Revisiting the CPC Designation
IMPROVING ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENGAGING PRODUCTIVELYTO ADVANCE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ABROAD

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOMUSCIRF’S MISSION
To advance international freedom of religion or belief, by
independently assessing and unflinchingly confronting threats
to this fundamental right.

chair
vice chair

Stephen Schneck
Eric Uelandcommissioners Mohamed Elsanousi
		 Maureen Ferguson
		 Susie Gelman		 Vicky Hartzler
		 Asif Mahmood
		 Meir Soloveichik
executive director

Erin D. Singshinsuk

September 2024

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOMCONTENTS
1

About The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

2

Executive Summary

4

Introduction

5

Scope of the Research and Methodology

6

The Designation: Identifying the Worst Violators

10

CPC and U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities

13

CPC Designation: A Mandate to Take Action

23

Conclusion

24

Recommendations for Enhancing the Religious Freedom Toolbox

26

Annex 1: Comparison between State Department
Designations and USCIRF Recommendations

27

Annex 2: State Department CPC Designations and Presidential Actions

28

About the Authors

This page intentionally left blank.

04

Revisiting the CPC Designation

ABOUT THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
WHO WE ARE

WHAT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ISThe U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom(USCIRF) is an independent, bipartisan U.S. Federal
Government commission created by the 1998 International
Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). USCIRF uses international
standards to monitor violations of freedom of religion
or belief abroad and makes policy recommendations
to the president, the secretary of state, and Congress.
USCIRF Commissioners are appointed by the president
and congressional leaders of both political parties.
The Commission’s work is supported by a professional,
nonpartisan staff of regional and subject matter experts.
USCIRF is separate from the U.S. Department ofState, although the department’s ambassador-at-large
for international religious freedom is a nonvoting,
ex officio Commissioner.

Inherent in religious freedom is the right to believe or not
believe as one’s conscience leads and to live out one’s beliefs
openly, peacefully, and without fear. Freedom of religion
or belief is an expansive right that includes the freedoms ofthought, conscience, expression, association, and assembly.
While religious freedom is America’s first freedom, it also is acore human right that international law and treaty recognize;a necessary component of U.S. foreign policy and America’s
commitment to defending democracy and freedom globally;
and a vital element of national security, critical to ensuring amore peaceful, prosperous, and stable world.

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), passed in
1998, was a landmark piece of legislation declaring it U.S.
policy to achieve two complementary aims: “to condemn
violations of religious freedom, and to promote, and to assist
other governments in the promotion of, the fundamental
right to freedom of religion.”
Among its many provisions, IRFA requires the president or
his designee, the secretary of state, to make an annual reviewof the status of religious freedom in each foreign country“to determine whether the government of that country
has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violationsof religious freedom in that country during the preceding
12 months.” When such a finding is made, the president orsecretary is required to formally designate the country as aCountry of Particular Concern (CPC).
IRFA prescribes a CPC designation and a specific class ofpresidential actions for violations deemed particularly severe,
defined as those that are “systematic, ongoing, and egregious.”
The statute also provides a nonexclusive list of examples ofsuch violations, including:
A. Torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment
or punishment
B. Prolonged detention without charges
C. Disappearance of persons by abduction or
clandestine detention
D. Other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or
security of persons
IRFA also requires that presidential actions accompany CPC
designations. As noted in interviews with those involvedin drafting the statute, at the time of its passage in 1998,
no other human rights apparatus carried such a binding
obligation to act. This mandate was intended to ensure
genuine consequences for particularly severe religious
freedom violations. The presidential actions were designed torequire intentional, high-level, vigorous actions specificallyintended to reduce persecution and advance religious freedom
in CPC countries.
Now, 25 years later, successive secretaries of state haveissued 19 rounds of CPC designations— the most recent on
December 29, 2023—designating 17 different countries as
CPCs 164 times. As a result of those designations, the U.S.

2

Department of State has imposed a range of actions, some far
more frequently than others.
Key informant interviews and independent discourse analysis
reveal that the CPC designation mechanism is far more
effective at condemning religious freedom violations thanpromoting changes to policy. The interviews conducted
for this report include engagements with a dozen former
or current officials, religious freedom advocates, andresearchers and an analysis of more than 260 annual religious
freedom reports covering all countries that have been
designated as CPCs.
Although the State Department has regularly identified CPCs,
its record in using the range of executive responses spelled
out in IRFA to respond to those violations has been mixed.
Stakeholders did tend to praise the State Department’s Officeof International Religious Freedom (IRF) for its candor,
thoroughness, and objectivity in reporting violations ofreligious freedom in all foreign countries, year over year. They
revealed limited criticisms of the State Department’s evidencecollection and reporting process that informs the CPC
decision-making process.
However, there was consensus among interviewees thatwhile IRFA has driven important changes in the status ofreligious freedom as a foreign policy goal, the act and its
sanctions instruments have yet to be utilized to their intended
extent. In the vast majority of cases, CPC designations haveresulted in the application of existing sanctions (67.7 percent
of cases) or a presidential waiver based on national interests(24.4 percent of cases). In seven cases (4.3 percent of cases), a
waiver was granted to further the purposes of the act. Onlyon three occasions (1.8 percent of cases)—all with reference
to Eritrea—were new sanctions enforced explicitly becauseof a CPC designation. In just three instances concerning
two countries (1.8 percent of cases), a binding agreement
was either secured, in the case of Vietnam (2004 and 2005),
or pursued, in the case of Uzbekistan (2006). Interviewees
viewed the limited use of specific actions as the primarybarrier to greater effectiveness of the act.
As noted above, there have been 164 CPC designations
since the State Department first made such designations in
1999. The breakdown of actions taken in response to those
designations has been:

Revisiting the CPC Designation

Executive Summary

Sanctions: 114 times

SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS:• Application of Existing Sanctions: 111 times

The State Department should:• New Sanctions: 3 times
Presidential Waiver: 47 times• National Interest: 40 times• Further the Purposes of the Act: 7 times
Binding Agreement (secured or pursued): 3 times
This report evaluates where CPC designations have provenmost effective across three situations: a) collaboration,b) designation with waivers, and c) as part of punitive
sanctions. Additionally, the report includes case studies on
Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Uzbekistan, including
lessons learned from U.S. IRF efforts in those countries.
In its 25-year history, IRFA has played a significant role inelevating international religious freedom as a U.S. foreign
policy priority and galvanizing a global effort to advance thisfundamental human right. The CPC designation mandate,including its requirement for subsequent actions, represents
a core component of that policy effort. When appropriately
utilized, it has energized action across the IRF ecosystem.
Maintaining this energy has been critical in cases of success;this is true both within the U.S. foreign policy sphere andwith violator states. When the United States is able to make asustained, coherent, and adaptive case for religious freedom,
U.S. interlocutors take note. The CPC designation tool isthe enforcement mechanism that undergirds these efforts.
However, its use can be improved through more consistent
application, integration into U.S. bilateral relationships, anddocumentation of changes to freedom of religion or belief.
Too often, the application of IRFA has failed to produce
genuine change to advance religious freedom. The repeateduse of sanctions waivers backed by vague justifications andthe repurposed application of preexisting sanctions dilutethe effectiveness of the CPC designation. The indefinite
suspension of sanctions or other punitive measures forreligious freedom violators, whether due to inertia orcompeting policy priorities, impedes accountability for
religious freedom violators. When waivers must be issued, as
the act permits, the State Department should provide clear
justifications and timelines.
After 25 years of implementation of IRFA and more than
160 CPC designations, further adjustments could be made toensure the act is optimized as a tool of U.S. foreign policy tocondemn violations of religious freedom and to promote thefundamental right to freedom of religion for all people.

• Develop a clear action plan for engagement with each CPCdesignated country, including a bilateral agenda with theviolator country with benchmarks and timelines, outlining
the response to positive and negative developments
regarding religious freedom promotion.
• Include religious freedom in the Integrated Country
Strategy for all CPC-designated countries to pursue
alignment of priorities and programmatic approaches
across various offices, bureaus, and agencies. It also should
consider such inclusion for countries it has placed on theSpecial Watch List (SWL) and other countries where there
are significant religious freedom concerns.
• Strengthen the evidence collection process regarding
specific individuals or entities responsible for particularly
severe religious freedom violations as part of the annual
reporting process. This would streamline the impositionof targeted sanctions against specific religious freedom
violators, in keeping with IRFA’s requirement for
identification of the responsible parties.
• Use the SWL designation as both an “on-ramp” and an “offramp” to CPC designation; it should be used in conjunction
with other means and can be presented to the violator
country as a viable alternative. The State Department also
should seek to use a bilateral agreement in the case of an
SWL designation to avoid a CPC determination.
• Ensure religious freedom is included in public diplomacy,
education and cultural affairs, democracy promotion,and human rights programs and engagements with bothgovernment and civil society partners. Doing so would
help mainstream religious freedom into U.S. foreign policy,
enabling it to be part of a proactive strategy rather thansolely punitive or reactive.
Congress should:• Update the list of required actions for CPC designation to
include more modern, targeted sanctions alongside othersanction options, particularly utilizing Global Magnitsky
sanctions against individuals and entities responsible forparticularly severe violations of religious freedom.
• Hold regular hearings on the U.S. government’s
implementation of IRFA. These hearings should cover
specific actions and programs taken over the previous year
and priorities for the coming year, with specific attention to
CPC countries. Witnesses should include relevant officials
from USCIRF, the State Department, the U.S. Agency forInternational Development (USAID), the National Security
Council, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and otherrelevant agencies.
• Request a Government Accountability Office reporton the use of IRF program funds and their impact in
implementing IRFA.

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad3

INTRODUCTION
Unanimously passed by Congress in 1998, the International
Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) was a landmark pieceof legislation declaring it U.S. policy to achieve twocomplementary aims: “to condemn violations of religious
freedom, and to promote, and to assist other governmentsin the promotion of, the fundamental right to freedomof religion.”
While drawing on a long tradition through the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981),
IRFA was historic in how it explicitly stated a commitment ofpolicy and provided concrete resources for the United States
to enact that commitment.
IRFA created various positions and tools to fulfill that
directive. These roles included the ambassador-at-large
for international religious freedom (IRF), the Office ofInternational Religious Freedom at the State Department,
and the independent U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom (USCIRF). IRFA also mandated that theState Department produce an annual report to Congress oninternational religious freedom. The report documents thestatus of religious freedom in each foreign country, including
an assessment of violations of religious freedom and a
description of U.S. actions and policies in support of religious
freedom or opposition to religious freedom violations.
The CPC mechanism represents one of the most concreteelements of implementing IRFA’s mandate. The president (orhis designee, the secretary of state) must review annually thestatus of religious freedom in each foreign country to identify
whether “the government of that country has engaged in or
tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom.”
Following a country’s designation as a CPC based on such afinding, IRFA mandates that within 90 days, the president

4

shall take one or more actions from a menu of presidential
actions or what is deemed a “commensurate action.” These
presidential actions range from a private demarche to thedelay of exchanges, official visits, financial aid, and economic
sanctions. For CPC countries, however, the actions are drawn
from the more significant actions listed in the statute, ranging
from “the withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of UnitedStates development assistance” to other punitive measures. In
addition, IRFA authorizes the pursuit of a binding agreement
on religious freedom as another means for fulfilling theintent of the act. The statute also allows the president to waive
taking any presidential action on a CPC-designated country
if the president determines that a waiver would further IRFA’s
purposes or is required by the important national interest of
the United States.
In the 25 years since the passage of IRFA, successive
secretaries of state have issued 19 rounds of designationsof CPC countries (the most recent on December 29, 2023),
designating 17 different countries as CPCs 164 times. As
a result of those designations, the State Department has
imposed a range of actions, some far more frequently
than others.
This report considers the implementation of the CPC
mechanism as a tool of U.S. international religious freedom
policy over the past 25 years. The findings of this report are
based on a robust range of sources and information, including
evaluation and coding of the State Department’s annual
IRF reports, review of primary source information, and key
informant interviews with past and present government
officials, congressional staff, civil society actors, and religious
communities. The goal of the research was to examine pastutilization of the CPC mechanism and to identify potential
recommendations for improved policy and practice for theUnited States government’s efforts to advance internationalreligious freedom.

