The Challenges of Market Sustainability
Accountability and Organisational Change in CEDAC’s
Agricultural and Empowerment Programmes in
CambodiaHart Feuer
Queen Elizabeth House
University of Oxford

Translated by: Piseth Som

April 2008

Acknowledgements. This thesis was made possible by the care, support and critical feedbackof many people in Cambodia and England. I am most indebted to my advisor, Graham
Brown, for putting clarity to my faults, and to my field assistant, Piseth Som, who was mybest informant and great friend. In Cambodia, I was cared for with the utmost generosity andhospitality by the senior staff of CEDAC, including Vuthy Bao, Seng Suon, Koma Yang
Saing, Kimthan Yi and Thy Or. My gratitude goes to Koma and Seng for reviewing my final
drafts and finding those errors that one else could. For hosting me warmly in Angtasaom andVaspors Village, my thanks go to Sister Sokha, Mr Leak and Uncle Mom. For nursing meback into Cambodian life, suffering through translation headaches and always being thewarmest friends, my heart goes to Sary Seng and his wife Pisey Meas. Special thanks to
Ayako Hiwasa and Payal Rajpal, two good friends in Cambodia who provided me
unsparingly with their companionship and perspectives. For putting up with my odd working
hours in Phnom Penh, I thank the staff of the Center for Khmer Studies, especially Kethya
Kheng, Philippe Peycamp and warmest housekeeper I know. Last but not least, myappreciation goes to the numerous field staff of Zone II for putting up with my constantpresence and onerous questioning. In England, my gratitude goes to Julie Taylor, who edited
my messes, and in America, my family for making that last-minute edit.

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1.0

INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores how and why sustainable agricultural programming has expanded
beyond the boundaries of strict ecological sustainability and made compromises with thecapitalist world system. In development discourse, the concept of sustainability has grown toencompass a wide range of ideas and practices, ranging from specific methods for improving
eco-efficiency to broad theories concerning how to (re)structure consumer society. In
practice, sustainability is operationalised by each user in an evolving manner (Judge, 1990).
In the short-term, development actors often define sustainability simply as the advancementof an environmentally-oriented activity, such as the promotion of ecological rice production.
This simple goal usually translates into early success and emboldens development actors.
This honeymoon persists until development actors recognise that agricultural techniques areof limited use unless broader market and societal configurations are brought into alignment
with production realities. Thus, the initial engagement in short-term issues eventually breeds
a longer-term—and more differentiated—view. It becomes clear that the long path towards asustainable outcome (e.g., sustainable consumer society, sustainable industry, sustainableagriculture, etc.) involves comprehensive engagement with society and markets. In thisthesis, I examine how rural development goals are affected by this ad-hoc (re)configurationof idea and practice by analysing the past and future programming of the Cambodian Center
for Study and Development in Agriculture (CEDAC).1 More specifically, I address thequestion of what are the consequences for rural people of continuously redefining
sustainability in a way that favours market-based frameworks?
I highlight the tensions and advantages of the evolving NGO-model of socially
responsible enterprise adopted over time by CEDAC. In particular, I show how an initial
focus on the improvement in rice-based agricultural livelihoods has transformed into animperative for building up market-oriented networks to expand organisational capacity.
Because these networks are defined by CEDAC to be inherently sustainable, growing theircapacity is logically seen as sustainable development. Improving rural livelihoods has thus
become a by-product of system expansion. This has been marked by a shift in accountability
that favours a passive, market demand-pull-based strategy for drawing in previously
uninitiated farmers, rather than the grassroots approach favoured since the inception of ruraldevelopment programming. I argue that this shift is symptomatic of the larger convergenceof promising sustainable agricultural initiatives upon the reformist, technocentrist andincreasingly hegemonic ‘market sustainability’ paradigm of sustainable development(SustainAbility, 2003). This state of affairs concurrently provides immense potential for
displacing traditional industrialist modes of agricultural development, but also makes it
increasingly vulnerable to cooptation by them (Jacobs, 1999: 281).
2.0

LIVELIHOODS TO ACTOR-WORLDS: SITUATING THEORIES OFSUSTAINABILITY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

This study focuses on two relatively discrete subjects—farmer families andinstitutions—and how they are bound together in a chain of relational macro-microinteractions that form a particular representation of the macro-social space of sustainable
development (Knorr-Cetina, 1981). In particular, I focus on how various ‘technologies ofknowledge’—such as the System of Rice Intensification (SRI), group formation and social
enterprising—have been employed instrumentally by CEDAC in order to enrol farmerparticipants into its practical model of sustainable development. My informants include 70
farmer families from three districts in which CEDAC works in Takeo province, as well as more
1This is a French acronym, the original of which is Centre d’Étude et de Développement Agricole Cambodgien.

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than 40 interviews with farmers, government officials, and NGO staff. This thesis employs
institutional analysis of a socioeconomic variety, informed by actor-network theory toilluminate the processes of enrolment and network expansion.
2.1

Melding the Discourses of Sustainability and Agricultural Development

Contemporary theories of sustainability in agriculture are largely an emanation fromthe Global North, and in particular from the influences of environmentalism and postindustrialism and, later, neo-liberal economic discourse (Adams, 1990). The early paradigmof sustainability was largely normative in nature, emerging from post-industrialist atavistic
notions about returning to nature, leading simpler lives and honouring rural farm heritage (cf.
Leopold, 1981; White, 1967; Wilson, 1996). The collective interpretation of embedded
actors such as animal rights activists, family and artisan farmers, discriminating consumers
and concerned agronomists have radically increased environmental awareness and enrolled
support for international health and environmental agreements (Singer, 1974). More recently,
this paradigm has been appended and challenged, by scholarship taking an economic, or
pragmatic, view of environment and social development (Freeman, 1998). This new
definition has either been seen as a reflective shift away from the narrow concerns ofmainstream economics and modernisation (Friberg & Hettne, 1985), or as falling in line with
neo-liberal economic development, because it shares a similar foundational premise
prioritising capital accumulation, competition, and efficiency (Adams, 1995; Aseniero, 1985;
Haque, 1999). Between these cleavages in the discourse of sustainable development, many
hybrid development models have emerged. Fairtrade is a recent manifestation of this more
systemic, economistic approach to dealing with rural agricultural livelihoods through thenormative lens of sustainability. Global institutional discourse has echoed this new tension,materialising most significantly in the Kyoto Protocol’s market-oriented Clean Development
Mechanism. The non-profit sector, the primary subject of this thesis, has also beenencouraged to partially adopt business plans and market-based structures (SustainAbility,2003).
The Cambodian Center for Study and Development in Agriculture (CEDAC)
CEDAC is a national-level NGO in the throes of redefining its self-image andoperating structure in response to the perception that their initial programming was limiting
their potential to respond to emerging development challenges. Founded in 1997 by a cadreof seven Cambodian professionals focussing on the promotion of low-external input,
management-oriented agricultural extension, CEDAC was poised to benefit from the growing
movement within the development industry for partnerships with national NGOs. The
French NGO GRET2 was the first to co-sponsor CEDAC’s activities by providing seedfunding from which it was able to develop its initial rural programmes. This recognition andthe base programmes it spawned attracted funding from Oxfam America and, in subsequent
years, many other donors. The primary draw of CEDAC during this early period was its
success in diffusing ecological rice cultivation, and other ecological farming practices.
CEDAC’s initial identity and purpose were relatively clear: it was promoting agricultural
practices embedded in the sustainable agricultural discourse and its work symbolised thealternative to the modernist AusAid-funded project of the International Rice ResearchInstitute called the Cambodian Agricultural Research and Development Institute (CARDI).3
Following an “additive” logic of sustainable development, CEDAC began expanding thescope of its programming rapidly. It began encouraging the formation of Farmers
Associations (FAs), intended as an umbrella under which local interest groups could form
2
3

