The Cost of Doing Nothing:
The Economic Burden of Salmon Declines
in the Klamath Basin......

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Prepared by:
The Institute for Fisheries Resources
Northwest Regional Office PO Box 11170
Eugene, OR 97440-3370(541)' 689-2000
Report No. 2 of 3 in this Series • July 1998
© Institute for Fisheries Resources 1998

Preface
The supporting data for this report was prepared for The Institute for Fisheries Resources under
the direction of the Institute's Conservation Program Director, Glen Spain. Data used in preparing thisreport is from several sources as cited.
Much of the data was compiled and the historic run size estimate methodology used in this report
was developed by Dr. Hans Radtke, Natural Resource Economist, Yachats, Oregon in association with
Shannon W. Davis, The Research Group, Corvallis, Oregon. Dr. Radtke is an associate professor on
courtesy appointment at Oregon State University and is a recognized leader in input/output analysis
and natural resource economics. As a freelance economist, he has worked on a variety of fishingindustry related projects over many years. Mr. Davis is a systems research specialist with 15 years ofexperience in the field of planning.
We are also deeply indebted to Mr. David Bitts for the important historical information andoverview provided in the sections on the history of Klamath Basin fisheries management(Appendix A) and the role that mitigation hatcheries play in the Klamath Basin (Appendix B)
This report was prepared using accepted methodologies and existing data with the understandingthat technically sound and defensible approaches would be used. Because this philosophy was strictly
adhered to in all aspects of this report, many of these estimates are very conservative. Less conservative
assumptions would lead to much higher job loss and economic loss figures.
This is the second report in a series of three reports, including Report No. 1 (Columbia River
Basin) and Report No. 3 (California Central Valley River Basins) using similar methodologies. A full
explanation of the basic economic methodology used in all three reports is contained (for brevity) onlyin the Columbia River Basin Report (Report No. 1), rather than duplicated in all three. That report
should be referred to for the details of our methodology. 1 Where other information was used, thesource is indicated.
This report is prepared to assist in analysis and decision making and is based upon the best available
information. The authors' interpretations and recommendations should prove valuable for that
purpose, but no assurance can be given that decisions based on this data will fulfill expectations ofmarket demands nor achieve any specific financial projections. Neither the study sponsor, nor any
person acting on its behalf, makes any warranty of representation, express or implied, on the usefulness
or accuracy of this information for commercial or· any other business purposes.
Production layout for this report was done by Berkana Publications of Eugene, OR. The covergraphic is a stylized picture of a commercial salmon troller typical of the many family owned boats
which make up the majority of the west coast salmon fleet.

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The Institute for Fisheries Resources is a nonprofit public benefit corporation dedicated to theprotection and restoration of marine and anadromous resources. The Institute is also affiliated with the
Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations (PCFFA), the largest organization of commercial
fishermen on the west coast, whose many members have been leaders in the protection and restorationof salmon habitat throughout the region.
1.

"The Cost of Doing Nothing: The Economic Burden of Salmon Declines in the Columbia River Basin': Report
No. l of 3 Institute for Fisheries Resources (October 1996). InparticularseeAppendixA of that report.

----------------------------------~-------~------ ~All rights to reproduce this document (or any portion of it) are reseived to the Institute forFisheries Resources. However, this document and any excerpts from it may be freely reproduced anddistributed for educational purposes, in public debate on the issues it raises, or for public testimony at
any time without prior approval or consent. The issue of the ultimate cost to society of environmental
destruction is one of the most important issues of our time. It is our hope that this report will shed somelight on the very real costs of doing nothing to prevent that destruction in the Klamath River Basin-abasin that was once the third most productive salmon river system in western North America.
Primary funding for this report was generously provided by The David and Lucile Packard
Foundation, with additional funding assistance from the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the True North
Foundation, the Bullitt Foundation, the Flintridge Foundation and the Rockefeller Family Fund. Thesefoundations have become leaders in the current effort to protect and restore the irreplaceable natural
resources of the west coast. Their assistance and support for this effort is greatly appreciated.

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in the first place, would be totally unnecessary. See Appendix A: "A Brief History of Klamath Basin
Fisheries Management" for more details.
Wholesale destruction of salmon habitat, excessive water diversions and the impacts of dams haveall combined to drive wild Klamath Basin salmon very close to extinction. 4 Other inland Klamath Basinfish, many dependent on the same habitats, are already on the Endangered Species List.5 In spite ofoften heroic restoration efforts by commercial fishermen and many others, the overall trend in the
Klamath Basin still appears to be toward extinction of salmon (and most other fish species) in large
portions of the basin. This may continue to be the case until policy makers tackle the tough questions
and address the underlaying land uses and water diversions causing salmon declines. The serious
economic impacts of these declines has been widespread but generally ignored by policy makers.

The Cost of Doing Nothing and the Price of Extinction
There is a very real economic cost to society-in terms of lost jobs and forgone economic
opportunities-of doing nothing to reverse the trend toward the decline of salmon in the Klamath
Basin. This "cost of doing nothing" can in fact be quite high.
The easiest way to quantify this cost for Klamath Basin salmon is to compare the historic productive
capacity of the river system with its current greatly diminished productivity, assuming all other things
the same. This difference can then be quantified as the "net economic drag" created by the loss of these
salmon runs in terms of today's dollars and today's lost jobs.
We make no effort in this report to allocate these impacts as among the three main sectors of thesalmon fishing economy, although we know that commercial, recreational and Tribal fishermen all arebeing adversely affected by these declines throughout the entire southern Oregon and northern
California region. 6 We can, however, estimate what the losses have been as a whole, as well as what therisk of future economic loss is if the current trend toward extinction is not reversed.
Using estimates derived from available habitat stream miles within the basin, and applying well
accepted estimates of escapement and spawning, the estimated run size of salmon (in adult equivalents)that made up the pre-development Klamath Basin salmon runs would have been between about 0.66 to
1.1 million fish. These run sizes, if they were available today (and assuming only a 50% harvest rate),would have annually yielded about 4,218,750 to 7,462,500 pounds of salmon to harvesters from between
328,750 to 545,000 fish (see Table 3). Using an existing (and basin-specific) economic study prepared
for the U.S. Department of Interior (see Table 4) which calculated the net economic contribution per
4.

The American Fisheries Society report "Salmon at the Crossroads" (see footnote 2) identified several Klamath
Basin salmon stocks as at risk of extinction. Coho salmon in the basin were listed under the Federal ESA as
threatened on May 6, 1997 (62 Fed. Reg. 24,588).

5.

The Lost River sucker (known to the Klamath Indians as the "tschum '? and the short-nosed sucker fish (the"kuptu ") are among the Klamath River fish species listed under both California and federal Endangered Species
Acts. For federal listing as endangered see 53 Fed. Reg. 27,130 (July 18, 1988).

6.

Separating out which portion of these job losses would impact which sector of the overall fishing economy would
take a level of detail that is not readily available, including extensive coded-wire tag data that has never been
compiled or correlated with economic data. This level of detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this report. All
economic sectors are being affected and the total impact is the important number.

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every 1,000 harvested fish, we can then estimate the net economic contribution such a hypothetical predevelopment harvest level could have generated. This is the overall economic potential of the basin interms of salmon production, conveniently converted into today's dollars.
All the harvesting, processing, and related economic activities associated with the Klamath Riversalmon and steelhead fishery at these pre-development run levels, if available today (at this 50%
harvest rate), could thus potentially generate regional economic benefits ( in 1996 dollars) as follows:•

Up to about $137.4 million/year in total personal income;•Up to about 6,870 jobs, based on a full time equivalent annual job earning$20,000 per year ($10 per hour).

The differences between these figures and today's dismal to nonexistent salmon harvests from theKlamath reflect the net economic damage done by these declines. These figures also therefore
represent the net "cost of doing nothing" to reverse these declines.

Roughly 3,090 fishery jobs generated from this basin still exist. However, up to roughly 3, 780 fisheryrelated jobs have already been destroyed-largely because of habitat destruction and consequent loss ofwild salmon productivity within the basin. Most of the remaining jobs-mostly supported by hatcheryreleases, not wild fish-are also at considerable risk from continued loss of habitat. Ultimately bothwild and hatchery fish must share the same habitat. Continued loss of habitat carrying capacity is
destroying hatchery and wild fish alike.
On the positive side, this 3,780 job loss figure (the equivalent of $75.6 million/year in lost economic
impacts) also represents the annual economic "dividend" which could potentially be derived from asocial investment in measures to make the Klamath River Basin more fish friendly. These measures
include better protection for riparian areas and the reallocation of water within the basin in ways that
better support fish. While full restoration to historic river populations is perhaps no longer possible,
nevertheless this figure demonstrates that the economic dividend of even partial restoration can still be
substantial.
Many measures can be taken to minimize the adverse impacts of agricultural and forestry (such as
water conservation and better road building practices) which in themselves have little or no impact oncompeting sectors while greatly increasing the economic dividend from restored fisheries. It thus makes------~------------------------ ________________,..

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little economic sense not to restore salmon to as near as feasible to their once abundant levels. Each

additional salmon helps create additional jobs.

What is the Klamath Basin Salmon Fishery Worth?
The present value of an income stream received over time is that income stream's "net asset value."Standard calculations based on the potential income stream from the Klamath Basin salmon fishery
shows that the net asset value of this fishery is at least $4.5 billion. 7 In other words, maintaining thecurrent regime of water system mismanagement and habitat destruction in the Kl.amath Basin may
ultimately (if these salmon go extinct) cost society at least $4.5 billion in lost economic value from thatfishery. Using other less conservative discount assumptions would give values up to $13.8 billion (seeTable 5), even without adding in any non-market benefits or any of the "secondary effects" and indirect
costs caused by related ocean fishing closures triggered by weak stock management. 8
A program of stringent protections for the remaining wild fish runs, coupled with an aggressive
effort toward habitat restoration, dam retrofitting or retirement and water allocation reforms continues
to make good economic sense. In addition to reducing existing and potential future conflicts between
one industrial sector and another, such a restoration program would also help return real jobs and real
economic value to the in-river and coastal economies in both Oregon and California which have been
economically the most devastated as Klamath Basin salmon declined.
Benefits from salmon restoration would not be limited to the Klamath Basin alone. As an example,
until recently Klamath River fall chinook salmon typically made up as much as 30% of all salmon
harvested between the ports of Coos Bay (OR) and Fort Bragg (CA) (Figures 4 and 5). Economic
problems created by salmon habitat destruction in the Klamath Basin are thus problems for many
coastal and inland communities throughout the whole region. It is these communities that now bear thebrunt of the "externalized costs" of this destruction. Klamath Basin salmon restoration can thus benefit
the entire regional economy.
Restoration of depressed Klamath Basin wild salmon stocks would also free up other ocean and inriver fisheries from the biological constraints of ''weak stock management," and thus allow a number ofmore abundant fish stocks to be harvested. An economic analysis of this secondary factor is beyond thescope of this report, but would without doubt be substantial. The economic benefits of additional fish
harvests in any form would cascade throughout the regional economy.

7.

In this case using a 3% annual discount rate over a term of 100 years (N =100). Other values can be derived using
different assumptions (see Table 5). The calculated hypothetical figure of $4.347 billion (Table 5) is themathematical result of many estimates and thus can only be expressed accurately to the nearest two digit significant
figures, and thus becomes $4.5 billion to two significant figures.

8.

These figures deliberately excludes all economic benefits allocated by Meyer (Table 4) to "non-market benefits" andso may be greatly understating the true societal value of this fishery. If added back in, these non-market economic
benefits would bring the total annual personal income impacts to potentially as high as $374.86 million/year. Using
the same discount assumptions (3% to 0% over a term of 100 years), the calculated net asset value of this fisherywould then be from $11.85 billion to $37.486 billion. Thus our calculated net asset value offrom $4.5 billion to$13.8 billion is a very conservative estimate.
XSource: Adapted from Klamath Fishery Task Force Report (1991)

Xll

Introduction"The increasing loss offish habitat, to pollution, unwise development and other humanactivities, is the single largest long-term threat to the future viability of the marine fisheries of
the United States ... Protection of habitat is the cheapest investment the nation can make tosustain productive fisheries',r;Until recent times the Klamath River Basin was the third most prolific producer of wild salmon on
the U.S. west coast. In just the last 140years, however, many wild salmon runs throughout the Klamath
Basin have been driven downward in numbers almost to the point of extinction. There is muchdiscussion these days about what to do about it. Almost universally the costs of emergency restoration
measures are widely acknowledged. Yet rarely is any attempt made by decision-makers to ascertain
what these declines have already cost or could potentially cost fishermen and fishing dependent
economies in terms of lost jobs, Jost economic opportunities and shattered Jives.
This report estimates the lost economic value to society, in terms of real jobs and dollars, which has
already been caused by allowing valuable salmon and steelhead runs in the Klamath Basin to decline
percipitously. These losses continue to be exacted from the regional economy each year. We also
estimate the annual future economic damages if these declines are allowed to continue. This economic
contribution is measured as household income potentially generated to harvesters (returns to owners,
skippers, and crew members), to processors, and to supporting businesses. In economic terms, these areregional economic impacts measured by direct, indirect, and induced income generated by commercial
salmon fishing activity annually.
Finally, we use the estimated annual income stream to derive the "net asset value" of the Klamath
Basin salmon resource as a whole-in other words, the real social cost to society if something is notdone to reverse the present trend toward salmon extinction. This net asset value is the net present valueof the future annual income streams which could have been realized over the _next one hundred years
had these declines never taken place. The end result is a preliminary estimate of the "cost of doing
nothing"-i.e., the economic costs to society of allowing the present declines to continue unab.ated. As
it turns out, the economic losses to society which would result from salmon extinctions are enormous.
Any estimate of economic impacts and asset values are sensitive, among other things, to figures forannual landings, the proportion of the run size available for harvest, the time frame being considered,and the future discount rate and analysis perio4 ~ed. The assumptions chosen for th-is report are
relative/,y conservative. Less stringent assumptions would simply result in higher loss figures andproportionately higher asset values which could potentially be lost.
Conditions have radically changed, of course, since the first settlement of the Klamath River Basinby Europeans. It is probably not possible to ignore all of the present demands on the river, nor to
expect that the fishery runs can return to historic levels without major changes in present water use.

9.

From Hinman and Safina, 1992. Summary and Recommendations. In: R.H. Stroud (ed), "Stemming the Tide of
Coastal Fish Habitat Loss." Marine Recreational Fisheries Symposium 14:245-249. National Coalition for Marine
Conservation, Savannah, GA.

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However, many realistic measures can still be taken to mitigate past practices and to help restore atleast a large part of the currently depressed wild salmon runs in a cost-effective manner.
The economic potential of the salmon resource, once restored, to repay what may be a substantialsocial investment in restoration depends on the potential economic value of the salmon resource to be
recovered. This value establishes the level of the "economic dividend" that could potentially beachieved through recovery. As seen from the analysis, the value of this potential economic dividend
could be quite large-more than large enough, in fact, to make reasonable recovery efforts very costeffective.
Many of the current fish-destroying land use and water system management practices in the
Klamath Basin are simply unnecessary. Many cost effective strategies have been proposed which would
allow both crop irrigation, timber harvest, grazing and other human activities to co-exist with salmon.
Many of these measures, however, will take a social investment of money and effort to get there.
Among other uses, these figures demonstrate that such an investment is just that-an investment,
and not a true cost. There will be a real economic return on that investment-in effect a dividend fromthe sustainable use of this "natural capital." This dividend can repay this investment over time. Most of
the changes required are one time costs. However, the economic dividend from salmon restoration willcontinue to benefit all future generations.
This report deals only with certain "hard" economic values which can be most easily quantified interms of lost dollars and jobs. However, it should always be remembered that there are many other(non-market) social and cultural values which salmon also provide, but which are outside the scope of
this report. Economics alone will not speak of the religious and cultural value of salmon to those whose
lives and cultures are inextricably intertwined with this species. We should never forget that these othersocial values are often far more'real so far as our daily lives are concerned than merely monetary ones.
The plight of salmon in the Pacific Northwest and northern California is a microcosm of the failureof our modem technological society to define a workable relationship between Humanity and the restof the natural world. Efforts in the Klamath Basin to rescue salmon are set against the background of a
massive cultural effort to redefine that relationship before we drive the majority of today's species (andwith them ourselves) to extinction. There are many lessons to be learned from salmon which will aid
this process. It is our hope that this analysis will contribute to that effort.

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The Klamath River Basin 10
More than any other wild region I've known, the K/,amaths have a venerable quality
which is not synonymous with "pristine" "unspoiled," or other adjectives commonly
applied to natural areas. These adjectives imply something of the smoothness andplumpness ofyouth, whereas the K/,amaths are marked by the wrinkles and leanness ofgreat age. Although their peaks and high plateaus have been marked by glacier they areat heart preglacial mountains, with elements offlora and fauna that reach back farther
into the past than any place west of the Mississippi River. The K/,amaths seem so old, infact, that I'd call them a grandparent of the Sie"a and Cascades instead of a sibling.
Owing to winters mild enough and summers moist enough for species to grow together
that are elsewhere segregated by elevation or latitude, several species that once grewthroughout the West now su,vive only in the K/,amaths.
-David Rains Wallace, "The K/,amath Knot"

The Tragic History of Salmon Habitat Destruction
Flowing through the Klamath Mountains, the Klamath River is the second largest in California,
draining approximately 15,600 square miles of northern California and southeast Oregon. It ranges inelevation from sea level at the mouth of the Klamath River to over 9,500 feet at the summit of Mt.
McLaughlin in the Cascade Range. Over half of the area is mountainous and is composed of steep,rugged slopes which are highly subject to erosion. Extensive lowlands are found only in the southern
Oregon or "Upper Basin" portion of the watershed-thus the headwaters of the basin are also precisely
in those lands most useful for farming and so most subject to irrigation demands at the expense of
salmon.
Historical accounts of the impact of European settlement in the Klamath. provide a grim picture of
the many assaults on salmon habitat, in addition to unregulated harvesting, which brought salmon in
the basin to their current depressed status. Among the best historical summaries is the .following:"Before Europeans settled in the Klamath Basin, the Yurok, Hoopa, and Karuk
Indians had been sustained by the river's fishes for thousands of years. Weirs wereconstructed annually at various sites in the Hoopa Valley, at Red Cap Creek, and thelargest at Cappell Creek below Weitchpec. Conservation of salmon populations wasinsured by use of harvest methods governed in accordance with a complex set of socialand religious customs. The behavior may have evolved from past experience with foodshortages after periods of overharvest.
"Mining was the first major impact of European culture on the Klamath watershed.
The first wave of degradation changed the balance of the river's chinook stocks frompredominantly spring chinook to fall chinook runs. The primary cause of the decline

10. Additional historical information can be found in "California's Chinook Salmon: Upstream Battle to Restore theResource," Western Water, Water Education Foundation, November/December 1992.