Revisiting the CPC Designation

SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH
AND METHODOLOGY
The research conducted for this report utilized key informant
interviews (KIIs) with a range of stakeholders, document anddiscourse analysis of statements and reports from relevantpublic officials, and comparative analysis with existing andsimilar legislation. The findings provide qualitative andquantitative insights into CPC designations versus USCIRF
recommendations, CPC designations and utilization of
waivers, and CPC designations and related programmatic or
policy interventions.
The initial research for this project focused on the means andprocesses of CPC determinations and concurrent presidential
actions. This included KIIs with former or current officials
to gain insight into the determination process, action
decision, implementation, and evaluation of those actions
as communicated by the State Department, including withembassies and ambassadors.

A second phase of analysis looked specifically at the countries
that have received CPC determination to consider the country
conditions and evaluate U.S. government efforts to promoteaccountability and encourage the development of religious
freedom in the given country. This consisted of reviewing andanalyzing the annual IRF country reports for each country
that has been designated as a CPC, including reports fromat least two years before a CPC designation and all years a
country was designated. In total, this research covered morethan 260 country years of annual IRF reports. Additionally,
the researchers reviewed the USCIRF annual reports for the
CPC countries over the same period.
The third phase of evaluation looked explicitly at themechanics of implementation of the legislation from atechnical perspective, including submission of required
reporting, documentation of required actions, and relevant
congressional oversight. Finally, the researchers reviewed
the existing IRFA legislation and other legislative tools andconsidered potential refinements or other remedies via
amendment language.

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad5

THE DESIGNATION:
IDENTIFYING THE WORST VIOLATORSOne of the central provisions of IRFA is that the president
or his designee, the secretary of state, is required to makean annual review of the status of religious freedom in each
foreign country “to determine whether the government ofthat country has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe
violations of religious freedom in that country during thepreceding 12 months.” Where a government is found tohave engaged in or tolerated such violations, IRFA provides
that the president shall designate it as a CPC with respect toreligious freedom. Based on the statute, if a country meets thestandard, the president or his designee is required to designate
it as a CPC.
One KII said, “I think the CPC designation exercise and list
is the most important part of IRFA. Sometimes, the worst
abusers can get lost in the details of the report. So, the CPC
designation highlights them, and for many countries, even if
they say they do not care, they do not want to be on the list.”
IRFA (Sec. 402) prescribes CPC designation and a specificclass of presidential actions for violations deemed particularly
severe, meaning those falling under the specific criteriaof “systematic, ongoing, and egregious.” The statute also
provides a nonexclusive list of examples of such violations,which includes:
A. Torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment
or punishment
B. Prolonged detention without charges
C. Disappearance of persons by abduction or
clandestine detention
D. Other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or
security of persons
In 2016, IRFA was updated by the Frank R. Wolf International
Religious Freedom Act, or the Wolf Act. The Wolf Act
was intended to improve reporting on country conditions,
expand diplomatic responses, and grant additional flexibility
in the mandated designations. It created a new categoryof designation for nonstate actors—Entities of Particular
Concern (EPCs)—and instated the SWL designation. Per the
Wolf Act, the SWL is for countries whose governments haveengaged in or tolerated violations of religious freedom that are“severe” but do not rise to the level of “particularly severe” (asdefined by Sec. 402) warranting a CPC designation.
6

Despite creating this distinction, the Wolf Act did not
specifically define or provide examples of severe violations.
Neither the annual IRF report nor the State Department’s
annual CPC and SWL designations delineate which specificviolations have been deemed particularly severe or severe.
As a result, it can be difficult for observers to discern
the differences between the two standards and levels ofdesignations.
In the early years of reporting under IRFA, the focus seemed
exclusively on violations by the foreign government or where
the government tolerated these violations. While culpability
for government-committed violations is often more clearcut,
whether a government has explicitly and inappropriately“tolerated” particularly severe violations committed by
nonstate actors can be harder to determine. As one KII
highlighted regarding Nigeria and Iraq, questions aroundwhen a government had permitted a culture of “impunity” ortolerated religious freedom violations were more challenging
to assess. In the case of both countries, the interviewee notedthat the results of unaddressed religious freedom violations
were disastrous for religious minorities.
As articulated in IRFA, the basis of review for CPC
determinations includes information contained in theState Department’s annual human rights country reports,
the annual IRF report, and any other evidence available.
It also considers the findings or recommendations from
USCIRF concerning conditions of religious freedom in agiven country.
Notably, the act also specifies that parties responsible
for religious freedom violations be identified. As IRFA
states, “The President shall seek to determine the agency
or instrumentality thereof and the specific officials
thereof that are responsible for the particularly severe
violations of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated
by that government.” This is important for an accurate
assessment of the conditions, as there may often be
regional variations based on the country’s demographics
or context. Identifying the responsible actors also helps “toappropriately target Presidential actions.” As designed, thereview and designations are not meant to be merely a blanket
condemnation of an entire country as violators but rather
to have an express intent to call out specific abuses andRevisiting the CPC Designation

The Designation: Identifying the Worst Violators

abusers and to tailor U.S. policy responses toward bringing
positive change.

nongovernmental organizations” and utilize or investigate theinformation provided in reports from these interlocutors.

IRFA also defines and provides examples of a class of lessserious abuses referred to as “violations” of religious freedom.
These are defined as “any violations of the internationallyrecognized right to freedom of religion” articulated byseveral international instruments cited by the act (Sec.
2(a)2), including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights (ICCPR), the United Nations (UN) Charter,and others. While violations not meeting the “particularly
severe” level do not carry the statutory requirement of a
CPC designation, they require their own set of less severepresidential actions. They also may lead to a country being
placed on the SWL, which the State Department has been
mandated to keep since 2016.

Another interviewee highlighted the difficulty of obtaining
complete information. Even when single incidents arereported, it can be hard to grasp the full context of what
is happening in a given area without direct engagementwith affected communities or independent voices. Suchengagement, however, can be challenging when governments
highly restrict access to sensitive areas.

REPORTING AND DETERMINATION
Across KIIs and independent discourse analysis conductedin this report, limited criticisms were made of the evidencecollection and reporting process used to inform the CPC
decision-making process. Stakeholders tended to praise the
IRF Office for its candor, thoroughness, and objectivity
in reporting violations of religious freedom in all foreigncountries, year after year.
Some interviewees highlighted their concerns with theperceived tone or interpretation of facts in some reports,
including those based on interactions with local religious
communities. As one religious freedom advocate noted,
some representatives of religious communities, particularly
those in positions of prominence, are prone to represent a
positive picture and hesitant to cite specific incidents that
may reflect negatively on the government. Alternatively, thosein independent or activist roles with a more oppositional
relationship with the government would be more prone toidentify specific incidents in a more critical matter. Thistension in many countries highlights the importance of a
dedicated IRF policy and staff committed to this issue within
the U.S. foreign policy establishment.
The potential for these tensions of competing viewpoints
and perspectives was foreseen in the drafting of IRFA,
which includes language that mandates that U.S. embassies
abroad “maintain a consistent reporting standard andthoroughly investigate reports of violations.” As an elementof this process, the statute explicitly notes that United States
Mission personnel, as part of compiling and assessing thestatus of religious freedom, shall, as appropriate, “seek out
and maintain contacts with religious and human rights

The proactive mandate that U.S. officials develop andmaintain contacts with a broad range of stakeholders is vitalin assessing the country’s religious freedom conditions.
There are often competing narratives and perspectives on
the status of religious freedom in each country. Experiencesof local faith communities from various backgrounds ordiverse geographic areas may differ significantly from what
U.S. diplomats hear through formal diplomatic channels
or from recognized religious leaders who may, by necessity,
have an established relationship with a government. Yet for
more independent, nongovernmental sources (minority
religious communities, minority news networks), providing
information on rights violations or forms of oppression
can come with risks. Some interviewees highlighted thechallenges their interlocutors faced within a country, andsome described instances of transnational repression due totheir work on human rights issues.
These challenges highlight the value of a proactive religious
freedom policy that involves engaging with both government
interlocutors and religious communities. The annual religious
freedom report and CPC determination process represent
an important opportunity for U.S. officials. The annual
preparation of the country report presents an opportunity
to engage with diverse perspectives and stakeholders, bothwithin and outside of the country, as part of the effort topursue fact-based decisions.
Within this process, conceptualizing IRFA’s religious freedom
reporting apparatus as an ecosystem can be helpful. Wherein
the State Department’s IRF Office publishes an exhaustive
timeline-style yearly report for nearly every country andterritory throughout the world, USCIRF publishes its
annual report primarily on countries that fall into its CPC
or watchlist recommendations. The purpose and style ofthese reporting mechanisms are fundamentally different.
Therefore, their conclusions also bear important differences.
The State Department’s yearly IRF report is designed to be
an exhaustive reporting mechanism, covering facts on the
ground in nearly every foreign country for that reporting
period. These reports are usually drawn from an initial
draft from a country-level human rights officer in each U.S.