GRET is known as the Group for Research and Exchange of Technology.
(Yi, 21 September 2007)3and through which CEDAC’s information and programmes could be disseminated. These
FAs are viewed by CEDAC as an entry point for empowerment programming and a forum
for farmer-to-farmer extension and local cooperation.4 FAs were also, importantly, theorganisational hub for local savings groups that provide one alternative to high-interest
moneylenders and large-scale microfinance organisations. FAs, thereafter, enabled therecruitment of farmers into CEDAC’s Natural Agri-Product Marketing Program, which
provides market assistance for promoting organic agricultural products. After years of very
rapid institutional growth under these conditions, CEDAC highlighted at their 10th Year
Anniversary celebration in Phnom Penh on 1 August 2007 that it was moving toward amarket-oriented approach to sustainable agricultural promotion.5
Immediately after the anniversary, large-scale meetings were held to communicate therationale for this decision and initiate the so-called “business plan”. The plan, CEDAC
hoped, would enable a performance-oriented institutional culture and bypass some of thestructural constraints in promoting markets for sustainable agricultural products. By 2008,
CEDAC had divided itself into three “Core Programs”: (1) agriculture and social
development, (2) agri-based enterprises support and (3) the CEDAC Institute of Local
Development (CEDAC, February 2008). The first Program could be seen as the “original”
programme of CEDAC, focusing on SRI extension, ecological livestock raising and groupformation. And although only one of these Core Programs (number 2) explicitly deals withbusiness and enterprise, a private sector-like performance orientation has suffused
institutional practice in all three Programs. The implementation of the “business plan” hasthus become the third stage in CEDAC’s institutional history, following from its initial focus
on agricultural extension, and subsequent focus on group formation and empowerment
programming. Analysing the process through which CEDAC reached this juncture is criticalto understanding how organisations balance the evolving discourses of sustainable
development with the practical challenges inherent to operationalising them.
The System of Rice Intensification
This thesis primarily focuses on one product of agroecological research diffused by
CEDAC, namely the System of Rice Intensification (SRI) developed in Madagascar by theJesuit missionary Henri de Laulanié (1993). Laulanié’s original formulation (according toUphoff, 2005) is as follows: Transplanting younger seedlings (age 8-15 days)
 Transplanting individual seedlings with increased and regular spacing between hills(25cm or more) Maintaining a moist, not saturated, paddy
 Applying proportionately more organic matter, rather than chemical fertilizers
 Controlling weeds frequently, particularly with a mechanical weeder
Subsequent additions to the set have stipulated shallower transplanting, same-day
transplanting, additional ploughing and field levelling, elevated nurseries, and an enhanced
focus on seedling and seed selection. Critical to understanding the nature of SRI is that bothwholesale adoption of practices and strict conformity to the stipulated parameters is notnecessary to see improvement in productivity. Also important for a comprehensive analysis,
based on total factor productivity and environmental imperatives, are the potential seed-,water-, labour- and fertilizer-saving features accompanying some of the steps (Satyanarayana
et al., 2007; Uphoff, 2003, 2006b). Improvement in overall soil fertility is another potential
by-product.
4
5(Yi, 21 September 2007)(Yang Saing, 1 August 2007)

4In South and East Asia, SRI cultivation has spread rapidly and become popularamongst development organisations, yet it continues to be contested by certain members oflarge agronomic research institutions. In practice, low external input techniques such as SRI
have often been criticised for producing low outputs (yields), not making good on adoption
expectations, being only appropriate in limited circumstances, and not even being
theoretically possible (Dobermann, 2004; McDonald et al., 2006; Moser & Barrett, 2003;
Sheehy et al., 2004; Sheehy et al., 2005). Rebuttals by SRI advocates point to specific data
and methodology problems with the critical assessments and are often quick to point out thewidespread civil society support and rapid proliferation amongst farmers in several countries(Stoop et al., 2002; Uphoff, 2006a).
2.2

Applied Actor-Network Theory

The methodological suggestions arising from actor-network theory (ANT) are
typically concerned with reassembling in full view the mechanics of actor-worlds that havebecome obscured over time. As Michel Callon has written, “Successful translation quickly
makes us forget its history” (1986b: 28). Using ANT terminology, CEDAC’s vision ofsustainable agricultural and rural development is being continually punctualised (Latour,1987)—a situation in which a complex and historically-constructed system of institutional
practice becomes increasingly opaque whilst inputs into and outputs from the system remain
visible. This is not necessarily a deceptive process; it simply describes how complexity ismasked in order to present a comprehensible front, just as turning on a faucet does not reveal
the enormous complexity of the system of water delivery.
To preface the empirical and ethnographic evidence I present below, I highlight a few
terms from ANT that are directly relevant to this case study. Foremost, ANT is primarily
based on examining processes of translation, or strategic representation of a situation for the
purpose of enrolling actors. Interessement is one of the primary translation exercises
employed in the development field. Organisations or leaders create practical or ideologicalincentives for joining concrete activities that draw on the moral resources of ideas such as‘sustainable development’ and on the practical (i.e., financial) resources of the development
industry. In order to facilitate this, ‘sustainable development’ is problematised in such a way
as to create a host of initiatives or activities (e.g., development projects, technologicalinnovations, environmental education, etc.) that are able to attract, retain and put to use avariety of human and non-human actors such as field staff, SRI techniques, farmers,
agricultural inputs, offices and expatriates.
Certain projects, or technologies, such as the SRI, become gatekeepers, or “obligatory
points of passage”, through which access to other initiatives, such as trainings, Farmers
Associations, women’s groups and organic markets, become available. Activities such as
writing reports, taking surveys, applying to donors, organising producer group meetings andpublishing research papers serve as constant displacement (or “buzz” of routine tasks), which
often serve to distract actor-members from reflecting on the controversies of their work.

