, lost in the pounding of the drums; the women, their voices keen in
response. Give us some sake! Ahead of us, our banner bobbed up and down as the standard
bearer danced to the rhythm of the drums.
Thousands of spectators of allages thronged the streets. They
parted before us as we
advanced, pressing up against
the walls and storefronts. The
spectators laughed and waved,
children darting through ourformation as we advanced.
People come together in thesestreets—people that would be
unlikely to associate underother circumstances. Not just
locals, but Okinawans andmainland Japanese from acrossa broad spectrum of classes,
American soldiers from thebases. Tourists, scholars,
Photo 10: Sonda Seinenkai Dancing During Obon
performers,
broadcasters. Older members
gently remind spectators to keep back and moved aside those who ignored their warnings.
The sanshin continued to repeat the same droning figure and we followed the standard
bearer deeper and deeper into the bar district. Then, on a signal from the jikata, thestandard was lifted high, and everything stopped. People rushed at us from all sides.
Elderly bar owners hurried their hostesses into the street, carrying trays full of glasses of
iced oolong tea or awamori to us. Reporters from local radio stations moved in to question
cooperative looking dancers. Cameramen moved up and down the ranks. Tourists asked
to join the dancers in photos. Local merchants signaled to older members, formallyhanding them envelopes bearing offerings or asking for dancers to enter their clubs forbrief performances. The offerings were accepted; the requests were politely declined. Now
was not the time for distractions—ōrāsē was only moments away.
The crowd before us literally seethed. For the past decade or so, eisā has been growing in
popularity and tourists throng to performances throughout Okinawa. This is also true of
performances in the mainland; however, an eisā festival in the Okinawan community inOsaka has been riven by controversy. Local activists encouraged young men and women todance in order to develop their pride in being Okinawan. They also hoped that the dance
would be a source of pride to older members of the community who have suffered fromJapanese prejudice throughout their lives–stigmatized as dirty, primitive, meniallaborers. In many ways, their eisā was an enormous success: thousands of people comeeach year to watch the performances. However, the presence of so many aggressive
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enduring years of discrimination, they were unwilling to publicly participate inperformances that identified them as Okinawans before a Japanese audience, regardless ofany putatively positive valuation. At the same time, the insistent clamoring of tourists tojoin the dance has created other problems. For activists such as Kinjō Kaoru, the festival
has become yet another occasion for Japanese tourists to demonstrate the colonizer’s
thoughtless appropriation of the most intimate practices of the colonized, the insolent
consumer’s unconstrained desire. As he bitterly reflected, any Japanese who honestly
respected Okinawan culture should simply stay away. 8
Sonda has been subjected to the same flood of visitors. Mainland tourists come to Sonda
throughout the summer, but their numbers swell during the days of obon and the festivalthat follows. The members of the seinenkai anticipate these visits and are prepared to deal
with their nearly overwhelming numbers. During performances, volunteers direct trafficand control tourist presence, keeping them out of the way of the dancers and insisting thatthey not interfere with local residents. While never quite extended the warm embrace of
belonging that they might hope for, tourists are treated as guests, with kindness andrespect. The dancers allow them to beat on the drums after practice, seat them at tables in
the kôminkan [public hall], offer them food and drink, entertain their questions, include
them in conversations, even teach them to dance. Moments such as this are opportunities
for the dancers to demonstrate their confidence and their pride in their dance.
Iha Masakazu, the charismatic young leader of the seinenkai, told me that members of the
youth group dance for many reasons: to be with their friends, to carry on a family tradition,
to show respect for their ancestors. Still, he said that the most important reason is to be
seen.9 Most of the members spend their working hours in garages, buses, technical schools,
grocery stores, hotel lobbies, restaurant kitchens and shop counters. They long to be seen
as something else, and in the images of the past and present members of the seinenkai thatline the kôminkan, they have an object for their longing.
When these young men and women perform in the streets of Sonda, on the fieldsurrounded by thousands of spectators at the Zentô Eisā Matsuri [All-Island Eisā Festival],
before a busload of mainland high school students, they know that they will not only beseen, but they will be seen as powerful, dynamic dancers of the Sonda Eisā. Time and timeagain members have told me of the pride, the pleasure and the sense of duty that they feel
when they are seen in this way, seen by their friends and family, their ancestral spirits,
Japanese tourists and American spectators.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

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This confidence is reflected in
the equal treatment that theyaccord to their visitors. Youngtourists and aging
schoolteachers, native
ethnologists and professional
performing artists, well-known
athletes and televisionpersonalities all seem to begiven the same consideration.
However, this does not seem tobe an attempt to flatten social
distinction. The courtesies
extended to guests in Sonda
acknowledge the importance of
these visitors. As Iha himself
wrote in a collection of essays
Photo 10: Sonda Seinenkai Television Interview
about eisā: “we dance the eisāholding in our hearts the ideathat each one of our viewers is our judge. What’s more, we are committed to show them aperformance that will live up to the expectations that they have for the Sondaeisā.”10 Without diminishing themselves, dancers acknowledge that their guests possess the
skill and knowledge to make valid aesthetic judgements. This is an important element in
the construction of the work: it enables the dancers to appropriate their audience in thesame way that Kinjō feared that spectators in Taishō-ku would appropriate theperformance.
The youth group from neighboring Kubota approached us from the end of the street,pushing through the crowd like an icebreaker. As they moved closer, the sounds of theirperformance filled the silence that we had created. Finally, they halted when they were no
more than ten yards to our front. A space opened between us, and the standard bearers ofboth groups stepped into the opening, lifting and shaking the huge flags as the crowd
roared. Without waiting for Kubota to be completely prepared, our jikata played theopening notes of Chunjun Nagari. Ōrāsē had begun. We all struck our drums in unison—thesound was tremendous. Kubota had also begun, their version of Chunju Nagari echoing
seconds behind our own. For a moment, I worried about the distraction of their competing
melody, feared being drawn away from our rhythm. But there was no time for that kind ofconcern—the dance demanded my whole attention. Every moment had to demonstratepride, poise, perfection.
The crowd was joining us too—long wailing whistles, shouted responses. I glimpsed anelderly man dancing in a doorway, the eisā of decades ago. The responses of the women
behind me, sharp and strong. The dancers next to me, behind and in front of me, matchingme in every move, perfectly synchronized. How can I describe their expressions—rapturous? I could no longer hear Kubota at all, I couldn’t see anything beyond the front of
our formation. There was no time, no space for anything but the dance. The repetitions ofNelson: Dances of Memory, Dances of Oblivion

211

the figures of the dance came effortlessly. I felt as if I was hitting the drum harder than I
ever had before, stepping higher, swinging the drum in powerful arcs. We danced throughthe cycle of songs, then repeated it again.
We all began to push forward. Our columns collapsed until we were all standing shoulderto-shoulder, beating the drums furiously. Behind us, the men and women dancers moved
forward as well, adding their voices and their clapping to the dance. I’d lost all track of
Kubota. Their standard bearer and ours circled each other, bobbing and leaping in thespace between groups. The tempo increased, the sanshin booming and percussive. We
pressed forward, hammering away as if we could physically drive them back with theintensity of our drumming. I was blinded with sweat, my arms ached with the effort. I was
beginning to worry that I couldn’t go on any further when I noticed Iha whistling andwaving us forward as he danced with the standard. Dancers from both groups set theirdrums on the ground and leaped into the space between the formations. More and more
dancers joined—two first year members rushed past me, one on the other’s shoulders.
The jikata shifted to a different version of the standard Tooshindoi—The Chinese Treasure
Ship Has Come—moving from the driving, percussive rhythms of eisā to a folk style thatshowcased their speed and agility. And as quickly as the tempo and the style of theperformance changed, the feeling of conflict slipped away. Everyone from Kubota andSonda came together, men and women, laughing and dancing. Everyone wasshouting Kachāshī! Kachāshī! Tourists were being pulled from the crowd into thestreet. The dancers offered them their drums, demonstrated gestures, drew them into thedance. Many of the tourists hesitated, laughing nervously; others rushed to join in, waving
their arms in imitation of kachāshī, the ecstatic dance that ends every performance. Taking
up the bachi and the drums that dancers handed to them, they tried to strike up a rhythm of
their own.
One of the former leaders of the seinenkai told me that he loved ōrāsē, the chance to put
Sonda’s skill and artistry on the line in front of an audience, to confront a rival group andshow them exactly what they could do. However, he said that the violence that once went
along with ōrāsē ruined the moment. Everyone in Sonda was proud of being tough, he said,
but a lot of other people in Okinawa were tough too. However, there wasn’t anyone else
who could dance like Sonda. Violence detracted from the performance, diminished theiraccomplishments. What’s more, it made enemies in the neighboring communities thatshould have been brought together by the dance. In the current performance of eisā,dancers like Iha have found a way to bring neighbors together while still demonstrating thebeauty of their dance.
Once, after a long and demanding practice, I asked several of the older dancers why they
still performed. Zukeran Masahide—one of the most active older members and a colorfuljikata—answered without hesitation: “We still have to put the world back together.” This
is what the dancers work together to create. In the streets where Okinawans have laboredfor decades, running bars and shops that cater to American G.I.s and Japanese tourists. In
the streets lined with faltering businesses, with Naha-based banks and mainland
convenience stores, where young men and women from the neighborhood are waitresses
and clerks, parking lot attendants and idlers. In the streets that are the lines ofPutting Okinawa at the Center

212

communication for the American bases, where Japanese and American strategic decisions
are executed, along which troops and supplies are moved. In the streets where Okinawans
once rioted against American oppression, burning vehicles, beating their occupants,
storming the gates of the base.
In these streets, the spectators and performers come together, linked in the productionof karī. As I have suggested, this is not simply the distribution of good fortune but thecreation of a network of relationships that includes the performers, the diverse group of
Okinawans and mainland Japanese, the spirits of the dead. In this place, once built by thelabor of their ancestors, a moment is created for them once again. Through the beauty ofthe performance, the stylish self-presentation of the dancers, the pain and sacrifice, theartistry and expressiveness of the dance, ancestral spirits are gathered from their homes
and entertained once more. They are given the gift of the eisā before leaving again to
return to their tombs, to the other world, to the places where they are believed to dwell
until they return again. Memories of every other performance, every other obon are drawn
into the constellation—the ancestral spirits are shown that the dance that they worked so
hard to create is still vibrant. Eisā is not just repeated without change from year to year, it
is transformed to honor the legacy of the past and to meet the demands of the present. This
is why the peaceful resolution of the ōrāsē is so important: in the place where there has
been war, suffering and death, a struggle can be resolved peacefully, a victory can be won
without loss, a conflict can end in friendship.
This is why the presence of outsiders is so critical to the creation of the work. It cannot bethat the painful burden of the past is easier to bear in Okinawa City than it is in Osaka. Eisāis danced in fields where battles once raged and where other ways of life were destroyed,in streets that bear the material signs of colonial subjugation, poverty and militaryoccupation, prostitution and menial labor. Before spectators whose class and ethnicity has
long dominated the lives of the dancers. And yet, they have found a tremendous resourcein other memories, in other formulations of the past. They are able to draw on all of theirperformances of eisā, on year after year, mile after mile danced in the courtyard of thekōminkan and the streets of Okinawa City; at festivals in Naha and throughout Okinawa; atExpo ’70 in Osaka, in schoolyards, stadiums and television studios across Japan.
All of these memories are brought into a manifold relationship in the present, conjoined to
the work that is created by the musicians and dancers. For the duration of the dance, in the
moment marked out by the rhythm and artistry of eisā—a hierarchy of relationships is
performed as other memories, other histories fade into a moment of oblivion. Building on
Ranciere’s observations, the performers make themselves visible, appear before theiraudience as dancers beautiful and strong, confident and kind. The audience is also
constituted in the performance, given an opportunity to be a part of the festival, to join in
the dance before them. To be treated as discerning and capable guests, to receive the gift ofgood fortune. And finally, the spirits of the dead are brought together with them, honored
for what they have done, assured that their legacy remains important, given the promise of
performances yet to come.
Inevitably, the moment ends. As the duration of the dance comes to a close, the memories
that had been kept at bay fill the space and the time that had been cleared for theNelson: Dances of Memory, Dances of Oblivion

213

performance. The uneasy accommodation that performers maintain between the worker,
the samurai and the dancer cannot be maintained; the same can be said for the tension
between the enthralled spectator, the uneasy visitor to the run-down streets of Koza, thetourist returned from the battlefield, the metropolitan traveler who suddenly realizes thatTokyo is very far away.
As the crowd begins to disperse, we fall into formation once again, laughing andexhausted. Dancing through the darkened streets, we make our way back to thecommunity center. Families return to their homes, tourists to their hotels, the spirits of thedead to wherever it is that they dwell—their tombs, the other world, the island paradise
known as nirai kanai.
What extends beyond the moment? New images have been produced, old images have been
reinvigorated, old practices reappropriated. Representations of the performance circulate
in tourist campaigns and commercial advertising, in banal television series andexperimental film. A massive banner depicting a powerful dancer in Sonda’s attire washung as a backdrop at an anti-base rally in Naha. Both the dancers and their audience carry
the memories of the performance into their everyday lives; the dancers also bear thephysical transformation of their experiences. After years of dancing with the seinenkai, twoolder men have become members of a popular Okinawan musical group that works to fusetraditional and contemporary forms. A young woman has formed a well-known vocal
duo. Several members told me that they quit their jobs in local clubs, or distanced
themselves from local gangs. Others have built on their experiences to become local
politicians—both progressive and conservative—and some have been selected to become
municipal bureaucrats. In every case, they have told me that their experience of eisā playeda critical role in their decision. I have also heard of stories of dancers who quit jobs in themainland and moved back to Okinawa so that they—or their children—could dance; others
refused promotions or transfers so that they could remain active in the group. Morecommon, however, are stories of the traces left in memory: the sense that one is more than
who she appears to be in the working world, that alternatives exist to a daily life that isrelentlessly commodified and stripped of meaning. The memories of eisā are often broughtup against daily experience, informing the way that the world is perceived and understood.
It is in this space, open to contradiction and question, that other possibilities exist, that new
choices are made legible, that the possibilities of transformative action are explored.
At the same time, I do not want to take away from the importance of the moment itself. It
seems that practices are too often considered only to expose their reference to othersituations, their relationship to other times and places. Eisā involves more than acts ofresistance to social pressure, a rejection of stigmatized categories of class and gender, adisplacement of concerns that cannot be addressed in any other way. Eisā should also be
understood as subject itself, created and recreated in the coordinated activity of thedancers, their audiences, and the ancestral spirits. Steeped in the forms of the past, yet
driven by creative action in the present. An expression of individual and collective artistry,
an archive of historical representations, and a source of strength and renewal. A
determination to define themselves—as men and women, as artists, as Okinawans—on
their own terms.

Putting Okinawa at the Center214

I learned a great deal in my years working with the Sonda Seinenkai; and yet, there are somany things that I will never know or fully understand. However, I do understand thecourage that allows one to appropriate rather than fear the judgment and expectations ofothers, to put aside the repressiveness of everyday life, the restrictions of gender and class,the constant pressures of labor, fatigue and boredom. I understand the courage to act andto create—I have seen it in the streets of Koza.
Christopher T. Nelson is an associate professor in the Department of Anthropology at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a specialist in the anthropology ofcontemporary Japan. His work on Okinawa can be found in his book Dancing with the Dead:
Memory, Performance and Everyday Life in Postwar Okinawa (Duke Press) and in thecollection Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to thePresent, edited by Maria Höhn and Seungsook Moon (Duke Press), both published by Duke
University Press.
This article is adapted for Asia-Pacific Journal from Chapter 5, Dancing with the Dead:
Memory, Performance and Everyday Life in Postwar Okinawa.
Notes
1 Here I am thinking of Judith Butler’s recent work on melancholy and the constitutive rolethat the internalization of loss has in the construction of the self. While I find Butler’s
argument about the repression of the originary experience of homosexual desirecompelling, I would like to broaden this category of melancholy objects to include otherforms of internalized historical experience. See Judith Butler, “Melancholy Gender/Refused
Identifications” in The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection, 132-150.
2 Michael S. Molasky, The American Occupation of Japan and Okinawa (London: Routledge,

1999); Norma Field, In the Realm of the Dying Emperor (New York: Vintage Books, 1993);
Gerald Figal, "Waging Peace in Okinawa" Critical Asian Studies 33 (March 2001).
3 The Okinawan bases do continue to generate revenue in the form of payments made tolandowners who either voluntarily lease their land to the Japanese government or arecompelled to do so. This land is then provided for use by American military forces.

4 Like the hansen jinushi [antiwar landlords] who testified at the prefectural hearing, manyof the residents of Sonda continue to own land within the US bases; however, like most
Okinawan landowners, very few are active in oppositional organizations such as the hansen
jinushi.
5 Young men and women spend a great deal of time together, but rehearsals are controlled

and there is little free time. Occasionally relationships emerge, and a number of couples
that I know have married. Many others date people from work or school with noconnection to the seinenkai. Surprisingly, there seem to be few relationships with theadmiring mainland visitors who attend rehearsals and performances.
6 Although women have danced in the seinenkai for decades, they have never become

drummers or sanshin musicians. While local women professed to be content with this,Nelson: Dances of Memory, Dances of Oblivion

215

several complained that it was difficult for women to socialize at the community center
once they stop performing.
7 The Ballad of the Southern Grove, The Chunjun River Flows, and Kudaka Island, respectively.
8 Kinjō Kaoru, cited in Nomura Kōya, Muishiki no Shokuminchishugi: Nihonjin no Beigun

Kichi to Okinawajin (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 2005) Note 128, page 175-177.

9 For an interesting discussion of the desire to be seen among Japanese youth, see Ikuya

Sato, Kamikaze Biker: Parody and Anomy in Affluent Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1991).
10 Iha Masakazu, “Kandō o Hada de Shiru,” in Eisā 360°: Rekishi to Genzai. 306.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

216

Much Ado over Small Islands: The Sino-Japanese Confrontation overSenkaku/Diaoyu
Gavan McCormack
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3947
May 27, 2013.
Gavan McCormack closes this course reader with an article that highlights the geostrategic
centrality of Okinawa by providing an overview of the currently raging dispute between
China and Japan over overlapping claims to a peripheral set of uninhabited islands in“peripheral” Okinawa. The dispute has become so heated that it has generated fears that it
could precipitate war between the two countries. As McCormack’s insightful analysis
makes clear, the issues involved grow out of the historical processes associated with the
decline of the Ryukyu Kingdom and Okinawa’s incorporation into the modern Japanesestate. His discussion covers the actions of the national governments of Japan, China, Taiwan
and the United States, and brings clarity to the dispute by detailing how differently the
Senkaku issue is framed and conceived in the countries involved. It serves as an excellent
illustration of how, thanks to its location, Okinawa’s fate in the twenty-first century
remains subject to the interplay of the larger powers active in the region, against which it
remains relatively powerless.

McCormack: Much ado over small islands

217

Much Ado over Small Islands: The Sino-Japanese Confrontation overSenkaku/Diaoyu1
Gavan McCormack
More than six decades from the San Francisco Treaty that purportedly resolved the AsiaPacific War and created a system of peace, East Asia in 2013 remains troubled by thequestion of sovereignty over a group of tiny, uninhabited islands. The governments ofJapan, China, and Taiwan all covet and claim sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
These tiny islands, together with other scattered outcroppings across the Western Pacific,
assume today some of the weight that attached almost a century ago to the vast domain ofNortheast China (“Manchuria”), with comparable potential to plunge the region into
conflict. If the countries of the region are to transcend the 19th and 20th century eras ofJapanese imperialism and US Cold War hegemony and construct a 21st century of peace,cooperation, and prosperity, the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue must somehow first be addressed.
1. The Long View
The islands known in Japanese as Senkaku and in Chinese as Diaoyu are little more thanrocks in the ocean, but they are rocks on which there is a real prospect of peace andcooperation in the region foundering. It is a problem that I first addressed just over 40
years ago, and on which I have published other occasional essays more recently.2
The Senkaku/Diaoyu problem calls to mind the research on which I once engaged on the“Manchurian problem,” which also arose over how to draw a line dividing “our” from “your”
territory, a life-line that absolutely had to be protected. Because the line early 20th century
Japan then drew was unacceptable to China, the dispute over it led in due course to thecatastrophe of war. “Senkaku” is of course not to be compared to the vast domains thatwere then at stake in “Manchuria,” but its importance far outweighs its barren andunpopulated rocks and focuses similarly passionate, uncompromising sentiment.
While economic integration in East Asia proceeds by leaps and bounds and popular culture
flows freely, the region has little sense of shared history, identity or direction and it is still
framed by the security architecture of the Cold War. The difficulty is compounded by theprocess of gradual, but fundamental, shift in the power balance that prevailed throughout
the 20th century. China rises and Japan declines, a phenomenon that may be encapsulated
in a single set of statistics. The Japan that as proportion of global GDP was 15 per cent in1990 fell below 10 per cent in 2008 and has been projected to fall to 6 per cent in 2030 and
3.2 per cent in 2060, while the China that was 2 per cent in 1990 is predicted to reach 25
per cent in 2030 and 27.8 per cent in 2060.3 It is that shift in relative weight, perhaps morethan anything that disturbs Japan. Islands that in themselves are trivial come to carry heavy
symbolic weight.
In the long historical perspective, it is possible to view the past millennium in Asia as asequence of more-or-less hegemonic orders: the Pax Mongolica (1206 to 1368), the Chinese“Tribute” system or Pax Sinica of Ming and Qing dynasties (1368 to 1911), the shortlived Pax Nipponica (roughly 1931 to 1945), and the still-continuing Pax Americana (bornwith US victory in the Asia-Pacific War and enshrined with the San Francisco Treaty inPutting Okinawa at the Center

218

effect from 1952). The last of these, however, entering upon its seventh decade shows signsof severe strain, not least because China is too great and too tied to all the major US allianceparties to be excluded or contained. President Obama may yet succeed in renewing andreinforcing the fabric of Pax Americana alliances, and thereby in maintaining its militaryand political pre-eminence under the Pacific Tilt doctrine declared early in 2012, but a very
different possibility is occasionally to be glimpsed: a post-hegemonic order, a concert ofstates or commonwealth, a Pax
Asia.
Looking towards such a future,then Japanese Prime Minister
Fukuda Yasuo agreed with
China’s president Hu Jintao attheir summit meeting in
February 2008 that the East
China Sea should be made a“Sea of Peace, Cooperation andFriendship,”4 and at thebilateral summit in September,
2009, a year and a half later,
Hatoyama Yukio proposed thatit be transformed into a “Sea of
Fraternity” (Yūai no umi),5 towhich Hu is said to have
responded positively. Threemonths later, in the heyday of
the newly elected Democratic
Party government in Japan, Ozawa Ichirō led a, 600-strong, semi-official friendship mission
to Beijing. That moment was the high point of a mood of empathetic cooperation. It pointed
to a possible way forward, one in which sovereignty issues would be shelved and thedevelopment of resources resolved cooperatively (as indeed foreshadowed by several
agreements reached and to some extent implemented during the early 21st century years),evolving gradually into some kind of regional community. The mood did not last long,
however, and by 2013 it seemed an age away.
2. What are These Islands and What is Their Significance?
The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands group comprises basically five uninhabited islands, morecorrectly islets (plus several even smaller outcrops), known respectively under their
Japanese and Chinese names as Uotsuri/Diaoyudao, Kita Kojima/Bei Xiaodao, Minami
Kojima/Nan Xiaodao, Kuba/Huangwei and Taishō/Chiwei. The largest (Uotsuri/Diaoyu;
literally “Fish-catch” in Japanese, “Catch-fish” in Chinese) is 4.3 square kilometres and thetotal area of all five just 6.3 square kilometres. The islands are spread over a wide area ofsea, about 27 kilometres separating the core cluster of three islands (Uotsuri, Kita Kojima
and Minami Kojima) from Kuba, and about 110 from Taishō.6 They are located in relatively
shallow waters at the edge of the Chinese continental shelf, 330 kilometres east of the
China mainland coast, 170 kilometres northeast of Taiwan, and about the same distanceMcCormack: Much ado over small islands

219

north of Yonaguni (or Ishigaki) islands in the Okinawa group, separated from the main
Okinawan islands by a deep (maximum 2,940 metres)7 underwater trench known as the“Okinawa Trough” or in China as the “Sino-Ryukyu Trough.”
Chinese documents from the 14th century record and name the islands as importantnavigational points on the maritime route between coastal China (Foochow) and the
Ryukyu kingdom capital at Shuri, especially necessary for tribute missions during Ming andQing dynasties. China sent the Ryukyu kingdom ten such missions and Ryukyu dispatched
281 to the Chinese court in return between the 16th and 19th centuries. Ryukyuan ships
heading farther afield, on trading missions to Southeast Asia, also almost certainly used thissame route.8 Ownership, however, did not greatly concern anyone. The European statesystem with its Westphalian notions of sovereignty was an alien concept. It appears that
nobody actually settled there.
Two late 19th century developments wrought decisive change. In 1879 the Meiji
government forcibly extinguished the Ryukyu kingdom’s residual sovereignty (building
upon the partial subjection accomplished by Satsuma following its invasion in 1609) andincorporated the Ryukyus (as Okinawa) within the Japanese state, unilaterally severing the
Ryukyu’s membership in the Beijing-centred tribute system and bringing the modern,imperialist state system that would replace it closer to Senkaku/Diaoyu.
As China protested the Japanese state’s encroachments in the East China Sea, US president
Grant played a role in attempting to mediate a Sino-Japanese settlement. What Japan mostsought, however, was a comprehensive revision of the China-Japan Treaty that opened
relations between the two countries in 1871. It wanted the same unequal treaty rights(“most favoured nation” status) in mainland China as were enjoyed by the establishedimperialist powers. In return it offered to split the Ryukyus: ceding the south-westernislands of Miyako and the Yaeyama’s to China. China countered with a proposal for a three
way split: the northern islands, including Amami, to Meiji Japan, the main island of Okinawa
to become independent under a restored Ryukyu/Okinawa king, and the southwest islands
ceded to China.9 Both proposals agreed that the Miyako and Yaeyama island groups, that is
to say the Okinawan islands closest to the Senkaku/Diaoyu’s, should be China’s. A treaty inline with the Chinese proposal was drawn up early in 1881 but not actually adopted
because of opposition at high levels within the Chinese government.10 Then pre-eminent
Chinese leader Li Hongjiang is said to have objected that “Ryukyu is neither Chinese nor
Japanese territory, but a sovereign state.”11 When China, one hundred and thirty-two years
later, protested that there had never been an agreement between the two countries on thestatus of Okinawa, and urging that it be the subject of discussions, Japan and Okinawa itself
were shocked, but it was stating a simple historical fact.12
The unilateral assimilation to Japan of Ryukyu as Okinawa in 1879 in no way affected thestatus of the tiny Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. But just five years later, in 1884, a Japanesemerchant, Koga Tatsushirō, settled on Senkaku. Initiating a business in collecting albatross
feathers and tortoise shells, he submitted a claim through the newly established Okinawa
prefecture to have them declared Japanese territory on grounds of being unclaimed andunoccupied.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

220

In other words, Koga’s 1884 Senkaku application related to territory that was of such little
import to Japan that it had been ready just years earlier to cede it (and much more) to
China as part of a frontier grand bargain. The Meiji government in Tokyo delayed a decisionon this matter for a full ten years, fearful of rousing China’s suspicions at a time when it
worried that China might enjoy naval supremacy. That anxiety only eased following the
major battles in which it decisively defeated Qing China in the Sino-Japanese War,
whereupon the Japanese cabinet resolved in January 1895 to accept the Koga proposal.
Japan annexed two of the islands (Uotsuri and Kuba), as part of Yaeyama County, Okinawa
prefecture. It then (1896) leased four (Uotsuri, Kota Kojima, Minami Kojima, and Kuba) toKoga on a thirty year, fee-less, basis, adopted the name “Senkaku Islands” (in 1900) as atranslation of the name “Pinnacle Rocks” found on British naval charts, and in 1926
converted the four island lease to a freehold grant to the Koga family.13 The fifth island,
Taisho/Chiwei, was never part of the Koga family domain, but was simply claimed by theGovernment of Japan in 1921.
The Japanese annexation was a diplomatic secret, not published until many years later inthe post-war compilations of Japanese diplomatic records, and the “markers” authorized by
the 1895 cabinet resolution were not actually set up on the islands until May 1969.14
Through the Japanese empire in East Asia from 1895, Koga maintained his business,
expanding it to employ perhaps as many as 248 people (99 households) by around 1910,15
catching, drying, processing, and canning fish, only withdrawing around 1940, abandoning
the islands under the shadow of war.
Asia then had much greater questions to worry about, and Senkaku was of interest to noone. In the immediate post-war years Japan’s Foreign Ministry made only brief reference tothem, dismissing them as “uninhabited and of little importance.”16 China (Beijing)’s Foreign
Ministry seems also to have had no interest in them. In a draft paper prepared in 1950,
soon after the Chinese Communist party came to power, it referred simply to the islands by
their Japanese name as “part of Okinawa.”17 Some doubt must remain on the status of this
proposal until the actual document is published, but had it been implemented, and had
Beijing actually been invited to San Francisco, such a stance might at least have informed
the comprehensive discussions on territory that would have followed.
The question of Okinawa itself, raised by China in 2013 as still problematic and needing tobe addressed in some arrangement between the two countries, was also seen as moot by
US President Franklin Roosevelt. In 1943, he considered China’s claim to the Okinawan
islands as a whole so strong that he twice asked Chinese president Chiang Kai-shek
whether he would like to take possession of them in the eventual post-war settlement.18
Chiang, in a decision he is said to have later deeply regretted, declined.
In administering the Ryukyus from 1951 to 72, the US also assumed control of seas that
included the Senkakus.19 However, in the negotiations over Okinawan reversion (19691972) it drew a line between the different sectors, transferring to Japan sovereignty over
Ryukyu but only administrative control over Senkaku. Sovereignty was left unresolved, in
implicit admission that the islands might be subject to competing claims. The United States
has held strictly to that position to this day.

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Why then, did the US split Senkaku from Ryukyu in 1972? Hara Kimie, Toyoshita Narahiko,and others, attribute the decision to Machiavellian US design. They believe it was explicit
and deliberate. According to Hara, the US understood that the islands would function as a“wedge of containment” of China and that a “territorial dispute between Japan and China,
especially over islands near Okinawa, would render the US military presence in Okinawa
more acceptable to Japan.”20 According to Toyoshita, the US took a deliberately “vague”(aimai) attitude over territorial boundaries,21 sowing the seeds or sparks (hidane) of
territorial conflict between China and Japan, and thereby ensuring Japan’s long-term
dependence on the US and justifying the US base presence.22 For both, the implication isclear: the Senkaku/Diaoyu problem of today is the consequence of a US policy decision.
Though conscious intent is necessarily difficult to prove, their hypothesis certainly offers aplausible explanation for the US shift of position.
The vague and unresolved “wedge/spark” formula of Senkaku/Diaoyu ownership, by
ensuring ongoing friction in the Japan-China relationship also served as one of a set of keys
locking Japan in place as a client or US-dependent state.23
The Senkaku/Diaoyu “problem” as it came to be known arose in the context ofsimultaneous developments at this time: the US shift of its position (marked mostdramatically by the Nixon-led rapprochement with China), the sudden realization on all
sides, following an ECAFE report on its 1968 investigation, that island ownership rights
might carry potentially valuable resource rights to a sector of the East China Sea believed tobe “the last remaining, richest, as yet unexploited depository of oil and natural gas,” thelodging of claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu group by both Japan on the one hand and ROC and
PRC on the other; and the stirring of a significant international overseas Chinese movement
to support the Chinese demand.24

3. The Shelf, 1972-2010
Subsequently, Japan and China paid attention to Senkaku/Diaoyu on two key occasions, in1972 and 1978. When Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei raised the question to
Chinese premier Zhou Enlai on the former occasion, Zhou replied that the matter should be
shelved as opening it would complicate and delay the normalization process.25 Six years
later, in Japan to negotiate a Peace and Friendship Treaty, Deng Xiaoping reiterated this“shelving” formula, preferring to leave it to “the next generation” to find sufficient wisdom
to resolve it.26 For roughly 40 years a modus vivendi held: though occasional landings (byChinese activists from a Hong Kong base and by Japanese rightists sailing from ports in
Okinawa) took place, the two governments tacitly cooperated to prevent them.27
Today, the Japanese Foreign Ministry adopts the improbable position that there was nosuch “shelving” arrangement.28 While it seems clear there was no formal diplomatic
document to such effect, however, the exchanges recorded above were not trivial. What
seems likely is that both sides stated their respective positions but chose to avoid formal
negotiations which might have delayed general settlement.29
One prominent Japanese scholar now accuses the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of“inexcusable and outrageous” behaviour in having altered the Minutes of the Tanaka-Zhou

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meeting of 1972 and “burned and destroyed” those of the Sonoda-Deng meeting of 1978
lest either yield evidence prejudicial to the official case of undisputed Japanesesovereignty.30 In light of the recent revelation of the trashing of a vast cache of Foreign
Ministry materials on the eve of Freedom of Information rules being introduced in 2001,
Yabuki’s allegation cannot simply be dismissed.31
In two decisive steps, however, in 2010 and 2012, Japan moved to ensure that the shelf
never be put back.32 In 2010, the Democratic Party of Japan’s government arrested theChinese captain of a fishing ship in waters off Senkaku, insisting that there was “no roomfor doubt” that the islands were an integral part of Japanese territory, that there was no
territorial dispute or diplomatic issue, and the Chinese vessel was simply in breach ofJapanese law (interfering with officials conducting their duties). The fierce Chinese
response caused Japan to back down and release the captain without pressing charges,33
but Japanese resolve hardened and China appears to have concluded that Japan had
determined to set aside the “shelving” agreement. Mutual antagonism deepened steadily
thereafter.
From China’s viewpoint, it was striking that Japan concentrated its diplomatic effort not on
resolving a bilateral dispute over borders but on widening it to a security matter involving
the United States, attaching its highest priority to securing an assurance from the US
government that the islands were subject to Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty, theclause that authorizes the US to protect Japan in the case of an armed attack “in territories
under the administration of Japan.” U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton accepted that
position in October 2010,34 and in due course, under strong Japanese prompting, it wasentered into the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013 and approved by the
Senate on 29 November 2012.35
That is to say the US continued to acknowledge the “administration of Japan over the
Senkaku Islands” but took no position on the question of sovereignty.36 Although much wasmade of this, there was “nothing new” in it.37 It means that, while the United States had noview on which country should own the islands, or even what they should be called, it was
ready to go to war to defend Japan’s claim to them. It is a position that Henry Kissinger (inApril 1971) described as “nonsense.”38
As the confrontation intensified, the left-right political divide in Japan dissolved into an “allJapan” front, with a broad national consensus supporting the Japanese official story of its
Senkaku rights, protesting China’s threat to Japan’s sovereign territory and insisting there
was no dispute and that the security alliance with the US covered defence of the islands
against any China challenge.
If September 2010 marked “shelf down,” in April 2012 it was as if the shelf supports were
removed too. Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro announced to a conservative American
think-tank audience in Washington, D.C. that his city was negotiating to buy the threeprivately owned islets of Uotsuri, Kita Kojima and Minami Kojima,39 in order, he said, toclarify public, Japanese governmental jurisdiction and remove any possible challenge totheir sovereignty by China or Taiwan. His announcement – coupled with his calculatedabuse of China (or “Shina,” the insulting, wartime appellation Ishihara deliberately chose toemploy) - stirred a diplomatic storm.

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Ishihara’s Tokyo Metropolitan Government began distributing a poster featuring aphotograph of the three islets that it was concerned with and the message calling for the“courage” to say, “Japan’s islands are Japan’s territory.”40 It also published anadvertisement in the Wall Street Journal asking for US support for its island purchasingplan, pointedly noting that the islands were “of indispensable geostrategic importance to
US force projection,”41 leaving no room for doubt as to the direction in which the UnitedStates should project its force.
The summer of 2012 in East Asia was hot. Rival groups of activists challenged each otherwith acts of bravado. Vessels under various flags and representing various claims over theislands made or attempted to make visits, ratcheting up tension.
On 7 July, 75th anniversary of Japan’s launch of all-out war on China, Prime Minister Noda
adopted the Ishihara cause and declared the national government would buy and“nationalize” the islands.42 Later that same month he declared his readiness to deploy the
Self-Defence Forces to defend them,43 and in September he formally purchased them (for20.5 billion yen, or ca. $26 million) and “nationalized” them,44 declaring to the UN General
Assembly that the islands were “intrinsic Japanese territory,” over which there was nodispute and could be no negotiation.45
Protest demonstrations followed in Hong Kong and cities and towns across China – cars
were overturned, Japanese restaurant windows smashed, Japanese goods trashed, andexchanges of tour groups, students, and businesses suspended.

4. Abe - “Taking Back”
Abe Shinzō campaigned for the December 2012 lower house election under the overallslogan of “taking back the country.” He pledged not to yield one millimetre of Japan’s“inherent” territory of Senkaku,46 a matter on which there was no dispute, no room fordiscussion or negotiation. He wrote:“What is called for in the Senkaku vicinity is not negotiation but physical force
incapable of being misunderstood.”47
Abe’s close friend, education minister Shimomura Hakubun, was equally forthright. He
referred to Senkaku as having been “stolen away” (an odd formulation when effective
control was plainly in Japan’s hands).
“Right now,” he went on, “Japan is not functioning as a nation. … The 67 years since
the end of World War ll have been a history of Japan’s destruction. Now is our only
chance to remake the country.”48
Shimomura, and presumably the Abe government, evidently believed that to stand up to
and refuse to negotiate with China was to “remake” Japan. When former Prime Minister
Hatoyama Yukio challenged the government (while on a visit to Beijing), saying,“But if you look at history, there is a dispute … If you keep saying, ‘There is no
territorial dispute,’ you will never get an answer;”49

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Abe’s Defense Minister, Onodera Itsunori, branded him a traitor (kokuzoku).50
The intransigent language of Japanese
governments in 2013 was reminiscent of1937, when Japan’s then leader, Konoe
Fumimaro ruled out negotiations with
China’s Chiang Kai-shek in the fatefulmonths leading to full-scale war with
China, and when the national media wassimilarly self-righteous and dismissive ofChina’s “unreasonableness” and“provocation.”51 To China it looked as
though Japan was actively collaboratingin construction of a militarized Maritime
Great Wall of China to block its access to
the Pacific Ocean. In April Diaoyu was forthe first time declared a “core interest,”
and in May thePeople’s Daily added thatthe status of Okinawa itself had to benegotiated.
However, the high-risk associated withthe policies and initiatives declared by
the new Abe government evidently
alarmed Washington. When US Secretaryof State Hillary Clinton told Foreign
Minister Kishida Fumio at their meetingin Washington in January 2013 that
there was indeed a dispute and thatJapan should sit down with China to52
negotiate it, it was in effect a rebuke. Although Abe subsequently moderated his language
and policy, when he visited Washington in late February 2013, he was given neither dinnernor even a joint press conference, having to satisfy himself with a perfunctory lunch withthe president. Furthermore, the Joint Communique made no reference to what he mostsought: US backing for the Japanese claim to sovereignty over Senkaku/Diaoyu.53 Instead it
was devoted entirely to a single issue, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, Washington’s
primary agenda. By insisting that he “would not act rashly” over the dispute, Abe appeared
to be striving to dampen fears that that was precisely how the White House suspected hemight act.54 There was a plaintive note to the press conference at which he stood alone to
declare the alliance strengthened. He was more at ease in front of the “Japan handlers” at
the Center for Security and international Studies (CSIS) later that day declaring that “Japanis back,”55 by which he was understood to mean that its obedience to Washington
directives on the construction of the new base at Henoko on Okinawa was unquestioned,
the TPP accepted and base reorganization his greatest priority. Concern that Abe’s neonationalist and historical revisionist (rejecting “the narrative of imperial Japanese

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aggression and victimization of other Asians”) agenda might be “divisive” and “could hurt
U.S. interests” spread in Washington (and throughout the US media).56
5. Intrinsic National Territory
The Japanese Senkaku claim rests on three fundamental assertions: that the islands, thoughannexed in 1895 just after China’s defeat in war and three months prior to the Treaty of
Shimonoseki by which Taiwan and other islands were specifically ceded to Japan, were not“war spoils,” (or “stolen territories” in the words of the 1943 Cairo Agreement) but terra
nullius, territory un-owned and unclaimed by any other country; that the Japanese
occupation had been unchallenged between the act of annexation in 1895 and the
publication of the ECAFE report in 1968, for at least 70 years; and that the islands were insome almost metaphysical sense Japan’s intrinsic, inalienable territory, what it called koyū
no ryōdo, a fundamental sector of the Ryukyu Islands. What for one purpose wasabandoned and un-owned becomes for another Japan’s absolute and inalienable territory.
As to the first claim, based on terra nullius, such a claim is of dubious merit today, if only forthe reason that it harkens back to the time when imperialist countries divided up the world
at their will. It has in some cases, notably Australia, has been judicially overruled at thehighest court level.57 It stretches credulity today to argue that the Japanese annexation wasjustified on the terra nullius principle and was therefore unrelated to the victory it had justseized over China in war and more broadly to the military and diplomatic advantage Japan
enjoyed in the context of its rise and China’s decline as the wave of high imperialism
washed across East Asia. From China’s viewpoint, a single line may be drawn from Ryukyu(1879), Senkaku (1895), Taiwan (1895), to Dongbei or “Manchuria” (1931). The People’s
Daily in May 2013 drew precisely such a line.
The prefix “koyū no ryōdo” (“intrinsic” or “inalienable” national territory), attaches now
almost inevitably to any reference to “Senkaku Islands,” implying at least that they had long
been “part” of the Ryukyu islands. Yet that is a dubious proposition since they were notpart of Ryukyu’s “36 islands” in pre-modern times nor when the prefecture was establishedin 1879, but were tacked on to it 16 years later. It is also an ironic appellation for islands
unknown in Japan till the late 19th century, then identified from British naval references,
not declared Japanese till 1895 or named until 1900, for which neither name nor Japanese
claim was revealed until 1952. Furthermore, what were annexed in 1895 were two islands,
Uotsuri and Kuba. Two others were added in the leasehold arrangements established in
1896, and one more in 1921. When the Government of Japan “nationalized” the “Senkakus”
in 2012, it acted in relation only to the three of them nominally in private hands. Two were
excluded, including one that still remains in private hands. They are commonly known,even to the Japanese Coastguard, by their Chinese names, Huangwei and Chiwei, rather
than their Japanese names, Kuba and Taishō, and have remained under uncontested US
control – as a bombing range – since 1955 for Kuba and 1956 for Taishō with neither
national nor metropolitan government in Japan ever complaining or seeking their return.
Responding on behalf of the government in 2010 to a Diet question as to why no effort had
been made to recover the islands, a spokesman said that the US side “had not indicated its
intention to return them.”58 In other words, Japan would not dream of seeking their returnunless the US first indicated that it would be permissible to do so.

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It means that, however outspoken and bold they may be to address China, and however
adamant on Japan’s “inherent” ownership rights, courage deserts Japan’s leaders whenfacing the United States. Long-term US military occupations of what they claimed to be“intrinsic” territory simply do not matter. Whatever “koyū” means, it is not inconsistent
with occupancy by another country, even if that other country should choose to bomb suchislands to smithereens, so long as that “other country” is the United States.
The word “koyū” (Chinese: “guyou”) has no precise English translation and the concept is
unknown in international law and foreign to discourse on national territory in much, if not
most, of the world.59 The concept seems to have been invented in Japan around 1970, alongwith the term Hoppō Ryōdo (Northern Territories) as part of the effort to reinforce
linguistically Japan’s claim to what had been known as the Southern Kurile Islands.60 It was
subsequently adopted to underline the Japanese claim to Takeshima (Dokdo) against South
Korea, and then to the Senkaku islands (against China and Taiwan). However, in due course
Japan’s rhetorical device to make its own case seem beyond dispute was adopted by allparties (including China and Korea), making the claims absolute and unnegotiable, andthereby obscuring one of the lessons of modern world history: that borders are rarely
absolute or sacrosanct, as shown by the example of Germany sacrificing most of its
Prussian heartland in 1945 but then emerging, reinforced, at the centre of Europe.
Furthermore, being a rhetorical rather than scientific term, the word “koyū” whose
linguistic sense is “intrinsic” or “unequivocal,” in practice has been given an opposite
meaning, territories that tended to be marginal and inferior, susceptible of being
abandoned or traded away by the “mainland” if the interests of the “koyū hondo” (intrinsic
mainland) core require it.61 Thus, Japan’s readiness (mentioned above) to trade the Miyako
and Yaeyama island groups in 1880 as part of a frontier grand bargain. Likewise, too, whenfacing a survival crisis in the summer of 1945 the Japanese mission to sue for peace headed
by Konoe Fumimaro (three times former Prime Minister), carried instructions issuing fromthe emperor himself to ensure the “preservation of the national polity” (i.e., the emperorcentred system), in which it was taken for granted that Japan would not only lose all its
colonies but be reduced to “abandoning Okinawa, Ogasawara and Karafuto (Sakhalin) andhaving to be satisfied with a “koyū hondo” consisting just of the four islands of Honshu,
Shikoku, Hokkaido and Kyushu.”62
The Miyako and the Yaeyama Islands could be traded away in 1880, and Okinawa itself
could be sacrificed to protect the interests of “Japan proper” and save the national polity in
1945, showed that frontier territories, whether or not graced with the title of “intrinsic,” infact ranked low in national policy. Nowhere ranked lower than Senkaku, the periphery ofJapan’s periphery.
As to the second, there is a disingenuous quality to the Japanese position that China’s
silence on the Japanese occupation of the islands until 1970 could be construed as consent.
International law offered no system to which aggrieved colonial or semi-colonial countries
could appeal and no such recourse was open to China - whether the Republic (whose
capital moved from Nanjing to Taiwan in 1949) or the People’s Republic (from 1949) - until
the time it was actually shown, when the withdrawal of US forces from Okinawa became
imminent and focussed attention on what was and what was not “Okinawa” and to whom itMcCormack: Much ado over small islands

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should be “returned.” Normalcy” with Japan was not accomplished for China until 1972,
which also happened to be the year that the US returned administrative authority over the
Senkakus to Japan. From then, the Chinese protest was plain.
6. China’s claim
The Chinese claim (People’s
Republic and Republic alike) to
Diaoyu rests on history (therecords of the Ming and Qing
dynasties) and geography (thecontinental shelf and the deep
gulf that sets the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands apartfrom the Ryukyu island chain).
For both, the islands are an
integral part of Taiwan’s
territory and the fact that they
were appropriated by Japan aspart of the violent processes of
the Sino-Japanese War, andshould therefore have beenreturned to China under the
Potsdam Agreement, is plain.
There are two further,increasingly important angles,
rooted in contemporary geopolitics. One is the inequity inthe hand China is bequeathedby its forbears because they
did not establish a chain ofisland colonial and dependent
territories like the otherpowers of the early modern
and modern world and for thatreason China gains virtuallynothing from the hugeTokyo Metropolitan Government Poster, 2012
distribution of global marine
resources carried out under“What is called for is the courage to declare that Japan’s islands
are Japan’s territory”)
the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) while the former colonial powers have been richly rewarded.
While global attention concentrates on the supposed grab for ocean and resources being
carried out by China in the East and South China Seas, the far greater claims by the club ofadvanced countries, mostly former imperialist and colonial powers, have for the most part

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escaped attention. The great beneficiaries have been the US, UK, France, together with
Australia, New Zealand and Russia, followed closely by Japan,63 whose claims as a maritime
great power, with or without Senkaku/Diaoyu, grow rapidly in significance. Discoveries ofmethane hydrates, rare earths, and precious and industrial metals in significant quantities
in its various ocean domains (including claimed but contested ones other than
Senkaku/Diaoyu) make it a potential maritime superpower.64 In terms of ocean domains
Japan ranks at No 9, controlling five times as great an ocean area as China, while China, at
No. 31, ranks just between The Maldives and Somalia.65 China “played no part in the 19thand 20th century processes of dividing up the Pacific land territories and plays none now in
dividing up its ocean.”66 The very fact that China is such a minor player in global terms in
its claims on world oceans might reinforce its determination not to yield in the spaces, suchas Senkaku/Diaoyu, where it does have a claim. As Peter Nolan notes (his reference here to
South China Sea may be extended to East China Sea),“The West’s preoccupation with Beijing’s involvement in the South China Sea
contrasts sharply with the complete absence of discussion of the West’s vast
exclusive economic zones in the region. The former imperial powers’ acquisition ofcontrol over vast marine territories and resources through UNCLOS has received
negligible attention other than in specialist legal journals, yet it eclipses by somedistance the area and resources that are in contention in the South China Sea.”67
Furthermore, the Chinese desire for “normalcy” as a global power, able to project its naval
weight and to protect its maritime interests in the same way other powers take for granted,
is seriously disadvantaged by lack of any undisputed access to the Pacific Ocean. From its
perspective, the gateways to the Pacific lie in the north through the Sōya Strait between
Sakhalin and Hokkaido, Tsugaru Strait between Hokkaido and Honshu, and in the south
through the Ōsumi Strait between Kagoshima and Tanegashima or the Miyako Strait
between Okinawa (main) Island and Miyako Island. Further south lies the Bashi Channel
between Taiwan and the Philippines. Japan resents the Chinese Navy’s passage throughsuch passages, notably the Osumi and Miyako Straits, but from the Chinese viewpoint, thelong chain of Japanese controlled islands looks like nothing so much as a maritime greatwall, and the moves to militarize the sectors till now neglected (especially between
Okinawa Island and Taiwan) stir rising Chinese concern.
The spectrum of thinking in Chinese society may be much less monolithic than commonly
assumed. Although anti-Japan sentiment in China is undoubtedly subject to somemanipulation by government, distrust of Japan rests on an accumulation of unresolved
grievances from the more than a century of modern history, and it is likely to be evenstronger at the popular than at the government level.68
In general, China and Taiwan are united in their stance on Senkaku/Diaoyu matters, but it
is to be noted that a Japan-Taiwan fisheries agreement was concluded in 2013 (after 17
years of talks) under which Taiwanese fishermen would have right to fish in certain
specified waters adjacent to Senkaku/Diaoyu, if not in near coastal waters. It may be seen
as a smart Japanese diplomatic gesture to split Beijing and Taipei, and thus to ease thepressure from hostile confrontation on all its frontiers. It presumably means that the
Taiwan coastguard will no longer confront Japanese forces with hostile intent. The deal

McCormack: Much ado over small islands229

made no reference to territorial issues but Beijing objected, and whether it will holdremains to be seen.69
Kyoto University’s Inoue Kiyoshi made the point forty years ago that, “Even though the[Senkaku] islands were not wrested from China under a treaty, they were grabbed from it
by stealth, without treaty or negotiations, taking advantage of victory in war.”70 It is a
judgement confirmed in 2012 from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum by The
Economist, which wrote: “Whatever the legality of Japan’s claim to the islands, its roots lie
in brutal empire-building.”71
7. The Okinawan Perspective
Okinawans are aware in the depths of their bones that contest over sovereignty, in theirregional waters, threatens them. The more the national security agenda as defined in Tokyoand Washington advances, the more insecure they become. War for the defence of Senkaku
would be a “re-run of the battle of the Second World war, with us, Okinawans, the victims,”
as Hiyane Teruo of the University of the Ryukyus puts it.72
Okinawan Senkaku thinking is characterized by five things: the claim of a long and close
connection; the agency of civil society rather than government; the orientation towards an
inclusive and regional cooperative rather than exclusive solution; the opposition tomilitarization (Okinawans in 1945 learned the bitter lesson that armies do not defend
people, and are therefore disinclined to believe in any defence of the Senkaku that rests on
militarizing them and embedding them in hostile confrontation with China); and (bycontrast with the rest of Japan) a long historical memory of friendly relations with China.
Some now talk of an Okinawa-centred “livelihood zone” or (a proposal originating in
Taiwan) of a “Minjian East Asia Forum.” Proponents of such agendas avoid the language of“inherent territory” or exclusive claims to oil or gas resources, prefer instead to talk ofcommunity, open borders and priority to the local over the nation state. For them,“livelihood zone” replaces “koyū no ryōdo.” Naturally, they oppose military interventions
and force-based positions. They are the antithesis of the Tokyo-centred “inherent”(national) territory. They believe the focus on “sovereignty” has to be widened to open aperspective of “spheres of border interaction,” “substantive spheres for neighbouring
countries,” and a Northeast Asian “demilitarized zone.”73
The challenge is especially critical for Okinawa because it has focussed so much of its social
energy over decades on the struggle against a militarization and base dependence, which
the Japanese state and mainland media justify by reference to “China threat.” The Japanesenational bureaucracy in Tokyo and its American patrons who pursue the agenda of
Okinawan base reinforcement as part of military confrontation with China naturally hopethat a sense of threatened “national” interest would serve to soften Okinawan opposition to
the base agenda. The adoption of unanimous resolutions by the Okinawan Prefectural
Assembly and the City Assemblies of Miyako and Ishigaki (geographically closest to
Senkaku) affirming that the Senkaku islands did indeed “belong to Japan” and calling forJapan to be resolute (kizentaru) in defending them indicted that “national security”
considerations were indeed becoming important considerations in Okinawan base politics.
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negotiated, the Okinawan people’s movement saw it as a blow, fearing that, whatever the
Chinese intent, any such campaign would be bound to weaken their movement.74
8. Conclusion
Where the Japanese case for exclusive entitlement to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is strong
on a strict reading of international law, China’s is strong on grounds of history andgeography. Its insistence that the frame for thinking of the problem include not just an
antiseptic “international law” but the record of colonialism, imperialism, and war also has amoral quality.
There are no tribunals to adjudicate on such conflicting claims and, despite the assumptionthat there has to be a “right” answer, international law is no set of abstract andtranscendent principles but an evolving expression of global power relations, reflecting at
any one time the interests of dominant global powers.75 None of the state parties (Japan,
China, Taiwan) is likely to submit to any formula that holds the possibility of a zero
outcome. So, even though there are no residents of these islands with rights to be protected
and in that sense resolution should not be so difficult, and despite the large economic
interests shared by China and Japan, recourse to international law arbitration is highly
unlikely.
Forty-five years after ECAFE’s report that raised the prospect of an oil and gas bonanza, noresource has been confirmed. The surrounding waters may or may not be rich inhydrocarbons but, even if they are, for one party to exploit them in the face of hostility ofthe other would be risky in the extreme. And if, for example Japan were to successfully to
extract some resource, to attempt then to transport it across the Ryukyu Trench toJapanese markets would also be forbiddingly difficult and expensive, rather liketransporting Middle Eastern oil over the Himalayas to Japan, while transport from the edgeof the continental shelf to markets in eastern China on the other hand would present little
problem.76 Quite apart from political considerations, the immense technical difficulty andrisk involved therefore makes the cooperation of multiple governments and financialgroups highly desirable.
For Japan, Senkaku/Diaoyu becomes a key element in the definition of a role in the region
and the world: a regional state concentrating on building a cooperative order or a US client
state cooperating in building a structure of containment of China, even while fearful the US
might one day shift its Asian core interest from Japan to China – the trauma of the Nixon
shocks remaining deep in the Japanese consciousness. The US “Client State” is bold towards
China and craven towards the United States. To be able to set aside the deception andsophistry over “inherent” territory and absence of dispute that has been allowed toswallow rational discussion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue would require nothing short of a“spiritual revolution.”77
The election in Japan late in 2012 of a government of “Shinto” believers in the uniquenessof emperor-centred Japan who were denialists of Nanjing and “Comfort Women” andproponents of a stronger Japan, with a fresh constitution to warrant greater military buildup, could scarcely fail to ring alarm bells in China, and for that matter throughout Asia.78 It

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also caused concern in Washington, as the Congressional Research Service in May spelledout.
Three general points may be made.
First, it is hard to imagine any advance on the current, increasingly militarized
confrontation over Senkaku/Diaoyu unless and until Japan concedes that there is a dispute.
The longer it resists doing so, the greater the loss of face it stands to suffer when eventually,
likely under US pressure, it finds that it has to.
Second, the issue is not simply territorial but deeply rooted in history. Japanese tend toforget; Chinese are unable to forget. The “Senkaku” issue today carries a “blowback” qualityof unassuaged Chinese suspicion over Japan’s long neglected or insufficiently resolved war
responsibility, the high-level denials of Nanjing, the periodic right-wing attempts to sanitize
history texts, the refusal to accept formal legal responsibility for the victims of the Asiawide “Comfort Women” slavery system, the periodic visits by Prime Ministers (notably
Koizumi, 2001-2006) and Diet Members to Yasukuni.79 In April 2013, Deputy PM Aso and
168 members of the Lower House participated in he spring rites at Yasukuni.
Third, Japanese elites and the mass media alike seem to have lost the capacity to appreciate
the Chinese position or to achieve a self-critical awareness of their own. While projecting a
picture of China as threatening and “other,” they pay minimal attention either to thecircumstances surrounding the Chinese claim to the islands or to the reasons for thegeneral suspicion of Japan. They take for granted that Japan “owns” the islands and blame it
for the crisis over them, and they have no sense of responsibility for the trashing of the“freeze” agreements of 1972 and 1978 (whose existence, for the most part, they simplydeny).80 Japan’s claim is rhetorical, ambiguous, manipulative, and hostile to compromise or
negotiation, yet few doubt that the Japanese position is “fundamentally solid and quite
tenable under existing international law.”81
However superficially intractable, however, the kind of regional, East China Sea way
forward, alluded to earlier by Fukuda Yasuo, Hu Jintao, Hatoyama Yukio, and others, neednot be so difficult and indeed could be fairly straightforward, at least in principle. Since theprospect of a resolution to the sovereignty question is minimal, best, therefore, to set it
aside, to revert in effect to the “shelving” agreement of 1972-2010 but to combine that withactive cooperation around and perhaps under the islands. Agreements for sharing
resources, sharing responsibility for the protection of nature (with possible UN World
Heritage status), and for shared policing and administration of the islands and their seas
could be negotiated. Cooperative arrangements for fisheries and resource extraction had
been put in place in parts of this sea before the crisis that erupted in 2010 froze most of its
mechanisms, and could be reinstated and expanded. China scholar Yabuki makes a simple,
radical proposal,
For instance, there could be a ‘one island, two governments’ response to ‘SenkakuDiaoyu,’ wherein Japan might administer the islands on odd days and China on evendays. What is required is the creation of this type of a ‘new consensus’ based onshared administration, the maintenance of peace and order, and fair sharing ofresources.82

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It is a formula unlikely to recommend itself to either side at this moment, but it, or
something like it, may in fact be the only realistic way forward. Only such a perspective,
relativizing the nation state and building a structure of cooperation around and acrossnational borders, offers a prospect of resolving the Senkaku/Diaoyu problem, transcending
the San Francisco system and signalling the birth of a Pax Asia.
AuthorGavan McCormack is a coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal, emeritus professor ofAustralian National University, and co-author, with Satoko Oka Norimatsu, of ResistantIslands – Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States, Rowman and Littlefield andJapanese edition from Hōritsu Bunkasha, 2013 (Korean and Chinese editions forthcoming).
Much of his work may also be consulted through the index to The Asia-Pacific Journal.
Notes
1 This is a slightly revised version of a paper first delivered as keynote address to “TheChina-Japan Dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Symposium,” at University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign on 19 April 2013, and presented subsequently during April–May
2013 at Cornell University, The School of Advanced and International Studies at Reischauer
Institute in Washington D.C., Free University of Berlin, University of Vienna and the Free
University of Tbilisi, Georgia. I am grateful for the comments and criticism received onthese various occasions.
2 Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack, Japanese Imperialism Today: Co-prosperity in Greater

East Asia, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, pp. 66-7; Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka
Norimatsu, Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States, Rowman andLittlefield, 2012, pp. 209-222.
3 1990 and 2030 from Wall Street Journal Online; 2060 from OECD. Details in Gavan

McCormack, “Zokkoku mondai,” in Kimura Akira and Magosaki Ukeru, eds, Owaranai ,Kyoto, Hōritsu bunkasha, 2013, pp. 18-38, at p. 18.
4 “China, Japan sign joint statement on promoting strategic, mutually beneficial ties,” China

View, 8 May 2008.

5 Sachiko Sakamaki, “China’s Hu, Japan’s Hatoyama agree to extend thaw in relations,”

Bloomberg, 22 September, 2009

6 Yamada Yoshihiko, Nihon no kokkyō, Shinchō shinsho, No 107, 2005, p. 123．
7 Guo Rongxing, “Territorial disputes and seabed petroleum exploration,” The Brookings

Institution, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, September 2010, p. 23.

8 Uemura Hideaki, “Ryōdo mondai to rekishi ninshiki,” Dai 11 kai “Rekishi ninshiki to

Higashi Ajia no heiwa’ Foramu Tokyo kaigi, 24-26 November 2012. Hōkoku shiryoshū, pp.
87-90.
9 Hane Jiro, “Senkaku mondai ni naizai suru hōriteki mujun,” Sekai, November 2012, pp.

112-119, at p. 116-118.

McCormack: Much ado over small islands

233

10 Uemura, op. cit., p. 89. See also Gavan McCormack and Satoko Oka Norimatsu, ResistantIslands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States, Rowman and Littlefield, 2012, p. 5
11 Quoted in Utsumi Shōzō, “Okinawa mushi, gyogyō kyōtei de mo,” Okinawa taimusu, 17

May 2013,

12 See the series on Senkaku/Diaoyu published in Renmin rihbao, 8-10 May 2013, especiallypart 3, “Ma-guan jōyaku to Diaoyudao mondai o ronjiru,” Renmin ribao (Japanese edition),
10 May 2013.
13 See Ivy Lee and Fang Ming, “Deconstructing Japan’s claim of sovereignty over the

Diaoyu/Senkaku islands,” p. 7. The Asia-Pacific Journal - Japan Focus, 31 December 2012.
14 Lee and Ming, p. 7.
15 Hosaka Masayasu and Togo Kazuhiko, Nihon no ryodo mondai, Kakugawa shoten, 2012, p.

119.

16 Foreign Office, Japanese Government, Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part

2, Ryukyu and other Nansei Islands, March 1947, p. 2.

17 “‘Senkaku wa Ryūkyū no ichibu’ Chūgoku, 76 nenkan igi tonaezu – sekiyu shigen deryōyū shuchō,” Jiji, 20 December 2012. Also “Chūgoku, ‘Senkaku wa Ryūkyū no ichibu’ toninshiki, 50 nen no gaikō bunsho de,” Asahi shimbun, 21 December 2012.
18 Ishii Akira, “Chūgoku no Ryūkyū/Okinawa seisaku,” Kyōkai kenkyū, No 1, 2010, pp.71-96,

at p. 79. See also Endō Homare, “Chūgoku kyōsantō mo shitte ita, Shō Kaiseki ga ‘Senkaku
ryōyū o kotowatta’ jijitsu,” Nihon keizai shinbun, 14 February 2013. (link)
19 Edict No 27 of the (US controlled) Government of the Ryukyus in 1953 formally defined

the geographic limits of the US Trust territory to include the Senkakus. That unilateral act
served to extend the bounds of the Ryukyus unilaterally and illegally, according to China.
(Renmin ribao, 10 May 2013).
20 Kimie Hara, “The post-war Japanese peace treaties and China’s ocean frontier

problems,” American Journal of Chinese Studies, vol. 11, No. 1, April 2004, pp. 1-24, at p. 23.
And see Kimie Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the San
Francisco System(Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2006), especially chapter 7, “The Ryukyus:
Okinawa and the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes.”
21 Toyoshita, Senkaku mondai to wa nani ka, p. 52.
22 Toyoshita Narahiko, “Aete hidane nokosu Bei senryaku,” Okinawa taimusu, 12 August

2012.

23 See my Client State: Japan in the American Embrace, New York and London, Verso, 2007,

and “Zokkoku mondai,” op. cit.

24 For my view of the problem as of this time, see Jon Halliday and Gavan McCormack,

Japanese Imperialism Today –Co-prosperity in Greater East Asia, Harmondsworth, Penguin,
1973, pp. 62-67.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

234

25 “Senkaku mondai o dō omou ka,” or “What do you think about the Senkaku islands?” The

Japan-China Summit meeting between Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and Premier Zhou
Enlai on September 27, 1972” reproduced in Lee and Ming, op. cit. p. 36. See discussion in
Toyoshita Narahiko, “Senkaku mondai” to wa nani ka, Iwanami gendai bunko, 2012, pp. 4850, also Yabuki Susumu.
26 See the documents reproduced at Lee and Ming, op. cit and discussion in Tabata

Mitsunaga, “Ryōyūken mondai o meguru rekishiteki jijitsu,” Sekai, December 2012, pp. 104113. Also McCormack and Norimatsu, Resistant Islands, pp. 216-7.
27 See Lee and Ming, p. 11.
28 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Senkaku Islands,” March 2013.
29 Tabata, “Ryōyūken mondai o meguru rekishiteki jijitsu,” pp.104-113, at .pp. 107-8
30 Susumu Yabuki, “Interview: China-watcher Yabuki says Senkakus are a diplomatic

mistake by Japan,” Asahi shimbun, 12 December 2012. Yabuki makes his strongest
accusations in his subsequent interview: Yabuki Susumu, interviewed by Mark Selden,“China-Japan territorial conflicts and the US-Japan-China relations in historical andcontemporary perspective,” The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 4 March 2013.
31 McCormack and Norimatsu, pp. 57-58.
32 There are those who now argue that it was China, first in 1992, then in 2008 and 2012,that pulled down the shelf. I am not persuaded, however, and the legal and administrative
measures referred to did not lead in practice to any change in China’s policies. (See Togo
Kazuhiko, “The Senkakus Issue,” NBR Japan Forum, 15 April 2013.))33 Details in McCormack and Norimatsu, pp. 211-214.
34 “Joint Press availability,” Department of State, 27 October 2010.
35 Ben Dolven, Shirley A. Kan, Mark E. Manyin, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia:

Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2013, p. 16.

36 “China condemns Senkaku amendment to US-Japan security treaty,” Japan Times, 4

December 2012.

37 Yabuki, interviewed by Mark Selden, p. 14-18.
38 Lee and Ming, p. 2
39 Ishihara Shintaro, “The US-Japan alliance and the debate over Japan’s role in Asia,”

lecture to Heritage Foundation, Washington D.C, 16 April 2012.

40 Mizuho Aoki, “Poster boasts metro plan to buy Senkakus,” Japan Times, 14 July 2012.
41 “To the American people, from Tokyo, Japan,” Wall Street Journal, 27 July 2012. And see

Kyodo, “Ad in Wall Street Journal seeks US support for Senkaku purchase plan,” Japan
Times, 29 July 2012.
42 Kyodo, “Government to make bid for Senkakus,” Japan Times, 8 July 2012.

McCormack: Much ado over small islands

235

43 In the Diet on 26 July 2012. See Takahashi Kosuke, “China, Japan stretch peace

pacts,” Asia Times Online, 7 August 2012.

44 Toyoshita, Senkaku mondai to wa nani ka, pp. 72-3.
45 Lee and Ming, pp. 4-5.
46 Meeting Deputy Secretary of State William Burns on 15 October, quoted in Tabata, p. 113,47 Abe Shinzō,"Atarashii kuni e,” Bungei shunjū, January 2013, 124-133, at p. 130. China’s

riposte came months later when Major-General Luo Yuan declared that it would depend for
resolution of the Diaoyu problem on “the elevation of our comprehensive national strength,”
to which end it would proceed with mobilizing its forces into Diaoyu waters, so that “whenneeded we can turn the three major fleets into a fist to draw out the [Japanese] blade.”(“Viewpoint: National strength still to be raised to solve Diaoyu Islands issue,” China
Military Online, 17 May 2013. )48 APA Group, Big Talk 257 - Japan Must Take Another Look at All Facets of its Modern

History, Including the Kono Statement, Murayama Statement, and Tokyo Trials HistoricalViewpoint. Hakubun Shimomura interviewed by Toshio Motoya, link.
49 Kyodo, “From Beijing, Hatoyama tells Tokyo to admit row,” Japan Times, 18 January 2012.
50 AFP-Jiji, “China hype: Hatoyama war regrets,” Japan Times, 19 January 2013.
51 Abe, meeting on 15 October with Deputy Secretary of State William Burns, quoted in

Tabata Mitsunaga, “Ryōyūken mondai o meguru rekishiteki jijitsu,” p. 113.

52 “Remarks With Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida After Their Meeting,” Hillary

Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Washington, DC, January 18, 2013. For Satoko Oka
Norimatsu’s analysis of the media reporting of this meeting, see “Kurinton Kishioda kaiken
hōdō: masumedia no aorini damasarenai yōni,” Peace Philosophy, 20 January 2013,
53 “Joint Statement by the United States and Japan,” Washington, 22 February 2013.
54 Jackie Calmes, “Japan and United States reaffirm their close ties,” New York Times, 22

February 2013.

55 Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, “Japan is back,” Speech on 22 February 2013 to CSIS,

Washington,

56 For US national and media thinking on the evolution of the “Japan question” under the

Abe government, see Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, William H. Cooper, Ian E.
Rinehart, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, May 1,
2013. ( 7-5700). And see Takeuchi Yoichi, “Shushō rekishi ninshiki Bei ga kenen ‘Higashi
Ajia konran’ ‘Beikoku kokueki gaisuru,” Tokyo shimbun, 9 May 2013.
57 “Eddie Mabo vs Queensland,” 1988 and 1992 in the High Court of Australia.
58 Toyoshita Narahiko, “‘Senkaku kōnyū’ mondai no kansei,” Sekai, August 2012, p. 42.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

236

59 For discussion of this point, Toyoshita, “Senkaku kōnyū’ mondai no kansei,” pp. 41-49(later resumed in his book, Senkaku mondai to wa nani ka, Iwanami gendai bunko, 2012.)
60 Wada Haruki, Ryōdo mondai o dō kaiketsu suru ka, Heibonsha shinsho, 2012, pp 23-33.
61 Toyoshita, “Senkaku kōnyū’ mondai no kansei,”pp. 44-45.
62 Yabe Teiji, Konoe Fumimaro, 2 vols, Kōbundō, 1952, vol 2, pp. 559-560.
63 See Peter Nolan, “Imperial Archipelagos: China, Western Colonialism and the Law of theSea,” New Left Review, 80, March-April 2013, pp. 77-95, and with specific reference to Japan,
my “Troubled seas: Japan’s Pacific and East China Sea Domains (and claims,)” The AsiaPacific Journal – Japan Focus, 3 September 2012.
64 See inter alia, “Deep-sea mud proves rich in rare earths, but remote deposits hard to

extract,” Yomiuri shimbun, 22 March 2013, and “Dai kibo kaitei kōshō ‘shigen rikken’ moyume de wa nai,” editorial, Ryukyu shimpō, 2 April 2013.
65 Gavan McCormack, “Troubled seas: Japan’s Pacific and East China Sea domains (andclaims),” The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 3 September 2012.
66 ibid.
67 Nolan, op cit, pp. 94-95.

68 In the view of Japan scholar Sun Ge (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), “Ganzen ni

semaru Okinawa minshu no sugata,” Gendai shisō, December 2012, pp, 158-165, at p. 164.
69 Alex Calvo, “Adult wisdom: The Japan-Taiwan fisheries deal,” Shingetsu News Agency, 19

April 2013.

70 Inoue, p. 123.
71 “China and Japan: Could Asia really go to war over these?” The Economist, 22 September

2012.

72 Hiyane Teruo, emeritus professor of the University of the Ryukyus, quoted in “Senkaku

kaiketsu e kennai kenkyūsha ra shidō,” Ryūkyū shimpō, 13 January 2013.

73 “Facing history, resolving disputes, working towards peace in East Asia: A Statement by

Minjian East Asia Forum,” revised, 12 November 2012. And see Wakabayashi Chiyo,“Futatabi ‘basho’ o sōzō suru,” Gendai shisō, December 2012, pp. 78-89.

74 “Jinmin nippō – rekishi no shiiteki kyokkai da,” editorial, Ryukyu shimpō, 12 May 2013.
75 Yabuki, interviewed by Mark Selden, p. 13.
76 Guo Rongxing, pp. 9, 25-6.
77 Wada, Ryōdo mondai o do kaiketsu suru ka, p. 19.
78 See my “Abe Days are Here Again - Japan in the World," The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan

Focus, 24 December 2012.

McCormack: Much ado over small islands

237

79 Zhang Ning, “‘Diaoyudao’ no haigo no Chūgoku no shisōteki bunki,” Gendai shisō,

December 2012, pp. 104-112, at p.106.

80 For the Congressional Research Service discussion, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East

Asia: Issues for Congress, p. 16 (fn. 24)

81 Togo Kazuhiko, “Japan’s territorial problem: the Northern Territories, Takeshima, andthe Senkaku islands,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, Commentary, 8 May 2012.
And see Togo and Kosaka, op. cit.
82 Yabuki, interviewed by Selden, p. 4.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

238

Asia-Pacific Journal Articles Recommended for Further Reading

Preparing Okinawa for Reversion to Japan: The Okinawa International Ocean Exposition of1975, the US Military and the Construction State
Vivian Blaxell
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Vivian-Blaxell/3386
July 19, 2010
The Ryukyus and the New, But Endangered, Languages of Japan
Fija Bairon, Matthias Brenzinger, Patrick Heinrich.
May 9, 2009http://www.japanfocus.org/-Matthias-Brenzinger/3138
Yonaguni: Dilemmas of a Frontier Island in the East China Sea
Gavan McCormack
October 1, 2012
http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3837
The Okinawan Diaspora in Japan at War
Steve Rabson
October 13, 2013
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Steve-Rabson/4008
Other Articles Recommended for Further Reading

Allen, Matthew. 2003. :”Wolves at the Back Door: Remembering the Kumejima Massacres.”
In Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds, Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japaneseand American Power. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Pp. 39-64.
Eldridge, Robert D. 2001. The origins of the bilateral Okinawa problem : Okinawa in postwar
U.S.-Japan relations, 1945-1952, East Asia, history, politics, sociology, culture. New York, NY:
Garland Pub.
Figal, Gerald A. 2003. “Waging Peace in Okinawa.” In Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds,
Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power. Lanham, Md.:
Rowman & Littlefield. Pp. 65-98.
Figal, Gerald A. 2012. Beachheads : war, peace, and tourism in postwar Okinawa. Lanham,Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
Hein, Laura and Mark Selden. 2003. ”Culture, Power and Identity in Contemporary
Okinawa.” In Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds, Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses toJapanese and American Power. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Pp. 1-35.
Heinrich, Patrick 2013. "Hōgen ronsō: the great Ryukyuan languages debate of 1940."
Contemporary Japan no. 25 (2):167-187.

Putting Okinawa at the Center

239

Howell, Thomas R. 2000. Foreclosing A Japanese Hong Kong: Okinawa, 1967-1972. In JPRI
Occasional Paper Cardiff, CA: Japan Policy Research Institute.
McCormack, Gavan. "Okinawa and the Structure of Dependence." In Japan and Okinawa :structure and subjectivity, edited by Glenn D. Hook and Richard Siddle, 93-113. London;
New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
McCormack, Gavan. 2013. "Yonaguni: Dilemmas of a Frontier Island in the East China Sea."
The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus.
Molasky, Michael S., and Steve Rabson. 2000. Southern exposure : modern Japanese
literature from Okinawa. Honolulu: University of Hawai*i Press.
Nakasone, Ronald Y., ed. Okinawan Diaspora. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 2003.
Obermiller, David. 2013. "Dreaminig Ryūkyū: Shifting and Contesting Identities in
Okinawa." In Japan since 1945 : from postwar to post-bubble, edited by Christopher Gerteis
and Timothy S. George. London; New York: Bloomsbury.
Rabson, Steve. 2008. "Okinawan Perspectives on Japan’s Imperial Institution." The AsiaPacific Journal: Japan Focus.
Rabson. 2012. The Okinawan Diaspora in Japan: Crossing the Borders Within. Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press.
Roberson, James E. 2003. :”Uchinā Pop: Place and Identity in Contemporary Okinawan
Popular Music.” In Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds, Islands of Discontent: Okinawan
Responses to Japanese and American Power. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. Pp. 39-64.
Yamashiro, Shin. 2005. "What in Okinawan about Okinawan Environmental Problems? : An
Outline of the Okinawa Cross-Cultural Environmental Experiences." The Okinawan Journalof American studies no. 2:51-56.
Smits, Gregory. 2006. "The Politics of Culture in Early Twentieth Century Okinawa." InJapaneseness versus Ryukyuanism : papers read at the Fourth International Conference on
Okinawan Studies, Bonn Venue, March 2002, edited by Josef Kreiner, 59-70. Bonn: Bonn
Bier'sche Verlagsanstalt.
Steben, Barry D. 1998. "The Transmission of Neo-Confucianism to the Ryukyu (Liuqiu)
Islands and Its Historical Significance " Sino-Japanese Studies no. 11 (1):39-60.
Yonetani, Julia. 2000. "Ambiguous Traces and the Politics of Sameness: Placing Okinawa in
Meiji Japan." Japanese Studies no. 20 (1):15-31. doi: 10.1080/10371390050009048.