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad7

The Designation: Identifying the Worst Violators

embassy. This process is overseen by a dedicated team within
the IRF Office, managing input from across the department.
The ultimate objective of the report, formally submitted
to Congress, is to present information in a comprehensive,
disciplined timeline style. Accordingly, the IRF reports aredense—some spanning over 100 pages per country—and
aim to describe specific incidents and the overall country
conditions. They provide an essential basis for the CPC
decision-making process. They are also a resource utilized
regularly by civil society organizations and even othergovernments to lend credibility to reports of religious freedom
conditions in a given country.
On the other hand, USCIRF is intended by IRFA to be awatchdog of religious freedom conditions abroad and U.S.
IRF policy and to provide independent recommendations
for policy options. USCIRF’s reporting is quicker to respondto changes on the ground. The current versions of USCIRF
annual reports and other publications are more easily
digestible for public consumption. The annual USCIRF
report has become something like a report card for the latest
changes in global religious freedom, along with a narrow listof specific policy recommendations.
COUNTRY CASE STUDY – ERITREA:REPORTING AS THE FIRST STEP
Overview of Religious Freedom Conditions
The religious freedom conditions in Eritrea are among themost repressive in Africa. The government regularly violates
both individual and institutional expressions of religious
freedom. Since gaining independence in 1993, under President
Isaias Afewerki, the Eritrean state has exercised strict control
over religious practice and institutions and sought to impose
national values through compulsory military service. The
government’s concern is not necessarily with religion per se
but rather that religious affiliation, especially with potential
foreign connections, may become a source of mobilization
and association that threatens the established political orderand government control. A 1995 proclamation to standardize
religious activities and institutions and separate religion
and politics has instead been the basis for state control ofand intervention in religious life. The government formallyrecognizes only four officially registered religious groups:
the Eritrean Orthodox Tewahedo Church, Sunni Islam,the Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Eritrea. A 2002 order requiring re-registration has
effectively closed all other organizations. The government has
not granted any new registrations since that time, providing
the pretext for the arrests of thousands of individuals forunsanctioned religious activities.
8

CPC Designation and U.S. Policy
The State Department first designated Eritrea as a CPC in
2004 and has redesignated it as such in every set of religious
freedom designations since then. The announcement of
the initial designation cited the 2002 closure of all activities
outside of the recognized four groups. Also noted were morethan 200 religious prisoners, including those who had faced
severe torture and pressure to renounce their faith.
As of 2023, Eritrea still retains the distinction of being
the only country sanctioned explicitly for its violations ofreligious freedom. Starting in 2005, the secretary of state
restricted the export of defense articles and services under theArms Export Control Act. The ability to engage substantively
with Eritrea on religious freedom has been relatively limited.
The annual IRF report notes that embassy officials regularly
attempted to meet with religious leaders and government
officials responsible for religious affairs to raise religious
freedom concerns—but with mixed results, as these efforts
were often blocked. For years, Eritrea has received little tono U.S. foreign assistance, which further limits the available
tools for meaningful engagement with governmental or civilsociety actors.
Policy Effectiveness and Outcomes
Eritrea represents an example of a primarily punitive
approach to religious freedom efforts in a repressive country
that has limited relations with the United States, complicating
efforts to develop a robust strategy for engagement. In
2005, the Eritrean government ordered USAID and manyother bilateral donors and international nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) to leave the country. The Eritrean
state frequently shows hostility toward external intervention
in the country, viewing it as a threat to national sovereignty
and pride. In this context, there has been minimal space fordirect engagement and limited success in addressing religious
freedom concerns in Eritrea.
In addition to continued efforts at engagement withreligious leaders in the country and government officials,
the U.S. government has highlighted its concern about
religious freedom violations in Eritrea by condemningunjust detentions and expressing solidarity and concern for
persecuted religious communities. In 2012, the IRF Report
noted that embassy staff had sought to promote religious
tolerance through educational, cultural, and charitable
activities. At times, these were limited or private, while otherevents were public, such as a Muhammad Ali film festival
highlighting key religious freedom issues. Additionally, the
IRF Reports cited examples of the U.S. embassy using social
media to highlight the principles and values of religious
freedom or condemn specific abuses to counter false
Revisiting the CPC Designation

The Designation: Identifying the Worst Violators

messaging. Following a 2018 agreement between Eritrea andEthiopia, formal U.S. delegations to the country increased,
including State Department officials and congressional
representatives. In 2019, a staff delegation from the Bureauof Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Office ofInternational Religious Freedom visited Eritrea, meetingwith government officials and representatives of religious
communities. The most recent Integrated Country Strategy(November 2023) highlighted that despite constraints due
to a lack of typical foreign assistance or other policy tools,
efforts were still being taken to share American values
through the American Center and other public diplomacy
programs, although not explicitly mentioning religious
freedom. However, it described the challenging environment,
noting that the government had forced the American Center
to close indefinitely in November 2022. In addition to these
efforts, the State Department highlighted where it would
take opportunities to engage with other diplomatic missions
and multilateral institutions to bring attention to religious
freedom concerns in Eritrea. The strategy of ensuring thatthese issues are known and recognized by other missions canbe an important aspect in the context of countries that havestrained bilateral relations with the United States.

• In a country such as Eritrea, with punitive measures inplace and a limited bilateral relationship, there can still be
opportunities to raise religious freedom concerns throughengagement via other diplomatic channels and multilateralmechanisms. In this case, the intentional and creative useof educational and cultural activities was a key avenue foradvancing support for fundamental rights and freedoms.

Summary Lessons Learned• While punitive measures alone are unlikely to bringabout substantive change, they send a message of the
U.S. government’s seriousness in combating violations offundamental rights and freedoms. It is critical that the
U.S. government consistently communicate the underlying
values and motivations for the measures to combat
false narratives.
• In the context of ongoing repressive behavior, the regular
documentation, reporting, and condemnation of ongoingabuses are important. Even if unlikely to bring change inthe short term, this provides an important accounting ofconditions and offers U.S. support and solidarity with those
suffering violations of their rights and freedoms.
• Broader regional or geopolitical developments, suchas the 2018 agreement with Ethiopia, can present newopportunities for the U.S. government to engage with aviolator country on religious freedom issues. Nominal
improvements in the U.S.-Eritrea relationship followingthat agreement allowed the United States to send severaldelegations to the country to press the government
on human rights issues while continuing to call out
ongoing abuses.

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad9

CPC AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIESA central objective of IRFA was to explicitly recognize
international religious freedom as a priority within U.S.
foreign policy. With each change of administration and ineach bilateral relationship, numerous issues are constantly
vying for attention. Within U.S. IRF policy, the CPC
mechanism is perhaps the most concrete way to demonstratea priority for religious freedom. Religious freedom is never a
standalone issue. As a congressional staffer directly involvedin drafting IRF legislation reflected, “The CPC in a vacuum
may have little hope of bringing about change. The use of
the mechanism is always contextual, tied to larger bilateralrelations and world events at that time.”
When a CPC determination is made, the designation serves
as a tool for elevating religious freedom concerns within
the broader context of U.S. foreign policy with respect tothat country. It emphasizes religious freedom issues among
competing priorities and ensures their prominence among U.S.
strategic interests. A former State Department official recalled
how frequently the department’s geographic bureaus would
push back against a CPC designation because of economic or
bilateral interests being impacted should the country end up
on the CPC list. As another former State Department official
said, “The CPC designation elevates [religious freedom] issues
on the human rights agenda and sends a signal across thewhole State Department that this is a priority.”At the passage of the act 25 years ago, this recognition given
to religious freedom in foreign policy was unthinkable. CPC
designations and the underlying body of evidence in theannual IRF Report provide significant leverage for engaging
countries on these human rights concerns. In enteringbilateral dialogues or other forms of direct engagement,
former State Department officials highlighted how these
IRFA mechanisms provided the framework for raising
religious freedom concerns as part of these dialogues, which
often covered a range of topics and for which human rights
concerns could be seen as an obstacle to progress.
One KII indicated that the CPC process may be the mostimportant part of IRFA because it shines a spotlight on
abusers and tells them that the world sees and knows about
their actions.

10However, while IRFA and the CPC designation tool havemade significant inroads in advancing religious freedom as aforeign policy priority, the issue still must contend with otherhighly competitive policy and bureaucratic interests. A former
State Department official reflected, “While the standard isclear, there [were] debates over interpretation of what was
required.” As a result, broader policy or relational concerns
may still influence the ultimate decision on a determination.
The KII continued, “It is not an information problem. It
is a political will issue. Based on the information, what doyou do with it? Are you willing to admit that this actually issystematic, egregious, and ongoing and thus triggers a CPC
designation? And that’s always where the debate is.”Another KII recalled, “The biggest criticism I saw overtime [of the CPC designations] is that [the U.S. governmentis] quick to call out countries where they have adversarial
relationships, but allies either don’t get that designation or
there are no repercussions for the designation.”
Particularly at the country level, bureaucratic actors often
see the presidential actions, including potential sanctions,required by a CPC designation as working counter tothe diplomatic interests of other initiatives. Stakeholders
frequently reported that geographic bureaus or U.S. embassies
cited their policy priorities in contradiction to religious
freedom concerns and at times opposed a CPC designation
altogether. The maintenance of sanctions waivers on countries
designated as CPCs—in some cases for over 10 years—is often
driven out of these bilateral policy concerns.
The utility of bilateral religious freedom agreementsin achieving broader country-level goals has been only
minimally realized. In the most successful examples,bilateral agreements with CPC-designated countries involved
government interlocuters and engagement with civil society,business leadership, and trade representatives. Accordingly,
bilateral engagement following a CPC designation candrive other human rights and development initiatives if
conceptualized as a holistic policy tool. Conditioned military
aid and human rights conditional trade partnerships are also
pertinent examples of potential pathways for engagement.

Revisiting the CPC Designation

CPC and U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities

DESIGNATION DELAYS OR GAPS
Given the obligations following designation and diplomaticconsiderations, the State Department’s CPC designations often
lag significantly behind recommendations made by USCIRF. A
side-by-side review of the State Department’s designations and
USCIRF’s recommendations found a clear gap in time-to-CPC
recommendations. In almost all cases of an emergent violator,
USCIRF was “sounding the alarm” multiple years ahead of
the State Department’s designation of the country as a CPC.
For example, in the cases of Turkmenistan and Pakistan, theState Department lagged behind USCIRF’s recommendations
by seven and 10 years, respectively. In the recent cases ofNicaragua and Cuba, however, State Department CPC
designations had for the first time preempted USCIRF
recommendations, as political factors in both countries
heightened the department’s prioritization of them within abroader regional human rights strategy.
Stakeholders disagreed on the implications of this gap. Manyobserved that, in some sense, disparities over designation
recommendations reinforced the importance of having
two separate reporting bodies with different objectives,
considerations, and audiences. Others noted that in almost
all cases, State Department designations followed USCIRF
recommendations, representing missed opportunities forearlier State Department engagement with violator countries.
In the era following the Wolf Act, the SWL designation can be
an essential tool in closing the designation gap, allowing theState Department to begin engagement with soon-to-be CPCs
before major violations and driving proactive diplomatic
engagement before a CPC designation is made.
See Annex 1 for a comparison of State Department
designations and USCIRF recommendations.
COUNTRY CASE STUDY – SAUDI ARABIA:
MAKING A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WORK
Overview of Religious Freedom Conditions
Violations of religious freedom in Saudi Arabia consistently
emerge from the state apparatus, which formally embraces
Sunni Islam, particularly the Salafi Hanbali interpretation.
Salafism is a fundamental source of legitimacy for themonarchy and has been since its founding despite recentchanges to how religion has been centered in Saudi national
identity. Accordingly, the Saudi government regards
Shi’a Muslims, Saudi Arabia’s largest religious minority(10–12 percent of citizens), as a demographic threat to theestablished order and routinely suppresses their identity or
confines them to particular regions. Saudi Arabia’s populationis also made up of approximately 38 percent expatriate