3.0

ENCOUNTERING THE EXTENSION AND EMPOWERMENT SYSTEM

3.1

CEDAC’s Typology of Farmers

The pioneers. From CEDAC’s perspective, rural people who exhibit a high level ofwillingness to participate and adopt techniques are commonly referred to as pioneers. To
some degree, pioneers are self-selected; they are those with the confidence, entrepreneurial
spirit and material resources who come forward voluntarily. In other cases, pioneers are“made”, either by direct payments for participation or by receiving an official title. Although5initial willingness is the minimal prerequisite to be informally seen as a pioneer by CEDAC,
pioneers come in many different forms. Mey Som, the “first” pioneer of SRI in Cambodia, isa national-level figure who has contributed heavily to the corpus of agricultural innovations,
local organising practices and livelihood philosophies promoted by CEDAC and academics.
Prak Ches, a regional-level pioneer of SRI, multi-purpose farms and environmental thought,
is well-known in CEDAC’s Zone II. Teap Mom (pseudonym), a village head and SRI
farmer, has become a leading figure at the commune-level for his leadership abilities andpresence in local organisations. Dein Toin (pseudonym), a village-level hero, achieved
notoriety for his record-breaking SRI yield in 2004, but has remained aloof of localorganising. Lop T’neen (pseudonym) is a “pioneer” because he simply tested SRI in the firstyear that CEDAC came to his village. The liberal conditions by which one can becomelabelled a “pioneer” suggest that CEDAC uses this label to honour these farmers for being so
readily recruited. For CEDAC, pioneers of all types become critical leverage for promoting
the success of agricultural programmes to donors and are indispensable agents for assisting in
the diffusion and extension of new agricultural techniques and group organising activities.
Contrary to the traditional connotations of the word “pioneer”, such as independence
and autonomy, pioneers in the context of CEDAC’s agricultural programming are “recruited”
actively. There are two primary routes for this recruitment. One route, which usually comeschronologically first, requires the purposeful selection of key local people, usually based on
their status as village head or renown for being a particularly talented farmer. These villagers
are either paid directly to field-test certain agricultural techniques6 or are ennobled by staff
members to be key facilitators in the ensuing programming. Very often, these people arecharged with organising the first village meeting or performing the first local-level field-testof SRI. These key individuals pave the way for a subsequent round of recruitment—thesoliciting of “interested farmers” during an introductory town hall meeting held in the village.
Attendees usually hear a participatory presentation by CEDAC staff and are then asked, by ashow of hands, who is interested in testing SRI. In subsequent years, some of these interested
farmers will passively garner the title of “pioneer”—especially if they themselves become
promoters of SRI.
As the CEDAC-initiated programming becomes more established and grows in scale,
opportunities for upward mobility by pioneers become numerous. As the set of agricultural
techniques expands from SRI to vegetable intensification, sustainable livestock production
and to multi-purpose farming, pioneers are continuously obliged to take part in more
activities. Usually this entails increasing involvement in Farmers Associations, producers’
groups, Commune Cluster organising, and eventually village enterprise activities. Drawing
pioneers into positions with more responsibility is a rather subtle process; but before theyknow it, many pioneers are absorbed in CEDAC’s programming.
The wait-and-sees. Particularly as SRI cultivation is usually the ‘entry point’ forbroader agricultural programming, there are many farmers who prefer to allow pioneers totake the initial experimental risks in their villages. They often want to make certain that the
proposed cultivation changes are suitable for their local agro-ecosystem and scale ofproduction. Generally, wait-and-sees are exposed to CEDAC through an introductory
meeting or by word-of-mouth and have elected, for a variety of structural and personalreasons, not to experiment in the initial year. The following quote illustrates a typicaloutcome of waiting:

6

The practice of funding individual farmers has diminished markedly since the early years of CEDAC (perhaps
up to 2002). Now, CEDAC’s reputation and networks largely set the stage for early collaboration. Initially,
payment was provided to insure farmers against the risks of trying experimental cultivation practices and might
be seen as a ‘research partnership’. However, one cannot deny the utility of this practice in “making” pioneersof local individuals.

6

In 2005, I started SRI. I saw people from previous years getting high yields, so I
decided to test it for myself. I tried it on 6 ares. That year we had a good crop. But
since then we have had bad weather and other problems unrelated to SRI – pests andaccidents. But I know these did not cause the lower yield for SRI, so I did half myfield the next year [2006] and this year I did all SRI. (male, age 42, Samraung
district)
Many farmers such as these are sceptical of CEDAC’s claims about high yield or they arerisk-averse and concerned that the new system may not be reliable or appropriate for theirfields. Others lack confidence in their ability to implement the system or feel sociallyawkward about trying something new. The experience of having one’s primary activity (i.e.,
farming) fundamentally transformed is rather unsettling to farmers and can erode theirconfidence.
Whilst there are indeed formidable constraints to full adoption, the possibility ofapplying as many or as few SRI “steps” as desired and the relative ease of making a small test
plot mean that the costs and risks of trying SRI are low. The existence of so many wait-andsees (approximately one-third of my sample) near successful SRI farmers suggests thatcomplex social constraints affect the propensity to experiment. I will explore these in detaillater. However, these constraints can serve as a rough filter for weeding out farmers who
might not subsequently join CEDAC’s broader organisational and empowerment activities.
Once a village has received its initial SRI training, the “wait-and-sees” are on their own in
deciding whether to apply SRI or not—they do not require intervention by CEDAC. Thatsaid, the personal initiative of many passionate field staff often transcends this operating
imperative, especially when it comes to including socially important individuals and women.
The difficult group. In a list generated by farmers and field staff at a workshop, “lackof agricultural techniques and knowledge” and “laziness” were the top two reasons for why
people remain poor (field notes, 7 September 2007). The first reason effectively legitimises
CEDAC’s role as purveyors of agricultural techniques in the countryside, whilst the second
reason summarily justifies why some misguidedly do not take up these techniques. The“difficult group”, then, as informally known by CEDAC,7 are those farmers who, in spite of
agricultural training opportunities, elect not to take part in rural agricultural development
programming.8 For CEDAC, “difficult” means that the farmer exhibits a personality trait,such as conservatism, irrationality, or closed-mindedness that affects his or her ability tojudge SRI on its merits. This rather imbalanced representation lumps together those with andwithout legitimate constraints to participation because it presumes that SRI is objectively
superior in most, if not all, cases. However, within this group, the range of rationales for
abstaining varies enormously and could be disaggregated in order to determine whether afarmer is “difficult” (in terms of his or her character) or structurally constrained in ways that
limit his or her capability to implement SRI.
I would likely not recommend SRI to many others, because I think those who canmanage to do SRI with their land have already started and know about it. A few more
people have started this year on small plots, but there are so many that just cannot doit because of their land. (male, age 36, Tramkok district)
Because CEDAC staff (as a result of training and experience) believe that there is aclear solution to most reported constraints, they tend to underestimate the salience of somerather important ones. In many cases, “laziness” is likely a synonym of “constrained”. For
7

I wish to stress that the “difficult group” is not an official term used by CEDAC, but a heuristic used
informally and occasionally by CEDAC staff when encountering difficulty in extension.
8(Yi, 21 September 2007)