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may have been the heavy sediment loads unleashed by hydraulic mining which filled the
deep pools required by spring chinook for holding during summer. Sediment problems
from mining were probably exacerbated by a large flood in 1861. Miners may have beenheavily reliant on salmon as a food source. Snyder claimed that 'large numbers of
salmon were speared or otherwise captured as they neared their spawning beds, and if
credence be given to the reports of old miners, there then appeared to be the first andperhaps major cause of early depletion.' A splash dam was constructed across theKlamath basin until it was washed out by a flood in 1902. By 1892, spring chinook were
thought to be almost extinct.
"It is unlikely that the Indian harvest contributed substantially to the early decline of

the spring run of chinook salmon. Spring chinook were not a high priority for
subsistence harvest by Indians because the fish's high body fat made it unsuitable fordrying and smoking. Because the river was often swollen and surging in the spring due
to snow melt, spring chinook may have been difficult to harvest even with gill nets. The
Yurok began to fish commercially at the mouth of the Klamath in 1876. Only Indians
were allowed to fish and the first pack for the new canneries in the lower river was in1881.
"Gold mining in the Klamath Basin dwindled at the tum of the century due todecreased profits. As habitat began to recover, the fall chinook in the river started torebound. The runs rebuilt to a peak in abundance around 1912, as indicated by thecannery pack. Toe Yurok began to modernize and increase their fishing efforts about
1915 and continued to do so until 1928.
"Commercial gill net harvest in the Sacramento River was greatly reduced in the
1880's as a result of pressure from sport fishermen. With the resurgence of salmon
populations in both the Sacramento and the Klamath Rivers, the ocean troll fisherygrew. Trolling efforts were fairly primitive, at first involving sailboats in the Monterey
and San Francisco Bay areas. By 1915 boats with motors were in use, and both catch andeffort were rising. Snyder and Schofield-tagged salmon-from the Klamath and noted thatthey were being caught as far south as Monterey. The combined efficiency of the newtroll fishery, which by 1920 covered the entire coast, and the modem gill net fisheryproved too much for the salmon. Snyder's observations were correct. Klamath stocks
reached an extreme low in the early 1930's. Toe canneries on the river were orderedclosed in 1~33, and commercial fishing in the river was outlawed."
Although the Klamath had already suffered much abuse, a biologist by the name of John Snyder(working for the California Division of Fish and Game) did a number of important fish surveys in the
1920's and 30's which has given us early baseline data by which to judge population trends. After
Snyder's work, little information about Klamath River run sizes was collected. The California salmon
troll fishery had declining catches through the 1930's, reaching a record low in 1938. After World War
II, the ocean salmon fishery rebounded strongly. Runs in the Klamath during the postwar period
probably reflected this general trend.
"Timber harvest activities were greatly increased after World War II. Disturbances
associated with logging and the 1955 flood caused substantial damage to salmon andsteelhead habitat. Toe flood and the poor ocean conditions (El Nino) in 1956-57
resulted in a downturn in salmon spawning escapement. Toe 1964 flood was a4catastrophic event which caused major habitat losses throughout the Klamath River
Basin. Entire watersheds turned into debris flows in some areas of the basin. From 1964
to 1984, the river's anadromous fish declined further. The habitat loss above Trinity and
Iron Gate dams, the reduced flows in the Trinity, lingering effects from the 1964 flood,further habitat degradation, continued fishing pressure, and natural cycles like El Ninoand the 1976-77 drought drove the river's stocks to new lows.
"From 1985 to 1988, salmon runs in the Klamath and Trinity Rivers rebounded, withparticularly large returns to the Trinity River and Iron Gate hatcheries. Evidence
suggests that many of the native stock groups of salmon, steelhead, and otheranadromous fishes of the basin may not have experienced increases similar to thehatchery stocks of chinook ·and coho salmon. As in Snyder's day, opinions vary as towhether stocks in the river are building up or in further decline." 11
A complicating factor in assessing wild salmon abundance is the widespread use of hatcheries to
produce additional fish for harvest. Large hatchery-produced runs often mask wild salmon run declines,
and until very recently the California Department of Fish and Game made little or no effort todistinguish between the two within the basin. Habitat loss, furthermore, is still pervasive throughout thebasin. Grazing, logging and water diversions still continue in the basin in ways that exacerbate andperpetuate existing salmon habitat problems and prevent recovery. Many of these practices are also
highly resistant to change because they are built into and sanctioned by customary land use patterns andarchaic water and land use laws.
The topology within much of the southern portion of the basin is steep sloped and highly erodable.
The commonly occurring granitic-type soils are especially sensitive to human disturbances such as
logging and grazing. Soil erosion caused by human disturbance to these unstable slopes has added huge
sediment loads to many salmon spawning streams which smothers eggs and juvenile salmon with silt. 12
Historically the Klamath and its six major tributaries-the Trinity, Salmon, Scott, Shasta, Spragueand Williamson Rivers-supported the third largest Pacific salmon runs found in the lower 48 states.
However, today at least 10 of the basin's 54 remaining salmon populations are at risk of extinction, withmany others severely depressed. 13•
For millennia the Klamath and Trinity Rivers (Figure 1) also provided important salmon habitat for
the Indian Tribal fishery. However the Hoopa, Karuk, Klamath and Yurok Tribes, who have fished the

11. Historical summary in this section is taken from "Long Range Plan for the Klamath River Basin Conservation
Area Fishery Restoration Program," prepared by the Klamath River Basin Fisheries Task Force with assistancefrom William M. Ki.er Associates, January 1991. Citations within that report have been omitted for brevity.
12. See for instance the sediment budget load research of Dr. Sari Sommarstrom in her work assessing the impact oflogging operations in the Scott Valley sub-basin of the Klamath, "Scott River Basin Granitic Sediment Study,"
Sommarstrom, S., E. Kellogg and J. Kellog& prepared for the Siskiyou Resource Conservation District (November,1990). Logging operations often have a synergistic impact-the sum of stream sedimentation washing down fromeither a clearcut or a logging road alone is often much less than that typically coming out of a combination of thetwo together.

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13. From Nehlsen, W., et. at ibid. (see note 2).
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Klamath and its tributaries for more than 10,000 years, now fear that these fish, upon which the very
survival of their culture depends, will soon be gone forever.
The Klamath Basin is also visited every year by more migratory waterfowl than anywhere else in
North America. Klamath Lake (in Klamath County, OR) is a major stop on the Pacific Flyway. The
Klamath Basin National Wildlife Refuges provide feeding and resting grounds for about a million
migrating ducks and geese each year. Four out of every five birds on the Pacific Flyway pass throughthese refuges. Of the 411 bird species that use the refuges, 25 are classed as endangered, threatened orof special concern and virtually all are protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. 703 et.
seq.). The shallow wildlife refuge lakes in the "Upper Basin" (which is that portion of the watershed
above Iron Gate dam) are also constantly pitted against the needs of irrigators. In recent years
waterfowl populations within the refuge areas have plummeted as agricultural water diversions
repeatedly dried up the refuge lakes. Agricultural operations are also allowed within the wildlife refuge
itself-about 22,000 acres of the wildlife refuge lands are currently leased for farming. Typicalagricultural practices on these lands (including the extensive use of pesticides toxic to birds and otherwildlife) routinely go on which are inconsistent with management of the wildlife refuge and thus inapparent violation of several federal laws. 14
In 1994, the Pacific Fishery Management Council reviewed and reported on the underlying causes· of the failure over the prior three years to meet the minimum spawner escapement goals of its Fishery
Management Plan for Klamath River chinook. The Council concluded that in addition to problems
with ocean survival and past harvest methodologies those causes also included: (1) low mainstem andtributary flows, exacerbated by irrigation diversion and drought; (2) hatchery operations, especially withregard to the size of juveniles at release and the magnitude and timing of releases, and; (3) habitat
conditions such as degradations of spawning and rearing areas by siltation, loss of riparian cover, andlarge woody debris removal. 15

Lack of Water and Lack of Upstream Passage
A major limiting factor for fish in the upper.portion of the basin is sheer.lack of in-stream waterflows. The eastern portion of the basin is arid and subject to drought. Expanding agriculture in theupper basin increased pressure for dams to impound large volumes of water for exclusive human use.
Dams in the Klamath River Basin were first built in the 1850's to supply water to mining and farming
operations, and over the years these many small dams were replaced by several major ones with little orno thought to fish passage or the in-stream flow needs of fish and wildlife.
Increasing irrigation water demands eventually resulted in the "Klamath Irrigation Project" aroundthe tum of the century. The avowed purpose of this large federal water delivery project was to capture

14. A number ofgroups have brought suit alleging that these practices within the refuges violate (among other laws),
The Kuchel Act (16 U.S.C. 695k et. seq.) which originally established these refuges, The National Wildlife Refuge
SystemAdministrationAct (16 U.S.C. 688dd et. seq.), the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 668
et. seq.) and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (16 U.S.C. 703 et. seq.). This action is now pending as case#S97-2274GEB-GGH in U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of California.
15. Pacific Fishery Management Counci~ "Klamath Fall Chinook Review Team Report," Portland, Oregon, December
1994.

---...----...----------------------------------....---..,.--------- ~6and deliver large volumes of federally subsidized water for agricultural development. In 1905, pursuant
to an Oregon statute16 the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation filed for water rights under Oregon state law
claiming its intent "to completely utilize all the waters of the Klamath River Basin in Oregon" for the
Klamath Project. Based on this statute, the Oregon Attorney General has recently issued an advisory
opinion that these water rights can only be used for irrigation purposes, and that there is no federal
authority to apply any of this water to protection offish and wildlife. 11
In other words, the irrigators in the Upper Klamath (Oregon) claim that all the water in the river
can legally be confiscated by themselves without any accommodation for fish or wildlife needs. This flies
directly in the face of several federal statutes (including the federal Endangered Species Act) andfederal case law as well as jeopardizing the water rights of downriver users (such as the Yurok Tribe)
under Tribal treaty rights guaranteeing them adequate water flows for fish. 18 Eventually there will be amajor legal confrontation between these two incompatible water rights theories. Recent efforts by the
Bureau of Reclamation to cut back deliveries on its long term water contracts in order to protect
recently listed coho salmon have been challenged in court and are now in litigation.19...

._._.-i.ow· , ·._ :: • '.=•~: :• :a •,. . _::-:._:;· :·:·>) /;:?:.::~(: =::::;;f.;\'t:wff{') -Source: Bottom, et al. (1985)

16. 1905 Oregon Laws, Chapter 228 in General and Special Laws of Oregon (pgs. 401-406).
17. Letter from Oregon Attorney General to Martha Page, Director, OR Water Resources Dept. dated March 18, 1996
(DOI File No. 690-002-G0037-86-0010).
18. See also a letter dated March ~ 199~ to Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt from the Law Firm ofAlexander &Karshmer on behalf of the Yurok Tribe. Recent opinions by the U.S. Solicitor General's Office also indicate thatfederal treaty obligations should prevail over Oregon's state water laws.
19. Klamath Water Users Association, et. al vs. Patterson, (Civil Case No. 97-3033-CO) recently filed in the U.S.
District Court of Oregon. A number offisheries groups, including the Institute for Fisheries Resources, haveintervened in this case and it is cu"ently in litigation.
7

In granting a license to Pacific Power and Light Company to operate Iron Gate Dam, the federal
government did recognize the fishery needs for assured releases of water below the dam, making
specific minimum releases a condition of the permit issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) for continued operation.
In recent years, however, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation has often refused to provide even these
FERC-minimum releases, let alone the larger flows probably necessary to satisfy the government's
federal trust responsibility to the tribes and under the ESA. Instead, as has happened throughout thearid west (including California's Central Valley) the Bureau has continued to provide full water supplies
to irrigators even during extended periods of drought at the expense of fish and wildlife and down riverinterests. The Bureau has even cut promised flows for fish and wildlife during the recent wet years of1995 and 1996 in order to meet the continually growing demands of Klamath Basin irrigators.
As on the Sacramento River, Bureau officials did recently modify water releases from Upper
Klamath Lake on the Klamath River, and from Lewiston Dam on the Trinity River, to improve waterflow conditions for fall-run spawners. But on the Klamath, these downstream measures are complicatedby the presence of two endangered freshwater fish in Upper Klamath Lake.20 In 1992, the US Fish andWildlife Service specified that certain lake elevations must be maintained to protect these fish. Such
dilemmas and trade-offs between species, some say, are a fact of life. "If you manage for one fish, yousometimes shortchange other fish," said Randall Brown, chief of Oregon's Department of Water
Resources Environmental Services Office.

Others, however, take issue with this argument and contend that it is not a matter of "either-or,"but rather of how the water project system as a whole is operated. To date the Klamath Project (thelargest federal water project in the basin) has been operated almost solely in order to satisfy upper basin
irrigation needs, with fish and wildlife needs explicitly given a much lower priority. This one-sided
management policy utterly ignores the economic losses to fishing-dependent communities downstream
who continue to suffer as the salmon resource they depend upon economically is slowly strangled toextinction. The Bureau of Reclamation's irrigation policies still do not acknowledge that there are othermajor economic interests besides agriculture involved in how the basin's water is managed.
Gradually, pressure from fishing organizations and the general public has forced federal water
agencies to begin to provide for the real water flow needs for fish throughout thf? basin. As could be
anticipated, these issues are hotly contested and have become highly politicized.
To their credit, the 1998 management proposals by the Bureau of Reclamation have acknowledged
their legal obligation to provide more water through the Klamath Project to protect downriver
spawning and rearing areas for ESA listed coho salmon. The Bureau's most recent "Draft 1998
Klamath Operations Plan Environmental Assessment" flatly admits that FERC-required minimum
flows ''would likely jeopardize the continued existence of coho salmon, adversely modify this species'
habitat and likely result in the listing of steelhead and chinook salmon." They also candidly admit that
"Overall, all of the alternatives provide inadequate flow for salmon egg incubation, fry and juvenile
rearing and outmigration during the period of April through June." Nevertheless, the Bureau is still
20. The federally and California listed Lost River and shortnosed sucker fish (the "tschwan" and "kaptu" as they are
known by the Klamath Tribes) were both historically very important not only as food sources but also to thereligious life and culture of the Klamath Tribe which has occupied the Upper Klamath Basin for thousands of___________________________ ____________ ___years.

..,.._....,..._

...

.,.,
______.,.

~~

8not proposing any options that would cure these obvious problems. Criticisms of the Bureau's
management of the Klamath Project continue to be valid, though with some hope that things may bechanging under the ESA.
Iron Gate Dam, the lowest of four mainstem Klamath dams, was built in 1956. Iron Gate is justbelow the Oregon border and is quite literally impassable for migratory salmon. All native salmon runs
originating above Iron Gate dam are now extinct. More than 75 miles of mainstem river, plus all its
tributaries as far as north of Upper Klamath Lake continue to be blocked by this dam. Habitat for
about 9,000 chinook and 7,500 steelhead spawners is potentially available in this area. 21 Blocking thishabitat represents a total lost economic value of $2.08 million/year ($252,170/1000 fish x 16,500 x 50%
harvest rate) in accordance with the figures developed in this report.

Danger
Zone

Danger
Zone

41

50

59

68

n

WATER TEMPERATURE (°F)

.Flaw

gen

Temperature

Source: Bottom, et. Al. (1985)
Note:
Salmon can only exist within a limited range of conditions. Water much over about 59 (F 0 ) in temperature greatly
increases stress and reduces survival. Reducing overall stream flow makes the remaining water easier for
sunlight to heat up. Increased water temperature in tum reduces dissolved oxygen, disrupts the food chain, andhas a multitude of overall negative impacts on salmon reproduction and survival. Dissolved oxygen levels far
below the minimum necessary to support fish are frequently observed below Iron Gate Dame and for somedistance downstream. Less water in the system also means greater concentration of pollutants from agriculturalor urban runoff. Stream flow issues are, therefore, intimately related to all other salmon survival factors.

21. From "Long Range Plan for the Klamath River Basin Conservation Area Fishery Restoration Program," ibid,
pg. 2-72.

- ------------------------....----------- ~9

Preventing Overfishing
There is no question that overfishing of Klamath Basin salmon occured in the past before there
were any regulations in place to prevent it. However, salmon harvests are now regulated under bothstate law and federally (since 1976) under the Sustainable Fisheries Act (16 U.S.C. 1801 et. seq.) in an
extensive effort to prevent any further overfishing.
Unfortunately, once in the ocean it is impossible to easily differentiate between individual salmon
runs. Thus the weakest stock becomes the biological limiting factor on all other harvests. In otherwords, even though other stocks may be far more abundant, they cannot be harvested once the "cap" isreached on the weakest. This biological principle is called "weak stock management," and is now built
into the very fabric of all fisheries management, both within the states and at the federal level.
Federal fisheries management coastwide is deeply affected by the decline of the Klamath Riverstocks under this "weak stock management" principle. The Sustainable Fisheries Act authorizes thefederal fisheries off California, Oregon and Washington (i.e., outside the 3-mile limit of state waters to
200 miles) to be managed by the Pacific Fisheries Management Council (PFMC). Congress also set up
a special management zone within the area in which Klamath river salmon are the most abundant,
which is called the Klamath Management Zone (KMZ). A special federal body known as the Klamath
Fishery Management Council was established in 1986 to help manage fishing impacts in the KMZ. 22
This body serves as an advisory body to the Secretary of Commerce and essentially exercises the same
fisheries management functions over the KMZ that the Pacific Fishery Management Council (PFMC)
does over the remainder of the west coast fishery beyond the 3-mile limit of state jurisdiction.23
Many of the relatively abundant salmon runs originating both north and south of the KMZ migrate
through the KMZ area during at least part of their life cycle. The health of wild salmon originating
within the KMZ thus becomes the most important limiting factor restricting harvests in and around the
KMZ for the entire California, Oregon and Washington salmon fishery under the principles of weak
stock management.24
For instance, when biologists predicted a very low return of Klamath River fall-run chinook
spawners in 1992, federal and state officials complete'ly closed all commercial ocean salmon fishing from
Point Arena in Mendocino County north to Florence, Oregon. Commercial fishing was also severely
limited from Point Arena south to Point San Pedro in central California from May through July to
22. The Klamath Fishery Management Council was established by 16 U.S.C. 460ss-2 under P.L. 99-552.
23. State jurisdiction is exclusive over inland waters to the shoreline, but concurrent with the federal Regional Fishery
Management Councils' jurisdiction from the shoreline to 3 miles offshore. From 3 miles to the 200-mile limit ofU.S. territorial waters exclusive management offederal fisheries rests in the various Regional Fishery Management
Councils created under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (16 U.S.C. 1801 et.
seq.; P. L. 94-265), now called the "Sustainable Fisheries Act."
24. The amount of lost fishery income related to these secondary impacts from Klamath Basin-decline driven ocean
fishery closures is outside the scope of this report, and could not be easily ascertained without extensive research,
including coded wire tag studies that have not yet been done. However, these impacts are (as seen from the example
presented) obviously quite large. Had these secondary impacts also been factored into the job loss equation, thenumber ofjobs lost or at risk would have been much greater than the relatively conservative figures actually used inthis report.

-----------------------___________._,.,__._.....
- ------ ~10

protect this weak stock. These closures continue today and are annually costing lost fishery income inthe several tens of millions of dollars range on what are healthy runs of mostly hatchery origin. These
opportunities simply had to be foregone in order to prevent accidental interceptions of these weak
Klamath River stocks.
These emergency measures were probably necessary under weak stock management principles toboost spawning escapement in the Klamath at the time. However, although some limited recovery has
since occurred, unless the ongoing decline of inland habitat is also halted and eventually reversed, there
is little more that fisheries managers can do. 25 In other words, without improvements in salmon
spawning and rearing habitat throughout the Klamath Basin, including the legal enforcement ofadequate water flows from the Upper Basin, all fishing closures can do is postpone an inevitable
extinction for a few short years.

.....

-

.__

25. Fisheries management agencies have no effective legal authority to halt or revei-se habitat declines, only to regulate
fisheries and fish harvests.
-------------------------------------~----------- ~11

Table 1
Summary of Habitat Constraints In the Klamath Basin
Subbasln

Anadromous Fish
Present•

Upper Klamath

None

UooerTrinilv
ShastaNone
fallchinook
steelhead
coho
Pacific lamorey
fall Chinook
steelhead
coho
Pacific lamprey

Scott

SalmonMid-Klamath

Lower Trinity

Mid-Trinity

South Fork Trinity

Lower Klamath

SedimentaUon Problems

Low Flow Problems

Water Quality Problems

Unecreened Dlventlon in

Migration Barriers

Anadromous Anlas
Iron Gate Dim

High temperatures, highnutrient levels In
Klamath River
None ldentlftecl
Throughout subbasin

Throughout subbasln

Potential Hydroeleclrlc
Projectsln
Anedromous Areas

Lewlllan Dam

High temperatures .,dNone Identified

321ocatlons

Palk,...,_
Shasta Riverhigh nutrient levels In
Shasta River below Lake

Shasllna
Scott River below Etna
Moffett Creek
Mill Creek
Sugar Creek
French Creek
Etna Creek
Shackleford Creek
Nona Identified

spring chinook
fall Chinook
coho
steelhead
Pacific lamprey!lreen StUl'!leOII
spring Chinook
fallchinook
coho
steelhead
Pacific lamorev
spring chlnook
fall chinook
coho
steelhead
Pacific lamprey""""'sturaeon
spring chinook
fall chinook
coho
steelhead
Pacific lamprey
green sturgeon
spring chlnook
tan chlnook
cohosteelhead
Pacific lamorev
spring Chinook
fall Chinook
coho
steelhead
Pacific lamprey
green sturaeon

Throughout subbasln

High temperaturn In

57 IOcallons

Non•--

Duzel Creeklower Scott River

None ldenUfled

High temperetures In
lower Salmon RiverBlack Gulch Creek
South FOik Salmon River

Salmon River(Nordhelmer allele and falls)
Blilc:k Bear Creek
South FOik Salmon River

None ldenllfied

Klamath River fromIron Gale 10 Shasta River;locally on Dry, Tenmlle, Elk,lndien, and. Thompson Creeks

Horse Creek
SeiadCreek

Hight temperaturn andhigh nutrient levels In
Klamath River

391ocaUons

l:ICIUth FOik Clear Creek
ENI FOik lndlan Creek
DllonCreek
W8br Creek

BogusCreek
DIHonCreek

Throughout subbasln

Trinity River
MiNCreek
SoctilhCreek
Supply Creek
Hostler Creek

High temperaturn in Trinity

Trinity River
Grass Valley Creek

Trinity River
Weaver CreakBig Bar Creek
Browns Creek
Reading Creek
Indian Creek

Throughout subbasln

Hayfork Creek
Tula Creek
Ditch Guk:h CreakBarker Creek
Little Creek
None Identified

Sall Creek
Hunter Creek
McGalvey Creek
MPahCreek
State Creek
Red Cao Creek

Horse Creek

East FOik lndlan Creek
Welker Creek

Cedar Creek

None identified

Mill Creek
Supply Creek
WIiiow Creek

None identified

None ldanllfiecl

East FOik Weaver Creek
Big French Creek

Big Bar Creek
Big French Creek

High temperatutes In lower
South FOik Trinity River, Hay
FOik Creek, and Rattlelnake
Creak

20 locatlons

Grouse Creek
PnllpectCreek
Ralllelnalle Creek
TIiie Creek, Uttle Creek
Little Creek 111n Creek

Ammon Creek
C&rrCreek

River;
poalble hazardous WUle8 In
Trinity River, Hostler Creek,
Supply Creek, and MiN Creek

High temperatures In Klamath
River

None Identified

None Identified

Eltapom Creek

GrouleCreek

Plummer Creek
BearCreek
Pine Creek
TuttyCreek
Blue Creek\• Other anadrornous fish species are also present.
These species are considered the most Important.

J

--- J

__ J

. ___J

_.J

__J

_J

_ _j

__J

-- j

___ J

___ J

_J

_ _j

--- J

_J

- __ _J- J

Estimates of Pre-Development
Klamath River Salmon Run Size
Historically, salmon were an important food source and cultural symbol for the Indian tribes ofCalifornia. "It's been a part of the culture, the religion and the diet for thousands of years," said Mike
Orcutt, director of the fisheries department for the Hoopa Valley Tribe along the Trinity River. "Thesalmon runs were dependable and dried salmon provided food for the winter."26 However, virtually no
reliable data exists concerning the magnitude of historic Native American harvest levels on the Klamath
and Trinity Rivers.
The California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) first set the Klamath Basin fall run chinook
spawning escapement goal at 115,000 in 1978. This rebuilding goal was based on Klamath Basinescapement estimates for the early 1960s and includes 97,500 natural and 17,500 hatchery spawners.27
The PFMC later adopted this goal, which however has never been met. 28 By 1983, the goal was modified
downward to include a "rebuilding schedule" whose first step, to be in place for four years, was a goal of
68,900 spawners, with the 115,000 goal to be in place by 1995.29
Soon into the rebuilding plan it became obvious, however, that even though these goals were only asmall fraction of the original run size that they still could not be met within the present seriously
degraded state of inland habitat. Therefore, in 1986 and long before any of these goals could be met, awhole new methodology was introduced by which the fishery itself was to be managed (see Appendix A,"A Brief History of Klamath Basin Fisheries Management" for more details on how current fishery
management practices evolved). Nevertheless these remain the "official" rebuilding goals for salmon in
the basin.
Coho runs from the North coast numbered about 150,000 annually in the 1940's decade, while
steelhead runs were estimated to be about 300,000.30 Since no other information is available on cohoand steelhead, a factor of 50 percent harvest rate is used in our calculations as an estimate of what
would be potentially available. Thus the estimate is that the Klamath River could have supported
harvests of up to 75,000 coho and 150,000 steelhead at that time.
For purposes of analysis some assumptions needed to be made about species/run composition of
the chinook salmon harvested, since their economic value varies by species/run. Acknowledging

26. "California's Chinook Salmon: Upstream Battle to Restore the Resource," Water Education Foundation, Western
Water, November/December 1992.
27. Boydstun, LB., "Draft Evaluation of KI.amath River Fall Chinook Escapement Options," Memorandum,
September 8, 1988, California Fish rind Game.
28. ''.An Assessment of the Current Carrying Capacity of the KI.amath River Basin for Adult Fall Chinook Salmon•:Hubbell and Boydstun, CDFG, Sept. 1985.
29. Ibid., see also "Final Framework Amendment for Managing the Ocean Salmon Fisheries... •: PFMC, October
1984,p. 3-20.
30. ''.An Environmental Tragedy: Report on California Salmon and Steelhead Trout," State of California, California
Department of Fish and Game, March 15, 1971.

-------------------------,_;---------~------------- )@$,

13

differences, for purpose of analysis species of harvested chinook are thus assumed to be in the same
proportion as in the Sacramento system (i.e. 5% late fall, 10% winter, 37% spring and 48% fall).
There are no generally accepted estimates of pre-development salmon run sizes for California rivers
except for the Fisher estimates of Central Valley stocks. 31 For the Columbia River study, the Northwest
Power Planning Council made its estimates based on review of habitat and on historical catch records.
However, using the number of square miles of viable salmon habitat in a basin as a factor andinterpolating production numbers from similar basins where data is more complete, it is possible toarrive at workable estimates of pre-development runs of up to 4 million fish in the Sacramento/San
Joaquin system and 1.1 million in the Klamath system (Table 2). These are the figures assumed for
purposes of our analysis.

Total Salmon
Habitat Land
Area in Basin

PreDevelopment
Habitat Stream
Miles
14,666 miles of
stream /1

Columbia
River System

163,000 sq.
miles to 260,000
sq. miles /1

Sacramento/
San Joaquin
System38,340 sq. miles/2

6,000 miles of
stream /3

Klamath River
System

9,691 sq. miles

no estimates

Notes:

Historic Record
Harvests(No. of Fish)

Estimated PreDevelopment
Runs

Escapement
Goal

3 to 3.6/4,
record canningpack 630,000
cases, about 40
million pounds
12 million pounds/5, average 5
million pounds
from 1873-1910
no estimates

10-16 million
fishvaries for stocks in
the Columbia

1.95 million /6
to4.0 million
fish /7

122,000-180,000 /9(mostly hatchery)

0.66 to 1.1
million fish/8

97,500 natural,
17,500 hatchery /10

1. Prior to development, over 163,000 square miles of salmon and steelhead habitat existed in the ColumbiaRiver. (Compilation of Information on Salmon and Steelhead Losses in the Columbia River Basin.
Appendix D of the 1987 Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program. Northwest Power PlanningCouncil. Portland, Oregon. Page 87.) The Columbia River drains a watershed that is 260,000 square miles.
(Bonneville Power Administration. "The World's Biggest Fish Story: The Columbia River's Salmon."Backgrounder. July 1987. Page 4.)
2. John Snyder. California Department of Water Resources.
Sacramento = 26,548 square miles
San Joaquin = 11,792 square miles
Delta = 4,154 square miles
Personal communication, January 1996.
3. The California Department Fish and Wildlife feels this estimate made in 1928 is too high. ("AnEnvironmental Tragedy." Report on California Salmon and Steelhead Trout. Assembly Concurrent
Resolution #64/1970 Session. March 1971. California Department of Fish and Game.)
4. High years:
1892 = 3.3

31. Fisher, Frank W., "Past and Present Status of Central Valley Chinook Salmon," Conservation Biology, Vol. 8, No.
3, September 1994.

----------------------------~-- __________________

...,.

,,..,

~

14

1895 = 3.3
1898 = 3.3
1911 = 3.1
1918 = 3.6
1919=3.1
1923 = 3.2
1924 = 3.1
1926 = 3.0
Radtke, Hans D. and Shannon W. Davis. "Lower Columbia RiverNoung's Bay Terminal Fisheries Expansion
Project." Salmon For All. January 1996.
In 1882, the California commercial salmon catch reached its historic peak of 12 million pounds. (E.R.G. Pacific,
Inc. "The Economic Issues Associated with the Commercial Salmon Fisheries and Limited Entry in California." A
Report to the California Commercial Fishing Review Board. October 1986. Page 1.)
6.
Fisher, Frank. "Past and Present Status of Central Valley Chinook Salmon." Conservation Biology. Volume 8,
No. 3. September 1994.
7. This estimate is based on the Columbia River Basin land area ratio to Sacramento/San Joaquin land area. Thismay be a high estimate, especially when compared to Frank Fisher's estimate of 1.95 million fish from theColumbia River.
8. Based on the land area ratios, the Klamath area could have had a pre-development run size of about 0.65 to 1
million fish.
9. Includes natural and hatchery fish. ("Review of 1994 Ocean Salmon Fisheries." Pacific Fishery Management
Council. Portland, Oregon. 1994. Page 8.)
10. Although natural production from the Klamath system includes both spring and fall runs, only the dominant fall
run is managed by the PFMC. ("Review of 1994 Ocean Salmon Fisheries." Pacific Fishery Management
Council. Portland, Oregon. 1994. Page 11.) The escapement goal has been changed to 33%-34% in 1987 witha floor of 35,000. "Natural" as defined by the California Dept. of Fish and Game is not, however, the same as"wild." "Natural" as CDFG uses it may include any hatchery-origin fish so long as it is found outside the hatchery(see discussion in the body of this report).

Surprisingly, there has been little effort to determine the actual population size of the remaining
wild salmon runs still left in the Klamath. Thus it is very difficult to determine whether in fact these
populations are still declining or by how much. In fact, the current data collection and stockclassification system used by the California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) actually obscuresthis data. CDFG now classifies all fish found in hatcheries as "hatchery fish" regardless of origi,n. What isworse, all fish that are found outside of hatcheries during any given sample period are classified defacto as "natural fish," again regardless ofgenetic origin. It is obvious that some wild fish may stray into
hatcheries, but more important is the fact that the vast majority of hatchery fish never make it back totheir hatchery of origi,n, and thus would (if found anywhere just short of the hatchery) be classified by
CDFG as "natural fish."This practice blurs and obscures important genetic differences between hatchery stock (often
imported) and the remnant wild stocks, leads to genetic dilution of the hard-won survival traits of theoverall wild fish population, and almost completely masks actual wild stock declines. Since these"natural" fish are often confused in the literature with truly indigeneous ''wild" stocks, this practice canalso easily lead to gross over-estimates of native fish populations. This in tum allows grossly inflated
estimates of the success of agency stock reseeding practices and rosy estimates of the total fish present
in the system.
However, "natural" fish are not "wild" fish as geneticists define them. Only a comparison between
pre-development genetically indigenous wild fish and current genetically indigenous wild fish
populations gives a meaningful estimate or a true ''before and after picture" of the extent of indigenous
wild salmon stock declines.

15

INSERT OF LOST TEXT BETWEEN PAGES 15 -18 FROM ORIGINAL REPORT

It is clear, though, that the majority of the returning Klamath Basin salmon are now hatcheryreared fish, rather than wild fish. However, hatchery fish-unlike their wild counterparts-require
the continual input of human dollars and energy to generate them, and are thus more costly tosociety than their wild counterparts. Hatchery production costs must first be subtracted to get their
net economic value. These costs also vary from year to year depending upon widely fluctuating
survival rates. In years of good ocean conditions when survival rates are relatively high, hatchery
program costs can be amortized over a larger number of returning adults. However, in years of very
poor ocean conditions (or when other habitat factors seriously affect smolt survival) the costs ofhatchery production must then be amortized over a much smaller number of harvestable fish.
Hatcheries are used most often to compensate for habitat that for all practical purposes cannever be restored (as above an impassable dam) as a way to continue to produce at least some fish
for sport and commercial harvest. This type of "mitigation hatchery" serves an importanteconomic function. Without mitigation hatcheries there would be nothing coming from many river
systems because their native runs have long since been destroyed. However, the belief that
hatcheries can adequately and forever substitute for salmon genetically adapted for millions ofyears for survival in the wild may be a false dream. Precipitous declines of wild salmon runs
throughout the region is fundamentally a biological and social problem caused by widespread
habitat destruction and the way we misuse our own technology.
While hatcheries play (and should continue to play) an important role in maintaining
commercially harvestable populations in many areas, hatchery programs should be managed tosupplement and maintain wild runs, not to replace them. Protection and restoration of wild runs
puts a limit on land use activities which destroy watersheds, and thus imposes a limit on corporate
greed. All too often the mere existence of a hatchery simply becomes a politically expedient excuse
to avoid protecting wild fish habitat at all.1
Also, hatcheries cost money to run. Even productive hatcheries are now finding it harder tofind funding in an era of severely declining state and federal budgets. Hatchery programs can sufferfrom genetic problems, disease, stress on juvenile fish from overcrowding, behavioral problems
with hatchery-reared fish failing to adapt to wild conditions, and many other problems.
Overproduction in some years may lead to precipitous declines in both hatchery and wild returns inother years. Also, hatchery programs which are run without careful attention to genetic impacts orcompetition effects on wild salmon populations can potentially be devastating to the genetic
integrity of wild runs. 2

1•

This report does not attempt to quantify the job base currently being maintained by the existing hatcheryproduction programs in the Klamath. Unfortunately, the data available to us will not allow us to make thatassessment unless a great deal more information about the costs ofeach of these hatchery programs on a
per smolt and per returning adult basis is obtained.

2•

For the most recent criticism of hatchery production programs see the National Research Council report"Upstream: Salmon and Society in the Pacific Northwest," National Academy Press {1996), which concluded
among other things that: "Despite some successes, hatchery programs have been partly or entirely
responsible for detrimental effects on some wild runs of salmon." For a good summary of all the scientificArtificial hatchery production rarely duplicates the high survival rates and genetic adaptabilityof wild fish. Neither can hatcheries adequately substitute for the loss of natural spawning andrearing habitat. 3 Nor can hatchery production really get fishery management out of the "weak stock
management" and ESA downward spirals it has gotten itself into, since these problems are based onwild fish which still continue to decline. Finally-as a matter of political realism-shrinking agency
budgets will mean many hatchery programs are likely to be closed simply for lack of funds.
These and many other factors make ultimate reliance by the fishing industry on hatchery
programs unstable in the long term. Ultimately, the only way to "hedge bets" biologically andeconomically so as to assure a future west coast salmon fishery is to maintain and restore (to as greatan extent as possible) the wild salmon runs which are uniquely adapted to long term survival.
Hatcheries must still be used where necessary to mitigate for permanent loss of habitat and inorder to maintain a commercial fishery in the interim, but within an overall policy of genetic
conservation coupled with an aggressive program of habitat protection and restoration.
For a more detailed summary of Klamath Basin hatchery practices and problems, refer toAppendix B, "The Role of Hatcheries in the Klamath Basin."

How Much is the Klamath Salmon Fishery Worth?
Because most jobs in the fishing industry are seasonal rather than full-time, publishedemployment figures of commercial and recreational fishing may be misleading. Therefore, full-time
equivalent employment numbers must be calculated by dividing the estimated total personal
income generated by fishing activity by a representative annual personal income average. In the
Pacific Northwest, a $20,000 per year wage or salary is a fair representation of a full-time
equivalent job when considering all jobs that are generated by an activity, from crewmen to
waitresses to lawyers.
Each fish harvested produces a net economic benefit to society as it travels through the chain ofcommerce from the boat to the consumer's table. The combined sums of all those benefits is the 'net
personal income impact' of that one fish. 4 These values have been quantified for the Klamath Basinin previous studies. For instance, in a recent study entitled "Fishery Values of the Klamath Basin-A
literature on hatchery and supplementation programs generally and the many problems they face, refer to
U.S. Dept. of Energy, Bonneville Power Administration Technical Report 1990 (September, 1990), "Analysis
ofSalmon and Steelhead Supplementation," (Document DEO/BP-92663~1).
3•

Destroying in-stream salmon habitat destroys both hatchery and wild fish alike. Once released into the wild,
hatchery fish use the very same feeding and sheltering habitat as do wild fish. Destroying stream habitat forwild fish will also decrease survival rates ofhatchery fish-a double whammy which threatens to collapse
both wild and artificial runs simultaneously. Allowing the destruction of the wild stocks which havegenetically adapted to a particular river system for millions ofyears also extinguishes the very best genepool from which to replenish that river's hatcheries.

4•

In other words, the sum ofall the direct, indirect and induced economic activity generated by that product as
it makes its way through the chain of commerce.

Report to CH2M Hill," by Meyer Resources, Inc., May 1984, printed in "Klamath River Basin
Fisheries Resource Plan," U.S. Department of the Interior, February 1985, an estimate was made of
the potential annual benefits associated with a catch of 1,000 adult Klamath salmonids to be$252,170 including all direct, indirect and induced market-based economic benefits expressed in
1996 dollars (see Table 4).
However, Meyer's study made no effort to assess historic run sizes. Using the numbers
developed in this report by Radtke is appropriate as the best available estimate of the biologicalpotential of the Klamath Basin for salmon production. We therefore combine Meyer's figures withthe estimated pre-development run sizes derived in Table 2 to give us a number for the "neteconomic benefit" which is missing from the salmon-based economy due to recent declines andlosses.
Assuming the escapement estimates developed above of between 657,500 to 1,090,000 million
adult equivalents to be accurate, and assuming only a 50% harvest rate, this would indicate under
Meyer's methodologies that the Klamath should be able to produce a total annual income stream ofbetween $82,900,878/year and $137,432,650/year in market-based salmon related economic
benefits alone (i.e., excluding any of Meyer's non-market values) when expressed in 1996 dollars.
From this we can easily calculate that a total job base (at $20,000/job, which is at or nearregional median income) of between 4,145 to 6,870 family wage jobs could potentially be supported
by fishing in or generated by this basin. This is the potential economic productivity of the Klamath as asalmon producer in today's economy. It is also a measure of the potential number ofjobs which are at
risk ifsalmon declines in the basin continue.
At a pre-development run size.of about 1.1 million fish in the Klamath Basin (and again at a
50% harvest rate) it may be calculated that about 0.55 million fish could have been available for
harvest at a sustainable level, compared to 250,000 to 300,000 fish that have been harvested fromthe Klamath Basin in recent years. By not attaining the potential habitat productivity of the Klamath
Basin for producing salmon, the Pacific Northwest and northern California region is therefore
sacrificing between 250,000 to 300,000 additional fish. Using Meyer's estimates for the economic
value per 1,000 adult harvested salmon (Table 4), this may be equated to about 3,150 to 3,780
annual family wage jobs that are lost to the in-river and coastal salmon fishing economy as a direct
result of the Klamath River Basin's damaged habitat. 5

END OF LOST TEXT INSERT BETWEEN PAGES 15-18

5•

The range difference results from differences in run size, which vary naturally depending on variations inocean conditions and other factors.

to 300,000 additional fish. Using Meyer's estimates for the economic value per 1,000 adult harvested
salmon (Table 4), this may be equated to about 3,150 to 3,780 annual family wage jobs that are lost to thein-river and coastal salmon fishing economy as a direct result of the Klamath River Basin's damaged
habitat. 35
Using the same methodologies and then applying various discount rate assumptions such as in
Table 5, the estimated net asset value of the Klamath Basin salmon fishery as a whole (assuming thiskind of potential income stream over time) should be at least $4.5 billion (to the nearest significant
figure), using a relatively conservative 3% discount rate. In other words, the net value to society of the"natural capital" that these Klamath Basin wild salmon runs represent could be at least $4.5 billion
under standard (even conservative) economic assumptions.
We use the term "at least" because using other less conservative (but still quite justified) discountassumptions gives values as high as $13.8 billion. Also, none of the indirect market benefits derived
from potential additional harvest opportunities on other (non-Klamath) salmon which would likely beavailable once ''weak stock management" constraints are removed ( as they would be once weak stocks
are restored) are calculated into these figures. These secondary benefits are outside the scope of thisstudy but are likely to be substantial.
This figure also excludes all economic benefits allocated by Meyer (Table 4) to the category of"non-market benefits" and so may be greatly understating the true social value of this fishery. Once
added back in these non-market economic benefits would bring the total annual personal income
impacts to potentially as high as $374.86 million/year. Using the same relatively conservative discountassumptions (3% over a term of 100 years), the calculated net asset value of this fishery would then be
potentially at least $11.85 billion up to $37.486 billion/year assuming a less convervative 0% discountrate.
We have omitted these non-market values only because there is as yet no broadly accepted
methodology for calculating them, not because they are unimportant. However, this omission means
our calculated minimum net asset value of $4.5 billion is probably a very conservative estimate.

35. The range difference results from differences in run size, which vary naturally depending on variations in ocean
conditions and other factors.
____________________________, _________.,...__.,..__....,..________~

18

~!t:·;~tt11tial'JI~Jiis:Wh1b1i'c6tii~B~D~nVedir<>~.Histoifosalriroi{•:aridsfoelhead :R.u:n Siiesinthe KfamathBasin.
.' ; '. .. .

.

.

.

.

,

.

,

..

'.

. .

Estimated Pre-Development Harvest (at 50% of Run
Size) - Range
Run Size - Range /1

Species

Notes:.

~

Late Fall Chinook
Winter Chinook
Spring Chinook
Fall Chinook
Coho
Steelhead

22,50045,000160,000
205,000
75,000150,000

Total

657,500-

45,00090,000320,000
410,000
75,000150,000

11,25022,50080,000102,500
37,50075,000--22,50045,000160,000
205,000
37,50075,000-1,090,000

328,750-545,000

-

15.0
15.0
15.0
15.0
9.0
8.5

168,750
337,500
1,200,000
1,537,500
337,500
637,500-

337,500
675,000
2,400,000
3,075,000
337,500
637,500

4,218,750-

7,462,500

Based on square mile comparisons between Columbia River and estimates of historic species comparison of
the Sacramento River for chinook. Coho and steelhead estimates are based on Northern California harvest
rates.

Business
Benefits in
Dollars

Benefiting Group

Non-Market
Benefits in
Dollars (basedon restorative
activity)

22,09014,040Sport Fishermen

Provides 7,000 to 7,500 lbs offood• Chinook/coho• Steelhead
Indian Peoples• Chinook• CohoCoastal Communities• Commercial chinook• Commercial coho
• Sport fish
MARKET BENEFITS

Subsistence, Cultural,
Religious, & Social Benefits

Supports way of life
Provides 7,000 to 7,500 lbs offoodCommercial
Fishermen• Chinook• CohoNote:

Average
Weight per
Total Fish Weight (pounds)Fish (pounds)
Range

=

28,73022,09014,04010,0306,380
56,510128,080
172,370

Maintains cultural and religious well-being
Provides 7,000 to 7,500 lbs of foodProvides 7,000 to 7,500 lbs offood
Supports basic community way of life

$173,910 (expressed in 1984 dollars 36 )One problem with using that figure today was that it was in 1984 dollars. In order to convert that into 1996
dollars one must use an escalation factor derived from the increases in the Consumer Price Index since that

36. The Meyer repon relied heavily on recreational and aesthetic non-market benefits to estimate total economic valuesof restoration. However, these values are inherently less cenain and more speculative than purely market values.
The decision was therefore made in this repon to use commercial value as our sole indicator of economic value
because it is the most easily quantifiable using well established methodologies.

-~------------------------__, __________,.._.._,,.,,_,,,._....

_____ ~ 19

Percent
50

I

40

30

20

I

I

I

10

0

I

I
Oregon-----------

Winchester Bay-

Brookings

Area wheremost Klamath
River Chinook
are caught

California
Eureka--------I

50

I

40

I

I

20

30

I

10

I

0

Percent

Legendc:==:J Other Stocks-

Klamath River Stocks

--

0

lN

I

80

160

i

I

Scale in Miles

Source: US Dept. of Interior (1985), maps prepared by CH2M Hill.

__________________________....~----------~---~.,...._----~ 22Percent

50

40

30

20

I

I

I

I

10

0

I

I
Oregon- - - - - - - - - · -Winchester Bay--

Brookings

California

Area wheremost Klamath
River Chinook
are caught

Sacramento River

Eureka---------

I

50

I

40

I

I

20

30

I

10

I

0

Percent

Legendr=::::J Other Stocks-

Klamath River Stocks

0

IN I

80

I

160

I

Scale in Miles

Source: US Dept. of Interior (1985), maps prepared by CH2M Hill.

--------------------►----------------------------- ~ 23

Sustaining Long Term Restoration
In recognition of the importance of the Klamath Basin to the entire west coast fishery, there areseveral federal Klamath Basin fish habitat restoration efforts currently underway. These include:
The Klamath River Basin Fisheries Restoration Task Force (16 U.S.C. 460ss-3 et.
seq. (P.L. 99-552 (October 27, 1986) as amended by P.L. 102-570)-Created the
Klamath River Basin Conservation Area Restoration Progam and the Klamath River
Basin Fisheries Task Force to develop and implement salmon restoration programs
within the basin as a whole. Congressional funding authorizations for this entity
continue until the year 2006, but are dependent upon annual appropriations.
The Trinity River Basin Fish and Wildlife Task Force (created by P.L. 98-541(October 24, 1984) as amended by P.L. 104-143)-Created as a federal task force to"restore the fish and wildlife populations to levels approximating those which existed
immediately before" various darns and water diversion projects on the Trinity River
which damaged fish and wildlife resources. Its designated projects included
rehabilitation of fish habitats between Lewiston and Weitchpec Darns and themodernization of the Trinity River Fish Hatchery. Congressional funding was
authorized only for a ten year year period until 1995, then extended by P.L. 104-143 only
until October 1, 1998, with some additional program changes. All funds are dependent,
however, upon annual Congressional appropriations.
The Upper Klamath Basin Working Group (established by Division B, Title II,
Section 201 of H. R. 3610 (Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997)
from the 104th Congress, signed into law on September 30, 1996)-This newly formed"Working Group" is empowered to "propose ecological restoration projects, economic
development and stability projects, and projects designed to reduce the impacts ofdrought conditions" in the Upper Klamath Basin (i.e., above Iron Gate Dam), and is
supposed to coordinate its activities with. both- the Klamath ..River Basin .Fisheries Task
Force and the Trinity River Basin Fish and Wildlife Task Force. Funding is authorized
until 2001, but is once again subject to annual Congressional appropriations.

In addition, an inter-state coordinating and dispute resolution body was created by the Klamath
River Basin Compact in 1957, composed of three members: a California representative, an Oregon
representative and a federal representative (non-voting) in order to: (a) facilitate and promote thedevelopment of water in the Upper Klamath Basin for domestic, irrigation, fish and wildlife, recreation,industrial, hydroelectric, navigation and flood prevention uses; (2) to further intergovernmental
cooperation and to prevent controversies over water uses in the two states. If agreement cannot bereached between the two state members, an arbitration forum is created.
The Klamath River Basin Compact became effective on September 11, 1957. The exact terms of theCompact can be found in several places, including in the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) at 542.620
and as ratified by the State of California in Chapter 113, California Statutes 1957 (signed by the
California Governor on April 17, 1957). The actual powers of the Klamath River Compact Commission
are fairly limited, however, and its authority has not been much used in recent years.

____________________________...... - - - - - - - - - - - - - --... _....,..__,~

24

institutions necessary to carry out a decades-long watershed restoration project on a well-organized andsustainable basis simply do not yet exist. Habitat restoration has to become firmly institutionalized andsustainable over decades if it is going to succeed.
Reliance on in-stream restoration projects alone will also not lead to recovery. The fundamental
land use practices which are powering salmon habitat destruction must also be corrected, or otherwise
any gains due to in-stream restoration efforts will eventually be swamped by continued watershed-wide
deterioration. Most in-stream restoration projects are at best only short-term emergency measuresintended to buy enough time to allow longer-term natural watershed healing processes to take place.
However, this natural watershed healing process is frequently inhibited or blocked by land use practices(including excessive timber harvest, overgrazing, mining pollution and confiscation of in-stream waterflows for human use) which then prevent any natural recovery.
Natural ecosystems can tolerate a wide range of disturbances and eventually recover. However, themagnitude of human disturbances in salmon producing watersheds can now be two to three orders ofmagnitude more than these natural systems were adapted to tolerate.41-

Additionally many small-scale impacts can have a combined "cumulative impact" which is far
greater than natural watershed restoration processes can easily overcome (at least on less than ageologic time scale). Other impacts may result in a "change of state" which can become a stable (andchange resistant) ecosystem in its own right. For instance, in arid areas the removal of large riparian
conifers by logging, when combined with later riparian grazing, can permanently alter the vegetation
types of that riparian area in ways that make it highly unlikely that conifers will ever naturally reestablish themselves within any conceivable human time scale.
In summary, it is not enough to have the will and means to begin salmon restoration efforts in aserious way. In order to be successful these efforts must be targeted carefully for the greatest long-term
public benefit, must take upland and other land use practices into account and mitigate those impacts,
must help re-establish and accelerate natural watershed healing processes, and must be institutionalized
so that they can be fully sustained over what in human terms is a very long period of time.42

biennial budgets by their state Legislature. The longest term institutionalized restoration effort to date (the Klamath
River Basin Fisheries Restoration Task Force) has only a 20 year term, of which approximately 10 have alreadyelapsed.
41. See for instance Sommarstrom. et. al (1990), op. cit (note 9). In that study erosion from logging roads wascalculated to be up to 200 times (2 orders of magnitude) more than what would have naturally occurred.
42. Salmon restoration is dependent to some degree on the restoration of old growth conifer forests in riparian areas in
the Pacific Northwest and northern California. Fully 2/3 of salmon habitat in these states is on private lands. Since
old-growth forests are now for all practical purposes non-existent on private lands, the process of re-establishingsuch forests on private lands will take (at a minimum) about 120 years. This is the time frame salmon restoration
programs should be conducted in.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - -•.,.------~ 27

~~~~J~:~~~~lili~iE!~~~~.
FEDERAL

Department of the Interior
US Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
Bureau of land Management (BlM)
Bureau of Reclamation (BuRec)
Geological Survey (USGS)
Department of Commerce
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
Pacific Fishery Management Council (PFMC)
Department of Agriculture
Forest Service (USFS)
Soil conversation Service (SCS)ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA)
Department of the Army
Army Corps of Engineers (ACE)
Department of Energy
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
Klamath Basin Ecosystem Restoration Office (ERO)-inter-agency

TRIBAL
Hoopa Valley Tribe
Yurek Tribe
Karuk Tribe
Klamath Tribe

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Resources Agency
Department of Fish and Game (CDFG)
State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB)
North Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB)
Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (CDF)
Department of Water Resources (DWR)
California Coastal Commission
California Conservation Corps (CCC)
State lands Commission (SlC)
University of California Cooperative Extension (UCCE)STATE OF OREGON
Department of Fish and Wildlife {ODFW)Water Resources Department (WRD)
Environmental Quality Department
Division of State lands

REGIONAL OR COMPACT COMMISSION
Klamath River Basin Compact Commission
Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission

LOCAL
Counties
Resource Conservation Districts (RCD)
Cities
Source: Klamath River Basin Fisheries Task Force, "Long Range Plan for the Klamath River Basin Conservation
Area Fishery Restoration Program; (January, 1991), adapted from page 7-14.

-----~----------------------.......,,--------------------------- ~28

APPENDIXAThe California Salmon Fishery-Historical Overview
We should include a somewhat detailed discussion on California based chinook landings in order todescribe the historical harvests. Most descriptions of California salmon harvests only include salmoncaught off California waters. However, California-produced chinook are harvested in several areas byseveral methods. These are:•Commercial harvest off California coast'•

California recreational harvest (ocean and in-river)•

Oregon commercial harvest•

Oregon ocean recreational harvest

Once all of these harvests are included in the figures for California based landings, there is asignificant increase in total landings. For example, if the recreational California landings are added to
California commercial landings between 1962 and 1990, this should show an additional 0.8 to 1.3
million pounds of chinook produced by California rivers. In addition, 50 percent of all Oregon chinook
landings ( commercial and recreational) should be added to the total average of about 7 million poundsof chinook caught commercially in California (Table A-2). On average about 1.5 million pounds ofchinook from California waters contribute to the Oregon fisheries ( about 20 percent of all California
chinook). The total average poundage harvested from California-produced fish is therefore about 10
million pounds.
Utilizing a 10 pound average per fish, this would indicate that in recent history the West Coast
harvest of California chinook has been about 1 million fish. When salmon are harvested, for every one
salmon that is retained, one salmon is released. The mortality rate of these non-retained fish is about 25
percent. If this mortality is included as a harvest, the total annual harvest may be about 1.25 million fish
per year. These 1.25 million fish may weigh 12.5 million pounds (at a 10 pound average). When fish
were harvested in pre-development years and in early settlement history (in-river), they may haveaveraged about 15 to 17 pounds each. That would indicate that recent historic runs of 1.25 million
chinook could be compared to up to 20 million comparable pounds that have actually been harvested in
the past.

Commercial Salmon Fishery4.l
Establishment of California's catch monitoring ("fish ticket") system in 1916 provided the means tocollect comprehensive commercial landings data over time. Although in-river landings of salmon weresignificant from 1916 to 1957 (the year the Sacramento/San Joaquin in-river commercial fishery wasclosed), they exceeded ocean landings in only one year-1918 (Table A-1 ).
43. Taken from: Thompson, Cyn,thia J. and Kenneth R. Saka~ "The /ndi,an, Commercial and Sport Fisheries for
Salmon and other Anadromous Fishes of the Central Valley: An Historical Perspective," National Marine FisheriesService, Southwest Fisheries Science Center, La Jolla, California, 1995.

~29

I

.Fi~~¥.h,c·"•?i..
< ·. ·•) .· i i••···••·•.·.· <>.· .·. . \·•9~tpJJ1~J:?hl~~o11.l.a11~n~iJ1(:~lifo~a (potin~),I>utiii~·•·~he:¥~f19l~1995
i,....... ·. :··16.000.000■ Ocean

14.000.000
12.000.000
10.000.000
0)

CD
C:

=cC:

s.000.000

Ill.J

6.000.000
4.000.000
2.000.000
0

Year

-

Source: Thompson, Cynthia J. and Kenneth R. Sakai, "The Indian, Commercial and Sport Fisheries for Salmon andother Anadromous Fishes of the Central Valley: An Historical Perspective," National Marine Fisheries Service,
Southwest Fisheries Science Center, La Jolla, California, 1995.

I

San
Year
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
19
28
1929

Other
Eureka Francisco Monterey

Total
Ocean

Sacrm/San
Ocean

Other
GRAND
Joaq Rivers
RiversTOTAL

5,592,216
6,085,997
5,933,346
7,208,382
6,066,190
4,483,105
4,338,317
3,736,924
6,374,573
5,481,536
3,863,677
4,921,600

3,450,786
3,975,487
5,938,029
4,529,222
3,860,312
2,511,127
1,765,066
2,243,945
2,640,110
2,778,846
1,261,776
920,786

1,896,592
999,097
1,221,813
1,408,123
1,207,317
996,700,131,741
1,109,391
1,000,586
1,265,371
958,626
669,543

10,939,594
11,060,581
13,093,188
13,145,727
11,133,819
7,990,932
7,235,124
7,090,260
10,015,269
9,525,753
6,084,079
6,511,929

3,444,306
4,033,660

553,777
581,497

480,483
429,7144,478,566
5,044,871

L

i

L-

~

L
.._
I

i

L

L
j

L
i

I

L..

I

i

L

L
I
I

.._
II
I

L

i.._

--

I#-~~,:::"''.::
Year
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

Eureka3,499,610
3,479,716
3,834,568
1,853,715
1,673,151
3,369,492
2,413,368
2,255,862
2,162,368
3,791,094
4,627,714
4,544,037
5,868,577
4,033,992
2,601,390
2,221,509
2,022,365
2,490,809
2,949,816
3,928,941
4,811,641
6,311,608
3,324,111
1,599,019
1,851,924
2,437,406
4,134,991
4,193,530
3,778,433
5,423,263
5,484,287
6,936,426
5,287,540
4,064,343
3,359,570
3,947,351
5,633,210
3,369,156
5,700,647
5,125,901
4,312,855
4,840,103
3,380,522

SanFranciscoMonterey

1,053,787
219,700
447,548
144,924
1,208,414
891,083
199,474
117,549
125,498434,626
1,177,086
613,224
375,766
153,662
1,642,017
164,9312,021,208 1,101,934
2,646,714
575,579
2,431,954
816,3032,079,449
569,350
1,485,657
738,469
1,544,479
230,248
2,455,543
468,757
2,868,570
769,705
3,165,400
679,128
2,937,533 1,093,955
3,314,547
790,970
3,380,182
974,3033,936,028
606,469
752,969
2,938,586
1,308,864
431,215
1,675,040
277,181
4,582,942
269,6882,889,532
815,778
3,701,733
654,577
2,050,993
308,369
3,493,591
512,3543,507,464
378,4213,652,201
491,899
2,238,476
188,518
1,761,930 · 242,882
2,198,806
572,605
1,722,027
821,740
1,912,462
542,978
2,112,796
270,772
2,503,404
420,664
2,226,719 1,412,520
614,1112,774,925
1,734,880
721,102
1,725,479 1,009,241
1,748,007
602,578

1978 4,100,813 1,441,550

861,201

Other
Ocean

Total
Ocean

Sacrm/San
Joaq Rivers

Other
Rivers

GRAND
TOTAL

15
1,020
931
183
0
24
3,198
462
0
7,434
36,783
2,120
11,401
20,658422,994
687,294
2,637
14,55881,082
314,237
302,858
271,739
112,719
105,60164,60878,729146,696
119,969
74,808172,067
109,388
83,575
109,377
116,177
247,569
208,731
100,100
130,065
329,098
234,477
156,245
211,465
196,926

4,085,650
3,666,841
2,649,204
3,657,661
3,921,530
4,773,112
4,073,208
5,934,996
2,170,921
2,233,275
5,159,826
2,945,994
4,063,272
5,285,510
7,020,821
7,912,754
7,194,956
8,104,104
5,829,377
5,948,684
6,547,078
5,849,530
6,536,855
7,136,415
8,597,663
9,656,996"
10,274,902
5,176,909
3,656,841
6,769,162
6,221,445
8,637,997
6,672,861
7,859,186
9,481,215
9,737,775
9,446,995
7,401,729
6,951,931
6,150,906
6,611,522
8,116,878
6,423,289
9,668,984
8,749,414
6,925,082
7,786,288
5,928,033

1,213,698
941,605
1,264,987
454,253
397,572
888,868
949,179
974,871
1,668,376
496,933
1,515,588
844,9632,552,944
1,295,424
3,265,143
5,467,960
6,463,245
3,380,484
1,939,801
899,090
1,202,890
1,343,171
738,081869,696
900,961
2,320,746
1,139,585
321,824
0
0
0
0
0
0

703,546
686,065
703,990446,520
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

6,002,894
5,294,511
4,618,181
4,558,434
4,319,102
5,661,980
5,022,387
6,909,867
3,839,297
2,730,208
6,675,414
3,790,957
6,616,216
6,580,934
10,285,964
13,380,714
13,658,201
11,484,588
7,769,178
6,847,774
7,749,968
7,192,701
7,274,936
8,006,111
9,498,624
11,977,742
11,414,487
5,498,733
3,656,841
6,769,162
6,221,445
8,637,997
6,672,861
7,859,186
9,481,215
9,737,775
9,446,995
7,401,729
6,951,931
6,150,906
6,611,522
8,116,878
6,423,289
9,668,984
8,749,414
6,925,082
7,786,288
5,928,033

407,426

6,810,990

006,810,990

0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

·O

_______,,...
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,..
______~._,.,..J""-w,,-_ - - - - - - - - ----

~ 31

Table A-1 ( continued)

I

L

L
L

Year

Eureka

1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

5,903,142
3,148,475
3,225,901
3,841,351
1,128,486
803,778
2,008,285
2,920,869
4,336,614
5,223,748
1,878,026
965,531624,003
22,782
234,166
36,0008,000

SanFrancisco2,234,562
2,062,847
2,095,280
2,830,544
551,599
1,684,711
2,153,997
2,782,632
3,877,908
7,226,164
2,677,876
2,034,445
1,955,803
999,439
1,354,906
2,189,000
2,784,000

Monterey

Other
Ocean

Total
Ocean

510,742699,787
608,375
1,044,747
580,432445,629
410,461
1,069,250
706,058
1,825,712
968,796
1,118,147
750,219345,230
678,239
831,000
3,162,000

101,332
112,120
116,608285,216
154,366
48,53871,663
831,395
385,323
485,134
298,075
321,104
371,642259,336309,219
77,00089,0008,749,778
6,023,229
6,046,164
8,001,858
2,414,883
2,982,656
4,644,406
7,604,146
9,305,903
14,760,758
5,822,773
4,439,227
3,701,667
1,626,787
2,576,530
3,103,000
6,044,000

Sacrm/San
Joaq Rivers
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

GRAND

Other
Rivers

TOTAL

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

8,749,778
6,023,229
6,046,164
8,001,858
2,414,883
2,982,656
4,644,406
7,604,146
9,305,903
14,760,758
5,822,773
4,439,227
3,701,667
1,626,787
2,576,530
3,103,000
6,044,000

Source: Thompson, Cynthia J. and Kenneth R. Sakai, "The Indian, Commercial and Sport Fisheries for
Salmon and other Anadromous Fishes of the Central Valley: An Historical Perspective,• National
Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest Fisheries Science Center, La Jolla, C81ifomia, 1995.
1916-1990 data obtained from CDFG (1935, 1937, 1940, 1942, 1944, 1946, 1947, 1949, 1951, 1952, 1953,
1954,1956,1958,1960a,1960b,1961,1963,1964, 1965a,1965b,1967, 1968a,1968b,1970, 1971,1973,
1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1990). 1991-1993 data obtained from unpublished CDFG summaries.
1994-1995 are data from PFMC "Review of Ocean Salmon Fisheries:
Note:

I

L...

L

Areas are depicted in Figure A-2.

By 1850 a commercial salmon fishery was operating in the lower Sacramento and San JoaquinRivers, Suisun Bay and San Pablo Bay. Gillnetting, which was introduced by Italian immigrants, was the
predominant method of harvest. The first salmon cannery on the west coast began operating on the
Sacramento River in 1864. The fishery expanded rapidly, with demand and prices fueled by the gold
rush and railroad construction. Annual landings in excess of nine million pounds were experienced
during 1880-1883. By 1883 there were 21 canneries in California. Landings subsequently declined,
experienced a temporary resurgence during 1907-1910, then declined precipitously during the WorldWar I years. After the last cannery closed in 1919, the river fishery declined somewhat but remained
active until 1957, when gill and trammel nets were prohibited in San Francisco Bay and Delta. Thislegislative action effectively closed the Sacramento/San Joaquin commercial fishery. Scientists attributethe decline of the river fishery to water development projects, competition from ocean trollers andsport fishermen, mining and logging pollution, siltation and industrial waste discharge.

During the late 1800s, the river fishery also expanded northward from the Sacramento/San Joaquin toother coastal rivers (i.e. the Mad, Eel, Klamath, and Smith Rivers). Landings statistics for these otherrivers prior to 1916 are not available, although the commercial fishery on these rivers apparently operated
on a smaller scale and was more short-lived than the Sacramento/ San Joaquin commercial fishery. The
Mad River was closed to commercial fishing in 1919, the Eel in 1922, and the Klamath and Smith in 1933.

~32

---- --- --... /DELNORTE

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/

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- .....
----', I-- -- -- ---..........

-- ---I

L,

MENDOCINO
Fl Bragg/.,, ...
f~
ILAK
\
'-

...,_/I

---1
\
\

--.._

I

I"
/HUMBOLDT

I

I

I

,/

--- ---N

I)/SAN MATEO-( l• SANTACRUZ

I

I

\
...__

-- -- -- --L--A· c:-- -- -- --\\MONTEREY\-- ----\\
I_, c, SAN LUIS OBISPO'~ SANTA BARBARA........... ___)... - -

L.oa~
.

--

- ... __

,Sil/J ,..,

-

-vea

-----

- _ ..,,99oA.,,..ea...........

~)(,VENTURA-----'9elea A~---- ..... ......

--_ Sanla Babara---- - - _

----

~

/

I ,,
,.,_I
' / LOSANGELES-------......

/• San Pedro 1-.......

................ ___CALIFORNIASTATISTICAL AREAS

7----Newport•
TORANGE.
.....
\- ~- \)
~~

--

.....

I
----- SanDiego ISANDIEGO

1~33

The ocean salmon fishery began operating in the 1880's in Monterey Bay. The first vessels were
sailboats utilizing troll gear. In about 1908, some Sacramento River fishermen began using powered gill
net vessels to troll in Monterey Bay. Use of this more efficient method of trolling spread northward to
Point Reyes by 1914 and Eureka and Crescent City by 1916. Power girdies introduced in the 1920s and1930s replaced the arduous manual labor required to pull the lines out of the water, and were inwidespread use by the late 1940s. With closure of the Sacramento/San Joaquin River commercial
fishery in 1957, the commercial salmon fishery became an exclusively ocean fishery.
During 1916-1943, ocean landings ranged from 2.2 to 7.2 million pounds and averaged 4.5 million
pounds per year. Landings experienced a general upward shift during 1944-1982, ranging from 3.7 to10.3 million pounds and averaging 7.3 million pounds per year. Since 1983 the fishery has experienced
record high and low landings. Landings in 1983 (the most severe El Nino year of the century) were thelowest since 1939, totalling 2.4 million pounds. Landings subsequently increased to a record high of 14.8
million pounds in 1988 and declined to a new record low of 1.6 million pounds in 1992. Althoughlandings increased to 2.6 million pounds the following year, 1993 was still one of the lowest landings
years in the history of the ocean fishery (rivaled only by 1938-1939, 1983 and 1992). The highly variable
landings experienced in recent years have been attributed to factors such as the 1986-1992 drought andsevere El Nino conditions.

--

Recent water reforms within the Central Valley Project (prompted first by the ESA listings of the
California delta smelt and the winter run chinook, and then institutionalized by the passage of theCentral Valley Project Improvement Act of 199244) have helped restore salmon outmigrant water flows
to the Central Valley and Delta areas, and these new flow regimes have doubtless also been major
factors in recent improvement in central California salmon harvests in 1995 and 1996.
Historically, 2.5 to 5.0 million salmon may have been produced by California river systems annually.
At a harvest rate of about 50 percent, the recent harvests of about 1.25 million fish (1962-1990) would
indicate that in recent years the annual harvests have been within the range of those possible for predevelopment runs. However, the vast majority of these harvested fish would have been of hatcheryorigin. The once abundant wild runs have now been seriously depressed by widespread habitat loss,
water diversion and dams, particularly in the Sacramento and San Joaquin River Basins of the
California Central Valley area but also in many portions of the Klamath Basin.
The California Central Valley winter run chinook run was first classified as "threatened" under thefederal Endangered Species Act in 1989 (first by emergency rule published in the Federal Register at 54
Fed. Reg. 32085 (August 4, 1989) then permanently at 55 Fed. Reg. 46515 (November 5, 1990)), butthen shortly afterwards was reclassified as "endangered" after percipitous declines continued (59 Fed.
Reg. 440-450 (January 4, 1994)). This unique run is slowly improving but is still highly vulnerable.
Several other historic Central Valley runs (once the mainstay of commercial salmon harvests for muchof the coast) are now thought to be extinct.

44. The Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) of 1992 was adopted as Title XXXW of P.L. 102-575(October 30, 1992), now codified as 106 U.S. Statutes at Large 4600, Sections 3401 et. seq. The Central Valley
Project is the largest federal water project ever undertaken but has had devastating impacts on wild salmon
populations in the Sacramento/San Joaquin River systems and some portions of the Trinity River system in the
Klamath Basin. The CVPIA makes major reforms in the way water is delivered within the Project to provide forrestoration of severely depressed salmon fisheries.

~34

I.-

L

During 1974-1993, most (88%) of the Oregon chinook harvest was landed (in decreasing order) in
Brookings, the Columbia River and Coos Bay; 78% of the combined chinook and coho harvest
occurred in Coos Bay, Newport and the Columbia River. About 75% of total salmon fishing effort
occurred in Coos Bay, Newport and Brookings (Table A-5).

,a:{A:',,I.-'

I

Cresc City/
Eureka/Ft Bragg

L

l
L

IL

l

L

L
IL
I

L
l.._

L

i

L

-

Year

#

%

1947
5,018
1948 11,209
1949 23,057
1950 56,337
1951 71,970
1952 86,472
1953 98,723
1954 119,911
1955
9,951 8%1956 10,286 9%
1957
6,400 14%
1,716 3%
1958
2,448
1959
4%
4,211 11%1960
1961
2,136 5%
1962
6,161 7%
7,271 10%1963
8,711 9%1964
1965
4,421 9%1966
6,309 9%1967
5,916 7%1968
7,162 6%
7,705 7%1969
1970
7,086 7%
1971 15,081 12%1972
8,220 5%
7,379 6%1973
1974
7,039 7%1975
2,933 4%
1976
5,355 8%1977
2,046 4%2,474 5%1978
1979
3,300 5%
1980
2,402 4%

SanFran
Bay/Delta#%

87,609 68%
63,359 55%
25,547 57%
42,205 80%
47,961 86%
30,122 79%
33,765 79%
74,223 85%
63,032 87%
77,027 84%
45,293 88%
62,178 89%
71,337 84%
111,900 88%
100,510 90%
89,176 91%
112,423 86%
141,753 94%
114,516 92%
97,789 91%
68,363 93%
57,412 87%
52,265 93%
41,414 91%
62,918 90%
59,366 92%

Bodega/Princeton#%

8,295 6%
3,721 3%766 2%
1,265 2%809 1%
293 1%
428 1%
888 1%
497 1%
1,445 2%497 1%
912 1%
1,078 1%2,213 2%810 1%
596 1%
611 0%
534 0%
765 1%
703 1%
833 1%
829 1%
929 2%
866 2%
1,499 2%
1,302 2%

Sta Cruz/
Moss Lndg/
Monterey#%

22,999 18%
36,428 32%
11,634 26%
6,258 12%4,140 7%2,363 6%
5,439 13%
5,522 6%917 1%
1,663 2%408 1%
227 0%
3,023 4%
1,806 1%
1,847 2%501 1%
549 0%
244 0%
668 1%
533 0%
698 1%
1,085 2%502 1%
691 2%
2,143 3%
1,236 2%All Else#%

Total#

124
711
354
1,232
587
952
1,197
818
740
3,175
1,058
525
4,117
4,503
517
942
2,148

0%
1%
1%
2%
1%
2%
3%
1%
1%
3%
2%
1%
4%
4%
0%
1%
1%
0%
1%
2%
1%
2%
0%
0%
0%
0%

128,978
114,505
44,701
52,67655,94537,94142,96587,61272,45792,021
51,677
70,151
84,946
127,584
111,389
98,301130,812
151,595
124,676
107,942
73,85766,09556,15745,646
69,90464,500

844

1,348
1,878
1,030
1.414
415
201
44
194

____. ,.,__________________.
__,. . , _ --------- ---..,

>e►

35

Cresc City/
Eureka/Ft Bragg

i.._

Year

#

%

SanFran
Bay/Delta

Bodega/Princeton

Sta Cruz/
Moss Lndg/
Monterey

#

#

#

%

%

All Else#%

Total#

2,128 3%
2,098 2%
1,207 2%
1,905 3%2,552 2%
9,734 11%12,755 10%
7,179 6%
12,388 11%
12,565 14%
9,372 17%
6,266 14%6,202 9%

86
977
750
17
7
794
75
237
80
510
686
124
123

0%
1%
1%
0%
0%
1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
1%
0%
0%

65,629102,556
55,56071,491
108,335
88,679126,202
113,040
111,11388,331
53,69243,384
69,6445,125 6%

8981%

%

I

I..._
I

i

L

L
l
l
L
I

L

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

1,708 3%
2,827 3%
2,765 5%
1,856 3%
6,266 6%
6,075 7%
11,155 9%9,735 9%11,310 10%
7,922 9%11,241 21%
1,242 3%2,603 4%

1955-1993
Avg.
5,919

7%

58,980 90%
92,876 91%
49,200 89%
65,707 92%
90,240 ·83%
66,041 74%
93,132 74%
81,032 72%
73,523 66%
57,156 65%
26,564 49%
32,276 74%
51,030 73%

2,727
3,778
1,638
2,006
9,270
6,035
9,085
14,857
13,812
10,178
5,829
3,476
9,686

68,493 82%

3,225 4%

4%
4%
3%
3%
9%
7%
7%
13%
12%
12%
11%
8%
14%

83,659Source: Thompson, Cynthia J. and Kenneth R. Sakai, "The Indian, Commercial and Sport Fisheries for Salmon and otherAnadromous Fishes of the Central Valley: An Historical Perspective,· National Marine Fisheries Service,
Southwest Fisheries Science Center, La Jolla, California, 1995.
CDFG summaries of logbook data provided by party/charter boat operators. Salmon harvest estimates include
both chinook and coho.

II

L

Recreational Fishery
L

L

Ocean Sport Fishery
Statistics on the early years of this fishery are available from several sources. Despite the fact thatthe data represent self-reported voluntary information, they are nevertheless the best available
indicator of general trends in the charter boat segment of the fishery. Salmon charter boat landings
have apparently experienced wide fluctuations over time, averaging 83,659 fish per year during 19471993. About 82% of total statewide salmon harvest occurred in the San Francisco Bay/Delta during
those years (Table A-2). Salmon has historically accounted for a significant percentage of total charterboat harvest of all species in Crescent City/Eureka/Fort Bragg and in the San Francisco Bay/Delta
regions. However, this percentage has tended to decline over time, as boat operators have diversified
their operations to include other target species.
Mixed landings of chinook and coho are often made on ocean sport trips targeting salmon. The
contnbution of chinook to total salmon harvest varies geographically, increasing as one moves~36

southward from Crescent City to Monterey Bay. The percentage of total salmon harvest consisting ofchinook during 1962-1993 was 38%-39% in Crescent City/Eureka, 46% in Fort Bragg, and 93%-95%
in San Francisco/Monterey.
Average annual chinook landings in the ocean sport fishery were significantly lower in Oregon(34,322 fish, 1966-1996 average) according to Table A-6 than in California (83,659 fish, 1955-1993
average) (Table A-2).

In-River Sport Fisliery
Beginning in the 1990/01 season, the California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) sponsoredan annual creel census on the Sacraµiento, Feather and American Rivers which provide estimates of
harvest and effort for all major species caught on those rivers. Creel census studies for earlier years
were sporadic. Because results from the few available historical studies are not necessarily comparable
to more recent estimates, due to differences in sampling design, it is difficult to evaluate long run trends
in harvest or effort. However, the recent creel studies conducted by the CDFG do enable us tocharacterize recent fishing patterns on the Sacramento, Feather and American Rivers.
The American River accounts for a larger share of the salmon caught (41 % ) and kept (43%) thaneither of the other two rivers, while the Sacramento River accounts for a majority of the salmon fishingeffort (54%). Although salmon fishing activity is lowest on the Feather River, the Feather still accounts
for a significant proportion of salmon harvest (23%) and effort (18%). Again, however, almost all ofthese fish are of hatchery origin, as only remnant wild populations still exist in those rivers.
Beginning in 1977, the California Department of Fish and Game's Trinity River Project has madeannual estimates of chinook harvest on the Trinity River. Survey results reveal wide fluctuations inharvest, ranging from annual highs of 10,000+ fish during 1986-1988, to annual lows in the hundreds
experienced in more recent years. Available data for recent years indicate that salmon harvest has beenquite low on the Trinity River (Table A-4) compared to the Sacramento, Feather and American Rivers(Table A-3).

Oregon and California Salmon Production/Harvest Interactions 45
Because California origin salmon stocks migrate northward, they are also harvested in Oregon andconsiderable economic benefit also accrues to the Oregon economy from this California origin
resource. Significant amounts of chinook salmon are landed commercially in Oregon, though in lesser
amounts than in California During 1952-1993, annual Oregon landings averaged 1.9 million pounds
and ranged from 0.463 to 5.2 million pounds (Table A-5). California ocean landings over the same
period averaged 7.0 million pounds-and ranged from 1.6 million to 14.8 Inillion pounds (Table A-1).
According to Don Bodenmiller of the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife and to genetic
identification studies, about 50% of the coho caught in California waters originate in Oregon streams,

45. This section is taken from "California's Chinook Salmon: Upstream Battle to Restore the Resource," Western
Water, Water Education Foundation, November/December 1992.

- - ___ ______,__ _,..._~ 37

and about 60% of the chinook harvested off the Oregon coast south of Cape Falcon originate from
California streams.46
Some genetic sampling studies indicate that the percentage of Oregon chinook landings for fish
originating in California may actually be higher, particularly off southern Oregon ports. For instance, a
1995 genetic stock identification program for a fairly large sample of fish caught in a test chinook
fishery off the Rogue River in southern Oregon found that (in that 446 fish sample) 99% of all thechinook encountered came from California, with 94% of the total from the California Central Valley.47
While this data is likely an anomoly, a similar 1994 chinook test fishery found that 50% of the fishcaught caine from California, with at least 16% from the Klamath. As Oregon stocks have declined over
the years, and as Central Valley and Klamath hatchery fish migrated in to replace them, the percentage
of fish landed in Oregon that originated in California likely increased over time.

A Brief History of Klamath Basin Fisheries Management
This subject divides itself readily into two parts: a) allocation of salmon harvest; and, 2) salmon
escapement policies. Both have been increasingly formalized over the past twenty years. In this section
we will briefly summarize the early years, then concentrate on more recent events and policies within
the Klamath Basin which affect this resource.

Salmon Harvest Allocation
The Native American Tnbes on the Klamath and Trinity Rivers caught salmon for ceremonial andsubsistence needs as well as for trade for thousands of years before European settlers "discovered" theriver and its fisheries. Conflicts between Tribes over salmon before European contact almost certainly
did occur, but are beyond the scope of this report.
Europeans discovered gold as well as fish in both the Trinity and Scott Rivers (the Scott is a major
upriver tributary of the Klamath) during the gold rush. The Trinity River was subjected to hydraulicmining in the area from Weaverville to Junction City around the time of the Civil War, with devastating
effects on its fisheries-and on the Tribes that depended upon them.48 Among the many other impactsof mining, the Scott River was dredged to bedrock and its river bottom virtually turned upside down
early in the twentieth century.49

46. Personal communication from Don Bodenmiller to Hans Radtke, 1994.
47. This data was reponed in a letter dated February 29, 1994 from Rob Kaiser, Ocean Salmon Management Program
for the Oregon Depanment of Fish and Wildlife titled, ''Rogue Ocean Troll Chinook Fishery, July, 1995: Results ofGenetic Testing for Stock Contribution in Fishery." The repon is available from the Oregon Depanment of Fish
and Wildlife.
50. See historical notes in Matts v. Arnett. 412 US 481 (1973), Appendix pg. B5.
49. Historic information from a presentation by Mike Bryan, 4th generation Scott Valley farmer, to Kio.math Basin
Restoration Symposium, Yreka, CA, March 11, 1997.

~38

By the late nineteenth century commercial salmon canning operations were running in the Klamath
estuary. The canneries were owned by Europeans, while much of the harvesting was done by Indiansusing gillnets. These operations eventually shut down, but another commercial cannery was operatingby the mid-1920's, with gillnetting by both Indian and European fishermen. Gillnetting for commercial
purposes in the Klamath was entirely shut down, however, by the State of California in 1933.
However, by the mid-1930's a thriving ocean troll salmon fishery had developed to replace theinriver fishery. 50 The ocean troll fishery originally began with a small number of boats using sail power,
but grew rapidly with the development of reliable small marine engines, which in addition to driving theboat provided power to run the trolling cables up and down. In 1957 California banned all in-rivercommercial salmon fisheries and provided that all commercial salmon fishing was to be done solely byocean trolling.
Meanwhile anglers had also discovered the Klamath and Trinity. Lodges and guide services catering
to steelhead fishermen developed upriver, and salmon fishermen flocked to the estuary in such
numbers that after WWII a Coast Guard station had to be established on the estuary to prevent skiff
fishermen from getting into the breakers and to rescue those that did. 51
I.._

Commercial gillnetting by Native Americans was banned from 1933 until 1976. While it still
occurred clandestinely, to what extent and at what level of catch will probably remain unknown. Indianrights to fish were the subject of several court cases during this period, including Matts v. Arnett, Arnett
v. Five Gil/nets, and Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Baldrige.
In 1977, the Pacific Fisheries Management Council (PFMC) was established as one of several
Regional Fisheries Management Councils pursuant to the newly adopted Fishery Conservation andManagement Act (then known as the "Magnuson Act," now known as the "Sustainable Fisheries Act")
which established federal authority to manage and regulate all ocean fisheries from 3 to 200 miles
offshore of California, Oregon, and Washington.52 The PFMC is composed of the Fish & Game
Department Directors of Oregon, Washington, California, and Idaho, the Regional Director of the
National Marine Fisheries Service, a Tribal representative from a Tribe with federally recognizedfishing rights, and seven additional members of the public (at least one of whom must be appointed
from each state) with interests or expertise in fisheries. Of these public members, traditionally one has
50. A salmon troller runs several thin cables with heavy leads so that they hang down in the water; each cable has
beads at interval.s to which leaders are clipped. The leaders, with lures or baits attached to hooks, trail behind thecables. The boat moves this a"ay through the water at two or three knots. The gear is "run" 1Jy reeling up the cables
and unclipping and coiling the leaders as they arrive at the boat, removing fish (if any) from the hooks as theycome up. By controlling the placement, depth and type of hook, this methodology can be very selective.
51. Historical information from conversations with Tun Walters, Eureka charter boat operator, who served in the U. S.
Coast Guard on the Klamath River {n the late '40s.
52. The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-265, 16 U.S.C. 1801 et. seq.), was signed into
law on April 13, 1976, and went into effect on March 1, 1977. The Act was officially retitled "The Magnuson
Fishery and Conservation Act" in 1980 1Jy Public Law 95-561 in honor of the late Senator W°"en Magnuson, who
was instrumental in its development and passage. The most recent amendments were adopted by the 1M1'
Congress (P.L. 104- 208, Div. A, Title I, 101(a), ll0Stat. 3009-41), and al.so changed the name of the Act to the''Magnuson- Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1996, "though it is now officially known as the"Sustainable Fisheries Act" (P.L. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559).

~39

been drawn from Idaho, one from Washington, two from Oregon, and three from California. The
public members are also supposed to be broadly representative of commercial and sportfishing interests
as well as the general public. The Regional Councils are advisory to the Secretary of Commerce, but inpractice most of their recommendations are followed. National Standard One of the Magnuson Act
charges regional councils to "prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum
yield from each fisbery..."53
One of PFMC's first actions was to re-open the commercial gillnet fishery in the Klamath estuary.
That fishery was allowed to run through the middle of the '78 salmon season when it was abruptly shut
down by armed federal agents. The gillnet fishery remained officially shut down for commercial
purposes through 1985.
In the early 1980's, the ocean troll fishery experienced a series of closures intended to conserve
declining Klamath fall run chinook salmon, which were perceived as failing to meet spawningescapement goals. In 1985, the "Klamath Management Zone" (KMZ) area (from Humbug Mountain in
Oregon to Punta Gorda in California-about 150 miles) was completely closed to ocean salmon trolling
for the first time. 54 At the same time the PFMC was realizing that: a) the ocean fisheries were capableof taking all the harvestable surplus of a given run of fish above spawning escapement needs; and, b)
the Klamath was the only river south of the Columbia with the potential for a major inriver catch-thegillnet fishery-in addition to the ocean catch.55 Oearly something bad to give. Some sort ofreallocation of the harvestable fish among ocean commercial, sportsfishing, and Native American
fisheries became necessary.
In 1985, the PFMC established the Klamath River Salmon Management Group (KRSMG) as an ad
hoc advisory body charged with recommending a more equitable allocation of the harvestable fish,consistent with spawning escapement objectives. To the KRSMG table came representatives ofCalifornia and Oregon trollers, ocean and inriver sports fishermen, Native American fishermen, andthe state and federal agencies with management responsibilities in the Klamath.56
The group agreed early on that its task was to reach CQnsensus on an allocation formula that would
provide a viable fishery for each interest, and that each interest would share proportionally the benefits
when stocks were abundant and the sacrifice when stocks were scarce.

KRSMG reached an allocation agreement in time for the 1986 ocean fishing season: ocean fisheries
would, in abundant years, be managed to catch 35% of the Klamath fall run age-4 fish in the ocean(compared with about a 66% ocean harvest rate for a wide-open ocean fishery); the remainder of theharvestable surplus would be taken inriver. Sub-allocations between ocean sports and commercial
fishermen on the one hand and inriver sports and Native American fishermen on the other followed,
with the Indian gillnet fishery to take about 80% of the inriver share. Whenever required to meetescapement goals, each fishery was to be proportionally reduced. PFMC thankfully accepted thisrecommendation from the KRSMG, but shifted the allocation slightly in favor of ocean fisheries.
53. 16 U.S.C. 185J(a)(l).

54. Review of1986 Fisheries. appendix C, Table C-1, PFMC.
55. At that time sports fishermen on the Klamath were taking only up to about 10% of the inriver run.
56. Information from David Bitts, who participated in the KRSMG and KFMC beginning Jan. '86, and who has sat on
the KFMC since Feb. '92.

~40

The next year the KRSMG modified the agreement slightly in favor of inriver fisheries (the ocean sharethen dropped to 32.5%) and extended the overall agreement for five years. The group's members
believed at that time that the allocation dispute was settled, and that all parties could then turn theirefforts towards improving the basin's overall habitat productivity so there would be more fish foreveryone. Ocean fishermen believed, based on the technical information about ocean catch thenavailable, that they had secured, at least in abundant years, a traditional (May 1-Sept. 30) fisheryoutside the K.MZ, with some fishing to be allowed inside the KMZ as well.
Unfortunately, shortly after the agreement was signed it was discovered that ocean fisheries outside
the K.MZ were capable of taking about 40% of the Klamath-origin fish in the ocean instead of the 25%that had been formerly thought. This meant that even in the best of times no commercial fishing would
be allowed in the K.MZ without compensating closures outside it. Efforts to renegotiate the agreement
in light of the new information failed, but in 1987 and for the duration of the agreement (through1991 ), the PFMC allocated slightly higher shares to ocean fisheries than called for in the agreement ascompensation. Unfortunately this did not sit well with inriver fishing interests.
Two additional unanticipated factors exacerbated the existing hard feelings: 1) ultimately there
were far more Klamath fish than predicted in 1986, 1987 and 1988--but ocean fisheries, because they
worked on a percentage-based formula, were able to take advantage of the abundance, while inriver
fisheries, managed instead for quotas based on the predicted abundance, were not; and, 2) measures toconstrain the ocean harvest rate (being new and experimental) turned out to be less effective than
anticipated, so that ocean fisheries exceeded their target harvest rates for the first six years of harvest
rate management.
Following passage of the Klamath River Restoration Act in 1986,57 the informal KRSMG was
replaced in 1988 by the Klamath Fisheries Management Council (KFMC), with basically the sameplayers and charge as the earlier group, but with a slightly different organizational format: the KFMC isorganized under the Interior Department's Fish and Wildlife Service, while the PFMC is organizedunder the authority of the National Marine Fisheries Service, a subdivision of the U. S. Department ofCommerce. The KFMC is charged with recommending a spawning escapement policy, determining theharvestable surplus, and recommending a harvest allocation for Klamath Basin fall chinook salmon to
the PFMC for its consideration as part of its federal fisheries management duties coastwide.
For 1992, there was no allocation agreement, the old one having run its unhappy course. However,the scarcity of Klamath fish that year almost made the matter moot. So few Klamath fish were expectedthat the option of allowing no fishing at all was seriously considered. In the end, PFMC allowed "deminimus" fisheries for that year-an 8% ocean harvest rate, and a total inriver catch of about 8,000
fish-even though there were not enough fish to meet the spawner escapement floor had there been no
fishing. The logic was that totally closing fisheries would do more harm to the fisheries than a very low
rate of harvest would do to the resource. This notion was fortunately borne out (though more by luck

57. The Klamath River Restoration Act (1986) (P.L. 99-552, 100 Stat. 3082, later amended by P.L. 100-653, 102 Stat.
3830). Codified as 16 U.S.C. '460ss through '460ss-6. The KFMC is created and governed by 16 U.S.C. '460ss-2.

- - · · - - - - - - - - - ~=========""

than foresight) when the very small 1992 spawning escapement later produced a large brood of at least
400,000 age-3 fish. 58
In the spring of 1993, the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce agreed that the Yurok and Hoopa
Tribes (two of the four federally recognized Tribes in the Klamath Basin) were entitled to up to half theallowable harvest of each run of Klamath salmon. Implementing this ruling (which has since survived acourt challenge by ocean fishermen)5 9 also required reducing the maximum allowable ocean harvest
rate of Klamath fall run age-4 year chinook from about 37% to about 21 %.60 This reallocation further
extended the KMZ closures another sixty miles in each direction: in California, the commercial fishery
can take its maximum share of Klamath fish (equally split with Oregon trollers after the KMZ sports
fishermen take their quota) without quite having a full season below Point Arena. In Oregon,eliminating any significant fishing off Coos Bay required closures off Newport, at least until 1997 whenthe virtual disappearance of the Coos Bay commercial salmon fleet allowed re-opening that area to thehandful of survivors.

-

Commercial fishermen have chosen to shape their seasons in this manner in order to maximize their
total catch-in other words, they seek to harvest some Klamath share while still retaining access to as
many non-Klamath fish as possible by still fishing outside the KMZ. They could choose instead to fish
entirely within the KMZ, but because Klamath fish are a much higher percentage of the total catchthere that choice would actually minimize total catch coastwide, because it would then require
disproportionate compensating closures below Point Arena and above Coos Bay, where Klamath fish
make up less than 5% of the catch.
However, the end result of the current allocation scheme for ocean fisheries is that the "old KMZ"
ports of Port Orford, Gold Beach, Brookings, Crescent City, Trinidad, and Eureka can never expect
more than token commercial salmon harvest opportunities at best. The "new KMZ" ports of Coos Bay,
Bandon, Shelter Cove, and Fort Bragg may do a little better, but not much, not in all years, and notwithout some costs in terms of closures farther away and some reduction in coastwide total catch. In
California, the ports of Bodega Bay and San Francisco must also often be closed during peak fishingtimes.

Thus increasing Klamath fall-run chinook productivity is now essential to keeping Coos Bay,
Bodega Bay and San Francisco viable as salmon ports, or to have any meaningful fishing opportunity
off Fort Bragg and Shelter Cove. In other words, the productivity of the Klamath Basin salmon runs has
now become a limiting factor for salmon fisheries for much of the rest of the coast. The only way this can beeffectively done is to improve the productivity ofspawning and rearing habitat within the Klamath Basinitself.

58. Preseason Report L 1997. PFMC, Table 11-4. Too many fish in the river system can also have serious ecosystem
repercussions, including leading to increasing inter and intra-species competition by overwhelming the carrying
capacity of the river, which can in tum lead to la.ter population 'crashes.'
59. Pa"avano v. Babbitt, 70 F3d 539 (9"' Cir. 1995), cert. den. 116 S.Ct 2546 (1996).
60. Preseason Report II, 1996, PFMC. This report also gives target harvest rates for 1996, with the largest predicted
K/,amath abundance to date.

___ ____ ____________..,.,..

..,,_~__,..._,.....,

Overall, and especially since the passage of the Magnuson Act, there are now strong controls overpotential overfishing. Inland habitat losses and lack of adequate instream water flows, however, havetaken an increasing share of the potential salmon production out of the system altogether, usually long
before the fish even get to the ocean.61 Habitat and water impacts have also been by far the hardest
problems to correct. However, both ocean and inriver fishing interests have a clear economic selfinterest in seeing that habitat problems and the lack of inland flows are addressed throughout theKlamath Basin. The salmon productivity of the Klamath Basin now controls much of the rest of thecoast wide salmon fishery.
With the granting of a 50% share of the harvestable fish, federal recognition of the Yurok Tribe(and that Tribe's official organization), and the passage of the Native American Self-Governance Act,the Hoopa and Yurok Tribes have taken over management of their fisheries from the Bureau of IndianAffairs and the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Both Tribes have expressed a strong interest in habitat
restoration and restoration of adequate flows for fisheries, which on both rivers can only come throughreduction of flows to other users (primarily agricultural irrigators) by the Bureau of Reclamation.

-

Unfortunately, the reallocation of half the harvestable fish to the Yurok and Hoopa Tribes has had
a very serious impact on ocean commercial salmon fisheries and the coastal communities that sustain
them, most profoundly in the region from Fort Bragg to Coos Bay. In years when fisheries must be
curtailed to meet the escapement floor, that curtailment can extend well below San Francisco and northto Cape Falcon. At the same time, the assumption of management responsibilities by the Tribes may
have a net positive effect on management of both the Tribal fisheries and the basin's habitat. Federally
guaranteed fishing rights for the Tnbes also imply the right to adequate instream flows and healthy
stream habitat so that salmon can continue to exist in the basin in harvestable numbers. These implied
water rights have to date been largely ignored by federal agencies. The Tribes in recent years have been
increasingly vocal advocates of major flow and habitat restoration efforts throughout the basin and havebecome more willing to back up those rights in federal court.

Escapement pollcy
Before the PFMC was established in 1977, escapement policy was largely left to chance. Fisheries
took what they took, and if there weren't enough to sustain a cannery in the river, it would close. If
ocean fishermen couldn't catch enough to make expenses plus a bit, they would tie up or go tunafishing. Traditional Tribal fishing methods were either less efficient or more selective than modem
gillnets, thus intrinsically providing for a fairly large escapement.
The California Department of Fish and Game (CDFG) set the first Klamath Basin fall run chinook
spawning escapement goal at 115,000 in 1978.62 The PFMC later adopted this goal. However, becauseof the difficulty in meeting this goal, by 1983 the goal had been modified downward to include a

61. Trinity Dam, for example, blocks about 80% of the original Trinity River spawning habitat and has allowed thediversion of 80% or more of basin water flows once available to salmon.
62. An Assessment of the Current Carrying Capacity of the Klamath River Basin for Adult Fall Chinook Salmon,
Hubbell and Boydstun, CDFG, Sept. 1985.

"rebuilding schedule" whose first step, to be in place for four years, was a goal of 68,900 spawners, withthe 115,000 goal to be in place by 1995.63

It became obvious, however, that these ambitious spawning escapement goals could not be met withthe present seriously degraded state of inland habitat. Extensive habitat loss coupled with other factors
such as reduced flows, increased water temperatures, etc., from human activities bas seriously reduced
the carrying capacity of the entire river system. Therefore, in 1986 and long before any of these goals
could be met, a whole new methodology was introduced. While developing its allocation agreement, the
KRSMG also developed an escapement policy called harvest rate management, whose core concept isthat, rather than a target number of spawners, the goal should be a percentage of the actual population;
specifically, that at least one-third of each brood should survive to spawn. The maximum allowable
harvest rate would then be the complement of the survival rate, or two-thirds.
In addition, a minimum number of natural spawners, in this case 35,000, would be imposed as a"floor'' to protect weaker broods and ensure their ability to rebound quickly under favorable
environmental conditions. If "full fishing" (i.e., a total harvest rate by all fisheries combined of two
thirds) would result in less than 35,000 natural spawners, fisheries would be reduced (proportionally,
under the allocation agreement) to the extent necessary to provide at least 35,000 natural spawners. 64--

The KRSMG recommended this policy to the PFMC, which adopted it provisionally, thenincorporated it officially into the Framework Plan as part of Amendment Nine to that plan in 1989.65
With very minor changes, harvest rate management is in place today as the official PFMC escapement
policy for Klamath fall chinook.
Harvest rate management would seem to require fairly accurate predictions of stock abundance inorder to achieve any degree of management success. However, to date no one seems to know how tomake such predictions accurately. Age-3 abundance is predicted from the number of early returningage-2 fish (also known as "jacks") estimated in the river the previous fall; in tum, age-4 abundance isestimated from the number of age-3 fish. Both predictors have been way off in both directions. Manysuggestions for improved accuracy have been examined, but so far none have proven themselves.
Unfortunately, to date no one has come up with a better predictive methodology.66
Ocean commercial fisheries have been managed, beginning in 1986, for an ocean harvest rate ofage-4 Klamath fall run chinook salmon, defined as the percentage of all age-4 Klamath fish in the ocean
taken by ocean fisheries (about 5/Sths of Klamath fall-run chinook salmon typically return as 4 year
olds.) The ocean harvest rate (OHR) for each year is derived by first determining the total allowable
harvest rate based on total predicted abundance, then applying the current allocation formula to it.
These numbers are nin through the harvest rate model (developed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service), which then spits out the allowable ocean harvest rate, the inriver run size, number of natural
spawners, and (beginning in 1993) the Tribal and the non-Tribal allowable catch in numbers.

63. Ibid., see also Final Framework Amendment for Managing the Ocean Salmon Fisheries, PFMC, October 1984,
pg.3-20.,
64. Klamath River Salmon Management Long-Term Harvest Sharing Agreement, Item #5, July, 1987.
65. Amendment Nine to Salmon Framework Plan, PFMC, 1989.
66. Preseason Report I, 1997, PFMC, Table 11-4.

----------_,...._~ 44

Ocean fisheries are managed by using time, area and gear limitations to achieve the desired harvest
rate. Managers' ability to shape ocean fisheries by time, area and gear limitations in order to achieve atarget Klamath harvest rate has improved considerably since about 1990. The harvest rate actuallyachieved has been under the target in four of the past six years, somewhat over one year, and double
the predicted amount in one year. 67
One feature of this method of management is that the ocean fisheries' ability to hit a target harvest
rate is somewhat independent of stock abundance and the accuracy of its prediction. This seems
desirable, and would be better were it not that inriver fisheries are still managed by a quota systemlinked only to the predicted abundance.
A weakness of harvest rate management with a spawning floor is that, while it should provide foradequate spawning escapement to the basin as a whole, it does not address the distribution of spawners
withi.n the basin. For example, the Klamath Underescapement Review68 Team discovered in 1993 that,while the 33% escapement goal had been met or exceeded for the Basin as a whole, the Klamath Riverside had fallen under the goal with about a 25% escapement rate, while the Trinity River side hadgreatly exceeded the 33% escapement goal and was over 40%.69 This difference is thought to occur
because of developmental differences between fish from the two river systems. Klamath-side fish tend
to mature at age 4, while Trinity-side fish tend to mature at age 3-thus both ocean and inriver fisheries
would tend to target Klamath-side fish more heavily. The Yurok Tribe has responded to this news withchanges in its own fishery practices designed to target Trinity River stocks more heavily while relieving
effort on Klamath River stocks.70
In a situation where one stream within a basin is not receiving adequate escapement, managing
fisheries to address this problem would require carrying the concept of weak-stock management to its
logical extreme. If Blue Creek, for example, is only getting a handful of spawners while the rest of thebasin is getting plenty, should fisheries be managed to put more fish into Blue Creek? What would that
imply for the rest of the basin? For fisheries generally? And what does this (hypothetical) situation say
about conditions in Blue Creek? Is it reasonable to suppose that fisheries have somehow inadvertently
more heavily targeted Blue Creek fish?
When harvest rate management was first adopted, estimates of the optimum spawning capacity of
the Klamath Basin ranged so widely that that number was for all practical purposes simply unknown. 71
One of the advantages of the new management system was that it would produce (overtime) a wide
range of spawning numbers, with the opportunity to evaluate the productivity of different numbers of
spawners and eventually figure out the optimum spawning capacity of the basin in its present condition.

67. Preseason Report I, 1997, Table 11-3.
68.- The overfishing review policy of PFMC provides that whenever a managed stock of salmon fails to meet its
escapement goal for three consecutive years, a review of the causes of the shortfall shall be conducted. The
Klamath basin fell short of 35,000 natural spawners in •~ '91, and '92, causing the formation of a Klamath
Review Team whose product is the Klamath River Fall Chinook Review Team Report, PFMC, December 1994.
69. Ibid., Appendix C, p. 9.

70. Report to the KFMC by Tray Fletcher, head of the Yurok Tribe Fisheries Department, Spring of 1994.
71. See Hubbell and Boydstun, op. cit. p. 7.

_________..,,,.________,_,,..,________________________________________

_,__,

~

45

To everyone's astonishment, extremely high spawning numbers were seen in the first three years of
harvest rate management. Within ten years, a tenfold range in natural spawning numbers was observed.
Comparing the productivity of those ten broods, plus the six or so before them, shows little relationshipbetween number of spawners and number of recruits produced. An analysis of the spawner/recruit
relationship done by Mike Prager of NMFS for the Technical Advisory Team of the KFMC suggests (itwill take forty or more years to be sure) that under current habitat conditions the optimum spawning
capacity may be very close to the current floor of 35,000 natural spawners. 72 All the "power broods"(age-3 populations over 400,000) came from escapements actually below the floor. None of the big
escapement years have yet produced more than an average number of recruits, though the 1995 brood
may become the first.
All this strongly suggests that the number of spawners may not be the principal factor driving
production today, but rather that the carrying capacity of instream spawning and rearing habitat is theprimary limiting factor. It may in fact be the case that instream waters flows in the Klamath Basin are a
far more important factor in determining brood survival than previously acknowledged. In a recent
Klamath Basin hydraulic study, for instance, it was determined that prior to the existence of irrigationwater diversions for the Klamath Project in the Upper Basin, the Klamath Basin above Keno appears tohave provided approximately 30% to 40% of the late spring and summer flows at the mouth of theKlamath River. Loss of these flows today may thus be a serious limiting factor on downstream salmon
survival all the way to the estuary.73 In a salmon survival study recently commissioned by the States ofOregon and California, it was also noted that:"Diversion of water is potentially one of the most serious factors adversely affecting
salmon in western Oregon and northern California... [W]ater rights and attendant
diversions have a potentially strong effect on salmon and represent an important
constraint on fisheries management." 74
In other words (at least above a given 'floor') the limiting factors on fishery recruitment (and thuson harvests) may be related far more to habitat quality and instream flows than to other factors such as
the total number of spawners in each brood year.
While this history is too brief to draw conclusions with certainty, a few comments may be made withsome confidence. Fisheries managers appear to be learning about the escapement needs of the Klamath
Basin as they go, and our production expectations for it may be more realistic now than they were tenor fifteen years ago. In the meantime, it does not appear that fisheries management and escapement
policies have damaged the long-term productivity of the fishery, especially compared to the habitatchanges wrought by dams and water management policies, among other agents. The level of scrutiny offisheries management from parties with very divergent interests is very high and the process is very
public. The KFMC provides a forum for these parties to express their concerns, and to have themexamined-and for the most part addressed-by fisheries managers.
72. Preliminary Analysis of Klamath River Fall-Run Chinook Salmon: Stock, Recruitment, Environment, and Yield,
Klamath Technical Advisory Team, Sept. 1~ pp 9-10.
73. "Initial Assessment of Pre- and Post-Project Hydrology on the Klamath River and Impacts of the Project on
Instream Flows and Fishery Habitat," Balance Hydrologies, Berkeley, CA, 1996; prepared for the Yurok Tribe.
74. Status and Future of Salmon of Western Oregon and Northern California, Center for the Study of the Environment(the so-called ''Botkin Study"), May, 1995.

~46

Ultimately, however, there is little more fisheries managers can do other than manage fishermen.
The current legal regime does not allow them to address or correct instream flow problems nor toreverse the history of widespread habitat degradation the basin has already faced. When salmon losses
are caused not by overfishing, but by rampant and pervasive habitat destruction and water diversions( as is largely the case today) there is really very little fisheries managers can do. Ultimately it is up to
fishermen ( and their political representatives) to address, and to try to correct, the more pervasive
problems of loss of inland water and habitat. Unless habitat factors can be controlled, and the impactsof habitat loss reversed, no amount of management of fishing impacts will ultimately prevent either
economic or biological extinction.

The Impact of the Federal Endangered Species Act
In recent years coastal coho salmon have been candidates for listing under the federal Endangered
Species Act, and as a result coho "bycatch" and incidental catch of coho has been severely restricting
fisheries managers coastwide. There has been no directed coho fishery allowed for the commercial
salmon fishing fleet in the lower 48 states since 1994, and for many years prior harvest opportunities
had been greatly reduced.
Wild coho runs are most severely depressed in the southern most portion of their current range(northern California and southern Oregon). The federal agency which has jurisdiction over ESA listing
decisions regarding anadromous fish is the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), which is part of
the U. S. Department of Commerce.75
NMFS classifies salmon within a species into subspecies called "evolutionarily significant units," or"ESU's." These are intended to be groupings of geneticially distinct subspecies of salmon which are
geographically isolated but can interbreed. This classification system is a compromise between
implementing ESA protections down to the smallest scale stock-by-stock level (there are hundreds of
distinct salmonid stocks coastwide), or alternatively limiting protection only to the species level
coastwide, thereby allowing widespread extinction of subspecies. The ESA, in fact, mandates protectionof subspecies as well as whole species in appropriate cases.76
As a result of litigation and under court order, NMFS listed the so-called "Central California Coast
Evolutionary Significant Unit (ESU)" for coho salmon as "threatened" under the federal ESA on
October 31, 1996. This listing covers the coastal area from the San Lorenzo River (near Santa Cruz,

75. Te"estrial species are under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which is in the U.S. Depanmentof Interior.
76. The federal Endangered Species Act at 16 U.S.C. 1523(15) defines "species" as follows: "The term 'species'
includes any subspecies offish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species orvertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature." (emphasis added) ESU's are an effort to define"distinct populations segments" for purposes ofprotection of those genetically distinct populations which are in
need. The NMFS ESU policy has been published as "Policy on Applying the Definition of Species under theEndangered Species Act to Pacific Salmon" at 56 Fed. Reg. 58612 (November 20, 1991). The ESU classification
system is controversiai however, because it may result in too little protection for individual salmon stocks facedwith extinction whenever other surrounding stocks within the same ESU are not.

~47

MISSING TEXT BETWEEN PAGES 47 - 55 FROMORIGINAL DOCUMENTS

As a result of litigation and under court order, NMFS listed the so-called "Central California Coast
Evolutionary Significant Unit (ESU)" as "threatened" under the federal ESA on October 31, 1996. This
listing covers the coastal area from the San Lorenzo River (near Santa Cruz, CA) to Punta Gorda innorthern California. 1 A decision to list what are called the "Southern Oregon/Northern California ESU"
and the "Oregon Coast ESU" further north was, however, postponed in the midst of considerable politicalcontroversy.2 Finally, in May of 1997, NMFS listed the coho in the Southern Oregon/Northern California
ESU as threatened (which includes the Klamath Basin) but declined to list the Oregon Coast ESU, citing
the existance of a statewide recovery effort in Oregon as cause not to list, a decision which was later
upheld in court but which is still in litigation. 3
The Umpqua River searun cutthroat trout ( Oncorhynchus clarki clarki, technically classed as asalmonid and not a trout) was listed under the federal ESA on August 9, 1996, for the limited area of theUmpqua River basin in southern Oregon.4 There is no commercial or sport fishery on this species, and theprimary impacts driving these declines are clearly habitat related. 5 Protections for this species may also
benefit coho, chinook and other salmonids in these same streams.
Steelhead ( Oncorhynchus mykiss) were proposed by NMFS for coastwide listing under the federal
ESA on August 9, 1996. NMFS identified at least 23 distinct steelhead stocks as already extinct, withanother 43 facing a moderate to high risk of extinction in the near future. 6 Steelhead are not acommercially fished species, and so are harvested (if at all) only by the recreational fishery. Steelhead(like coho) are also very sensitive to changes in their spawning and rearing habitat and other inland
habitat degradations and face similar declines. Some stocks of steelhead were listed on August 11, 1997,

1•

Final listing decision for the coho "Central California Coast" ESU was published in the Federal Register at 61
FR 56138-56149 on October 31, 1996.

2•

Postponement decisions for coho listings were published in the Federal Register at 61 FR 56211-56213, also
on October 31, 1996.

3

Coho were formally listed in the Klamath Basin on Southern Oregon/Northern California ESU on May 6, 1997,
published in the Federal Register at_ FR _ __4•

Listing decision for the searun cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarki clarkiJ was published by NMFS in theFederal Register on August 9, 1996, at 61 FR 41514-41522.

5•

The searun cutthroat trout has never been commercially fished because it migrates very close to the shore
well inside areas where commercial harvests are allowed to take place. Recreational fishing on the species
has been closed for many years, although there may be some incidental harvest impacts in catch and releasefisheries for other species in the area. The watershed in which it exists has been heavily logged for many
years, many local streams are over appropriated for human use, and there are a wide variety ofotherhabitat related impacts within the basin as well which are likely driving these declines.

6•

NMFS identified 15 separate steelhead ESU's from northern Washington to southern California. The
proposed listing decision was published in the Federal Register at 61 FR 41541-41561 (August 9, 1996).

but the stocks in the "Klamath Mountains Province ESU" were deferred for listing decision for an
additonal six months, which means a decision is due in February of 1998.7
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is currently considering a petition for thecoastwide listing of chinook salmon under the federal ESA. 8 In addition, NMFS is undergoing its own
comprehensive reviews of the status of all salmon and anadromous trout populations in Washington,
Oregon, Idaho and Califomia.9 NMFS is now scheduling all salmonid listing decisions to be completed
by December, 1998.

7

Final steelhead listing decisions were published on August_, 1997 at_ FR _ _ _ __8•

Several chinook salmon runs are already listed under the federal ESA, most notably the winter run chinookof the California Central Valley, and also the Snake River spring/summer chinook and Snake River fallchinook in the Columbia River. The Columbia River runs were recently reclassified from "threatened" status
to "endangered" in a decision published in the Federal Register on December 28, 1994, at 59 FR 6678466787. There is evidence that some other chinook runs may need protection as well. Many chinook runs,
however, are relatively abundant. Chinook salmon are generally less inland habitat sensitive than coho or
steelhead because they spend their juvenile stage in the lower river systems in areas that are usually less
impacted by such issues as logging, grazing and water diversions. They also migrate out to sea relatively
quickly as compared to other salmonid species. This is why it is not uncommon to find river systems in whichcoho and steelhead are severely depressed while chinook salmon from the same river system may berelatively abundant. Chinook, coho and steelhead are all different species with very different habitat needs
and different life histories..

9•

Notice of this comprehensive review program was published in the Federal Register on September 12, 1994,
at 59 FR 46808-46810. However, NMFS is many months behind in its scheduled reviews. NMFS inaction has
provoked several lawsuits in an effort to require it to meet statutory listing decision deadlines it has_frequently been unable to meet.
2

TableA-3
Number of Fish Kept and Caught Per Season by Species and River and Number of Angler Hours Per Season by
Target Species and River, Averaged Over 1990/1991-1993/1994 Seasons
FISH KEPT
Sacramento

Feather

AmericanAll Rivers

SalmonSteelhead
Trout
Shad
Striped Bass
Sturgeon
Catfish

9,817
2,128
7,203
20,272
31,542
2,320
20,630

5,857
1,692
175
7,783
2,339
0
1,302

10,281
1,376
880
6,471
1,162
0
0

25,955
5,196
8,258
34,52635,043
2,320
21,932

TOTAL

93,912

19,14820,170133,230

Species

FISH CAUGHT
Species

Sacramento

Feather

AmericanAll Rivers

SalmonSteelhead
Trout
Shad
Striped Bass
Sturgeon
Catfish10,155
5,997
37,971
58,967201,763
22,53329,119

6,760
3,537
614
28,535
8,459
0
1,879

11,9392,217
2,994
15,9402,183
0
028,854
11,752
41,578103,442
212,406
22,53330,998TOTAL

366,505

49,78435,273

451,562

ANGLER HOURS
TargetSpecies

Sacramento

Feather

AmericanAll Rivers

SalmonSteelhead
Trout
Shad
Striped Bass
Sturgeon
CatfishAny Fish

307,870
23,591
120,728
95,788981,476
462,808
124,319
193,310111,090
35,9992,928
56,39048,5682,562
11,76548,787

140,675
41,78810,437
23,342
17,9270
2,775
40,596559,635
101,378
134,093
175,520
1,047,971
465,370
138,859
282,693

All Species

2,309,890

318,089

277,540

2,905,519

Source: Thompson, Cynthia J. and Kenneth R. Sakai, "The Indian, Commercial and Sport Fisheries for Salmon and otherAnadromous Fishes of the Central Valley: An Historical Perspective," National Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest Fisheries
Science Center, La Jolla, California, 1995.

3

TableA-4
Number ofFall Run Chinook Caught on the Trinity River, by Year

Year

Chinook Harvest(# Fish)

1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

5,464
0
1,922
3,454
4,630
4,875
2,476
1,129
5,596
15,477
10,356
12,076
3,263
350
1,271
472

Avg.

4,551

Source: Thompson, Cynthia J. and Kenneth R. Sakai, "The Indian, Commercial and Sport Fisheries for Salmon and otherAnadromous Fishes of the Central Valley: An Historical Perspective," National Marine FisheriesService, Southwest Fisheries
Science Center, La Jolla, California, 1995. Kano, in press.
Note: Fishery closure in 1978.

TableA•S
Q~~ ,&mmer~1al 1lro11 Chinook Landings in Oregon (Pounds), by Port Area, 1952-1993
Year

Columbia
River

Tillamook

NewportCoos Bay

Brookings

TOTAL

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

718,485
453,423452,679
457,488414,015
154,865
80,67264,674
82,372
99,62972,132
164,193
103,522

7,499
9,377
29,29649,57431,001
22,24031,261
14,382
10,300
8,946
3,616
9,042
14,056

1,278,153
804,365
685,075
1,343,608
1,395,470
913,766
592,955
180,895
367,383
350,324
116,546
103,705
71,083682,037
408,142755,582
1,364,677
1,978,046
1,532,563
879,732
197,012764,233
351,907
227,931
797,014305,262

149
210
1,578
4,171
7,382
7,167
10,715
6,008
103,732
416,539
177,086
330,248
133,751

2,686,323
1,675,517
1,924,210
3,219,518
3,825,914
2,630,601
1,595,335
462,971
1,328,020
1,227,345
597,311
1,404,202
627,674

Table A-5 (Continued)
4Columbia
Tillamook

NewportCoos Bay

Brookings

TOTAL

48,264
157,447
179,635
190,483
94,041
212,121
141,418
77,14975,968
159,516
106,208
268,247
200,087
165,698
101,322
107,260
128,918
170,055
65,56327,195
69,16260,87879,24035,601
49,31027,1239,000
17,0005,000
151,120

12,58918,77034,91154,291
46,97747,95931,99440,65673,65276,447
71,137
98,622285,263
91,74550,807
63,76475,99859,22633,194
17,02737,360
119,301
419,386
340,995
303,218
139,281
110,000
108,000
86,00075,932

160,534
168,249
231,507
98,678147,254283,208
109,958
225,850
943,617457,626
337,954367,345
726,587
569,943
490,038
497,379
302,643
312,481
196,522
164,319
378,764
751,141
997,3141,230,624
775,688
387,547
267,000
676,000
460,000
498,074

202,364
345,689472,814548,344665,887
838,341
250,325
551,945
2,035,741
1,427,260
1,671,150
908,973
1,640,634
774,9141,074,447
1,119,843
414,453
1,344,839
222,844
223,883
1,540,033
2,128,245
3,328,250
2,491,161
2,233,156
1,566,881
292,000
206,000
182,000
974,918

148,132
107,001
197,072
101,614247,311
303,399
467,015
408,129
332,343
169,554
396,877
278,390
612,374
291,320
863,353
383,263
651,408
463,651
137,189
117,386
4,530
310,678
353,926
286,929
169,691
59,31218,0007,000
28,000216,990571,883
797,156
993,4101,201,470
1,685,028
1,000,710
1,313,729
3,461,321
2,290,403
2,583,326
1,921,577
3,464,945
1,893,620
2,579,967
2,171,509
1,573,420
2,350,252
655,312549,8102,029,849
3,370,243
5,178,116
4,385,310
3,531,063
2,180,070
695,000
1,013,000
761,000
1,917,035

8%

4%

26%

51%

11%

100%

Chinook+Coho
472,615464,706

1,469,325

2,166,926

406,052

4,979,624

9%

9%

30%

44%

8%

100%

Chinook as % of
Chinook+Coho
Avg.
32%

16%

· 34%

45%

53%

39%

Year

River

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Avg.

% Dist.
of Avg.
Avg.

1,115,939% Dist. of
Chinook+Coho
Avg.

Source: Thompson, Cynthia J. and Kenneth R. Sakai, "The Indian, Commercial and Sport Fisheries for Salmon and otherAnadromous Fishes of the Central Valley: An Historical Perspective," National Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest Fisheries
Science Center, La Jolla, California, 1995. 1952-1990 data obtained from PFMC (1993). 1991-1993 data obtained from PFMC

(1995).

5

TableA-6
Ocetlll Recreational Chinook Harvest in Oregon(# Fish), by Port Area, 1966-1993

Columbia
Year

River

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1900
1991
1992
1993

Tillamook

NewportCoos Bay

Brookings

TOTAL

16,244
47,77044,57820,149
7,890
7,542
5,503
11,516
8,235
3,440
61
3,567
1,948
4,019
481
1,435
3,317
1,000
500
900

2,015
1,712
2,283
1,510
833
981
1,574
1,895
1,360
692
1,110
2,610
471
3,515
2,698
873
1,230
700
1,500
300

3,367
5,035
4,500
2,572
2,068
1,431
1,829
2,412
3,495
1,608
1,922
4,092
2,186
6,374
5,332
1,824
2,658
900
4,100
400

2,943
10,355
14,54322,401
4,826
4,537
5,307
4,455
10,088
6,583
4,854
9,456
5,918
18,873
8,057
6,642
6,544
5,100
3,800
1,100

9,892
10,568
13,162
11,460
7,178
6,411
4,801
8,897
15,53812,354
9,045
36,142
11,84325,814
21,69821,257
12,732
6,800
,600
3,800

37,40042,80025,10031,80042,90029,60044,10060,984
34,46175,44079,06658,092
22,79520,902
19,01429,17538,716
24,677
16,99255,86722,36658,59538,26632,031
26,481
14,50012,500
6,500

9,505

1,493

2,905

7,819

12,60034,322

1974-1993
Chinook+Coho
Avg.
52,08323,33865,336

81,742

32,922

255,422

Chinook as % of
Chinook+Coho
Avg.
18%

6%

4%

10%

38%

13%

1974-1993
Avg.

Source: Thompson, Cynthia J. and Kenneth R. Sakai, "The Indian, Commercial and Sport Fisheries for Salmon and otherAnadromous Fishes of the Central Valley: An Historical Perspective," National Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest Fisheries
Science Center, La Jolla, California, 1995. 1966-1990 data obtained from PFMC (1993). 1991-1993 data obtained from PFMC

(1995).

6

APPENDIXBThe Role of Hatcheries in the Klamath Basin
Both the Klamath and Trinity Rivers end, as far as upstream migration of anadromous fish isconcerned, at impassable dams: Iron Gate Dam on the Klamath, and Lewiston Dam on the
Trinity. Each of these is a flow-regulating dam built to even out the pulses of water coming fromeven larger (and also impassable) power-generating dams upstream. Each of them has a hatchery
immediately below it, built to mitigate for the loss of spawning habitat above the dam. Thissection will give a brief history of these hatcheries, including their purpose, mitigation goals,
performance, some past problems in the programs and how those problems were corrected, andsome ongoing management difficulties they currently face.
The Iron Gate Hatchery (IGH)
The current facility, just below Iron Gate Dam, was completed by Portland Power and Light(operators of the upstream hydropower dams) in February, 1966, with the California Departmentof Fish and Game (CDFG) taking over operations in March, 1966. A temporary fish trapping
station had been in operation since 1962. 10 The hatchery is eight miles east of Hornbrook in
Siskiyou County, California, about a hundred yards above the confluence of Bogus Creek with
the Klamath River, and about seven river miles above the confluence of the Shasta River with
the Klamath. The country there is semi-arid high plateau.
Iron Gate Hatchery was built and is operated to mitigate for the loss of spawning habitat above
Iron Gate Dam, which itself was built to even out the flow pulses from the Copco hydropowerdam further upstream. Before Iron Gate Dam was built flood pulses from Copco were a real
hazard downstream, occasionally even washing away unsuspecting fisherman. These sudden
pulses were also highly destructive to downstream riparian habitat.
The mitigation responsibility for Iron Gate Dam is considered to be 4.9 million fingerlings
released, but for many years the de facto policy seems to have been to release as many fish as thehatchery could take and rear. However, in some years, "as many as ... " falls far short of theoriginal mitigation responsibility. Although IGH has shipped eggs elsewhere, there is no clear
indication that it has received eggs or fish that originated elsewhere.
IGH has a water supply problem in dry or warm years: the pool behind Iron Gate Dam is only
about 80 feet deep and not very large, and it is fed by water released from a series of broad,shallow reservoirs. Thus there are times when an adequate flow of sufficiently cool water fordownstream salmon streams is simply not available. The hatchery manager may face a very
difficult juggling act in late spring ifhe is to: a) raise the fingerlings on hand to the appropriate

10

Iron Gate Hatchery Annual Report, Anadromous Fish Branch Annual Reports, CDFG the reports cited are fromthe 1970's.
7

size; b) release them at the right time; and, c) avoid temperature shock when the fish hit theriver.11
END OF MISSING TEXT BETWEEN PAGES 47 - 54 FROMORIGINAL DOCUMENTS

11

Phone conversations by David Birts with IGH Manager Bob Rawstron of CDFG, late summer 1986 (following
reports of massive fish kill).
8to: a) raise the fingerlings on hand to the appropriate size; b) release them at the right time; and, c)
85
avoid temperature shock when the fish hit the river.
The hatchery had serious problems in the spring of 1986 when a large number of just-released fishdied in the river. IGH had received about 20,000 king salmon in the fall of 1985 (7,500 would havesupplied enough eggs to meet the mitigation goal), and part of the problem may have been that thehatchery tried to rear too many fingerlings for the conditions of the river at that time.
There were four years of big returns to IGH (and three to TRH) in the mid-1980's, and releases
from the two hatcheries in those years jumped from an average 6 million in the three years before (wellshort of the combined mitigation goals) to an average of almost 20 million.86 Those big releases turned
out, however, not to be very productive: with dropping total harvest rates, the Klamath system still fell
well short of its "floor" escapement goal of 35,000 natural spawners in 1990, 1991 and 1992. During theKlamath Underescapement Review process in 1993, CDFG made some changes in hatchery policy as aresult of lessons learned from the big releases of 1985-1989. This issue will be discussed at greater
length under the Trinity River Hatchery subsection below.

-

A "natural spawner" in the Klamath Basin is defined as a fish that spawns in gravel, regardless of its
origin. During the big returns of the 1980's, a high percentage of the "natural spawners" came fromhatcheries. Some biologists have complained that "inferior" hatchery fish were driving indigenous wild
fish out of the river and that failure to distinguish between wild and hatchery stock in data collection
masks some serious declines of wild fish in the basin.
The situation at IGH and Bogus Creek (which is only 100 yards downstream from the hatchery)appears to be that fish mingle freely between the creek and the hatchery. In fact, counters at the Bogus
Creek weir reported in 1995 that the number of fish per hour through the weir went from 8 to 40 when
the hatchery gate were closed,87 while coded-wire tag analysis of the fish entering IGH indicated that
half of them came from elsewhere.88

By 1993, Iron Gate Hatchery was again experiencing large returns of fall chinook above and beyond
those needed for broodstock. The question then became what to do with the excess fish? Egg take waslimited by then to 10 million89 but just four thousand females can supply that number. Rather thandestroy them, IGH managers decided to mark the excess fish with an identifying fin clip and returned
them back to the river. This turned out to be an unpopular practice, because: 1) some of the returned
fish strayed at least as far as the Shasta River (in 1995 at least), leading to concerns about dilution of its
natural stocks with "inferior'' hatchery fish; and, 2) it was feared that fish returned back to the riverwould be double counted, thus giving false confidence about the numbers of such fish and statisticallyskewing data used to determine whether the all important escapement floor had been met.90
85. Phone conversations by David Bitts with Bob Rawstron of CDFG, late summer 1986 (following reports ofmassive
fish kill).
86. Klamath River Fall Chinook Review Team Report. Appendix I, Table I-2.
87. Conversations by David Bitts with weir operators, Oct. 1995.
88. Conversation by David Bitts with Alan Baracco of CDFG, Oct. 1995.
89. Iron Gate Hatchery Production Goals and Constraints. Farley and Elliott, CDFG, July 1993.
90. These concerns were raised at the KFMC, Fall 1995--Spring 1996 meeting.

~55

In response to these concerns, by 1996 IGH managers had decided not to release any excess fish
91
that returned to their hatchery. Excess fish would be donated to charity or otherwise disposed of. Withthe Trinity River Hatchery doing the same, by 1996 for the first time counts of "natural" spawners were
free of adult fish that had first entered a hatchery and then been returned to the river. Thus the only
natural spawners released from a hatchery from 1996 on will be those earlier released as smolts or
yearlings in the ordinary course of hatchery operations, not as adults.

Trinity River Hatchery (TRH)
Trinity Dam presents a completely different type of problem for anadromous fish than Iron Gate
Dam. Trinity Dam blocks access to at least 80% of the historic salmon spawning habitat of the entire
Trinity Basin. Roughly the same percentage of the total inflows to Trinity Lake are also diverted to theCentral Valley for irrigation. Nevertheless, when Congress authorized the Trinity River Project one ofits conditions was that the natural runs offish would be restored to pre-Project levels-yet with at best
20% of the original habitat and flows to work with! 92 This goal recurs in the Trinity River Restoration
Act of 1984, and in its later reauthorization. With so little natural habitat and flow left for instream
restoration, clearly any effort to rebuild run sizes back up to pre-Project levels must rely heavily onhatchery mitigation-and may be problematic even then.

-

Built by the Bureau of Reclamation to mitigate for the habitat lost by construction of Trinity andLewiston Dams, Trinity River Hatchery has been operated by the California Department of Fish andGame (CDFG) with funding from the Bureau of Reclamation since May, 1963.93 It is interesting tocompare its record with that of Iron Gate Hatchery, given the different weights of their roles in theirrespective basins: from 1971-81, IGH released an average of 4.4 million fingerlings and 430,000
yearlings, while TRH released an average of 1.2 million fingerlings and about 700,000 yearlings.94
TRH also has an ample year-round supply of cold water, and the physical room to expand its facility
should that be desirable. Its major intrinsic problems have instead been with predation and disease.

Annual reports from the 1970's cite problems with mink, loons, gull, herons, kingfishers, and"especially" great blue herons as major predators on TRH fingerlings. 95 Otters, raccoons, and brown
trout alS!J eat TRH fish either before or shortly after their release.
Disease has also been a serious problem for this hatchery. For instance, all the fingerlings of the1990 brood year at TRH had to be destroyed to prevent spreading their diseases (primarily IHN andbacterial kidney disease (BKD)) throughout the system.96 This example illustrates why fisheries cannot

91. From Iron Gate Hatchery/Trinity River Hatchery Production Goals and Constraints, Farley and Elliott, CDFG,
1996.
92. Adams, Garth. Net Economic Benefit of Restoring Trinity River Salmon and Steelhead, (masters' thesis) 1984.
93. From Trinity River Hatchery Annual Reports, CDFG (those cited are from the 1970s).
94. From Recommended Spawning Escapement Policy for Klamath River Fall-Run Chinook, Klamath River
Technical Team, February, 1986, Table 111-3.
95. From Trinity River Hatchery Annual Reports, CDFG for the 1970's.
96. From information reported to Klamath Review Team in 1993.

~56

rely on hatcheries alone: all hatcheries are at risk of major loss to disease at any time, due to inherent
problems created by crowded conditions in incubators and raceways. Such events have to be
anticipated, and hatchery managers ( and hatcheries themselves) should not be censured when theyoccur-provided prudent measures have been employed to prevent disease and deal with outbreaks.
Genetic intermixing from basin to basin and state to state, though now recognized as a serious
problem, was very common in many hatchery programs in the past. As late as the mid-1970's, Trinity
River Hatchery was importing steelhead from Washington, and exporting coho and steelhead to other
California streams. In 1971, TRH imported fall-run chinook eggs and fingerlings from IGH. 97 However,by the mid-1980's such "inter-basin transfers" were recognized as a serious mistake and are now
proscribed. 98-

When the big runs of returning fish started in 1986 as a result of better ocean conditions, Trinity
River Hatchery was simply unable to handle the flow. Thousands of returning adult salmon were simply
denied entrance to the hatchery, consequently spawning just below it in large but ultimately
unproductive numbers. In response to the emergency, private efforts were m<;ide to enlarge thehatchery's rearing capacity. Temporary rearing ponds were excavated, and production of fingerlings
tripled over the previous few years. 99 Interestingly, this increase in production actually had a negative
effective-the big broods of 1986-1989 produced progressively fewer adult recruits than prior years haddone with smaller broods. Indeed, the 1990 brood year (with no contribution from TRH fingerlings)
was more productive in terms of adult returns than 1988 or 1989 had been with far larger hatcheryreleases. 100

In assessing the cause of this problem, hatchery overproduction together with both decreased
biological carrying capacity of the river and competition between hatchery-produced and wild juveniles
were identified as contributing factors by the Klamath Review Team in 1993.101 Hatchery policies wereafterwards changed to include a cap on broodstock egg take and on total hatchery releases following
this review. 102 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service also began studying ways to minimize instream
competition between hatchery and natural fish. Among other things, investigators discovered that astrong correlation existed between the size of hatchery fish at release and the speed of their
97. From Trinity River Hatchery Annual_Reports, op. cit.
98. Information from discussions at the KFMC in late 1980's and from 1993 Production Goals and Constraints, op.
cit. The problem with inter-basin genetic transfers is that each river basin's salmon stocks are uniquely genetically
adapted to that basin's river conditions. The extent to which homing behavior in salmon is genetically determinedversus learned is still uncertain, and it is most likely a combination of the two. Disrupting the natal genetic strains
with outside genes may disrupt that and other important survival behavior, leading to much reduced survival rates.
99. Information from David Bitts, who assisted in those projects.
ZOO.From the Preseason Report L 1997. Pacific Fishery Management Council (PFMC), Table 11-4.
101.Quotingfrom the K/,amath River Fall Chinook Review Team Report. Appendix]: 'The combination of decreased
canying capacity related to the drought in main river environments, a shallow Klamath River estuary, extremely highhatchery releases and the slow migration rate [of the too-small hatchery fish] of release groups may have acted together
to cause very low survival rates for both hatchery and natural chinook salmon juveniles from brood year 1986-1988."(original quote in italics)

102.Farley and Elliott, 1993, op. cit~57

. . ) 103 B
downstream migration (the faster they migrate through, presumably the less t h e compet1t1on .
Y
1996, hatchery policy included minimum release size standards in an effort to reduce intra-species
competition.

Other potential genetic problems seem to have been adequately _addressed. For instance, both Iron
Gate Hatchery and the Trinity River Hatchery take broodstock fish at different times from throughout
the whole run ( as opposed to taking fish until the incubators are full, then closing the gates-which
would tend to genetically alter the run timing in favor of early-returning fish). This seems to have beenstandard practice for some time.
Both Iron Gate and Trinity River hatcheries mark production runs of fish with coded wire tags
(CWT's) to assess the effectiveness of different feeding, rearing, and release regimes. These tags arerecovered from adult fish taken in fisheries, encountered as spawned-out carcasses instream, or
returning to the hatcheries. Statistical expansions from the tag recoveries are then done as a primary
tool for fisheries and escapement monitoring. Marked hatchery fish are thus used as statisticalsurrogates for calculating the size of the runs as a whole in fisheries management.

-

The proportion of natural to hatchery stocks can also be estimated from inriver tag-and-recovery
operations. Without the monitoring tool provided by CWT marking, it would be impossible to know theocean harvest rate of Klamath fish, for example, or the distribution of those fish in the ocean, or thepercentage of total ocean landings that are Klamath fish. It would also be impossible to determine therelative success rates of adult recruitment from natural versus hatchery spawners.
Until the darns are modified or removed we must either learn to live with hatchery fish in
mitigation, or learn to live with a lot fewer fish. Hatchery operators in the Klamath Basin have learned
from experience, however, and have changed their operations accordingly-though sometimes only inresponse to public pressure.
Those who depend on continued robust runs of salmon must continue to pay attention to hatcheryoperations, suggesting improvements as the need appears, while working persistently to improve flow
and habitat conditions for naturally produced fish. In other words, we must strive to do the best we canwith what we still have. As long as these darns remain, and as long as most darns have no fish passage,then for better or worse dams and mitigation hatcheries are inevitably going to be a large part of what
we still have to work with. We must therefore continue to improve them, though never losing sight of
the need for restoration of habitat wherever possible. Since the carrying capacity of instrearn habitat
affects both hatchery and wild fish alike, habitat protection-and where possible habitat restorationmust continue to be a high priority for fishermen.

103.Joe Polos of USFWS was the lead investigator in these studies. Information is also from the K/,amath River Fall
Chinook Review Team Report. Appendix L______,,,_______..,_______________--

Glossary of Terms Used in This Report
Fish species that hatch from eggs in fresh water and then migrate into the ocean,returning back as adults to fresh water to spawn. Species generally lumped together under the tenn"salmonids" are the most common family of anadromous fish.

Anadromous -Escapement -The total number of salmon "escaping" (returning) from the ocean to spawn in fresh
water streams. A minimum escapement number is needed in each generation in order to continue thespecies at the same population levels (i.e., at least a l-to-1 replacement from one generation to thenext). Harvest levels are established only on the surplus above and beyond the minimum escapementlevels required for replacement.
Ex-vessel price - the price per pound of salmon landed at the docks, as paid by the processor. This
market price is only a small fraction of the total economic value to society generated by salmon because
it is only at the beginning of a long chain of market transactions. However, the "ex-vessel price"establishes the market flow from that point onward, and careful records have been kept for many years.

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Gear type - salmon are harvested with various types of gear, which use different boat and crew
configurations, and thus have different impacts on the economy. Personal income impacts of harvested
salmon thus vary by gear type used. Some of these gear types include "troll" (hooks on lines), "purse
seine" (a towed net system), and "gillnets" (an alternative net system mostly used in-river). Economic
analysis of fishery personal income impacts often needs to take into account the type of gear used toland the fish.
Salmon - any of 7 major species which are members of the genus Oncorhynchus, which includes
chinook or king salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawtscha), coho or silver salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch),coastal searun cutthroat (Oncorhynchus clarki clarki), steelhead (Oncorhynchus mykiss gairdneri), chumsalmon (Oncorhynchus keta), pink salmon (Oncorhynchus gorbuscha), and sockeye salmon(Oncorhynchus nerka,). As a genus these species are also often lumped together and called "salmonids."
Smolt - juvenile salmon making or about to make the transition from fresh water living to ocean
conditions where they will mature to adulthood.
Stocks - the stock is the basic unit of salmon fishery management. Because salmon return to theirnative streams to spawn, salmon within the same species can be further subdivided into geneticallydistinguishable subspecies, each of which is uniquely adapted genetically to its natal stream system orgroup of tributaries. The "stock" concept is loosely defined and is undergoing scrutiny as to whether it
recognizes the genetic uniqueness of individual stream populations on a fine enough level to conserve
genetic diversity ( National Research Council 1996), but is still commonly used.

~59General Bibliography
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River and Impacts of the Project on Instream Flows and Fishery Habitat." 1996, prepared for the
Yurok Tribe. 36 pp.
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Bottom, D. L, P. J. Howell, and J. D. Rodgers, 1985. The Effects of Stream Alterations on Salmon andTrout Habitat in Oregon. Oregon Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, Portland, OR
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Lawson, Peter W., "Cycles in Ocean Productivity, Trends in Habitat Quality, and the Restoration of
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Meyer Resources, Inc., "Fishery Values of the Klamath Basin-A Report to CH2M Hill," May 1984, in"Klamath River Basin Fisheries Resource Plan," U.S. Department of the Interior, February 1985.
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Nehlsen, W., J.A Llchatowich, and J.E. Williams. "Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads: Stocks at Risk
from California, Oregon, Idalho and Washington." Fisheries 16(2): 4-21, March-April, 1991.

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Pacific Fishery Management Council, "Klamath Fall Chinook Review Team Report." Portland,
Oregon, December 1994.
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Project: Market Potential, Financing Options, and Economic Contributions," Salmon for All, Inc.,
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20(1 ):70-72.
Sommarstron, S., E. Kellogg and J. Kellogg (1990). "Scott River Basin Granitic Sediment Study,"
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Cooperative Agreement 14-16-001-89506 (November, 1990).
Thompson, Cynthia J. and Kenneth R. Sakai, "The Indian, Commercial and Sport Fisheries for Salmon
and Other Anadromous Fishes of the Central Valley: An Historical Perspective," National Marine
Fisheries Service, Southwest Fisheries Science Center, La Jolla, California, 1995.
-

U. S. Dept. of the Interior, 1985. "Klamath River Basin Fisheries Resources Plan, prepared by CH2M
Hill (February, 1985).
U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation. "Draft 1998 Klamath Operations Plan
Environmental Assessment." February, 1998. Available from the Klamath Basin Area Office,
Klamath Falls, OR. Note also the attachments and references cited in Appendices.
The Wilderness Society, "The living Landcape-Vol. 1: Wild Salmon as Natural Capital," Bolle Center
for Forest Ecosystem Management (August, 1993).
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Center for Forest Ecosystem Management (October, 1993).
The Wilderness Society, "The living Landscape-Vol. 3: Taxpayer's Double Burden," Bolle Center for
Forest Ecosystem Management (October, 1993).
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Assumptions for Building Standards Cost Effectiveness." California Energy Commission,
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U.S. Dept. of Energy, Bonneville Power Administration Technical Report 1990 "Analysis of Salmon
and Steelhead Supplementation," (Document DEO/BP-92663-1), September, 1990.
Water Education Foundation, "California's Chinook Salmon: Upstream Battle to Restore theResource," Western Water, November/December 1992.

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