workers of manifold religious backgrounds. Expatriates
exercise non-Islamic faiths in private, though state authorities
surveil and interrupt these activities on what are at times
religious and political grounds. The public expression of any
non-Muslim faith is legally prohibited.
CPC Designation and U.S. Policy
Engagement and progress toward improved religious freedom
conditions in Saudi Arabia have been decisively slow, though notinsubstantial. The State Department has designated Saudi Arabia
as a CPC every year since 2004. However, due to Saudi Arabia’srole as a key strategic ally to the United States in the Persian
Gulf and a major energy partner, the U.S. government has not
imposed IRFA sanctions in response to the CPC designation.
In 2006, the State Department announced that extensive
bilateral discussions related to the CPC designation had
produced a list of policy changes the Saudi government would
implement. In the negotiations, according to stakeholders,
officials expressly avoided phrases such as “binding agreement”
and even “bilateral work plan” for diplomatic maneuverability.
Instead, the 2006 agreement was referred to as a “confirmationof policies.” Its announcement was accompanied by anindefinite sanctions waiver “to further the purposes of the act”
implicitly tied to the pursuit of those policies. Primary among
the requests were revisions to intolerant content in school
textbooks, protections for non-Muslim private worship, andlimitations to the notoriously overreaching state religious police.
Policy Effectiveness and Outcomes
Despite marginal gains on these issues at the time, inredesignating Saudi Arabia as a CPC in July 2014, theState Department again granted a sanctions waiver, citing“important national interests of the United States.” Every year
since, USCIRF’s country report has recommended against thewaiver, but the State Department has renewed it. Since then,the State Department has indicated in the IRF Reports thatits primary modes of engagement on religious freedom issues
in Saudi Arabia have included ambassador-level discussions
on human rights, meetings between U.S. religious freedom
officials and Saudi government officials, pressure applied to
the Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information on the textbook
issue, and educational exchanges to build religious tolerance.
While the Saudi government did not meet the desired timelines
on the policy outcomes it agreed to in 2006, progress on all three
can be seen today. In the case of textbooks, reforms were madein fits and starts through the mid-2000s. However, by 2020, an
independent NGO observed that several improvements had been
implemented, although some problems persisted. While legal
protections for the private religious practice of non-Muslim
faiths have not been enacted, human rights groups report a de

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad11

CPC and U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities

facto loosening of restrictions and oversight, especially whencompared to the environment of 20 years ago. In the case of thereligious police, royal decrees gradually reduced their autonomy,
and in 2016, an act by the royal Cabinet revoked their authority
to arrest, interrogate, and detain independently.
While these policy outcomes happened amid over a decadeof express U.S. government engagement, domestic changes
within Saudi Arabia have had the most significant effect on
improvements in religious freedom. Specifically, Mohammad
Bin Salman’s ascension to Crown Prince in 2017 was followed
by a renewed focus on reform and a desire for religious
moderation, as outlined in the 2030 Vision. Bin Salman’sreforms have included additional marginalization of religious
police, codification of laws previously at the discretionof religious courts, and some limitations to the maleguardianship system.
However, Bin Salman has also used many of thesedevelopments to consolidate his power domestically andappeal to foreign partners by nodding to liberalization
without enacting policies that create systemic change.
Egregious violations of religious freedom persist under
the new Crown Prince, some at a scale previously unseen.
For example, in 2022, Bin Salman presided over a mass
execution—the largest in the country’s history—of individuals
convicted of holding “deviant beliefs” and terrorism; overhalf of the prisoners were from the Shi’a minority. Laws thatcriminalize blasphemy, apostasy, and atheism remain inplace and still result in executions. U.S. engagement has had
ostensibly little effect on changes to these laws.
While some aspects of the religious freedom situation in
Saudi Arabia have improved through the period of IRFA

12

engagement, grave violations remain. Saudi Arabia’s position
as a special partner of the United States significantly
complicates diplomatic attempts to improve the Saudi humanrights framework. It has been an impediment to the UnitedStates imposing meaningful sanctions based on the CPC
designation. Further, U.S. sanctions waivers predicated on
bilateral discussions have not produced results in a timely
manner. While tangible gains have been made, many ofthe more recent changes are linked to considerations anddevelopments within the country rather than the CPC
designation, which has, over time, been rendered all but
toothless given nearly two decades of uninterrupted waivers.
Summary Lessons Learned• Bilateral agreements addressing CPC violations andimproving religious freedom conditions can take many
forms. Flexibility in drafting or implementing these
agreements—in this case, with respect to even the nameof the agreement—proved essential in creating mutuallyagreed-upon and cognizable goals between the U.S.
government and the foreign government in response to the
CPC designation.
• Without the credible threat of the imposition of sanctions
or other punitive measures, a bilateral agreement risks
becoming overly flexible, surpassing realistic deadlines, andserving to legitimize negative behaviors.
• Domestic political changes in a country, including highlevel leadership changes, can be key opportunities for policy
advancements on religious freedom. The IRF Office must
be prepared to present religious freedom as a policy priority
quickly and persuasively during a major administrative or
ideological change.

Revisiting the CPC Designation

CPC DESIGNATION:
A MANDATE TO TAKE ACTION
One of the most significant aspects of IRFA was its requirementthat presidential actions accompany CPC designations. As
noted in interviews with those involved in drafting IRFA, at thetime of its passage in 1998, no other human rights apparatus
carried such a binding obligation to action.
This mandate was to ensure there were genuine consequences
for particularly severe religious freedom violations.
The presidential actions were designed to require those
consequences to be intentional, high-level, vigorous actions
specifically intended to reduce persecution and advancereligious freedom in CPC countries. A former State
Department official said, “I think this is where the draftersof IRFA were smart not just to create a report that would‘name and shame,’ but an ambassador and commissioners
that would engage with the CPC. You have some teeth thatcan bite, that can create consequences for their unwillingness
to adhere to the international standards they have committed
to.” However, the State Department’s preference for waivers
or applying existing sanctions has limited the effectivenessof other means of response, in contradiction to the original
spirit of the law.
As noted at the outset, IRFA had dual aims for U.S. policy:
condemning violations of religious freedom on the one handand promoting religious freedom on the other. The CPC
designation mechanism and IRF policy seem to have been far
more effective on the former than the latter. As one former
State Department official said, “To the extent that our policy
is the denunciation of violations of religious freedom, theCPC mechanism has, in fact, achieved that or assisted in theachievement of that.” There have been collateral impacts on
raising awareness of violations. However, when considering
the effects on a government’s policy or practices, a KII
commented that in many places, “the CPC designation hasn’t
really had an impact on the ground.”Another longtime State Department official, while pointing out
IRFA’s remarkable successes in highlighting religious freedom
as a global human rights concern, said the most significant
shortcoming has been in acting. The KII said, “There hasn’t
been that sustained political will at a leadership level to use
the CPC in a coordinated fashion, in a broader strategy ofengagement, to move a country in a positive direction onhuman rights. But when it has been used, it works.”

MENU OF OPTIONS
Under IRFA, the U.S. government must take some action
toward all foreign countries whose governments engage inor tolerate violations of religious freedom (IRFA Sec. 401),
with specific requirements in response to particularly severe
violations of religious freedom (IRFA, Sec. 402). These actions
are to be undertaken following steps to request consultation
with the government regarding the violations of religious
freedom, with the hope of securing change (IRFA, Sec.
403). While the criteria for designation are somewhat rigid,
this menu of policy options affords some flexibility in how
specifically the U.S. government responds.
The act provides four categories of responses to the violationsof religious freedom. These include a range of presidential
actions, a commensurate action in substitution for any of thespecifically listed actions, a binding agreement, and finally awaiver on taking any action.
The following is a complete list of the actions
outlined in IRFA:
A. Presidential Actions (IRFA, Sec. 405(a))
Available in response to any religious freedom violations
1. A private demarche
2. An official public demarche
3. A public condemnation
4. A public condemnation within one or more multilateral fora
5. The delay or cancelation of one or more scientific exchanges
6. The delay or cancelation of one or more cultural exchanges
7. The denial of one or more working, official, or state visits
8. The delay or cancelation of one or more working official orstate visits
Available following a CPC designation
9. The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United Statesdevelopment assistance
10. Denials of credit, insurance, or guarantees by the U.S.
Export‑Import Bank, U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation, or U.S. Trade and Development

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad13

CPC Designation: A Mandate to Take Action

Agency to the government, entities, or officials responsible
for the violations
11. The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of U.S. security
assistance
12. Directing the U.S. executive directors of international
financial institutions to oppose and vote against loans
primarily benefiting the government, entities, or officials
responsible for the violations
13. Denials of licenses for exports under certain instruments
such as the Arms Export Control Act
14. Prohibiting U.S. financial institutions from making loans or
extending credit over a certain amount to the government,
entities, or officials responsible for the violations
15. Prohibiting the U.S. government from procuring goods
or services from the government, entities, or officials
responsible for violations
B. Commensurate Action (IRFA, Sec. 405(b))
For any of the actions listed above, IRFA allows the president
to substitute “any other action authorized by law” if that
action “is commensurate in effect to the action substituted
and if the action would further the policy of the UnitedStates” outlined in IRFA. If a commensurate action is taken,
the statute requires the president to “report such action,
together with an explanation for taking such action, to theappropriate congressional committees.”
C. Binding Agreement (IRFA, Sec. 405(c))
IRFA provides that:
The president may negotiate and enter into a binding
agreement with a foreign government that obligatessuch government to cease, or take substantial steps
to address and phase out, the act, policy, or practiceconstituting the violation of religious freedom. The
entry into force of a binding agreement for the cessationof the violations shall be a primary objective for thepresident in responding to a foreign government thathas engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violationsof religious freedom.
D. Waiver (IRFA, Sec. 407, as amended)
IRFA allows for a waiver on taking any presidential action
under certain circumstances. The relevant provision states:(a) In general
Subject to Subsection (c), the president may waive,
for a single, 180-day period, the application of any

14

of the actions described in paragraphs (9) through(15) of Section 6445(a) of this title (or commensurate
action in substitution thereto) with respect to a country,
if the president determines and so reports to theappropriate congressional committees that—(1) the exercise of such waiver authority would
further the purposes of this chapter; or(2) the important national interest of the UnitedStates requires the exercise of such waiver authority.
(b) Additional authority
Subject to Subsection (c), the president may waive, for
any additional specified period of time after the 180-day
period described in Subsection (a), the application of
any of the actions described in paragraphs (9) through(15) of Section 6445(a) of this title (or a commensurate
substitute action) with respect to a country, if thepresident determines and reports to the appropriate
congressional committees that—(1) the respective foreign government has ceased theviolations giving rise to the presidential action; or(2) the important national interest of the UnitedStates requires the exercise of such waiver authority.
(c) Congressional notification
Not later than the date of the exercise of a waiver undersubsection (a) or (b), the president shall notify theappropriate congressional committees of the waiveror the intention to exercise the waiver, together with adetailed justification thereof.
(d) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—(1) ongoing and persistent waivers of the applicationof any of the actions described in paragraphs(9) through (15) of Section 6445(a) of this title (orcommensurate substitute action) with respect
to a country do not fulfill the purposes of thischapter; and(2) because the promotion of religious freedom
is an important interest of United States foreign
policy, the president, the secretary of state, andother executive branch officials, in consultation
with Congress, should seek to find ways to address
existing violations, on a case-by-case basis, throughthe actions described in Section 6445 of this title orother commensurate substitute action.