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instance, in theory, SRI cultivation can be performed with less labour; however, most farmers
require a few years of experience in order to reach this stage and are thus put off by overly
optimistic claims during training. The local rumour mill can magnify the salience of someconstraints, which serves to bulwarks the position of many non-adopters. For example, thescientific fact that tall stalks and improved yield usually counteract the negative effect oflower planting density on straw production is unable to compete with rumours circulating that
SRI reduces straw output, and may mean that the family’s cow will have less fodder toconsume late in the dry season.
The “difficult group” is, in fact, comprised of a broad range of farmers with manyreasons for being unable or unwilling to implement SRI. I have also shown that CEDAC
portrays this group as “difficult” in order to rationalise the lack of emphasis made on
addressing their constraints. But the underlying reason for why such a heterogeneous groupare marginalised from CEDAC activities is because they not only require additional resources(i.e., personal attention, action research) for inclusion, but they have a lower propensity tojoin CEDAC’s other activities, which is essential for CEDAC’s growth.
3.2

The “strategic agents”

This final category of farmer families, which I have coined for this study, includes
those who have interacted openly (and willingly) with SRI techniques and have found thesystem wanting in their particular context. This group overlaps with many of those includedin CEDAC’s “difficult group” but I argue that they are strategic in their behaviour, rather
than “difficult”. This view prompts open exploration rather than marginalisation of theiradoption constraints. Primarily, strategic agents include those struggling to overcome
structural constraints, those who have experiment with SRI and have abandoned it and thosefor whom certain elements of the system—but not others—are viewed as unsuitable. The
most common strategic agents are those who have “disadopted” SRI. In my randomised
sample of 70 farmer families, 30% of my respondents are disadopters.9 Although disadoption
should be seen in light of the “fairness” (or comprehensiveness) of the field-test(s) conductedby the farmer (Moser & Barrett, 2003), I have deliberately chosen the strictest of definitions:farmers who have at least tested SRI and chosen not to continue. Some farmers might seen as
having “unfairly” disadopted due to an idiosyncratic shock like poor weather in the testing
year, but I maintain that even this should be seen as disadoption because it reflects the lack of
warnings, preparation and over-optimism of agricultural extension.
Analysing the motivations and constraints of these strategic agents is particularly
gainful, as this sub-group represents farmers who have meaningfully engaged with ruraldevelopment programming, including SRI, and encountered important constraints. Veryoften, a farmer who disadopted would provide me a veritable laundry list of their constraints:
I stopped [doing SRI] after 2004. I got less yield, small clumps, and with poor soil
and bad water management it was very difficult to do. I also have less compost on myland and had to deal with a big problem of weed problem. Oh right! I also got lessstraw. (male, age 39, Samraung district)
Resolving the constraints of this sub-group is likely to be the most expedient means ofderiving feedback and reflexively evaluating the potential for broader reform andimprovement.
3.3

Recruitment

9This represents 22 farmers out of a sample of 70. Farmers who disadopted after scaling up (usually after at
least two years of testing) comprise 6 out of the sample (9% disadoption).

8

Because history, experience and theory have shown CEDAC that SRI practices
increase yield and because savings groups provide a profitable solution to the lack of rural
credit, staff go out into the field confident that the real work is simply to convince farmers to“participate”. The question of whether SRI cultivation should be practiced at all (by certain
farmers) has, for them, already been closed and the new question becomes “how” toefficiently encourage people to adopt. In this way, ongoing scientific disputes, such as thosesurrounding SRI, are ignored for the sake of moving forward with the project (Desai, 2006:174). Having committed, or sold themselves on SRI, field staff become defensive insiders
rather than reflexive instructors and their pedagogy switches from one of education to one ofrecruitment.
CEDAC staff thus launch into a type of translation called interessement, which is
focussed on recruiting people into the CEDAC system through indirect incentivising, such as
promising more yield and profits from savings and shared production. Tentative recruits
often believe they are simply testing SRI cultivation, when in fact they are already on their
way towards induction into the broader range of CEDAC activities, of which SRI is only theentry point. One tactic used to sustain the translation is the practice of giving recruits titles(e.g., Village-Based Animator, Community-Based Animator, etc.) or giving them the chanceto earn titles (e.g., president of the nascent Farmers Association, the treasurer, etc.). Recruits
are also generally kept busy organising their various group activities, refining their , which
serves to make the question of whether or not SRI is a fair test for recruitment in theircommunity redundant.
CEDAC staff themselves are often unaware of the structural marginalisation thatensues. Because they generally work with those who have been (easily) recruited, thelifeworlds of those who have not taken up SRI become increasingly distant. The discomfort
with the existence of such people is the impetus for the three groupings: pioneers, wait-andsees, and ‘difficult group. It is also the reason for the lack of a mental category called“strategic actors”. Because the staff themselves exist as inductees in the chain ofinteressement populated by their managers and bosses, donors, development academics, anddevelopment discourse itself, their distance from strategic actors permeates to other types ofactors.

4.0

FIELDWORK: RECRUITMENT CONSTRAINTS AND REALITIES

4.1

CEDAC by the Numbers

In the study area of Takeo province, which is a flagship area for their agricultural andrural development initiatives, the view of many donors, development agencies and NGOs isthat CEDAC programmes have improved the agricultural production of many farmers in
addition to empowering them to engage more thoughtfully with producer and credit
markets.10 In addition, farmers have internalised a set of important ecological concepts andmany active members have significantly reduced or eliminated their use of chemicalfertilizers and pesticides. Furthermore, this has been accomplished without risky or
unnecessary investments into fossil fuel-run farming equipment or external seed, and has
enabled farmers to have more control over cultural change in their communities.
Empowerment programming, primarily utilising group formation strategies, has activatednetworks that have led to enhanced farmer-to-farmer extension, co-operative sales andpurchasing groups, certified organic rice sales, improved local governance and increasedsocial capital. With the initiation of CEDAC’s business plan in 2007, participant farmers
10

Although the list of CEDAC’s “fan club” is numerous, a fairly complete collection of outside views, reports
and assessments can be found at website of the Cornell International Institute for Food, Agriculture, andDevelopment (CIIFAD). Web: http://ciifad.cornell.edu/sri/countries/cambodia/index.html#reports

9now also engage in far more entrepreneurial activities, such as shared investment in village
shops, organic chicken sales, natural palm sugar production, eco-tourism and all-organic
catering. CEDAC’s activities are generally looked upon favourably by government, and, inparticular, SRI has received support from the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries(MAFF) and SRI’s place in policy has been enshrined in the SRI Secretariat, a governmental
working group. Many development agencies and northern donors see CEDAC as theirdarling organisation; indeed, one prominent manager at the Japan International Cooperation
Association (JICA) has called CEDAC “our hope”.11 These achievements and thisrecognition are indeed substantial in the realm of rural development, where development
programming in Cambodia has produced very little widespread success.
However, in many cases of run-away success, those who are left behind tend to standlittle chance of catching up with the pioneers or, more simply, they tend to be forgotten far
behind. During fieldwork, I randomly sampled farmer families from CEDAC target villages
and compare the unbiased village-wide results with CEDAC’s own statistics kept only for
CEDAC member farmers. By and large, I find that the absolute gains reported by CEDAC
are mostly true: CEDAC members’ livelihoods improved over project periods. However, I
also find that some of the gains are statistically insignificant and, when comparing to overall
village results, find that many non-CEDAC farmer families fared just as well or better.
My primary sources for this assessment are impact evaluation reports, Englishlanguage brochures to celebrate CEDAC’s 10th anniversary, and CEDAC’s selfrepresentation at press conferences. For comparative quantitative data, I primarily use two of
the most recent impact assessments produced by the now-defunct Research and Development
Department at CEDAC: one focusing on country-level impacts (Suon, 2007a), and the otherfocusing on the area in which I conducted fieldwork (Suon, 2007b). As an alternative angle,
I also analysed individual Khmer-language staff reports from Zone II, although thesegenerally do not impact CEDAC’s official external and internal representation. Now, let’slook at a few highlights.
4.1.1

Overall Impact.