Revisiting the CPC Designation

CPC Designation: A Mandate to Take Action

APPLICATION OF THE MANDATE
Although the State Department has regularly identified CPCs,
its record in using the range of executive responses spelled
out in IRFA to respond to those violations has been mixed
over the 25-year history of the act. Stakeholders interviewed
for this report agreed that while IRFA has driven importantchanges in the status of religious freedom as a foreign policy
goal, the act and its sanctions instruments have not beenutilized to their intended extent.

CPC Designation as the Basis for
Collaborative Engagement
While a CPC designation is punitive, the State Department
has sometimes used it as a tool to encourage improvements
rather than simply to “name and shame” a violator
government. Even if sanctions accompanied a CPC
designation in every case, this approach alone would
be unlikely to improve global religious freedom as theact intends.

In the vast majority of cases, CPC designations have resulted
in the application of existing sanctions (67.7 percent ofcases) or a presidential waiver based on national interests(24.4 percent of cases). In seven cases (4.3 percent of cases), a
waiver was granted to further the purposes of the act. Onlyon three occasions (1.8 percent of cases), all with reference
to Eritrea, were new sanctions enforced explicitly becauseof a CPC designation. In just three instances concerning
two countries (1.8 percent of cases), a binding agreement
was either secured, in the case of Vietnam (2004 and 2005),
or pursued, in the case of Uzbekistan (2006). Interviewees
viewed the limited use of specific actions as the primarybarrier to greater effectiveness of the act.

IRFA includes various mechanisms for pursuing joint
partnerships to address religious freedom concerns. Whether
to end a designation or to avoid the expiration of a waiver,bilateral cooperation coupled with the CPC process has
been the most reliable means to securing tangible results.
A former State Department official recalled, “When countries
feared actual consequences from being designated, that gave
diplomats, gave the IRF office, gave the ambassador theleverage, that was so crucial to see things change.”

As noted above, there have been 164 CPC designations since
the first in 1999.1 The breakdown of actions taken in responseto those designations has been:

One of the KIIs stated in an interview that the binding
agreement mechanism was drawn from trade law, where it
had been effective, but it had never been applied to a humanrights issue. If, through this process, a country reformed theviolations justifying a CPC designation in the first place, thatwould be “emblematic of the purpose of the whole bill.”

Sanctions: 114 times• Application of Existing Sanctions: 111 times• New Sanctions: 3 times
Presidential Waiver: 47 times• National Interest: 40 times• Further the Purposes of the Act: 7 times
Binding Agreement (secured or pursued): 3 times
Other Presidential Actions Certified to Congress: N/A
See Annex 2 for a table showing the State Department’s CPC
designations and accompanying presidential actions.
The following sections will consider how IRFA’s mandate totake action against governments that engage in or tolerateparticularly severe violations of religious freedom has been
applied across three primary types of responses following
CPC designations. First, as the basis for collaborative
engagement; second, with a waiver of further actions; andthird, as part of punitive sanctions.

1

The most robust of these tools is the development of a binding
agreement with a violating country, securing commitments
to make substantive improvements to address religious
freedom concerns.

The only example of a binding agreement being entered into
force is with Vietnam in 2004 and 2005. In 2006, based on the
Vietnamese government’s actions under the agreement, theState Department lifted the country’s CPC designation. Since
then, and despite continued USCIRF CPC recommendations,
Vietnam has remained off the State Department’s CPC list.
However, recent regressions led the department to place
Vietnam on the SWL in its 2022 and 2023 designations.
The State Department’s CPC designations of Vietnam
in 2004 and 2005, combined with waivers on taking any
presidential action and efforts toward the binding agreement,
provides a case study of the United States using IRFA’s tools
to spur a violating government to take visible, constructive
actions on religious freedom, even as the United States
continued to engage with it fruitfully on other matters liketrade and regional security. USCIRF noted in its 2005 and2006 annual reports that the government of Vietnam

In IRFA’s early years, the State Department also deemed as “particularly severe violators of religious freedom” two regimes that the United States did not recognize as legitimate
governments—the Milosevic regime in the Serbian Republic of Yugoslavia (in 1999 and 2000) and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (in 1999, 2000, and 2001). Because these were notformal CPC designations and no presidential actions were imposed, they were not counted in this analysis.

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad15

CPC Designation: A Mandate to Take Action

responded to the designation, U.S. diplomacy, and positive
engagement by international civil society organizations by:of engaging with the United States and seeking substantive
changes to protect religious freedom.

• Releasing “several prominent democracy, free speech, andreligious freedom advocates” from prison.

While not resulting in fully executed binding agreements,
several interviewees cited similar efforts of substantive
engagement to encourage a foreign government to makechanges before a CPC designation, including work with
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. As one
former senior official recalled, a high level of collaborative
engagement on IRF concerns was important not only forthe relationship with officials in the other government but
also for U.S. officials in other offices and bureaus within theState Department and the White House. Recalling one suchnegotiation, a former State Department official rememberedthat by the time the CPC designation for Vietnam wasannounced by the secretary of state, the representatives ofthe foreign government “really admired the carefulness
with which we’ve made that process.” Also, within the U.S.
government, the KII recalled that “you’ve got to earn the rightto [recommend a CPC determination] by proving to people
within the building that this is necessary and that you havewarned [the violator government] and you have tried to do
everything you can with them.”• Issuing “legal documents to clarify and implement
Vietnam’s 2004 Ordinance on Religious Beliefs andReligious Organization…. The new instructions also
prohibit forced renunciation of faith efforts by government
officials,” although they “do not specify criminal penalties
for those who carry out these practices.”• The prime minister [issuing] Decree 22, “establishingspecific requirements and deadlines for government
approval of all religious groups, venues, seminaries,
conferences, donations, festivals, ceremonies, and theselection and training of religious leaders.... The primary
benefit of the new decree appears to be streamlining theprocess of registration and obtaining permits; deadlines for
an official response are outlined in the decree, and, in somecases, religious groups can expect a written explanation on
why their application was denied.”• Reaching the May 2005 binding agreement with theState Department “on benchmarks to demonstrate an
improvement in religious freedom conditions. Under
the agreement, the Vietnamese government committed
to: 1) implement fully the new legislation on religious
freedom and render previous contradictory regulations
obsolete; 2) instruct local authorities strictly andcompletely to adhere to the new legislation and ensurecompliance; 3) facilitate the process by which religious
congregations are able to open houses of worship; and4) give special consideration to prisoners and cases ofconcern raised by the United States during the grantingof prisoner amnesties.”• Reopening “some churches in the Central Highlands,
officially outlawed forced renunciations of faith, and issued
new guidelines to help speed the process of registration ofreligious congregations.”
The 2004 and 2005 CPC designations of Vietnam offer
counterevidence to the argument that the United Statesshould not designate a strategically important country as a
CPC because the designation will undermine U.S. national
interests and security. As one interviewee who was a senior
State Department official at that time noted, rather thanbreaking the relationship, the extensive engagement with
the Vietnamese around the CPC designation and thedevelopment of the binding agreement led to deepening
relational ties and mutual respect. The official recalled thatin his subsequent engagements with other countries, hecould cite Vietnam as an example of the positive outcomes16

Another former official recalled that U.S. diplomats engaging
in diplomacy on IRF issues made a point of providing
the violator country a clear indication of the issues being
considered as part of the CPC designation process. Whileacknowledging that the final decision was with the secretaryof state, the interviewee noted that officials could indicate thatsteps such as reforming the registration process for housesof worship, allowing churches to operate, allowing men togrow beards in line with their religious convictions, releasing
prisoners held for religious reasons, allowing the training ofchildren in line with parents’ religious beliefs, etc. would beconsidered. In some cases, these recommendations becamea roadmap for ongoing engagement and a pathway towardreforms. These examples suggest ways that U.S. officials
can use the CPC designation process within the context ofongoing collaborative engagement driven toward change.
Waiver of Presidential Action
If using the binding agreement option as the consequenceof a CPC designation has been rare but effective, using a
waiver on taking any presidential action has been far morecommon. However, its effectiveness is questionable at best.
Of 164 total CPC designations during the lifetime of the act,
the State Department has granted a waiver on 47 occasions.
For these waivers, which the statute allows for two reasons,the State Department cited the important national interestof the United States as the basis 40 times and furthering the
purposes of IRFA seven times.
Revisiting the CPC Designation

CPC Designation: A Mandate to Take Action

Given IRFA’s requirements concerning presidential actions,
the waiver authority allows the U.S. government flexibility
in certain instances based on the two specified grounds.
As a former State Department official remarked, “Thereare circumstances under which there might be militaryor geopolitical concerns, where it is wise to hold off on a
sanction per se, or something that’s as heavy as something
could be. But in that case, you need to come up with analternative, [but] there’s no excuse for waivers without any
action at all.”Waivers justified on the grounds of furthering the purposes of
IRFA have been used seven times and for only two countries(i.e., Saudi Arabia five times and Uzbekistan twice). For bothcountries, these waivers were granted in connection withongoing and significant diplomatic engagement on religious
freedom concerns, which saw meaningful, if incomplete,
progress on some religious freedom violations. A former
senior State Department official recalled that in bothinstances, these waivers came amid intense negotiations withthose governments that made clear what violations required
a CPC designation and what steps could be taken to address
them in the particular context of each country. When thesewaivers were issued, they were clear pieces of an ongoingengagement process.
Waivers based on the requirements of the important national
interest of the United States have been far more common.
National interest waivers have been utilized 40 times for six
different countries (i.e., Nigeria once, Pakistan six times,
Saudi Arabia 10 times, Tajikistan nine times, Turkmenistan
10 times, and Uzbekistan four times).
Interviewees expressed concern about the perpetual use of
the waiver. One former official noted that repeatedly waiving
punitive measures can make the CPC designation “be seen
as worthless, especially by regimes who will not care unlessthere is some economic impact.” By contrast, when there wasa robust policy of engagement and genuine economic impacts,
there were examples of both short-term (e.g., prisoner
releases) or longer-term movement in some countries, theformer State Department official recalled.
Another former official recalled an example where the IRF
ambassador began questioning the longstanding waiver ona particular country, which was important in incentivizingchange. When the possibility of removing the waiver
was included in a letter to the foreign minister, the IRF
ambassador understood this as a type of “saber-rattling.” It
became part of a “carrot and stick” approach that led to aministerial-level change in that country and improvements
resulting in it ultimately coming off the State Department’s
CPC list altogether.