According to the CEDAC president’s statement at a press conference 18 March 2008,
82,000 families, or 4.5% of rice farming families, which engage 2% of rice land in
Cambodia, are employing SRI techniques. Overall, the latest impact evaluation from 2007
reports that average agricultural incomes of participants have increased from 1.7 million Riel(~$425) to 2.2 million Riel (~$550) during the period 2004-2007 (Suon, 2007a). Within thesefigures, several quantitative and qualitative issues emerge concerning the absolute andrelative nature of the numbers, their significance overall, and the context they obscure.
Firstly, the increased agricultural income (30%) is not calculated using Purchasing Power
Parity and came at a time when inflation was hovering between 5-11% (nominal) per annum
and spiked to nearly 20% in the early months of 2008.12 Secondly, attributing all income
increases to project intervention during that time period ignores many exogenous factors, theleast of which is the fact that the Cambodian economy grew rapidly (5-13% real GDP
growth) in the evaluation years. Whilst poor subsistence farmers are somewhat insulated
from the effects of inflation and are not component to the tourism and garment sector-driven
GDP growth, the rural economy has not been stagnant and it relies increasingly on consumer
goods. CEDAC is not unaware of these statistical problems and also includes a subjective
assessment by respondents about their overall living standard (but not about the project’s
impact’s per se): 15.6% reported no increase in living standards, 37.2% reported a slightincrease, 39.5% reported a medium increase, and 1.7% reported a high increase (Suon,
2007a). This follows my own results very closely, which is to say, it follows the trends of the11
12

Anonymous, 23 March 2008, personal communication
See official figures at the National Institute of Statistics (Cambodia): http://www.nis.gov.kh/

10villagers in general because I sampled from participants and non-participants alike. In otherwords, many of the improvements observed in CEDAC’s impact evaluations could apply tofarmer families in areas without any CEDAC intervention. This is not a surprising result, as
one would expect even rural villages to improve their livelihoods in the context of a rapidly
growing economy. This conclusion is not to say that CEDAC programmes are not improving
livelihoods. Indeed the reduction in chemical fertilizer usage, increases in social capital,
microcredit availability, and entrepreneurial training are positive externalities, but this doessuggest that ecological agriculture techniques are not being applied on a wide enough scale tobe significant.
4.1.2

Impact in Ecological Agriculture.

Table 1. Rice land and yield from various reports, 2007
Rice production in the sample (This study)
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Total Rice Land (ha/hh)
Total SRI rice fields (ha/hh)
Total SRI rice fields as a proportion of total
Total good SRI rice fields (ha/hh)
Total partial SRI rice fields (ha/hh)
Overall rice yield (t/ha)
Rice yield excluding SRI (t/ha)Overall rice yield (t/ha) for SRI farmers
Rice yield excluding SRI (t/ha) for SRI farmers
SRI yield, good SRI fields (t/ha)
SRI yield, partial SRI fields (t/ha)

0.35
0.14
0.40
0.12
0.19
2.10
1.89
2.39
2.01
2.57
2.43

0.46
0.28
0.61
0.30
0.27
2.32
1.94
2.68
1.80
2.92
2.87

0.59
0.19
0.32
0.22
N/A
2.10
1.92
2.33
1.79
2.57
N/A

0.64
0.45
0.70
0.43
0.56
2.37
1.98
2.54
1.69
5.03
2.65

Overall
0.51
0.26
0.51
0.24
0.36
2.22
1.93
2.49
1.83
3.07
2.65

Rice production in the sample (Samraung Report, CEDAC)
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Overall
Total Rice Land (ha/hh)
Total SRI rice fields (ha/hh)
Total SRI rice fields as a proportion of total
Total good SRI rice fields (ha/hh)
Total partial SRI rice fields (ha/hh)
Overall rice yield (t/ha)
Rice yield excluding SRI (t/ha)
SRI yield, good SRI fields (t/ha)
SRI yield, partial SRI fields (t/ha)

0.48
0.32
0.67
0.17
0.31
2.48
1.94
3.61
2.74

0.76
0.54
0.71
0.27
0.46
2.26
1.50
2.91
2.56

0.78
0.48
0.62
0.25
0.38
2.84
2.40
3.75
3.20

1.07
0.91
0.85
0.34
0.79
2.34
1.63
3.42
2.33

0.77
0.57
0.74
0.27
0.50
2.48
1.88
3.41
2.74

Rice production in the sample (Country Report, CEDAC)
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Overall
Total Rice Land (ha/hh)
Total SRI rice fields (ha/hh)
Total SRI rice fields as a proportion of total
Total good SRI rice fields (ha/hh)
Total partial SRI rice fields (ha/hh)
Overall rice yield (t/ha)
Rice yield excluding SRI (t/ha)
SRI yield, good SRI fields (t/ha)
SRI yield, partial SRI fields (t/ha)

0.83
0.43
0.52
0.21
0.45
1.78
1.45
3.10
2.10

1.21
0.64
0.53
0.28
0.62
1.84
1.41
3.10
2.20

1.38
0.62
0.45
0.26
0.61
1.85
1.41
3.30
2.40

1.89
0.91
0.48
0.34
0.96
1.86
1.51
3.20
2.20

1.33
0.66
0.50
0.28
0.67
1.83
1.44
3.20
2.20

11

SRI farmers allocate on average 51% of their fields to SRI (CEDAC reports indicate
57-66%). To compound this, less than half of the overall field allocation for SRI receives‘good’ SRI treatment,13 which diminishes the yield-raising potential. All of the studies I
reviewed, including my own, find comparable per hectare yield increases from SRI ranging
from 49-122%, but this is contrasted by an increase of only 15-36% in overall yield, with thelowest projections emerging from my figures (see Table 1).
My suggestions here are based on descriptive statistics but they are also borne out by
significance tests and econometric analysis. Firstly, a paired t-test indicates that SRI yields
are significantly higher non-SRI yields, on a per-hectare basis. However, two OLS models
below indicate that SRI application is not found to be a significant factor in explaining
overall yield (see Table 2), as many farmers do not cultivate enough of their fields using SRI
practices. Furthermore, the OLS models displayed in Table 3 show that SRI cultivation is
not significantly associated with wealth. In other words, SRI cultivation does not raise
incomes.
Table 2. Regression output for two models explaining overall yieldcultivationsoil typeorganic mattergood SRI
partial SRI
any SRI
_cons
N