While recognizing the necessity of the waiver, legislative or
policy fixes that would “limit the amount of waivers before
you take action” would be a significant development, said acongressional staffer.
In the Wolf Act, Congress expressed its concern with theabuse of the waiver policy. It inserted into law that “it is thesense of Congress that—(1) ongoing and persistent waivers of
the application of any of the actions described in paragraphs(9) through (15) of Section 405(a) (or commensurate substituteaction) with respect to a country do not fulfill the purposes ofthis act.”
Reforming this policy, which allows indefinite waivers
without requiring any meaningful actions, was one of thechanges to U.S. IRF policy most frequently suggested byinterviewees. The perception of the waivers as perpetualand without conditions undercuts the value of the
CPC designation as a tool for advancing internationalreligious freedom.
“Double-Hatted” Sanctions
By far the most common presidential action, used in
67.7 percent of cases, has been the application of existing
sanctions—also referred to as “double-hatting,” to fulfill therequired presidential action in response to a CPC designation.
In total, existing sanctions have been cited 111 times (i.e.,
Burma 19; China 19; Cuba two; Eritrea 12; Iran 19; Iraq four;
Nicaragua two; North Korea 17; Russia three; and Sudan
14) as the means for fulfilling the required actions.
IRFA included the application of existing sanctions as an
exception to the requirement for presidential actions in thecase that the “​​country is already subject to multiple, broadbased sanctions imposed in significant part in response
to human rights abuses, and such sanctions are ongoing”(IRFA, Sec. 402(a)(5)). The president must certify to Congress
the specific sanction that has been determined to fulfill theintention of IRFA and, following the Wolf Act amendment,
describe the impact of the sanction on each country. A
congressional staffer recalled the intent was to ensure that the
sanctions being cited genuinely were relevant to the religious
freedom violations in the country.
In the case of long-term CPC designees (such as Burma,
China, Iran, and North Korea, where existing sanctions
have remained consistent), it becomes more difficult tosingle out actions taken in response to specific violations ofreligious freedom rather than other forms of human rights
abuse. As one former official noted, a presidential actionthat was “a unique sanction for religious freedom violations”
could provide a significant additional incentive for change
by a foreign government based on the knowledge that

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad17

CPC Designation: A Mandate to Take Action

certain violations are being targeted. Another former State
Department official recalled that a robust policy toward one
country could have knock-on effects, such as “encouraging
countries to reform and seeing the reforms happen can
generate new diplomatic avenues. And responding withsanctions when countries refuse to reform can also create
deterrence and prevent other countries from going further.”Targeted sanctions tools provide an important mechanism
for taking explicit action. The most prominent of thesemechanisms, the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act, was enacted in 2016 and permanently
reauthorized in 2022. It represents an important authoritythat can be used against foreign individuals and entities
responsible for “extrajudicial killings, torture, or other grossviolations of internationally protected rights,” including
gross religious freedom violations. The Global Magnitsky
Act and other measures allowing for visa bans and asset
freezes against human rights violators represent a critical
opportunity for fulfilling the CPC designation mandate,including determining responsible parties and taking specificaction in response to abuses.
Since 2016, the Departments of State and the Treasury haveused Global Magnitsky Act sanctions to target individuals
and entities responsible for religious freedom violations,
including in CPC-designated countries such as China
and Burma. There are opportunities for a far more robust
utilization of this tool in closer coordination with CPC
designations. The Wolf Act, signed into law in December
2016, included a sense of Congress provision calling on
the State Department, Congress, and USCIRF to consider
ways to update the existing list of presidential actions
included in IRFA.
While legislative language could explicitly add the use of
Global Magnitsky or other targeted sanctions to IRFA’s list ofpresidential actions, the ability to substitute commensurate
action already exists within the law. This allows for using
these or similar human rights sanctions measures to fulfill
the spirit of IRFA.
While the required documentation for targeted sanctions
is substantial, the sanctions process allows U.S. officials to
use and refine the annual IRF reporting process. This would
include enhanced engagement with civil society and affected
communities to effectively gather the necessary information
to apply tailored measures against specific religious freedom
violators. Doing so more frequently, instead of continually
relying on existing sanctions already in place for otherhuman rights issues, would help reinvigorate the CPC
designation tool.

18

COUNTRY CASE STUDY – VIETNAM:RESPONDING TO BACKSLIDING
Overview of Religious Freedom Conditions
Abuses of religious freedom in Vietnam have tended tostem from the state’s control over the process of religious
registration and its persecution of unregistered groups.
Although Vietnam is a highly religiously diverse society,state authorities have frequently opposed the registration ofminority religious organizations, often for perceived politicalreasons. Groups that have experienced frequent legal andadministrative disenfranchisement include Montagnardand Hmong Protestants, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Unified
Buddhists, Duong Van Minh, and the Falun Gong. Lackof oversight on local authorities has created significant
imbalances in how Vietnam’s laws and regulations on religion
and belief have been applied to the particular detriment of
the groups mentioned above. Even among registered groups,
state authorities have near total control over the approval andcontent of religious activities, gatherings, and appointmentof leaders. Dissidents, including religious leaders, have faced
harassment, physical abuse, imprisonment, and surveillance.
The government’s interference has extended to theconfiscation of property, closure of religious institutions, andcensorship of religious materials.
CPC Designation and U.S. Policy
Although Vietnam was once a success story for using abinding agreement and CPC designation, today the country
is a case study in using IRFA to respond to backsliding.
The State Department first designated Vietnam as a CPC
in 2004. It lifted that designation after two years, following
the negotiation of a binding agreement, and observed
improvements in the religious freedom landscape duringthat period. In 2022 and 2023, the State Department placed
Vietnam on its SWL. However, USCIRF has recommended a
CPC designation for Vietnam every year since 2002.
Vietnam’s path to CPC designation was graduated, thoughswift. In May 2002, U.S. officials warned the Vietnamese
government of a possible CPC designation should it fail to
improve stipulated religious freedom conditions. In 2003, theUnited States suspended its annual human rights dialogue
with Vietnam, noting a “lack of progress” in issues including
religious freedom.
Upon designating the country as a CPC in September 2004,
the State Department proved equally nimble in driving
positive engagement on religious freedom concerns with
Vietnam. By May 2005, the U.S. government signed anagreement promising to reconsider the designation following
commitments by the government of Vietnam to implement
Revisiting the CPC Designation

CPC Designation: A Mandate to Take Action

new laws to improve religious freedom thoroughly, reign innoncompliance from local authorities, streamline processes
to register religious groups and activities, and reevaluate thecases of several religious prisoners. Then President George
W. Bush met with then Vietnamese President Tran Duc
Luong in Washington, DC, to discuss these issues in 2005 andagain in-country in 2006. The United States resumed theannual bilateral human rights dialogue in 2006, and religious
freedom became a regular topic.
Policy Effectiveness and Outcomes
The outcomes were, at first, largely positive. The Vietnamese
government enacted several implementing decrees
streamlining the country’s religious registration laws,
registered an unprecedented number of religious groups,
and freed numerous prisoners of conscience. Within ayear of the CPC withdrawal, the United States granted thecountry permanent normal trade relations status and gave
final approval to Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade
Organization. While these policies dramatically improved
Vietnamese economic conditions, and the government
made clear improvements on some religious freedom issues,
USCIRF and other observers argued that the CPC withdrawal
and trade normalization had been premature.
In the years to follow, enforcement of new laws governing
religion in Vietnam remained regionally uneven, while
overarching rights abuses against dissenters and minorities
continued. In its 10-year retrospective, USCIRF suggested
that elements of the U.S. administration pursuing trade goals
in Vietnam rushed the CPC withdrawal because humanrights sanctions otherwise would have precluded those goals.
When Vietnam passed a new Law on Belief and Religion in2016, stakeholders observed that while the law does include
language on rights to freedom of religion and belief, it further
entrenches the state’s firm grip on defining allowable practiceand stifling dissent.
In 2022, the State Department named Vietnam an SWL
country for the first time, repeating this designation in 2023.
Vietnam is a challenging case for IRF policymakers as thegovernment met nearly all conditions of the 2005 agreement.
Yet, inconsistencies in the application of these policies meanthat religious freedom conditions have broadly deteriorated.
While the United States has maintained a strong level of
discourse with Vietnamese leadership on religious freedom
concerns, additional guardrails are needed to secure robust
religious freedom in the country.

Summary Lessons Learned• Linear progress resulting from a CPC designation is ideal
but unlikely. Backsliding should be expected to somedegree and must be accounted for in country agreements.
During the negotiation stage, the State Department should
consider how to deal with future backsliding, defining
clear measurements of progress and avenues for redress forregression even after a designation has been lifted.
• Local authorities’ attitudes and behaviors can diverge
significantly from those of central-level representatives
participating in bilateral agreement negotiations.
Accordingly, U.S. officials should consult or include such
entities where possible, aiming to understand gaps inperception and diminish gaps in implementation.
• U.S. government programming on religious freedom
and related human rights should seek to expand efforts
at the provincial/state and local levels. This is especially
important in localities where religious freedom violations
are particularly egregious.
MAKING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM A
PART OF THE STRATEGIC PLAN
While much of IRFA’s focus on responses to the CPC
designation are punitive measures, the act also provides that
State Department-administered funds and programs should
be used to promote religious freedom. Accordingly, IRFA
recommends that U.S. diplomatic missions in countries thatengage in or tolerate violations of religious freedom should
develop a strategy to promote respect for religious freedom aspart of their annual program planning (IRFA, Sec. 106).
However, a review of the latest Integrated Country Strategies
for CPC countries shows substantial room for improvement
in meaningfully integrating religious freedom as part ofthese overall strategies. Of the 12 CPC countries designatedin 2023, the strategies for only two countries (China andPakistan) meaningfully discuss religious freedom dynamics.
For three other countries (Burma, Eritrea, and Tajikistan), thestrategies minimally acknowledge the issue. For four others,
the country strategies make no mention of religious freedom
or related dynamics in the country, though they reference toAmerican values or fundamental freedoms more generally.
For the remaining three countries, no strategy is available.

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad19

CPC Designation: A Mandate to Take Action

Country

Last Date
Approved

Level ofIntegration

Burma

7/26/2022

Minimal“The regime continues to deploy violence and other forms of oppression
against pro-democracy activists, deposed government officials, andmembers of ethnic and religious communities.”“Provide targeted and timely humanitarian assistance to communities incrisis to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain dignity.”China

2/2/2023

Meaningful“We will defend democracy and freedom of expression, freedom of thepress, religion, and the rule of law.”“Mission Goal 5: Champion American values to promote freedom andequality for all, including by promoting: the rule of law; freedom of speech,
religion, assembly, and the press; combating censorship; promoting theprinciples of diversity and inclusion; and by advancing human rights andfundamental freedoms.”“Mission Objective 5.1: Promote and defend internationally recognized
standards on human rights and rule of law, including the promotion of
freedoms for marginalized groups and civil society.”“In all aspects of the U.S.-PRC [People’s Republic of China] relationship, theU.S. government will press for the protection of individual and collective
rights and freedoms and rule of law, including religious freedoms, laborrights, and freedom of speech and of the press, equal treatment of womenand minorities, and due process.”Cuba

5/27/2022

No Mention“The United States, through its engagement with human rights activists
and denunciations of Cuban abuses, upholds our universal values andpromotes human dignity in the face of a regime that denies its citizens thebasic freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, towhich it is a signatory.”

Eritrea

11/17/2023

Minimal“Eritrea’s tier 3 rating for Trafficking in Persons, and designation as aCountry of Particular Concern with regard to religious freedom, further
impede use of funds for targeted programs.”“Sharing American values and fostering relations with Eritreans: Our
diplomatic engagement and public diplomacy programming are focusedon laying the groundwork for building ties with the Eritrean people […] topromote cultural exchange and engender close relations with students,
educators, artists, intellectuals, businesspeople, religious leaders,technocrats in the government, people with disabilities, and other civilsociety contacts.”