(1)
overall yield
0.174+-0.139
0.063
0.216
0.343
2.284
70

*

(1.75)(-1.23)(0.39)(1.06)(1.34)(9.03)(2)overall yield
0.180+-0.1260.064
0.254
2.261*
70(1.82)(-1.15)(0.40)(1.34)(9.12)

t statistics in parentheses+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05

Table 3. Regression output for two models explaining wealthavg. yieldsoil typeliterate
high-paying job
low-paying job
organic matter
residents/hh
good SRI
partial SRI
any SRI
_cons
N

(1)
wealth
0.404*
0.228
0.581+
0.225-0.3390.502*
0.095-0.3250.049-2.414*70(2.21)(1.37)(1.90)(0.99)(-1.47)(2.19)(1.31)(-1.21)(0.15)(-3.45)(2)
wealth
0.407*
0.275+
0.522+
0.244-0.3150.501*
0.071-0.191-2.353*70(2.22)(1.72)(1.73)(1.08)(-1.37)(2.19)(1.03)(-0.81)(-3.37)t statistics in parentheses+
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05

13

The question of what should be considered ‘good’ or ‘partial’ SRI is sharply debated. For statistical analyses,
I avoid this problem by employing factor analysis but for the sake of comparison with CEDAC figures, I
developed the following definition, suitable for this sample: a farmer is considered to apply partial (as opposed
to good) SRI if he or she fails any two of the following conditions: (1) transplanting the same day as pulling, (2)ageing seedlings less than 23 days and (3) spacing hills at least 20cm or more from one another.

12

My overall conclusion is that whilst incremental improvement of SRI is positively
associated with (and likely causes) increased yield, its effect on livelihoods is statisticallyinsignificant due to a low commitment to SRI, as exhibited by poor technique and limited
land area devoted to SRI cultivation. My own fieldwork, and other adoption studies in
Cambodia (Rajpal, 2008), indicate that many of the reasons for the lack of commitment by
current SRI farmers, including social and structural constraints, can result in low adoption
rate, high disadoption rate, and difficulty for extension staff in recruiting and incentivising
CEDAC’s programming.
4.2

Adoption Challenges

This following analysis is based on the same premise as above: that, although theextension system and teaching pedagogy employed by CEDAC has been very effective
relative to many other rural agricultural development projects in Cambodia, there are open
questions as to whether these efforts are “effective enough” (to ultimately reach a large
enough and vulnerable enough cross-section of the population) and whether CEDAC’s
extension is improving in efficacy over time.
First of all, it is interesting to note that in spite of SRI’s pivotal role in recruitment
lasting until this day, the technical aspects of SRI have received dwindling focus over theyears and now action research concerning how to best tailor and adapt SRI for Cambodia andCambodians has diminished considerably. As I have already addressed above in regards tore-examining “strategic actors”, this is a glaring oversight as there is yet considerable
potential for additional adoption and improvement of SRI practices, and thus more
prospective recruits for the broader CEDAC system. Indeed, because the focus on adapting
SRI to farmers has diminished, a consistent sub-section of farmers who face intractablestructural and social constraints continue to fail to take up SRI and thus fail to become part of
CEDAC’s many other programmes.
The main structural constraints, very briefly mentioned due to space limitations, are:
1. Water management: history often decides who will have good water resources and who
will not, and furthermore, water management affects both the ability to implement eventhe basic SRI steps and also the potential for optimising growth. The challenges faced bycanal digging and community-wide infrastructure are considerable and the erratic rainfall
patterns brought about by climate change have complicated even historical systems.
Without water management, it is hard to plan for the extra labour in advance and the shortwindow for nurserying makes the inability to plan a worrisome object for farmers
considering SRI. Furthermore, the ideal within SRI of low water levels contradicts many
farmers survival strategy of ponding water to withstand dry shocks.
2. Straw production: possibly the most passionately debated aspect of SRI production
amongst my informants and responsible for most disadoption in addition to being a major
factor in poor uptake. CEDAC staff will fiercely assert that, in theory, there is no
problem with straw production from SRI. Because there are ways of increasing straw
output within the framework of SRI, this issue is often discounted. However, doing so
disregards the experiences of less skilled SRI farmers, usually those in their first year(s),who have not yet found a way to balance straw output. Indeed, amongst my informants, I
found very few farmers who have reached the theoretical straw output claimed by
CEDAC. If straw was not such an important element in the lowland Khmer farming andlivestock system, this would not be such a critical concern. Indeed, I found thatmaintaining straw stockpiles as cattle fodder is as much of a preoccupation as keeping
rice in the bowls of the family. However, once a competency in SRI is achieved, tilleringand heightened stalks, as well as increased yield, should compensate. More of a concern
13

for me, however, was the unwillingness of many CEDAC staff to admit that this was areal, as opposed to imagined, problem for many farmers.
3. Lack of adequate resources for organic matter: similar to straw production, this is amatter that can be addressed in the long-term given proper preparation, but remains a
potent barrier in the initial adoption and subsequent scaling-up of SRI cultivation. In fact,
CEDAC has a conflicting relationship with the issue of organic vs. inorganic fertilizer.
CEDAC’s commitment to ecological agriculture implies that it does not support the useof inorganic fertilizers, as exhibited by the following quote:I never know if I should say that it’s okay to use fertilizer or not. I want thefarmers to start learning about the environmental problems but I also want tomake sure they get a good yield. If they start SRI on a field with really poor soil,
the result might be disappointing if they don’t use a little fertilizer, but it is against
my training to recommend it. (field staff, Zone II)
On the other hand, CEDAC’s commitment to diffusing SRI, which requires
improvements to soil fertility, cannot often be accomplished with the resources initiallyavailable on most of its target families’ farms. There is an historical precedent here that I
have already mentioned: emerging from the forced organic production of the Pol Pot era,
Cambodian farmers embraced inorganic fertilizers with a vengeance. Over the past 20-25
years, fundamental soil fertility, which is based on replenishment of organic material,
microbial activity and sustainable cultivation, has decreased across the board in
Cambodia (Kingdom of Cambodia, 2000). The contradiction is that rebuilding soil
fertility is a long-term process, whilst CEDAC expects SRI adoption to be a short-term
process. Because of the confusion about the role of inorganic fertilizers, and the lack oforganic matter available initially on farmers’ land, the relationship between SRI and
fertilizers must be clearly communicated and strategies for the long-term improvement ofsoil fertility must be explicated.
The main social constraints to SRI adoption, summarised here briefly, are as follows:
1. Staff become more out of touch over time. Given limited resources for extension,
CEDAC has adopted a strategy predicated on training a cadre of key farmers in eachvillage to diffuse agricultural techniques. Under these conditions, it is natural to selectthe most enthusiastic and willing trainees, as these figures are more likely to be effective
extension agents. In doing so, however, CEDAC not only escapes directly training themore hesitant farmers, but also misses the opportunity to learn about the constraints
facing those farmers. Specifically, it becomes problematic if it results in field staff
systematically escaping healthy confrontation with challenges to their model. By thislogic, because so many families in Takeo, and indeed Cambodia, have succeeded
nominally in applying SRI, it appears less and less rational for others not to apply.
Common amongst field staff is the bipolar perception that farmers are either open or
closed, and by extension, worthy or unworthy of attention. By privileging the initiallyinterested farmers, not only have the elderly, young and the ‘strategic agents’ often been
marginalised from early efforts to disseminate SRI, but there are few plans to learn fromthe dilemmas facing these groups and, thus, there is limited potential for their inclusion in
the future.
2. Staff often ignore natural social cleavages in target villages. CEDAC works on thebasis of communal and public participation—but the pioneers who join in the beginningmight create social challenges for others to join, especially if there are big income
differences. Firstly, although interest groups and Farmers Associations are open formembership, joining later comes at a slight risk of alienation. Secondly, there is no14

particular reason why anyone would necessarily enjoy the social experience of learningand doing business with one’s neighbours. Indeed, there are many divisions and social
boundaries that discourage certain groups or families from attending open meetings.
Thirdly, many farmers are embarrassed to attend training sessions because doing so
implies that their current skills are inadequate.
3. There are diverse opportunity costs to SRI adoption. Inherited from mainstream
institutional discourse on rural development, CEDAC historically had a very static andsedentary view of development, although this is being reviewed. The locale is of primary
importance, and “enabling people to stay at home” is an overriding concern (Bakewell,2007). In fact, preventing migration and preserving beneficiaries as “small farming
households” is an integral part of their mission (CEDAC, 2007). In reality, migration,
off-farm work, cottage industries and other social and economic aspirations areconspicuous elements of rural life. Indeed, 84% of sampled farmer families are engaged
in work outside of the farm, 54% of families have at least two main occupations, and 46%
of families have one member working a “high-paying” job.14 Some of these occupations
conflict or compete with SRI in various ways. I have already outlined how a large herd ofcattle conflicts with SRI. In addition, alcohol and palm sugar production require large
amounts of kindling and wood fuel that could otherwise be used for compost. The more
intensive weeding, stricter water management and the degree of monitoring required canalso make it difficult for the entire family to slip away to weddings and celebrations.
Many other jobs can conflict as well if they tie up family labour, which is important(although not necessary) for SRI, in the cultivation season(s).
4.3Summary: How CEDAC arrived at its present state

In the preceding section, I outlined a host of structural and social constraints in orderto show how the extension practice and institutional culture of CEDAC has evolved in waysthat have incrementally weakened SRI as an effective entry point to CEDAC’s programming.
Additionally, the manner in which CEDAC represents the outcomes of its work in ‘impact
assessments’ does not allow for critical self-reflection. Through statistical analysis and areview of data presentation, I show that the absolute improvements overlook a relational(statistical) insignificance and mask over exogenous factors affecting rural Cambodia as awhole. I also show that increasingly distant involvement by staff in organisations has
resulted in a shift in accountability that increasingly favours a passive, demand-pull strategy
for drawing in previously uninitiated farmers, rather than the grassroots approach favoured
since the inception of rural development programming. This increasing distance from SRI, as
I have argued above, is responsible for decreased motivation to deal with hesitant farmers anda declining capacity to conduct action research in order to make SRI a more inclusive entrypoint. This conclusion is somewhat paradoxical, because whilst the technical aspects of SRI
extension are receiving less and less focus at CEDAC, SRI continues to remain theblockbuster entry point for most other programmatic activities. Limiting the effectiveness of
SRI extension limits the pool of potential participants—and clients—for CEDAC and, in thelong-term, lowers the chance that CEDAC will become accountable to more vulnerable
groups. Discussing why this is the case is the focus of the following section.
4.4

CEDAC’s Performance Orientation

Although in the works for a number of years, following the celebration of its 10th
anniversary, CEDAC officially kicked off a new and ambitious campaign to partially reform
its activities to conform to business and performance guidelines. Although nominally split
14

What constitutes a low, medium or high-paying job is specified according to previous research. High-paying,
however, is a relative term that exists only within the context of rural agriculturally-based communities.

15

into three “Core Programs”, only one of which is exclusively focussed on enterprise, abusiness-like performance orientation has permeated into all areas of programming (CEDAC,
February 2008). Generally, this performance orientation has adopted recruitment, farmergroup development and profitable production, as codified in reports, as its underlying goals.
Report Writing. Filling out reports to document “business transactions”, however,
may threaten to objectify the participants as “clients” rather than farmers with complex socialand productive lives. Whilst staff garner most of their personal feedback subjectively fromday-to-day encounters, report-writing can slowly alter the nature of this experience. Staff’subjective views become incrementally coloured by their exposure to impact assessment
methodology and formulaic report-writing (Desai, 2006: 178). Through my archival researchin Zone II, I also discovered that many field staff have begun decoding the underlying
demands of the CEDAC report monitoring system. In their field reports, they recycle thesame successful key words and ideas to manipulate the representation of their work in thefield (Desai, 2006: 177). Some of this redundancy is also caused by the burden of reportwriting, which forces field staff to adopt economising strategies for report-writing.
Enterprise Scale-Up. Generally, the performance orientation has meant that
“enterprise” becomes the highest tier of organisational activity and thus depends on thestability of the organisational structures “below” it. After evolving through Farmer
Community Schools, Farmers Associations and Commune Clusters, business and enterpriseare seen as the next steps. Farmers must be “groomed” for the CEDAC system in order tomake them ideal partners within the framework of the national level business plan. To
become partners, farmers and farmer groups must travel the track laid by CEDAC, which
involves following its prescribed organisational evolution. As a result, Farmers Associations,which were originally conceived of as forums for community empowerment (Mishra et al.,2006) also serve as channels leading towards engagement in specific CEDAC-coordinatedactivities further down the line (Wright, 1994).
A few years ago, my son-in-law said he just wanted to try SRI. The next year, hejoined the Farmers Association. The next year he was the treasurer and then hejoined the Commune Cluster committee. Next year he wants to do business with
CEDAC. I think many people in this village followed this path. I guess I missed out.
(male, age 53, Tramkok district)I argue that FAs, whilst theoretically open forums, are controlled by a hegemonic relationshipwith CEDAC. The programme director in Zone II commented to me that FAs are
empowerment-oriented because CEDAC only sets up the structures for farmer-to-farmer
extension and then leaves the fate of the FA in the hands of its members. Indeed, members
do share agricultural knowledge, learn how to work together to develop statutes, elect leadersand discuss important issues facing their village. Occasionally, the FA succeeds in providing
a forum for empowering village residents. More commonly, however, the formal activities
and structures of the FA are generally those prescribed by CEDAC field staff. For instance,
all Farmers Associations adopt more-or-less the same governing structure (often the same
founding documents) and most FAs feature the same interest groups and microcredit
activities. Moreover, FAs often lack non-traditional features and creative initiatives, likewedding assistance programmes, equipment rental, voluntary guidelines for cattle grazing
and village newspapers. FA members suggested all of these activities to me but felt that the
restrictive atmosphere made it uncomfortable for them to introduce such new activities to the
FA. Farmers Associations can thus be seen as training grounds, in which “participatory”
techniques are used to produce potential rural partners for CEDAC. As a result of the strict
track for group formation and the growing demands for business associations with rural

16

people, there is little room for altering the foundational organisational structures influencing
accountability of CEDAC to more vulnerable groups.

5.0

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Evidence presented here concerning SRI adoption, group formation andorganisational evolution are intended to reveal the development apparatus of CEDAC as anorganisation that sees its work as constitutive of sustainable development, such thattranslation, or “network building” becomes its primary occupation. Indeed, the concept ofsustainability is self-referenced; it is constantly redefined, usually in an additive manner, inorder to portray organisational evolution simply as strategic re-targeting of resources in order
to better achieve sustainable development (Adams, 1995: 87). Originally defined as
ecological and productive improvement in rice-based agriculture in Cambodia, sustainable
development has been refashioned as the building of formal, often market-based networks ofproducers coordinated by CEDAC. Improving rural livelihoods has thus become a byproduct of system expansion rather than an activity unto itself. The shift in accountability
arising from the declining importance of agricultural extension is symptomatic of anorganisation seeing the betterment of livelihoods as constitutive of its own performance,
rather than a moral goal. This is not to say that CEDAC wishes to have less participation inits programming, but to acknowledge that, in focusing on its performance, the outreachsystem has less incentive to reach each marginal recruit, whose cost of recruitment is
progressively elevated by structural and social constraints.
Whilst the cost of recruitment and, by extension, the cost of increased accountability,
can be reduced by addressing the social and structural constraints I have outlined, I show thatthe growing rigidity of the organisational apparatus as it evolves makes CEDAC increasingly
unable to accommodate the adaptation necessary to do so. The operating parameters of
CEDAC in the early years, which included action research and sensitivity to rural constraints,
are increasingly crowded out or viewed as an uneconomical regression to “old” functionality
in light of the new performance orientation. Impact assessments and report-writing culture
further serve to obscure the past and prevent critical and reflexive analysis about where
CEDAC is going by focussing on current work. The new imperative emerging from theperformance orientation is to ensure that extension (i.e., recruitment) is “effective enough” toprovisionally maintain donor-funding and to supply the CEDAC actor-world with sufficientand readily-drafted new recruits. It is clear from CEDAC’s relative success with SRI
extension and group formation that numerically it has a strong positive influence, but thesefigures obscure important exogenous factors and many relative untruths about its influence inrural communities. It is my conclusion then, that CEDAC is a recent convert to the growing
community of developmentalist-oriented organisations that have converged upon thereformist ‘market sustainability’ paradigm of sustainable development (Adams, 1995).
Whilst critiquing this paradigm is not within the scope of this work, in Prospects I shallconclude with a brief discussion of the prospects for this paradigm to challenge traditional
industrialist modes of agricultural development or fall in line with it.
I focus on SRI in this thesis because, in Takeo, it has become a gatekeeper throughwhich all other activities must flow and is thus a critical element of accountability. For most
farmers, learning SRI is the first step in becoming a full-fledged member of the CEDAC
system, which can variously include ecological livestock raising, village microcredit, social
interest groups, producers groups, farmer-to-farmer extension, and business-related activities.
The inability or unwillingness to take up SRI generally pre-empts a farmer from taking partin all of these other activities, thus making SRI an ‘obligatory point of passage’ (Callon,
1986a: 26-27). I gave considerable attention to the structural and social constraints whichmediate whether or not a farmer family is able to pass the SRI-gatekeeper because these17constraints effectively predict whether or not a farmer will (be able to) join the wider
CEDAC system.15 I concluded that, given CEDAC’s historical ability to solve constraints, asseen by its historical record of effective action research in agriculture, CEDAC has allowed
these adoption constraints to persist because they help to passively select suitable partners. In
other words, the constraints are a natural filter or screen, determining which farmers areworth working with (i.e., easily recruited and willing to take part the broader CEDAC
system) and which farmers are unworthy (i.e., costly to include and potentially unenthusiastic
about further engagement in organisational activities). This “unworthy” group is definedwithin CEDAC’s informal typology as the “difficult group”,16 which are farmers who arerather neutrally considered by CEDAC as ‘beyond their ability’ to include. The “worthy”
group, conversely, is seen approvingly as the “pioneers”. A third group, the “wait-and-sees”,
includes farmers who have simply not yet joined the pioneers or the difficult group. My
analysis of the social and structural constraints shows that, contrary to this typology, there isa large group of “strategic agents” which includes many wait-and-sees and “difficult” groupmembers, who have engaged with SRI and found it wanting, or face considerable realconstraints. The broader question for accountability is: should these strategic agents be left
out of the larger CEDAC system as well as SRI cultivation?
I also conclude the organisational imperatives of CEDAC require staff to beconstantly engaged in activities that distance them from strategic agents, and thus limit theirability to see and act upon challenges to accountability. The imperative to upgrade theirtarget villages to higher and higher levels of organisational activity draws them away fromthe hesitant and constrained villagers. In addition, there are increasing demands on staff torepresent their work/progress in a synthetic ‘impact assessment’ format, which creates acompeting, and increasingly dominant, lens through which to “see” farmers. In light of thebusiness plan in particular, staff are so busy with the requirements of CEDAC, that theirability to reflect on the real beneficiaries, farmer families, decreases. Adaptive rural
programming and action research, once prominent features of CEDAC’s activities forbroadening the access of agricultural innovations such as SRI to more people, are subtly
supplanted by the operational necessities of the business plan.
The incremental convergence upon a market sustainability and performance-oriented
model for sustainable development presents many risks and opportunities for an organisationsuch as CEDAC. CEDAC has already shown remarkable capability to succeed within the
new performance-oriented framework, as shown by the rising sales of organic products,
increasingly entrepreneurial cadre of farmer families and governmental support for marketing
initiatives. But these successes have also arrived with significant tradeoffs in its
accountability and its declining ability to sensitively document the experiences of its current
participants and solve the constraints of its potential participants. This highlights the limited
degree to which rural livelihoods and poverty reduction can accountably be addressed withmarket-sustainability based development activities.

15

To pre-empt any direct criticism here, I should point out that there are always exceptions—non-SRI farmers
who join Farmers Associations and also SRI-farmers who do not join Farmers Associations. In generally,
however, the presence of these individuals does not upset my overall conclusion.
16(Yi, 21 September 2007)18

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