Iran

None

Nicaragua

5/23/2023

No Mention“To help build a future Nicaragua that is more democratic and prosperous,
we must also engage and support Nicaraguan civil society to bolster its
resilience and capacity to promote our shared values.”“Credible independent polling shows an overwhelming majority ofNicaraguans want such change and share our fundamental values.”

North Korea

None

Pakistan

3/16/2023

Meaningful“Mission Objective 4.1: Pakistan strengthens democratic institutions andsupports the political participation and civil rights of women, religious
minorities, ethnic minorities, residents of under-governed areas, and otherdisadvantaged groups.”“The U.S. Mission will also support Pakistan’s efforts to enact Financial
Action Task Force international standards for anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), develop an effective,
professional, and transparent criminal justice system and increase law
enforcement capacity that serves all citizens, regardless of religion or
ethnicity, equally.”

RussiaNone

Saudi Arabia

7/11/2022

No Mention“We will advocate for the rule of law, good governance, the inclusion of
women and marginalized communities, and the protection of individual
freedoms.”

Tajikistan

4/1/2022

Minimal“Furthermore, refugee communities and ethnic and religious minorities
groups remain economically, educationally, and politically marginalized,
furthering the appeal of messaging from extremist organizations. PAS[Public Affairs Section] programs seek to raise awareness about theharm of radicalization and provides positive alternative narratives among
affected communities so that the communities will be less susceptible toviolent extremist messaging.”

Turkmenistan

4/26/2022

No Mention“Objective 4.1 | Advance basic freedoms, effective governance, anddemocratic values throughout Turkmenistan’s government and society.”“Achievement of this objective will positively impact human rights in
Turkmenistan, advance the rights and freedoms for which the UnitedStates is known and respected worldwide.”20

Excerpts

Revisiting the CPC Designation

CPC Designation: A Mandate to Take Action

While program planning is only one measure of potential
U.S. engagement in a country, it provides an opportunity fora more robust and strategic approach to proactively integrate
religious freedom within the mainstream priorities of U.S.
foreign policy in countries designated as CPCs. Where theviolations of religious freedom have reached a level severe
enough for a designation as a CPC, the issue should bereflected in the strategy for that country.
The U.S. government could also do more in other strategicplanning efforts to incorporate a commitment to advancing
religious freedom as a foreign policy priority across thegovernment. The Joint Strategic Plan for the State Department
and USAID (most recent version, March 2022) also plays
an important role in outlining agency priorities. In thisstrategy, however, religious freedom explicitly receives only
limited attention. The Joint Strategic Plan mentions IRFA
as one means by which U.S. foreign policy offers support tomarginalized people, acknowledges religious communities
as among those who may be most vulnerable and in needof protection in crises, and mentions the need to include
religious communities as participants in efforts to breakcycles of violence. These are important markers of how
religious freedom fits within foreign policy priorities, andgreater attention should be given to making this operational
within the agencies’ programs at multiple levels.
In contrast to these department-wide strategies, theFunctional Bureau Strategy for the Office of International
Religious Freedom (J/IRF) represents a developed andcoherent strategy for carrying out its mandate to promotereligious freedom abroad in U.S. foreign policy. The mostrecent strategy (December 2021) seeks to connect its specificaims and objectives with topline U.S. foreign policy priorities
as articulated in the Interim National Security Strategy
Guidance and remarks by the secretary of state. After
delineating the high-level linkages, the strategy sets out
specific commitments and objectives. These include religious
freedom advocacy to see more governments make meaningful
steps to reform laws and practices, more frequent use ofbilateral and multilateral tools to hold individuals accountable
for religious freedom abuses, and efforts to increase theawareness among other U.S. government personnel ofreligious freedom issues and the tools available to advocate
for this right.
The IRF Office has also developed tailored action plans for
CPC countries, which can be essential tools to proactively
encourage change. As a former State Department official said,“The big thing is having an action plan. For each country
to come off [the CPC list], what would be required to movethem to the Special Watch List? What measurable, practicalthings may not be as crazy for the Saudis to do in the nextten years? What may not be as wild for the Tajiks to do in
the next few years? That is how to make the CPC designation
more fluid and make it a kind of breathing and helpful list.
Not just saying that you’re on this irredeemable list that justentrenches them and gives them cover.”As another former official recalled, “The CPC, the way weused it, and the way it’s historically been used is that it is mostvaluable for countries in transit in a sense, for countries thatare going up or down in terms of religious freedom measures.”
Citing examples from South and Central Asia or Sub-SaharanAfrica, the official recalled that the designation mandate
and process could be a valuable tool to prompt “those direct
diplomatic conversations with the government saying this is
likely coming down the pipe if x, y, z doesn’t change.” While
such conversations may not impact entrenched violators, they
can be a valuable tool for other countries where the situation
is deteriorating or improving.
COUNTRY CASE STUDY – UZBEKISTAN: RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM MEETS STRATEGIC PLANNING
Overview of Religious Freedom Conditions
Historically, the government of Uzbekistan has violated
religious freedom mainly under the justification of antiextremism laws and state control over religious participation.
Crackdowns against Sunni Muslims and perceived foreigngroups have been severe following security events such as
domestic unrest in 2004, the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) in 2014, and the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan
in 2021. In 2004, mass protests in the Andijan region ushered
in a new era of arrests, violence, surveillance, and social
control against Muslims accused of membership in extremistgroups. The country’s 1998 Law on Freedom of Conscienceand Religious Organizations criminalizes unregisteredreligious groups, requires permission for all religious
activities and materials, and bans proselytization and private
religious education. These abuses led to Uzbekistan’s first
CPC designation in 2006.
CPC Designation and U.S. Policy
Uzbekistan is a story of significant legal and procedural
improvements on religious freedom achieved via diplomatic
engagement, especially after the accession of Shavkat
Mirziyoyev to the presidency in 2016. The administration of
President Islam Karimov (from independence in 1991 until
2016) established nearly every major restriction on religious
freedom in Uzbekistan during that period. Following theinitial CPC designation in 2006, the State Department
dispatched the IRF ambassador to the country to begin
a dialogue and issued a 180-day waiver. The department

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad21

CPC Designation: A Mandate to Take Action

extended that waiver each time it redesignated Uzbekistan
as a CPC until 2011, when it made the waiver indefinite to“further the purposes of the act.”
Particularly in the mid-2000s, security cooperation in
Afghanistan was a central consideration in any U.S.
human rights diplomacy conducted with Uzbekistan. Thisconsideration limited diplomatic potential on human rights
issues, though the U.S. government sometimes conditioned
security exchanges on human rights improvements from2005 to 2012. Throughout that period, the IRF Officecontinued to conduct visits and negotiate for specific reforms
to the country’s religion and terrorism laws with marginal
success (reductions in religious prisoners and raids on housesof worship).
President Karimov’s death and President Mirziyoyev’s
ascension in 2016 was a critical moment for U.S. religious
freedom engagement with Uzbekistan. According tostakeholders, the Mirziyoyev administration expressed astrong desire to work with U.S. government entities to end
the CPC designation. Shortly after taking office, Mirziyoyev
announced a new policy for the regulation of religion, which
included new freedoms of worship, reduced surveillance,
and the largest pardoning of prisoners of conscience in the
country’s history.
In pursuit of this new opening, the IRF ambassador held
regular meetings with Uzbek representatives and traveled tothe country in 2018. In the spring of that year, Uzbekistan’s
parliament approved a Religious Freedom Roadmap guided
by the UN special rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief,
who had visited the country in 2017. The roadmap included
simplified rules for registering religious organizations,set forth clemency measures for extremism charges, andestablished a consultative body of 17 recognized religious
groups. Former State Department officials interviewed notedthat the drafting of this document by a UN expert, rather
than U.S. officials, was important to the Uzbek leadership.
The roadmap’s reforms also reflected many of the IRF
ambassador’s specific requests. After the government of
Uzbekistan made progress on some elements of the roadmap,
the State Department downgraded the country from a CPC toan SWL country at the end of 2018.

22

Policy Effectiveness and Outcomes
During the following two years, the IRF ambassador
continued close engagement with Uzbek officials on
amendments to the country’s 1998 Religion Law. The State
Department removed Uzbekistan’s SWL designation in
2020. In 2021, the Uzbek government approved the amended
religion law, which further streamlined the registration
process and lifted the ban on religious attire in public
spaces. The government also promised to release additionalreligious prisoners. However, USCIRF and other observers
continued to warn that the government retained nearly total
control over exercising freedom of religion in the country
and that its promises of amnesty and registrations remained
unfulfilled. According to a 2021 USCIRF report, the Uzbek
authorities continued to imprison over 2,000 people forpracticing their religious beliefs peacefully. In addition, after
the Taliban takeover of neighboring Afghanistan in 2021,
Uzbek authorities ramped up their targeting of individuals
with extremism charges based on their religious identity or
activities and imposed new restrictions on travel for religious
education.
In 2023, both USCIRF and Human Rights Watch issued
warnings about the country’s backsliding on religious
freedom, especially concerning detentions of Sunni Muslims
and restrictions on public displays of religion. In 2021, 2022,
and 2023, USCIRF recommended that the State Department
return Uzbekistan to its SWL.
Summary Lessons Learned• When a new administration took power in Uzbekistan
in 2016, representatives sought ways to end the CPC
designation. This kind of enthusiasm for engagement is notpossible without a sustained commitment by the UnitedStates to continue communicating the importance ofreligious freedom, even to an unresponsive regime.
• It is often misconstrued that religious freedom policy
complicates or detracts from more topline foreign policy
priorities. In Uzbekistan, the use of withheld militaryexchanges in the mid-2000s produced meaningfulprogress toward additional dialogues for human rights,
demonstrating how U.S. defense policy can interact
productively with religious freedom policy.

Revisiting the CPC Designation

CONCLUSION
In its 25-year history, IRFA has played a significant role inelevating international religious freedom as a U.S. foreign
policy priority and galvanizing a global effort to advance
this fundamental human right. The CPC designation
mandate, including its requirement for subsequent actions,represents a core component of that policy effort. Whenappropriately utilized, as a former State Department official
said, “the CPC tool gave energy to the whole ecosystem of
IRF players.” Maintaining this energy has been critical incases of success; this is true both within the U.S. policy sphere
and with violator states. When the United States is able to
make a sustained, coherent, and adaptive case for religious
freedom, our interlocutors take note. The CPC designationis the enforcement mechanism that undergirds these efforts.
However, it can be used more effectively to this end.
Too often, the application of IRFA fails to produce genuinechange to advance religious freedom. The repeated useof sanctions waivers backed by vague justifications andthe repurposed application of preexisting sanctions dilutethe effectiveness of the CPC designation. The indefinite
suspension of sanctions or other punitive measures forreligious freedom violators, whether due to inertia orcompeting policy priorities, is a source of frustration within
the IRF policy community. When waivers must be issued,
as the original act permits, clear justifications and timelines
should be given.

Of course, the nature of a violator government and its
relationship with the United States are crucial in determining
the impact of a CPC designation. Where the designation
has been effective—such as in Uzbekistan or Vietnam—U.S.
diplomacy has been able to leverage the bilateral relationshipwith those states to produce clear and attainable objectives
for reform and to work in tandem with government andcivil society counterparts to see them achieved. Building
religious freedom into country-level policy planning can be
an effective approach. However, progress on the ground canbe inconsistent and backsliding is possible. When regression
does take place, punitive measures must again be on the table.
Clearly defined metrics for success and penalties or modes ofredress for backsliding must be a part of any IRF policy.
Further, the value of leadership cannot be understated. In
the most successful cases, the role of the ambassador-at-large
for IRF has been vital in serving as a champion for religious
freedom not only with foreign governments and on behalf ofpersecuted communities but also within the U.S. bureaucracy
facing a range of competing policy priorities. Similarly,
congressional oversight and engagement play a crucial role inensuring there are appropriate resources and accountability topush meaningful initiatives forward.
After 25 years of implementation of IRFA and more than
160 CPC designations, much has been accomplished.
Nevertheless, further adjustments in policy and practice
could be made to ensure the act is fit for purpose in its next
25 years as a tool of U.S. foreign policy to condemn violationsof religious freedom and to promote the fundamental right tofreedom of religion for all people.

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad23

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING
THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM TOOLBOX
Action Planning:

Bilateral Agreements:• For all CPC-designated countries, the State Department
should develop a clear action plan or “toolbox” forengagement and a bilateral agenda with the violator country
with benchmarks and timelines, outlining the response
to positive and negative developments regarding religious
freedom promotion.

• The State Department should prioritize using bilateralagreements (whether binding agreements or other types offormal commitments) as a response to CPC designations.
While the specifics may change in each instance, these
agreements can provide measurable benchmarks and abasis for ongoing engagement.

• The State Department should clearly delineate and enforce
requirements for following up on CPC/SWL designations,
including but not limited to the sanctions or waiver
designation made by the secretary of state.

• The State Department should use the SWL designation as
both an “on-ramp” and an “off-ramp” to CPC designation;
it expands the IRF toolbox when used in conjunction withother means and can be presented to the violator country
as a viable alternative. The State Department should alsoseek to use bilateral agreements in the case of an SWL
designation to avoid a CPC determination.

• The State Department should ensure that religious freedom
is meaningfully included in the Integrated Country Strategy
for all CPC countries to pursue alignment of priorities andprogrammatic approaches across various offices, bureaus,
and agencies. It also should consider such inclusion for
countries it has placed on the SWL and other countries
where there are significant religious freedom concerns.
Sanctions:• Congress should update the list of required actions for CPC
designation to include more modern, targeted sanctions
alongside other sanction options, particularly utilizing
Global Magnitsky sanctions against individuals andentities responsible for particularly severe violations ofreligious freedom.
• The State Department should strengthen the evidencecollection process regarding specific individuals or entities
responsible for particularly severe violations of religious
freedom as part of the annual reporting process. This would
streamline the imposition of targeted sanctions against
specific religious freedom violators, in keeping with IRFA’s
requirement for identification of the responsible parties.

Robust Engagement:• The State Department should ensure religious freedom
is included in public diplomacy, education and culturalaffairs, democracy promotion, and human rights programsand engagements with both government and civil society
partners. Doing so would help mainstream religious
freedom into U.S. foreign policy, enabling it to be part of aproactive strategy rather than solely punitive or reactive.
• The State Department should leverage the perspectives
and approaches of other IRF actors—including USCIRF,
multilateral institutions or networks (such as the UN
special rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief and theInternational Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance/Article
18 Alliance), and NGOs—to enhance its efforts to provide
both accountability and incentives to support religious
freedom to foreign governments.

• Where applicable, the U.S. government should pursue
targeted sanctions that focus on the sectors or regions
where the worst violations occur, rather than country-wide
sanctions. This may incentivize local reforms and enable
meaningful government partnership rather than prompt ahostile or adversarial response.

24

Revisiting the CPC Designation

Recommendations for Enhancing the Religious Freedom Toolbox

Accountability:• The State Department should provide specific andmeaningful justification to Congress (whether public
or private) for issuing any CPC waiver, including
waivers extended from the previous year.
• Congress should consider amendments to IRFA tolimit the renewal of waivers and the application ofpreexisting sanctions.
• The State Department should ensure that meaningful
reporting on implementing actions taken in furtheranceof IRFA (including CPC, SWL, and EPC designations,presidential actions and their impact, diplomatic
engagement, IRF programs funded, or other activities) is
provided to Congress and the public through the annualinternational religious freedom report.
• Congress should hold regular hearings on the U.S.
government’s implementation of IRFA. These hearings
should cover specific actions and programs taken overthe previous year, including IRFA designations andpresidential actions, as well as priorities for the coming
year, with specific attention to CPC and SWL countries.
Witnesses should include the secretary of state, theambassador-at-large for IRF, and other relevant officials
from the State Department, USAID, the National Security
Council, and other agencies.
• Congress should request a Government Accountability
Office report on the use of IRF program funds and theirimpact in implementing IRFA.

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad25

ANNEX 1: COMPARISON BETWEENSTATE DEPARTMENT DESIGNATIONSAND USCIRF RECOMMENDATIONSCountry

Algeria

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

State Dept.

SWL SWL SWLUSCIRF
Azerbaijan

SWL SWL SWL SWL

State Dept.

SWL

USCIRF
Burma

State Dept.

T2
CPC

USCIRF
Central African Republic

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC
CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC
CPC

CPC

T2
CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

Comoros

CPC

T2

T2

T2

T2

SWL SWL SWL SWL

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

State Dept.

SWL SWLUSCIRF
China

T2

CPC

State Dept.

CPC

CPC

CPC

USCIRF

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC
CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC
CPC

CPC

CPC
CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC SWL

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

State Dept.

SWL SWLSWL SWL SWL SWL SWL SWLUSCIRF
Cuba

Eritrea

IranState Dept.

SWL SWL SWL CPC

USCIRFWLWLWLState Dept.

CPC

CPC

CPC

USCIRF

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

State Dept.

CPC

USCIRF
Iraq

State Dept.

CPC

USCIRF
Nicaragua

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

WL

WL

CPC

CPC

WL

WL

CPC
CPC

CPC

WL

T2

CPC

CPC

CPC
CPC

CPC
CPC

WL
CPC

T2

T2

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

T2

T2

T2

SWL SWL SWL CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

T2

SWL SWL SWL SWL

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

T2

T2

CPC
CPC

CPC

CPC

WL

State Dept.

SWL SWL SWL CPC

USCIRF
Nigeria

PakistanState Dept.

SWL CPC

State Dept.

CPC

USCIRF

CPC

CPC

WL

WL

WL

WL

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

WL

WL

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

State Dept.

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC
CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC
WL

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

WL

WL

T2

CPC

CPC

CPC
CPC

CPC

WL

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC
CPC

CPC

T2

T2

CPC
CPC

CPC

CPC
CPC

CPC

WL

WL

CPC

CPC

State Dept.

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

State Dept.

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC
WL

State Dept.
USCIRF

CPC

CPC

CPC

USCIRF
Vietnam

CPC

State Dept.

USCIRF
Uzbekistan

CPC

CPC
CPC

CPC
CPC

USCIRF
Turkmenistan

CPC
WL

State Dept.

USCIRF
Tajikistan

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

SWL CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

SWL SWL SWL CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

State Dept.

USCIRF
Sudan

CPC

CPC

USCIRF
Saudi Arabia

CPC

State Dept.
USCIRF

RussiaCPC

SWL SWL SWL CPC

USCIRF
North Korea

CPC

T2

CPC

CPC

WL

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

T2

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC SWL

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC SWL

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC SWL SWL

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC SWL SWL SWL SWL

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

SWL SWL
CPC

CPC

CPC

CPC

This table includes only the countries that the State Dept. has designated as CPCs or placed on its SWL. USCIRF has recommended other countries for CPC or SWL status that are notlisted. USCIRF began making recommenations for the State Dept.’s SWL in 2020. Previously, USCIRF called its second category its Watch List (WL) from 2003-2012 and its Tier 2 (T2)from 2013-2019. Countries on USCIRF’s WL or T2 that the State Dept. has not named as CPCs or SWL countries are also not shown.

26

Revisiting the CPC Designation

ANNEX 2: STATE DEPARTMENTCPC DESIGNATIONS ANDPRESIDENTIAL ACTIONSCountry

1999

2000

2001

2003

2004

2005

2006

2009

2011

2014

2016 (feb) 2016 (oct)

Burma

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

China

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

Cuba
Eritrea
Iran

ES

ES

ES

ES

Iraq

ES

ES

ES

ES

NS

NS

NS

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

Nicaragua
NI

Nigeria
ES

North Korea

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

Pakistan

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

ES

ES

ES

RussiaSaudi Arabia
Sudan

ES

ES

ES

ES

FP

FP

FP

FP

FP

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

ES

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
BA

Uzbekistan
Vietnam

BA

FP

FP

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

NI

BA

Key:
ES = Existing Sanctions
NS = New Sanctions
NI = Waiver based on National Interests
FP = Waiver to Further the Purposes of IRFA
BA = Binding Agreement (secured or pursued)

Improving Accountability and Engaging Productively to Advance Religious Freedom Abroad27

ABOUT THE AUTHORSThis research was conducted by the Religious Freedom Institute, a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization committed to achieving
broad acceptance of religious liberty as a fundamental human right, the cornerstone of a successful society, and a source ofnational and international security. Additional thanks are offered to colleagues across the Religious Freedom Institute and themany researchers, advocates, policymakers, and practitioners who provided their time and expertise for this research.
Jeremy P. Barker is the Associate Vice President forInternational Strategies at the Religious Freedom Institute. He
has worked in rights-based relief, development, and advocacy
across the Middle East for more than a decade. Since 2016, he
has worked with the Religious Freedom Institute in operational
and program leadership roles, including research and analysis,
equipping and mobilizing, and strategic grassroots and politicaladvocacy with a particular focus on the Middle East and theintersection of religion and foreign policy. He holds a B.A.
in History and M.A. degrees in Cross-Cultural Studies andInternational Relations. Barker is also a Ph.D. researcher at theInstitute of Development Studies and the University of Sussex.

28

Ryan Zoellner served as a Research Consultant with
the Religious Freedom Institute. He currently works as
a Middle East Program Associate at the International
Republican Institute. He has previously worked with arange of institutions, including the Woodrow Wilson Center,
the Middle East Initiative at Harvard’s Kennedy Center,and the Office of the Prime Minister in the Kurdistan
Regional Government of Iraq. Ryan holds a Master ofTheological Studies, with a concentration in Islamic Studies
from Harvard Divinity School and a B.A. in Political Scienceand Philosophy of Religion from Colgate University.

Revisiting the CPC Designation

PROFESSIONAL STAFF
senior strategic advisor

Elizabeth K. Cassidy

director of research and policy

Guillermo Cantor

chief administrative officer

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chief of public affairs
deputy director of research and policy

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supervisory policy analyst

Scott Weiner

supervisory policy advisor

Mingzhi Chen

policy analyst

Michael Ardovino

senior policy analyst

Susan Bishai

policy analyst

Mollie Blum

policy analyst

Patrick Greenwalt

senior policy analyst
public affairs associate
policy analyst
operations specialist
policy analyst
international legal specialist
policy analyst

Sema Hasan
Veronica McCarthy
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UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM