UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON

INTERNATIONALRELIGIOUS

FREEDOM
2019

A N N U A L
R E P O R TPhoto Credits
Above: A demonstrator wearing a mask painted with the colours of the flag of East Turkestan
and a hand bearing the colours of the Chinese flag attends a protest of supporters of themostly Muslim Uighur minority and Turkish nationalists to denounce China’s treatment of
ethnic Uighur Muslims during a deadly riot in July 2009 in Urumqi, in front of the Chinese
consulate in Istanbul, on July 5, 2018. - Nearly 200 people died during a series of violent riotsthat broke out on July 5, 2009 over several days in Urumqi, the capital city of the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region, in northwestern China, between Uyghurs and Han people.
(Photo by OZAN KOSE / AFP) (OZAN KOSE/AFP/Getty Images)
Left: Ethnic Uighurs take part in a protest march asking for the European Union to call upon
China to respect human rights in the Chinese Xinjiang region and asking for the closure of‘re-education center[s]’ where some Uighurs are detained, during a demonstration aroundthe EU institutions in Brussels on April 27, 2018. (Photo by Emmanuel DUNAND / AFP)
(EMMANUEL DUNAND/AFP/Getty Images)
Bottom Left: People from the Uighur community living in Turkey carry flags of what ethnic
Uighurs call ‘East Turkestan’, during a protest in Istanbul, Tuesday, Nov. 6, 2018, against
what they allege is oppression by the Chinese government to Muslim Uighurs in far-western
Xinjiang province. (AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis)
Below: A gate of what is officially known as a vocational skills education centre is photographed in Dabancheng, in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, China September 4, 2018.
This centre, situated between regional capital Urumqi and tourist spot Turpan, is among thelargest known ones, and was still undergoing extensive construction and expansion at thetime the photo was taken. Police in Dabancheng detained two Reuters journalists for morethan four hours after the photos were taken. Picture taken September 4, 2018. To match
Special Report MUSLIMS-CAMPS/CHINA REUTERS/Thomas Peter

ANNUAL REPORTOF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOMCOMMISSIONERS
Tenzin Dorjee
Chair
Kristina Arriaga
Gayle Manchin
Vice Chairs
Gary L. Bauer
Anurima Bhargava
Andy Khawaja
Nadine Maenza
Johnnie Moore
Tony Perkins
Ambassador Samuel D. Brownback,ex officio, non-voting member (as of February 1, 2018)
Erin D. Singshinsuk
Executive Director

A P R I L 2 019

PROFESSIONAL STAFF
Dwight Bashir, Director of Research and Policy
Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Director of International Law and Policy
Thomas Kraemer, Director of Operations and Finance
Tina L. Mufford, Deputy Director of Research and Policy

Lindsey Eilon, Senior Congressional Relations Specialist
Jamie Staley, Senior Congressional Relations Specialist

Ferdaouis Bagga, Policy Analyst
Keely Bakken, Researcher
Patrick Greenwalt, Researcher
Alex Iverson, Researcher
Kirsten Lavery, International Legal Specialist
Jason Morton, Policy Analyst
Dominic Nardi, Policy Analyst
Scott Weiner, Policy Analyst
Kurt Werthmuller, Policy Analyst
Zachary Udin, Research AssistantJavier Peña, Communications Specialist
Zaronda Watson, Travel and Administrative Specialist
Henry Young, Management and Program Analyst

U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714
Washington, DC 20401
202–523–3240, 202–523–5020 (fax)
www.uscirf.gov

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1
2019 Annual Report Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
Implementation of the International Religious Freedom Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
Recommendations to the Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
Recommendations to Congress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
Legal Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
Developments in 2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

Country Reports: Tier 1 Countries (Recommended for CPC Designations)Burma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
Central African Republic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
Eritrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
North Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
Pakistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80
Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  90
Sudan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  98
Syria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  104Tajikistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  110Turkmenistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  116Uzbekistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  124Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  132

Country Reports: Tier 2 Countries
Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  140Azerbaijan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  146Bahrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  152Cuba. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

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Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  166India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  174Indonesia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  182Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  188Kazakhstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  196Laos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  204Malaysia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  210Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  216

Appendix 1: Commissioner Biographies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  223Appendix 2: Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  225

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INTRODUCTION
The cover of USCIRF’s 2019 Annual Report tells thestory of abuses against Uighur Muslims in China, a tragedy that Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo in March
2019 called “abhorrent.” Sadly, the atrocities predate
both IRFA and USCIRF.
Twenty years ago—in June 1999—USCIRF selected
three countries as the primary focus of the Commission’s first-ever Annual Report, released in 2000:
Russia, Sudan, and China. In that first report, USCIRF
found that Uighur Muslims: “faced heightened repression of their religious and other human rights;” were
subject to arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial
executions; and were “imprisoned for their religious
belief, association or practice.”

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n October 27, 2018, the International Religious
Freedom Act (IRFA), which created the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), reached its 20th anniversary. In the two
decades since, a greater and more diverse number ofactors across the globe are working to protect the fundamental freedom of thought, conscience, and religion asprescribed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. In fact, the U.S. Department of State’s 2018 Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom became a fulcrum
for change in these efforts—more foreign governments
than ever before are taking action to uphold these rights
in their own countries and around the world.
But the enduring story of the last 20 years is not about
IRFA or USCIRF. Rather, it is the story of people who wish
to live their lives as their conscience leads, who dreamof raising their children so that they can make their own
choice about what to believe or not believe freely andopenly. Yet for some, the last 20 years have been a chronicle of a different kind, spanning a generation of cruel andunrelenting treatment because of their beliefs.
One such saga is currently unfolding in China where
the government has been particularly pernicious toward
religion and religious believers during the last 20 years—
and increasingly so in recent years, including in 2018.
As a Tibetan, you may be forced to study Buddhism
in a language that is not Tibetan, your native tongue, or
detained for possessing a photo of your spiritual leader,
the Dalai Lama. As a Christian, your Bible may havebeen rewritten by the Chinese government, your church
shuttered or demolished, and your pastor imprisoned. As
a Falun Gong practitioner, you may end up at a detention
center where you are attacked with electric batons andforced to undergo medical and psychological experimentation. As a human rights defender who works to protect
people targeted for their faith, you may be arrested, orworse, disappeared. And as a Muslim—particularly an
ethnic Uighur Muslim—you may be forcibly sent to a concentration camp where you are held against your will andsubjected to unspeakable acts of abuse and alleged torture,
all while authorities pressure you to abandon your faith.

io
s
nal
Religiou

Ten years later, USCIRF’s 2010 Annual Report—
which covered events in 2009 and early 2010—featured
on its cover a photograph of a Uighur Muslim woman
facing down armed Chinese security forces, with a

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defiant fist raised in protest to Chinese government
Chinese government to immediately and unconditionally
repression. She was responding to authorities’ disset Uighur and other Muslims free and also release prisproportionate response to peaceful demonstrations
oners of conscience like Uighur Muslims Gulmira Iminin 2009 in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Uighur
and Ilham Tohti, Tibetan Buddhists like the Panchen
Autonomous Region where at least 10 million Uighur
Lama and Tashi Wangchuk, Christians like Pastor Wang
Muslims reside. The ensuing violence left an estimatedYi and Hu Shigen, and human rights defenders like Gao
200 Uighur Muslims dead and more than 1,600 injured.
Zhisheng. Also they must urge the Chinese government
Moreover, Chinese authorities carried out enforced
to cease detaining, arresting, and imprisoning believers
disappearances of Uighur men and teenage boys andand human rights defenders for their peaceful activities
sentenced others to death.
and stop interfering in the practice, instruction, andNearly 20 years later, Uighur Muslims are conobservance of their beliefs.
stantly surveilled, their phones confiscated andUnfortunately, China is only one of several counscanned, their skin pricked for blood samples to collecttries where freedom of religion or belief remained intheir DNA, their children prohibited from attending
peril throughout 2018, as documented in USCIRF’s
mosque. Even worse, the Chinese government has
2019 Annual Report. Although some foreign governripped entire families apart, detaining between 800,000
ments have joined the fight to promote freedom ofand two million adults in concentration camps and relreligion or belief, others brazenly suppress it. Some—egating some of their children to orphanages. Families
like Sudan, Vietnam, and Tajikistan—do so under thecannot contact one another due to fear of government
guise of protecting “public order” or “national secumonitoring; thus, countless Uighur Muslims have nority,” frequently invoking real or perceived threats ofidea where their loved ones are or if they are even alive.
public discontent or even terrorism to justify not just
Although a handful of foreign governments—
the restriction of rights, but the outright persecution ofincluding the United States, Britain, and Turkey—have
their own people. Some—like Russia, China, Eritrea,
harshly condemned the Chinese government for theseand Turkmenistan—expose their own insecurities by
egregious abuses, China has faced few, if any, consebranding religious and ethnic minorities as “extremquences. Despite years of escalating abuses, the wider
ists,” in part because these governments believe theseinternational community has tragically missed thegroups are under “foreign influence.”
opportunity to prevent what is now happening to Uighur
In several countries where USCIRF found deteand other Muslims in China. Policy and practice now
riorating religious freedom conditions it also foundmust focus on holding the responsible parties accountincreased securitization and politicization of religion:able, ceasing China’s myriad abuses against all faithfor example, in countries like India, it is increasingly
communities, and documenting the evidence of the
difficult to separate religion and politics, a tactic that is
atrocities that have occurred.
sometimes intentional by those who seek to discrimiThe U.S. government—and the international comnate against and restrict the rights of certain religious
munity—must swiftly andcommunities. And theresolutely sanction Chivery governments pernese officials and agencies
petrating or tolerating
The U.S. government—and thethat have perpetrated orthese abuses often decryinternational community—must swiftly
tolerated severe religious“interference in internal
and resolutely sanction Chinese officials
freedom violations,affairs” when they are
and agencies that have perpetrated
including Chen Quanguo,
rightfully admonished foror tolerated severe religious freedom
Communist Party Secretheir deplorable religious
violations, including Chen Quanguo.
tary in the Xinjiang Uighur
freedom and humanAutonomous Region andrights records.
Politburo Member, among
In 2018, both stateothers. The U.S. and other governments must press theand nonstate actors increasingly used religion as a

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tool of exclusion to isolate, marginalize, and punish
innumerable believers and nonbelievers across thethe “other” through discrimination and violence. For
globe continued in 2018 to experience manifold sufferexample, blasphemy and related laws in countries likeing due to their beliefs.
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—and also in countries withOn the one hand, it is the responsibility of govcomparatively lesser challenges such as Indonesia andernments to protect and uphold freedom of religion
Egypt—were typicallyor belief and the related
enforced against indifreedoms of expression,viduals belonging to aassembly, association,. . . despite two decades ofminority faith, following
and press. No nonstate or
tireless work to bring an end toa faith not recognized bystate actor—not the Chireligious-based discrimination, violence,the state, or holding nonese government nor any
and persecution, innumerable believers
faith at all. At times, whenother government—has
and nonbelievers across the globe
a government or nonstate
the authority to comcontinued in 2018 to experience
actor deems actions andmand a person’s soul andmanifold suffering due to their beliefs.
expressions blasphemous
beliefs. On the other, theor insulting to religion, it
international community
is that declaration—andis increasingly responnot the underlying alleged defamation—that incites
sible for allowing the Chinese government and otherhatred and violence. Nationalistic and ideological sengovernments to get away with systematic, ongoing,
timent underpins some of these accusations, and canegregious violations of religious freedom without conmotivate state and nonstate actors to manipulate relisequence or accountability.
gion in a way that is detrimental to other, often minority,
Across the globe, the collective voices of those fightreligious and ethnic groups, such as in Burma and Iran.
ing for freedom of religion or belief must consistently
As USCIRF’s 2019 Annual Report concludes, despite
sound the alarm against state and nonstate actors who
two decades of tireless work to bring an end to reliperpetrate and tolerate such abuses. These violators
gious-based discrimination, violence, and persecution,must be held accountable. The impunity must end now.

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2019 ANNUAL REPORT OVERVIEW

C

reated by the International Religious Freedom
to, the State Department’s Annual Reports on InterAct of 1998 (IRFA), the U.S. Commission on
national Religious Freedom. First, USCIRF’s annual
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) is anreports have a refined focus on fewer than 30 countries,
independent, bipartisan U.S. government advisory body,typically those that experience the most problematic
separate from the U.S. Department of State, that monitors
religious freedom violations. The State Department’s
religious freedom abroad and makes policy recommenreports cover every country in the world except thedations to the president, secretary of state, and Congress.
United States. Second, USCIRF’s annual reports
USCIRF bases these recommendations on its statutory
unflinchingly describe violations of international
mandate and the standards in the Universal Declaration
religious freedom. Whereas the State Department mustof Human Rights and other international documents.
account for overall bilateral relationships in its reportThe 2019 Annual Report documents religious
ing, USCIRF has the independence and objectivity to
freedom violations and progress during calendar
call out violations wherever and whenever they may
year 2018 in 28 countries and makes independent
occur. Third, USCIRF’s annual reports, unlike the State
recommendations for U.S. policy. The key findings,
Department, analyze U.S. policy with respect to interrecommendations, and analysis for each country
national religious freedom and make extensive policy
chapter reflected inrecommendations, boththis report—and eachto the Executive Branchcountry’s Tier status—are
and Congress. Fourth,
USCIRF’sannualreports—andbased on a year’s work by
USCIRF’s annual reports
USCIRF’s mandate more broadly—are
USCIRF, including travel,
are timely: in its 20-year
different
from,andcomplementary
to,meetings, briefings,
history, USCIRF has eachthe State Department’s Annual Reports on
and research, and areyear submitted its Annual
International
Religious
Freedom.
approved by a majority
Report to the White
vote of Commissioners,
House, State Departwith each Commissioner,
ment, and Congress by its
under the statute, having the option to include astatutory May 1 deadline, conveying up-to-date analstatement with his or her own individual views. In 2018
ysis of current country conditions from the precedingand early 2019, Commissioners and/or staff visited 10
calendar year. Finally, in addition to featuring selectcountries to assess conditions: Bahrain (March 2018,
prisoners of conscience in individual country chapters,
March 2019), Bangladesh (January/February 2018),
USCIRF’s annual reports also feature prisoners in the
Egypt (March 2018, January 2019), Indonesia (October
report appendices, putting a human face to the myriad2018), Iraq (March 2018), Kazakhstan (April 2018), Nigereligious freedom violations perpetrated and tolerated
ria (May 2018, November 2018), Saudi Arabia (September by state and nonstate actors.
2018), Sudan (April/May 2018), and Thailand (August
The 2019 report is divided into three sections. The
2018). In the coming year, USCIRF also intends to holdfirst section focuses on the U.S. government’s implehearings, pursuant to its statutory authority under IRFA.
mentation of IRFA and provides recommendations to
USCIRF’s annual reports—and USCIRF’s mandate
bolster U.S. efforts to advance freedom of religion ormore broadly—are different from, and complementary
belief1 abroad.
In this report, USCIRF uses the terms “religious freedom,” “freedom of religion,” and “freedom of religion or belief” interchangeably to referto the broad right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief, including the right to nonbelief, protected under international
human rights law.
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The second section highlights 16 countries USCIRF
concludes meet IRFA’s standard for “countries of particular concern,” or CPCs, for the period covered by thisreport, which USCIRF refers to as Tier 1 countries. IRFA
requires the U.S. government to designate as a CPC any
country whose government engages in or tolerates particularly severe religious freedom violations, meaning
those that are systematic, ongoing, and egregious.

In 2019, USCIRF recommends that the State
Department redesignate the following 10 countries as CPCs: Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North
Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tajikistan,
and Turkmenistan. USCIRF also finds that six othercountries meet the CPC standard and should be
so designated: Central African Republic, Nigeria,
Russia, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

The State Department most recently made CPC
designations in November 2018, naming 10 countries:
Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.
At the same time, the State Department named three
countries—Comoros, Russia, and Uzbekistan—to its
Special Watch List, a category created by the Frank R.
Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2016 (Frank
Wolf Act) for governments that engaged in or tolerated severe violations but were deemed to not meet all
the criteria of the CPC test. In the State Department’s
previous designations, in December 2017, Pakistan had
been on the Special Watch List and Uzbekistan had been
designated as a CPC.
The third section of the Annual Report highlights 12
countries USCIRF categorizes as Tier 2, defined by theCommission as nations in which the violations engaged
in or tolerated by the government during 2018 are serious
and characterized by at least one of the elements of the“systematic, ongoing, and egregious” CPC standard.

USCIRF’s 2019 Annual Report covers a select groupof countries, but during the year, USCIRF monitored
and had concerns about religious freedom conditions
globally, including in countries not included in thisreport. The fact that other countries are not included inthis report does not mean religious freedom issues do
not exist in those countries or that concerns discussed
in previous USCIRF annual reports have improved.
Information on religious freedom conditions in all
foreign countries may be found in the State Department’s annual International Religious Freedom reports.
USCIRF also issues publications throughout the year ona variety of countries and topics, which can be found atwww.uscirf.gov.
As USCIRF’s annual reports have long recognized,
nonstate actors are among the most egregious violatorsof religious freedom. The Frank Wolf Act requires the
U.S. government to identify nonstate actors engaging
in particularly severe violations of religious freedom
and designate them as “entities of particular concern,” or EPCs. The law defines nonstate actor as “anonsovereign entity that exercises significant politicalpower and territorial control; is outside the control of asovereign government; and often employs violence inpursuit of its objectives.”
In 2019, USCIRF recommends five organizations
for designation as EPCs based on their violations during
2018. USCIRF also continues to report, in various
country chapters, on particularly severe violations ofreligious freedom perpetrated by nonstate actors that
do not meet the Frank Wolf Act’s definition because, forexample, they do not exercise significant political power
and territorial control.

In 2019, USCIRF recommends that the State
Department designate the following five organizations as EPCs: the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS), the Taliban in Afghanistan, al-Shabaab
in Somalia, Houthis in Yemen, and Hay’at Tahriral-Sham (HTS) in Syria.

In 2019, USCIRF places the following 12 countries
on Tier 2: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cuba,
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Laos,
Malaysia, and Turkey.

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There were two sets of EPC designations in 2018.
On March 5, 2018, the State Department designatedeight nonstate actors as EPCs for particularly severereligious freedom violations: “al-Nusra Front, al-Qa’ida
in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qa’ida, al-Shabab, BokoHaram, ISIS, ISIS-Khorasan, and the Taliban.” On
November 28, 2018, the State Department designatednine entities as EPCs: the eight designated in Marchand the Houthis. Although USCIRF’s assessment of thestatutory requirement that EPCs “exercise significant
political power and territorial control” differs from theState Department’s, the Commission is similarly concerned by these entities’ particularly severe religious
freedom violations as defined by the December 2016
amendments to IRFA.

U S C I R F 2 0 19

CPC Recommendations(Tier 1):
Burma*
Central African Republic
China*
Eritrea*
Iran*
Nigeria
North Korea*
Pakistan*
Russia**Saudi Arabia*
Sudan*

Tier 2 Countries:

EPC Recommendations:

Afghanistan

The Islamic State of Iraq and

Azerbaijan

Syria (ISIS)*

Bahrain

The Taliban in Afghanistan*Cuba

Al-Shabaab in Somalia*

Egypt

Houthis*India

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)

Indonesia
Iraq
Kazakhstan
Laos
Malaysia
TurkeySyria
Tajikistan*
Turkmenistan*
Uzbekistan**
Vietnam* Designated as CPCs by the State
Department on November 28, 2018

* Designated as EPCs by the State
Department on November 28, 2018** Designated as Special Watch List by
the State Department on November
28, 2018

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8

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACTKEY FINDINGSor EPCs, citing nine nonstate groups for particularly
severe violations. The State Department and U.S. DepartIn 2018, the administration of Donald J. Trump took
ment of the Treasury actively used the Global Magnitsky
action on the commitments to prioritize religious
Human Rights Accountability Act and a related execufreedom it made in 2017. Samuel D. Brownback, whotive order to impose targeted sanctions for corruption oras a U.S. Senator was a sponsor of the International
human rights abuses, but only a few of these sanctions
Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), assumed therelated to religious freedom violations.
position of Ambassador-at-Large for International
During the year, the U.S. Agency for International
Religious Freedom in February and energeticallyDevelopment (USAID) placed a new emphasis on
implemented his mandate. In July, the U.S. Departhumanitarian aid for religious groups targeted forment of State hosted the first-ever Ministerial topersecution or genocide and programs to promote
Advance Religious Freedom, bringing together
religious freedom, tolerance, and pluralism. The State
hundreds of government officials, international orgaDepartment worked to develop an online training
nization representatives, religious leaders, civil society
course on international religious freedom for all foractors, and victims of religious persecution. Key
eign service officers, as required by the Frank R. Wolf
outcomes included a declaration and plan of action,
International Religious Freedom Act of 2016 (Franknew programs to respond to persecution and promote
Wolf Act). U.S. refugee resettlement decreased in 2018
religious freedom abroad, and a commitment to hold a
and a special program for Iranian religious minorities
second ministerial in 2019.
stopped accepting new applicants; instead, the Trump
In November, the State Department made the firstadministration focused on humanitarian assistance
new addition since 2016 to its list of “countries of particfor those displacedular concern,” or CPCs,
abroad and programs tounder IRFA for particuhelp enable their returnlarly severe violations of
In November, the State Department
home. Longstanding
religious freedom: Pakimade the first new addition
flaws in the U.S. govstan, which USCIRF hadsince 2016 to its list of “countries of
ernment’s processing ofrecommended for CPC
particular concern,” or CPCs,
asylum-seekers at ports
designation since 2002. It[naming] Pakistan, which USCIRF
of entry and the borderalso named three counhad recommended forremained unaddressed.
tries to its “Special Watch
CPC designation since 2002.
Throughout 2018, theList” for severe violations,
Trump administration
including Uzbekistan,continued to prioritize
which had been on theState Department’s CPC list since 2006, and Russia, which the case of Dr. Andrew Brunson, an American pastor
unjustly imprisoned in Turkey. After sustained highUSCIRF had recommended for CPC designation sincelevel pressure, Pastor Brunson was released in October
2017. The State Department also made two sets of desigand allowed to return to the United States.
nations during the year of “entities of particular concern,”

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9

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATION• Appoint a Special Adviser to the
President on International Religious
Freedom within the National Security Council (NSC) staff, as outlined
by IRFA;• Develop a government-wide
strategy for promoting religious
freedom abroad;• Prepare action plans for specificcountries; and• Establish an interagency working
group to oversee implementation;• Increase the use of targeted
sanctions against specific officials,

agencies, and military units forsevere religious freedom violations,
including visa denials under section
604(a) of IRFA (section 212(a)(2)(G)of the Immigration and Nationality
Act) and visa denials and asset
freezes under the Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act
and Executive Order 13818;• Ensure that the State Department
and USAID sponsor programs
to assist countries in developing
school textbooks, curricula, andteacher training materials that
accurately portray religious groups;

promote tolerance, pluralism, andrespect for the human rights—
including religious freedom—of
all individuals; and do not containlanguage urging hatred, discrimination, or violence; and• Allocate funding through the State
Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program and relevant U.S.
Department of Defense programs
to train and equip local officials andcommunities to protect places ofworship and other holy sites, especially in countries where such sites
face a high risk of attack.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS• Hold annual oversight hearings• Examine, during delegation trips

on the implementation of IRFA
and the Frank Wolf Act, as wellas hearings on religious freedom
issues, and raise religious freedom
and cases of religious prisoners

abroad, conditions for persons of all
faiths and beliefs or none, including bymeeting with religious communities,
religious freedom advocates, and prisoners held for their religion or belief orof conscience in country-specifichearings and ambassadorial confirmation hearings;

their religious freedom advocacy; and• Participate in the Tom Lantos Human
Rights Commission’s Defending

LEGAL PROVISIONS
IRFA, as amended by the Frank Wolf Act, seeks to makereligious freedom a higher priority in U.S. foreign policy
through a range of mechanisms and tools:

Government Institutions
Inside the U.S. executive branch, IRFA created the position of Ambassador-at-Large (an appointee nominatedby the president and confirmed by the Senate) to heada State Department office focused on religious freedom
abroad: the IRF Office. The law also urges the appointment of a special adviser dedicated to the issue on the
White House NSC staff, although no administration
since the law’s enactment has done so. The Frank Wolf
Act reiterates this position’s importance. IRFA also created USCIRF, an independent legislative branch agency
mandated to independently assess and to accurately
and unflinchingly describe threats to religious freedom

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Freedoms Project, through which
Members of Congress advocate on
behalf of prisoners of conscienceabroad, and the International Panelof Parliamentarians for Freedom of
Religion or Belief, an informal, global
network of legislators working tocounter persecution and promotereligious freedom.

around the world, evaluate U.S. policy, and make policy
recommendations to the president, secretary of state,
and Congress.

Monitoring and Reporting
IRFA mandates that the State Department prepare
an annual report on religious freedom conditions ineach foreign country (the IRF Report), in addition to
the department’s annual human rights report. It also
requires that USCIRF issue its own annual report setting
forth its findings and providing independent policy
recommendations, including whether or not efforts by
the United States to advance religious freedom abroad
are timely, appropriate to the circumstances, prudent,
and effective. IRFA further requires the State Department to maintain country-by-country lists of prisoners
and issues of concern for use by executive and legislative
branch officials, and the Frank Wolf Act now requires

that USCIRF, to the extent practicable, make available
online lists of prisoners and other victims of governments or nonstate actors the Commission recommends
for CPC or EPC designation.

Consequences for Violators

IRFA defines “particularly severe” violations of religious freedom as “systematic, ongoing, egregious
violations of religious freedom, including violations
such as—(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; (B) prolonged detention
without charges; (C) causing the disappearance of

IRFA requires the president—who has delegated thispersons by the abduction or clandestine detention
power to the secretary of state—to designate CPCsof those persons; or (D) other flagrant denial of theannually and take action designed to encourageright to life, liberty, or the security of persons.”
improvements in those countries. CPCs are definedas countries whose governments either engage in or
tolerate “particularly severe” violations of religious
Laws other than IRFA also provide tools to sanction
freedom. A menu of possible actions is available,
individual religious freedom abusers. Some of these apply
including negotiating a bilateral agreement, imposing
to specific countries, such as the Comprehensive Iransanctions, taking “commensurate action,” or issuing
Sanctions and Divestment Act (CISADA, P.L.111-195) anda waiver. The Frank Wolf Act amends this provision
the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions
to add a “Special Watch List” category, in which the
Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44). More broadly, the 2016 Global
State Department is to place countries it deems to have
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act allows theengaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious
president, who has delegated these authorities to thefreedom. The term “severe violations” is not defined.
secretaries of treasury and state, to deny U.S. visas to andNo specific actions are required or delineated for Spefreeze the U.S.-based assets of any foreigner responsible
cial Watch List countries.
for “extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violaThe Frank Wolf Act
tions of internationallyalso creates a new presprotected human rights”
idential designation ofagainst someone seeking
CPCs are defined as countries
EPCs for nonstate actors
to expose illegal governwhose governments either engage inengaging in particularly
ment activity or to exercise
or tolerate “particularly severe”
severe religious freeor defend internationallyviolations of religious freedom.
dom violations. The law
protected rights. Execudefines nonstate actor astive Order 13818, issued“a nonsovereign entity
in December 2017 tothat exercises significant
implement and build on the Global Magnitsky Act, authopolitical power and territorial control; is outside therizes visa bans and asset freezes against foreign persons
control of a sovereign government; and often employs
involved in “serious human rights abuse,” providing anviolence in pursuit of its objectives.” The president
even more expansive basis for targeted sanctions.
delegated the power to make EPC designations to thesecretary of state on January 26, 2018.
International Standards
IRFA also makes inadmissible to the United States
Under IRFA, USCIRF’s and the State Department’s
foreign government officials who are responsible forreports and determinations are based on international
or directly carried out particularly severe religious
legal standards: the law defines violations of religious
freedom violations. The Frank Wolf Act now requires
freedom as “violations of the internationally recognized
the State Department to establish, maintain, and submit
right to freedom of religion and religious belief andto Congress every 180 days “designated persons lists”
practice” as articulated in the Universal Declaration ofof foreign individuals denied visas or subject to finanHuman Rights, the International Covenant on Civil andcial sanctions or other measures for particularly severe
Political Rights, and other international instruments
violations of religious freedom.
and regional agreements.

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Programs and Training

freedom through statements from high-level officials,
as it had in 2017. For example, speaking at the July 2018
IRFA includes religious freedom as an element of U.S.
Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, Vice Presiforeign assistance, cultural exchange, and international
dent Michael R. Pence said that “[t]he right to believe or
broadcasting programs. It also provides that Statenot believe is the most fundamental of freedoms,” andDepartment foreign service officers and U.S. immigrathat “America will always stand for religious freedom,tion officials receive training on religious freedom andand we will always speak out boldly wherever andreligious persecution. The Frank Wolf Act requires thewhenever it’s threatened.” Secretary of State MichaelState Department to make international religious freedom training mandatory for all foreign service officers at R. Pompeo made similar comments at the ministerial,and published an op-ed in USA Today highlighting thecertain points in their careers and to develop, in consulimportance of religious freedom. USAID administrator
tation with USCIRF, a specific curriculum for it.
Mark Green also spoke at the ministerial, stating that“[a]t USAID, we see freedom of worship as an essential
Refugee and Asylum Issues
element in our pursuit of government that is citizenIn recognition that religious freedom violations cancentered and citizen-responsive.” In May, at the releasedrive displacement, IRFA includes provisions on U.S.
of the IRF Report, Secrerefugee and asylum policy,
tary Pompeo stated that
including requiring that“[a]dvancing liberty
the president consider
In recognition that religious freedom
and religious freedom
information about reliviolations can drive displacement,
advances America’s
gious persecution as part
IRFA includes provisions on
interests,” and that “proof his annual determinaU.S. refugee and asylum policy . . .
tecting and promotingtion of refugee admissions,
global respect for religious
and that immigration
freedom is a priority ofofficials use the IRF Report
the
Trump
Administration,”
citingthe administration’s
as a resource in adjudicating refugee and asylum claims.
December 2017 National Security Strategy.
IRFA also sought assessments of whether immigration
officials were implementing Expedited Removal—a summary removal procedure that was new when IRFA wasenacted—in a manner consistent with the United States’
obligations to protect individuals fleeing persecution,
including by authorizing USCIRF to examine the issue.

Additional Resources
For a more detailed discussion of IRFA’s legislative
history, provisions, and first decade and a half of implementation, please see the 15th anniversary retrospective
included in USCIRF’s 2014 Annual Report. For more
information on the Frank Wolf Act’s provisions, please
see the IRFA Implementation chapter of USCIRF’s 2017
Annual Report. To watch USCIRF’s April 2018 summit
marking IRFA’s 20th anniversary, please click here.

DEVELOPMENTS IN 2018
High-Level Commitment
During 2018, the Trump administration continued toemphasize its commitment to international religious

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Ambassador-at-Large and Related Positions
On February 1, 2018, Sam Brownback was sworn in as
Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom. President Trump nominated him in July 2017 andthe Senate confirmed him in January 2018. Ambassador
Brownback, who previously served as the governor of
Kansas, is the fifth Ambassador-at-Large for International
Religious Freedom in IRFA’s 20-year existence. As a U.S.
senator from 1996 to 2011, he was a key sponsor of IRFA
and a cochair of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus.
During 2018, Ambassador Brownback energetically implemented his mandate, including through public speeches,
travel, meetings with the nongovernmental organization(NGO) IRF Roundtable and other stakeholders. Pursuant
to IRFA, the Ambassador-at-Large also serves ex officio as anonvoting USCIRF Commissioner, and USCIRF welcomed
Ambassador Brownback’s nomination and confirmation.
Under IRFA, the Ambassador-at-Large is to be a“principal adviser to the President and the Secretary

of State regarding matters affecting religious freedom
abroad” and, under the Frank Wolf Act, is to report
directly to the secretary of state. In previous administrations, the Ambassador-at-Large reported to the assistantsecretary for democracy, human rights, and labor, not thesecretary, although some Ambassadors-at-Large were
given informal access. During 2018, consistent with theFrank Wolf Act, the Ambassador-at-Large reported to thesecretary. The IRF Office remained housed in the Bureauof Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL).
Over the years, various administrations and Congress created other State Department positions withoverlapping or related mandates, such as special representatives or envoys on religion and global affairs, toMuslim communities, to the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC), and to monitor and combat anti-Semitism, as well as a special advisor for religious minorities
in the Near East and South and Central Asia. The only
one of these positions that was filled during 2018 was the
special advisor on religious minorities in the Near Eastand South and Central Asia. In February 2019, after thereporting period, Secretary Pompeo named Elan Carr tobe special envoy to monitor and combat anti-Semitism,an appointment USCIRF welcomed.

and United Nations; more than 400 NGO representatives and religious figures; and survivors of persecution
from Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, Nicaragua, North Korea,
Pakistan, Sudan, and Vietnam, representing a range ofreligious groups including Christians, Muslims, Jews,
Yazidis, Baha’is, Ahmadis, and Buddhists. Alongside
the sessions at the State Department, USCIRF hosted
an event marking the 20th anniversary of IRFA and a
training session for NGOs on how to apply for U.S. government grants. Numerous NGOs also hosted separate
events on a variety of countries and topics throughout
the entire week.
At the ministerial, the United States released the
Potomac Declaration and Plan of Action to stress theimportance of promoting religious freedom for all andpropose activities for the international community.
Groups of country delegations signed statements ofconcern on Burma, China, Iran, blasphemy and apostasy laws, counterterrorism as a pretext for repression,and violations by nonstate actors. The U.S. government
announced two new programs—the International
Religious Freedom Fund, for the United States andlikeminded partners to fund efforts to protect andsupport religious freedom worldwide, and the Genocide
Recovery and Persecution Response Program, for the
Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom
State Department and USAID to partner with faith and
On May 29, 2018, Secretary Pompeo announced at thecommunity leaders to quickly deliver aid to persecuted
release of the IRF Report that the United States would holdcommunities, beginning with Iraq—as well as a special
the first-ever Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom.
accelerator workshop, Boldline, to support innovativeIts purpose was to bring together representatives ofpublic-private partnerships. Vice President Pence andlikeminded governments, international organizations,
Secretary Pompeo announced that a ministerial on
religious communities, andreligious freedom would
civil society to highlight
be an annual event, otherthe importance of freedom
governments offered to[The Ministerial’s] purpose was toof religion or belief for all
host regional conferbring
togetherrepresentativesofand identify ways to fightences, and civil society
likeminded governments, international
persecution and promoteorganizations expressedorganizations,religious
communities,
andreligious freedom.
interest in creating
civil society to highlight the importance
The ministerial
NGO religious freedomoffreedomofreligionor
beliefforallandtook place at the State
roundtables in a variety
identify ways to fight persecution and
Department on Julyof countries. Just before
promotereligious
freedom.
24–26. Attendees included
or after the ministerial,
officials from 84 governseveral governments,
ments; representatives ofincluding the United
the European Union, Organization of American States,
Kingdom, Germany, Mongolia, Bahrain, and Taiwan,
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
created new ambassador-level positions on religious

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13

freedom, joining the existing ones from the UnitedStates, Norway, Denmark, and the European Union.
On January 26, 2019, after the reporting period,
Secretary Pompeo announced that the United States
would host the second Ministerial to Advance Religious
Freedom on July 16–18, 2019, in Washington, DC.

CPC and Special Watch List Designations
On November 28, 2018, Secretary Pompeo designated 10
countries as CPCs for engaging in or tolerating particularly
severe religious freedom violations: Burma, China, Eritrea,
Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. This was the State Department’s
14th set of CPC designations over IRFA’s 20-year existence.
Pakistan was a new designee, the first addition to the State
Department’s CPC list since Tajikistan in February 2016.

On the same date, Secretary Pompeo named Comoros,
Russia, and Uzbekistan to the State Department’s Special
Watch List, the Frank Wolf Act’s category for countries
that engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious
freedom. The Special Watch List is a level below the CPC
threshold, but neither IRFA nor the Frank Wolf Act more
explicitly define “severe violations.” Uzbekistan had beenon the State Department’s CPC list since 2006, but madesome improvements in response to U.S. concerns. This
was the first time the State Department removed a country
from its CPC list due to diplomatic activity since its liftingof Vietnam’s CPC designation in 2006. USCIRF welcomed
the November 28 designations, particularly regarding
Pakistan and Russia, but questioned whether Uzbekistan
had improved enough to be moved from the CPC list to theSpecial Watch List.

STATE’S DESIGNATIONS OF COUNTRIES AND REGIMES AS CPCs
Oct.
1999:
Burma,
China,
Iran,
Iraq,
Sudan,
and
Miloševic
andTalibanregimes
Sept.
2000:
Burma,
China,
Iran,
Iraq,
Sudan,
and
Miloševic
andOct.
Taliban2001:
regimes
Burma,
China,
Iran,
Iraq,
Sudan,
and
Talibanregimes

1999

2000

2001

Jan.
2001:
Miloševic
regimeNov.
2006:
Burma,
China,
Eritrea,
Iran,
North
Korea,
Saudi
Arabia,Sudan,
andUzbekistan

Sept.
2004:
Burma,
China,
Eritrea,
Iran,
North
Korea,
Saudi
Arabia,Sudan,
andVietnamMar.
2003:
Burma,
China,
Iran,
Iraq,
North
Korea,
and
Sudan

2002

Jan.
2009:
Burma,
China,
Eritrea,
Iran,
North
Korea,
Saudi
Arabia,Sudan,
andUzbekistan

Nov.
2005:
Burma,
China,
Eritrea,
Iran,
North
Korea,
Saudi
Arabia,Sudan,
andVietnam

2003

2004

Mar.
2003:
Talibanregime

June
2004:
Iraq

2005

2006

2007

2008

Nov.
2018:
Burma,
China,
Eritrea,
Iran,
North
Korea,
Pakistan,
Saudi
Arabia,Sudan,
Dec.
2017: Tajikistan,
Burma, andChina, Turkmenistan

Aug.
2011:
Burma,
China,
Eritrea,
Iran,
North
Korea,
Saudi
Arabia,Sudan,
andUzbekistan

2009

2010

2011

July
2014:
Burma,
China,
Eritrea,
Iran,
North
Korea,
Saudi
Arabia,Sudan,
Turkmenistan,andUzbekistan

2012

2013

2014

Feb.
and
Oct.
Eritrea,
2016:
Iran,
Burma,
North
China,
Korea,
Eritrea,
Saudi
Iran,
Arabia,North
Sudan,
Korea,
Tajikistan,
Saudi
Turkmenistan,
Arabia,andSudan,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan,andUzbekistan

2015

Nov.
2006:
Vietnam

STATE’S REMOVALS OF COUNTRIES AND REGIMES FROM CPC LIST
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State information, updated by USCIRF14U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

2016

2017

2018

Nov. 2018:
Uzbekistan moved
to Special Watch List

The Frank Wolf Act requires the State Department
to make its CPC and Special Watch List designations
annually, not later than 90 days after the issuance of
the IRF Report. The IRF Report covering 2017, on whichthese designations were based, was issued on May 29,
2018, meaning that the CPC and Special Watch List
designations made on November 28 should have been
issued by August 27.
For the nine countries that were redesignated as
CPCs on November 28, the same presidential actions
that had been imposed in December 2017 were continued. For Pakistan, the new designee, a waiver was put inplace “in the important national interest of the UnitedStates.” The 2018 presidential actions are shown in thetable below. Of the 10 CPC designees, six are subject
to preexisting or “double-hatted” sanctions, and four
have waivers. Successive administrations have reliedon such an approach, and while the statute permits it,
USCIRF has long expressed concern that using preexisting sanctions or indefinite waivers provides little or no
incentive for CPC-designated governments to reduce orhalt egregious religious freedom violations.

The Frank Wolf Act requires the State Department
to notify Congress of CPC designations not later than 90days after they are made and to provide justifications
for any waivers. This notification was due on February
26, 2019, but as of March 7 did not appear to have beenmade. Under the Frank Wolf Act, waivers are permitted
to continue for 180 days; after that period, the law gives
the president waiver authority if the president determines
and reports to Congress that the foreign government hasceased violations or that the waiver is required in theimportant national interest of the United States.

Individual Violators
Section 212(a)(2)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, a provision added by IRFA, makes inadmissible to theUnited States foreign officials who are responsible for or
directly carried out particularly severe religious freedom
violations. To date, the provision’s only publicly known
use was in 2005, when then Chief Minister Narendra
Modi of Gujarat State in India was excluded due to hiscomplicity in 2002 riots in his state that resulted in thedeaths of an estimated 1,100 to 2,000 Muslims. Because of

PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS FOR 2018 CPC DESIGNATIONS(AS DESCRIBED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER)
For Burma, the existing ongoing
restrictions referenced in 22 CFR 126.1,
pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act;For China, the existing ongoing
restriction on exports to China ofcrime control and detection instruments and equipment, under theForeign Relations Authorization Act of1990 and 1991 (Pub. L. 101-246), pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act;For Eritrea, the existing ongoing
restrictions referenced in 22 CFR 126.1,
pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act;For Iran, the existing ongoing travel
restrictions in section 221(c) of the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human
Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) for individuals identified under section 221(a)(1)(C) of the TRA in connection with thecommission of serious human rights

abuses, pursuant to section 402(c)(5)of the Act;For the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the existing ongoing
restrictions to which the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea is subject,pursuant to sections 402 and 409 of
the Trade Act of 1974 (the JacksonVanik Amendment), pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act;For Pakistan, a waiver as required in
the “important national interest of theUnited States,” pursuant to section
407 of the Act;For Saudi Arabia, a waiver as requiredin the “important national interestof the United States,” pursuant tosection 407 of the Act;For Sudan, the restriction in theannual Department of State, Foreign

Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act on making certain
appropriated funds available for assistance to the Government of Sudan,currently set forth in section 7042(i)of the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2018 (Div. K, Pub.
L. 115-141), and any provision of law
that is the same or substantially thesame as this provision, pursuant tosection 402(c)(5) of the Act;For Tajikistan, a waiver as required in
the “important national interest of theUnited States,” pursuant to section
407 of the Act; andFor Turkmenistan, a waiver as
required in the “important national
interest of the United States,” pursuant to section 407 of the Act.

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15

the confidentiality of visa decisions, there may be other,
unknown uses. In recent years, the IRF Office has worked
to identify noncitizens who would be inadmissible on thisbasis should they apply for U.S. visas.
Two newer accountability tools—the 2016 Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and a
related 2017 executive order, E.O. 13818—allow the secretaries of state and treasury to deny U.S. visas to or block
the U.S.-based assets of foreigners involved in corruption
or human rights abuses. As of December 2018, the U.S.
government had sanctioned 101 foreign individuals
and entities under these authorities, including a few forreligious freedom violations. The initial set of these sanctions, announced by the State and Treasury Departments
in December 2017, included General Maung Maung
Soe, who as then head of the Burmese Army’s Western
Command oversaw atrocities against Rohingya Muslims.
In addition, in August 2018, four Burmese military andborder guard police officials and two Burmese military
units were sanctioned for abuses against Rohingya Muslims. The same month, the U.S. government sanctioned
the Turkish ministers of justice and interior over thedetention of Pastor Brunson. Those sanctions were lifted
in November, after Pastor Brunson’s October release.
The Frank Wolf Act requires the State Department toestablish, maintain, and submit to Congress every 180 days
“designated persons lists” of foreign individuals denied
visas or subject to financial sanctions or other measuresfor particularly severe violations of religious freedom. No
designated persons lists were made public in 2018.

EPC Designations

Programs
IRFA envisaged the funding of religious freedom programs, authorizing U.S. foreign assistance to promoteand develop “legal protections and cultural respect forreligious freedom.” For FY2018, USCIRF was funded
at $3.5 million for its operations, while the IRF Office
was appropriated $8.5 million for operating costs and$25 million for programs on international religious
freedom and on protecting, investigating abuses
against, and providing justice to vulnerable and persecuted religious minorities.
During 2018, as part of the Trump administration’s
prioritization of religious freedom, USAID placed a newemphasis on humanitarian aid for religious groups
targeted for persecution or genocide and on programs
to promote religious freedom, tolerance, and pluralism.
Iraq was a particular focus, with the agency allocatingnearly $300 million in assistance for northern Iraq andposting a special representative for minority assistancein Erbil, Iraq. USAID also sought to expand its partnerships with civil society and religious groups, including
by signing a memorandum of understanding with theKnights of Columbus to work together to respond to
genocide and persecution in the Middle East. More
broadly, in his remarks at the Ministerial to Advance
Religious Freedom, Administrator Green stated that
USAID was supporting programs to address religious
hate speech and interfaith conflict, strengthen laws
protecting religious freedom, increase civil society
capacity to advocate for freedom of religion or belief,
and reinforce pluralism.

The State Department made two sets of EPC designaTraining
tions during 2018. On March 5, then Secretary of StateThe Frank Wolf Act added a provision to the Foreign
Rex Tillerson designated the following eight nonstate
Service Act requiring the State Department to provide
actors as EPCs for particularly severe religious freedom
training on international religious freedom for all
violations: “al-Nusra Front, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian
foreign service officers, including by covering the topic
Peninsula, al-Qa’ida,
in courses required for
al-Shabab, Boko Haram,
entry-level officers, for
ISIS [the Islamic State of
officers prior to postings
The State Department made two sets of
Iraq and Syria], ISIS-Khooutside the United States,
EPC designations during 2018.
rasan, and the Taliban.”and for ambassadors and
On November 28, Secredeputy chiefs of mission
tary Pompeo designated(DCMs), as well as bynine entities as EPCs: the eight designated in Marchdeveloping a specific curriculum. The State Departand the Houthis.
ment’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI) began including

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religious freedom issues in its courses for entry-level
officers and ambassadors and DCMs in 2017. During
2018, FSI and the IRF Office, with input from USCIRF,
worked to develop a distance learning course on
religious freedom to be required for all foreign service
officers prior to assignments overseas, which theyplanned to roll out in early 2019.

Asylum-Seekers in Expedited Removal

Under U.S. law, noncitizens who fear persecution or
torture at home may apply for asylum if they arrive at,or are already in, the United States. As authorized by
IRFA, USCIRF has examined the U.S. government’s
treatment of asylum-seekers in Expedited Removal,
the process that allows Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) officers to quickly deport, without
Refugee Resettlement
immigration court hearings, noncitizens who arrive at
Under the United States Refugee Admissions Program
U.S. ports of entry or cross the border without proper(USRAP), the president sets a ceiling for how many
documents, unless they can establish a crediblerefugees the United States will accept from abroadfear of persecution or torture. USCIRF’s reports oneach year; under IRFA, religious persecution should be
the subject, released in 2005, 2007, 2013, and 2016,
considered in this determination. Since 2001, the refdocumented major problems that successive adminisugee admission ceiling has averaged 75,000 per year.
trations have not addressed.
After suspending the USRAP for part of FY2017 to put
Specifically, USCIRF’s monitoring over more thaninto place enhanced vetting procedures, the Trumpa decade revealed that DHS officials often fail to follow
administration resumed
required procedures tothe program and set theidentify asylum-seekceilings for FY2018 anders and refer them for
As authorized by IRFA,
FY2019 at 45,000 andcredible fear determiUSCIRF has examined the
30,000, respectively.
nations, and that they
U.S. government’s treatment of
Actual refugee admisdetain asylum-seekers
asylum-seekers in Expedited Removal,
sions in FY2018 totaled
in inappropriate, pris[and its reports on the subject have]
22,491, the lowest in
on-like conditions.
documented major problems
the program’s history.
Over the past few fiscalthat successive administrations
Instead of resettlement,
years, the percentage of
have not addressed.
the Trump administraindividuals in Expeditedtion focused on aiding
Removal who say theyrefugees and internallyfear return has been
displaced persons abroad through humanitarianrising. As a result, the unaddressed flaws in the system
assistance and programs to help enable their safe andplaced even more asylum-seekers at risk of erroneous
voluntary return home. For example, the adminisreturn. To ensure the fair and humane treatment oftration prioritized assistance to support vulnerable
asylum-seekers while protecting U.S. borders, USCIRF
minority communities in Iraq.
has recommended that DHS (1) appoint a high-level
During 2018, approximately 90 Iranians seeking
official to coordinate refugee and asylum issues
refugee status in the United States under the Lautenand oversee reforms, (2) improve quality assurance
berg Amendment—a special resettlement program formeasures, (3) give officers additional training, (4) use
certain persecuted religious minority groups—had their
non-prison-like detention facilities, and (5) increase
applications denied or significantly delayed, an unusual
funding for asylum officers and immigration courts tosituation about which USCIRF and Members of Conpromptly and fairly adjudicate claims. USCIRF also has
gress expressed concern. Because of these issues, theurged Congress to exercise oversight on these matters,
Lautenberg program, which USCIRF has long supported
including by requesting the Government Accountabilas a lifeline for vulnerable Iranian minorities, stopped
ity Office to assess whether noncitizens removed toaccepting new applicants. It had not resumed by the end
their home countries under Expedited Removal haveof 2018.
faced persecution or torture upon return.

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Prisoners
During 2018, the Trump administration continued
to prioritize seeking the release of American citizens
unjustly imprisoned abroad. One of these cases, that of
Pastor Brunson in Turkey, was also a high priority for
USCIRF, and was part of USCIRF’s Religious Prisoners ofConscience Project. After significant U.S. advocacy andpressure, including the imposition of Global Magnitsky
sanctions on two Turkish cabinet ministers, Pastor
Brunson was released in October 2018 and allowed toreturn to the United States. A Turkish court convicted
Pastor Brunson on the unfounded charge of aiding
terrorism but ruled that his two-year detention and good
conduct counted as serving the imposed sentence ofimprisonment for three years and one month. USCIRF
Commissioner Tony Perkins was at the final court hearing and accompanied Pastor and Mrs. Brunson home.

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2019 COUNTRIES■ TIER 1 COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
Burma
Central African Republic
China
Eritrea

Iran
Nigeria
North Korea
Pakistan

RussiaSaudi Arabia
Sudan
Syria

Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Vietnam

Cuba
Egypt
India

Indonesia
Iraq
Kazakhstan

Laos
Malaysia
Turkey■ TIER 2 COUNTRIES
AfghanistanAzerbaijan
BahrainU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

19

BURMATIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Burma trended negatively, particularly for Rohingya Muslims. Despite the factthat Burma’s government, military, and nonstate actors havedenied responsibility and largely evaded accountability forwidespread atrocities, the United States and its allies have
imposed a handful of targeted sanctions against military
actors “for their involvement in ethnic cleansing in Burma’s
Rakhine State and other widespread human rights abuses in
Burma’s Kachin and Shan States.” Victims of severe humanrights and religious freedom violations have little hope forjustice; this includes Rohingya and other Muslims, Buddhists,
Christians, and Hindus, as well as ethnic Kachin, Shan, Karen,
Rakhine, and Chin. As of January 2019, just after the reporting
period, 911,000 mostly Rohingya Muslims resided in refugee
camps in Bangladesh; more than 700,000 of these refugees
fled Burma (also known as Myanmar) because of massive military crackdowns in Rakhine State in October 2016 and August
2017. In January 2018, a USCIRF delegation visited Bangladesh
to meet with Rohingya Muslim refugees and discuss theirplight with the government of Bangladesh. For the Rohingya
Muslims who remained in Burma, their deprivation of rights
and ongoing humanitarian crisis has been catastrophic. In
November 2017, the United States labeled the atrocities as
ethnic cleansing, but only with respect to the crisis in RakhineState. However, others—including an independent commission created by the United Nations (UN)—who have examined

the available evidence not just in Rakhine State, but also inother areas heavily targeted by Burma’s military such as Kachin
and northern Shan states, concluded that crimes against
humanity and even genocide have occurred. Burma’s militaryand nonstate actors continued to target with discriminationand violence other religious and ethnic minorities in addition
to Rohingya Muslims, such as Christians. Moreover, decadesof growing suspicion and depleted trust across religious andethnic groups have in recent years been amplified by the proliferation of social media platforms to spread rumors, cultivate
intolerance, and incite violence. In 2018, Burma’s government
tapped into increasing nationalist fervor by continuing to target critics—both domestically and internationally—including
by vilifying both peaceful expression and the media, exemplified by seven-year prison sentences for two Reuters journalists
who reported on atrocities against Rohingya Muslims.
Based on the systematic, ongoing, egregious violations ofreligious freedom occurring in the country, in 2019 USCIRF
again finds that Burma merits designation as a “country ofparticular concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious
Freedom Act (IRFA). The U.S. Department of State has designated Burma as a CPC since 1999, most recently in November
2018. USCIRF recommends that the State Department redesignate Burma as a CPC under IRFA and maintain the existing,ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1 of theInternational Traffic in Arms Regulations.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Reinstate the designation of a
National Emergency with respect
to Burma—terminated by executive
order in October 2016—pursuant
to the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 17011706, in response to the ongoing andsevere atrocities and multiple humanitarian crises occurring in the country,
including particularly severe violationsof religious freedom, and refocus
efforts to definitively and publicly
conclude whether such atrocities meetthe legal definition of crimes against
humanity and/or genocide;• Support efforts to collect, preserve,
and analyze evidence of the crimes

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and atrocities committed in RakhineState, Kachin State, northern Shan
State, and other areas, and to holdperpetrators accountable by:• Continuing to impose targeted
sanctions on members of Burma’s
military, security forces, and nonstate actors for severe human rights
and religious freedom violations;• Actively supporting and cooperatingwith the UN’s Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar;• Pursuing with international partners a tribunal for both state andnonstate actors accused of serious
crimes under international humanitarian and human rights law; and• Bringing a case before the International Court of Justice basedon Burma’s violations of the 1948
Convention on the Prevention andPunishment of Genocide; and• Work with the government of Burma,
representatives from all religious
communities (including leaders andlaypersons), and other relevant stakeholders to combat intolerance andpromote inclusivity and nondiscrimination in the spirit of the Rabat Planof Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial, or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement todiscrimination, hostility, or violence.

TIER 1 BURMACOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Union of Burma, also known as Myanmar, or theUnion of Myanmar
GOVERNMENT
Parliamentary Republic
POPULATION
55,622,506
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHS
Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Animism

BACKGROUND
In 2018, Burma’s government continued to perpetrate,
tolerate, and deny its role in religious- and ethnic-based
discrimination and violence against vulnerable communities. The country’s democratic form of governmentis aspirational, with a constitution that advances Buddhism as the de facto state religion and longstanding
institutionalized discrimination against anyone notbelonging to the majority Bamar ethnic group or the
majority Buddhist faith.
The ruling National League for Democracy (NLD)
government faced mounting criticism in 2018 not only
for its silence and inaction about multiple human rights
and humanitarian crises, including against Rohingya
Muslims in Rakhine State, but also for its actions in
Kachin and northern Shan states. For de facto leader
State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, the criticism cameto a head during the year when several organizations
within the international community rescinded awards
and honors previously bestowed upon her, including theUnited States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Its complex relationship with the military—which still controls
many important governing levers—is often misunderstood. Some observers characterized the NLD’s win of
only seven of 13 seats contested in the November 2018
by-elections as a harbinger of the party’s chances in

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY
87.9% Buddhist
6.2% Christian
4.3% Muslim (mostly Sunni)
0.8% Animist
0.5% Hindu
0.2% Other (including traditional Chinese and indigenous
religions, Jews, and others)
0.1% None*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook and the U.S.
Department of Statethe upcoming 2020 general elections. While politicalconsiderations alone do not explain the calculations
that the NLD, the opposition Union Solidarity andDevelopment Party, and the military make in response
to human rights concerns, they do contribute to their
posturing vis-à-vis one another.
During the year, there were reports that the Ministryof Religious Affairs and Culture issued orders restricting
the instruction of Islam and Christianity to government-approved houses of worship and limiting such
instruction to the Burmese language, which is not the first
language of many religious and ethnic minorities. Additional reports suggested that the General Administration
Department (GAD), the body within the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs in charge of the vastcivil service apparatus, similarly ordered restrictions on
Islamic teaching.
In addition to examining conditions in Rakhine State, the UN actively monitored developments
countrywide throughout 2018. In her February 2018end-of-mission statement, UN Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in Myanmar Yanghee Lee
stressed the themes of belonging and equality for ethnic
minorities and noted the military’s history of attacks onplaces of worship. In April 2018, the UN secretary-generalappointed Swiss diplomat Christine Schraner Burgener

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TIER 1 BURMA
22

as special envoy on Myanmar; she made her first visits2017 waves of violence “the authorities rape, burn, and kill
to Burma and Bangladesh in that role in June. The UN’sthem.” Some of the refugees showed USCIRF their freshly
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission onhealed wounds—from gunshots and burns—inflicted by
Myanmar—whose mission included Kachin, Rakhine,
Burma’s military and security forces.
and Shan states—released
In June 2018, rainy
preliminary findings inseason landslides proved
August 2018 and its full
deadly in the crowded[A UN-commissioned report concluded]report in September, conrefugee camps of Banthat Burma’s top military leaderscluding that Burma’s top
gladesh; in one incident,
should be investigated andmilitary leaders should be
at least a dozen womenprosecuted for genocide,investigated and proseand children died and,noting circumstances suggesting
cuted for genocide, noting
according to the UN,
their “genocidal intent.”
circumstances suggesting
monsoon rains washedtheir “genocidal intent.”
away at least 9,000 refuIn December 2018,
gees’ shelters. Refugees
the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly approved
also continued to battle malnutrition, unsanitary cona resolution regarding human rights in Burma, which
ditions, and disease. Conditions for Rohingya Muslims
noted the situation of minority communities and thewho remained in Burma continued to be dire, such“statelessness, disenfranchisement, economic disas: blocked humanitarian aid resulting in shortages ofpossession, marginalization, deprivation of livelihood
food and medical supplies; restricted movement; andand restrictions on freedom of movement for persons
perpetual statelessness, including for those internallybelonging to the Rohingya community, including thedisplaced in camps. What were once Rohingya villages
confinement of approximately 120,000 people in camps
in Rakhine State were bulldozed and replaced withfor internally displaced persons, the majority of whom
military installations and, in some cases, makeshift
rely entirely on foreign aid.” (Several thousand of thosecamps to intern any returning Rohingya Muslim refuinterned in Rakhine State are believed to be ethnic
gees. Thousands of Rohingya Muslims reportedly fled
Kaman Muslims, one of the country’s 135 officially recto a “no-man’s land” along the border, trapped between
ognized ethnic groups.)a small canal on the Bangladesh side and barbed wire
fencing on the Burma side. When in April 2018 a family
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018of five Rohingya Muslims was reportedly repatriated
The Rakhine State Crisis—Rohingya
back to Burma, the government of Bangladesh accused
Muslims and Others
Burma of propaganda, alleging that the individuals
hailed from no-man’s land and had never left Burma.
August 2018 marked one year since authorities in Burma
These conditions continued to prompt some Rohingya
began their second brutal campaign terrorizing, sexually
Muslims to attempt to flee Burma by boat.
assaulting, and killing mainly Rohingya Muslims. Since
Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims andthe violence began—including the clearance operations
othervictims uprooted from their homes, families, andthat Burma’s security forces first launched in Octobercommunities also faced lifelong damage, including
2016—more than 700,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled
post-traumatic stress, the stigma of giving birth to or
to Bangladesh, whose refugee population in Cox’s Bazar
being a child conceived by rape, the disadvantage of
totaled 911,000 as of January 2019. In January 2018, aundereducation, and diminishing cultural, linguistic,
USCIRF delegation visited the Kutupalong and Nayapara
and religious traditions. This includes the scores ofrefugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. In a poignant
Rohingya Muslim women and girls whom internacharacterization of how Rohingya Muslims’ plight has
evolved, one refugee told USCIRF that whereas previously tional groups have thoroughly documented as victimsof systematic mass rape and other forms of sexual andthe authorities in Rakhine State restricted Rohingya
gender-based violence. Their ongoing vulnerability to
Muslims’ freedoms, since the October 2016 and August

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TIER 1 BURMA

exploitation includes trafficking, human smuggling,
During 2018, both governmental and nongovernand forced labor—including prostitution; Burma’s
mental actors researched and reported the atrocities
military has long used these tactics as “weapons of war”
in Rakhine State; several of them concluded thatagainst multiple religious and ethnic communities.
the attacks on Rohingya Muslims were not a sponWhen in March 2018 Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, thentaneous response to insurgency violence, but rather
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, called for thewere planned in advance. USCIRF learned during aperpetrators of atrocities against Rohingya Muslims to be
November 2017 visit to Burma and a January 2018 visit
brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC),
to Rohingya Muslim refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar,
Burma’s national security
Bangladesh, that mosques
advisor claimed that what
had been closed or
happened in Rakhineburned in Rakhine State,.
.
.
attackson
Rohingya
Muslims
State could not possibly
children were unable towere not a spontaneous responsebe genocide because
attend madrassas, andtoinsurgency
violence,
Rohingya Muslims still
the military interfered
but rather were planned in advance.
lived there. After the Burwith religious practices,mese government initially
including by threatenblocked a visit by represening Rohingya Muslims
tatives from the UN Security Council in February 2018,with arrest or physical assault to prevent them fromin late April and early May the representatives visited
worshipping in their homes. Echoing many of USCIRF’s
Burma and met with State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi
findings, in September 2018, the State Department
and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and also traveled
publicly issued documentation concerning atrocities
to Rakhine State and the refugee camps in Bangladesh.
in Rakhine State based on more than 1,000 interviews,
Members of the Security Council reportedly requested to
but made no legal determinations beyond its 2017
investigate human rights abuses in Rakhine State, but theannouncement of ethnic cleansing. (For more informamilitary denied there was anything to investigate. In Julytion about the State Department’s report, see the U.S.
2018, UN Secretary-General António Guterres publicly
Policy section below.)
recounted his experience meeting with Rohingya Muslim
Burma’s government and military, though broadly
refugees in Bangladesh, calling their suffering a “patterndenying and distorting the facts of the Rakhine crisis,of persecution” and “ethnic cleansing.”
displayed some nuance in their responses. In a rare
In June 2018, the European Union (EU) and Canada
admission of responsibility, in January 2018 the miliimposed sanctions on seven military officials and one
tary acknowledged that security forces and civilians
police commander for their role in committing crimes
massacred 10 Rohingya Muslims in Inn Din in Septemand atrocities against Rohingya Muslims. Australia
ber 2017. In April 2018, seven members of the military
sanctioned five military officials in October. Several ofwere sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment with hard
the individuals also appeared on the United States’ list
labor. Ironically, it was the investigative reporting about
for sanctions and in the UN-commissioned report. Also
the Inn Din massacre by Reuters journalists Wa Lone
in June, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Ref- and Kyaw Soe Oo that resulted in their imprisonment.
ugees (UNHCR) and the UN Development Programme
During the year, the government again attempted to(UNDP) signed a memorandum of understanding
quell international requests to properly investigate(MOU) with the governments of Burma and Bangladesh
crimes and atrocities in Rakhine State by assigningabout the return of Rohingya Muslims to Burma. The
another commission. However, this latest effort was
full details of the MOU were never made public—somecriticized by international rights advocates for its lack ofthing Rohingya advocacy groups criticized along withtransparency and credibility, and by Burmese nationthe fact that the process did not include any Rohingya
alists for the inclusion of foreigners on the panel. On the
Muslim representatives in the negotiations and it also
one hand, the government failed to provide safe andfailed to address the root causes of the crisis.
dignified conditions to which Rohingya Muslims could

23

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24

safely return, including by attempting to force Rohingya
Muslims to accept ID cards that neither recognize themas Rohingya nor grant them citizenship; on the other,
it facilitated the resettlement of some Hindu families
in Rakhine State. Hindu civilians were among themany other communities ensnared in the violence thatgripped Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017.
On September 6, 2018, the ICC—specificallythe Pre-Trial Chamber I—decided that it “may exercise jurisdiction over the alleged deportation of theRohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh,”after which ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda opened
a preliminary examination. Unsurprisingly, Burma’s
government rejected the ICC’s ruling.
Although discrimination and violence against
Rohingya and other Muslims is not always religious innature, it has impacted their ability to teach and practice their faith. Five years after the March 2013 violence
between Buddhists and Muslims in Meiktila, several ofthe mosques that were closed in the aftermath remained
shuttered. Over three days in 2013, armed mobs, which
included some Buddhist monks, burned more than 1,500
Muslim homes, damaged or destroyed three Islamic
schools and more than a dozen mosques, displaced
thousands of people, and killed more than 100 people.
Following a 2017 incident in which police apprehended
several Muslims for organizing prayers outside after
authorities closed two madrassas in Thaketa Township,in April 2018 a court sentenced seven Muslim men to
three-month prison terms. In January 2019, after thereporting period, USCIRF received reports that officials
closed madrassas and a mosque in Ayeyarwady Region.

northern Shan states displaced thousands of civilians,
many of whom were Christians. These fresh displacements were in addition to the more than 100,000 peopleinternally displaced in camps in Kachin State andnorthern Shan State, triggered by the collapsed 2011ceasefire agreement between the military and Kachin
Independence Army; some of these individuals havebeen displaced multiple times. The longstanding conflicts, while not religious in nature, have deeply impacted
Christian and other faith communities, and the military’s blockades on humanitarian assistance continued
to restrict civilians’ access to food, shelter, health care,and other basic necessities for long periods of time. In
2018, USCIRF received information that the military targeted houses of worship and religious leaders, accusing
them of working with ethnic armed organizations. In
2018, two examples of religious structures damaged bymilitary gunfire and explosives included May attacks on
a Baptist mission school in Sumpra Bum Township anda Roman Catholic church in Hpakant Township, bothin Kachin State. Moreover, the military blocked humanitarian aid, held civilians hostage in their villages, andblocked journalists from entering conflict zones.
Furthermore, USCIRF received information that inrecent years, more than 30 churches were destroyed in
Kachin State, most by heavy weapons attacks. By someestimates, there are more than 100 churches in Kachin
State at which parishioners can no longer worship. In
2018, USCIRF also received reports that local mobs,
which included some Buddhist monks, physicallyassaulted Christian pastors and parishioners in RakhineState; in at least one instance, Christians were too afraid
for their safety to attend
Discrimination andchurch services.
Abuses Targeting
Ethnic armed organi. . . intensified fighting between
Christian Minorities
zations were not blameless
Burma’s military and ethnic armed
While some Christiansin the protracted conflict.
organizations
in
parts
of
Kachinin Burma have little to no
Beginning in September
and northern Shan states
trouble practicing their2018, the China-backed
displaced
thousandsofcivilians,
faith, others are targeted
United Wa State Army
many of whom were Christians.
with discrimination and(UWSA), considered Burviolence because of theirma’s most powerful ethnic
religious beliefs. For
armed organization, tarexample, beginning in late 2017 and continuing into
geted religious institutions and leaders in Wa-controlled
2018, intensified fighting between Burma’s militaryterritory in northern Shan State. Under the guise ofand ethnic armed organizations in parts of Kachin androoting out alleged “religious extremism,” particularly

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TIER 1 BURMA

among missionaries, UWSA soldiers interrogated andIntolerance, Nationalism, and thedetained clergy, closed religious schools, destroyed unauRole of Social Media
thorized churches and banned new church construction,
In 2018, some governmental and societal actors continand forcibly recruited Bible students to join their ranks.
ued to push back against the discriminatory, intolerant
The UWSA held hostage 100 ethnic Wa Christians andwords and actions of nationalists and chauvinists who
approximately 100 ethnic Lahu Christians; both groups
directed their vitriol at religious and ethnic minorities. In
were released by the end of 2018, and churches in the area
February 2018, Minister of Religious Affairs and Culture U
were allowed to reopen.
Aung Ko recommended to the State Sangha Maha Nayaka
Christians beyond Kachin and northern Shan
Committee—Ma Ha Na, the official monk-led association
states similarly experienced threats. In June 2018,that manages Burma’s Buddhist clergy—that it monitor
UNHCR announced that Chin refugees from Burmaand discipline Buddhist monks’ behavior so as not towere no longer in need of international protection, amalign Buddhism. In August 2018, Buddhist nationalists
decision that could rescind their refugee status. The
protested in Rangoon following Ma Ha Na’s July decision
decision affected tens of thousands of Chin refugees
to ban the Buddha Dhamma Parahita Foundation (onceand asylum-seekers residing in Malaysia and India.
called Ma Ba Tha, but in May 2017 Ma Ha Na ordered it to
UNHCR contended that Chin are no longer fleeing
cease using that name and remove all signage).
Burma, but they are also not returning to their homes.
Despite these encouraging actions, Burma’s long(In March 2019, after the reporting period, UNCHR
standing challenges with hatred and violence directedannounced that “Chin refugees may still have ongoat religious and ethnic minorities continued in 2018.
ing international protection needs” and that it would
Over the last decade in Burma, the rapid rise of internet
be “maintaining their refugee status.”) International
penetration, mobile phone usage, and in particular thehuman rights advocates remain concerned about ongoubiquity of Facebook as the primary source of news anding human rights violations in Burma; for instance,
information—as well as other social media platforms—
USCIRF received reports that both state and nonstatecatapulted the country into the digital age. At a time
actors continued in 2018 to intimidate and harass
when Burma itself was also rapidly opening, the influx
Chin Christians—including to compel them to convert
of information not choreographed by state propaganda
to Buddhism under threat of eviction—and various
was overwhelming, on the one hand creating new
administrative discriminations prevented them from
communication channels, and on the other providing
obtaining land to use forpeople the tools to quickly
religious purposes. Also,
spread rumors that had
during 2018 and early
deadly consequences. In
In Burma, some observers have noted
2019 the ongoing conflict
Burma, some observersthat the rapid rise of
between the military andhave noted that the rapid
false information through social media
the Arakan Army, an ethdissemination of false
may be a precursor to genocide.
nic armed organization,
information throughprompted some Chin tosocial media may be aflee and deterred others
precursor to genocide.
who were internally displaced—primarily Buddhists
In March 2018 remarks at the UN Human Rights
and Christians—from returning to their home villages.
Council, Marzuki Darusman, chairperson of the
The situation in and around Chin State remained preIndependent International Fact-Finding Mission (FFM)
carious enough that in January 2019, shortly after the
on Myanmar, stated, “Hate speech and incitement toreporting period, the U.S. Embassy in Burma updated
violence on social media is rampant, particularly on
its travel advisory, recommending, among other things,
Facebook. To a large extent, it goes unchecked.” The
that individuals not travel to Paletwa Township in Chin
FFM’s detailed findings released in September 2018
State “due to civil unrest and armed conflict” and notalso noted that nationalists used Facebook and othering overall civil unrest in Chin State.
materials in hate campaigns that incited anti-Muslim,

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26

in particular anti-Rohingya, sentiment, and the miliDuring the year, various forms of arbitrary arrest andtary used Facebook to make unsupported claims about
detention continued, particularly in Rakhine, Kachin,alleged insurgent-led violence in Rakhine State. (Theand Shan states, and some detainees have described
FFM paid particular attention to Facebook, noting that it
ill treatment at the hands of the military based on their“is clearly by far the most common social media platform
religious and ethnic identity.
in use in Myanmar.”) Moreover, Burma’s government
In September 2018, a court sentenced two Reuters
has used Facebook—and state-run media—in ways thatreporters from Burma—Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo—toviolated human rights:
seven years in prison within January 2018, thehard labor under the cologovernment’s Informanial-era Official Secrets. . . some detainees have describedtion Committee, created
Act for their groundill treatment at the hands of thein 2016 purportedly to
breaking investigation
military based on theirrelease news about Rakhinto the December 2017
religious and ethnic identity.
ine State, posted on its
massacre of 10 Rohingya
Facebook page the names
Muslims in Inn Din
and photos of more thanVillage in Rakhine State.
1,300 Rohingya Muslims it deemed “terrorists”; accordLawyers filed appeals on their behalf, but at the end ofing to the chair of the FFM, the post included children
the reporting period, both remained in prison. A former
and was done “without any form of due process.”
police captain was released from prison in January 2019,
In the past, the government of Burma has blocked
just after the reporting period, after being sentenced to a
Facebook in an attempt to stop the spread of false inforyear in prison following his admission in court that themation that could lead to violence. However, government Reuters journalists were framed; he subsequently lostand military authorities and offices regularly use
his job and his family was evicted from their home.
Facebook accounts in an official capacity to disseminate
In December 2018, a court sentenced Kachin activinformation that is discriminatory and even factuallyists Lum Zawng, Nang Pu, and Zau Jat to six months
incorrect, often to the detriment of religious and ethnic
in prison for allegedly defaming the military while
minorities, particularly Rohingya Muslims. At multipeacefully protesting the military’s actions earlier in theple times during 2018, Facebook banned Ma Ba Tha’s
year trapping civilians—many of them Christians—in apresence on the site and blocked pages run by nationalist
conflict zone and cutting them off from humanitarianmonks and members of the military—including fireassistance during ongoing fighting with the Kachinbrand monk U Wirathu and Senior General Min Aung
Independence Army.
Hlaing, respectively; several of the individuals whose
In a positive development, on April 17, 2018, Burpages were removed were also sanctioned by the United
ma’s president granted amnesty to more than 8,500
States, the EU, Canada, and Australia. In an Octoberprisoners, several of whom were political and reli2018 human rights impact assessment commissioned
gious prisoners, including two Kachin Baptist leaders.
by Facebook, nonprofit Business for Social ResponsibilDumdaw Nawng Lat and Lang Jaw Gam Seng—bothity (BSR) reported that Facebook removed accounts “tomembers of the Kachin Baptist Convention—were servprevent [the account holders] from using Facebook to
ing prison sentences for allegedly supporting the Kachin
further inflame ethnic and religious tension.”Independence Army after they assisted local journalists
following a 2016 military airstrike on St. Francis Xavier
Arrests and Imprisonments
Catholic Church in Mong Ko.
As of December 2018, the Assistance Association for
U.S. POLICY
Political Prisoners (Burma) calculated 327 political prisThe U.S. government provides financial aid to Burmaoners in the country, including those currently serving
on a number of fronts; since the August 2017 violence insentences and those awaiting trial both inside and outRakhine State, the amount of humanitarian assistanceside prison, a 39 percent increase from December 2017.

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The State Department’s interviews with Rohingya Muslims indicated that “perpetrators of the violence singled
out community or religious leaders as their targets insome areas,” and some respondents described “the military’s desecration of sacred texts” and “soldiers burningor urinating on [Qur’ans].” Military personnel raped
women and girls in mosques and madrassas, as wellas in other structures. To the dismay of many humanrights advocates, the State Department did not label theabuses against Rohingya Muslims as genocide or crimes
against humanity despite robust supporting evidence.
In November 2018, Vice President Michael R. Pence
met with Burma’s state counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi,
in Singapore and said that the “violence and persecution by military and vigilantes that resulted in driving
700,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh is without excuse.”
In 2018, both chambers of Congress advanced
legislation that would have sanctioned Burma’s military for abuses against Rohingya Muslims, but that
language ultimately was removed from the John S.
McCain National Defense Authorization Act for FY2019(P.L. 115-232). However, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-409) restricted U.S. funds frombeing used for military education and training andmilitary financing programs in Burma. Also, the Houseof Representatives in December 2018 passed a resolution (H.Res.1091) that labeled the atrocities against
Rohingya Muslims as both crimes against humanity
and genocide, supported additional targeted sanctions
on the perpetrators, and called for the release of the twoReuters journalists.
The State Department last redesignated Burma as a
CPC in November 2018. In lieu of prescribing sanctions
specific to the CPC designation, the State Department
again applied “double-hatted” sanctions against Burma,in this case extending the existing arms embargo
restrictions referenced in 22 CFR 126.1.

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TIER 1 BURMA

reached new levels. In September 2018, then Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley announced $185 million in
additional funding, the majority for Rohingya Muslim
refugees and host communities in Bangladesh. The
influx of aid brought total U.S. assistance in addressing
the Rakhine State crisis to nearly $389 million since2017. In April 2018, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom Samuel D. Brownback visited
Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, to meet with Rohingya Muslim
refugees and Bangladeshi officials, and in May 2018, U.S.
Agency for International Development administrator
Mark Green traveled to Burma and Bangladesh to meetwith stakeholders impacted by the crisis. At the July 2018
Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom held in Washington, DC, participating delegations issued a Statement
on Burma about the discrimination that religious
minorities “including Muslims, Christians, and Hindus”
face because of their beliefs.
In August 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
sanctioned four Burmese commanders and two military
units “for their involvement in ethnic cleansing in Burma’s Rakhine State and other widespread human rights
abuses in Burma’s Kachin and Shan States.” The sanctions, pursuant to Executive Order 13818, are in addition
to the December 2017 sanctioning of Burmese general
Maung Maung Soe—who was subsequently fired—andcame two months after Canada and the EU sanctioned
eight military, police, and border guard commanders.
In September 2018, the State Department released
a report documenting atrocities in northern RakhineState. The report revealed systematic abuses against
Rohingya Muslims—including a pattern of violence
leading up to the October 2016 and August 2017 crackdowns—and stated that the military’s operations in
Rakhine State were “well-planned and coordinated”
and “explicitly targeted Rohingya, [leaving] neighboring
non-Rohingya sites (e.g., Buddhist stupas)” untouched.

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLICTIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGS
Religious freedom conditions in the Central African Republic(CAR) trended negatively in 2018. Armed actors continued
to control an estimated 80 percent of the country, vying forresources and territory, and attacking civilians and communities based on their religious and ethnic identities, including
mass attacks against places of worship. Infrastructure generally, and roads in particular are extremely poor, inhibiting the
movement of security and aid actors to many towns across
CAR. Government representatives also feared for their safety,lack funding, and are unable to reach many communities. In
May 2018, at least 15 people were killed in an attack on theNotre Dame de Fatima church in Bangui, and in November, atleast 112 civilians—including two priests—were killed when
an armed group attacked a displaced persons camp near the
Catholic Cathedral in Alindao. Also, in 2018, the government
took no apparent action to rebuild or restore the hundredsof mosques destroyed in the 2014 sectarian violence. Marginalization of Muslims continued, as well as limitations toMuslims’ free movement and unequal representation ingovernment. Justice and reconciliation efforts also remain
stalled, and an ongoing culture of impunity for human rights
and religious freedom violations threatens efforts toward
long-term stability and reconciliation. The CAR government
has failed to acknowledge religious freedom issues and has
lacked the will to address them in areas within its capacity
to reach and work.
Given the systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of freedom of religion, USCIRF again recommends in 2019 that CAR
be designated as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC,
under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), as it hasdone every year since 2015. The U.S. Department of State has
not designated CAR as a CPC.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Increase engagement with CAR
authorities, the United Nations (UN),and international donors to ensurethat issues related to ending sectarian
violence and impunity, increasing interfaith reconciliation, and affirming therights of religious freedom and religious
minorities are supported and raised inall engagements with relevant parties;• Increase efforts to achieve accountability for human rights violations,
including through:• Assisting the UN Security Council insanctioning armed actors responsible for organizing and/or engaging in28

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sectarian violence, ethnic cleansing,and crimes against humanity; and• Funding programs to reestablish
and professionalize CAR’s judiciaryand to support the Special Criminal
Court (SCC);• Press CAR authorities to undertake
initiatives to ensure that Muslims havea future in the country by:• Rebuilding destroyed Muslim
mosques and properties;• Ensuring Muslim participation ingovernment administration, security
forces, and police units;• Safeguarding sustainable returnsof Muslim refugees and internallydisplaced persons (IDPs) to theirhomes; and• Expanding reconciliation programs
and interfaith dialogue to rural
areas; and• Increase funding for peace and security initiatives; bolster humanitarianassistance for refugees, IDPs, andreturnees, and rebuilding projects; andcollaborate with humanitarian actors tocollect data on religious demographics
to more effectively protect religious
freedom and minorities.

TIER 1 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

COUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Central African Republic

POPULATION
5,745,062

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
35% Indigenous Beliefs
25% Protestant
25% Roman Catholic
15% Muslim(Animist beliefs are also integrated into Christian andMuslim practices.)

GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHS
N/A*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook

GOVERNMENT
Presidential Republic

BACKGROUNDThe Central African Republic (CAR) ranks at the bottomof the United Nations (UN) Human Development Index(188 out of 189), and extremely poor infrastructure
inhibits development in education, security, and theeconomy. CAR also ranks last on the Global Hunger
Index (119 out of 119), and a majority of the population
live below the international poverty line. CAR has struggled with a series of coups and governance and security
challenges since independence in 1960, with one of thebiggest crises beginning in late 2012 and leading to an
escalation in violations of human rights, including religious freedom. Around 50 percent of the population are
Christian—nearly evenly split between Protestants andRoman Catholics, and 15 percent are Muslim. However,religious identities in CAR are syncretic in many ways,
with people throughout the country integrating otherindigenous beliefs into the ways they practice theirfaith and live their lives. Although people identify mostclosely with their ethnic and tribal groups, religious
identity is important to many Central Africans, and religious leaders wield significant influence in society.
For decades, ethnic and religious resentments
have been exacerbated by and closely interlinked witheconomic and political grievances. These issues wereheightened in 2013 when the mostly Muslim Séléka
militias overthrew then President Francois Bozize, a

Christian. Following the atrocities committed against
the mainly non-Muslim populations during the coup,
including by Chadian and Sudanese mercenary fighters,
mostly Christian anti-balaka (anti-machete) groups
formed and conducted reprisal attacks on civilians
perceived to be Muslim or of an ethnic group alignedwith the Séléka. Since then, the armed groups known as“ex-Séléka,” “anti-balaka,” or “self-defense groups” have
evolved and conducted attacks against communities
and places of worship based on their religious identity. The sectarian conflict heightened already hostileinterreligious relations and rhetoric, displaced morethan one million people, killed thousands, and led tothe destruction of 417 out of 436 mosques in the country.
In December 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry on
the Central African Republic (COI) issued a report thatfound a “pattern of ethnic cleansing committed by theanti-balaka in the areas in which Muslims had been
living,” and UN officials warned of the risk of genocide. In some cases, Muslims were forced to convert toChristianity or hide their religious identity to be safe
from anti-balaka attacks. In response to the crisis, in2014 the UN deployed the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central
African Republic, or MINUSCA, which had more than
14,000 personnel posted in the country at the end of thereporting period. In 2015, under transitional president

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Catherine Samba-Panza, the Special Criminal Court
certain communities and locations based on ethnic and(SCC) was also established in order to address grievous
religious identity or for other reasons. International andhuman rights abuses committed since 2003. The Bangui
domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also
Forum on National Reconciliation paved the way toward warned about the impact of hate speech and incitement
the 2016 election of current president Faustin-Archange
to violence in CAR dividing communities along religious
Touadéra. In 2016, CAR adopted a new constitution,lines. For the first time, in January 2018, the UN Security
which enshrines freedom of religion and belief andCouncil also added the potential for sanctions desigprohibits religious fundamentalism and intolerance.
nations of individuals and entities that commit “actsNevertheless, respect for the rule of law and judicial
of incitement to violence, in particular on an ethnic or
accountability remain core challenges.
religious basis” in its extension of the existing sanctions
A total of 2.5 million people are estimated to be
regime on CAR.
in need of humanitarian assistance. According to the
While armed actors coalesced in 2013 and 2014 along
UN, there were 640,969 IDPs in CAR at the end of 2018,
religious lines, many allegiances have since shifted: someas well as hundreds of thousands of refugees in neighgroups have merged across religious lines, and fighting
boring Cameroon, thebetween factions with the
Democratic Republic ofsame religious identity has
the Congo, and Chad.
also occurred. NeverFor the first time . . . the UN Security
Updated religious
theless, during the past
Council added the potential for
demographic data are senyear there was anothersanctions designations of individuals
sitive and remain largely
escalation in attacks onand entities that commit “acts ofunavailable, including
civilians targeted based onincitement to violence, in particular on an
statistics on the numbers
religious identity. Armedethnic or religious basis” . . .
of Muslims who haveactors frequently attacked
returned to CAR, or figurescivilians and IDP campsof displaced Muslims andin reprisals or based on
Christians in the IDP camps.
the belief that a camp was harboring enemy fighters. In
In addition to the UN, several external actors have
March, Catholic priest Father Joseph Desire Angbabataintervened in CAR, including the African Union, France, was killed, reportedly while trying to protect refugees atand Russia, in furtherance of various peace and security
his church compound in Bambari. In May, in the capigoals. After the reporting period, on February 6, 2019,tal Bangui, at least 15 people—including a priest—werearmed group leaders signed a new peace deal in Sudan,
killed in an attack on the Notre Dame de Fatima church
which mentioned a commitment to religious freedom
and associated fighting after the attack. Civilians reportand human rights.
edly carried the body of the priest toward the presidential
palace afterward in demonstration. In July, the vicar genRELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018eral of Bambari was killed, reportedly by members of the
Religious Sectarian Violence andUnion for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC),
Ethnic Cleansing
the predominantly Muslim ex-Séléka militia.
On November 15, UPC fighters and Muslim civilIn 2018, leaders of armed groups, as well as some govians
attacked, burned, and ransacked an IDP campernment officials, continued to manipulate ethnic andlocated at the Catholic mission in Alindao. Alindao
religious identity issues and deliberately foment further
has faced recurring sectarian conflict over the past
conflict along religious lines to serve their politicalseven years, and Christians and Muslims remainedand economic interests. At the same time, the conflictcontinued to be very complex, and religion remained just separated throughout 2018. MINUSCA forces failed toprotect the camp and reportedly allowed anti-balaka
one of several drivers. Due to the competition for control
fighters to operate there, putting the IDPs at greaterover the rich mineral resources and territory, it was not
risk. Human rights and humanitarian actors initiallyalways clear whether attacks were intended to targetU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

Harmful Practices and Sectarian Conflict

Muslim populations often reside in separate enclaves,such as in Bangui where most Muslims live in the PK5neighborhood. In Bangassou, where Muslims remained
trapped in the Catholic church compound since a 2017attack by anti-balaka fighters, religious leaders haveplayed a key role in protecting civilians. In April 2018,
two of the most influential religious leaders in CAR—
Cardinal Dieudonné Nzapalainga, the archbishop of
Bangui, and Imam Oumar Kobine Layama, president of
the Islamic Community of the Central African Republic(an NGO)—mediated an agreement between armed
actors to ensure civilians’ ability to move safely outsideof the compound.
During USCIRF’s visit to CAR in 2017, senior officials were dismissive of Muslims’ safety concerns andacknowledged neither the religious dynamics of the conflict nor that it has resulted in gross violations of religious
freedom. Reports from NGOs suggest that in 2018, thegovernment took few steps
to address these concerns.

TIER 1 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

reported between 70 and 100 people—including two
priests—were killed in the massacre, and more than
18,000 people were impacted by the destruction of thecamp. MINUSCA investigated the incident and reported
at least 112 civilians were killed. In December, an IDP
camp at the Catholic church in Ippy was also attacked.
During the year, sectarian violence also occurred in
Bambari, Batangafo, and Bria, among other locations,causing additional deaths, destruction of property, anddisplacement of thousands of civilians.

In recent years, children in CAR have also been targeted because of their perceived religion or community
affiliation; in 2018, they continued to experience brutal
violence and forced recruitment and enslavement byarmed groups.
In 2018, abuses of individuals accused of practicing
witchcraft continued to bea serious concern. Individuals who are accused. . . children in CAR have also been
Peace, Justice,of practicing witchcraft
targeted because of their perceived
and Reconciliation
or sorcery may be buried
religion or community affiliation [and]In 2018, some progressalive or otherwise killedin 2018 they continued to experience
was made toward endingby fellow citizens, or
brutal violence and forced
impunity and building
arrested by authorities
recruitment . . . by armed groups.
justice and peace in CAR.
and formally prosecuted.
The African Union has
At the Bimbo prison for
taken the lead on peace
women outside of Bangui,
processes, but parallel efforts have arisen in light ofat least 20 women were reportedly detained in 2018 forpractices of charlatanism and sorcery. Anti-balaka fight- failures of past agreements. Armed actors continued tomeet and negotiate in 2018. The latest iteration resulted
ers have also targeted civilians suspected of practicing
in a peace agreement signed in February 2019—after
witchcraft. Women, children, the pygmy population,
the reporting period—in Khartoum, Sudan, giving
and the elderly are most commonly the victims of aburise to new optimism. The agreement identified thesive witchcraft accusations in CAR.
destructive role that political manipulation of ethnic
Discrimination against Muslims
and religious identities has had on the country, andIn 2018, Muslims continued to face marginalization,
signatories reiterated their commitment to respecting
discrimination, and limitations to free movement
fundamental freedoms, including religious freedom
around the country. Since the displacement and killing
and related human rights. However, the agreementof most of the minority Muslim population from CAR
quickly faced setbacks. Religious leaders also continover the past four years, it is unknown how many Musued to engage in other fora for the promotion of peacelims remain in the country. Muslims historically faced
between religious groups and the cessation of violence.
societal and structural discrimination, receiving low
They wield political influence and significant authority
representation in government and diminished accessamong the population, and have had success in someto health care, education, and identity documents.
local peacebuilding efforts.

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The SCC, the hybrid court established in 2015, wasnominated in July 2018 as the U.S. ambassador to the
not fully staffed until 2017, and investigations into humanCentral African Republic and confirmed in January
rights abuses did not begin until October 2018. Prior to2019, after the reporting period. The United States
the start of SCC operations, anti-balaka leader Rodrigue
continued to provide assistance for peacekeeping
Ngaibona was convicted in January 2018 in the Bangui
operations and security sector reform, and is the largest
Criminal Court—the first such conviction since the start
donor of humanitarian funding for CAR. The Unitedof the current war. In 2018, MINUSCA also arrested miliStates supported the renewal of MINUSCA’s mandate
tia members accused of human rights violations.
in December. In 2018, the United States also provided
In November 2018, anti-balaka commander Alfred
support to peacebuilding and natural resource manageYékatom, known as “Rambo,” was arrested in CAR andment projects, such as the U.S. Agency for Internationaltransferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Development’s (USAID) funding for the Central African
His arrest warrant and charges relate to systematic andInterfaith Peacebuilding Partnership and other initiawidespread attacks on civilians and property based ontives that specifically address religious divisions andreligious identity, andhate. The United States
reference Yékatom’s use
continued its support forof “violent and inflamthe African Union-led
In November 2018 anti-balaka
matory rhetoric,” orders
peace initiative.
commander Alfred Yékatom . . . wasof subordinates to “killIn May 2018, thearrested in CAR and transferred to the
Sélékas and Muslims”
White House released
International Criminal Court.
and “destroy the Muslims
a press statement onhouses so they will go
religious violence againstback to their country,”
civilians and urged
and other orders to attack mosques and torture and kill.
officials and security forces to provide security for all
This was only the second arrest of an anti-balaka leader
citizens regardless of faith. On May 10, 2018, President
by the ICC. Human rights groups continued to call for
Donald J. Trump declared that the national emergency
greater justice and accountability.
related to security issues in CAR, as begun by Executive
Order (EO) 13667 in 2014, would continue for an addiU.S. POLICY
tional year. EO 13667 imposes sanctions on individuals
The United States maintains diplomatic relations
contributing to the conflict in CAR, including any
with CAR, but for the majority of the reporting period
persons responsible for attacks on religious sites, or locathe ambassador post was vacant; Lucy Tamlyn wastions where civilians are seeking refuge.

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CHINATIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in China trended negative
after the new Regulations on Religious Affairs—implemented
on February 1, 2018—effectively banned “unauthorized” religious teachings and required religious groups to report any
online activity. Moreover, the Chinese government continued
to persecute all faiths in an effort to “sinicize” religious belief,a campaign that attempts not only to diminish and erase theindependent practice of religion, but also the cultural andlinguistic heritage of religious and ethnic communities, particularly Tibetan Buddhists and Uighur Muslims. During thesummer, reports emerged that the government had detained
800,000 to possibly more than two million Uighur and other
Muslims in Xinjiang. It also deployed one million party cadresto live with Uighur Muslim families and report on any signsof “extremist” religious behavior. The Chinese government
continued to use advanced surveillance technology and othermeasures to repress Tibetan Buddhists. In September, theVatican reached a provisional agreement with China that would
allow the government a role in the appointment of new bishops; nevertheless, repression of the underground Catholic

Church increased during the latter half of the year. The government also raided or closed down hundreds of Protestanthouse churches, including Zion Church, Rongguili Church, andEarly Rain Covenant Church. Meanwhile, more than 900 Falun
Gong practitioners were arrested during the year simply forpracticing their beliefs or distributing literature about the Falun
Gong. In March 2018, jurisdiction over religious affairs wastransferred from the government to an organ of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), further eroding the barrier between
religion and party.
Based on the Chinese government’s systematic, ongoing,
egregious violations of religious freedom, USCIRF again findsthat China merits designation in 2019 as a “country of particularconcern,” or CPC, under the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA). The U.S. Department of State has designated China
as a CPC since 1999, most recently in November 2018. USCIRF
recommends that the State Department redesignate China asa CPC under IRFA and maintain the existing, ongoing export
restrictions under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of1990 and 1991 (P.L. 101-246).

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Integrate religious freedom andrelated human rights diplomacy into
ongoing trade negotiations, theU.S.-China Diplomatic and Security
Dialogue, and all other levels of the
U.S.-China bilateral relationship, anddevise messaging tailored to specificreligious communities in China;• Prioritize funding for programs that
seek to preserve the cultural andlinguistic heritage and identity of religious and faith communities in China
and to document the experiences ofrefugees and asylum-seekers from
China who have suffered particularly
severe violations of religious freedom;

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• Coordinate with U.S. allies and partners,
especially in Asia, on targeted sanctions,visa restrictions, public diplomacy, andother actions taken in response to China’s crackdown on religious freedom;• Direct the State Department to workwith foreign governments and theUnited Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees to prevent the
refoulement of individuals from China
seeking asylum on the basis of religious
persecution; and• Work with U.S. businesses, nongovernmental organizations, andacademic institutions to counter
Chinese government influence inthe United States that are designed
to suppress information about or
advocacy in response to violations ofreligious freedom in China.
The U.S. Congress should:• Support legislation that would increase
restrictions on the export to China
from the United States of advanced
technology—including surveillanceand biometric equipment—that hasenhanced the Chinese government’s
capacity to monitor and harass religious and ethnic communities; andraise the profile of religious freedom in
the U.S.-China relationship.

TIER 1 CHINACOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
People’s Republic of China
GOVERNMENT
Communist StatePOPULATION
1,384,688,986
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHS
Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism;officially atheist

BACKGROUND
Article 36 of China’s constitution grants citizens “freedom of religious belief” and directs the government
to protect “normal religious activities.” However, thisfreedom is limited by the requirement that religious
activities cannot “disrupt public order, impair the healthof citizens or interfere with the educational system.” The
constitution also bans religious organizations that are“subject to any foreign domination,” a provision the government has used to crack down on Uighur and other
Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and otherreligious groups.
In 2018, President Xi Jinping continued to consolidate power; in March, the National People’s Congress
voted to abolish presidential term limits, effectively
allowing Xi to serve as president for life, and added “Xi
Jinping Thought” to the national constitution. Throughout 2018, the government continued to crack down onhuman rights defenders and religious freedom advocates. For example, Gao Zhisheng, a prominent humanrights lawyer known for defending religious minorities,
remained disappeared in 2018 with no information
available about his whereabouts and wellbeing. On
February 26, 2018, Dr. Li Baiguang, a human rights
lawyer who represented Chinese pastors and others
targeted for exercising their right to freedom of reli-

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
18.2% Buddhist
5.1% Christian
1.8% Muslim
21.9% Folk Religions
52.2% Unaffiliated
OTHER GROUPS
Taoist, Hindu, Jewish, and others*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook

gion, unexpectedly passed away. Also during the year,
judicial authorities revoked or suspended the licensesof more than a dozen human rights lawyers, including those who represented defendants prosecuted fortheir religious activities. As of October 11, 2018, theU.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China(CECC) counted at least 1,422 prisoners of consciencein Chinese prisons (not including the mass detention ofMuslims in Xinjiang). Of those, approximately 700 prisoners—including 145 monks, priests, or other religious
leaders—were detained, at least in part, for engaging in
religious practices that the Chinese government deemed“unauthorized.” The government also arrested dozens ofjournalists and contributors to news websites, including
some who were charged with “divulging state secrets” fortheir coverage of religious freedom violations.
On February 1, the new Regulations on Religious
Affairs came into effect, institutionalizing President
Xi’s policy on religion. The regulations detail strict registration criteria for religious organizations. Althoughregistering allows religious groups to apply for status as legal persons, many groups refuse to registerbecause doing so requires submitting to the directionof state-sanctioned patriotic religious associations.
The regulations ban “unauthorized” religious teachingand expand the role of local authorities in controlling

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religious activities. As a consequence, any religious
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018activity conducted online must be reported to local
In 2018, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) became
religious affairs departments. Religious groups must
increasingly hostile toward religion and what it deemedalso report any donations that exceed 100,000 yuan
to be “foreign” influences on certain religious groups.
($15,900). The regulations effectively ended the legal
At a conference in April, President Xi told party cadres
gray area that had existed for independent religiousthat religious adherents must “subordinate themselves
activity since the early 1980s.
to, and serve, the highest interests of the country” andIn March 2018, the Chinese government announced “actively practice socialist core values.” The governthat it was transferring jurisdiction over religious affairs
ment-affiliated Chinese Christian Council and Chinese
from the State Administration of Religious Affairs
Islamic Association announced five-year plans to(SARA)—a government institution—to the United Front“sinicize” Christianity and Islam, respectively. However,Work Department (UFWD), an organ of the CCP. For
even followers of Mahayana Buddhism and Taoism (alsomany religious groups, this meant the end of working
spelled Daoism), faiths that the government generally
relationships they might have had with SARA officials
has viewed as part of China’s “traditional cultures,”and the removal of a buffer—however limited—between
experienced greater restrictions on their religious activreligion and party. In September, the UFWD launched
ity. In 2018, local authorities also closed or demolishedits first nationwide program to monitor the implementadozens of Buddhist and Taoist temples, as well as statues
tion of religious policies in provinces and municipalitiesof the Buddha and Lao-Tzu.
across the country.
International criticism of China increased during
Uighur and Other Muslims
the latter half of 2018 as the scale of the government’s
According to the State Department, since April 2017 thecrackdown on religious freedom and related human
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) governrights became more widely publicized. In August
ment under Communist Party Secretary Chen Quanguo
2018, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial
has detained 800,000 to possibly more than two milDiscrimination (UN CERD) criticized the Chineselion Uighur (also spelled Uyghur), Kazakh, Kyrgyz,
government’s repressive policies in Xinjiang and Tibet.
and other Muslims in internment camps. The Chinese
In September, the UN High Commissioner for Humangovernment initially denied the existence of the camps,
Rights called on China to
but later defended themallow UN investigators to
as a means to combat
visit Xinjiang and otherterrorism and provide. . . the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
locations in China (thisvocational training.
Region (XUAR) government . . . has
had not happened by
However, the detention ofdetained 800,000 to possibly more thanthe end of the reporting
prominent doctors, protwo million Uighur . . . and otherperiod). On November 6,
fessors, businessmen, andMuslims in internment camps.
2018, the Chinese governother professionals belied
ment went before the UN
the government’s justiHuman Rights Counfication for the camps.
cil for its Universal Periodic Review. Representatives
According to Uighur human rights groups, among thefrom 24 nations asked the Chinese government about
detainees were at least 242 Uighur public intellectuals,
religious freedom issues, but the Chinese delegation
including artists, journalists, and university professors,dismissed their questions as “not factual” and “politias well as 96 students. Most of the detainees have notcally driven.” At the end of the reporting period, several
been charged with a specific crime, but rather were
Muslim-majority countries—including Indonesia anddetained for religious behavior deemed “extremist,”
Malaysia—had all publicly expressed concerns to thesuch as having an “abnormal” beard, wearing a veil,
Chinese government about the mass incarceration ofaccessing religious materials online, or participatUighur and other Muslims.
ing in other “illegal” religious activities. According to

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former detainees, those in the camps were required toImin as part of the Commission’s Religious Prisoners ofrenounce Islam and swear loyalty to the CCP. DetainConscience Project.
ees routinely faced harsh treatment and unhygienic
Hui Muslims—a diverse group of around 10 milconditions in overcrowded facilities, leading to several
lion Chinese Muslims—have not experienced the same
reported deaths. Some were forced to work in privately
scale of repression as Uighur Muslims, but they did faceowned, state-subsidized factories.
increased restrictions on religious activities during theOutside the camps, the Chinese government conyear. In December 2018, local authorities shut downtinued to use intrusive measures to create an “open-air
three mosques in Yunnan Province, claiming they had
prison” in Xinjiang, including discriminatory profilingconducted “illegal religious education.” In some cases,
at armed checkpoints and police stations; travel restricpolice physically attacked worshippers who protested
tions both within and outside of China; and Global
the mosque closures. Authorities in Ningxia Hui AutonPositioning System (GPS) tracking systems, facial and iris omous Region had planned to demolish the newly built
recognition, DNA sampling, and voice pattern samWeizhou Grand Mosque in August, but were forced topling to monitor Muslims. The regional capital Urumqi
postpone the demolition after hundreds of Muslims
also banned stores from using halal (Muslim dietary
protested. In Ningxia and Gansu provinces, local authorlaws) labels for nonfood products and services, and inities removed Arabic signs from buildings and forcibly
October launched a campaign against halal food andclosed Arabic-language schools. Meanwhile, there wererestaurants. Thousands of mosques have been shutreports of anti-halal groups harassing Muslims andtered or destroyed. In November 2018, a Chinese court
damaging halal restaurants. In December, Gansu andsentenced Abdughapar Abdurusul, a prominent Uighur
six other provinces abolished local halal food-identifibusinessman and philanthropist, to death for taking ancation standards, making it more difficult for Muslims
unsanctioned pilgrimage to Mecca. Starting in Decemto identify which foods are halal. In November, officials
ber 2017, the Xinjiang UFWD launched the “Pair Up andfrom Ningxia went to Xinjiang to study the internment
Become Family” program, which deployed more thancamps and signed a “counter-terrorism co-operation”
one million local government workers to live in Muslim
agreement with the XUAR government.
households for at least five days every two months toTibetan Buddhists
assess each family’s ideological views and report on any
In 2018, the Chinese government continued to pursue areligious activity. In an unprecedented level of intrusivestrategy of forced assimilation and suppression of Tibetan
ness, these “relatives” attended private family functions
Buddhism throughout Tibet. Authorities controlled
such as weddings and funerals, shared meals, posed inmonastic education, decided if religious venues could befamily photographs, and even slept in the same beds as
built or repaired, and restricted religious gatherings. In
their hosts. USCIRF received credible reports that Chisome parts of the Tibetan
nese security services andAutonomous Region
their affiliates attempted(TAR), local authorities
to harass and intimidate
In
some
parts
of
the
banned schoolchildren
Uighur Muslims living
Tibetan Autonomous Region . . . local
from attending religious
overseas, including in theauthorities
bannedschoolchildren
fromfestivals during their
United States.
attending religious festivals . . .
holidays. In February 2018,
Gulmira Imin, athe TAR Public Security
Uighur Muslim who
Bureau published a list of
was a local government“organized crimes,” which
employee at the timeeffectively banned civil society initiatives to promoteof her arrest, continued to serve a life sentence for her
Tibetan language and culture. In August, the governalleged role organizing protests in the regional capment introduced a policy requiring monks and nuns toital, Urumqi, in July 2009—an allegation she denies.
demonstrate “political reliability,” “moral integrity,” andThroughout the year, USCIRF advocated on behalf of Ms.

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willingness to “play an active role at critical moments”—a2009, including Drugkho, a former monk at Kirti Monasphrase human rights groups believe would require monks
tery, who set himself on fire on December 8, 2018, while
to oppose antigovernment protests. The government alsochanting for the return of the Dalai Lama. Meanwhile,
selected a group of monks and nuns to attend a three-day
Chinese authorities harassed and arrested Tibetans who
training session during the summer to prepare them topeacefully advocated for the protection of their religion
conduct propaganda campaigns in their monasteries.
and culture. In May 2018, renowned Tibetan language
On February 17, a large fire damaged Jokhang Temple inadvocate Tashi Wangchuk was sentenced to five years’
Lhasa, a UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientificimprisonment connected to his March 2016 arrest andand Cultural Organization) world heritage site that conJanuary 2017 indictment on alleged separatism charges;
tains important Tibetan Buddhist relics. Citing satellite
he remained in prison at the end of the reporting period.
imagery, human rights groups alleged that the Chinese
In other parts of Tibet, the Chinese government
government suppressed information about the extent ofmaintained tight control on Tibetans and religious andthe damage.
educational centers focused on the study of Tibetan
The Chinese government continued to accuse theBuddhism. In recent years, authorities forcibly evicted
Dalai Lama of blasphemy and “splittism,” and cracked
thousands of monks, nuns, and laypersons living in thedown on anyone suspected of so-called “separatist”
monastic communities of Larung Gar and Yachen Gar
activities. Monks and nuns who refused to denounce
in Sichuan Province and forced many of them to attend
the Dalai Lama or pledge loyalty to Beijing have been
“patriotic reeducation classes” for up to six months. In
expelled from their monasteries, imprisoned, andOctober 2018, Chinese authorities banned Larung Gar
tortured. The Chinese government protested foreignfrom holding the Dechen Shedrub festival—a major
officials meeting the Dalai Lama. Authorities also
Tibetan prayer event—for the third year in a row. In
tightened control over passports issued to Tibetans andDecember, authorities in Qinghai Province banned
blocked Tibetan pilgrims attempting to travel to Tibetanmonasteries from teaching Tibetan language classes toexile communities in India and Nepal. Several hundred
children (previously, such restrictions applied only to
Tibetans who attended teachings given by the Dalai
schools in the TAR).
Lama in Bodhgaya, India, had their Chinese passports
Christians
confiscated and destroyed upon their return. Because
On September 22, 2018, the Vatican and China reachedof the Chinese government’s policies, the number ofa provisional agreement under which the pope would
Tibetans from China who attended the Dalai Lama’s
rehabilitate seven bishops from the state-run Chineseteachings in 2018 was estimated to have decreased sigCatholic Patriotic Association (CCPA) who had beennificantly from previous years.
excommunicated, in return for a veto over any future
One prisoner whose whereabouts have been a secretappointments by the Chinese government. The deal wasfor more than two decades is Gedhun Choekyi Nyima.
controversial among Chinese Catholics, particularly
Selected by the Dalai Lama at the age of six as the 11th
because the Chinese government cited it as justification
Panchen Lama, Gedhun holds the second-highest posifor pressuring clergy and members of the undergroundtion in Tibetan Buddhism. Throughout the year, USCIRF
church to join the CCPA
advocated on behalf of(an estimated half of
the Panchen Lama as
China’s Catholics worpart of the Commission’s
In 2018, at least two undergroundship in underground
Religious Prisoners ofbishops were replaced bychurches). In 2018, at least
Conscience Project.
government-approved bishops.
two underground bishops
Dialogues between Beijing
were replaced by governand the Dalai Lama havement-approved bishops.
been stalled since January
In October and November, four priests from an under2010. In protest of repressive government policies, atground church in Hebei were taken into police custodyleast 157 Tibetans have self-immolated since February

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and forced to meet with CCPA bishops, who attempted toonline sales of the Bible. There were numerous reports
persuade them to join the state-run church. On Novemthroughout 2018 of authorities attempting to replace
ber 9, local authorities in Zhejiang Province detained
crosses, pictures of Jesus, and other symbols of the
Bishop Peter Shao Zhumin without charge; he was
Christian faith with images of Xi Jinping. In Henanreleased 14 days later, along with Father Lu Danhua ofProvince, local authorities required churches to remove
Lishui, who was arrested in December 2017. In addition,
the first commandment from lists of the Ten Commandthere were widespread reports of Chinese authorities
ments on the grounds that it placed loyalty to God above
closing underground Catholic churches, destroying
loyalty to the CCP.
crosses, confiscating Bibles and other religious materiHu Shigen, a church leader and religious freedomals, and otherwise restricting or interfering in religious
advocate, who was sentenced in 2016 to a 7.5-year senactivities. The crackdown has been especially severe intence for “subversion of government power,” remained
Henan Province, where churches received notices statin prison. Throughout the year, USCIRF advocated on
ing that children under 18 were forbidden from attending behalf of Mr. Hu as part of the Commission’s Religious
services such as Sunday school.
Prisoners of Conscience Project.
The Chinese government also intensified its
Falun Gong and Xie Jiao Groups
crackdown on Protestant groups that refused to join the
The persecution of the Falun Gong was initiated in 1999
state-run Three-Self Patriotic Movement (an estimatedby then President Jiang Zemin, who also created thehalf to two-thirds of Protestants worship in unregisinfamous 610 Office, an extrajudicial security apparatered house churches). According to religious freedom
tus wholly designed to eradicate the Falun Gong. The
advocates, more than 5,000 Christians and 1,000 church
Chinese government has classified the Falun Gong as
leaders were arrested in 2018 because of their faith orxie jiao, translated as either “evil cults” or “heterodox
religious practices (most of these arrests were shortteachings.” Under article 300 of the Chinese Criminal
term detentions that did not lead to criminal charges).
Code, belonging to one of these groups is punishable
Authorities closed down or demolished thousandswith three to seven years’ imprisonment or more.
of churches or religious sites, including Zion Church
Throughout 2018, authorities harassed, detained, andin Beijing; the Golden Lampstand Church in Shanxi
intimidated Falun Gong practitioners simply for pracProvince; and the Bible Reformed Church, House of
ticing their beliefs. There were reports that many of theDavid Church, and Rongguili Lane Church in Guangdetainees suffered physical violence, psychiatric abuse,dong Province. On December 9, police officers raided
sexual assault, forced drug administration, and sleep
the Early Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu, Sichuandeprivation. According
Province, and arrested
to Falun Gong advocates,
Pastor Wang Yi and more
the government impristhan 100 congregants.
. . . several Falun Gong practitioners
oned at least 931 Falun
Some of the congregants
were arrested for sending pro-Falun
Gong practitioners in
who were later released
messages over social media and for2018. During the summer,
claimed that police had
distributing Falun Gong pamphlets . . .
several Falun Gong pracbeaten them and forced
titioners were arrested forthem to sign a pledge
sending pro-Falun mesrenouncing the church. In
sages over social media and for distributing Falun Gong
December 2018, Pastor Wang and his wife were charged
pamphlets in a marketplace. In September, the Henan
with inciting “subversion of state power”; at the end of
Province Department of Education issued a document
the reporting period, they remained in secret detention
instructing universities to intensify the anti-xie jiao
while awaiting trial.
campaign and required students to take an online test
Even house churches that were not shut down
about xie jiao misconduct. Although the Chinese govfaced increased restrictions on their ability to conduct
ernment claimed that as of January 1, 2015, it had ended
religious activity, and in April, the government banned

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the practice of harvesting organs from prisoners (manyof whom are believed to be Falun Gong practitioners),
in 2018, human rights advocates, medical professionals,
and investigative journalists presented additional evidence that the practice continued on a significant scale.
In November, the Justice Bureau of Changsha, Hunan
Province, suspended for six months the law licenses of
two attorneys who defended Falun Gong practitioners
because they “denied the nationally recognized natureof a cult organization” in court. Meanwhile, in 2018,
the Chinese government harassed and arrested thousands of followers of other xie jiao groups, including
the Church of Almighty God. Many of those detained
during the year—whom the Church of Almighty God
estimates to be in the thousands—suffered torture andother abuses, in some cases resulting in deaths or unexplained disappearances while in custody.

Forced Repatriation of
North Korean Refugees
The Chinese government routinely violates its obligations under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention andits 1967 Protocol by forcibly returning individuals to
North Korea without evaluating their cases to determine if they qualify for refugee status. Some of these
individuals fled in part because of the North Korean
government’s repression of religion and related humanrights. After the new Regulations on Religious Affairs
went into effect in February, there were reports that
Chinese authorities had closed down several churches
frequented by North Korean defectors and deported
South Korean missionaries.

U.S. POLICY
In 2018, tensions between the United States and China
escalated over concerns about Beijing’s trade practices,
cybertheft of U.S. intellectual property and national
security secrets, and military activities in the region.
In September 2018, the United States announcedplans to levy tariffs of 10 percent on $200 billion worthof Chinese goods, with an additional increase to 25
percent by the end of 2018. However, at the G20 Summit in December, the United States and China reacheda temporary truce in the trade war and began tradenegotiations that remained ongoing at the end of thereporting period. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy continued

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to conduct freedom-of-navigation operations in theSouth China Sea. On December 1, Canadian authorities
detained Huawei’s chief financial officer at the requestof the U.S. government, allegedly because the company
had violated U.S. sanctions against Iran. U.S. officials
also became increasingly concerned about Chinese
government influence operations in the United States;
in February 2019, after the reporting period, the Government Accountability Office released a report about
Confucius Institutes at U.S. academic institutions.
Throughout 2018, U.S. government officials
voiced concern about deteriorating religious freedom conditions in China. On May 23, Secretary ofState Michael R. Pompeo raised the issue of religious
freedom when Chinese state councilor Wang Yi visited
Washington, DC. A State Department spokesperson
also condemned the Chinese government’s convictionof Tashi Wangchuk and its harassment of the Early
Rain Covenant Church. At the July 2018 Ministerial to
Advance Religious Freedom held in Washington, DC,participating delegations issued a Statement on China
concerning the government’s “significant restrictions
on religious freedom.” In an October 2018 speech, Vice
President Michael R. Pence warned that “a new wave of
persecution is crashing down on Chinese Christians,
Buddhists, and Muslims.” In November, the UnitedStates also expressed concern about the Chinese
government’s lack of adherence to its international
obligations on religious freedom at the second U.S.China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue.
Also in November, during the UN Universal Periodic Review of China, the U.S. delegation called upon
the Chinese government to release all Uighur Muslims
held in arbitrary detention; release any human rights
defenders currently imprisoned, including Tashi Wangchuk, Ilham Tohti, Huang Qi, and Wang Quanzhang;and cease interference in the selection and education of
Tibetan religious leaders. The United States also asked
about the Falun Gong and Christian church closures in
written questions submitted in advance.
Congress continued to criticize China’s crackdown on religious freedom in 2018. In December,
Congress passed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act(P.L. 115-409), which mandated appropriations for U.S.
government efforts to counter China’s strategic influence and expressed “grave concern” about constraints

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
CHAIR TENZIN DORJEE
If there is one country in the world that epitomizes CPC
designation it is China. Religious freedom only exists
in name but not in reality in China. China has sinicized and securitized religions for a political agenda.
The worst cases are in Tibet and the Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region. In Tibet, China has sinicizedand politicized the reincarnation system and micromanaged the study of Buddhism in monasteries thatare central to Tibetan Buddhism. Ironically, Chinese
government officials assert the right to choose reincarnations of all Living Buddhas of Tibet only to serve
their political agenda and domination. In this regard,
China forcibly disappeared Panchen Gedhun Choekyi
Nyima for decades and installed Gyaltsen Norbu forcontrol and showcase. In a most recent interview with
Reuters, His Holiness the Dalai Lama said his next
reincarnation could come from “here” (India)—a freecountry. According to His Holiness, China appears
to be more worried about his reincarnation than heis and nobody will actually trust and respect China’s
selection, and that would be solely China’s problem.
In the recent past, His Holiness mused that first Chinaneeds to subscribe to Buddhism and the reincarnation
system, then find reincarnations of Chairman Mao andDeng Xiaoping before it gets involved in finding his
next reincarnation. Unlike the Panchen Lama, China
cannot control the next reincarnation of the Dalai
Lama because he will reincarnate in a free country as
long as Sino-Tibetan issues persist. The winning cardis in the hand of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the
Tibetan people. Thus, the Sino-Tibetan conflict will
persist. In its separate rating, Freedom House’s 2018
Report found the religious and human rights conditions in Tibet second to Syria and worse than even
North Korea. Uighurs and Tibetans are the two most
oppressed minorities in China today.
In Xinjiang, as many as two million Uighurs are
estimated to have been detained in detention camps.
China has been using state of the art technology tomonitor social movement and religious activities
of Uighurs and Tibetans, including children. China
called the detention camps for Uighurs re-education
camps, and also, in its new white paper on Tibet, calledsystematic and egregious violations of religious freedom and human rights in Tibet democratic reform in
60 years of ruling Tibet. I ask China to respect religious
freedom, free all the Uighurs in detention camps,
and call for the immediate release of Panchen Lama,
Tashi Wangchuk, Gulmira Imin, and all prisoners ofconscience. As required by the Reciprocal Access toTibet Act, the State Department recently released its
first “well-documented” report on reciprocal access
restrictions to Tibet and also pushed back on China’s
criticism of the report. The Foreign Correspondents’
Club of China released its position paper calling for
unfettered access to the Tibet Autonomous Region andother Tibetan areas to gather accurate information
on human rights conditions in those areas. I strongly
recommend the U.S. government utilize the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and theReciprocal Access to Tibet Act.

TIER 1 CHINA

on religious freedom. Also in December, Congress
passed the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act (P.L. 115330), which requires the State Department to report on
the level of access Chinese officials granted U.S. diplomats, journalists, and tourists to Tibetan areas, andto deny U.S. travel visas to Chinese officials involved
in denying such access. In November, the House ofRepresentatives and the Senate both introduced the
Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2018 (H.R.7123 /S. 3622), which would have required the secretary ofstate to appoint a special coordinator for Xinjiang andto consider imposing sanctions on individual Chinese
officials; neither bill received a vote before the end of
the 115th Congress, though both bills were reintroduced in early 2019, after the reporting period.
The State Department last redesignated China asa CPC in November 2018. At the same time, Secretary
Pompeo extended the existing sanctions related to restrictions on exports of crime control and detection equipment.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
COMMISSIONER JOHNNIE MOORE
My personal opinion is that one of the most alarming
incidents as it relates to religious freedom in the entire
year was the decision by the Vatican to negotiate a
diplomatic relationship with China that resulted in
the recognition of government appointed bishops andwhich also—in effect—deposed prominent Chinese

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religious leaders who had persevered through horrificpersecution in previous generations in China, including
China’s most well-known Catholic leader.
Literally, within days of the Vatican negotiating
its deal, the Chinese used it as cover to embark upon
the closure of several of the nation’s largest and mostprominent unregistered church communities. That hascontinued. Being that the Vatican is both a Church anda State, it is my opinion that the Vatican now bears asignificant moral and legal responsibility to help solve
the problem which it helped created—albeit inadvertently—by providing China license to viciously crack
down on Christian communities (as cited in this report),
and by providing the Chinese government further cover
to continue its incomprehensible, inexcusable and inhumane abuses of Muslim citizens in the western part ofthe country.
While I am entirely for direct engagement on theseissues, including with the most severe violators in theworld, that engagement must not result in these typesof unintended consequences, as has been the case in
China. The Vatican made a terrible mistake, which it
must take seriously. This debacle must be dealt withurgently and seriously.

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ERITREATIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Eritrea trended the sameas in previous years, in spite of hopes raised with the historic July
2018 Eritrea-Ethiopia peace deal and again with the September
2018 signing of a second peace agreement in Saudi Arabia. The
agreement led to the opening of border crossings in September
2018, and trade, commercial flights, and phone calls between
the two countries resumed. However, with no improvement inreligious freedom and other human rights conditions in Eritrea,
the opening enabled a surge in Eritrean refugees freely crossing into Ethiopia. Only four religions are officially recognized in
Eritrea: the Eritrean Orthodox Church, Sunni Islam, the Roman
Catholic Church, and the Evangelical Church of Eritrea. But eventhese official religious groups are unable to practice their faith
freely because the Eritrean government regulates and interferes in their affairs. The government does not allow any otherreligious groups to register and treats them as illegal. It also
continues to forcibly conscript Eritreans and deny their rights topractice their religion or belief while in civil or military service.

Conscientious objection to service is prohibited, ultimately denying the religious freedom of Jehovah’s Witnesses and others.
The government continues to arrest and detain individuals who
disagree with its actions, including Patriarch Abune Antonios of
the Eritrean Orthodox Church, who has been under house arrest
since 2007. U.S. and United Nations (UN) officials estimate that
hundreds of people are currently imprisoned for their religious
beliefs, but in the extremely secretive and closed-off society
there are no official figures.
In light of these violations, USCIRF again finds in 2019 that
Eritrea merits designation as a “country of particular concern,”
or CPC, under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).
The U.S. Department of State has designated Eritrea as a
CPC repeatedly since 2004, most recently in November 2018.
USCIRF recommends that the State Department redesignate
Eritrea as a CPC under IRFA and maintain the existing, ongoingarms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1 of the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Use bilateral and multilateraldiplomatic channels to urge thegovernment of Eritrea to:• Release unconditionally and immediately detainees held on accountof their peaceful religious activities,
including Patriarch Antonios;• End religious persecution of unregistered religious communities, registersuch groups, and grant full citizenshiprights to Jehovah’s Witnesses; and• Extend an official invitation forunrestricted visits by the UN Special
Rapporteur on the situation ofhuman rights in Eritrea, the UN

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Special Rapporteur on freedom of
religion or belief, the UN Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention, andthe International Red Cross;• Seek a meeting for U.S. Embassy
officials with Patriarch Antonios; and• Encourage the African Union toestablish an accountability mechanism to investigate, prosecute, andtry individuals accused of committing
crimes against humanity in Eritrea,
as recommended in 2016 by the UN
Commission of Inquiry on Human
Rights in Eritrea and the UN Human
Rights Council.

The U.S. Congress should:• Contribute to the international community’s information-gathering efforts
about Eritrea by:• Requiring a report from the State
Department on the United States’
relationship with Eritrea and toevaluate efforts to address religious
freedom and other human rights
issues; and• Sending a congressional delegation
to Eritrea to focus on religious freedom and other human rights issues.

TIER 1 ERITREACOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
State of Eritrea
GOVERNMENT
Presidential Republic
POPULATION*
5,970,646

GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHS
Eritrean Orthodox Church, Sunni Islam, the Roman Catholic
Church, and the Evangelical Church of Eritrea
RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY**
48–50% Christian
48–50% Muslim*Estimate compiled from the CIA World Factbook**Estimates compiled from the U.S. Department of StateBACKGROUND
The Eritrean government highly regulates religious
practice, and there is little to no freedom of religion or
belief for people outside of the four officially recognizedfaith communities: the Eritrean Orthodox Church, Sunni
Islam, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Evangelical
Church of Eritrea. President Isaias Afwerki, leader of the
only political party permitted in the country—the Popular Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ)—vigorously
suppresses dissent and has ruled Eritrea with absoluteauthority since its independence from Ethiopia in 1993.
Policies toward religious communities are made with the
purported goals of avoiding conflict between religious
groups and secularizing society; but in effect the government harshly represses religious freedom. Individuals
who protest government actions or follow unapproved
religious beliefs may be reported on by their neighbors,dismissed from their jobs, have their bank accounts
closed, and be arrested, tortured, or forcibly disappeared. Also, freedom of the press, assembly, association,and speech are as restricted as the freedom of religion or
belief. While the constitution, in text, guarantees theserights, it has not been applied in practice since its ratification in 1997. Thousands of Eritreans are imprisoned
without formal charges; the 2015 and 2016 reports of the
UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea(COI-E) describe extensive use of torture and forced laborof prisoners.

Since breaking from Ethiopia in 1993, the Eritrean
government has required indefinite national service ofall physically and mentally capable adults between 18
and 70 years old. The COI-E and human rights organizations have deemed this service equivalent to slavery.
Religious practice is prohibited in the military, and conscripts are punished for possessing religious materials
or participating in religious gatherings. President Afwerki’s government has justified this service as necessary
due to the state of conflict with Ethiopia.
In July 2018—a few months after Abiy Ahmed wasconfirmed as Ethiopia’s new prime minister—Eritrea
and Ethiopia celebrated a historic shift in relations
toward peace in the Horn of Africa and made a Joint
Declaration of Peace and Friendship. Signing thepeace agreement resolved the border conflict andopened crossing points between Ethiopia and Eritrea
in September 2018. Many Eritreans and international
actors became hopeful that the peace would naturally
obligate the end of indefinite national service, but thisand other key reforms had not yet occurred by the endof the reporting period. Indefinite national service, in
addition to other human rights abuses, is a primary
driver of mass emigration from Eritrea. According to
the UN Refugee Agency, in the first month after the
opening there was an immediate surge in Eritreanscrossing into Ethiopia; around 10,000 new refugees
arrived, the majority of whom applied for asylum. By

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46

the end of the reporting period, Ethiopia was hostingat least 173,000 Eritrean refugees, and at least 118,000
were reported in Sudan. Without a significant effort tohalt human rights violations, steady migration flows
are likely to continue.
Following the signing of peace agreements in Julyin Asmara and in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in September
the UN Security Council unanimously voted to lift arms
embargoes and targeted sanctions on Eritrea. Eritrea
rapidly changed its reclusive and closed status and began
repairing diplomatic relations with Somalia and Djibouti.

and not afforded due process under the law. Members ofapproved religions are regularly arrested for protesting
government interference in their activities, and members of unregistered religious groups can be arrested if
found to be observing the illegal religion. In March 2018,the honorary president of the Al Diaa Islamic Schoolin Asmara died in detention, having been arrested anddetained in 2017 along with other colleagues for opposing government interference in the school. Muslims
protested following his arrest as well as upon his death,and hundreds were reportedly arrested and remained indetention at the end of the reporting period.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
In prison, praying aloud, singing, preaching,
Registrationand possessing religious books are also banned.
Arrested individuals have reported being asked to
The government uses difficult registration requirements
sign documents certifying that they renounce theiras a tool to limit the freedom of religion or belief and tofaith or that they join or return to the Eritrean Orthocontrol messages and narratives that do not favor the
dox Church, and if they do not, face transfer to worse
party in power. The government of Eritrea requires allconditions. First-hand accounts documented by the
religious group to apply for registration, but only the
UN and human rights groups describe physical abuse,
four approved communities—the Eritrean Orthodox
sexual violence, and torture as normal and ongoing
Church, Sunni Islam, the Roman Catholic Church, andpractices. Authorities
the Evangelical Churchneither inform familyof Eritrea—are allowed tomembers when someoperate since the polIn 2018, the government did not approve
one is arrested, nor
icy change in 2002, andany additional religious groups andprovide cause of arrest,
even then within certain
continued its repression ofaccess to the prisoner,
restrictions. President
nonofficial religious groups,
or information on theirAfwerki is reportedly aincluding Muslims and Christians.
health. Prisoners are
member of the Orthodox
often denied medical
Church, and has only suptreatment and many haveported the recognition ofdied in prison due to severe human rights abuses. Many
more established faith groups. Other religious commuprisons, including Mai-Serwa, reportedly use metal
nities, including Baha’is, the Presbyterian Church, theMethodist Church, and the Seventh-day Adventists, have shipping containers to hold large numbers of people.
The Meitir Prison Camp is notorious for subjecting
submitted applications in the past. Without formal regprisoners to cruel and inhumane treatment. Because
istration, other faith groups’ rights are denied; they areof extensive government secrecy and suppression ofprohibited from building or owning houses of worship or
engaging in religious practices such as praying in groups. access to information, accurate numbers of prisoners
are unknown. Worshippers are arrested in waves each
In 2018, the government did not approve any additional
year and it is unknown how many remain detained or
religious groups and continued its repression of nonoffihave been released. International religious and humancial religious groups, including Muslims and Christians.
rights groups work to independently and discreetly
Arbitrary Detention and Torture ofverify the location and number of prisoners. In 2018,
Religious Prisoners of Conscience
reports offered various estimates of imprisonments,
ranging from 300 to more than 1,000 religious leaders
Individuals, including children, are regularly arrested
and laity imprisoned.
and detained for their religious beliefs and practices

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a report to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) released in 2018, the government
In 2018, the Eritrean government took extreme meaattempted to justify its treatment of Jehovah’s Witnesses,
sures to address its perceived fears of social discord,alleging that the community causes discord and politinternational religious and political interference in theicizes their religion. Upon coming to power, President
country, and potential growth of religious fundamenAfwerki quickly revoked citizenship for all Jehovah’stalism. It vigorously and systematically suppressed
Witnesses because of their political neutrality during
freedom of religion or belief of groups outside of thethe war for independence and the 1993 referendum andapproved and controlled four. This included Pentecostal
for their continued conscientious objection to miliand Evangelical communities, which have been heavily
tary service. As a result, Witnesses have been denied
targeted and reportedly comprise the majority of religovernment identity documents, business and marriage
gious prisoners of conscience.
licenses, and land purchases. In addition, Witnesses
Authorities have not provided information onreportedly do not register for the 12th-grade due to theconditions or charges of the estimated hundreds ofrequirement that highChristians detained
school students complete
through door-to-door
that year of education
searches in 2017. Security
Many Evangelicals and Pentecostals
in tandem with militaryforces continued to arrest
have been detained for more thantraining, and are therePentecostals and Evan13 years, including several pastors . . .
fore unable to complete
gelicals for participating
their education.
in prayer meetings andWitnesses have been
religious ceremonies. In
arrested without charge
March 2018, authorities reportedly arrested 32 Chrisfor
practicing
aspectsof
theirreligion,such as holding
tians. In July, after flights resumed between Ethiopia
religious services or Bible study meetings in privateand Eritrea, Ethiopian Pentecostal preacher Suraphel
homes, and have been detained in poor conditions andDemissie traveled to Asmara to meet with Evangelidenied fair representation or public trial. Witnesses’ famcals and was seen preaching publicly. Security forces
ily members of different faiths have also been arrested
arrested more than 40 Christians whom they believed
and allegedly tortured. Three Witnesses have been in
to be greeting or meeting with the preacher. Also in
prison since 1994. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, ofJuly, 35 Christians belonging to unapproved denomiall prisoners for whom they have accounted, only one has
nations were reportedly released. The Christians had
ever been tried in court and sentenced. In January andbeen detained for at least four years and were forced toMarch 2018, Witnesses Habtemichael Tesfamariam andsign promises that they would no longer attend meetHabtemichael Mekonen, respectively—both of whomings or worship services of their churches.
authorities arrested 10 years prior—died while imprisMany Evangelicals and Pentecostals have been
oned at the Mai-Serwa Prison, where all but two Jehovah’s
detained for more than 13 years, including several pastors:
Witnesses are known to be held.
Pastor Kidane Weldou (since 2005) and Reverend Haile
Naizghi (since 2004) of the Full Gospel Church, Pastor Kiflu
Gebremeskel of the Southwest Full Gospel Church (since2004), and Pastor Meron “Million” Gebreselasie of the
Massawa Rhema Evangelical Church (since 2004). In June,
Pastor Ogbamichael Teklehaimanot of the Kale Hiwot
Church was released after being detained since 2005.

Jehovah’s Witnesses
Since 1994, Jehovah’s Witnesses have been denied
both basic citizenship rights and religious freedom. In

TIER 1 ERITREA

Pentecostals and Evangelicals

Recognized Religious Communities
The Eritrean government does not respect the religious
freedom of the officially permitted religious denominations and strictly controls their administration
and activities. Most Christian Eritreans are part of theEritrean Orthodox Tewahedo Church (part of the Oriental Orthodox church family), which estimates a global
membership of two million. Eritrea’s Muslim population
is predominantly Sunni, and the government does not

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TIER 1 ERITREA
48

recognize other forms of Islam. Much of the governwell as the arrests of teachers, based on the government’s
ment’s justification for controlling Islam—including
claims the schools were promoting fundamentalism. In
religious education—is based on fears of any religious
a purported effort to prevent exclusionist teachings or
expression changing or challenging the state, or of relidiscrimination based on religion, the government sent a
gious fundamentalism.
letter in September 2017 to heads of Orthodox, Catholic,
The government appoints leaders to key positions
and Islamic schools stating the schools must report to theand closely monitors their activities both in Eritrea as
public school administration and comply with the state
well as in the Eritrean diaspora religious communities,
education system. Some private Christian and Islamic
although the Eritrean government denies interferingschools were reportedly closed either at the end of 2017
in religious institutions and hierarchies. The Eritrean
or early 2018, while others were forced to become public
government has appointed the patriarch of the Eritrean
or change religious teachings and policies, such as being
Orthodox Church and the mufti of the Eritrean Muslim
closed on a holy day. Along with the letter, the governcommunity, as well as
ment also demanded lists
other lower-level religiousof students and directed
officials. Patriarch Antoschools to remove
An unknown number of Muslims andnios, who was replaced forreligious symbols, such
Christians remain in detention
not complying with govas wearing the hijab byfor protesting the government
ernment interference, hasMuslims or crosses byappropriation of their institutions.
been held under house
Christians. Authorities
arrest since 2007 and hasarrested many school
not been seen in public
officials and students forsince 2017. His case has been highlighted by USCIRF’s
protesting these changes as a violation of their schools’
Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project. The incident
and students’ freedom of religion or belief. Leaders of theresulted in a split among church members, with someAl Diaa Islamic School, including honorary presidentaligning to the newly appointed church leadership and
Hajji Musa Mohamed Nur, resisted the transformation ofothers remaining loyal to Patriarch Antonios.
their school and were arrested in October 2017. HunIn addition, the government tightly controls theirdreds of people protested these arrests, and were in turninteraction with international groups and members
also arrested. In March 2018, Nur’s body was delivered tohave been denied travel abroad to participate in relihis family—he died in detention and no cause of deathgious education or events sponsored by international
was provided. According to human rights groups andreligious organizations. Foreign travelers to Eritrea are
the UN, more than 800 people, including children, wererequired to obtain special permission to visit religious
arrested following his funeral.
institutions. When Eritrean clergy abstain from joining
U.S. POLICY
indefinite military service, the government has reportRelations between the United States and Eritrea
edly retaliated with additional collective restrictions onremained poor in 2018. Eritrea and the United States
the group. Protests of government appointments andhave not exchanged ambassadors since 2010. The
other interferences have been met with mass arrests,
United States provides no security or development
and security forces routinely fire live ammunition on
assistance to Eritrea, and the government of Eritrea
demonstrators. An unknown number of Muslims andexpelled the U.S. Agency for International DevelopChristians remain in detention for protesting the govment (USAID) in 2005. Eritrea remains extremely
ernment appropriation of their institutions.
closed off to international actors, and access to inforIn 2017, the government began another crackdown
mation is extremely limited; U.S. Embassy officials
on religious educational institutions based on a 1995
are highly restricted in their movements within the
proclamation that government should control all social
country. Eritrea has frequently accused the Unitedservices. The 1995 proclamation was also made followStates of smearing its reputation, spreading fabricateding the closure of Islamic schools and organizations as

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However, the 2018 peace negotiations between
Eritrea and Ethiopia caused a major shift in international
relations, with Ethiopia and other actors supporting
the lifting of sanctions on Eritrea. Although the UnitedStates originally expected to—but did not—see Eritrea
make progress on human rights issues as a precondition, it ultimately agreed to the lifting of UN sanctions.
On November 14, UNSCR 2444 (2018) passed unanimously, lifting sanctions on Eritrea and ending the
mandate of the SEMG. Many Member States supported
this resolution on the basis that the original conditions
for sanctions—including support for al-Shabaab andregional conflict—were no longer evident.
The United States first designated Eritrea as a CPC in
September 2004, and when redesignating Eritrea as suchin September 2005 the State Department announced specific restrictions under IRFA. The State Department mostrecently redesignated Eritrea as a CPC on November 28,
2018, and continued the associated arms embargo.

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TIER 1 ERITREA

information about its human rights situation, andbeing responsible for UN sanctions on the country.
Due to Eritrea’s longstanding security and borderissues in the region, the United States has endorsed avariety of UN resolutions and sanctions on the government and key individuals. These include: UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1907 (2009), which
imposed an arms embargo and sanctions on individuals
due to Eritrean support for armed opposition groups
and incitement of instability in the region; targeted
sanctions of Eritrean officials under Executive Order
13536; and UNSCR 2023 (2011) condemning destabilizing activity by Eritrea and expanding the mandate of the
UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (SEMG).
Until 2018 the United States consistently maintained
support for the arms embargo and the work of theSEMG, although the SEMG was prevented from fulfilling its mandate and was unable to visit Eritrea for eight
years due to Eritrean government barriers.

49

IRAN
TIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Iran trended in a negative direction relative to 2017, with the Iranian government
heightening its systematic targeting of Muslims (particularly
Sunni Muslims and Sufis), Baha’is, and Christians. The government arbitrarily detained, harassed, and imprisoned Baha’isbased on their religion and continued its long-term practice ofegregious economic and educational persecution of the community. Hundreds of Sufis were arrested and scores were sent
to solitary confinement and beaten in prison. Christians faced
a dramatic uptick in arrests from previous years, and Muslim
converts to Christianity continued to face severe persecution.
Sunni Muslims experienced discrimination in employment andpolitical leadership, and had difficulty obtaining permission tobuild mosques. A senior member of Iran’s government led ananti-Semitic conference in Tehran accusing Jews of manipulating the global economy and exaggerating the Holocaust. Shi’aMuslim reformers and dissenters faced prolonged detention

and the threat of execution. While President Hassan Rouhani
in 2016 signaled his intent to address some religious freedom
violations, these promises have yet to be implemented; meanwhile, the number of individuals imprisoned for their beliefs
continued to climb.
Based on these severe religious freedom violations, USCIRF
again finds in 2019 that Iran merits designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International
Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). Since 1999, the U.S. Department of State has designated Iran as a CPC, most recently in
November 2018. USCIRF recommends that the State Department redesignate Iran as a CPC under IRFA and maintain theexisting, ongoing travel restrictions in section 221(c) of the
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
(TRA) for individuals identified under section 221(a)(1)(C) of
the TRA in connection with the commission of serious humanrights abuses.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Speak out publicly and frequently at
all levels about the severe religious
freedom abuses in Iran, and highlightthe need for the international community to hold authorities accountable inspecific cases;• Identify Iranian government agencies
and officials responsible for severe
violations of religious freedom, freeze
those individuals’ assets, and bar
their entry into the United States, asdelineated under the Comprehensive
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and50

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Divestment Act (CISADA), the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, and related executive
orders, citing specific religious freedom violations;• Press for and work to secure the releaseof all prisoners of conscience, including
Youcef Nadarkhani, Golrokh Ebrahimi
Iraee, and Mohammad Ali Taheri;• Work with European allies to use
advocacy, diplomacy, and targeted
sanctions to pressure Iran to end
religious freedom abuses, especiallyleading up to Iran’s 2019 Universal
Periodic Review; and• Develop and utilize new technologies
to counter censorship and to facilitate
the free flow of information in and outof Iran.
The U.S. Congress should:• Reauthorize and ensure implementation of the Lautenberg Amendment,
which aids persecuted Iranian religious
minorities seeking refugee status in
the United States.

TIER 1 IRAN

COUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Islamic Republic of Iran
GOVERNMENT
Theocratic Republic
POPULATION
83,024,745

GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHS
Shi’a Islam (Jaafari and Zaydi); Sunni Islam (Maliki, Hanafi,
Shafi’i, Hanbali); Christianity; Judaism; Zoroastrianism
RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
99.4% Muslim (90–95% Shi’a, 5–10% Sunni)<1% Other (includes Baha’is, Christians, Jews,
Sabean-Mandaeans, Zoroastrians, and Yarsanis)*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook and U.S. Department of StateBACKGROUND
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a theocratic authoritarianstate with elements of restricted political participation.
The Jaafari (Twelver) school of Shi’a Islam is the official
religion of the country. Iran is governed under the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih or rule of the jurist. Its supremeleader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is a religious scholar
appointed by the 88-member Assembly of Experts.
Iran’s constitution stipulates that followers of five otherschools of thought within Islam—Maliki, Hanafi, Shafi’i,
Hanbali, and Zaydi—should be accorded respect andpermitted to perform their religious rites. The constitution recognizes Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians
as protected religious minorities, free to perform theirrites “within the limits of the law.” There are two Hindu
temples in Iran, one each in the cities of Bandar Abbas
and Zahedan, and Buddhism has historic influences in
Iran despite the confiscation of Buddha statues in recent
years. Iran holds elections for parliament every four
years, but candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council, a group of 12 Muslim scholars appointed
either directly by Ayatollah Khamenei or nominated forparliament approval by the head of the judiciary, who
is in turn appointed by Ayatollah Khamenei. Five of theparliament’s 290 seats are reserved for these groups—
two for Armenian Christians and one each for Assyrian/
Chaldean Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians.

All of Iran’s laws and regulations are based on unique
Jaafari Shi’a Islamic interpretations. Under Iran’s Penal
Code, moharebeh (“enmity against God”) is vaguely
defined and often used for political purposes. Bothmoharabeh and sabb al-nabi (“insulting the prophet”)
are capital crimes. Apostasy is not codified as a crimein the Penal Code but detainees are still tried as apostates because the constitution specifies that Shari’ah beapplied to any cases not explicitly addressed by the law.
In December 2016, President Rouhani publicly
released a nonbinding Charter on Citizens’ Rightsthat promised, among other rights, recognition of
all religious identities and nondiscriminatory legal
protection. However, since his reelection in May 2017,
religious minorities in Iran have seen little change
based on this document. Instead, growing numbers of
religious minorities, dissident Shi’a and Sunni Muslims(especially Sunni Muslim Kurds), and human rights
defenders have been subject to harassment, arrest, andexecution for exercising rights nominally protected by
the charter. These arrests have intensified in the wake ofa wave of protest activity that started in December 2017and continued through 2018. Initial protests sparked
by economic grievances expanded to include politicalissues including corruption, involvement in regional
conflicts, unchecked power in the religious establishment, and restrictions on women’s rights justified on

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52

religious grounds. These protests have resulted in thedeaths of approximately 30 Iranians.

Nonetheless, criticism of Sunni Muslims is also apunishable offense in Iran. In May 2018, forces from theIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps arrested Persian litRELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
erature Professor Hameed Samsaam for insulting Sunni
Muslims
Muslims in a video clip posted online.
Adherents to Sufi orders, which emphasize mystic
Over the past few years, Iranian authorities have charged
elements
of Islam, are targeted by the government for
many reformers within the Shi’a Muslim community of“following a deviant sect” that does not conform to the“insulting Islam,” criticizing the Islamic Republic, andstate’s official interpretation of Islam. Members of Iran’s
publishing materials that allegedly deviate from Islamic
largest Sufi order, the Nematollahi Gonbadi, face a range
standards. In March 2018, the Iranian Intelligence Serof abuses. In February 2018, Iranian police, security, andvices (Itila’aat) arrested cleric Hossein Shirazi, the son
intelligence agents surrounded the house of Sufi leader
of detained senior cleric Ayatollah Sadegh Shirazi. Iran’sNoor Ali Tabandeh, leading to clashes with protestors.
Special Clergy Court charged him with criticizing Iran’s
At the end of the reporting period, Tabandeh remained
leadership and its system of rule of a single jurist.
under house arrest without an official explanation fromThe Sunni Muslim population in Iran is conIran’s government. Iran has also targeted members ofcentrated in underdeveloped areas and experiences
the Sufi community itself. During Sufi protests in Febdiscrimination in employment. Repeated requests—
ruary 2018, five security officers and one other person
including some made in 2018—by Tehran’s Sunni
were killed and reports indicate 300 protestors were
Muslim community to build an official mosque havearrested. Mohammed Salas, a Sufi Iranian, was accused
been refused. While the Iranian government claimsof driving a bus into security officers, killing three
Sunni Muslims in Tehran have nine mosques at whichof them, during these protests. Following his arrest,
to pray, most Sunni Muslim sites in Tehran are “prayer
Salas was denied access to his chosen lawyer, allegedly
houses,” which—unlike mosques—have no imam,
tortured into a confession, convicted by Tehran Appeals
budget, or religious instruction. Most Sunni Muslim
Court judge Mohammed Shahriari in March 2018, andworship in Tehran occurs in private homes or large
executed at Raji Shahr Prison in June. Throughout 2018,
rooms in other buildings. In August 2018, police blocked
the entrances to prayer houses in four districts of Tehran Sufi prisoners at Great Tehran Prison and Shapour
Detention Center conducted hunger strikes protesting
during the Eid al-Adha holiday. Sunni clerics were also
Salas’ execution and torture by prison guards.
the targets of violence in Iran in 2018. In July, gunmen
In August 2018, Iran’s revolutionary courts senassassinated a Sunni cleric in southeastern Iran, andtenceda group of 208 Sufis held at Fashafuyeh andin November a Sunni cleric was shot four times with a
Qarchak prisons to prison terms ranging from four
hunting rifle on his way home from a mosque.
months to 26 years, flogging, internal exile, a ban on
Sunni Muslim Kurds face particular discriminatravel, and a prohibition on participation in certain
tion since they are neither Shi’a nor Persian, and aresocial and political groups
often targeted by Iranianin the country. In someauthorities. Iran executed
cases, trials for theseapproximately 53 Kurds
In August 2018, Iran’s revolutionary
individuals lasted noin 2018. These include
courts sentenced . . . 208 Sufis . . . tolonger than 15 minutes,
Zeinab Sekaanvand,prison terms . . . In some cases,
and charges and evidencea child bride who wastrials for these individuals lasted
against the defendants
allegedly beaten andno longer than 15 minutes.
were not made publicly
forced into confessing toavailable. That same
her husband’s murder; shemonth, six administrators
was executed in OctoberofthepopularSufi
website
Majzooban
Noor were also
2018. Approximately 100 Kurds now remain on death row,
sentenced in absentia by Judge Abolqasem Salvati, head
including those who were accused of crimes as minors.

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arrested on the order of the Shiraz Revolutionary Court
after criticizing the arrests of Baha’is in his city. He wasreleased 10 days later with a bail of $47,500 (200 million
tomans) but forced out of his council seat in October
2018. That same month, intelligence and security forces
arrested two additional Baha’is in Karaj.
All seven of the high-profile Baha’i leaders known
as the “Friends of Iran,” or Yaran, were released fromprison by the end of 2018 after serving 10-year sentences.
Three of the seven Yaran were released in 2017, and four
additional members were released in 2018: Saeid Rezaie,
Vahim Tizfahm, Jamaloddin Khanjani, and Afif Naemi.
Nonetheless, more than 70 Baha’is remained in prisonin Iran at the end of 2018.
Although the Iranian government maintains
publicly that Baha’is are free to attend university, thede facto policy of preventing Baha’is from obtaining
Baha’isdiplomas continued in 2018. At least 60 Baha’i students
There are more than 300,000 Baha’is in Iran, whowere prevented from beginning university studies
together constitute the largest non-Muslim religious
despite passing national university entrance exammajority in the country. Iran’s government considinations on the pretense of having incomplete files or
ers the Baha’i faith a heretical “deviant sect” whose
not being registered. In other cases, Baha’i students
members are de facto
had their examination
apostates. Despite promscores invalidated by theises by President Rouhani
National Organization
Baha’is are not recognized by theto end religious discrimfor Educational Teststate and are denied political, economic,
ination, Baha’is are noting. Other Baha’is were
cultural, and social rights on this basis.
recognized by the state
expelled by their uniand are denied political,
versity security office or
economic, cultural, andprevented from receivingsocial rights on this basis. Since 2014, more than 26,000
diplomas despite having completed, or nearly compieces of anti-Baha’i media have aired on official or
pleted, their studies.
semi-official Iranian television channels.
Throughout 2018, Baha’i places of business were alsoOver the past 10 years, more than 1,000 Baha’istargeted. Security forces shut down Baha’i businesses
have been arbitrarily arrested on the basis of their faith.
in Abadan and Maku, and the Ministry of Intelligence
Arrest orders come from revolutionary courts that wereclosed a business in Tabriz. In July, Mazandaran Provset up following the 1979 Islamic revolution, and areince county supervisor Esmail Hossein Zadeh ordered
executed by both security forces and agents of Iran’s
restrictions on Baha’i businesses in Sari. Twenty-four
Ministry of Intelligence. In February 2018, security
Baha’i-owned businesses in Urmia shut down in 2017 byforces arrested seven Baha’is in Bushehr, and five
the Office of Public Places remained closed at the end
additional Baha’is were sentenced by the Revolutionaryof the reporting period. Security forces also prevented
Court of Mashhad. In September 2018, Iran’s Ministry
the burial of two deceased Baha’i individuals in a Baha’iof Intelligence escalated its crackdown on the Baha’i
cemetery in Kerman after it was sealed in March 2018.
community when its agents, along with security forces,
In October, the body of a deceased Baha’i woman wasarrested six Baha’is in Karaj, eight in Baharestan, andexhumed four days after her burial and abandoned in a
six in Shiraz. Shiraz city councilman Mehdi Hajati wasdesert area outside the town of Jaban.

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TIER 1 IRAN

of the 15th branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Court in
Tehran, to prison time (three received a seven-year sentence, two received a 12-year sentence, and one received
a 26-year sentence), 74 lashes, two years of internal
exile, and a two-year ban on journalistic activity. Mistreatment also occurred while approximately 300 Sufi
Muslims served prison terms during the year. In August
2018, prison guards beat detainees on a sit-in strike overthe detention and physical abuse of four Sufi women
incarcerated at Qarchak Prison. In late August, eight
Sufi Muslims were sent to solitary confinement at Great
Tehran Penitentiary as punishment for their participation in a prison protest that turned violent. In November,
three Sufi women were beaten at Qarchak Prison andeight Sufi Muslims at Great Tehran Penitentiary weresent into solitary confinement.

53

TIER 1 IRAN

Christians

security.” Converts to Christianity in Iran also face persecution. Two converts to Christianity from Islam, Hadi
Asgari and Amin Afshar-Naderi, awaited verdicts at theend of the reporting period from appellate courts on
extensive prison sentences for “conductive evangelism”
and “illegal house church activities.”
Pastor Youcef Nadarkhani, a prisoner for whom
USCIRF advocates as part of its Religious Prisoners ofConscience Project, is a convert from Islam to Christianity who leads the Evangelical Church of Iran and has
been arrested several times. In 2017, Judge Ahmadzadeh
sentenced Nadarkhani to 10 years in prison and two
years in internal exile for “promoting Zionist Christianity.” After several failed appeals, he was rearrested inJuly 2018 by plainclothes agents, beaten, and taken to aquarantine ward in Evin Prison.

Iran has nearly 300,000 Christians, including traditional
Armenian and Assyrian/Chaldean ethnic churches andnewer Protestant and evangelical churches. The government monitors members of the historical churches
and imposes legal restrictions on constructing andrenovating houses of worship. Christians have beensentenced to prison terms for holding private Christmas
gatherings, organizing and conducting house churches,
and traveling abroad to attend Christian seminars.
Evangelical Christian communities face repression
because many conduct services in Persian and proselytize to those outside their community. Pastors of housechurches are often charged with national security-related crimes and apostasy.
In 2018, Iran drastically escalated its arrests ofChristians. Whereas 16 Christians were arrested in Iran
Other Religious Minorities
in 2017, at least 171 were arrested in 2018. While Iran
Iran is home to between 15,000 and 20,000 Jews, andoften arrests Christians ahead of Christmas, arrests inthe capital city Tehran hosts 13 synagogues. Although
2018 began earlier and took place in a wider set of cities
government-driven anti-Semitic sentiment in 2018 was
and towns than usual. A total of 114 Christians were
not as pronounced as in previous years, the governmentarrested in Iran during the first week of December 2018
continued to propagate and tolerate anti-Semitism. In
and more than 150 were arrested between November
October 2018, Ali Reza Soltan-Shahi, an Iranian govand December 2018. Christians arrested in Iran are
ernment official from
often treated and charged
the Office of the Iranianas enemies of the state,
Presidency, organized an
114 Christians were arrested inand lawyers who take on
anti-Semitic conference in
Iran during the first week of
their cases face the threat
Tehran that accused Jews
December 2018 and more thanof detention. In Septemof manipulating the global
150 were arrested between
ber 2018, for example,
economy and exploiting
November and December.
Iran revolutionary court
the Holocaust. Jews injudges Mashaullah
Iran do not hold senior
Ahmadzadeh and Ahmad
government or military
Zargar affirmed sentences leveled in 2017 against Saheb
positions
and
many
are
believed
to be under government
Fadaie and Fatemeh Bakhteri on the charge of “spreadsurveillance. Iranian officials and clerics regularly calling propaganda against the regime.”
for the elimination of the state of Israel, and members of
Iran has specifically targeted the family of Assyrian
the Jewish community have been targeted on the basis of
Christian pastor Victor Bet-Tamraz on spurious charges
real or perceived ties to Israel. In December 2018, a groupof acting against national security. In 2017, Bet-Tamrazof evangelical Christians were also arrested and charged
was sentenced to 10 years in prison and continues towith promoting “Zionist Christianity.”
appeal the sentence. In January 2018, Judge Mashallah
In 2018, members of Iran’s Zoroastrian community,
Ahmadzadeh of Branch 26 of the Tehran Revolutionary
which
numbers between 30,000 and 35,000 people,
Court sentenced Bet-Tamraz’s wife, Shamiram Isavi,
faced ongoing discrimination. However, a ban imposed
to five years in prison on national security charges.
on a Zoroastrian member of the Yazd city council in 2017
In July 2018, the judge sentenced their son, Ramil, to
was lifted by Iran’s Expediency Council in July 2018 after
four months in prison, also for “acting against national

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TIER 1 IRAN

protests by Iranian deputy speaker Ali Motahari. PresOpponents to the bill, including the Basij Student Union
ident Rouhani also expressed support for the council
and senior clerics, appealed to justifications in Shari’ah
member in June 2018.
as the basis for their opposition. Statements from other
While the Iranian government considers followers
senior religious clerics, such as Grand Ayatollah Naserof the Yarsan faith to be Shi’a Muslims who practice
Makarem Shirazi, opposed child marriage.
Sufism, members of the faith identify as a distinct andSince May 2017, Iranian women have participatedseparate religion known as Ahl-e Haqq, or People ofin “White Wednesdays” in protest of Iran’s mandatory
Truth, whose numbers are
hijab laws justified on theestimated at more thanbasis of religion. In Februone million. Membersary 2018, Iran arrested 29
Iran’s Parliamentary Committeeof the Yarsani commuwomen for protesting thefor
Judicialand
Legal
Affairsnity face discrimination
law without wearing hijab.
rejected a bill to ban marriage forin education, employThese arrests included
girls
under
the
age
of
13.
ment, and running foractivist Shaparak Shapolitical office. During
jarizadeh, who removed
crackdowns on protests
her headscarf in public atagainst the house arrest of Iran’s Sufi spiritual leader in
a May 2018 protest in Kashan. Shajarizadeh was charged
February 2018, police and Basij forces arrested a Yarsani
by Tehran prosecutor Abbas Jafari Dolatabadi withwoman, Shokoufeh Yadollahi, beating her so hard that“inciting corruption and prostitution” and was sent toher skull cracked and some of her ribs broke; at Shapour
solitary confinement at Shahr-e Rey Prison where she
Detention Center she was denied access to medical
was allegedly tortured. In July 2018, Branch 1089 of Tehtreatment for dizziness and high blood pressure andran’s Criminal Court sentenced Shajarizadeh to serve 20
eventually lost her sense of smell.
years in prison, though 18 of these years were suspended
Mohammad Ali Taheri, another USCIRF-adopted
from the sentence. Shajarizadeh fled the country soon
prisoner of conscience, university professor, andthereafter and at the end of the reporting period continfounder of a spiritual movement (Ergan-e Halgheh or
ued to seek asylum in Canada.
Spiritual Circle), remains in prison. In 2015, Taheri was
Author and human rights activist Golrokh Ebrasentenced to death before the Iranian Supreme Court
himi Iraee, another USCIRF prisoner of conscience, wasoverturned his death sentence. In August 2017, he wasconvicted in 2016 of “insulting the sacred” based on her
retried and once more sentenced to death for “spreading
unpublished story in which a protagonist angered bycorruption on Earth.” His death sentence was overstonings burns a Qur’an. In January 2018, Iraee faced
turned in March 2018 and Taheri was instead given
additional charges for allegedly insulting Ayatollah
an additional five-year sentence by Judge Abolqasem
Khamenei and reciting a political poem. After being
Salavati of Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court
beaten and moved to Qarchak Prison in January 2018,
for “insulting religious sanctities.” In January 2019,
Iraee began a hunger strike. She was transferred back to
Taheri announced his intention to give up his Iranian
Tehran’s Evin Prison in May 2018 and remained there atcitizenship, citing “comprehensive injustice” at thethe end of the reporting period.
hands of Iran’s government.

U.S. POLICY

Women and Religious Freedom
In 2018, Iran’s government violated the freedom of
women and girls on religious grounds. In December
2018, Iran’s Parliamentary Committee for Judicial
and Legal Affairs rejected a bill to ban marriage forgirls under the age of 13. The bill would have banned
marriage for boys between the ages of 16 and 18 as well.

Since President Donald J. Trump assumed office inJanuary 2017, the U.S. government has significantly
shifted its approach to relations with Iran, adopting
a “maximum pressure” campaign that emphasizes
accountability for Iran’s nuclear activity and destabilizing activities in the region in addition to its
egregious violations of human rights and religious

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56

freedom. Since 1999, the State Department has
designated Iran as a CPC and has imposed travel
restrictions under section 221(c) of the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA)
for individuals identified under section 221(a)(1)(C) of
the TRA in connection with the commission of serious
human rights abuses.
In May 2018, the Trump Administration announced
a re-imposition of sanctions waived or lifted under
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) tooccur over a 180-day wind-down period. The first ofthese re-impositions occurred on August 7, 2018, andthe second occurred on November 5. By the end of thereporting period, the United States had fully re-imposed
the sanctions on Iran that had been lifted or waived
under the JCPOA.
During the year, the U.S. government increasingly
highlighted the poor religious freedom situation in
Iran. At the July 2018 Ministerial to Advance Religious
Freedom held in Washington, DC, participating delegations from around the world issued a Statement on
Iran concerning its mistreatment of religious minorities.
Vice President Michael R. Pence also spoke about Iran’s
restriction on religious freedom and urged Iranians

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to “press on with courage in the cause of freedom.” In
August 2018, the Iran Action Group at the State Department issued a report in which it detailed Iran’s targetingof religious minorities, noting “Baha’is, Christians,
Jews, Zoroastrians, and Sunni and Sufi Muslims facewidespread persecution, discrimination, and unjust
imprisonment.” In December, the House of Representatives passed H.Res.274, which condemns thepersecution of Baha’is in Iran.
On November 28, 2018, the secretary of state redesignated Iran as a CPC. The secretary also designatedthe following presidential action for Iran: “The existingongoing travel restrictions in section 221(c) of the [TRA]
for individuals identified under section 221(a)(1)(C) of
TRA in connection with serious human rights abuses,
pursuant to section 402(c)(5) of the Act.”INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
COMMISSIONER ANURIMA BHARGAVA
Iran raises a multitude of political and human rights
concerns. My view is that the Commission should notraise concerns about Iran’s relationship with Israel orother countries unless that relationship has a direct
impact on religious freedom in Iran.

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57

NIGERIA
TIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGS
Religious freedom conditions in Nigeria trended negatively in
2018. The Nigerian government at the national and state levels
continued to tolerate violence and discrimination on the basisof religion or belief, and suppressed the freedom to manifest
religion or belief. Religious sectarian violence increased during
the year, with Muslims and Christians attacked based on theirreligious and ethnic identity. The Nigerian federal government failed to implement effective strategies to prevent or
stop such violence or to hold perpetrators accountable. BokoHaram and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-West Africa(ISIS-WA) continued to perpetrate attacks against civilians andthe military throughout the year, despite the government’s
claims of progress in defeating them. In addition, membersof the military and the civilian joint task force, a local vigilantegroup supporting official forces, were accused of human rights
violations against civilians displaced by conflict. The Nigerian
military and government continued to violate the religious
freedom and human rights of the Shi’a members of the Islamic
Movement in Nigeria (IMN). IMN leader Sheikh Ibrahim Al

Zakzaky remained in detention, along with his wife and hundreds of other members; state governments continued toban the group’s activities; and in October 2018, soldiers andpolice reportedly killed more than 45 IMN members during
religious processions and protests in Abuja. Finally, otherreligious freedom abuses continued at the state level, including coercive official or societal actions to enforce particularreligious norms. USCIRF delegations visited Nigeria in May
and November 2018 to examine religious freedom concerns.
Based on continued systematic, ongoing, and egregious
violations of freedom of religion or belief, USCIRF again
finds that Nigeria merits designation in 2019 as a “countryof particular concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), as it has found since 2009. The
U.S. Department of State has never designated Nigeria asa CPC, but in 2017 and 2018 designated Boko Haram as an
Entity of Particular Concern, or EPC, for its particularly severe
religious freedom violations as defined by December 2016
amendments to IRFA.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Enter into a binding agreement, as
authorized under section 405(c) of
IRFA, with the Nigerian government,
and provide associated financial andtechnical support to obligate the Nigerian government to take substantial
steps to address violations of religious
freedom, including but not limited to:• Advise and support the Nigerian
government in the development ofcounter-radicalization and deradicalization programs;• Enhance training for officials, themilitary, and police officers on
international human rights standards, including countering hatespeech based on religious identity;
responding to sectarian violence;
reporting on violence against Muslim and Christian communities; andensuring security officers accused58

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of excessive use of force and otherhuman rights abuses are investigated and held accountable;• Allocate funding through theState Department, U.S. Agency
for International Development, or
U.S. Department of Defense forprograms to train and equip officials
and communities to protect placesof worship and other holy sites; and• Increase conflict resolution
programming and research—inpartnership with local and traditional leaders and other parts of civilsociety—to counter hate speech
and incitement to violence based onreligious identity;• Press the Nigerian government toacknowledge the significant threats
posed by Boko Haram and ISIS-WA,
to prioritize greater support to bothmilitary and nonmilitary efforts tocounter the insurgency, and to protect the rights of the Nigerian press
to report on the continuing war;
• Hold a session of the U.S.-Nigeria
Bi-National Commission to discuss further actions to end sectarian violence,
address land and water concerns,
hold perpetrators accountable, andreconcile communities; and• Urge the Nigerian government topursue justice for IMN members,
allow U.S. Embassy officials to meetwith detained IMN leader Sheikh Al
Zakzaky, review all cases of detained
IMN members and release those held
wrongfully or without charge, anddevelop an independent judicial commission of inquiry (COI) to investigate
the Nigerian security forces’ killing of
IMN members in October 2018.

TIER 1 NIGERIACOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Federal Republic of Nigeria
GOVERNMENT
Presidential Republic
POPULATION
203,452,505
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSN/ABACKGROUND
Nigeria has one of the fastest-growing populations in theworld and the largest economy in Africa. Its population
includes more than 300 ethnic and linguistic groups,
with the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo representing amajority. The religions and beliefs practiced in Nigeria
are highly diverse, although historically the population has been about evenly divided between the largely
Muslim north and more Christian south. Other groups
include atheists, Baha’is, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists,
and indigenous traditions that may incorporate otherreligious practices; however, USCIRF observed a low
level of awareness among interlocutors of such smaller
religious communities. Smaller religious communities
and human rights groups report that the dominant two
religions suppress other beliefs and practices, including
the widespread syncretic traditions in the country.
The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria includes provisions
protecting freedom of religious belief and prohibiting
religious discrimination, and there is no official state
religion. However, in 12 Muslim-majority northern
Nigerian states, federalism has allowed the adoption ofIslamic Shari’ah law in the criminal codes. The Nigerian
constitution also establishes the roles of customary law
and Shari’ah courts for Islamic personal law, family

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
51.6% Muslim (majority Sunni; also Sufi orders, Shi’a, andother sects and approaches to Islam)11.2% Roman Catholic
35.7% Other Christian (including Anglican, Baptist, Evangelical,
Methodist, Pentecostal, Presbyterian, The Church of Latter-day
Saints, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and other denominations)
1.5% Indigenous beliefs, Other, or Unspecified(including Jews, Baha’is, atheists, and other beliefs)*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook and the State
Department. Population statistics are highly controversial and disputed in Nigeria.

law issues, and other areas as may be determined by
the state. Religious police, which are sometimes state
funded, are also used to enforce Shari’ah, often focusing
on family issues and “moral” behavior.
For decades, the Nigerian government has struggled to manage conflict resulting from competition
between groups over political access, land rights, andfears that one ethnic or religious group will dominate
another. When the government in 1996 established theFederal Character Commission, it intended the bodyto enforce the country’s “federal character” principle.
While this principle was intended to be helpful and protective, it is applied through a controversial “indigene”
concept, whereby certain groups are considered native
to a particular area (“indigenes”) and others nonnative(“settlers”); indigenes often are afforded more benefits
and privileges, and settlers have been denied equal citizenship rights. Additionally, across Nigeria traditionalrulers and religious leaders wield significant influence
in politics and governance. For example, religious leaders may advise politicians or attempt to influence who
contests elections. Religious and traditional leaders aresome of the most highly respected individuals in society
and can also influence followers to support different
policies and candidates.

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Sectarian violence between rural farmer and herder
Zaria in May. USCIRF visited sites of religious sectariancommunities is prevalent in more than a dozen states,
violence and places of worship.
primarily in the broadly defined “Middle Belt” region
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018of the country. Ethnic and religious identity—andReligious Sectarian Violence
consequently ethnic and religious conflict—are often
intertwined, especially when the majority of one ethnic
Violence targeting groups and individuals due to theirgroup practices the same religion (Fulani, for example,
religious identity continued in 2018. Across the country,
are predominantly Muslim and are often identified withsectarian conflict caused at least 2,000 deaths, withboth markers). The dynamic of the religious and ethnic
rising numbers of fatalities in Benue, Plateau, Taraba,
violence—and where and how religion and ethnicity
Adamawa, and Nasarawa states in particular. During
overlap—is highly localized. Inflammatory media reports USCIRF’s visits to Nigeria in 2018, civil society reprethat generalize the parties to a conflict or polarize people
sentatives and government officials offered diverse andalong ethnic and religious lines have increased tensions.
overlapping reasons for the burgeoning and complex
In 2018, rural violence escalated, and violent conflictintercommunal violence: religious, ethnic, and tribal
in urban areas continued. Many community members
identity; clashes between farmer and herder communiconveyed that they did not understand the reasons forties; land and water disputes; and longstanding regional,
the escalation in attacks during 2018, citing a history of
local, and ethnic divisions. Given the myriad ways thatpeaceful living between their communities. Sectarianreligious, ethnic, and tribal identities are intertwined,
violence has resulted in mass displacement, destruction
it can be difficult to determine the basis or catalyst forof property, and the deaths of thousands.
violence: violence stemming from disputes over land or
Attacks by the terrorist groups Boko Haram andwater, for example, can become immersed in and exacISIS-WA continued in spite of the Nigerian government’s
erbate religious difference. Similarly, clashes between
progress in its counterinsurgency efforts. Through its
farmer and herder communities can also take place
violent jihadi-driven
across—or be perceived tocampaign in Nigeria andbe due to—religious andthe Lake Chad Basin, sinceethnic divides, as herders
Attacks by the terrorist groups
2009 Boko Haram has
are primarily Muslim,
Boko Haram and ISIS-WA
killed tens of thousands,
and farmers Christian.
continued in spite of the
kidnapped hundreds,
The violence isNigerian government’s progressand displaced nearly
exacerbated by thein its counterinsurgency efforts.
two million Nigerians. A
proliferation of and easy
culture of impunity foraccess to arms, polarizperpetrators has been a
ing media coverage, andmajor issue in both sectarian violence and violence by
the failure of security services to address the violence
security forces against civilians. In camps for internallyeffectively and prevent it from recurring. High rates ofdisplaced persons (IDPs), the Nigerian military has been
unemployment and drug use were also identified as
accused of human rights violations against civilians. The
contributing factors. During the year, the decline of
Nigerian military continued to repress and use excessive
personal and community security and administration
force against the IMN.
of public affairs presented a serious threat to religious
USCIRF traveled to Nigeria in May and Novemfreedom. Both Muslims and Christians stated that theyber 2018 to learn from government officials, religious
did not feel protected by security services. Police arecommunities, and other civil society members about
either unresponsive or untimely in their response, lackreligious freedom conditions throughout the country as
capacity, fail to arrest (or prosecute) perpetrators, andwell as sectarian violence in the Middle Belt. A Commisdo not properly collect data and document incidents
sioner-led delegation traveled to Abuja, Jos, and Lagos inof violence or subsequent investigations, nor do they
November, and USCIRF staff visited Abuja, Kaduna, andeffectively communicate results of investigations to the

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TIER 1 NIGERIA

public. Vigilante groups often fill the security gaps. In
organizations (NGOs) have developed radio programs to
many cases, the military has deployed to restore order,build trust and dialogue between Muslims and Christhough troops have faced criticism for using excessive
tians and to encourage young people to use nonviolent
force, harming civilians, fostering mistrust of authorities
methods to resolve issues.
and among religious groups, and tacitly encouraging vigIn November 2018, USCIRF visited an Evangeliilante responses. The pervasiveness of vigilante groups
cal Church Winning All church building that lies on
and the continuous and disproportionate role of military
the border between Muslim and Christian neighboroperations around the country are evidence of a serious
hoods in Jos. Members of the church brigade showed
need for reform of police and security services. Human
USCIRF fire damage inside the building and describedrights groups, journalists, and religious communities
an attack on the church on September 28–29, 2018, inare often relied upon for documentation. Journalists
which between 10 and 20 people were killed, allegedly
may report on violent incidents and estimates of deaths,
by Muslim youth militia. Following that attack, Muslim
injuries, and property damage, but often do not follow up
community members reported that their houses wereon arrests and outcomes of trials.
attacked and burned on October 1 and 2. The brigade
USCIRF gathered information on numerous
men informed USCIRF that congregants planned toincidents of religious sectarian violence that occurred
continue worshipping in the church in spite of the ongoin 2018. In an April 24 attack in Benue State, gunmen
ing tensions and risks. Following these violent incidents,
believed to be Fulani herders attacked a church, killing
the Dutse Uku Muslim Community wrote a letter to the19 people, including two priests, and destroyed more
Plateau State Police Command complaining that police
than 50 homes. In retaliation, an angry mob reportedly
did not protect them and that Christian militia did furkilled 11 Muslims and raided two mosques. In June,ther damage in the presence of police.
suspected Fulani herders killed an estimated 80–200
Boko Haram and ISIS-WA
people in multiple attacks on villages in Plateau State.
The terrorist group Boko Haram—also known as
Also in June, Berom youth reportedly set up checkpoints
Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad—andon the main highway in Plateau State and stopped andits ISIS-supported faction—known as ISIS-West Africa
killed travelers they believed to be Muslim or Fulani.
(WA)—continued to commit attacks in northeast Nigeria
In July, an unknown ethnic militia reportedly attacked
in 2018. In 2015, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau
five Fulani communities in Adamawa State. In October,pledged allegiance to ISIS. In 2016, Boko Haram split,
at least 55 people died in clashes between Muslim andwith one faction supporting Shekau and another supChristian youth in Kaduna State.
porting Abu Musab Al-Barnawi, whom ISIS endorsed.
Christian interlocutors reported ongoing fears that
The Barnawi faction, ISIS-WA, has focused on targeting
their communities were being targeted in ethnic cleansmilitary forces and bases. Since 2009, Boko Haram has
ing campaigns. Religious communities in many areas
inflicted mass terror on
remain highly polarized.
civilians, killing at least
In some cities, people are
37,000 Nigerians, kidafraid to go into neighborIn some cities, people are afraid to go
napping thousands, andhoods of the other religion
into neighborhoods of thedisplacing more than twoor refuse to sell land toother religion or refuse to sell land to
million. The group has
individuals from the otherindividuals from the other faith.
killed and harmed people
faith. Civil society memfor being “nonbelievers,”
bers reported to USCIRF
including prominent
an ongoing problem withreligious leaders. Civilians have been abducted andhate speech on the basis of religious and ethnic identity,
subjected to forced marriage, forced conversion, sexual
including from clerics and clergy, as well as the spreadabuse, and torture. Increasingly, Boko Haram has turnedof misinformation, which at times incites people toto suicide attacks and has used women and children toviolence and reprisals. Numerous nongovernmental

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62

launch them. In May 2018, Boko Haram reportedly coninspired by the 1979 Iranian revolution, and mainducted twin suicide bombings at a mosque and nearby
taining photos of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini andmarket in the city of Mubi, killing at least 27 people.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in tribute on its website, theIn February 2018, ISIS-WA abducted an estimated
IMN also supported the establishment of an Islamic
110 schoolgirls from Dapchi, in Yobe State. Five girls
government in Nigeria. The IMN has since become thedied during the abduction. One month later, the remain- target of violence by the Nigerian government, which
ing girls were released, except for the only reportedclassifies the IMN as a “violent group” and uses excesChristian student, Leah Sharibu. Her freed classmatessive force to repress IMN members and activities.
reported that she was not released because she refused
More than three years since the most violent crackto convert to Islam. As of the end of 2018, Sharibu
down on the IMN—the December 2015 mass killing andremained captive. In 2018, the militants executed otherburial of 347 IMN members by the Nigerian Army infemale hostages whom they accused of being apostates.
Zaria—and despite the 2016 Kaduna State COI finding
Of the 276 schoolgirls abducted by Boko Haram fromthe army responsible and recommending prosecutions,
Chibok in 2014, at least 100 girls remain missing, as do
no Nigerian Army officers have been held to account.
an unknown number of other women, girls, and boys
In 2018, Nigerian police continued to detain hunkidnapped by the terrorist group. In April 2018, the Nige- dreds of IMN members—including, most prominently,
rian Army reported freeing 149 women and children
Sheikh Zakzaky and his wife Malama Zeenah Ibrahim,
from a Boko Haram hideout in Borno State.
who have been held without charges since December
There was little accountability for human rights vio2015, despite an order from the Federal High Court inlations in the northeast—both by Boko Haram members
Abuja on December 2, 2016, that they be released within
as well as by the processes used to seek justice. In October
45 days. Authorities arrested at least 15 IMN members2017 and February 2018, the Nigerian military conducted
in 2018.
secret trials of more than 2,300 Boko Haram suspects.
Throughout 2018, IMN members staged protests
According to reports, at least 468 were ordered to particiaround the country advocating for Sheikh Zakzaky’s
pate in deradicalization programs. Human rights groups
release. In Kaduna and Sokoto, state-level officials
reported numerous flaws in the justice process, such as
maintained bans on IMN activities, including religious
witnesses and victims not being permitted to provide
processions. The IMN and news sources reported that
testimony and defendants not being allowed access toforce used to disperse protests was at times excessive,
lawyers. During its November 2018 visit, USCIRF learned
causing both injuries and deaths.
that judges generally serve as their own court reporters
Between October 28 and November 1, Shi’a Musand take notes by hand, and that criminal justice reform— lims marched around the country for Arbaeen—an
more broadly—is also needed to better protect religious
annual religious procession observed by Shi’a Muslims
freedom. In October 2017,globally to commemothe Nigerian Army opened
rate the death of Imama new office in MaiduHussein in the seventh
The Nigerian Army fired
guri to deal with militarycentury. Hundreds ofindiscriminately into [IMN] crowds,
human rights abuses, and
IMN followers reportedly
killing at least 45 people,
reportedly began new
marched in Abuja bothaccording to human rights groups.
human rights protection
to honor the religious
training in May 2018.
occasion and to protest for
Sheikh Zakzaky’s release.
Repression of the
Although the Nigerian Army said protestors threw rocks
Islamic Movement in Nigeria
at security services, there was no evidence of any vioThe IMN, the country’s largest Shi’a Muslim group,
lent provocation by the IMN. The Nigerian Army fired
was formed by Sheikh Zakzaky in the northern city ofindiscriminately into crowds, killing at least 45 people,
Zaria in Kaduna State in the 1980s and 1990s. Originallyaccording to human rights groups. There was no official

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genital mutilation (FGM). According to the United
Nations (UN), 25 percent of women and girls aged 15–49
have undergone some form of FGM. FGM is most common in predominantly Christian states in the south but
is also practiced by Muslims in the north.
State-Level Religious Governance
Similarly, religious and traditional beliefs haveand Policing
justified child marriage, and activists have reported
Twelve states in northern Nigeria are governed by forms
fierce opposition from Muslim groups on settingof Shari’ah law, and some utilize religious police tominimum age limits for marriage. According to the
supplement the regular police force or provide social
UN, 44 percent of Nigerian women between 20 and 24
services. State enforcement of Shari’ah and the use or
years old were married before age 18, and 18 percent
funding of religious police (known as Hisbah) varies
before age 15. Child marriage is particularly prevalent
by location, as does public perception of their value orin northern Nigeria. Child marriage remains wideimpact. In some states,
spread despite the fact
vigilante or informalthat the Child Rights Act
police and neighborof 2003 set the minimumChild marriage remains widespreadhood watches, including
age for marriage at 18;
despite
the
fact
that
the
Hisbah, are regulated andmany state governments
Child Rights Act of 2003 set thedefined by law. Some state
still do not enforce thisminimumage
formarriageat18;
governments, such asprovision. At the same
many state governments still
Kano and Zamfara, alsotime, many religious anddonotenforce
thisprovision.
fund and equip Hisbah.
traditional leaders have
In Plateau and Kaduna
opposed child marriage
states, some neighborand are fighting to end
hood watch groups are organized along religious lines
it. Polygyny (where a man is married to more than one
and have religious leadership. In 2018, Hisbah police
woman) was reported as common for both Christians
continued to arrest and detain, seize or destroy theand Muslims, and is permitted under common law andproperty of, and enforce punishments on individuals
Shari’ah law across the country. Under Islamic law,
who violated local and state religious and morality
men are limited to marrying up to four wives. Nationcodes, including arrests for possession and consumpally, the Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act, as well astion of alcohol. Hisbah as well as other police also
Shari’ah law, criminalize marriage between persons
arrested people on charges of homosexuality, on theof the same sex and prohibit places of worship frombasis of religious laws.
solemnizing same-sex unions.
During USCIRF’s November 2018 visit, interlocutors
Women, Marriage, and Religious Freedom
described issues around religious dress for female MusWomen are uniquely impacted by religion-based laws,
lim students in the south. In September in Lagos State,policing, and discrimination. The revival of Islamic law
five female students were reportedly suspended fromin 1999 led to both positive and negative impacts on
school for wearing the hijab.
women’s rights in the north. In July 2018 in Kano State,
U.S. POLICY
Hisbah arrested five women for alleged immoral acts.
Boko Haram has abducted thousands of women and girls, Nigeria remains a key partner to the United States inAfrica and is one of the biggest recipients of assistancesubjecting them to various forms of violence. Women andin the region. In 2018, U.S. support to Nigeria included
girls displaced by conflict continue to report sexual andessential conflict resolution and violence prevention
gender-based violence by security officers in camps.
work, anticorruption efforts, and democracy and goverSome Nigerian religious and traditional beliefs
nance initiatives, including support of the Independent
allow, if not encourage, the harmful practice of female

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statement from the Nigerian government condemning
this excessive use of force on peaceful protestors. The
Nigerian Army initially tweeted a defense of soldiers’
actions, but then deleted it.

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National Electoral Commission and international
observer missions to bolster the credibility of 2019
general elections. In December 2017, the U.S. National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2018
included a provision requiring the president to develop
a strategy to improve defense institutions and security
sector forces in Nigeria; submit to Congress a reportassessing the threats from Boko Haram and ISIS-WA
and the Nigerian government’s efforts to protect civilians and human rights; and present a plan for the UnitedStates to work with Nigerian officials to investigate
human rights violations by Nigerian security forces andimprove detainee conditions. The report, submitted
in 2018, thoroughly outlined U.S. support for Nigerian
security forces, including in the area of human rights,
such as efforts to improve the capacity of newly established human rights desks within the Nigerian Armyand to urge accountability for violations against IDPs.
The report noted that no army officers have yet been
held accountable for the mass killing of IMN members
in 2015, but did not identify whether and how the U.S.
government has urged accountability for those events.

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The U.S. government remains committed tosupporting the fight against Boko Haram and ISIS-WA,
and is the largest humanitarian donor to the Lake
Chad region. In July 2018, U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria
W. Stuart Symington announced an additional $102
million in humanitarian assistance for populations
affected by the Boko Haram insurgency. In FY 2018
the United States provided an estimated $333 million
in humanitarian support in Nigeria as well as broader
support in the Lake Chad Basin. The United States has
funded radio programs, such as one to counter BokoHaram’s ideology and appeal to vulnerable populations. It also continued to provide funding to theregional Multi-National Joint Task Force to combat
Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. In November
2018, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo redesignated Boko Haram as an EPC under IRFA. It had beenpreviously designated by the State Department as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) in 2013. In February 2018, the State Department designated ISIS-WA as
SDGT and an FTO.

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NORTH KOREATIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in North Korea trended
the same as in 2017. North Korea (also known as the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) is one of the most isolated and repressed societies in the world. The North Korean
regime has an appalling human rights record and places unjust
restrictions on its people’s inherent right to freedom of religion
or belief. The North Korean government maintains totalitarian
control over society by espousing and brutally enforcing its
own state-generated ideology known as Juche. This ideology isinherently self-serving and exists solely to empower the North
Korean regime, which treats any expression of independent
assembly or thought, including religious practice, as a threat toits very existence. Although the country is officially atheist, thegovernment allows a small handful of state-backed houses ofworship to operate. Defectors interviewed after fleeing North
Korea often question the legitimacy of these institutions andcaution that their congregations may be preselected for therole in order to maintain the illusion of religious freedom forinternational audiences. Any expression of religion outside
this heavily regulated sphere happens in secret, and anyone
caught practicing religion or even suspected of harboring
religious views in private is subject to severe punishment. The
government has been known to arrest, torture, imprison, andeven execute religious believers and their family members,
whether or not they are similarly religious. There are an estimated 80,000–120,000 political prisoners currently languishingin North Korea’s notoriously harsh labor camps, as many as
50,000 of whom may be Christians. Inmates at these facilities
face dire living conditions and are likely forced to provide hardlabor for the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. As relations grew between the UnitedStates and North Korea during the year, so too did the opportunities to raise religious freedom and related human rights
with the regime.
Throughout 2018 the North Korean government continued
to carry out systematic, ongoing, and egregious violationsof freedom of religion or belief, and USCIRF again finds that
North Korea merits designation in 2019 as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious
Freedom Act (IRFA). The U.S. Department of State repeatedly has designated North Korea as a CPC since 2001, mostrecently in November 2018. USCIRF recommends that the State
Department redesignate North Korea as a CPC under IRFA andmaintain the existing, ongoing trade restrictions pursuant tosections 402 and 409 of the Trade Act of 1974 (the JacksonVanik Amendment).

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Pressure the North Korean government
to grant international human rights
monitors unfettered access to document human rights conditions, including
religious freedom, inside the country;• Make any future discussions regarding the easing or lifting of sanctions
contingent upon North Korea’s
sincere and demonstrable efforts toimprove its religious freedom andhuman rights record consistent withinternational standards;• Fill the current vacancy and maintainthe Special Envoy for North Korean

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human rights issues as a full-time,
independent position at the State
Department and ensure religious
freedom is a priority for that office;• Include, whenever possible, both theSpecial Envoy and the Ambassadorat-Large for International Religious
Freedom in official and unofficial
discussions about or with North
Korea in order to incorporate humanrights and religious freedom into
the dialogue, and likewise incorporate human rights and religious
freedom concerns into discussions

with multilateral partners regarding
denuclearization and security, as
appropriate; and• Expand existing radio programming transmitted into North Korea
and along the border, as well as
the dissemination of other forms
of information technology, such as
mobile phones, thumb drives, andDVDs, and facilitation of improved
internet access so North Koreans
have greater access to independentsources of information.

TIER 1 NORTH KOREACOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
GOVERNMENTSingle-party state; official state ideology of “Juche” or“national self-reliance”
POPULATION
25,381,085
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHS
Government-sponsored religious groups (e.g., the Korean
Religious Practitioners Association, the Korean ChristianFederation, the Korean Buddhist Federation, the Korean

BACKGROUND
The North Korean regime’s approach toward religion
and belief is among the most repressive in the world.
Its governing style is communist-like (although allreferences to communism were removed from theconstitution in 2009), and the regime maintains totalitarian control over North Korean society by espousing
and brutally enforcing its own state-generated ideology
known as Juche. This ideology is inherently self-serving
and exists solely to empower the North Korean regime.
It engenders cult-like devotion and deification of thecountry’s current leader, Kim Jong-un. His father andgrandfather before him enjoyed the same god-like status. Many Juche concepts amount to idol-worship andthus run counter to some religious doctrines. Even theslightest resistance or hesitation to accept Kim Jong-un
as the supreme authority, for religious or other reasons,is treated as political subversion and severely punished.
North Korea is one of the most isolated societies in
the world and its government refuses to tolerate any formof expression or independent thought, including religion
or belief—even though these rights are nominally protected by the constitution. That is not to say religion isentirely absent in the officially atheist DPRK, but those

Catholic Association, the Korean Chondokyo Central
Committee, and the Korean Orthodox Committee) exist to
provide the illusion of religious freedom
RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*(Note: figures are outdated and difficult to confirm)<1% Christian
Other groups: historical traditions of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shamanism, as well as Chondoism (also spelled
Cheondoism), a local religious movement*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook, the U.S. Department of State, and the Korea Institute for National Unification

who choose to follow a religion place themselves ingrave danger. The United Nations (UN) issued a report in2002 estimating that somewhere between 200,000 and
400,000 of North Korea’s inhabitants identify as Christian. No more recent figures were available at the end of
the reporting period. North Koreans are also influenced
by the country’s historical Buddhist, Confucian, andShamanist traditions, along with an indigenous religious
movement known as Chondoism. It is not known how
many North Koreans adhere to these beliefs. Those whopractice a religion most often keep their faith a secret,sometimes from immediate family members, due towell-founded fears of draconian and multigenerationalfamilial punishment.
The North Korean regime has traditionally looked
inward to reinforce its legitimacy, often through fieryrhetoric that overstates external threats, extensive military spending, and further development of its nuclear
and ballistic missile capabilities. This is almost always at
the expense of the impoverished North Korean people’s
basic needs and fundamental rights. In 2018, however,Pyongyang scaled back its characteristically aggressive
discourse in favor of more conventional diplomacy. This
may indicate a desire for greater inclusion and legitimacy

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in the international system. For example, the 2018 WinterOlympics in South Korea spurred a series of promising
diplomatic initiatives, including three inter-Korean summits and a pledge by North Korea to suspend all futurenuclear and ballistic missile testing.

practicing their faith in secret. Their immediate andextended family members are often incarcerated aswell, whether or not they are similarly religious. The
State Department estimates there are between 80,000
and 120,000 political prisoners currently languishing inNorth Korea’s notoriously harsh labor camps, known as
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018kwanliso. Up to 50,000 of these detainees are believed
Freedom of religion or belief does not exist in Northto be Christians. Inmates in these facilities are detained
Korea. Even basic awareness of religion as a concept isindefinitely and face hard labor—likely to advance theuncommon, and defector interviews suggest the Northdevelopment of nuclear weapons and other military
Korean government’s restrictions on religion haveequipment—along with starvation, torture, and arbionly grown more severe over time. Although the North
trary execution. Defectors report that prison authorities
Korean constitution protects its people’s freedom of relioften single out prisoners for more severe treatment ifgion in principle, in practice the regime exerts absolute
they are suspected of being Christian or having contact
influence over a handful of state-controlled houses ofwith Christians.
worship permitted to exist. This creates a facade of reliThere is an alleged network of undergroundgious life maintained chiefly for propaganda purposes.
churches in North Korea but the highly sensitive nature
All religious activities occurring outside this heavilyof their activities renders information regarding theirregulated domain are severely restricted. Some religious locations and congregation size nearly impossible tomaterials are smuggled
confirm. A 2017 report
into the country, mostly
by the Korea Institutefrom China, but provifor National Unification. . . the [North Korean] government
sions in North Korea’s(KINU) found that whileinterprets any expression of religion or
Criminal Code rendersome Pyongyang residents
belief as a threat to its very existence.
simple possession of
had heard of these secretforeign religious materials
churches, very few could
illegal. Anyone found tooffer specific information.
be in violation of this code is subject to punitive action,
Virtually no residents outside the capital had knowledge
including arrest, torture, beatings, and execution.
of their existence, and many North Korean defectors
The North Korean regime fears its people orgahave questioned whether they exist at all.
nizing socially or politically, as these activities occur
Some North Koreans can access faith-based
beyond the immediate purview of state institutions.
programming by tuning in to the Far East BroadcastFollowing this logic, the government interprets any
ing Company (FEBC), South Korea’s most prominent
expression of religion or belief as a threat to its very
religious radio program. The station broadcasts defecexistence. In 2018, North Koreans of faith continued to
tor-run audio sermons and informational programming
face persecution for spreading religious doctrine, having about Christianity. FEBC also donates radio receivers
contact with known religious believers, possessing
to Christian organizations that then work with smugreligious items, or engaging in religious activities, evenglers to bring the radios inside North Korea. There arein the privacy of their own homes.
no prohibitions against owning a radio in North Korea,
and they are not brought inside with any preset stations.
Christianity
However, North Koreans who tune in to FEBC broadThe North Korean government associates Christiancasts do so at great risk to themselves and their families.
ity with the West, particularly the United States, andAccording to the State Department, state-run relithus singles out Christians as the greatest religious
gious institutions include three Protestant churches, athreat. The regime utilizes a sophisticated surveillance
Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox Church, and one Catholic
apparatus to actively pursue and imprison Christians
church. Reports indicate that sermons at these official

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religious institutions may focus more on progovernment
multiple countries and culminating in South Korea,
propaganda than religious principles. The sole Catholic
where defectors are typically granted citizenship shortly
church is not affiliated with the Holy See and therefore
after their arrival. Both options are objectively safer
holds services without a priest. According to researchthan fleeing directly across the heavily fortified borderpublished by South Korean Catholic priest Kim Yeon-su,
with South Korea, but defectors crossing over into China
the single Catholic church in North Korea has about 3,000
still face significant challenges. Those who remain in
members. Also, the Korean Christian Federation (KCF)
China must cope with linguistic and cultural barriers
reportedly holds government-approved services in inforand are not legally permitted to work. This leaves themmal house settings. Some defectors caution, however, that open to various forms of exploitation, and many female
the congregations of state-sanctioned religious facilities
defectors find themselves sold into marriage against
are likely assigned or preselected for the role in order totheir will or forced into prostitution.
help maintain the illusion of religious freedom. NoneThe Chinese government views all North Korean
theless, some international Christian organizations haverefugees as illegal economic migrants and deports themover the years maintained continued engagement withback to their country of origin when they are discovstate-run religious institutions and noted what they viewered. By most accounts, Chinese authorities conspireas genuine theological depth in their sermons.
with their North Korean counterparts to actively track,
In what could be a promising development, inhunt down, detain, and forcefully repatriate North
October 2018 Kim Jong-un extended a private invitation
Koreans attempting to cross over into China. This is in
to Pope Francis to visit North Korea. Pope Francis stateddirect violation of China’s obligations under the 1951
that he would consider a
UN Convention on Refuvisit if the invitation camegees and its 1967 Protocol.
through official channels.
All would-be defectors. . . Chinese authorities conspire
He also noted that certain
are treated harshly
with
their
North
Koreancounterpartstounspecified conditions
upon their repatriation.
actively track, hunt down, detain, andwould have to be met.
North Korean authorities
forcefully
repatriate
North
Koreans.
.
.
One Vatican official statedoften explicitly ask if thethat even if these condireturnees encountered
tions were met, the Pope’s
Christian missionaries
schedule would not likely permit a visit anytime in 2019.
outside the country. If they answer affirmatively, they
No pope has ever visited North Korea, so such a trip
are likely to face torture in addition to serving a lengthy
would be historic, but it also raises concerns that Popeprison sentence.
Francis’ presence would simply be used to legitimize theU.S. POLICY
official state-backed version of the Catholic faith.
As noted in the Commission’s November 2018 Policy
North Korean Refugees
Update on Religious Freedom and Related Human
Since the Korean War ended in 1953, between 100,000
Rights in North Korea, relations between the Unitedand 300,000 North Koreans have fled the country toStates and North Korea improved throughout theescape famine, persecution, and human rights abuses.
reporting period. In June 2018, President Donald J.
With the near-complete absence of transparency
Trump and Kim Jong-un met face to face for the firstregarding conditions on the ground in North Korea,time in Singapore. Shortly thereafter, President Trumpthese individuals are a valuable source of information.
stated he would suspend large-scale joint military
The vast majority of North Korean defectors escapeexercises with South Korea. These exercises have been
through the shared 880-mile border with China. The
a longstanding source of contention in U.S.-DPRK
border is fairly porous and the region itself poorly
relations. For his part, Kim Jong-un approved modest
patrolled. China is the final destination for some, while
efforts to dismantle known nuclear and ballistic misfor others it is the first stop in a complex route spanningsile testing facilities and saw to the return of at least 55

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boxes believed to contain the remains of U.S. servicemen lost in the Korean War.
In May 2018, the North Korean government
released three American prisoners—Kim Dong Chul,
Kim Hak Song, and Kim Sang Duk. This goodwill
gesture marked the first occasion since 2012 that North
Korea held no U.S. citizens in captivity. North Korea hasin the past arbitrarily detained U.S. nationals within
its borders and extracted false confessions intended todamage the United States’ reputation. For this reason, in
August 2018 the State Department extended its ban on
U.S. citizens traveling to North Korea, citing lingering
concerns over the risk of politically motivated arrest anddetention. Since the ban was first imposed in 2017, various humanitarian and development organizations havecited greater difficulty carrying out their work inside
the country. Some have expressed desire for the U.S.
government to streamline its review process and moreleniently grant exceptions in order to facilitate aid to theNorth Korean people.
Discussions at the June 2018 summit in Singapore
focused primarily on the final, fully verified denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but it is clear there
is a growing awareness within the administration thathuman rights and security are not mutually exclusive. Shortly after the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State
Michael R. Pompeo tweeted that President Trump used
the occasion to also raise concerns over religious freedom and the status of Japanese abductees. The summit
concluded with the issuance of a joint statement inwhich both sides agreed to improve relations and work
toward denuclearization. How they plan to operationalize this agreement is not yet clear. A second summit
occurred in February 2019, after the reporting period,in Hanoi, Vietnam.
In July 2018, President Trump signed the North
Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2017 (P.L.
115-198) into law and it is presently authorized until
2022. The act delineates various human rights concerns
in North Korea, including the persecution of religious
minorities and what could be described as enforced
worship of the Kim family. The act also acknowledges
the Chinese government’s complicity in crimes against

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humanity by failing to adhere to its obligation to upholdthe principle of nonrefoulment in its repeated, forcefulrepatriation of North Korean refugees.
The Trump administration later underscoredreligious freedom and related human rights in North
Korea at the July 2018 Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom hosted by Secretary Pompeo. North
Korean defector Ji Hyeona addressed the Ministerial,describing how North Korean authorities imprisoned
and tortured her for possessing a Bible. In remarks at
the Ministerial, Vice President Michael R. Pence said,“There is no escaping the plain fact that North Korea’s
leadership has exacted unparalleled privation and cruelty upon its people for decades.”The U.S. government continues to comply with theNorth Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act
of 2016 (P.L. 114-122), as amended by the Countering
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (P.L. 11544). For example, in December 2018 the U.S. Departmentof the Treasury imposed targeted, unilateral sanctions
against three North Korean officials for their role inhuman rights abuses and censorship. The sanctions
corresponded with the State Department’s release of areport on human rights and censorship in North Korea
that is similarly required by the act.
Beginning in 2014, the UN Security Council has
convened each year to discuss human rights in North
Korea. This meeting, slated to convene in December
2018, was postponed because the United States was
unable to persuade at least nine of the 15 Member States
to cast a “yes” vote in favor of having the discussion.
American diplomats indicated they hope the discussion
will occur sometime early in 2019.
On November 28, 2018, the State Department
re-designated North Korea as a CPC for engaging inor tolerating severe violations of religious freedom.
The State Department has also consistently placed
restrictions on North Korea under the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment of the Trade Act of 1974, which Congressdeveloped to deny normal trade relations to communist
countries known for their severe human rights abuses,
and which has since been used to restrict trade withcountries like North Korea.

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PAKISTAN
TIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Pakistan generally
trended negative despite the Pakistani government taking
some positive steps to promote religious freedom and combat religiously motivated violence and hate speech. During
the year, extremist groups and societal actors continued todiscriminate against and attack religious minorities, including
Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Ahmadis, and Shi’a Muslims. The
government of Pakistan failed to adequately protect thesegroups, and it perpetrated systematic, ongoing, egregious
religious freedom violations; this occurred despite some
optimism about the potential for reform under the new government of Prime Minister Imran Khan. Various political parties
and leading politicians promoted intolerance against religious
minorities during the leadup to the 2018 national elections.
For example, the entry of extremist religious parties into thepolitical arena during the election period led to increased
threats and hate speech against religious minorities. Also,
abusive enforcement of the country’s strict blasphemy laws

continued to result in the suppression of rights for non-Muslims, Shi’a Muslims, and Ahmadis. USCIRF is aware of at least
40 individuals currently sentenced to death or serving life
sentences for blasphemy in Pakistan, including two Christians,
Qaiser and Amoon Ayub, who were sentenced to death inDecember 2018. Forced conversions of non-Muslims continued despite the passage of the Hindu Marriage Act, which
recognizes Hindu family law.
Based on these particularly severe violations, USCIRF again
finds in 2019 that Pakistan should be designated as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International
Religious Freedom Act (IRFA), as it has found since 2002. In
November 2018, the U.S. Department of State for the firsttime ever designated Pakistan as a CPC. Nevertheless, theState Department immediately issued a waiver against any
related sanctions on Pakistan. USCIRF recommends that theState Department redesignate Pakistan as a CPC under IRFA
and lift the waiver.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Encourage the government of Pakistan and the Standing Committee
on Religious Affairs and InterfaithHarmony to create the National
Commission for Minorities’ Rights as
mandated by the Supreme Court ofPakistan’s 2014 decision;• Enter into a binding agreement,
under section 405(c) of IRFA, with thegovernment of Pakistan, to encourage
substantial steps to address violationsof religious freedom with benchmarks,
including but not limited to:72

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• Release blasphemy prisoners andother individuals imprisoned fortheir religion or belief;• Repeal its blasphemy and anti-Ahmadiyya laws; until repeal can beaccomplished, enact reforms to
make blasphemy a bailable offense,
require evidence by accusers,
and allow authorities to dismiss
unfounded accusations, and also
urge the enforcement of existing
Penal Code articles that criminalize
perjury and false accusations; and• Assign a portion of existing State
Department programs to help thegovernment of Pakistan protect at-risk
religious minority community leaders—both with physical security andpersonnel—and create partnerships
with government bodies, such as the
Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory
Authority, to ensure that extremist
rhetoric that precedes attacks on
minorities is addressed.

TIER 1 PAKISTANCOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
GOVERNMENT
Federal Parliamentary Republic
POPULATION
207,774,520
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSIslamBACKGROUND
Pakistan’s constitution nominally protects membersof all religions by prohibiting public discrimination on
the basis of faith and guaranteeing all citizens the rightto practice their religion and have access to religious
education. The constitution also mandates that 10 seatsin the national parliament be reserved for non-Muslim
community leaders. However, the second amendment
to Pakistan’s constitution prohibits Ahmadiyya Muslims
from self-identifying as Muslims or calling their placesof worship mosques, underpinning a discriminatory
legal structure that has systematically diminished theirright to practice their faith.
Pakistan’s overall security has improved since 2015,
with fewer casualties attributed to extremist groups’
attacks. However, groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the Islamic State in Khorasan
Province (ISKP), and Tehrik-e-Taliban (Pakistani
Taliban) continued to challenge national security in
2018. These groups have directly threatened religious
minority communities—particularly Hazara Shi’as in
Quetta—and have targeted community leaders who
advocated for religious freedom. In addition, extremistgroups have created a chilling effect for members ofthe majority faith who wish to advocate on behalf ofreligious minority communities but fear doing so due toextreme threats against themselves and their families.

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
96.28% Muslim (85–90% Sunni Muslim, 10–15% Shi’a Muslim,
0.22% Ahmadiyya Muslim)
1.59% Christian
1.60% Hindu<1% Sikh, Buddhist, Baha’i, Zoroastrian/Parsi, and other*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook and Pakistan
Bureau of Statistics

As a result, politicians and judges avoided the public
promotion of rights for religious minorities, which
has fostered the spread of an increasingly divisive andantiminority narrative among the public. Moreover, thegovernment of Pakistan has not effectively addressed
the spread of sectarian or religiously motivated intolerant speech. For example, during the 2018 national
elections, several political candidates made defamatoryand derogatory statements toward religious minorities
as a means of garnering support among the public.
The government of Pakistan also has not adequately
prosecuted perpetrators of violent crimes against
religious minorities. Despite the existence of specialized courts that deal with terrorism cases, a number ofextremists have either been released from custody or
avoided arrest all together. Often, acquittals of terrorist
suspects can be attributed to flawed police investigation
procedures, a longstanding challenge across Pakistan’s
police forces. In 2015, rather than address institutional
shortcomings in civilian antiterrorism courts, thegovernment created military tribunals to take over theprosecution of terrorism cases; as of March 2018, thesecourts have sentenced 180 individuals to death. The
military tribunals have been accused of torture andviolating due process rights.
While the government in 2014 established an
overall counterterrorism plan—known as the National

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TIER 1 PAKISTAN

Action Plan (NAP)—in practice it has pursued few ofthe plan’s objectives. With a newly elected government
under the leadership of Prime Minister Khan that came
to power in late 2018, it remains to be seen whether thegoals set forth by the NAP, which included the prevention of violence and hate speech against religious
minority groups, will be realized.

when the Pakistani government issued few, if any, visas
to Indian Sikh citizens for religious pilgrimages. In
another symbolic message, Prime Minister Khan congratulated the Hindu community during the November
religious festival of Diwali.
In a few cases involving private actors attacking
religious freedom, the government has taken somepositive steps in prosecuting wrongdoers. For example,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
in relation to the April 2017 mob killing of college student
Positive Developments
Mashal Khan based on false blasphemy accusations, thegovernment convicted 31 people, though sentenced one
In 2018, the government of Pakistan took some positive
to death, in February 2018. Also, in August 2018 authorsteps to promote religious freedom and combat reliities
arrested and charged two suspects in a separate
giously motivated violence and hate speech. The 2018
instance of killing based on false accusations of blaselections saw the historic election of three Hindus forphemy
against the victim.
general seats in Muslim-majority areas in Sindh and
In December 2018, an independent “people’s
the first non-Muslim elected to a nonreserved/generalcommission
for the protection of minorities’ rights” wasnational assembly seat. However, in the leadup to theformed including leading members of the Christian,2018 elections, Prime Minister Khan and members of his
Sikh, and Hindu communities, as well as retired justices
political party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), veheof high courts and human rights lawyers. This citizens’
mently defended the nation’s blasphemy laws and usedderogatory language in reference to Ahmadiyya Muslims. committee was formed after the Standing Committee
on Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony failed to
Despite using divisive language during the camset up the much-anticipated National Commission for
paign, Prime Minister Khan surprised many when, in
Minorities’ Rights, despite
November, he delivered aa 2014 Supreme Court
national address defenddecision directing the two
ing the Supreme Court’s. . . in the leadup to the 2018 elections,bodies to do so. Finally,acquittal of Asia Bibi andPrime Minister Khan and members
in January 2019, aftervehemently refuted callsof his political party . . . vehemently
the reporting period, theby extremist preachers
defended the nation’s blasphemy laws
Supreme Court ruled thatthat she be killed. In
and used derogatory language
Christian marriages must
addition, his administrain reference to Ahmadiyya Muslims.
be officially registeredtion responded directlywith marriage certificatesto these preachers whenand ordered provincial
they organized violent
governments—wheresomeofficials
had ceased regisprotests and threatened the safety of the Supreme Court
trations—to comply.
justices involved in her acquittal. Hundreds of protestors were arrested and their leader, Khadim Hussain
Rizvi, who has led a hate speech campaign against religious minorities over the last decade, was charged withterrorism and treason; at the end of the reporting period,
his case was ongoing.
In November, during the 549th anniversarycelebration of the Sikh faith’s founder, the Pakistani
government granted visas to 3,500 Indian Sikhs to visit
historic temples (gurdwaras) and carry out religious
ceremonies. This was in stark contrast to previous years

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Blasphemy Laws
Sections 295 and 298 of Pakistan’s Penal Code criminalize acts and speech that insult a religion or religious
beliefs or defile the Qur’an, the Prophet Muhammad, aplace of worship, or religious symbols. These provisions
inherently violate international standards of freedomof religion or belief, protecting beliefs over individuals.
Accusers are not required to present proper evidence thatblasphemy occurred, which leads to abuse, including

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TIER 1 PAKISTAN

false accusations. Moreover, the law sets severe punishsocietal harassment or violence. For example, in Februments, including death or life in prison.
ary 2018, two teenage Christians were arrested in Lahore
While Muslims represent the greatest number ofafter one of them posted an allegedly “sacrilegious
individuals charged or sentenced, religious minority
photo” to a Facebook group. During the interrogation
communities fall victim to a disproportionately higher
with police, one of the arrested teenagers jumped fromrate of blasphemy allegations and arrests. USCIRF isa window in order to evade torture by the interrogators.
aware of at least 40 individuals currently sentenced to
Subsequently, religious extremist groups carried out
death or serving life sentences for blasphemy in Pakistan,violent protests in the teenagers’ predominantly Chrisincluding two Christians, Qaiser and Amoon Ayub, whotian neighborhood, threatening to burn down the entire
were sentenced to death by a district judge in December
area and its inhabitants. Nearly 800 Christians living2018 based on allegations that they insulted the Prophet
in the area fled for fear of attacks, and the families ofMuhammad in articles and images posted online.
the accused have fled the area for the same reason. In
Pakistan’s best-known case of blasphemy is that ofanother instance, a Hindu teenager in Sindh was charged
Asia Bibi, a Christian woman whom the Supreme Court
with blasphemy after he shared allegedly “controversial”
acquitted of blasphemy charges in October 2018 after aimages relating to Muslims on Facebook.
lower court sentenced her to death in 2010. The Supreme
Many individuals accused of blasphemy neverCourt’s landmark decision criticized the lower court
made it to the courtroom as vigilante violence has
judges and prosecutors for pursuing falsely accusedcaused the murder of 62 people since 1990, with very few
blasphemy cases that did not meet the requirements ofprosecutions for mob violence or lynching. For examPakistan’s evidentiary rules. While the Supreme Court
ple, in August 2018, various courts cleared nearly 113
highlighted institutional biases faced by minorities
suspects of wrongdoing for their 2014 involvement inaccused of blasphemy,a mob that burned alive
the decision justified
a Christian couple whoand defended Pakistan’s
were falsely accused of
Further, despite being acquitted
blasphemy laws. Further,
blasphemy. In anotherby the Supreme Court, Asia Bibi lost
despite being acquitted byincident, a student at thenearly a decade of her life in prison due
the Supreme Court, Asia
National Art College into a false accusation of blasphemy . . .
Bibi lost nearly a decadeLahore was murdered inof her life in prison due
July 2018 over an arguto a false accusation ofment with his landlord,
blasphemy, a fate shared by many individuals accused
who later falsely accused the dead victim of blasphemyof blasphemy who similarly languish in jail during the
as a defense for the murder charge.
delayed justice process. Further, religious extremist
In 2018, some political leaders, including Primeleaders and preachers virulently attacked the Supreme
Minister Khan, began publicly recognizing the growCourt’s decision and threatened that their followers
ing phenomena of false blasphemy accusations being
would murder Asia Bibi if she were released. Accordweaponized to strip members of minority communities
ingly, the government of Pakistan kept Asia Bibi andof their property or employment. Such false accusations
her family’s location confidential after her November
were mentioned in the Supreme Court’s judgment in therelease from prison. In January 2019, after the reporting
Asia Bibi case as well as by the Islamabad High Court
period, the Supreme Court upheld her acquittal, clearin its 2018 judgment on a blasphemy case. Accordingly,
ing a path for her to leave the country.
in March 2018 the Senate Functional Committee on
During the reporting period, there were dozens of
Human Rights put forth proposals to punish thosereports of arrests and charges for blasphemy, especially in making false blasphemy accusations to the Council on
Punjab Province where many religious minorities reside
Islamic Ideology. However, few politicians have been
and the majority of blasphemy cases occur. Frequently,
willing to call for repealing or amending the blasphemy
the arrests and charges occurred in an atmosphere oflaw for fear of retribution by extremists.

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TIER 1 PAKISTANIn a December 2018 report entitled Limitations on
Minorities’ Religious Freedom in South Asia, USCIRF
also noted that in Pakistan, blasphemy laws are used tocriminalize religious conversion and proselytization,
thereby limiting the rights of religious minorities.

Anti-Ahmadiyya Laws and Attacks

Ahmadiyya Muslim faith by selling copies of the Qur’anand Ahmadiyya publications. His Shi’a Muslim store
manager, Mazhar Sipra, also was sentenced to five years
on terrorism charges. In March 2019, after the reporting
period, Mr. Shakoor was released from prison. USCIRF
advocated for Abdul Shakoor as part of its Religious
Prisoners of Conscience Project.
Institutional discrimination extends beyond
wrongful criminal prosecutions for Ahmadis in
Pakistan. In September 2018, Prime Minister Khan
nominated Atif Mian, an economics professor at Princeton University and a member of the Ahmadiyya Muslim
community, to Pakistan’s Economic Advisory Council.
Hardline clerics subsequently critiqued Mian’s nomination and accused the prime minister and his party of
blasphemy. Advocates were initially encouraged that
Khan not only nominated Mian, but his government
later defended the nomination once certain religious
groups criticized the move; nevertheless, advocateswere subsequently disappointed when Khan later
revoked the appointment.

Ahmadis are subject to severe legal restrictions andsuffer from officially sanctioned discrimination. In
addition to the constitution’s second amendment thatdeclares Ahmadis to be “non-Muslims,” Penal Code section 298 criminalizes Ahmadis referring to themselves
as Muslims; preaching, propagating, or disseminating
materials on their faith; or referring to their houses ofworship as mosques. They also are prohibited fromvoting as Muslims and were denied registration underjoint electoral lists in 2018, relegating them to separate
electoral lists that command less political power.
Ahmadis frequently face societal discrimination,
arrest, harassment, and physical attacks, sometimes
resulting in murder. The Ahmadiyya community suffered
two serious attacks on their mosques in 2018. In May, a
Education
mob of nearly 600 people destroyed a 100-year-old hisProvincial textbooks with discriminatory content
torical Ahmadiyya mosque in Punjab Province. The mob
against minorities remain a significant concern.
included a local leader with ties to the leading political
USCIRF’s 2016 report, Teaching Intolerance in Pakistan:party in Pakistan, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). The
Religious Bias in Public Textbooks, found that Pakistanimosque and adjacent historically preserved home were
textbooks continue to teach bias against and distrust
once inhabited by the Ahmadiyya Muslim community’sof non-Muslims and followers of any faith other thanfounder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Subsequently, many polIslam, and portray them as inferior. Moreover, the textiticians—including from the PTI—condemned the attack
books depict non-Muslims in Pakistan as non-Pakistaniand called for the perpetrators to be prosecuted. Yet, inor antinational.
August, a mob carried out a similar attack on an AhmadiFurther, in April 2017, Pakistan’s parliament passed
yya mosque in Faisalabad; nearly 30 were injured, and thethe Compulsory Teaching of the Holy Quran Bill, whichmosque was virtually destroyed.
requires that all Muslim students receive mandatory
Along with physical attacks by individual civilians
Qur’anic lessons in bothand mobs, state institupublic and private schools.
tions often have targeted
While non-Muslims are not
the Ahmadiyya comAlong with physical attacks by individual
required to attend thosemunity for prosecution.
citizens and mobs, state institutions
lessons, many minorities
In January 2016, Abdul
often have targeted thehave critiqued the law for
Shakoor, an optician and
Ahmadiyya community for prosecution.
failing to establish religious
store owner in Rabwah,
education in schools for
Punjab Province, wasother faiths. Also, there
sentenced to concurrent
continue to be fears that separating the students for thesethree-year and five-year sentences on terrorism andcourses could encourage communal intolerance.
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Targeted Sectarian Violence

Hazara men were shot dead; no arrests were made.
Responding to the government’s failure to act, leadersin the Hazara community launched a sit-in protest to
demand action by the government to protect them.
During a special case hearing in May 2018, the chief justice of Pakistan stated that attacks on the Hazara Shi’aMuslims in Balochistan Province were tantamount towiping out an entire generation and that the state must
“protect lives and property of the Hazara community.”
The persecution of the Shi’a Muslim community
in Pakistan has continued not only at the hands ofextremist groups, but in some instances also by the government itself. In May 2018, the BBC exposed the “story
of Pakistan’s ‘disappeared Shias,’” which detailed theharassment, arrest, and torture of nearly 140 Shi’a Muslims at the hands of Pakistan’s security agencies. These
individuals were often kept in secret detention without
trial or any formal charge.

TIER 1 PAKISTAN

Along with curriculum taught at public schools,
leaders in Pakistan have recognized the need to institutionalize religious seminaries or madrassas as a meansof combating religious extremism and antiminority
sentiment. Under the National Action Plan (NAP),
provincial authorities were tasked with registering all
madrassas. Yet, by April 2018, the provincial government in Kyber Pakthunkhwa, for example, reported
ongoing confusion and extreme delays over the registration process.

Pakistan serves as a base of operations for many international and domestic extremist groups that pose aserious and continued security threat to the nation’s
religious minority communities. International terroristgroups have launched attacks in Afghanistan from theborder regions in Pakistan’s sovereign territory. This
has inspired harsh rebuke by many officials in Kabul
Conditions for Non-Muslim Minorities
who have openly alleged that these operations, which
Pakistan is home to many Sikh, Hindu, Buddhist, Parsi/
sometimes target Afghanistan’s religious minorities, areZoroastrian, and Christian citizens who face continued
carried out with the assistance or approval of Pakistan’s
threats to their security and are subject to various forms
intelligence agencies.
of harassment and social exclusion. In April 2018, three
In addition to cross-border terrorism, there are many
attacks claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
domestically focused extremist groups operating in Paki(ISIS) left six Pakistani Christians dead in Quetta. Furstan. In addition to attacking government and militaryther, beyond actions by terrorist groups, state security orsites, groups such as the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) andpolice forces have disappeared dozens of young ChrisLashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) are known to persecute religious
tian men in Karachi. While many have been released,minorities. Along with non-Muslims, these groups often
there is widespread fear in the community that the govtarget Shi’a and Sufi Muslims, which has sown deepernment will escalate thisseated sectarian tensions
spate of arbitrary arrests.
in the country. According
Social issues andto reports from the South[T]he chief justice of Pakistan statedsocietal pressures also
Asia Terrorism Portal,
that attacks on the Hazara Shi’a Muslims
continued to negatively
nearly 2,700 Shi’a Muslims
in Balochistan Province were tantamount
impact non-Muslims. In
have been killed and 4,800
to wiping out an entire generation . . .
September 2018, Muslim
injured in 471 attacks since
residents of Gujar Khan in
2001. For example, in 2018,
Punjab Province reportextremists targeted a Shi’aMuslim seminary with a terrorist attack, leaving nearly 30 edly forced out a Christian family, assaulting them andsetting their house on fire. According to some accounts,
people dead and 50 injured.
a local court denied bail to three of the suspects—
Groups like the Islamic State, LeJ, and the TTP
whom police later arrested—though more suspects
have particularly targeted Hazara Shi’a Muslims. The
not apprehended by authorities were believed to be at
National Commission for Human Rights in Pakistan
found that nearly 509 Hazaras have been killed in terror- large. Also, there has been little progress concerning
marriage and divorce bills for Christians, Sikhs, andist-related incidents since 2012. In April 2018, two young

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TIER 1 PAKISTAN

Parsis, perpetuating a longstanding legal gray zone. In
December 2018, the minister for human rights, Shireen
Mazari, stated that the government would present to
the lower house the Christian Marriage and Divorce
Bill, which had stalled since it was originally proposedin 2012.
In addition, non-Muslims remain on the peripheryof the political sphere. While Hindu candidates madeseveral gains in the 2018 elections, their overall representation in the provincial and national parliamentremains low; low levels of Hindu representation also
extend to the security forces, which, if remedied, could
help protect Hindu temples and other structures. In
the aftermath of the 2017 census, non-Muslim community leaders continued to complain in 2018 that
despite increases in their community’s population thecensus failed to reflect this growth, effectively denying
non-Muslim communities the right to more reservedseats in parliament and other government benefits.

erly investigate them. If such cases are investigated or
adjudicated, the young woman is reportedly questioned
in front of the man she was forced to marry, which creates pressure on her to deny any coercion.
In March 2017, Pakistan’s parliament passed the
Hindu Marriage Bill, which gave legal effect to Hindu
marriages. Before the bill came into effect, married
Hindu women remained legally unmarried and subject
to forms of forced conversion and divorce. The law makes
polygamous marriages unlawful to protect Hindu girls
and women from being forced to marry as second wives.
Further, in a positive development, in August 2018 theSindh provincial parliament passed an amendment to the
Marriage Bill that allows both spouses the right to divorce
and remarry and also provides greater financial benefits
to women and children in the Hindu community.

U.S. POLICY

In 2018, Pakistan continued to be an important partnerof the United States on various security challenges, parForced Conversions and Marriage
ticularly as the government has presented threats to andForced conversion of Hindu and Christian young
opportunities for the Afghanistan peace talks between
women into Islam and marriage, often through bonded
the U.S. government, the Afghan government, and thelabor, remains a systemic problem. Several independent
Taliban. Over the past decade, Pakistan has received
institutions, including the National Commission ofnearly $30 billion from the United States in military andJustice and Peace and the Human Rights Commission
civilian aid as an active partner in countering terrorof Pakistan, recognize that an estimated 1,000 young
ism and extremism. However, on November 20, 2018,
women are forcibly converted to Islam each year; many
President Donald J. Trump remarked that $1.3 billion
are kidnapped, forcibly married, and subjected to rape.
in aid was being suspended based on the continued
Hindu and Christian
unwillingness of thewomen were particularly
Pakistani government tovulnerable to these crimes
confront certain terrorist
Hindu and Christian women
because of the societalgroups—like the Haqqani
were particularly vulnerable tomarginalization and
Network—that impact[kidnapping, forcible marriage, and rape]lack of legal protections
security in Afghanistan.
because of the societal marginalization
for religious minorities,
As of September 2018,
and lack of legal protections
combined with deeply
the Pentagon suspended
for religious minorities . . .
patriarchal societal andnearly $300 million in
cultural norms. In April
military aid due to the2018, a Christian woman
Pakistani government’s
died from her injuries when a Muslim man set her on
failure to effectively target extremist groups.
fire after he reportedly pressured her to convert so they
Despite the cooling relationship, in December
could marry; the man was arrested and charged. Local2018 President Trump sent a letter to newly elected
police and political leaders, particularly in Punjab andPrime Minister Khan to ask for assistance in faciliSindh provinces, are often accused of being complicit intating peace talks for Afghanistan. Shortly after theforced marriage and conversion cases by failing to propreporting period, President Trump publicly explained78

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INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
COMMISSIONER JOHNNIE MOORE:
Pakistan’s newly elected prime minister, Imran Khan,
has not only voiced his support for significant reforms
in Pakistani society, but he seems to be in the process oftaking some practical steps necessary to begin reform
while also articulating realistically the challenges
reform entails for a society like Pakistan.
I was particularly struck by a speech delivered byPrime Minister Khan in Dubai at the World Government Summit in February 2019 where he articulated hisdesire for a more tolerant and more pluralistic Pakistan,alluding to a golden age in Medina where there wastolerance, the rule of law, and a commitment to pursue
knowledge. He was arguing that such values are not in

conflict with a majority Muslim society. Much that hesaid reflected a vision for Pakistan that would promotereligious freedom, advance pluralism, and improve thegeneral conditions in a country which has been in an
alarming, dangerous and precipitous decline.
Meanwhile we have seen in the cases of Asia Bibi
and Abdul Shakoor, an inclination by some on Pakistan’s high courts to overturn lower court rulings thatwere clearly bigoted restrictions of religious freedom,largely influenced by the bullying and threats of extremists in Pakistani society. When one reads these legal
opinions, it’s apparent that judges are wisely utilizing
both religious and legal arguments.
This is not to excuse, by any means, for the long andterrible abuse of these religious prisoners of consciencebut it is to say that there remain powerful judicial voices
in Pakistan’s society who are willing to take bold actions
in a precise way.
Both from the lips of the prime minister and fromoccasional rulings of Pakistan’s courts, I can see a
pronounced struggle to address several of the concerns cited in this report, but I see that pronounced
struggle at a time when power may be increasingly on
the side of what is the right and correct approach tothese questions.
The only question is whether the damage thathas been done, and continues to be done by several
elements of Pakistan society by extremists, is so severethat it means the best intentions of the prime ministerand of those who adhere to the rule of law in Pakistan, face a challenge that is beyond their capacity toresolve. I find some of the recent words and actions ofPakistan’s prime minister, and of some of the languageof some of the court rulings, a reason for optimism
despite believing that Pakistan might represent thesingle least accommodating religious freedom environment in the world, presently.

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TIER 1 PAKISTAN

that while Pakistan was assisting extremists andthreatening international security, the U.S. government was willing to meet with the country’s newleadership in pursuit of mutual security goals. Several
high-level delegations made official visits to Pakistan
in late 2018 to reset bilateral relations, including a joint
visit by Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo and then
Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis. In 2018, the U.S.
ambassador to Pakistan and embassy officers met withgovernment officials, including those representing theprime minister’s office, to discuss religious freedom
issues like blasphemy laws, school curriculum, and theprovision of security to religious minorities.
Beyond the tense bilateral security relationship, theState Department has highlighted the importance ofreligious freedom in Pakistan. In November 2018, Secretary Pompeo for the first time designated Pakistan as a
CPC under IRFA, which USCIRF has recommended fortwo decades. However, despite the designation, the State
Department waived the sanctions and penalties for
Pakistan that normally accompany a CPC designation.

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RUSSIA
TIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGS
During 2018, Russia accelerated the repressive behavior that
led USCIRF to recommend its designation as a “country ofparticular concern,” or CPC, for the first time in 2017. The
government continued to target “nontraditional” religious
minorities with fines, detentions, and criminal charges under
the pretext of combating extremism. Russian legislation
targets “extremism” without adequately defining the term,
enabling the state to prosecute a vast range of nonviolent,
nonpolitical religious activity. The Jehovah’s Witnesses, whom
the government banned outright in 2017, faced severe persecution by the state. By the end of the reporting period, hundredsof members remained in detention, had travel restrictions
imposed, or were under investigation, and church property
estimated at $90 million had been confiscated. The leadershipof the St. Petersburg Church of Scientology remained underhouse arrest, while numerous adherents of the Islamic missionary movement Tablighi Jamaat and readers of the works
of Turkish theologian Said Nursi were sentenced to lengthy

prison terms for peaceful religious expression. In the North
Caucasus, security forces acted with complete impunity, arresting and kidnapping persons suspected of even tangential links
to Islamist militancy. In Russian-occupied Crimea, the Russianauthorities continued to kidnap, torture, and imprison Crimean
Tatar Muslims at will. Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine,
often referred to as the Donbas, continued to expropriate
church buildings and intimidate religious communities.
In 2019, USCIRF again finds that Russia merits designation as a CPC under the International Religious Freedom Act(IRFA). In November 2018, the U.S. Department of State forthe first time placed Russia on its “Special Watch List,” a new
category created by December 2016 amendments to IRFA.
Unlike a CPC designation, the Special Watch List carries nopenalties, sanctions, or other commensurate actions. USCIRF
recommends that the State Department designate Russia as a
CPC under IRFA and impose sanctions specific to its religious
freedom violations.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Urge the Russian government toamend its extremism law in line withinternational human rights standards, such as adding criteria on the
advocacy or use of violence, and toabandon its religious registration laws,
which are frequently used to harassand prosecute religious minorities;• Implore the Russian government torelease Dennis Christensen, Ivan Matsitsky, and all other religious prisonersof conscience in Russia;

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• Urge the Russian government topermit the establishment of aninternational monitoring presence inoccupied Crimea to verify compliancewith international human rights andreligious freedom standards;• Identify Russian government agencies
and officials responsible for severe
violations of religious freedom, freeze
those individuals’ assets, and bar theirentry into the United States, as delineated under the Countering America’s

Adversaries Through Sanctions Act(CAATSA), the Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act, andrelated executive orders, citing specificreligious freedom violations; and• Work with European allies to use
advocacy, diplomacy, and targeted
sanctions to pressure Russia to end
religious freedom abuses.

TIER 1 RUSSIA

COUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Russian Federation
GOVERNMENT
Presidential Federation
POPULATION
142,000,000

GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSTechnically a secular state with complete religious freedom.
In practice, the government gives preference to Orthodox
Christianity, Hanafi Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism.
RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
68% Russian Orthodox
7% Muslim
25% Other (including Protestants, Catholics, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, Buddhists, Jews, and Baha’is)*Estimates compiled from the U.S. Department of StateBACKGROUNDThe Russian government views independent religious
activity as a major threat to social and political stability as well as to its own control, while simultaneously
cultivating significant relationships with the country’s
so-called “traditional” religions. The government maintains and frequently updates laws that restrict religious
freedom, including a 1996 religion law and a 2002 law on
combating extremism. The religion law sets strict registration requirements on religious groups and empowers
state officials to impede their activity. Its preface,which is not legally binding, singles out Islam, Judaism,
Buddhism, and especially Orthodox Christianity as
the country’s four traditional religions; other religious
groups are treated with suspicion. This is consistent
with the longstanding tendency of the Russian Empire,and later the Soviet Union, to coopt representatives ofthe dominant religions and use their institutions as defacto organs of the state.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, religion has
dramatically increased in popularity across the region.
While in 1991, just 30 percent of Russian adults identified
as Orthodox Christian, by 2008 this number had risen
to 72 percent of the population. Over time, the Russian
government has come to favor the Moscow Patriarchateof the Russian Orthodox Church (MPROC) as the de facto

state church. This favoritism has fostered a climate of
hostility toward other forms of Christianity, which are
increasingly perceived as foreign. This has accelerated
since President Vladimir Putin’s reelection in 2012 andhis strategic alliance with the Russian Orthodox Church.
Muslims currently make up approximately sevenpercent of the population, or roughly 6.5 million people.
This number is also rising, largely driven by migrationfrom Central Asia and the Caucasus. The government
defines acceptable Islamic practice, favoring clerics,
institutions, and traditions perceived to be indigenous
while persecuting those deemed to be foreign. In addition to Muslims and Christians, there are approximately
1.5 million Buddhists and 176,000 Jews in Russia. As
with their “traditional” counterparts, these communities tend to be tolerated as long as they refrain frompolitical activity and do not have foreign ties.
The 1996 religion law has since been amended
numerous times and supplemented by a series of laws
prosecuting so-called “extremism,” missionary activity,
blasphemy, and “stirring up religious hatred.” Theselaws are typified by their vagueness and give Russianauthorities broad powers to define and prosecuteactivity it deems harmful. The anti-extremism law, forexample, lacks a clear definition of extremism, and theuse or advocacy of violence is not a prerequisite for suchU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

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82

a designation. Because virtually any speech can be prosecuted, the law is a powerful way to intimidate membersof religious communities. Religious and other communities can be financially blacklisted or liquidated, andindividuals can be subjected to criminal prosecution
for social media posts that are arbitrarily determined tooffend the religious sensibilities of others.
In July 2016, the Russian government adopted apackage of amendments, known as the Yarovaya Law,that significantly enhanced the scope and penalties of
the religion and anti-extremism laws. The religion law
broadly defines “missionary activities” as preaching,praying, disseminating religious materials, and evenanswering questions about religion outside of officially designated sites, all of which are prohibited. Any
religious speech or activity not explicitly sanctionedby the authorities has the potential to be criminalized,
depending on the whims of local law enforcement andprosecutors. At the end of the reporting period, there
were 4,847 items on the Federal List of Extremist Materials, maintained by the Ministry of Justice.
In 2018, Russian occupation authorities in both
Eastern Ukraine and Crimea continued to systematically persecute religious minorities in their efforts tomaintain social and political control.

Characteristic “soft targets” for the Russian security
services are readers of the Qur’anic commentary of Said
Nursi, a Turkish Islamic revivalist theologian and ethnic
Kurd who advocated for the modernization of Islamic
learning. Although Nursi followers have been targets ofRussian law enforcement since the early 2000s, the severityof the persecution has increased in recent years. Nursi
readers are typically charged with belonging to a supposed“Nurdzhular” terrorist movement, which was officiallybanned in 2008 as extremist but is widely believed to be a
fiction invented to prosecute Nursi adherents.
In May 2018, Ilgar Aliyev, a Muslim from Dagestanin the Russian North Caucasus, received an eight-year
prison sentence and two years’ additional restrictions
for leading a Nursi study group. The verdict was the most
severe yet handed to an accused Nursi follower. Aliyev
was one of three Nursi followers prosecuted in 2018:
Komil Odilov was sentenced to two years in prison, andAndrei Dedkov was fined the equivalent of more thansix months’ average wages. A fourth man, Sabirzhin
Kabirzoda, was given a two-year suspended sentence atthe end of a trial lasting more than six months.
The charges leveled against Nursi and his followers
claimed that the theologian’s work incites hatred byproclaiming the superiority of Islam and the exclusivity of the Qur’an. In August 2018, the European Court
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018of Human Rights ruled that the Russian government’s“Extremist” Islambanning of Nursi’s commentaries constituted a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Security and terrorism concerns in Russia are real.
Numerous expert witnesses attested to the essentially
However, the government frequently exploits these fears
humanistic and peaceful character of Nursi’s work.
to persecute political dissidents, critics, and nonsancDuring the year, Russian authorities also frequently
tioned religious groups, especially those perceived totargeted members of thebe foreign. The label ofMuslim missionary move“extremism” is broadly
ment, Tablighi Jamaat. The
applied to many Islamic
The
label
of
"extremism"
isbroadlygroup, which originated ingroups with no links toappliedtomanyIslamic
groupsIndia, focuses on calling
violence or revolution,
with
no
links
to
violenceor
revolution,
existing Muslim comwhose only common
whose
only
commondenominatormunities to a more pious
denominator is theiris
their
non-Russianorigin.
religious life. Human
non-Russian origin.
rights and other groups
As with Christianity,that monitor conditions
Buddhism, and Judaism,in Russia have found no
the Russian governevidence linking Tablighi Jamaat to terrorism or acts ofment privileges Islamic practice that is perceived to beviolence. The group is widely considered to be pacifist,
indigenous, while remaining suspicious of movements
as one of its primary tenets is noninvolvement in politics.
originating elsewhere.

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TIER 1 RUSSIA

Nevertheless, Russian members of Tablighi Jamaat weresentences handed down to suspected HT members areroutinely arrested and charged with “extremism.” In May
significantly more severe than those given to others
2018, two residents of the Russian province of Bashkordeemed as extremists, and typically range between 10
tostan were sentenced to two years’ imprisonment forand 19 years. During 2018, authorities arrested and prosmembership in the group. In December, a Moscow court
ecuted HT members nearly every month; in July alone,convicted four Tablighi Jamaat members of missionary
there were 21 arrests. While the Russian government has
activity and sentenced them to two years and two months
legitimate security concerns about Islamist extremism,
in a penal colony, followed by six months of additional
the charges brought against HT members have been
restrictions, such as not being permitted to leave theirpredicated on scant evidence and, in many instances,home town without special permission from authorities.
appeared primarily motivated by a desire to discourage
After the reporting period, on January 22, 2019, after Islamic practice or coerce local Muslim populations. For
more than 15 months in pretrial detention, 49-year-old
example, accusations of belonging to HT are frequently
Crimean Tatar Renat Suleimanov was sentenced to four
used to arrest ethnic Tatar activists in occupied Crimea.
years in prison for his alleged leadership of a Tablighi
Russian human rights groups consider those incarcerJamaat cell in Crimea. Three other Muslim Tatars
ated for membership in HT to be political prisoners andsentenced with him were given suspended sentences
prisoners of conscience.
of two and a half years. At the end of January 2019, after
Jehovah’s Witnesses
the reporting period, five farmers in the Saratov region
On April 20, 2017, Jehovah’s Witnesses became the firstof southern Russia were arrested and charged with posreligion to be banned outright across Russia, based on
session of extremist literature and plotting to establish a
the accusation that the church is an “extremist organizalocal cell of Tablighi Jamaat.
tion.” The designation purportedly derived from the fact
By far the greatest number of Muslims arrested inthat Jehovah’s Witnesses discourage their members from
Russia are accused of belonging to the banned Islamist
donating blood or receiving blood transfusions. Since theorganization Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). The group is secretive;
beginning of 2018, Russian law enforcement agents raided
it has not condemned acts of terrorism and declares its
the homes of Witnesses across the country. Witnesses
ultimate goal to be the replacement of all non-Islamic
were dismissed from theirstates with an Islamic
jobs, schoolchildren andcaliphate, and its memtheir parents were interrobers have been vocally
At
the
end
of
the
reportingperiod,gated and threatened, andanti-Semitic. However, thethere were 23 Jehovah’s Witnesses
the community’s buildings
group has never publiclyinprison,
27
under
house
arrest,and property were burned
advocated—or claimed
41 forbidden from leaving theirand vandalized. By the end
responsibility for—an act
home
towns,
and
121
under
investigation.
of the reporting period, theof terrorism, violence,
estimated value of churchor revolution, and its
property seized by the state
members have emphawas $90 million.
sized individual religious
Since the ban, Jehovah’s Witnesses have no longer
practice over engagement in politics. Russian humanbeen permitted to request alternative service as conrights groups have argued that the Russian government
scientious objectors and have been ordered to reportroutinely fails to provide reliable evidence that thosefor military service. Targeted individuals have beenarrested for membership in HT have any plausible links
subject to search and seizure of property, detainment,
to terrorism. Those HT members who have been proseinterrogation, and travel restrictions. At the end of thecuted were only shown to have met for prayer, scripture
reporting period, there were 23 Jehovah’s Witnesses inreading, and the discussion of HT ideology.
prison, 27 under house arrest, 41 forbidden from leaving
More Russian citizens are arrested for their ties totheir home towns, and 121 under investigation.
HT than to any other religious or political group. The

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On February 15, 2019, after the reporting period,at least seven Jehovah’s Witnesses in northern Siberia
were allegedly tortured at the hands of local police after
being detained on extremism charges. The victims werereportedly stripped naked, bound, suffocated, beaten,
doused with cold water, and subjected to electric shocks.
Investigators demanded information about local membership, meeting places, and leadership; three local
members remained in prison and 19 were under active
investigation following the February 2019 incident.
On May 25, 2017, Danish citizen Dennis Christensen was arrested at a peaceful meeting of theJehovah’s Witnesses in the city of Oryol, about 200 miles
south of Moscow. The meeting was raided by heavily
armed police and agents of the Federal Security Services(FSB), and Christensen was charged with “organizing
extremist activity” under article 282.2(1) of the Russian
Criminal Code. Christensen, who moved to Russia in
1995 for personal reasons, has never been employed as a
missionary by the Jehovah’s Witnesses and was not sent
to Russia at the behest or invitation of any organization.
On February 6, 2019, after the reporting period, he wassentenced to six years in prison. Christensen had spent
622 days in pretrial detention, where Danish Embassy
officials affirmed he was not mistreated and remainedin good health. USCIRF advocates on behalf of Dennis
Christensen as part of its Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project.

2018, the three female leaders remained under housearrest or restricted freedom regimes while the two maleleaders, Sakhib Aliev and Ivan Matsitsky, remained inprison. According to a complaint filed by Matsitsky’s
lawyer, his client suffered inhumane conditions while incustody. This included being placed in solitary confinement for 10 days and being forced to share his cell witha convicted murderer who systematically threatenedhim, pressured him to confess, and tormented him byrefusing to close the window in the middle of winter.
Although conditions have subsequently improved, Matsitsky remained in pretrial for an indeterminate period
and was rarely able to visit with his wife and family.
USCIRF advocates on behalf of Matsitsky as part of its
Religious Prisoners of Conscience Project.

Other “Nontraditional” Religious Groups

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints andHare Krishnas report a pervasive atmosphere of fear
and the need to radically alter their religious practice
to avoid violating the 2016 prohibition on missionary
activity. Authorities reportedly filed at least 89 court
cases for illegal missionary activity over the course of
2018. The chilling effect of official state pressure has
had a noticeable impact on religious communities; forexample, one Russian member of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints in the city of Tver reported
that her congregation has halved in recent years as older
members have died, younger members have ceased
The Church of Scientology
attending, and newer members have become a rarity.
The Church of Scientology was designated a “destrucOn April 28, 2018, the Pentecostal “Jesus Embassy”
tive” group by the Russian legislature in 1996. Althoughin Nizhny Novgorod was found guilty of permitting
never banned outright, the church has been hinderedmembers to perform illegal missionary activity andby Russia’s strict registration laws. Despite attempting
failing to display its full official name on a video being
to register as a religion
distributed by members.
on 12 separate occasions,
The church was issued
they were denied eachfines equivalent to about
Despiteattemptingtoregistertime because of supposed$457 (or one month’s
as a religion on 12 separate occasions,administrative techniaverage local wages) and[the
Churchof
Scientology
was]calities. On June 6, 2017,$1,522 for each offense.
denied each time because of supposed
Russian police raided the
On August 10, 2018,
administrativetechnicalities.
Church of Scientology
Moscow police searchedin St. Petersburg as well
the offices of Alexander
as the homes of all fiveKargin, the leader of theleaders of the group, who were arrested on charges of“Shakhar” organization, a Jewish youth movement“illegal business operations” and extremism. Duringfounded in Russia in 2011 that seeks to cultivate Jewish

84

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Tibetan Buddhism

One of the earliest examples of this was the 2013 blasphemy law, passed in response to a 2012 political protest
in Moscow’s main MPROC cathedral that offended many
Orthodox believers. The law imposes up to three years’
imprisonment or the confiscation of up to three years’salary for “offending religious convictions and feelings.”
In 2018, numerous individuals were charged underthe blasphemy law and await potentially harsh convictions. Daniil Markin, a 19-year-old film student, faces
up to five years’ imprisonment for posting an image
likening Jon Snow, a character from the television seriesGame of Thrones, to Jesus. Maria Matuznaya, age 23,
also faces up to five years in prison for social media
posts mocking religion, including Russian Orthodoxy.
Thus far, no one has been imprisoned under the 2013
law for publicly offending the religious sensibilities ofothers. Those convicted have received either fines orsuspended sentences.

TIER 1 RUSSIA

identity. During their search, authorities reportedly
found “nationalist” literature. Kargin’s lawyers claimed
that this literature, some of which has a blatantly
anti-Semitic character, was planted.
Since October 2018, the Moscow Theological Seminary Union of Evangelical Christians-Baptists of Russia(UECBR), the largest evangelical school in the RussianFederation, has faced increased pressure from thegovernment. An official inspection found an “absence ofdeveloped and approved curriculums as well as teacherswith due qualification and necessary experience.” On
December 27, 2018, the local court suspended the seminary’s activity for 60 days.

Three Russian republics—Kalmykia, Buryatia, andTuva—have Buddhist majorities who follow Tibetan
Buddhism and revere His Holiness the Dalai Lamaas their foremost spiritual leader. Although the Dalai
The Situation in the North Caucasus
Lama was permitted to visit these republics several
In the heavily militarized zone of the North Caucasus,
times between 1991 and 2004, he has subsequently been
anyone suspected of practicing “nontraditional” Islam
unable to receive a visa from the Russian governmentor of having any link to the ongoing Islamist insurgency
despite numerous invitations from prominent members
is at risk of being disapof the Russian Buddhist
peared by the FSB. In
community. Those Rus2018, the region remainedsians wishing to see the
Although the Dalai Lama wasin a state of low-level
Dalai Lama frequently
permitted to visit [in the past],
conflict, resulting in 108
travel to Latvia, where hehe has subsequently been unable tocasualties, including 82
has made several trips
receive a visa from the Russian government
deaths. Most of thesesince 2014. Since 2015,
despite numerous invitations
casualties occurred
local officials have madefrom prominent members of thein Dagestan Province,
numerous attempts to
Russian Buddhist community.
followed by neighboring
remove the EnlightenChechnya, where Russian
ment Stupa monument inforces battled a separatist
Moscow. The oldest of theinsurgency with heavy Islamist elements in 1994–1996
only two canonical stupas in Moscow, the monument
and 1999–2000.
holds hundreds of sacred relics and is a site of immense
Since 2007, Chechnya has been led by the Kremsignificance to the Tibetan Buddhist community in
lin-appointed president, Ramzan Kadyrov, who
Russia. After their most recent effort to remove the stupa
oversees a private army that engages in human rights
in September 2018, local authorities have hinderedviolations, conducts collective reprisals against theattempts to renovate it.
families of suspects, and suppresses all dissent. KadyBlasphemy Law Enforcement
rov also enforces his own views of Islam. He is the son
Many of the religious policies enacted in recent yearsof Akhmad Kadyrov, the former mufti and president
have been motivated by pressure from the Moscow
of Chechnya, whose strategic alliance with Russia
Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (MPROC).
helped to reestablish Russian control over the republic

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in 2000. Kadyrov actively promotes the image of his
In North Ossetia, the only North Caucasus provfather, who was assassinated in 2004, as the politicalince without a Muslim majority, there were reports inand spiritual father of the Chechen nation—naming2018 of plans to convert the historic Persian Mosque
the largest mosque in Chechnya after him and proposin the capital of Vladikavkaz into a planetarium. The
ing his model of a “moderate” but tightly controlled
North-Ossetian Muftiate has complained of a chronic
Islam as a beacon for the entire Muslim world. The
shortage of mosques in the province—allegedly only 29
younger Kadyrov is a vocal opponent of “Wahhabism”
mosques for a population of 200,000 Muslims.
and “Salafism,” even as he forces Islamic dress codes
Restrictions on Religious Activity inand polygamous marriages upon Chechen women
Occupied Crimea
and oversees a strict regime of traditional Chechen
In 2018, the Russian occupation authorities continued
values. On December 21, 2018, the Organization for
their policies of harassment, intimidation, and targeting
Security and Cooperation in Europe released a reportof religious groups in Crimea suspected of disloyalty toalleging hundreds of atrocities against the lesbian,the Russian state, chief among them Crimean Tatars andgay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBTQ) community inother Muslims. Until November 2018, the FSB in Crimea
Chechnya, including arbitrary arrests, imprisonment
was headed by Viktor Palagin, a supposed “Islamicin special camps, forced disappearances, torture, andspecialist.” His replacement, Leonid Mikhailyuk, served
extrajudicial executions. Those critical of authorities
in Chechnya before distinguishing himself as the head
have been publicly shamed on central television (aof the FSB in Kaliningrad, where he uncovered an active
profound humiliation in Chechen culture), sometimes
cell of the terrorist group Islamic Jihad in 2016. The
by Kadyrov himself. In addition, in 2018, Chechen
profiles of these officials
religious authorities
reflect the essentially reliannounced they would
gious lens through which
increase the number ofDespitemost
oppositiontothe government views
theologians accompa[Crimea’s] occupation being politicalsecurity on the peninsula.
nying Chechen pilgrims
andethnicinnature,Russianauthorities
Despite most oppoon the hajj to Saudi
routinely disrupt religious activities
sition to the occupation
Arabia and provide eachand institutions.
being political andparticipant with religious
ethnic in nature, Russian
reading materials.
authorities routinely
The need to demondisrupt religious activities and institutions. In April
strate success against the ongoing threat of Islamist
2018, armed FSB officers interrupted Friday prayers
terrorism in the North Caucasus has led security forcesin the village of Pavlovka and physically searched
to target peaceful Muslim dissidents. Violations ofeveryone present. The officers claimed to be respondreligious freedom also result from the use of “prophying to reports that extremist meetings were being held
lactic measures” such as the maintenance of blacklists
in the mosque. In addition to the prosecution of fourof alleged extremists, including secular dissidents;
Crimean Tatars for membership in Tablighi Jamaat,frequent raids on Salafist mosques; and harassment
in 2018 there were numerous prosecutions for allegedof their members. On November 26, 2018, authorities
membership in HT. Accusations of belonging to HT
detained Nigmatula Radjabov, the imam of a Salafist
are frequently leveled against ethnic Crimean Tatars,
mosque in the Dagestani capital of Makhachkala, andmany of whom are political activists opposed to thedetained and interrogated him before releasing him theRussian annexation of 2014.
same day. Radjabov had previously complained about
the attempted kidnapping of his 18-year-old son by
Non-Muslim Minorities in Crimea
members of the local police. During the year, raids on
Religious persecution in Crimea is not limited to MusRadjabov’s mosque during Friday prayer services werelims. Russia’s repressive laws have greatly curtailed
an almost weekly occurrence.

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During 2018, LNR forces carried out a systematic
campaign of repression against local Christian minorities. On March 27, armed militants reportedly looted a
Baptist church in the city of Stakhanov, taking everything from sound equipment and kitchen appliances
to religious items. On June 3, armed men in ski masksinterrupted a Baptist service and detained five members, including the pastor, who was eventually fined$120. The rest of the congregation was forced to provide
their names and addresses to the armed men before thebuilding was sealed. On July 26, 2018, the LNR banned
the All-Ukrainian Union of Evangelical Christian Baptist Churches as an extremist organization, accusing itof plotting to overthrow the separatist government andclaiming that local Baptists distributed psychotropic
substances to their members. On August 6, a Pentecostal
service was raided by armed men, who forced everyone
to lie on the floor as they confiscated church property
and detained the pastor along with several members of
the leadership. Prior to the conflict in 2014, there were 18
Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate churches
in the LNR; as of 2018, only two continued to operate.
In addition, LNR armed forces seized and sealed five
Russia’s Separatist Enclaves in the Donbas
Jehovah’s Witness Kingdom Halls, and on May 30, one of
In 2018, the Russian-occupied separatist parastates of the these halls was destroyed by a fire of unknown origin.
Lugansk People’s Republic (LNR) and Donetsk People’s
In 2018, DNR forces seized two Baptist churches
Republic (DNR) in easternand a mosque. In a
Ukraine remained heavily
familiar pattern, armed
militarized warzones
men occupied the build[T]heLNR
bannedthepoliced by parallel minisings and confiscated
All-Ukrainian Union of Evangelicaltries of state security. The
literature and other
Christian
BaptistChurchesasanseparatist governments
property before sealing
extremist organization, accusing it
were deeply suspicious
off the premises. Afterofplotting
tooverthrowthetoward religious groups
the June 2018 seizure of
separatist government . . .
other than the Russian
the Donetsk mosque,Orthodox Church andthe imam and one othercontinued to persecute
member were interroreligious minorities through legal restrictions, confiscagated, accused of distributing extremist literature, andtion of property, prosecution of clergy, and harassment
forbidden from leaving the city. In addition, on Sepof congregations. In February 2018, the LNR government
tember 26, the DNR followed Russia’s lead and banned
announced it would require registration of all religious
the Jehovah’s Witnesses.
groups in its territory, which experts believed to be a preUkrainian Autocephaly
lude to the official exclusion of religious minorities. All
On January 6, 2019, after the reporting period, thePentecostal, Seventh-day Adventist, or Baptist commuEcumenical Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew of Connities were denied this compulsory registration by the
stantinople granted autocephaly, or independence, toOctober 15, 2018, deadline.

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religious freedom on the peninsula. In 2018, there were
23 prosecutions for “missionary activity” in Crimea,
representing a twofold increase since 2016. In addition,
17 cases were brought against religious communities
and individuals for failing to use the full legal name ofa registered religious community. Nine of these cases
resulted in fines equaling roughly two months’ average
local wages. The majority of those prosecuted were“nontraditional” Christian groups. After the Russian
takeover of 2014, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of
the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) refused to register,
considering this to be submission to an illegal occupation. Russian authorities responded by seizing church
property and harassing clergy. By the summer of 2018,
only eight of the original 46 parishes remained, while
all but four priests had fled. On November 16, 2018,
Sergei Filatov became the first resident of Crimea to beprosecuted for being a Jehovah’s Witness. Following an
FSB search of dozens of homes, Filatov was arrested andcharged with being the leader of the local Jehovah’s Witness community; his trial was still pending at the end of
the reporting period.

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the UOC-KP, which was established in 1992. Prior to thisannouncement, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), which is part of the Russian
Orthodox Church, was the only one recognized as an
official part of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Current
members of the Moscow Patriarchate have the choice of
joining the Ukrainian Church or remaining membersof a new “Russian Church.” In cases where the outcome
is unclear, the Ukrainian state will apparently make thefinal determination about any changes of ecclesiasticalstatus and redistribution of church property.
On September 14, 2018, amid news that Ukrainian
autocephaly was imminent, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church declared it would stop offering
prayers for Patriarch Bartholomew and temporarily
cease all communion with Constantinople. In November 2018, Ukrainian intelligence services raided thehome of Metropolitan Pavlo, the cleric who oversees thelargest and oldest UOC-MP church in Ukraine. Although
no charges have been filed to date, officials justified
the raid by claiming Pavlo incited hatred. There werereports of at least a dozen such cases of UOC-MP priests
who were interrogated by security services for allegedtreason and inciting religious hatred; by the end of thereporting period, no charges had been filed.

U.S. POLICY
U.S.-Russian relations have continued to deteriorate since
Vladimir Putin announced his intention to run for reelection in 2012. In December 2012, the United States passed
the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act
sanctioning Russian officials responsible for gross humanrights violations. In response, the Russian government
denied U.S. citizens the opportunity to adopt Russianchildren and issued a list of U.S. officials prohibited fromentering Russia. The Russian annexation of Crimea
and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, intervention in
Syria in 2015 on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad, andinterference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election have
deepened strains between Russia and the United States.

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In 2018, the U.S. government increased pressure
on Russia over its violations of religious freedom. On
June 18, the State Department announced it was “deeply
concerned” about the growing number of religious
prisoners in Russia, specifically mentioning Mr.
Christensen, the St. Petersburg Church of Scientology
leadership, and followers of Said Nursi. On November
28, 2018, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo added
Russia to the State Department’s Special Watch List
as a country that has engaged in “severe violations ofreligious freedom.” In a December press briefing on thedesignations, Ambassador-at-Large for International
Religious Freedom Samuel D. Brownback explainedthat since 2016, Russia has “targeted and stepped up its
oppression” of religious groups, citing its persecutionof Christian minorities and the large number of imprisoned Muslims. He warned Russia that continuing its
current trajectory could warrant its designation as a
CPC, noting the requisite sanctions that accompany
such a designation. USCIRF has recommended thisdesignation for Russia since 2017.
There is evidence that Russia seeks to extend its
interference to religious groups within the United States.
On July 15, 2018, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)arrested Russian national Maria Butina and charged her
with espionage. She is accused of—among other things—
using the National Prayer Breakfast to establish contacts
between attendees and Russian officials. At the end of
December, in a move widely considered to be retaliatory,
Russian authorities arrested Paul Whelan, an American
citizen, and charged him with spying for the UnitedStates. At the end of the reporting period, he remainedin Russian custody; State Department and intelligence
officials have disputed the charges against him.
Following Mr. Christensen’s conviction in February 2019, after the reporting period, the U.S. Embassyin Moscow expressed its concern over his harsh sentence “for simply practicing his faith.” The statement
was subsequently translated and reissued by Ambassador Brownback.

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89

SAUDI ARABIATIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, while Saudi Arabia remained a country of particularconcern, religious freedom conditions trended positive in certain areas, including: Saudi senior officials no longer statedthat Islam can be the only religion on the Arabian Peninsula;senior leadership met with several Christian leaders, including
the head of the Anglican Church and a group of American
evangelical leaders, pledging to promote interfaith dialogue
and the flourishing of different faith traditions as part of the
kingdom’s domestic reforms; Egyptian Bishop Ava Markos led
the first known publicized Coptic Church Mass in Saudi Arabia’s
history; USCIRF was granted the first-ever meeting between
the head of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue andPrevention of Vice (CPVPV) and a U.S. government delegation; religiously motivated restrictions on women driving werelifted, and provisions of the guardianship laws treating womenas legal minors were less strictly enforced in the kingdom’s
capital, Riyadh; the Ministry of Justice announced greater
protection of due process rights for Saudis who are arrested;
and the government continued to aggressively combat extremist ideology. Notwithstanding these positive developments,
religious freedom concerns in Saudi Arabia remain. While thegovernment continued to implement some economic andsocial reforms related to Saudi Vision 2030, it remains unclear
if religious freedom conditions will improve as part of thesereforms. During 2018, it maintained a ban on non-Muslim public religious observance and continued to arrest, detain, andharass individuals for dissent, blasphemy, and apostasy. The
Saudi government continued to violate the rights of Shi’a Muslims and non-Muslim minorities, and to advocate a doctrine ofreligious intolerance. While it began new construction in the
Shi’a town of Awamiya, the Saudi government restricted theobservance of religious holidays by the Shi’a Muslim minority.
After more than 15 years of incremental progress, the Saudi
government showed backsliding on improvements to its textbooks that continued to propagate intolerance and advocate
violence against religious minorities, women, and the lesbian,gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) community.
Despite the fact that in 2018 women were given the right todrive, the religiously justified guardianship system remainedin place, adversely affecting the religious freedom of womenin the kingdom.
Based on these particularly severe violations of religious
freedom, USCIRF again finds in 2019 that Saudi Arabia merits
designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, underthe International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). Although the
U.S. State Department has designated Saudi Arabia as a CPC
since 2004, most recently in November 2018, an indefinite
waiver has been in place since 2006. The waiver releases theadministration from taking an otherwise legislatively mandated
action as a result of the designation. USCIRF recommends that
the State Department redesignate Saudi Arabia as a CPC under
IRFA and lift the waiver.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Press the Saudi Shura Council to passand fully implement an antidiscrimination law protecting the equal rights
of all Saudi citizens and expatriate
residents, take measures to end
the harassment of Shi’a Muslims,
particularly in the Eastern Province,and end prosecution of individuals
charged with apostasy, blasphemy,and sorcery;90

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• Implore the Saudi government torelease Raif Badawi, his counsel Waleed
Abu al-Khair, and other religious prisoners of conscience in Saudi Arabia;• Press the Saudi government todevise and implement a plan to end
the guardianship system that treats
women as legal minors and, in themeantime, codify any informal easingof this system in the kingdom; and• Continue to press the Saudi Ministryof Education to remove inflammatory
and intolerant content in government-issued textbooks, cease theexportation of these textbooks to
Saudi-supported schools abroad,and make every effort to retrievepreviously distributed materials that
contain intolerance.

TIER 1 SAUDI ARABIACOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
GOVERNMENT
Absolute Monarchy
POPULATION
33,091,113
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSIslamBACKGROUND
Saudi Arabia is officially an Islamic state. According
to the 1992 Saudi Basic Law of Governance, the constitution is the Qur’an and the sunna (traditions of theProphet). The judicial system is largely governed by
the Islamic Shari’ah as interpreted by judges trained in
the Hanbali school of jurisprudence. The king of Saudi
Arabia, currently Salman bin Abdulaziz, holds the title“Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.” In 2017, King Salman appointed his son Mohammed bin Salman to serveas crown prince. The king also appoints members of
the Shura Council, a legislative advisory body, and may
dissolve and reconstitute the council at will. Since thecrown prince’s appointment, there have been a series ofcrackdowns on corruption, including the 2017 arrestsof several prominent businessmen and members of theroyal family. These arrests included American citizen
Walid Fitaihi, who was allegedly tortured and remainedin prison at the end of the reporting period.
There are more than 33 million Saudis, 85–90
percent of whom are Sunni Muslims and 10–15 percentof whom are Shi’a. The United Nations (UN) estimatesthat 37 percent of the Saudi population are expatriates,
at least two million of whom are non-Muslim, including Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, practitioners of folk
religions, and those without religious affiliation. Some
Saudi citizens identify as non-Muslim or atheist, but

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
Muslim (official; citizens are 85–90% Sunni and 10–15% Shi’a)
Other (more than eight million expatriate workers include atleast two million non-Muslims, including Eastern Orthodox,
Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh,folk religions, and religiously unaffiliated)*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook and U.S. Department of State

hide this identity in order to avoid the harsh social andlegal consequences the government imposes on those
who leave Islam. Saudi Arabia also hosts and is the largest donor to the Muslim World League (MWL), a global
nongovernmental organization that propagates a particular interpretation of Islam. The MWL’s December 2018conference in Mecca focused on the “Perils of Labelingand Exclusion” and its secretary general, Mohammed
al-Issa, has been outspoken against violent extremism
over the past year; in January 2018, he condemned Holocaust denial during a visit to the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum.
Despite the ongoing implementation of Saudi Vision
2030, a national development initiative announced in
April 2016, Saudi Arabia restricts most forms of public
religious expression inconsistent with its interpretation of Sunni Islam. The crown prince has reduced theinfluence of Saudi Arabia’s powerful religious establishment, though he has simultaneously consolidated his
own power and targeted adversaries. During the past
year, there were indications that over the long term, theSaudi government harbors the political will to improveconditions for freedom of religion and belief.
The Saudi Commission for the Promotion of Virtue
and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), known informallyas “the religious police,” has continued its process oflong-term reforms under new leadership, though theseU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

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reforms are not yet complete. These include higher
standards for recruiting and training officers, public
education programs, and greater assistance to Muslim
pilgrims performing the hajj pilgrimage. USCIRF’s
September visit to the kingdom included the first evermeeting between a U.S. government delegation and thegeneral president of the CPVPV. USCIRF also conducted
meetings with the Minister of Justice, Ministry of
Defense’s Ideological Warfare Center, the Shura Council, and the Tatweer Company for Educational Services,
as well as some nongovernmental interlocutors.

the CPVPV had made and was planning to make to its
recruitment and enforcement processes. The former
head of the CPVPV’s Mecca branch, Abdullatif Al-Sheikh,
was appointed minister of Islamic Affairs in June 2018.
Al-Sheikh was the first head of the CPVPV to publicly
announce efforts to reform the CPVPV upon his appointment in 2012 in the wake of strong public criticism in Saudi
Arabia. Religiously motivated restrictions on women
driving were also lifted in 2018, and provisions of theguardianship laws treating women as legal minors wereless strictly enforced in the kingdom’s capital, Riyadh.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
Positive Developments

Shi’a Muslims

Shi’a Muslims in Saudi Arabia continue to face discrimination in education, employment, and the judiciary,
In 2018, Saudi Arabia continued to combat religious
and lack access to senior positions in the government
extremism in the kingdom. In March, the crown prince
and military. The building of Shi’a mosques is restricted
criticized “extremists who forbid mixing between theoutside majority-Shi’a Muslim areas in the Eastern Provtwo sexes” noting that “many of those ideas contraince, and Saudi authorities often prohibit use of the Shi’adict the way of life during the time of the Prophet andMuslim call to prayer in these areas. Authorities arrest
the Caliphs.” In April 2018, he noted in an interview
and imprison Shi’a Muslims for holding religious gaththat Saudi citizens have been jailed for financing anderings in private homes without permits and reading
supporting terrorist groups. In an August 2018 speechreligious materials in husseiniyas (prayer halls). Saudi
marking the holiday of Eid al-Adha, King Salman
Arabia also restricts as a practice the establishment of
declared that “the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia affirms
Shi’a Muslim cemeteries.
its firm stance to fightDuring a USCIRF visit
terrorism and extremism.”to the Eastern Province,
Saudi Arabia has cooperShi’a Muslims in Saudi Arabia continuecertain Shi’a Muslims
ated with the United States
to face discrimination in education,
reported harassment byin the field of counterteremployment, and the judiciary.
local police and invarorism and continued tosions of privacy by the
combat violent extremGeneral Intelligenceism, including throughDirectorate(GID).
Shi’a
Muslims
who do not comply
the monitoring and reporting efforts of Etidal, the Global
with GID instructions have their national identification
Center for Combatting Extremist Ideology. The crownblocked, restricting access to bank accounts and social
prince also conducted outreach to several Christianservices. Authorities also continued to target certain
leaders in 2018. These included the Archbishop of CanShia’ religious leaders. In early 2018, the Specialized
terbury and the Coptic Pope, the head of the Anglican
Criminal Court in Riyadh opened a second case against
Church, and a group of American evangelical leaders.
Sheikh Mohammed al-Habib for “encouraging protests
In these meetings he emphasized the need for interfaithintended to destabilize the kingdom.” Al-Habib, a Shi’adialogue and religious tolerance. Also, in 2018, Egyptiancleric and close associate of executed Shi’a Sheikh Nimr
Bishop Ava Markos led the first known publicized Coptic
al-Nimr, was detained in 2016 for “creating dissent.”
Church Mass in Saudi Arabia’s history.
The Saudi government has continued rebuilding the
In September 2018, USCIRF was granted the firstpredominantly Shi’a Muslim town of Awamiya, which theever meeting between the head of the CPVPV and a U.S.
government’s security forces largely destroyed following
government delegation. In this meeting, the generalpresident of the Commission explained important reforms violent clashes with Shi’a Muslim protesters and armed

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the past, but expressed fear that their communities would
be targeted even though they practice within the boundaries of the law. The Saudi government has broken up
private religious gatherings on the grounds that they are
violating noise regulations, that alcohol is present, or thatmembers of the gathering lack proper work authorization (iqama). The government also breaks up gatheringson the grounds that men and women in attendance sit
together in the same room, claiming such mixing could
encourage prostitution. Hotels must obtain approval
from regional governorate offices before hosting
mixed-gender events in their conference spaces; thegovernorate offices deny permission when the event isa religious gathering. The government monitors leadersof non-Muslim communities, who often face difficulty
depositing money from weekly offerings into bankaccounts in the United States. In September 2018, theSaudi government detained a Catholic priest alongsidemultiple attendees at a festive gathering prior to his
departure from the country. In October 2018, 17 Filipina women in Riyadh were arrested for attending a
Halloween-themed party; subsequently, the Philippine
ambassador issued an advisory against public celebrationof Halloween, Valentine’s Day, or Christmas for expatriates living in Saudi Arabia.

TIER 1 SAUDI ARABIA

gunmen beginning in May 2017 and continuing throughApril 2018. During these clashes, security forces sealed
off the town, occupied a boys’ secondary school near
the town of al-Musawara, closed the town’s clinics andpharmacies, and prevented essential services such as
ambulances from reaching the area. The government
plans to invest nearly 64 million dollars (239 million
Saudi riyals) into the Awamiya reconstruction project,which includes a park, market, library, conference center,and recreational facilities. Local residents expressed concern to USCIRF in September 2018 that the government’splans for the neighborhood do not address the area’s lackof roads, schools, and adequate hospital facilities. The
government also has not expanded and modernized the
local sewage system, citing security concerns. A totalof 488 houses were demolished as part of the Awamiya
development project, although the Saudi government
provided compensation and new housing to residents ofthese domiciles. Residents also expressed fear that violence would re-erupt after completion of the project.
In September 2018, the Saudi government reportedly
restricted the observance of Ashura in Qatif and limited
the performance of public mourning rituals to specifichours. Restrictions included bans on Shi’a Muslims broadcasting their rituals via loudspeakers and the destructionof food shelters where marchers are offered free meals
because authorities claimed they lacked proper permits.
Municipal police also removed kiosks selling religious andcultural books, and took down celebratory signs on the
grounds that they constituted “visual pollution.”

Women and Religious Freedom

Saudi Arabia’s guardianship system classifies womenas legal minors, requiring them to obtain a guardian’s
permission to study at universities and travel abroad.
The Saudi government justifies the guardianship system
Restrictions on Non-Muslims
on religious grounds. It cites Hanbali Sunni interpretaAs a matter of law, the Saudi government bans the public
tions of the Qur’an and hadith to justify these significant
practice of non-Muslim faiths by citizens and expatriates
restrictions on women’s agency. Despite this justification,
alike. While the Saudi
the law applies to bothgovernment has statedSunni and Shi’a women,
repeatedly that non-Musas well as non-Muslim
Saudi Arabia’s guardianship systemlims who are not converts
women in the kingdom.
classifies women as legal minors,
from Islam may practice
Saudi Arabia is the only
requiring them to obtain atheir religion in private,
Muslim country withguardian’s permission to study atthis policy has not beensuch an extensive system
universities and travel abroad.
codified. Several Christianof guardianship, whichleaders in Saudi Arabia
places severe limitations
with whom USCIRF
on women’s religious
communicated in 2018 stated that the Saudi government
freedom and human rights. USCIRF obtained anecdotal
seemed less interested in monitoring Christians than inevidence during its September 2018 visit that certainU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

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provisions of the guardianship law are no longer being
enforced in urban areas to the extent they have been inyears past. For example, in the past women needed aguardian’s permission for doctors to perform medical
procedures, however, there have been recent cases wherea guardian’s permission was not required. In general,religious-based restrictions on Saudi women remained inplace in both urban and non-urban parts of the kingdom.
In April 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salmanannounced his intent to reform the guardianship system
and afford greater equality to women in Saudi Arabia.
On June 24, 2018, Saudi women were given the ability to
exercise their legal right to drive, and the Shura Council
voted in early 2019, shortly after the end of the reporting
period, to make child marriage illegal. However, adultwomen in Saudi Arabia continue to be legal minors
according to the guardianship laws. Moreover, the GID
arrested several activists opposed to the guardianshiplaw in May 2018 and continues to detain them at Dhahban Prison outside Jeddah and al-Hayer Prison outside
Riyadh. Some of these activists have been subjected toalleged torture as well as sexual harassment and assault.
In December 2018 the Saudi Human Rights Commission
opened an investigation into these allegations.

ambassador and froze trade in August 2018 after the
Canadian foreign minister expressed “alarm” at thearrest and called for Samar and Raif Badawi to be immediately released.
Palestinian poet Ashraf Fayadh remains in prison
for allegedly questioning religion through the poetryin his book Instructions Within and spreading atheist
thought during an argument at a coffee shop in the cityof Abha in 2013. In November 2015, Fayadh was sentenced to death for apostasy, but the charge was reducedin February 2016 to eight years, 800 lashes, and arenunciation of his poetry on Saudi state media. During
USCIRF’s 2018 visit to the kingdom, the Saudi ministerof justice stated that the Fayadh sentence was reduced
from death to eight years in prison because of his denialof the apostasy charge in court. The minister of justicefurther stated that an individual can only be convictedof apostasy if the defendant charged confesses in court,
not because the court finds the individual guilty without
a confession.

Curriculum and Exportation of Textbooks

For more than 15 years, the Saudi government has failed to
sufficiently address intolerant content in official textbooks. USCIRF has regularly communicated its concern toPrisoners of Conscience
Saudi government officials about the content of textbooks,
Saudi blogger Raif Badawi, a USCIRF Religious Prisoner
and did so again in 2018. Despite progress in recent years,of Conscience, is among Saudi Arabia’s most high-proSaudi textbooks have seen backsliding into intolerant lanfile prisoners of conscience. Badawi was the founderguage inciting hatred and violence toward non-Muslims.
and editor of the website Free Saudi Liberals and was
Through regular review of Saudi textbooks forarrested in 2012 on the charge of “insulting Islam
more than a decade, USCIRF has found continued—
through electronic channels.” In 2014, he was sentenced
though slow and incremental—progress toward
for insulting Islam. A 2015 court ruling upheld his senremoving or revising passages that included incitement
tence of 10 years in prison, 1,000 lashes, and a fine of one
to hatred and violence. However, a USCIRF analysis of
million Saudi riyals ($266,000). Fifty of these lashings
2017–2018 religion textbooks revealed the continued
were carried out in Janupresence of some of theary 2015. In March 2017, amost egregious content
Saudi court affirmed his
promoting violence andDespite progress in recent years,
sentence and demanded
intolerance, once thought
Saudi textbooks have seen backsliding
payment of his fine. As
to have been removed.
into intolerant language inciting hatred.
of 2018, Badawi remains
Shi’a and Sufi venerain prison. On July 30,
tion of the gravesites of
2018, authorities arrested
prophets is dismissed as
Badawi’s sister Samar after she advocated against the“heresy” while criticism of Islam is deemed “apostasy,”
guardianship law; she too remained in prison at the end
for which textbooks endorse the death penalty. Theyof the reporting period. Saudi Arabia expelled Canada’s
caution students to avoid friendship with members of94

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has maintained an anti-witchcraft unit since May 2009.
In February 2018, officials at Mohammed bin Abdulaziz
airport in Medina seized a parcel containing papers
and small charms they claimed was a “witchcraft spell.”
On June 10, 2018, security services arrested a man andhis wife at the holy mosque in Mecca for “performing
witchcraft.” Most people arrested for sorcery or witchcraft in Saudi Arabia are expatriate workers from Africa
and Southeast Asia, many of whom are accused of using
witchcraft against their employers or disrupting Saudi
society through their activities.

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other religions. The textbooks encourage both violent
and nonviolent jihad against nonbelievers. Finally,
they encourage the death penalty for women who havean affair and for gay men.
Saudi officials have stated that they haverequested the return of all old textbooks from their
institutions abroad and sent out new, revised textbooks
to replace them, but an unknown number of materials
reportedly remain in circulation both within Saudi
Arabia and at Saudi-funded schools abroad. In recent
years, a Saudi royal decree banned financial support
outside Saudi Arabia of religious schools, mosques,
hate literature, and other activities that support religious intolerance and violence. In February 2018, theSaudi government also agreed to hand over controlof the historic Grand Mosque in Brussels, Belgium, tolocal Islamic authorities following years of allegations
that the Saudi-controlled mosque was preaching violent extremism and intolerance. Reports indicate Saudi
Arabia is pursuing a similar approach for mosques andreligious schools in other countries.

U.S. POLICY

During its second year, the Trump administration
continued to strengthen the U.S.-Saudi relationshipwhile Congress pursued a more cautious approach in thewake of the killing of journalist and U.S. resident Jamal
Khashoggi. At the Ministerial to Advance Religious
Freedom held in July in Washington, DC, Vice President
Michael R. Pence reiterated the administration’s focus on
religious freedom in the Middle East. He noted that $100
million had been devoted to support persecuted reliApostasy, Blasphemy, and Sorcery Charges
gious minorities in the region and stated that “the United
In early 2019, after the reporting period, the SupremeStates is also committed to ensure that religious freedom
Judicial Council announced that detainees would be
and religious pluralism prosper across the Middle East.”
informed of their crimes, granted access to a lawyer,
Saudi Arabia has continued to support U.S. policy
permitted to contact their families, and given optionsin the Middle East, including security cooperation on
for appeal. However, the Saudi government continues
counterterrorism and countering violent extremism inito use criminal charges of apostasy and blasphemy totiatives, and the administration’s decision to reimpose
suppress debate, silence dissidents, and restrict religious sanctions that had been lifted under the Joint Comprefreedom. Muslim Saudis
hensive Plan of Action
who convert away from(JCPOA) with Iran. The
Islam face legal penalSaudi government has
The Saudi government continues toties that include capitalalso signed letters of offer
use criminal charges of apostasy
punishment for the crimeand acceptance for $14.5
and blasphemy to suppress debate,of “apostasy.” Whilebillion in defense pursilence dissidents, andSaudi ministers no longer
chases from the Unitedrestrict religious freedom.
hold that “there can onlyStates. President Donald
be one religion on the
J. Trump continued topeninsula” as in years
indicate support for Saudi
past, public confession of apostasy remains a crime. In
Arabia in regional struggles against Iranian influence
meetings with USCIRF, Saudi government officials clarin the Middle East. During Crown Prince Mohammed
ified that only a public confession of conversion would
bin Salman’s visit to the White House in March 2018,
qualify as grounds for prosecution under Saudi aposthe president emphasized the U.S.-Saudi defense relatasy laws. Witchcraft and sorcery also remain crimes
tionship, and congressional leaders from both parties
punishable by death in Saudi Arabia, and the CPVPV
impressed upon the crown prince the importance ofU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

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addressing humanitarian concerns over the Saudi
intervention in Yemen. In November 2018, the UnitedStates called for a ceasefire to the Saudi-led campaign
in Yemen, and in December the Senate passed S.J.Res.
54, which prohibited U.S. in-flight refueling support for
Saudi aircraft participating in the campaign.
Then Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Secretaryof State Michael R. Pompeo, and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin met with Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Gina Haspel visited Turkey and met with Turkish
investigators following the killing of Jamal Khashoggi
inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. In November
2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed
sanctions under the 2016 Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act on 17 individuals connectedwith the killing, including close confidantes of Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In December 2018, theUnited States Senate passed S.J.Res. 69, a bipartisan billthat condemned the killing and held the crown prince
responsible, drawing a statement of concern from theSaudi Shura Council.
On November 28, 2018, the State Department redesignated Saudi Arabia as a CPC but kept in place a waiverof any sanctions citing the “important national interestof the United States,” pursuant to section 407 of IRFA.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
COMMISSIONER JOHNNIE MOORE:This chapter correctly cites the decisions and signals
being sent from Saudi Arabia that it is willing to engage
on the topic of religious freedom in a way we haven’t
seen before (and there are many other examples that
could have been included), but based upon a simple
analysis of—as the Saudis are fond of saying—the “key96

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performance indicators” this country still necessitates adesignation as a CPC, without question.
However, as I stated after my September visit with
USCIRF and November visit in my personal capacity,
I believe—for the first time—that religious freedom ispossible in Saudi Arabia.
As a committed advocate for religious freedom
throughout the Middle East, I do not believe that punitive measures will have the intended effect on Saudi
Arabia. On the contrary, I think such punitive measures
could likely have the effect of forcing the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia to engage directly and more seriously withcountries where religious freedom is not a consideration
at all in their foreign policy priorities. If they do not enjoy
the important relationship they have with the UnitedStates, they will have a relationship with other countries, because they have to have those types of security
and economic relationships.
So I do believe the State Department—while joining
us in stating clearly a shared opinion of the religious
freedom conditions in Saudi Arabia—is correct in maintaining their waiver.
I do not think the way of persuading Saudi Arabia
to improve its religious environment is by shame and byforce. I do think it is through direct, respectful and meaningful engagement, as I have personally experienced
and am personally experiencing. Furthermore, the State
Department is correct in articulating that the present
security environment in the Middle East presents real
threats and any likely alternative to the status quo would,
in all probability, worsen the conditions for minority religious communities—as we saw so horrifically in Iraq.
I remain optimistic that Saudi Arabia’s slow, but
steady, reforms will continue and eventually extend to
the way it handles religion. We shall see.

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97SUDANTIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Sudan trended thesame as in 2017. Throughout the year, the government of
Sudan continued to restrict the religious expression of Muslims and non-Muslims. The government actively promoted andenforced a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam and imposed religious-based constraints on Muslims and non-Muslims. Security
forces continued to harass, arrest, detain, and use excessive
force against Muslim religious minorities, Christians and church
leaders, protestors, journalists, and human rights defenders
for challenging the state’s control of religion or for manifesting their religion or beliefs. In February 2018, state actors
demolished an evangelical church in Khartoum in spite of apending court battle over the property rights to the land on
which the church was built. In October, authorities arrested 13
Christians—reportedly for practicing their faith—and charged
one with apostasy. Women’s rights continued to be hinderedby restrictions on religious freedom, including through theenforcement of public order laws. USCIRF visited Sudan in
May 2018 to review religious freedom conditions and met
with religious communities, displaced persons, civil society
organizations, government officials, and others. At the end of
the reporting period, historic nationwide protests prompted
citizens to call for President Omar al-Bashir to step down.
During the protests, security forces used excessive force on
civilians and shot tear gas into and around mosques in attempts
to suppress demonstrations and free speech.
In 2019, USCIRF again finds that Sudan merits designation
as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). The U.S. Department ofState has designated Sudan as a CPC since 1999, most recently
in November 2018. USCIRF recommends that the State Department redesignate Sudan as a CPC under IRFA and extend theexisting presidential action restricting U.S. assistance to thegovernment of Sudan.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Identify Sudanese government agencies and officials responsible for severe
violations of religious freedom, freeze
those individuals’ assets, and bar theirentry into the United States, as delineated under the Global Magnitsky
Human Rights Accountability Act andrelated executive orders, citing specific religious freedom violations;• Appoint a Special Envoy to Sudan andSouth Sudan and ensure that religious
freedom is a priority for that office;98

articles in the 1991 Criminal Codeand state public order laws—that
violate Sudan’s international commitments to freedom of religion or
belief and related human rights;• Lift government prohibitions on
church construction, issue permits forthe building of new churches, createa legal mechanism to provide compensation for destroyed churches
and address future destructions if
necessary, and cease interference inchurches’ internal affairs;• Press the government of Sudan toimplement reforms in the Action Plan
presented by the State Department
since 2015 and to undertake the following actions:• Revive and strengthen the Commission on the Rights of Non-Muslims
to protect religious freedom for
non-Muslims in Sudan; and• Repeal apostasy, blasphemy, andother laws—including all relevant• Hold accountable any person who
engages in violations of freedom of

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religion or belief, including attacking
houses of worship, attacking or
discriminating against any person
because of his or her religious
affiliation, and prohibiting any person from fully exercising his or her
religious freedom.
The U.S. Congress should:• Draft and pass a resolution to condemn religious freedom and related
human rights violations committed by
the Sudanese government, to commit
U.S. government resources to investigating such violations, and to support
Sudanese human rights actors advocating for religious freedom in Sudan.

TIER 1 SUDANCOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Republic of the Sudan
GOVERNMENT
Presidential Republic, highly authoritarian regime
POPULATION
43,120,843
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHS
Sunni Islam; small Christian minority

BACKGROUND
Sudan was ruled by the government of then President
al-Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP), which
al-Bashir also chaired, through the reporting period.
The ruling regime grew out of the Sudanese Muslim
Brotherhood movement and the former National Islamic
Front party, which supported the 1989 coup that brought
al-Bashir to power. Despite constitutional protections
for religious freedom, the regime and government-appointed religious scholars have maintained tight control
over religious expression in the country and repressedviews other than the state-sponsored interpretations ofSunni Islam. Sudan has a rich history with Sufism, andSufi communities exist and worship throughout thecountry, but also face constraints on the free practice of
their faith. Human rights remain largely unprotected
in Sudan; freedoms of assembly and expression are
repressed, and that repression is closely interlinked withthe repression of freedom of religion or belief.
Officials and security forces are permitted to act with
impunity and have arrested, arbitrarily detained, andtortured individuals for peacefully protesting the regime
and other activities otherwise legally protected by theInterim National Constitution (of 2005). The government
also continued to censor journalists and media outlets
from reporting on issues facing religious minorities andreligious freedom and other human rights issues broadly.

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
97% Muslim (primarily Sunni, as well as a range of Muslim
minority groups and Sufi orders)
3% Christian (Coptic, Greek, Ethiopian, and Eritrean Orthodox; Roman Catholic; Anglican; Presbyterian; Pentecostal;
Evangelical; Seventh-day Adventist; and Jehovah’s Witnesses)*Estimates compiled from the U.S. Department of State

Along with specific restrictions around coverage of
economic and antigovernment protests, there are explicit“red lines” on human rights subjects that journalists
cannot cross. Mosques and imams are also at risk of being
targeted for speech critical of the regime or for supporting
demonstrations by their followers.
At the end of the reporting period, historic antigovernment protests intensified across Sudan. The
government and the notorious National Intelligenceand Security Services (NISS) brutally cracked down on
protestors, arresting hundreds and killing dozens. As theprotests challenging the regime grew, in February 2019,
after the reporting period, al-Bashir stepped down fromheading the NCP but consolidated power at the federal
level through the declaration of a national year-long stateof emergency and an overhaul of additional government
posts. Ultimately, al-Bashir was removed as head of state
on April 11, 2019, after the reporting period, after morethan 30 years in power. While the protests arose in largepart due to the economic crisis and steep rise in costs ofbasic items, they have also been fueled by popular discontent with the repressive government, including with
its severe restrictions on religious freedom and otherhuman rights. The 2018–2019 protests led to stronger andmore sustained civic mobilization against the government than in past years and gave many Sudanese newhopes for a transition of government.

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Since 2009, al-Bashir has been wanted by thewhere a person recants his or her disavowal of Islam.
International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges includUnder the state’s interpretation of Islamic law, certain
ing genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
sexual activity is criminalized with possible penalties
in the 2003–2004 conflict in Darfur, in western Sudan.
ranging from imprisonment to death.
Despite the order for his arrest, al-Bashir was able toIn 2018, USCIRF met with and received information
travel internationally in 2018 without consequence.
about multiple individuals charged with apostasy for
Armed conflict in areas of Darfur, Blue Nile, and South
expressing theological views that differ from the governKordofan continued at varying levels through 2018 inment’s preferred interpretation, particularly members
spite of ceasefire agreements.
of minority Muslim communities. Government officials
USCIRF traveled to Khartoum and North Darfur,
were reluctant to acknowledge the presence of Shi’a
Sudan, in May 2018 toIslam in the country,
assess religious freedom
viewed Shi’a communities
conditions and met withthrough a geopolitical
In
2018,
USCIRF
met
with
.
.
.
individuals
a range of civil societylens as enmeshed with
[who had been] charged withactors including humanIran, and infringed on
apostasy
forexpressing
rights activists and peacetheir freedom of religion.
theological views that differ from thebuilders, journalists, andThe government also
government’s
preferredinterpretation.
.
.
religious communities,
repressed members ofas well as government
the Quranist community
officials, including the(Muslims who believe
Ministry of Guidance and Endowments, Fiqh Council,
solely in the teaching and authority of the Qur’an) andand National Human Rights Commission.
Republican Brothers and Sisters (a movement focusedon Islamic reform in Sudan), including by harassing
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018students or demanding that they follow certain Islamic
Government Promotion of Sunni Islam andpractices. Minority Muslims also reported being disTreatment of Muslim Minorities
missed from their jobs or facing other ill treatment bysociety and officials. Some shared with USCIRF how their
In 2018, the government of Sudan continued to broadly
members have been beaten and allegedly tortured over
enforce its interpretation of Sunni Islam on the populatheir religious beliefs. The government also attempted
tion. Although the Interim National Constitution avows
to forcibly prevent adherence to atheism or secularism.
the protection of freedom of religion, it also highlights
In 2017, authorities arrested Mohamed Salih Aldsogi on
the role of Islam as a primary source of law. Religiously
apostasy charges after he sought to change the religion
based laws and penalties are found in the national
field on his national identification card from “Muslim”
Criminal Code, state laws, and public order laws. The
to “nonreligious.” A judge declared him mentally unfit topolice are officially charged with “preserving ethics,
stand trial and dismissed the charges. In February 2018,
and morals of the society, and the public order,” which
Aldsogi sought to challenge article 126 in court, but theis often done on the basis of Islamic principles. Article
Sudanese Constitutional Court dismissed the case. In
125 of the Criminal Code (1991) outlaws blasphemy
addition, although the government nominally recognizes
against any religion and carries the penalty of up to a
Sufi councils in various states, it nevertheless reportedly
year imprisonment, a fine, or lashes. However, in pracmonitors and restricts their activities. Civil society intertice the application of the law has generally privileged
locutors also noted that some mosques are monitored
Islam. Article 126 of the Criminal Code (as amended
during their Friday sermons.
in 2015) criminalizes apostasy and applies to Muslims
who renounce or advocate for the renunciation of Islam(such as by proselytizing), or who question or criticize
the Qur’an, the Sahaba, or wives of the Prophet Muhammad. It carries the death penalty except in some cases

100

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Persecution of Christians
Persecution of Christians in Sudan occurs largely by
the actions of government, security, and police officers.

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TIER 1 SUDAN

Since the separation of Sudan and South Sudan in 2011,
In 2018, security forces were still able to harass
the government of Sudan has stated that most Christians
and arrest Christians and other minorities, sometimes
remained in or moved to South Sudan and that 97 percent arbitrarily, without consequence or respect for the ruleof the population is Muslim. However, numerous Chrisof law. On October 10, NISS forces in Darfur arrested
tian communities still exist in Sudan, and at the end of
and allegedly tortured 13 Christians—some said to be
the reporting period Sudan was the largest refugee-hostrecent converts from Islam—during a prayer meeting anding country in the region with more than 850,000 refugees charged the leader of the group with apostasy. All werefrom South Sudan—higher by around 80,000 refugees
reportedly released by October 23. Also in October, inthan were reported at the beginning of 2018.
response to a legal case against the NISS, the agency conUSCIRF has observed continued persecution of
firmed that it previously arrested Reverend Noah Ibrahim
Christians in Sudan since 2011. While some groups
and confiscated his car because it belonged to a “foreign
such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses report positive
organization working in Christian evangelism,” and justiexperiences and the ability to worship, others expefied their actions based on national security laws.
rience ongoing difficulties. Christians from the Nuba
In August 2018, authorities dismissed the cases ofMountains are uniquely targeted, highlighting theand released eight SCOC leaders who were arrested inconvergence of discrimination against religious and2017. Minority religious leaders and their lawyers haveethnic minorities by the government. For example,
been monitored, harassed, and frequently arrested for
security and land authorities particularly target memvarious reasons such as proselytization or speaking out
bers and evangelical church leaders of the Sudanese
against the government, accused of criminal activity,
Presbyterian Evangelical Church (SPEC) and Sudanesedetained, forced to defend themselves in court, fined,
Church of Christ (SCOC). During USCIRF’s meetings
and released, on a repeated basis. One Muslim humanin 2018, evangelical leaders said that the Ministry ofrights lawyer, who advocated for non-Muslims’ rights
Guidance and Endowments has directly interfered in
and was repeatedly arrested and harassed, was forced totheir church affairs since
flee Sudan in 2018. Some2012. SCOC and SPECof these arrests have beeninterlocutors reported
due to religious leaders’[I]n February 2018, authorities
officials confiscating
protest over authorities’
bulldozed a SPEC church in thetheir papers documentinterference in church
Hajj Yousif neighborhood . . . in spite
ing property rights. In
affairs and leadershipof a pending decision on the2016, Sudanese authordecisions.
church’s property rights.
ities placed 27 churches
Interlocutors also
on a list to be destroyed,
informed USCIRF aboutclaiming issues withoccasional harassment ofzoning and illegal construction, but reportedly
Christians by a Salafist group during Christmastime, inrescinded the order in 2017. Nevertheless, in February
particular by the hanging of offensive posters.
2018, authorities bulldozed a SPEC church in the Hajj
Women and Religious Freedom
Yousif neighborhood in Khartoum. Church members
In 2018, authorities continued to target women withtold USCIRF that police gave no notice and demolarrest, harassment, and detention by applying existished the building in spite of a pending decision on theing religious laws. In particular, the enforcement ofchurch’s property rights. Police confiscated belongings
Sudan’s public order laws under the 1991 Criminal Act
from within the church, including all of the church’s
and other state and local laws continued to uniquely
books, and reportedly gave them to another individual
impact women through criminalization of indecent
claiming ownership of the land. Sudanese officials told
dress and other offenses based on state interpretations
USCIRF that churches were not uniquely targeted, andof Islamic principles. Penalties for these offenses regclaimed that mosques had also been demolished forularly include imprisonment, fines, and lashings, andsimilar issues with zoning regulations.

101

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102

research by Sudanese nongovernmental organizations
U.S. POLICY(NGOs) has shown that women have been more likely
The United States’ relationship with Sudan remained
to receive harsher penalties for some infractions than
the same in 2018, though it made some progress inmen. Determinations for arrests are at the discretion
promoting religious freedom reforms in the country.
of public order police. Public order cases are common;
Throughout the year, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Stevenaccording to Sudanese civil society actors, more thanKoutsis and other U.S. officials emphasized the impor40,000 public order cases are processed annually intance of religious freedom reforms with the Sudanese
Khartoum State alone.
government and effectively connected with religious
Women’s rights groups and legislators continued tocommunities and minorities. In May 2018, the United
fight in 2018 for legislative reform. However, one official
States and Canada cohosted a roundtable on religious
contended that the existing laws are important in order
freedom issues in Sudan that involved the participation
to maintain the protecof government officials,
tion of women and girls in
religious leaders, andSudanese society; he said
other members of civil[In] North Darfur, military forces
the laws are also relesociety. Toward the end ofreportedly publicly beat women andvant for non-Muslims. In
2018, the government ofgirls for wearing indecent dress.
January 2018 in El Fasher,
Sudan began to address
North Darfur, military
proposals within the reliforces reportedly pubgious freedom action plan
licly beat women and girls for wearing indecent dress.
that the State Department has recommended to Sudan
In October, authorities arrested a Sudanese singer for
multiple times since 2015.
indecent dress, but her trial was postponed indefinitely
In October 2017, the United States lifted economic
following protests by civil society actors.
sanctions on Sudan as a result of reported progressChild marriage rates remained high; the United
made in the five key areas outlined in phase one of
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
U.S.-Sudan bilateral negotiations, including ceasing(UNICEF) estimates Sudan’s rate to be at 34 percent,hostilities in conflict areas, improving delivery ofand girls as young as 10 are legally allowed to be marhumanitarian aid, and strengthening counterterrorism
ried with the consent of a male guardian and a court
and regional security efforts. The easing of sanctions
decision. Some interlocutors noted that in some areas,
led to improvements in bilateral relations, but did nothardline religious groups campaigned against reforms
improve the human rights situation or lead to economic
to marriage age laws. The case of Noura Hussein, a
improvements in Sudan, and organizations continued
woman who was forcibly married at age 15, received
to report difficulties with facilitating humanitarian
substantial international attention in 2018. In May
aid. U.S. human rights organizations pushed the U.S.
2018, she was sentenced to death for the murder of her
government to do more to hold Sudan accountablehusband after she attempted to defend herself fromfor ongoing human rights violations. Phase two of themarital rape. After Hussein’s lawyers appealed thebilateral negotiations began in November 2018 andsentence, the court overturned her death sentencecommitted the United States to removing Sudan fromand instead handed her a prison term of five years andthe State Sponsors of Terrorism list if criteria in six key“blood money” (diya). At the end of the reporting periodareas are met; this includes a track on human rights
she remained imprisoned in the Omdurman women’sreforms with an emphasis on freedom of religion or
prison, and she and her family members continued tobelief. During 2018 and following the launch of phaseface risks of violent social reprisals. Throughout 2018,
two negotiations, Sudan began concrete preparations
a range of civil society actors and some government
for a religious freedom workshop, which it held after
actors, including female legislators, worked to end childthe reporting period on January 29, 2019. The workmarriage in states across Sudan through both legal
shop made particular progress on issues concerningreform initiatives and social campaigns.
non-Muslims. For example, the government of SudanU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

TIER 1 SUDAN

agreed to publish rules and regulations concerning theconstruction of houses of worship and obtaining land
permits, and froze a previous Khartoum State decision
requiring Christian schools to hold classes on Sundays
and observe the Friday-Saturday weekend. However,civil society actors were critical of the involvement of
security services and the lack of inclusion of civil society
actors in the workshop and advance preparations.
The State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) continued to funddevelopment, peace, and security initiatives in Sudan.
The United States remained one of the largest donors ofhumanitarian assistance to Sudan, including more than
$20 million in humanitarian response to conflictaffected populations. Sudan and the United States havenot exchanged ambassadors, but maintain embassies
and Chargés d’Affaires in the respective countries.
The State Department last redesignated Sudan as a
CPC in November 2018. In lieu of prescribing sanctions
specific to the CPC designation, the State Department again applied “double-hatted” sanctions against
Sudan, in this case limitations on both assistance to thegovernment of Sudan and on modifying loans and loan
guarantees held by the government of Sudan.

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103

SYRIATIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions remained dismal in Syria,
generally trending the same as the previous year. As a consequence of the complex sectarian dynamics of the country’s
ongoing civil war, more than 500,000 people have died andmore than 12 million people have been displaced. Although theIslamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) ostensibly faced near-complete defeat in its control of territory in Syria and Iraq in 2017,
the group maintained a visible but diminishing presence inseveral parts of Syria throughout 2018. It continued to threaten
and perpetrate violence against religious minorities and Muslim
communities who did not share its radical Islamist ideology.
At the same time, an al-Qaeda affiliate, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham(HTS), significantly bolstered its presence in the country’s northwest, particularly Idlib Province, where it had almost overtaken
rival armed opposition groups by the end of the reporting
period. In addition to perpetrating wider human rights abuses,
HTS repressed religious minorities in the growing expanse of
territory under its control, reportedly including the forcible
confiscation of property from Christian families and other forms
of sectarian violence. Syrian government forces continued toconsolidate their hold over a significant portion of the country
that was once held by various opposition forces, with significant
support from their Russian, Iranian, and Lebanese allies. In sodoing, armed forces loyal to or allied with the regime persisted
in a clear wartime agenda of marginalizing and punishing Sunni
Muslim communities for their real or perceived support of the

opposition. Turkish-backed rebel forces exploited a United
Nations (UN)-brokered ceasefire in the northern district of Afrin
to persecute and displace religious and ethnic minorities in thatarea. Religious and ethnic minorities in Kurdish-controlled areasof the country’s northeast, where they have generally experienced a relatively high degree of religious freedom, also faced
mounting concerns at the close of 2018 regarding potential
ramifications of the pending withdrawal of U.S. forces from
northeastern Syria. Those concerns included the possibility of alarge-scale Turkish offensive against Kurdish forces in that area
and the threat of an ISIS resurgence.
Due to the collective systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom perpetrated by radical Islamist
elements of the Syrian opposition, including U.S.-designatedterrorist groups such as ISIS and HTS, and the Assad regime
and its allies, USCIRF again finds in 2019 that Syria merits designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under theInternational Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). USCIRF also finds
that, based on conditions in 2018 that included its ongoing—albeit shrinking—control of territory as well as its potential
for rapid resurgence, ISIS merits renewed designation as an“entity of particular concern” (EPC) for religious freedom violations under December 2016 amendments to IRFA. USCIRF
also finds that, based on conditions in 2018 that included its
expanding control of territory, HTS merits designation as an
EPC for religious freedom violations.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

104• Provide immediate and effective assistance to Syria’s vulnerable religious
and ethnic minorities under the termsof the Iraq and Syria Genocide Reliefand Accountability Act of 2018 (P.L.
115-300), and utilize the resources
enacted under the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act
of 2018 (P.L. 115-441) to avert further
disaster for those communities, particularly in northern Syria;• Advocate for the inclusion of representatives from the autonomous
administration of Kurdish-majority
northeast Syria, which has supported
the promotion of religious freedom in
its territory, in the UN-led committee
charged with rewriting the Syrian
constitution;• Ensure that the planned withdrawal of
U.S. forces from northeastern Syria isconducted in such a manner that will

• Support efforts through relevant UN
agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and like-mindedU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

not negatively impact the rights andsurvival of vulnerable religious andethnic minorities;

partners among the Global Coalition
to Defeat ISIS to fund and develop
programs in Kurdish-controlled
northeast Syria that bolster intra- andinterreligious tolerance, alleviate sectarian tensions, and promote respect
for religious freedom and related
rights; and• Continue and prioritize the resettlement of Syrian refugees to the UnitedStates—subject to proper vetting—with priority being given to victims of
ISIS and vulnerable religious minority
communities.

TIER 1 SYRIACOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Syrian Arab Republic

POPULATION
19,454,263

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
87% Muslim (74% Sunni Muslim; 13% Alawi, Ismaili, Shi’aMuslim)
10% Christian (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian)
3% Druze<1% Jewish (few remaining in Damascus and Aleppo), Yazidi,
and other

GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSIslam (Sunni/Shi’a), Christianity, Judaism, Druze*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook and the U.S.
Department of State

GOVERNMENT
Presidential Republic, highly authoritarian regime

BACKGROUND

all expressions of Kurdish, Assyrian, and other forms of
non-Arab identity.
The Assad family has ruled Syria since former presiThis fragile balance of religious, ethnic, and ideodent Hafez al-Assad seized power in a Ba’athist coup
logicalidentities persisted for decades, until it finallyin 1970. His son, Bashar al-Assad, became president incollapsed in early 2011 as mass uprisings proliferated
2000 following the death of his father. The Assads hailthroughout the Middle East. Despite the largely nonvifrom the Alawis, an offshoot of Shi’a Islam that repolent nature of antiregime demonstrations that spread
resents approximately 13 percent of Syria’s population.
across the country beginning in March of that year, theFollowing their rise to power, the Assad family placed
Assad government responded with a violent crackdown
loyal Alawis in key positions throughout the Ba’athistthat repressed the peaceful movement while allowing
government, including in the security, intelligence,
armed rebel factions to dominate the uprising, as theand military sectors. Both Assad regimes also spentsituation steadily devolved into a full-scale civil war
decades forging strategic ties with prominent Sunni
later that year. As opposition forces increased in number
Muslim families and religious authorities in orderand prominence, so too did their ideological variety:to consolidate their hold on political and economic
defectors from the Syrian
power, even as they
military comprised themaintained a rigid but
leadership and fighters ofuneasy framework ofThis fragile balance of religious,
some secular factions that
authority over the counethnic, and ideological identities persisted
enjoyed early battlefield
try’s diverse religious
for decades, until it finally collapsed insuccesses, but a spectrum
and ethnic groups. They
early 2011 as mass uprisings proliferatedof Islamist fighters also
also courted support
throughout the Middle East.
quickly emerged. For
from Christians, Druze,
its part, the Syrian Araband other non-Muslim
Army (SAA) received
communities by allowcrucial help from domestic, regional, and international
ing them to worship freely and practice their faith, butallies—including National Defense Forces (NDF) loytheir particularly authoritarian and nationalist brandalists, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
of Arab Socialism also led to the forcible suppression of

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Lebanese Hezbollah, and Russia by mid-2015—which
East Syria controlled a large swath of territory in whichcollectively prevented the fall of the Assad regime andChristians, Yazidis, Sunni Muslims, and other commuprogressively turned the tide of the conflict against
nities experienced relatively open religious freedom,
the opposition. Amid this complicated and seemingly
albeit with some limitations.
intractable conflict, many religious minorities, such
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018as Druze, Ismailis, Christians, and Alawis, came to
Violations by the Assad Regime andperceive the Assad regime as the only entity capable ofAffiliated Groups
shielding them from the growing threat of violent sectarian attacks by radical Islamist groups.
In 2018, the Syrian government reasserted authority
The steady rise of radical Islamist groups fromover significant portions of the country that were once
2011 to 2014 culminated in the emergence of ISIS as aunder opposition control, including predominantly
territorial power across parts of eastern Syria and northSunni Muslim areas that had served as key strongholds
western Iraq, including its provincial capital of al-Raqqa
for the latter. The regime and regime-allied forces conalong the Euphrates River in north-central Syria.
tinued to employ brutal methods of destruction in their
Between the time of ISIS’s declaration of a so-calledadvance. In Ghouta, a stronghold of the Islamist militia“caliphate” in mid-2014 and its significant loss of terJaysh al-Islam, the SAA declared victory in April 2018
ritorial control by late 2017, it had perpetrated massive
after a grueling five-year siege and intense two-month
religious freedom violations, sexual violence, and otheroffensive that led to widespread devastation—including
atrocities across the areas under its control, including
the destruction of an estimated 93 percent of buildings
kidnapping and executing thousands of Christians,
in one district—and displaced tens of thousands of resYazidis, Shi’a Muslims, and even fellow Sunni Muslims
idents to northern areas still under opposition control.
who opposed its authority.
In June, more than 330,000 civilians fled their homes
By the end of 2018, the Syrian conflict had fragin southern Syria in advance of a regime offensive tomented into several different zones of control, eachretake that part of the country, including the symbolof which presented a unique set of religious freedom
ically important city of Daraa where protestors first
conditions. The Assad regime, along with its domestic
sparked antiregime protests in early 2011. Crucially, theand international allies, controlled most of the country’s
SAA was joined or supported in the above offensives bysouth, west, and center, where it reserved its harshest
primarily Shi’a Muslim foreign fighters, many of whom
repression for the Sunni
were recruited by the
Muslim population over
IRGC from Afghanistan,its perceived support for
Pakistan, Iraq, and LebaBy the end of 2018, the Syrian conflictthe opposition movement.
non, in addition to Syrian
had fragmented into several
Islamist groups such as
Alawi, Shi’a Muslim, anddifferent zones of control, each of which
HTS, and to a lesser extent
other domestic militiaspresented a unique set of
ISIS, controlled several
under the umbrella of thereligious freedom conditions.
noncontiguous pockets of
NDF. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
territory, particularly inand Harakat Hezbollah
Idlib and other northern
al-Nujaba, two factions ofareas, where they sought to enforce highly repressive
the Iraqi PMF under the control of the IRGC, continued
codes of religious and social order. The Turkish-alto operate in Syria but with a less visible role than in 2017lied Free Syrian Army (FSA) occupied Afrin and otherwhen they participated in the SAA’s recapture of Aleppo
sections of the northern border region, at times vying
and other urban centers.
with HTS for additional territory while also displacing
The Assad regime continued its longstanding effort
thousands of religious and ethnic minorities. In addition, to push previously unaligned religious minorities such
the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its Kurdish-maas the Druze to join its military ranks, even as it sought
jority Autonomous Administration (AA) of North andto exclude, restrict, and repress Sunni Muslims in areas

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U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

TIER 1 SYRIA

over which it had retaken control. The regime has longthroughout the reporting period, both from its fighters
tried to lure Druze men from their southern heartland
who have fled underground and its forces that remainedof the Suwayda/Jebel Druze area to join the SAA, forcing
engaged in fighting near Hajin. Few of the more thanan estimated 30,000 men to abscond into hiding or exile
9,000 Assyrian Christians who fled Hasaka Province
in Lebanon and elsewhere. The impact of this loss wasduring a massive ISIS offensive in 2015 have returned,
keenly felt during a massive ISIS attack on the area inand the fate of some 25 Christians who ISIS abducted at
July 2018, as few able-bodied fighters were left to defend
that time remains uncertain. Likewise, the whereabouts
the traditionally reclusive community. Meanwhile, theof several Christian leaders whom ISIS and its predeAssad government passed a new law in October 2018
cessors abducted in previous years are still unknown,that delegated to the Ministry of Religious Endowments
including Italian Jesuit priest Father Paolo Dall’Oglio,
significantly greater state authority to control all Islamic
Syriac Orthodox Archbishop of Aleppo Mar Gregorios
affairs across the country; this law will likely have the
Yohanna Ibrahim, Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Aleppo
greatest impact on the religious life of Syria’s Sunni MusPaul Yazigi, Armenian Catholic priest Father Michellims. Finally, the regime has increasingly marginalized
Kayyal, and Greek Orthodox priest Father Maher MahSunni Muslims from public and residential life across thefouz, among others.
country, handing traditional Sunni Muslim-held offices
In July 2018, ISIS fighters launched the deadliest
to Christian and Shi’a Muslim loyalists, while redistributattack to date on Druze communities of al-Suwayda,
ing Sunni Muslim homes
likely from the terrorist
and districts to Shi’a Musgroup’s desert stronghold
.
.
.
Law
No.10
of
2018
.
.
.
is
widelylim fighters in parts of thein al-Badiya, reportedly
expected to prevent many of thosecountry over which it hasbombing, shooting,dispossessed
persons,amongwhomregained control. Its secuand stabbing more thanSunni Muslims are disproportionately
rity forces have refused
300 Druze to death. It
represented,
from
returningtotheir
to grant permits for mostalso abducted 20 Druze
homes and communities of origin . . .
Sunni Muslim civilians
women and 16 children,
to return to their family
although all but two who
homes in cities like Homs,
died while in captivity
and the government’s new Law No. 10 of 2018 placed
were later freed through a combination of negotiations,severe restrictions on the ability of internally displaced
ransom, and prisoner swap.
persons (IDPs) and refugees to reclaim family homes andViolations by Other Islamist andproperties. That law is widely expected to prevent many
Non-Islamist Opposition Groupsof those dispossessed persons, among whom Sunni MusAs the ISIS threat has diminished, religious freedomlims are disproportionately represented, from returning
has come under increasingly dire threat from Islato their homes and communities of origin, or to dismist opposition factions that are allied with al-Qaeda,
courage them from returning to the country altogether,
particularly in the northwestern province of Idlib, andthereby permanently reshaping Syria’s demographics towith Turkey, especially in Afrin and other parts of thethe regime’s advantage.
country’s north-central and northeastern region. IslaViolations by ISIS
mist forces under the umbrella of HTS—led by Jabhat
In 2018, the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS (GCDI), theal-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliate with a particularly sordid
U.S.-backed, largely Kurdish SDF, and to a lesser extent
history of violence against religious minorities—played
the SAA and its allies, continued to liberate territories
a dominant and increasing role in Idlib Province, wherefrom ISIS, driving its estimated 14,000 fighters into either
they seized territory from rival opposition groups while
hiding or ever-smaller pockets of territory. However,
either subsuming or eliminating almost all of them. At
ISIS continued to represent a clear and present danger
the same time, while broadly using political violence
to GCDI and SDF forces as well as to Syrian civilians
such as arrests and kidnappings against its Sunni Muslim

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opponents, HTS enforced its strict Islamist interpretation
to religiously cleanse the area. According to religiousof Islamic law that suppresses all expression of non-Musfreedom groups, FSA fighters seized one church in Afrin
lim religion in public spaces. The group also reportedly
in June 2018 for use as a base, while others burnt anotherengaged in a campaign to expropriate Christian homes
church and covered its remains in Islamist graffiti.
and land: in November 2018, multiple reports emerged
Conditions in the Autonomousthat it had distributed notices to an unknown number ofNortheastern Region
Christian families, many of whom had long since fled the
The AA has maintained generally positive religiousarea, ordering them to report to the “Office of Properties
freedom conditions over the territory under its control,and Spoils of War,” which suggested an effort to seize
allowing Muslims, Christians, and other communitheir properties. In other cases, HTS reportedly directly
ties to openly practice and express their beliefs—even
seized the shops and homes of absentee Christian owners
including the freedom for Muslims to convert to otherin order to collect income from renters. Although it istraditions and for residents to express unbelief or athedifficult to obtain clear documentation of many of theseism. Representatives of religious and ethnic minorities
incidents, these reports contributed to an already hostileliving in the autonomous region told USCIRF that theyenvironment for religious and ethnic minorities in Syria,
have experienced not just safe refuge but also a substanfurther discouraging them from returning to their homes
tial degree of religious freedom, gender equality, andand places of worship.
representation in local governing bodies such as the
Religious freedom conditions deteriorated sigSyrian Democratic Council. One of the few concerns has
nificantly in the area of Afrin, home to a once-diverse
been a simmering dispute between Kurdish authorities
population of Kurdish Muslims, Syriac Christians, andYazidis. Between January and March 2018, Turkish forces and Christian communities over school curriculum—alongstanding point of contention over the boundaries ofand their Arab and Turkmen allies in the Free Syrian
ethnic, religious, and national identity—which reached
Army (FSA) launched an offensive under the name ofa boiling point in August“Operation Olive Branch”
2018, when authorities
to seize territory from
reportedly ordered theKurdish People’s Protec. . . barring a large-scaleclosure of up to two dozention Units (YPG) forces
Turkishinvasionor
ISIS
resurgence
Assyrian and Armenianin that area. In the waketo dislodge the local authorities’
schools, accusing them ofof that offensive, aroundyears
ofeffort.
.
.
northeast
Syria
having failed to imple137,000 people fled
has come to represent an imperfect but
ment an AA-approved
their homes and soughtlargely
positive
model
for
the
promotion
curriculum. For theirrefuge mainly in territoryand protection of religious freedom.
part, school adminiscontrolled by the Autontrators, and Christianomous Administration
activists who took to the(AA) and protected by thestreets in Hasaka Province in late August to protest
SDF. Those numbers reportedly included more than 400
those closures, complained that the AA-mandated
Kurdish converts to Christianity, who feared repression
curriculum denied them their own unique ethnorelifrom Islamist factions of the FSA. While some of thosegious identities, instead substituting the ardent Arab
IDPs sought to return to Afrin during 2018, FSA elements
nationalism of the Ba’athist Assad regime for a Kurdish
had seized or destroyed properties and redistributed anumber of homes to Sunni Muslim IDPs who had fled the nationalist platform. Nevertheless, barring a large-scale
Turkish invasion or ISIS resurgence to dislodge the local
regime’s recapture of Eastern Ghouta just weeks earlier.
authorities’ years of effort, there is strong evidence toIslamist elements within the FSA reportedly destroyedsuggest that northeast Syria has come to represent an
Kurdish monuments as well as Yazidi, Sufi Muslim,
imperfect but largely positive model for the promotion
and Alawi shrines, cemeteries, and other sacred sites,and protection of religious freedom.
employing tactics similar to those of ISIS in an effort

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Several events toward the end of 2018 typified U.S. policy
regarding religious freedom in Syria during the year.
First, the SDF successfully captured the city of Hajin inearly December, representing the fall of one of the lastremaining territories under the direct control of ISIS.
Although intense fighting between the SDF and ISIS
remnants in and around that city persisted at the endof the reporting period, the successful capture of thecity represented the culmination of efforts by the GCDI
and particularly by its SDF partners throughout 2018 todestroy the remaining operational capabilities of ISIS in
Syria and neighboring Iraq—although its organizational
potential to regroup and its ideological attraction still
remain for many radical Islamist fighters still operating
there. While the emphasis of U.S. policy following the endof the reporting period appeared to reconcentrate on Iranian influence in Syria, 2018 was otherwise marked by aprimary focus on defeating ISIS and ending the genocidal
threat it posed to Christians, Yazidis, Shi’a Muslims, andother religious and ethnic communities in Syria and Iraq.
On December 11, President Donald J. Trump
signed into law the Iraq and Syria Genocide andRelief Accountability Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-300), which
declared that ISIS “is responsible for genocide, crimes
against humanity, and other atrocity crimes against
religious and ethnic minority groups in Iraq and Syria,
including Christians, Yazidis, and Shia, among otherreligious and ethnic groups.” The law directed the U.S.
government to assist in meeting the “humanitarian,stabilization, and recovery needs” of those communities as well as to support the efforts of governments
and nongovernmental organizations to hold ISIS
members accountable for the above. The framework for
implementing this aid in the quickly evolving Syrian
context was unclear at the end of the reporting period,
particularly in contrast to Iraq where the United States
maintains clear ties to Iraqi government officials,

Kurdish regional authorities, and nongovernmentalorganizations. However, the 2018 law is expected toeventually supply a mechanism for holding ISIS members accountable and providing relief and rehabilitationfor Syria’s religious and ethnic minority communities.
In addition, President Trump announced on
December 19 his intention to immediately withdraw
all U.S. troops from the Syrian front, citing the ostensible defeat of ISIS as the conclusion of the U.S. mandate
there. That announcement precipitated a rapid scramble among armed factions—Arab, Kurdish, and Turkish
alike—for the renegotiation and reconfiguration of
military and economic dynamics in northeastern Syria.
The White House announced in February 2019, after
the reporting period, that 200 U.S. military personnel
will continue to assist the SDF in the northeasternregion as part of a multinational observer force, while
an additional 200 personnel will reportedly remain insoutheastern Syria in the area of al-Tanf, near the Iraqi
and Jordanian borders.
The pending withdrawal of most U.S. military
personnel has also sparked widespread anxiety among
religious and ethnic minorities in that same area
regarding the possibility that, in its zeal to root out theKurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)-linked YPG, Turkey
might seek to exploit a subsequent, perceived militaryvoid by launching a large-scale incursion into Kurdish-held territory. Representatives of some of thosecommunities have expressed to various media outlets,
and to USCIRF directly, that they fear such an operation would replicate on a larger scale the disastrous
results of Turkey’s Afrin operations: paving the way
for the proliferation of radical Islamist FSA factions,effectively ending all advances in religious freedom
conditions in that area, trapping tens of thousandsof civilians in the crossfire, creating an opportunity
for ISIS to regroup, and displacing vulnerable Syrian
minorities yet again.

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U.S. POLICY109

TAJIKISTANTIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Tajikistan trended thesame as in recent years, as President Emomali Rahmon andthe Tajikistani government continued their repressive policies, suppressing displays of public religiosity and persecuting
minority communities, especially actual and alleged Salafists.
Authorities pursued a crackdown on various attributes of faith,
including restrictions on wedding and funerary banquets, andpursued extralegal bans on beards and hijabs. Higher Islamic
religious education was all but decimated, and updates to thecountry’s 2009 religion law resulted in the closing of more than
2,000 mosques in the last two years. Under the guise of a struggle against religious extremism, the government continued totorment former members of the banned Islamic RenaissanceParty of Tajikistan (IRPT), sentencing rank-and-file former party

members to extensive jail time and extraditing former party
elites from abroad; the party’s legal existence was part of thecountry’s post-civil war peace treaty.
Based on these concerns, in 2019 USCIRF again finds—as it
has since 2012—that Tajikistan merits designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International
Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). The U.S. Department of State
designated Tajikistan as a CPC for the first time in February
2016 and did so again most recently in November 2018. Nevertheless, the State Department immediately issued a waiver
against any related sanctions on Tajikistan “as required in the‘important national interest of the United States.’” USCIRF
recommends that the State Department redesignate Tajikistan
as a CPC under IRFA and lift the waiver.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Condition U.S. assistance to the Tajikistani government, with the exceptionof aid to improve humanitarian conditions and advance human rights, on
the government reforming the 2009
religion law and improving conditionsof freedom of religion or belief;• Work with the international community,
particularly during Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) events on countering terrorism,110

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to include private and public criticism
of Tajikistan’s approach to regulating
religion and countering extremism—
including its classification of the IRPT asa terrorist group;• Press for at the highest levels andwork to secure the immediate releaseof individuals imprisoned for theirpeaceful religious activities or religious
affiliations and press the Tajikistani government to treat prisoners humanely

and allow them access to family, humanrights monitors, adequate medical care,and lawyers, and the ability to practicetheir faith; and• Ensure continued U.S. funding for Radio
Ozodi, contingent on its compliancewith international standards of journalistic objectivity, so that uncensored
information about events inside Tajikistan, including those related to religious
freedom, will be disseminated.

TIER 1 TAJIKISTANCOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Republic of Tajikistan

receive preference from the state and are themselves highly
monitored and restricted.

GOVERNMENT
Presidential Republic

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
90% Muslim (86% Sunni Muslim and 4% Shi’a Muslim)
10% Other (including Russian Orthodox, Protestants,
Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Buddhists, Jews,
and Baha’is)

POPULATION
8,604,882
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSTechnically a secular state with complete religious freedom. In
reality, Sunni Hanafi Islam and Russian Orthodox Christianity

BACKGROUND
Tajikistan is an isolated and impoverished country,
ruled since 1992 by President Emomali Rahmon, who
has concentrated power in the hands of his family.
In January 2017, President Rahmon appointed his
son to be mayor of the capital city, Dushanbe. In
the 1990s, Tajikistan experienced a five-year civil
war that resulted in more than 100,000 deaths; thepost-war amnesty included many Tajikistani officials
responsible for torture. The government is weak andhighly corrupt, and 40 percent of the country’s grossdomestic product is from labor remittances, mostly
from Russia.
Tajikistan’s legal environment for freedom of
religion or belief sharply declined after several highly
restrictive laws were adopted in 2009. In particular,
the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Unions set onerous registration requirements;
criminalized unregistered religious activity, private
religious education, and proselytism; set strict limits
on the number and size of mosques; allowed stateinterference with the appointment of imams and thecontent of sermons; required official permission for
religious organizations to provide religious instruction and communicate with foreign coreligionists; andimposed state controls on the content, publication,*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook and the U.S.
Department of Stateand import of religious materials. Small Protestantand other groups cannot obtain legal status under theburdensome registration requirements.
In 2011 and 2012, administrative and penal code
amendments set new penalties, including large fines andprison terms for religion-related charges such as organizing or participating in “unapproved” religious meetings.
Alleged organizers of a “religious extremist study group”
face eight- to 12-year prison terms. A 2011 law on parental responsibility banned minors from any organized
religious activity except funerals. In addition, Tajikistan’s
extremism law fails to define extremism clearly and often
leads to arbitrary detention. Extremist, terrorist, or revolutionary activities are punishable without requiring actsthat involve violence or incitement of imminent violence.
Trials under these charges lack due process and procedural safeguards. The Tajikistani government continues
to use concerns over Islamist extremism to justify actions
against participants in certain religious or political activities. Although the existence of the IRPT—the former Soviet
Union’s only legal Islamic political party—was a conditionof the post-civil war peace treaty, in September 2015 theTajikistani government banned the IRPT as an extremistgroup. The government’s suppression of the IRPT is intertwined with its repression of Islamic religious practices;
the group had called for respecting Tajikistan’s secular

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constitution and international religious freedom commitments, and opposed restrictions on beards, headscarves,
religious education, and children attending mosques.
In 2018, the occurrence of two significant security
events gave the government greater pretext to clamp down
on religious freedom in the country. First, in July 2018, a
group of Tajikistani citizens with Islamic State sympathies
attacked a group of foreign cyclists, killing four—including
two American citizens—in the Khatlon region, in one ofthe only domestic terror attacks in recent years. Then, on
November 8, a riot broke out at a high-security prison nearKhujand that houses prisoners, including many convictedof terrorism and extremism. The government declared adeath toll of 21 prisoners and two guards, while unofficial
sources claimed the number was as high as 50 inmatesand six guards. The deceased prisoners were denied Muslim burials. The Tajikistani government blamed the firstevent on the IRPT, despite the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) claiming credit, but did not contest ISIS’s claim
for the second event. Some observers were skeptical about
the extent to which the riot was actually orchestrated by
the terrorist entity, citing credible reports that it was aspontaneous reaction to harsh conditions in the prison,
including instances of alleged torture.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
Trials and Imprisonment of Muslims
Security and terrorism concerns in Tajikistan are real.
The government estimates that more than 1,000 Tajikistani nationals have joined ISIS in recent years. However,
the government exploits these fears to persecute politicaldissidents, critics, and nonsanctioned religious groups.
In 2017 alone, Sogd Province courts examined terrorism
and extremism cases involving 257 citizens.
In 2018, as in previous years, the bulk of the Tajikistani government’s judicial persecution appeared to target
adherents—both real and suspected—of Salafism. The
term technically refers to a complex array of fundamentalist beliefs and practices that developed, primarily on
the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt, between the 18th and20th centuries. In Tajikistan, the term is broadly applied topractices and doctrines deemed to be ‘foreign,’ or outside
the Hanafi school of Islam. Since 2009, ‘Salafism’ hasbeen banned as an “extremist movement,” and as suchthe mere performance of Muslim rituals in a mannerinconsistent with the Hanafi school is tantamount to112

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criminal activity, whether the individual identifies as
Salafi or not. To be charged with ‘Salafism,’ all that isnecessary is the practice of Islam outside of places andtimes designated by the state. No advocacy of, preparation
for, or commission of violence is necessary for Salafists tobe sentenced to multiyear prison terms. In 2018, at least adozen people were imprisoned for Salafism. The Tajikistani government arranged for the detention of Parviz
Tursunov in Belarus for alleged extremism and Salafism;
the former professional soccer player refused to shave his
beard in 2011 and then fled the country. However, Belarus
declined to extradite Tursunov. Men who have spent time
abroad, especially in the Gulf States, are especially prone
to suspicion. In December 2018, 36-year-old Mukhtadi
Abdulkodyrov, the nephew of the current head of theCouncil of Ulema, the semiofficial board in charge ofsermons and doctrine, was arrested upon returning to
Tajikistan after working for four years in Saudi Arabia,
despite writing a letter seeking “repentance” at the requestof National Security Committee officials who reportedlyoffered him amnesty.
The government is particularly suspicious of prayer
leaders with training abroad, even those who have longsince returned to Tajikistan with no record of violence or
encouragement of extremism. For example, in April 2018,
Abdullo Saidulloev, the imam-khatib—prayer leader andsermon-giver—at Khujand’s Sari Sangi mosque, was sentenced to six years in a hard labor colony for propagationof Salafism as well as praying “in a Salafi manner.” A raidof his home revealed allegedly “extremist literature” andtwo of his brothers were also sought for Salafi membership. Saidulloev had trained at the Al-Masjid an-Nabawi
mosque in Medina, Saudi Arabia, from 2004 to 2006
before returning to Khujand. In March 2018, six otherimam-khatibs in Sogd Province were also detained, eachof whom had also trained in Medina and in the 1990s had
allegedly joined the Muslim Brotherhood.
Since 2014, the Tajikistani government has provided amnesties to ISIS fighters and others suspectedof extremism who voluntarily return to the country andrepent. In July 2018, it offered similar terms to opposition politicians, such as three members of Group 24—abanned secular opposition party—though it is notclear whether the government followed through on its
promised amnesty upon arrival. This process createsa warped set of incentives whereby a former murderer

Persecution of the IRPT

he ran in Istanbul and urged him to return home voluntarily, promising safety and financial rewards. Eventually,
Turkish police detained Sharipov upon request of the
Tajikistani government, whose consular officials seized
him from a detention center and forced him on a flight toDushanbe, where he is reportedly detained.
Tajikistani citizens risk arrest even by talking
publicly about the IRPT. In April 2018, four men in their
30s in the northern city of Istaravshan were sentenced
to six years in prison for allegedly discussing the
IRPT and supporting its ideas while socializing at ateahouse. In May, a Tajikistani man was sentenced tonine and a half years in prison for watching, liking, andsharing videos of the IRPT online.
In July 2018, four foreign bicyclists were killed by agroup of young men with ISIS sympathies in one of themost significant domestic terrorist acts in Tajikistan’s
history. Even though ISIS took credit for the murders, theTajikistani government assigned blame on the IRPT.

TIER 1 TAJIKISTAN

may return to Tajikistan without punishment, whereas
application of the extremism law can result in jail time
for internet speech that may only suggest an interest in
joining extremist groups.

Since the IRPT was banned in 2015, more than 150
actual or suspected members have been arrested andat least 1,000 are reported to have fled the country. The
Tajikistani government presses for their extradition,
particularly through INTERPOL “red notices” (an alertthat an individual is the subject of an arrest warrant ina member country), and IRPT defense attorneys havebeen given lengthy prison terms. IRPT chair Muhiddin
Kabiri—who was granted political asylum in an unidentified Western European country—has asserted thatthe extremism charges against his party are false andpolitically motivated. In Warsaw in September 2018,
Kabiri was elected head of a new political coalition, theNational Alliance of Tajikistan—comprised of four exiled
Restrictions on Muslims
opposition parties, including the IRPT—and asserted his
The government of Tajikistan seeks to meticulously control
commitment to Tajikistan becoming a secular, demMuslim religious practice, regulating even small details ofocratic state. In October 2018, Kabiri was sentenced in
who may express religious belief, at what age, when, where,
absentia to an additional, unknown prison term. Kabiri’s
and how. The 2011 religion law restricts Muslim prayer tofamily in Tajikistan continued to be the targets of petty
four locations: mosques,
and cruel punishment
homes, cemeteries, andfrom authorities. In
shrines. The official State
February 2018, Kabiri’s
The government of Tajikistan seeks
Committee on Religious
four-year-old grandson
tometiculously
control
Muslimreligious
Affairs (SCRA) controls
was diagnosed with canpractice, regulating even small details
the selection and retencer but was banned from
of
who
may
express
religious
belief,tion of imams and theforeign travel for medical
at what age, when, where, and how.
content of their sermons.
treatment. As his condiThe government paystion worsened, it was only
the salaries of imams ofafter online petitions, thecathedral mosques, which are the only mosques where theadvocacy of journalists and human rights organizations,state allows sermons (prepared by the semiofficial Council
and the appeals of foreign doctors that the Tajikistaniof Ulema). The law requires that the call to prayer only be
government permitted him to travel to Turkey in August
audible within the confines of a mosque, many of which
for emergency surgery.
contain cameras installed and monitored by the state.
In 2018, IRPT former leaders and the rank-andIn 2018, the government continued its repressive
file membership continued to be subject to arrest andcampaigns against dress, grooming, and public celebrapersecution. In February 2018, businessman and former
tions with allegedly foreign roots. Many of these policies
IRPT senior member Namunjon Sharipov reportedly waswere solidified in a July 2017 speech by President Rahmon“forcibly and extra-judicially” returned from Istanbul toand a series of subsequent amendments the government
Dushanbe, where he faced “real risk” of torture. Tajikistanipassed to the law on Regulating Traditions, Celebrations,consular authorities had visited Sharipov at the teahouse

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and Ceremonies, regulating the observance of a wide
enforcement uneven. The hijab and beard bans arevariety of rituals related to marriage, burial, and childmostly enforced in Tajikistan’s major cities, yet, as latebirth, as well as Islamic dress. Many prohibitions govern
as October 2018, the Interior Ministry press secretary
the banquets or communal meals traditionally offered
reportedly confirmed that there was no formal law
to friends, family, and neighbors at life events such as
banning hijabs and beards. Because the article in theweddings or Tajik-specific milestones like circumcision
Traditions Law on national dress does not provide aor the placing of a newborn in its cradle for the first time.
specific penalty for noncompliance, the General ProseThe prohibitions altogether ban their celebration or limit
cutor’s Office was compelled to publicly state that fines
the number of guests, amount of food served, animal
were, in fact, unlawful. Meanwhile, enforcement ofslaughter, and length of dining tables, as well as other
other aspects of the Traditions Law, such as those govservices like professional wailers or masters of ceremony.
erning ceremonies and celebrations, has been erratic
The Tajikistani governand its logic unclear. For
ment is concerned with
example, in October 2018,
controlling every aspecta young woman was fined
In January 2018, amendments to theof religious life, not justapproximately $530 for2009 law on Freedom of Conscience
those with plausible links
breaking the Traditions
and Religious Unions set rigorous new
to violent extremism. In
Law because she celerequirements for reporting mosque
Tajikistan, as in several
brated her 25th birthday
income, property, staff, salaries, andother post-Soviet counat a restaurant in Khuworshippers’ personal data.
tries, all religious practicejand, one of Tajikistan’s
is seen as a potential
oldest cities. Foreign
security threat that theobservers speculate thatstate monitors and regulates accordingly. According tosuch laws instead serve as an avenue for local officials
one human rights activist, “Mosques have stopped being
to extract fines and settle scores.
a social institution, and have become some kind of state
In addition, a state license is required for religious
agency. Imams are known to share all information on
instruction, and both parents must give written permismosque community members with state agencies.”
sion for students to attend. The law also requires state
Returnees from the pilgrimage to Mecca—limited
permission for pursuing religious education abroad andto persons over the age of 40—are now forbidden fromonly after completion of religious education in Tajikistan.
engaging in communal celebration of their accomplishOnly central mosques may set up educational groups.
ment. Amendments to the Traditions Law also provided
Since a series of closures in 2016, no madrassas for teachingsome legal basis for campaigns of harassment against
16- to 18-year-olds are allowed to operate in Tajikistan. In
women wearing hijabs and obliging all citizens to wear
January 2018, amendments to the 2009 law on Freedom“national dress.”of Conscience and Religious Unions set rigorous new
State regulations of public piety continued in 2018.
requirements for reporting mosque income, property, staff,
Forum 18 reported that hijab-wearing women weresalaries, and worshippers’ personal data. Likewise, in 2018,refused employment and medical care. Also, univerimam-khatibs were again subject to being tested on theirsities enforced the beard and hijab ban, and police
religious knowledge for reaccreditation as spiritual leaders.
in Dushanbe enforced the bans with regular visits toThis process enabled the state to filter out unwanted clergy
schools. In September 2018, police set up a roadblock
members, including 16 from Sogd Province.
on the outskirts of Dushanbe, stopping cars and forcThe small Shi’a Muslim minority in Tajikistan is
ing men to shave and women to remove their hijabs.
generally tolerated by the government, although subject
News reports also found that young bearded men wereto the same level of official scrutiny given to the Sunni
frequently denied passports until they agreed to shave.
majority. Nevertheless, there were some signs of tension
Although state campaigns to limit personal piety
in 2018. During the summer, a senior member of thehave been pervasive, their legality is opaque andAcademy of Sciences of Tajikistan published an article

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In December 2018, customs officers at Dushanbe Airport destroyed 5,000 Baptist calendars with New Testamentverses on them. The calendars were confiscated after a “linguistics expert” from the Ministry of Culture determinedthem to contain the “propaganda” of an “alien faith.”

Treatment of Non-Muslims

Imprisonment of Conscientious Objectors

Although there were fewer arrests and less harassmentof Christians in 2018 when compared to the previous
year, it is not clear that this represented a policy shift.
As is the case with several other Central Asian governments, the Tajikistani government is deeply suspiciousof Christian minority groups, especially those engaged
in proselytism. Jehovah’s Witnesses—who were bannedin 2007 for allegedly causing “discontent” and for conscientious objection to military service—continue tobe subjected to harassment in schools and on the job,
and also faced threats of imprisonment. On October
5, 2018, 18 Jehovah’s Witnesses, including women andchildren, were detained by Tajikistani security services
and interrogated for several hours. Similar episodes,
involving 18 Jehovah’s Witnesses, were reported during
January and February 2019, after the reporting period.
One woman was reportedly questioned for 14 hours
before suffering a stroke that left her unable to speakor walk. In December 2018, police opened a criminalcase against Jehovah’s Witness Muhibahon Isanova forcomplaining about a teacher’s bullying of her eight-yearold son. While persecution is usually confined to raids,fines, and temporary detention, Christians have also
been handed down lengthy prison terms. In July 2017,
Bakhrom Kholmatov, Protestant pastor of the Sunmin
Sunbogym church in Khujand, was sentenced to three
years in prison on charges of extremism for leading worship services, “singing extremist songs,” and “inciting
religious hatred.” According to his family, Kholmatov
was denied family visitation rights for more than fourmonths and was denied the right to receive his mail. In
December 2018, Forum 18 reported that Kholmatov had
decided against any further appeals in his case.
The estimated 1,000 followers of the Baha’i faith in
Tajikistan are registered as a recognized faith community and able to conduct worship. Yet in 2018 somemembers reported rising hostilities among Tajikistanisociety at large, where there is an increasing tendency
to equate Tajikistani nationality with Sunni Islam.

Tajikistan provides no exemptions for conscientious
objection. In April 2018, Daniil Islamov—a Jehovah’s
Witness—was released from prison after serving out asix-month sentence for refusing military service.

TIER 1 TAJIKISTAN

alleging that the membership of IRPT had converted to
Shi'a Islam, which he labeled an ‘alien religion’. On July
2, the article, which also alleged intense IRPT interest in
Iran and its Islamic revolution, was republished by the
Tajikistani government news agency, Khovar.

U.S. POLICY
Tajikistan is strategically important to the United States
because of its long border with Afghanistan and thatcountry’s large Tajik minority. Since 2010, the UnitedStates has expanded cooperation with Central Asianstates, including Tajikistan, to ship cargo overland via theNorthern Distribution Network as U.S. and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) troops in Afghanistan
continue to withdraw. Tajikistan has given U.S. Special
Operations Forces permission to enter the country on acase-by-case basis during counterterrorism operations,while the United States has provided counterterrorism
training to Tajikistan’s border guards and Special Forces.
In July 2018, a U.S. delegation attended the C5+1
Ministerial in Almaty and Tashkent, which brought
together the foreign ministries of the five Central Asianstates and the United States for discussions on various
multilateral issues, including respect for basic freedoms.
Then Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Asia Henry Ensher led the Security Working Groupin Tashkent. Since 2010, the United States and Tajikistan
have discussed bilateral policy and economic assistancein an Annual Bilateral Consultation (ABC). After a hiatus
in 2017, the ABC resumed in Dushanbe in October 2018,with a U.S. delegation led by Emilia A. Puma, acting
deputy assistant secretary for Central Asia and press
and public diplomacy, who raised U.S. concerns abouthuman rights and media freedom in Tajikistan.
In November 2018, the State Department redesignated Tajikistan as a CPC. However, in light of
Tajikistan’s ongoing security cooperation with theUnited States, the State Department granted a waiver ontaking any action as a consequence of the CPC designation, in consideration of U.S. “national interest.”

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TURKMENISTANTIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Turkmenistan
remained largely unchanged. Turkmenistan is widely considered the most closed of the former Soviet states, and thiswas reflected in the range and severity of the government’s
religious freedom violations in 2018. For the first time in four
years, the government resumed its practice of imprisoning
conscientious objectors to military service. The government
continued to be suspicious of all independent religious activity
and maintained a large surveillance apparatus that monitors
believers at home and abroad. Turkmenistan law requires
religious groups to register under intrusive criteria, strictly
controls registered groups’ activities, and bans and punishes
religious activities by unregistered groups. Persons accusedof criminal religious offenses may be tried in closed-regime
courts in which the sentences remain secret. Many of thoseconvicted are disappeared in the state’s prison system andare presumed to be held without any contact with the outside

world; some are held at the notorious Ovadan-Depe Prison
where prisoners routinely die from torture and starvation.
However, the full extent of religious persecution is unknown
due to the nearly complete absence of independent news
media and the threat of retaliation by the government against
communities, family members, and individuals who publicize
human rights and religious freedom violations.
In light of these systematic, ongoing, egregious violations, in2019 USCIRF again finds that Turkmenistan merits designation
as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). The U.S. Departmentof State has designated Turkmenistan as a CPC since 2014,
most recently in November 2018. At the same time, the State
Department used a waiver against any related sanctions on
Turkmenistan “as required in the ‘important national interestof the United States.’” USCIRF recommends that the State
Department redesignate Turkmenistan as a CPC under IRFA.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Lift the waiver on taking action as aconsequence of Turkmenistan’s CPC
designation to hold the government of
Turkmenistan accountable for its continuing violations of religious freedom;• Identify Turkmenistan government
agencies and officials responsible forsevere violations of religious freedom,
freeze those individuals’ assets, and bar
their entry into the United States, asdelineated under the Global Magnitsky

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Human Rights Accountability Act andrelated executive orders, citing specificreligious freedom violations;for the whereabouts of all prisoners ofconscience, including those imprisoned on religious grounds; and• Press for at the highest levels andwork to secure the immediate
release of individuals imprisoned
for their peaceful religious activities
or religious affiliations and urge thegovernment of Turkmenistan to desist
immediately from the practice of“disappearing” prisoners and account• Ensure continued U.S. funding forRadio Azatlyk, the Turkmen serviceof Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), so that uncensored
information about events inside
Turkmenistan, including those related
to religious freedom, continues tobe disseminated.

TIER 1 TURKMENISTANCOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Turkmenistan
GOVERNMENT
Presidential Republic

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
89% Muslim (primarily Hanafi Sunni)
9% Orthodox Christian (Russian and Armenian)
2% Other (including Protestants, Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Shi’a Muslims, Buddhists, Jews, and Baha’is)

POPULATION
5,411,012
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSTechnically a secular state with complete religious freedom.
In practice, the government gives preference to Hanafi Islamand Orthodox Christianity.

BACKGROUND
Turkmenistan is a highly authoritarian country
under President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov,
who enforces a cult of personality and demands thatthe population conform to his personal whims, suchas mandating the color of privately owned cars. The
country’s first post-Soviet president, Saparmurat Niyazov, who died in late 2006, also presided over his own
personality cult that included renaming the months ofthe year in his honor and mandating his semi-autobiographical moral treatise, the Ruhnama, as required
reading in Turkmenistan’s schools, universities, andgovernment offices. After assuming the presidency inearly 2007, Berdymukhamedov rolled back some aspectsof Niyazov’s cult, set up two new official human rights
commissions, registered 13 religious minority groups,
and eased police controls on internal travel.
Over time, however, President Berdymukhamedov
has done little to reform oppressive Turkmenistan laws,
rein in the all-powerful state security apparatus, or place
curbs on his personal power. In fact, a new 2016 constitution removed the presidential age limit and President
Berdymukhamedov was reelected in 2017 with 97
percent of the vote in an election that international
observers widely regarded as unfair. With few—if any—

*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook and the U.S.
Department of State

checks and balances, the government of Turkmenistan
in 2018 continued to impose an information blackout,
including by strictly controlling electronic communications; it also harasses and imprisons journalists.
On May 9, authorities detained an RFE/RL journalist,
Soltan Achilova, threatening her with trumped-up drug
charges and forcing her to renounce her employment
with RFE/RL before she was released.
The country is adjacent to northern Afghanistan,which is home to approximately 250,000 ethnic Turkmen, some of whom the Turkmenistan government
alleges sympathize with Islamist extremist groups. As
a result, the government continued to be concerned
about religious extremism spreading into Turkmenistan. The Afghan border is also the site of periodic
clashes with various armed groups, including smugglers and Taliban militants.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
Government Legal Control overReligious Activities
Although the constitution guarantees religious freedom, the separation of religion and state, and equality
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participants in the United Nations (UN) Human Rights
of five new groups; however, registration applications
Council’s Universal Periodic Review of Turkmenistanfrom certain Shi’a Muslim groups, the Armenian Aposremained concerned that legislation, especially the 2016
tolic Church, Protestant congregations, and Jehovah’s
law on religious freedom, restricted freedom of reliWitnesses have faced numerous rejections. Non-Musgion and belief, in particular citing barriers to religious
lim communities led by ethnic Turkmen have proveneducation, the registration of religious groups, and theespecially difficult to register. In January 2018, at least
importation and distribution of religious literature. The
six evangelical churches reportedly had been waiting for2016 law raised the group registration requirement minregistration since 2016 and were forced to conduct worimum from five to 50 adult citizen founders, rendering
ship services in secret, where they were subject to arrest
smaller congregations illegal. In addition, the law also
and raids. According to Jehovah’s Witnesses, between
continued several restrictive provisions from the previSeptember 2017 and August 2018, authorities carried out
ous legislation, including: intrusive registration criteria,
the following against their members: five police raids
prohibition of any activity by unregistered groups, theand searches of religious meetings and private homes,
requirement that the government be informed of all
17 detentions by authorities, two severe beatings byforeign financial support, bans on worship in private
police, and 12 fines imposed for religious activity.
homes and private religious education, and prohibition
In addition, the Turkmenistan governmentof wearing religious garb in public except by clerics.
imposed unspecified conditions on the exercise of freeMore recently, the government has stepped up enforcedom of religion or belief by requiring religious leaders
ment of its unofficial ban on full beards for men underand believers to cooperate closely with the Ministry of
40, which it views as an indicator of Islamist extremism.
National Security’s secret police.
Young men are routinely stopped on the street by police
Punishment for Religious Activities
and forced to shave or pay a fine.
The Turkmenistan government subjects religious adherThe Commission for Work with Religious Organients to harsh penalties, such as imprisonment, forcible
zations and Expert Analysis of Resources with Religious
treatment with drugs, and alleged torture. In recent
Information, Published and Printed Production
years, Muslims, Protestants, and Jehovah’s Witnesses(CWRO), which reports to the Cabinet of Ministers, musthave been detained, fined, imprisoned, or internallyapprove registration applications before they are sent
exiled for their religious
to the Justice Ministry. It
beliefs and activities.
is illegal for unregistered
Politically sensitive
groups to rent, purchase,
The Turkmenistan government
trials often take placeor build places of worship.
subjects religious adherents toin a closed regime, with
Justice Ministry officials
harsh penalties, such as imprisonment,
the sentence remaining
can attend any religious
forcible treatment with drugs,
secret. Once convicted,
event of a registeredand alleged torture.
prisoners are routinely
religious community andsubjected to brutal andask its members about theinhumane conditions,nature of their religious
including starvation, alleged torture, and infectious
activities. Registered religious communities mustdisease. The most politically sensitive prisoners,
undergo re-registration every three years, and religious
including some religious prisoners, are subjected toactivity is not permitted in prisons or in the military.
“disappearance” in the state prison system. Oftentimes,
According to the Turkmenistan government, as ofdeath announcements by authorities are made after a
January 2018, there were 131 registered religious organilengthy period of the prisoner being incommunicado.
zations, including 108 Muslim (103 Sunni and five Shi’a),
Most of the “disappeared” are believed to be held in
12 Orthodox Christian, and 11 others. The Working
Ovadan-Depe, a prison also known by its official desGroup of the UN Universal Periodic Review affirmed
ignation, AN-T/2, in the Karakum Desert. In Decemberthat in 2017 Turkmenistan approved the registrationU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

Muslims

associated with the movement of Turkish Islamic clericFethullah Gülen, who is currently based in the UnitedStates. In February 2017, 18 of the detained individuals
were sentenced to between 12 and 25 years in prison on
charges of belonging to an unnamed terrorist group.
The arrests reportedly were a “goodwill” gesture to
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has
blamed Gülen for the 2016 attempted coup against his
government. Several of those convicted were reportedlytransported to Ovadan-Depe Prison. In December 2017,
the UN’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention ruledthat the 18 cases had major irregularities and were infact arbitrary.
In 2018, no new information became available about
Annamurad Atdaev, a Muslim prisoner of conscience
who disappeared in January 2017 after being charged
with “inspiring religious, national, and social hatred.”
Atdaev’s disappearance occurred while authorities
transferred him to a regime prison; he is believed to beheld in Ovadan-Depe Prison, though his precise whereabouts were unknown at the end of the reporting period.
In July 2018, the 12-year sentences of five men convicted in 2017 of convening a prayer group devoted to
discussing the works of the late Turkish Muslim theologian Said Nursi were upheld in a court of appeals. At theend of the reporting period, four of the men were held at
Ovadan-Depe Prison even though their sentences called
for them to serve time in labor camps.

TIER 1 TURKMENISTAN

2016, the UN Committee Against Torture stated that
it was “gravely concerned” about the use of torture to
extract confessions, the deaths of “numerous” prisoners
in Ovadan-Depe, and the “impunity” of state officials
involved in torturing detainees.
Disappearances were pursued most widely in theearly 2000s under the reign of then President Niyazov.
The practice has tapered but has continued under President Berdymukhamedov, whose administration has
upheld the sentences and conditions of those previously“disappeared” and resisted providing information about
prisoners to international organizations and the UN.
Against this backdrop, there have been some positive
steps taken in recent years. In 2016, authorities started
to hand over the bodies of “disappeared” prisoners totheir families for burial. In June 2018, the government
provided limited family visits to certain “disappeared”
prisoners at Ovadan-Depe, including a few individuals
accused of Islamist extremism.

Because of the government’s information blackout, noaccurate numbers of religious prisoners exist. In 2018,sources in Turkmenistan informed the UN’s Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances thatamong the approximately 120 disappeared prisoners, 30
individuals were held on charges of Islamist extremism,
most with sentences between eight and 25 years. In a
few cases, those charged with religious extremism areProtestants and Jehovah’s Witnesses
members of nonviolent religious communities or people
In 2018, the Turkmenistan government regularly raided
refusing to cooperate with security agencies. In several
homes and places of worship of both registered andcases, those given sentences of between two and a half
unregistered religious minorities, confiscating literand three years on suspicion of extremism were thenature and temporarily
resentenced to longer
detaining believers. In
terms while in prison,
addition to incarcerations
allegedly for more serious
In 2018, the Turkmenistanwith significant jail time,
crimes, and the details
government regularly raided homes
Protestants and Jehovah’sof the sentences wereand places of worship of bothWitnesses were jailed as
unknown. According toregistered and unregistered religious
short-term prisoners ofsources, four prisoners
minorities, confiscating literature
conscience for periods upheld on religious charges
and temporarily detaining believers.
to 15 days. In recent years,
have died in prison.
Jehovah’s Witnesses
In 2016, Turkmenreported being taunted,
istan officials detained
threatened, expelled from schools, and removed from
more than 150 businessmen and former teachers andtheir jobs. Ethnic Turkmen Protestants also reported
graduates of joint Turkish-Turkmen secondary schools

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being summoned before community leaders, accusedof betraying their “ancestral faith,” and pressured torenounced Christianity. However, reports of persecution
are limited and incomplete because authorities tightly
control information and communities fear retaliation if
they publicize violations of their rights.

Gurbansoltan Eje district of Dashoguz Region in a conference hall of the district military conscription officerather than a courtroom.

Government Interference inInternal Religious Affairs

The Turkmenistan government interferes in the leadership and organizational arrangements of religious
Turkmenistan has no civilian alternative military sercommunities. The Sunni Muftiate (Muslim Spiritual
vice for conscientious objectors. Although by law those
Administration) continued to be under tight governwho refuse service can face up to two years’ jail time,
ment control. The Justice Ministry names the chief
between 2014 and 2017
mufti and senior muftiate
the dozen or so citizens
officials, who also funcprosecuted by Turkmenition as officials for the
Sermons by imams . . . convey
stan authorities typically
CWRO and thereby overstate messages, the Justice Ministry
received only suspended
see the activities of otherforbids imams from discussing certain
sentences or terms of
religious communities.
topics, and Friday prayers end“corrective labor,” under
The muftiate appoints
with a short prayer for the president.
which the state withholds
imams, including at thea portion of the convicteddistrict level, and district
person’s salary.
imams appoint local
The UN and the Organization for Security andmullahs, with all appointments subject to secret police
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have repeatedly deemed
vetting. Sermons by imams at Friday prayers convey
the prosecution of conscientious objectors to be a violastate messages, the Justice Ministry forbids imams fromtion of their human rights and have urged Turkmenistan discussing certain topics, and Friday prayers end with ato introduce a nonmilitary service alternative. In May
short prayer for the president.
2018, the UN Working Group on Turkmenistan’s UniverAside from basic education in some Sunni mosques
sal Periodic Review urged the government “to recognize
and churches of the Moscow Patriarchate Russian
the right to conscientious objection to military service,”
Orthodox Church (MPROC), formal religious education
which the Turkmenistan government rejected, citing its
is almost completely banned. Religious groups cannot
law on universal military service.
arrange lectures, courses, or training programs. The
In 2018, the Turkmenistan government increased
sole exception is a small Sunni Muslim theological secthe frequency of prosecutions and reintroduced jailtion in the history faculty of Ashgabat’s Turkmen State
time for conscientious objectors after a break of four
University that is authorized to train imams.
years. Since January 2018, authorities imprisoned
Restrictions on Houses of Worship
10 Jehovah’s Witnesses for refusing military service.
Registered religious communities are eligible to own
Nine of the men received one-year sentences and one,
property but require the approval of the CWRO and19-year-old Mekan Annayev, received a two-year senlocal government authorities to build places of worship.
tence. According to Forum 18, when Annayev initially
In practice, religious communities face major diffideclined military service in 2017 he was subject toculties in securing leases for religious services and for“explanatory work” conducted by the chief imam ofbuilding or acquiring places of worship. In the capital,
the city of Turkmenbashi. At his trial in June 2018, theTurkmenistan authorities have demolished at least eight
presiding chief judge in Turkmenbashi denouncedof Ashgabat’s 14 mosques without compensation to the
Annayev and all Jehovah’s Witnesses as “traitors.”
religious communities.
In July, Jehovah’s Witness Ikhlosbek Valijon oglu
Rozmetov was tried for conscientious objection in theConscientious Objectors

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Turkmenistan continued to ban most religious publications and state authorities routinely confiscatedreligious literature. Because very little literature is produced in Turkmenistan, it is difficult to acquire copies
of religious books such as the Qur’an and the Bible. In
December 2018, authorities detained a Turkmenistani
woman for 24 hours for trying to bring copies of the
Qur’an back from Turkey. She was eventually released,
but the texts were confiscated. Only registered groups
can legally import religious literature, but only undertight censorship. The CWRO must review and stamp“approved” on all religious texts; documents withouta stamp are subject to confiscation and individuals tofines or imprisonment. Although the MPROC can sell
approved religious texts, Protestant churches have been
unable to register a Bible Society to promote and sell
Christian scriptures.

State Restrictions on Foreign Travel
and Religion

Authorities also confiscated the women’s cell phones
and checked their social media accounts.
The government also continued to monitor andharass its citizens abroad, especially students. In
June 2018, students returning to Turkmenistan werereportedly required to visit the offices of the Ministryof National Security for “prophylactic conversations,”
during which authorities sought to reconstruct theircircles of friends and acquaintances and inquired about
their religious activity.
At a secret trial during the spring of 2018, Omriuzak Omarkulyev was found guilty of high treason andsentenced to 20 years in prison. Omarkulyev had beena second-year student at Osmaniye Korkut Ata University in Turkey and the leader of an informal Turkmen
student group that was monitored by the Turkmenistan
Embassy in Ankara. He was invited back to Turkmenistan by authorities on the pretense of being trained totake part in pre-election activities in Ashgabat in February 2018. He was subsequently prevented from boarding
a flight to Turkey for a week before being arrested andcharged and sentenced in closed trial, and is believed tobe held in Ovadan-Depe Prison at the end of the reporting period.

TIER 1 TURKMENISTANState Control of Religious Literature

The Turkmenistan government continued to restrict
the movement of its citizens across international borders, especially when it suspects religious activity as
the purpose of travel. The only exception to this policy
U.S. POLICY
is for the approximately 110,000 individuals with dual
For more than a decade, U.S. policy in Central Asia
Russian-Turkmenistan citizenship, mainly Russian
has been dominated by the Afghan war, with human
Orthodox, who usually meet coreligionists abroad andrights and religious freedom remaining low on the list ofundertake clerical training. Muslims, however, are notregional priorities. However, the drawing down of U.S.
permitted to travel abroad for religious education. In
forces in the region could impact the status quo.
2018, the government stated that it routinely allows more
The United States has security and economic
than 1,500 people to travel to Mecca for the hajj pilgriminterests
in Turkmenistan due to its proximity to Iranage each year, though this assertion belies reported
and Afghanistan and its
figures from previous
large natural gas reserves.
years; for example, in 2017,
Despite its neutral staonly 160 people reportedly
In January 2018, all women returningtus, Turkmenistan has
made the hajj, the lowest
from Turkey to Turkmenistan
allowed the Northernnumber since 2009.
reportedly were summarily detained
Distribution Network to
In January 2018, allfor questioning about theirdeliver supplies to U.S.
women returning fromreligious convictions . . .
and international troops
Turkey to Turkmeniin Afghanistan, as wellstan reportedly wereas the refueling of U.S.
summarily detained forflights with nonlethal supplies at Ashgabat Internationalquestioning about their religious convictions at the
Airport. During counterterrorism operations over the
Ashgabat International Airport, especially those withpast year, U.S. Special Operations Forces reportedly
Turkish residency permits or those who wore the hijab.

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have been allowed to enter Turkmenistan on a “case-bycase” basis with Turkmenistan’s permission.
In July 2018, a U.S. delegation attended the C5+1
Ministerial in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and Tashkent,
Uzbekistan, which brought together the foreign ministries of the five Central Asian states and the United States
for discussions on various multilateral issues. However,these discussions have historically focused on regional
cooperation, U.S. investment, counterterrorism, andenvironmental concerns more than human rights issues.
The Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABCs) area regular mechanism for the United States and Turkmenistan to discuss a wide range of bilateral issues,
including regional security, economic and traderelations, social and cultural ties, and human rights.
Although no ABC sessions were held in 2016 and 2017,
they resumed in October 2018 with a visit to Ashgabat by Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

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Central Asian Affairs Emilia A. Puma. As part of the
dialogue, the delegations reportedly discussed humanrights issues.
In recent years, U.S. participation alongside othernations at the UN has provided another important platform to address concerns over Turkmenistan’s humanrights and religious freedom record. In May 2018, aspart of the UN’s Universal Periodic Review, the UnitedStates made explicit recommendations to lift practices
that “restrict freedoms of religion or belief, expression
and movement.”
In November 2018, the State Department redesignated Turkmenistan as a CPC under IRFA, a designation
it first made in 2014. However, in light of its ongoingsecurity cooperation with the United States, the State
Department granted a waiver on taking any action as aconsequence of the CPC designation in consideration of
U.S. national interest.

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UZBEKISTANTIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Uzbekistan trended
positive in certain areas, though serious concerns remain.
During the year, Uzbekistan continued on a path of reform
to expand religious freedom in the country. Notably, in May
2018, Uzbekistan’s parliament adopted a road map to improvereligious freedom conditions, incorporating the recommendations made by the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteuron freedom of religion or belief, and pledged to rewrite theoppressive 1998 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Organizations. Despite the positive developments originating
at the highest levels of the government, severe violations ofreligious freedom persisted. Thousands of Muslim religious
prisoners remained behind bars on allegations of religious
extremism. Of the prisoners who have been released under theadministration of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, none of them
have been rehabilitated for full reintegration into society, andthe government has yet to provide a means for former prisoners
to seek justice and exonerate their names. The government
continued to restrict certain manifestations of Muslim piety insettings such as schools, where it has prohibited women andgirls from wearing the hijab, and punished those who criticizedsuch policies with short-term detentions, fines, or—in the caseof at least one public figure—dismissal from employment. At
the same time, local authorities continued to target Christiancommunities for failing or being unable to register, possessing
and distributing religious literature, and engaging in missionary
activities, despite government assurances that efforts were
underway to decriminalize acts that posed no threat to public
safety. This inability to rein in local authorities and police forces
throughout the country demonstrates the government’s ongoing lack of capacity to fully implement and enforce top-downchanges. On the contrary, during the year, police forces andmembers of Uzbekistan’s State Security Service (SSS) continued
to harass, intimidate, raid, fine, and detain members of Christiancommunities, particularly Baptists and Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Based on these violations, USCIRF again finds in 2019 thatUzbekistan merits designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious Freedom Act(IRFA). In November 2018, the U.S. Department of State moved
Uzbekistan from its list of designated CPCs and placed thecountry on its “Special Watch List,” a new category created by
December 2016 amendments to IRFA. Unlike a CPC designation, the Special Watch List carries no penalties, sanctions, orother commensurate actions. USCIRF acknowledges the government’s willingness and interest to reform, but neverthelessrecommends that the State Department redesignate Uzbekistan as a CPC under IRFA and use available tools to leveragesustainable improvements in religious freedom conditions.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Establish a binding agreement with
the Uzbek government, as authorizedunder section 405(c) of IRFA, on steps
it can take to ensure long-lasting
improvements to religious freedom;• Work with the Uzbek government torevise the 1998 Law on Freedom ofConscience and Religious Organizations to ensure it is consistent
with international human rights
standards, and encourage the Uzbek

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government to remove registration
requirements on religious communities, permit the distribution andpossession of peaceful religious
literature, and permit the sharing of
religious beliefs;• Urge the Uzbek government to close
the notorious Jasliq Prison, where
many religious prisoners of conscience
are held, and allow for independent
prison monitoring; and• Press for at the highest levels andwork to secure the immediate
release of individuals imprisoned fortheir peaceful religious activities orreligious affiliations and press the
Uzbek government to treat prisoners
humanely and allow them access tofamily, human rights monitors, adequate medical care, and lawyers, andthe ability to practice their faith.

TIER 1 UZBEKISTANCOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Republic of Uzbekistan
GOVERNMENT
Presidential Republic

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY**
93% Muslim (92% Sunni Muslim and 1% Shi’a Muslim)
4% Russian Orthodox
3% Other (including the Baha’i faith, Buddhist, Hare Krishna,
Jehovah’s Witness, Jewish, Protestant, and Roman Catholic)

POPULATION*
32,653,900
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSIslam, Christianity (Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant),
and Judaism

BACKGROUND
Uzbekistan’s constitution provides for freedom of
religion or belief, but also limits it where it encroaches
on the “lawful interests, rights, and freedoms of othercitizens, the state, or society.” Religious freedom is also
regulated and controlled by the 1998 Law on Freedomof Conscience and Religious Organizations, as well as
the administrative and criminal codes. The 1998 law
requires religious groups to register with the government and criminalizes any unregistered religious
activity. Such failure to register often results in police
raids, detainment, arrests, or fines many times theaverage monthly salary. The private teaching of religion, proselytism, and other missionary activities arestrictly prohibited. The Committee on Religious Affairs(CRA) under the Cabinet of Ministers is the government body responsible for the oversight of registeredreligious activity. As official approval is required forthe content, production, and distribution of religious
publications, the CRA is also tasked with the review
and censorship of religious materials.
Control of religious activity in Uzbekistan isgenerally based on security grounds, requiring
authorities to combat religious extremism andterrorism, which has served to justify the State Security Service's (SSS) involvement in monitoring and*Information sourced from the government of Uzbekistan.
**Estimates compiled from the U.S. Department of State.

policing religious communities. However, international human rights organizations contend that the
government has regularly used dubious allegationsof links to extremist or terrorist organizations as ameans to suppress dissent, and members of the SSS
have been accused of using torture to extract confessions. In January 2018, Rustam Inoyatov, the headof the National Security Service (NSS) that was later
renamed the SSS, was dismissed following President
Mirziyoyev’s criticism that “every ordinary issue has
been considered a threat to national security.” In February 2018, Aydarbek Tulepov was similarly dismissedfrom his post as the deputy chairman of the Muslim
Board of Uzbekistan (MBU). The NSS reportedly hadtasked him to monitor the MBU. The work of others
assigned to watch the activities of mosques was also
temporarily discontinued.
Throughout 2018, the government under President Mirziyoyev continued to pursue an ambitious
agenda of political and economic reform. Government officials highlighted efforts to address humanrights concerns and emphasized a commitment
to end torture, although allegations of torture persisted during the year despite a 2017 presidential
decree banning the use in court of evidence obtained
through torture.

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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
Positive Developments

Arbitrary Accusations of Islamist Extremism

Government officials frequently attribute the need forstrict regulation and monitoring of religion and religious
Throughout 2018, the government of Uzbekistan continactivity to the persistent threat of religious extremism.
ued to publicly address religious freedom concerns in the
While the government has legitimate concerns aboutcountry and engage with the international community
radicalization and terrorism, particularly given theabout ongoing steps for reform. In May 2018, the parlianumber of Uzbek citizens reported to have joined or
ment adopted a joint resolution on a “road map” to ensure
supported the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in
freedom of religion or belief in direct response to therecent years, accusations of religious extremism have
October 2017 visit and February 2018 recommendations
tended to be excessively vague, unfounded, or spurious
made by UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion orat times. Despite the removal of an estimated 16,000
belief Ahmed Shaheed. Among the stated goals included
names from a government blacklist of alleged religious
in the road map were: improving the legislative frameextremists and the release of a number of politicalwork and rewriting the 1998 law; improving the process
prisoners at the end of 2017, thousands of individualsof registration for religious organizations, including byremain imprisoned on charges of religious extremism or
reducing fees and lowering the minimum number ofmembership in a banned
founders from 100 to 50;
religious group—some
introducing changes toestimates range between
the criminal and admin. . . thousands of individuals remain
1,500 and 7,000 individuistrative codes regarding
imprisoned on charges ofals. According to human
freedom of religion or
religious extremism or membershiprights groups, many ofbelief; reviewing thein a banned religious group . . .
them have been behind
overly broad definition ofbars for approximately“extremism”; and reviewtwo decades.
ing the cases of individualsIn
February
2018,
court
proceedings
began against
charged with “religious extremism,” “anti-constitutional
local human rights activist Musajon Bobojonov, who
activity,” or “membership in an illegal religious group.”
faced extremism charges under article 244(1) of the
The government of Uzbekistan also took positive
Criminal Code. Police claimed to have discovered
steps to relax some longstanding restrictions on the“extremist” materials on Bobojonov’s computer. In an
private and public practice of Islam, which has generallyinterview with Radio Ozodlik, Bobojonov explained thatbeen closely monitored and controlled as a purported
the materials were for his work “conduct[ing] researchmeans to combat Islamist extremism. In keeping withon the negative impact of radical literature” on Islam,trends from 2017, the government continued to expand
and that he had published a number of books on thesome freedoms by increasing access to religious edusubject before. In March 2018, he was convicted of thecation and permitting greater religious expression in“production, storage, distribution or demonstration of
the public sphere. In January 2018, the Justice Ministrymaterials containing a threat to public safety and public
registered the International Islamic Academy of Uzbekiorder” and sentenced to three years’ probation. In Junestan, the first institution of higher education dedicated2018, G’ayrat Ziyahodjaev was similarly convicted for
entirely to Islamic studies. The government also sponpossessing religious texts downloaded online. Whilesored Qur’an and hadith recitation contests, a move
he did not receive any jail time, both his phone and his
seen as a significant departure from previous practices
parents’ computer were ordered destroyed.
censoring public displays of piety.
In February 2016, Aramais Avakian, a ChristianIn December 2018, the UN General Assembly
fish
farmer,was sentenced to seven years in prison for
adopted a resolution introduced by Uzbekistan on
allegedly “plotting unconstitutional activities” and“Enlightenment and Religious Tolerance,” which calls
participating in a religious extremist organization. Avaon members to eliminate intolerance and discriminakian’s family claims he was targeted by local authorities
tion and protect freedom of religion or belief.

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TIER 1 UZBEKISTAN

as a means to seize his profitable fish farm. Local andincluding hijabs, yarmulkes, and crosses. The ban oninternational human rights organizations have statedreligious clothing reportedly was implemented taking
that Avakian was subjected to torture in attempts to
into account the ethnic and religious diversity of
extract a confession. In May 2018, Avakian was reloUzbekistan and the country’s secular nature—a justicated to a less strict prison facility in his home region offication suggestive of social conflict the government of
Jizzakh and informed that he would be released within
Uzbekistan often uses to limit or restrict religious freetwo months. At the end of the reporting period, Avakian
dom. Other regulations less overtly related to religious
remained imprisoned.
expression were also criticized as limiting Muslim reliJahongir Kulijanov, a member of Uzbekistan’s
gious practice, such as a requirement that the length
Shi’a Muslim minority community, also remainedof boys’ pants extend below the ankle. In September
imprisoned throughout 2018 for his conviction for
2018, reports emerged about female students who were
allegedly participating in an illegal religious orgaforced to remove their headscarves in order to enter thenization and the possession and dissemination ofrecently established International Islamic Academy.
extremist religious materials. Kulijanov was one of
School authorities pressured students, many of whom
20 Shi’a Muslims originally detained in Bukhara inchose to wear wigs and tie scarves around their necks
February 2017 for holding an illegal religious meetingin order to be admitted. Others who refused to removein a local café and sharing Shi’a Muslim literature.
their headscarves were denied entry and unable to
According to Forum 18, Kulijanov’s peers believe heattend class. At least four students reportedly were
was targeted after he was tapped to replace the imam
dismissed from the academy for refusing to removeof a local Shi’a mosque. In February 2019, after thetheir hijabs.
reporting period, Kulijanov was reportedly granted a
Similarly, voicing public support for a greater
reduction of his term androle and place for Islam
released from prison,in society, and thereby
though the details
opposing government
Voicing public support for a greaterof his release could
policies limiting Musrole and place for Islam in society,not be confirmed. In
lim manifestations ofand thereby opposing government
November 2018, Humanreligious expression,
policies . . . continued to be punished.
Rights Watch identified
continued to be punRuhiddin Fahriddinovished in Uzbekistan.
(Fahrutdinov), Nodirbek
In August and SeptemYusupov, and Askar Ahmadiy as religious prisoners;
ber 2018, at least eight bloggers—Miraziz Ahmedov,
reports suggest Yusupov may have been released after
Tulkin Astanov, Sulaymon Erkin, Dilshodbek Halilov,
the reporting period.
Adham Olimov (who writes under the pseudonym“Musannif”), Ziyavuddin Rahmon, Hurshidbek
Restrictions on Muslim Religious Activity
Muhammad Rozikov, and Otabek Usmanov—were
Despite some positive developments as discussed
arrested in various cities in response to their writings
above, violations of religious freedom targeting theand criticisms of the government regarding reliMuslim community persisted throughout the year.
gious issues, such as restrictions on wearing hijabs.
This is particularly true for individuals and religious
However, as many as 30 people in total reportedly
communities that espouse views or lifestyles thatwere detained, but chose not to go public about theirdeviate from state-backed norms, such as Muslims
detention for fear of further retribution against either
who support and promote a more conservative interthemselves or their families. In social media posts
pretation of Islam. In August 2018, the government
shared primarily on Facebook, some of the bloggers
introduced new guidelines regulating the dress andcalled for protests against the government for banningappearance of students and explicitly prohibiting thethe headscarf at schools, prompting the government
wearing of religious clothing or symbols at schools,
to lash out in what was likely an attempt to quash

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further dissent. Preceding the arrests, both police
Repression of Christians
and SSS officers raided bloggers’ homes without
Christian groups in Uzbekistan—particularly Protobtaining a warrant and confiscated computers,
estants and Jehovah’s Witnesses—endure harshmobile phones, and books. Many of the bloggers wererestrictions on nearly all aspects of their religious activsubsequently fined and given jail sentences of 15
ity. Although the government has pledged to revise strictdays, and authorities inlegislation limiting the
Tashkent prohibited apractice of religious belief,
public demonstration
authorities continue
Because the Uzbek governmentthat planned to protest
to persecute Christianviews proselytism as an inherent threat
hijab restrictions in earlygroups regarding registo social stability, missionary activity
September 2018.
tration, the distribution
is strictly prohibited.
In addition, Fazlidor possesion of religious
din Parpiev, an imam
literature, and missionat Tashkent’s Omina
ary activity. Because theMosque, was dismissed from his position in September
Uzbek government views proselytism as an inherent
2018 after posting a video to Facebook in which he madethreat to social stability, missionary activity is also
an appeal to President Mirziyoyev. In the video, Parpiev
strictly prohibited.
asked the president to lift the ban on religious clothing,According to the February 2018 report issued by UN
citing restrictions on wearing Islamic headscarves forSpecial Rapporteur Shaheed, complex requirements for
women and growing beards for men. Although the Musregistration in Uzbekistan discriminate against relilim Board of Uzbekistan did not specify the reason forgious minorities, such as Christians, that cannot meet
Parpiev’s dismissal, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
prerequisites necessary to obtain registration. The law(RFE/RL) reported that an official reproached Parpiev
stipulates that in order to register, a religious commufor “deviat[ing] from the script” by publicly criticiznity must have a minimum membership of 100 adulting state policies. At the end of 2018, Parpiev and his
Uzbek citizens, residing in Uzbekistan, who are willingfamily left Uzbekistan for an undisclosed country after
to provide their personal information to the governprosecutors warned him against continuing to sharement—a requirement that precludes the registration of“political” posts on social media outlets.
many small Christian communities. Moreover, many
Furthermore, citizens wishing to perform theChristian communities are prevented from applying for
Muslim hajj or umrah are required to obtain permisregistration with the Ministry of Justice because theysion from the government, which reportedly maintains
fail or are unable to obtain the mandatory, preliminary
quotas separate from and lower than those establishedapproval of the mahalla (local community) committee,
by Saudi Arabia for each pilgrimage. In October 2018,
which issues—in effect—a completely arbitrary decithe government also announced that Uzbek citizens
sion. In September 2018, Jehovah’s Witnesses applied forwill be prohibited from utilizing private travel agencies
registration with seven mahalla committees but wereto secure their visas and plan their trips; rather, theyrejected in each case. While some committees did not
must join tours organized by the CRA, which requires
provide a reason for the denial, others cited a generalthat individuals meet certain criteria regarding theirdisapproval for the religious group, claimed that thefinances, health, religious knowledge, and standing inpresence of other registered Christian denominations intheir communities in order to participate. While thethe area was sufficient, or alleged that the registration of
government claimed to make the process of performing
Jehovah’s Witnesses would lead to divisions and conflictthe hajj and umrah easier through its services organizing within the community. To date, Jehovah’s Witnesses
flights and providing for the more rapid processing of
have only been able to register in Chirchik, a small city
visas, it limited the ability of Muslims to make religious
outside of Tashkent.
pilgrimages, as many more Muslims apply than governIn addition to registration issues, Christian comment-mandated quotas permit.
munities continued to experience regular police

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Other Religious Minorities
In May 2018, local authorities announced plans toappropriate part of the grounds of the “Compassion”
Buddhist Temple located on the outskirts of Tashkent. Described as the only active Buddhist temple inCentral Asia, authorities claimed the land was needed
to expand the nearby road. In October 2018, officials
in Tashkent intervened and the expansion plans
were allegedly changed to circumvent the temple.
However, at the end of the reporting period, reports
again emerged that local authorities intended to move

forward with the original plans to expand the road into
the territory of the temple.

U.S. POLICYTIER 1 UZBEKISTAN

intimidation and harassment, raids, fines, and detention. Throughout 2018, the Baptist Council of Churches
experienced systematic persecution by authorities in theprovinces of Navoiy, Qashqadaryo, and Xorazm, and thecity of Tashkent. Police reportedly raided Baptist placesof worship, homes, and businesses; searched, seized,
and destroyed property without a warrant; and threatened Baptists with jail time for the peaceful practice of
their religion. In January 2018, police reportedly took theeight-year-old son of Baptists from his school in Navoiy
for questioning without the knowledge or presence ofhis parents. In November 2018, the military for the firsttime participated in a raid against Baptists in the Yashnobod District of Tashkent in what was characterized asa “special operation.” Authorities confiscated approximatley 7,800 pieces of literature and media and took 14
people to a police station, temporarily detaining them.
In addition to Baptists, police have also raided a numberof other Protestant congregations, including an ethnic
Korean church in Tashkent in September 2018.
Some Uzbek officials have publicly expressed
regret for the raids, attributing recent police conduct
to challenges with the implementation of laws at
the local level. Nevertheless, the Uzbek government
was unable to effectively restrain this persistent andlongstanding practice. Moreover, it is often the police’s
Struggle with Extremism and Terrorism Department(SETD) that conducts the raids. After a raid conducted
on a Protestant home in December 2018, the SETD in
Urgench reportedly called a woman’s mother-in-law
to the police station and instructed her to beat her
daughter-in-law until she signed a statement implicating local Protestants of holding “unauthorized
religious meetings.”

Bilateral relations between the United States andUzbekistan have focused on regional security in Central and South Asia, including combating terrorism,
illegal narcotics, and human trafficking. Uzbekistan
has also served as an important partner for the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S. forcesin Afghanistan, which rely on Uzbekistan as a criticalroute for supplies as part of the Northern Distribution
Network. In March 2018, Uzbekistan hosted the Tashkent International Conference on Afghanistan, whichthen Under Secretary for Political Affairs Thomas A.
Shannon Jr. attended, to discuss the ongoing peace andreconciliation process. Uzbekistan contributed to efforts
to stabilize Afghanistan through both infrastructuredevelopment and economic assistance, and is a participant in the C5+1 diplomatic forum for dialogue between
the countries of Central Asia and the United States.
In May 2018, President Mirziyoyev visited theWhite House to meet with President Donald J. Trump,the first visit of a president of Uzbekistan to the UnitedStates since 2002. President Trump noted the progress Uzbekistan has made in terms of recent political,
economic, and social reforms, and highlighted thepositive steps taken so far to improve the human rights
conditions in the country. Both sides collaborate on
defense through participation in a five-year military
cooperation plan, and continue to pursue closer traderelations, signing an estimated $4.8 billion in businessdeals over the course of President Mirziyoyev’s visit.
That same month, the United States announced the
beginning of a new era of strategic partnership with
Uzbekistan that will focus on regional security, humanrights reform, and economic cooperation.
In July 2018, Uzbek diplomats attended the State
Department’s inaugural Ministerial to Advance
Religious Freedom. In his remarks delivered at the Ministerial, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo applauded
the steps Uzbekistan had taken to expand religious
freedom. Also, in September 2018, Ambassador-at-Large
for International Religious Freedom Samuel D. Brownback visited Uzbekistan to assess the state of religious
freedom and encourage legislative reform. In November

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2018, the State Department removed Uzbekistan fromthe CPC list and placed it on a Special Watch List forgovernments that have engaged in or tolerated “severe
violations of religious freedom.” This marked progressfor Uzbekistan, which had previously been designatedas a CPC from 2006 through November 2018. Whileencouraged by the government of Uzbekistan’s sincere
intent to reform and improve religious freedom conditions, there was not sufficient positive progress madeduring the 2018 reporting period to warrant removalfrom the CPC list. Therefore, USCIRF recommends
maintaining the CPC designation as a means to engage,encourage, and advise the government of Uzbekistan as
it makes historic efforts to improve freedom of religion
or belief for all.

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VIETNAM
TIER 1 | USCIRF-RECOMMENDED COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN (CPC)KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Vietnam trended
negative. Although the new Law on Belief and Religion, whichcame into effect on January 1, 2018, granted recognized
religious organizations status as legal persons and reduced
the waiting period for applications, it also required thoseorganizations to seek prior approval for routine religious
activities. Furthermore, the law closed the gray area in which
independent religious groups had previously operated byoutlawing groups that do not register, effectively criminalizing many peaceful religious practices and activities. During
2018, the government continued a nationwide crackdown on
religious leaders, human rights defenders, peaceful activists,and other critics across the country, particularly in response
to widespread protests against the draconian new Cybersecurity Law and a draft bill on special economic zones. As of
December 31, 2018, there were an estimated 244 prisoners ofconscience in Vietnamese jails, as well as 20 detained activists
still awaiting trial, including some who advocated for freedom of religion or belief, and others who simply professedor practiced their faith. Local authorities continued to seize
property from Catholic churches, Buddhist temples, andother religious groups for economic development projects

without providing just compensation. Vietnamese police
harassed Catholic, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai religious leadersfor participating in religious freedom conferences overseas
and for meeting with foreign diplomatic personnel. Ethnic
minority communities faced especially egregious persecution
for the peaceful practice of their religious beliefs, including
physical assault, detention, or banishment. An estimated
10,000 Hmong and Montagnard Christians in the Central
Highlands remain stateless because local authorities haverefused to issue ID cards, in many instances in retaliation forrefusing to renounce their faith.
Based on these systematic, ongoing, egregious violationsof religious freedom, USCIRF again finds that Vietnam merits
designation in 2019 as a “country of particular concern,” or
CPC, under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA),
as it has recommended every year since 2002. Although the
U.S. Department of State removed Vietnam from the CPC listin 2006, the government of Vietnam has continued to persecute religious individuals and organizations—despite somemodest improvements—and the overall situation for religious
freedom has regressed since the short-lived progress under
the CPC designation.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Enter into a binding agreement with
the Vietnamese government, as
authorized under section 405(c) of
IRFA, setting forth mutually agreed
commitments that would foster
reforms to improve religious freedom;• Pursue both public and private highlevel engagement with Vietnamese
government officials about prisonersof conscience and religious freedom
concerns, not only in the context of132

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the annual U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights
Dialogue, but also as part of discussions about security, economic, anddevelopment issues; and• Prioritize funding for programs thatbuild the capacity of religious leaders, human rights defenders, and civilsociety organizations to negotiatewith local authorities, especially as
pertains to disputes over property
and land.

The U.S. Congress should:• Send regular delegations focused onreligious freedom and related humanrights to Vietnam and request to visit
areas impacted by restrictions on
religious freedom, such as the Central
Highlands, Northern Highlands, andMekong Delta, as well as request to
visit prisoners of conscience.

TIER 1 VIETNAM

COUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Socialist Republic of Vietnam
GOVERNMENT
Communist StatePOPULATION
97,040,334
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHS
43 religious organizations from 16 religious traditions:
Buddhism, Catholicism, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Protestantism,
Islam, the Baha’i faith, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, Buu Son Ky Huong, Tinh Do Cu Si Phat Hoi, Tu An
Hieu Nghia, Phat Duong Nam Tong Minh Su Dao, Minh Ly
Dao Tam Tong Mieu, Khmer Brahmanism, Hieu Nghia Ta Lon
Buddhism, and Vietnam Adventist Church; officially atheist

BACKGROUNDThe Socialist Republic of Vietnam is officially atheist, but the constitution allows citizens to “follow any
religion or follow none.” According to article 70, “Allreligions are equal before the law” and the government“respects and protects” freedom of religion. However,article 14(2) authorizes the government to override
human rights, including religious freedom, for reasonsof “national security, social order and security, social
morality, and community well-being,” which government officials have sometimes exploited to impede
religious gatherings and the spread of religion to certain
ethnic groups.
The government has officially recognized 39 religious organizations and granted operating licenses tofour other religious organizations, representing in total
more than 25 million followers affiliated with 16 different
religions—including Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai. However, some Buddhist,
Protestant, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai religious communities
do not participate in government-approved religious
associations due to fear of persecution or concern for theirRELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*(Note: figures are outdated and difficult to confirm)
7.9–14.9% Buddhist
6.6–7.4% Catholic
1.5–1.7% Hoa Hao
0.9–1.2% Cao Dai
1.1% Protestant
0.1% Muslim (including ethnic Cham Muslims)
45.3% Folk Religion/Animism/Traditional Practices
OTHER GROUPS
The Baha’i faith, Falun Gong, Hindu, members of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and practitioners of local religions or other forms of traditional worship*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook and the U.S.
Department of State

independence, leading to both government-sponsoredand independent organizations competing to represent the religion. For example, the government createdthe Vietnam Buddhist Sangha (VBS) in 1981 as the sole
representative of Vietnamese Buddhism and required
all Buddhist monks to join the organization, effectively
banning the independent Unified Buddhist Church of
Vietnam (UBCV).
In June 2018, tens of thousands of people across thecountry protested draft laws on cybersecurity and special
economic zones—the largest public demonstrations
since reunification in 1976. Catholic priests were among
the most vocal critics of both laws. After the National
Assembly passed the Cybersecurity Law (which went into
effect on January 1, 2019, just after the reporting period),
the Federation of Vietnamese Catholic Mass Media criticized the law’s lack of privacy protections and claimed it
had already reduced online traffic to Catholic websites.
Rights defenders expressed concern that the proposedlaw on special economic zones would give China toomuch influence over the economy. The government took
an aggressive approach against any perceived criticism

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of these two bills. According to human rights groups, by
November 2018 at least 127 people had been arrested andconvicted for participating in the protests.
In January 2019, after the reporting period, Vietnam
went before the United Nations (UN) Human Rights
Council for its third Universal Periodic Review; theoutcome of the review is expected later in 2019. Several
international civil society organizations submitted
information and recommendations about religious
freedom in Vietnam to be incorporated into the formal
review process.

which seldom happened before the enactment of thelaw. In 2018, the government approved registration for
the Full Gospel Church and the United Gospel Outreach
Church, which previously had faced serious persecution. In December, the state-recognized Evangelical
Church of Vietnam (South) held an outdoor, public
Christmas event for 20,000 people—the first time ineight years it was permitted to do so.
Although the Vietnamese government released
several prominent prisoners of conscience in 2018, theirfreedom was conditional upon them immediately leaving the country. In June, authorities released Christian
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018human rights lawyer Nguyen Van Dai and his colleague
Although the Vietnamese government generally
Le Thu Ha; both immediately boarded a flight to Gerembraces its religious diversity and publicly expresses
many. In October, environmental activist Nguyen Ngoc
support for religious freedom, the overall situation
Nhu Quynh, a Catholic woman popularly known as
for religious groups“Mother Mushroom,” wasdeteriorated in 2018.
freed and sought asylum
Communities in ruralin the United States, along
Communities in rural parts of someparts of some provinces,with her elderly motherprovinces . . . face ongoing and severe
especially in ethnic
and two young children.
violations of freedom of religion or belief.
minority areas, face ongoThese releases, while
ing and severe violations
welcome, stood in starkof freedom of religion orcontrast to the overall
belief. However, religious freedom violations are notincrease in the number of prisoners of conscience inequally distributed across Vietnam. Religious followers
2018 (see below).
in urban, economically developed areas usually are
Law on Belief and Religion
able to exercise their religion or belief freely, openly, andOn January 1, 2018, Vietnam’s new Law on Belief andwithout fear.
Religion went into effect. The law nominally obliges
Positive Developments
the government to protect religious freedom and, forVietnam has taken some positive steps to improve relithe first time, gives Vietnamese religious organizations
gious freedom and related human rights. Certain partsa right to legal personhood. However, it also requiresof the government have demonstrated the willingness
religious groups to register with the Government Comto listen to and engage with international stakeholders
mittee for Religious Affairs (GCRA) and to report on
about religious freedom concerns. Moreover, the central
routine activities like festivals and conferences. Article
government reportedly has tried to intervene in or medi5 grants the government discretion to reject religious
ate property disputes on behalf of religious communities.
activities that “infringe upon national security” andThe Law on Belief and Religion (discussed in“violate social morality.” The implementing regulamore detail below) did bring some positive changes,
tions, which came into force in June 2018, impose fines
including granting registered religious organizations
on organizations deemed to abuse “religion to infringe
legal personhood and reducing the waiting period forupon the interests of the state or engage in fabrication
religious groups to apply for recognition from 23 years
or slander.” Several human rights organizations haveto five years. USCIRF has received reports that local
expressed concern that these provisions are overly
governments are now more likely to reply in writingvague and potentially allow authorities to arbitrarily
to registration applications for new houses of worship,punish religious groups.

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TIER 1 VIETNAM

During the year, some recognized religious groups
environmental disaster. Occasionally, this harassment
found it more difficult to obtain government approval
led to violence. In June, after local authorities imposed afor routine activities since the law went into effect. For
fine on Hua Phi—sub-dignitary of the independent Cao
unrecognized groups, the law criminalizes activities
Dai—for his religious activities, men in civilian clothes
not approved in advance by the government, effectively
reportedly broke into his house, assaulted him, and cut
closing the gray area in which they had previously operoff his beard.
ated. Indeed, throughout 2018 local authorities cited
Local authorities also have prevented religious
the law to justify prohibiting informal religious activity
groups from holding public activities, even if the underthat the previous legal
lying activity does notframework had tolerviolate the law. In Julyated, if not endorsed. For
2018, police and plainLocal
authorities
also
cited
the
example, local authorities
clothes security agents
law as justification for seizing
in Quang Binh Provincesurrounded the UBCV’sreligious
sites
andtemples
associatedbanned Catholic priest
Long Quang Pagoda inwith independent religious groups.
Cao Duong Dong from
Hue to prevent children
making home visits tofrom attending a Buddhist
conduct prayer services,
youth camp. There wereas he had been doing since 2014. In January 2018, thealso reports that security forces and government employQuynh Ngoc
. Province People’s Committee cited theees prevented monks and adherents from entering An Cu
new law to declare a Catholic Mass illegal because the
Pagoda in Danang and Lien Tri Temple in Ho Chi Minhparish allegedly had not registered the meeting. Local
City during major religious festivals. Local authorities inauthorities also cited the law as justification for seizing
An Giang Province kept followers of the unrecognized
religious sites and temples associated with independent Central Church of Pure Hoa Hao Buddhism (CCPHHB)
religious groups.
from celebrating important holy days, including thefounder’s birthday, by erecting roadblocks and temporary
Harassment of Religious Groups
police stations. In January 2018, members of the governand Individuals
ment-run Cao Dai Tay Ninh Sect (or 1997 Sect) in Tay
Vietnamese local authorities, police, or hired thugs
Ninh Province—supported by local officials—attempted
regularly target certain religious groups and individto prevent several independent Cao Dai from burying auals because of their faith; ethnicity; advocacy for
deceased relative in Cuc Lac Thai Binh Cemetery, insistdemocracy, human rights, or religious freedom; historicing the ceremony use clergy from the 1997 Sect.
ties to the West; or desire to remain independent ofEthnic minorities in Vietnam face particularly
government control. During 2018, USCIRF received
severe and persistent harassment because of their relimultiple reports of local police “inviting” individuals forgion or belief. Throughout 2018, USCIRF received reports
questioning without citing a specific charge and subseof local government officials and police interrupting
quently interrogating them about their religious beliefs
house worship sessions in Hoa Thang Commune, Ea
or association with certain religious organizations. In
Drong Commune, and other Montagnard ChristianMarch 2018, police in Soc Trang Province summoned
communities. In April 2018, police in Tuong Duongthe Venerable Lieu Ny—a Khmer Krom Buddhist monk
District disrupted a Hmong worship group affiliated
who advocated for the linguistic and cultural preserwith the government-sponsored Evangelical Church ofvation of the Khmer Krom people—to question him
Vietnam (Northern Region), claiming it was not properly
about his activities since his 2017 release from prison.
registered (an estimated 40 percent of Hmong are ChrisThroughout 2018, state-run media and local authoritiestian). In numerous instances, local authorities attemptedin northern Vietnam continued to publicly denounce
to coerce members of independent religious groups
Catholic priests for their role in protesting the govto renounce or recant their faith, sometimes employernment’s handling of the 2016 Formosa Steel Plant
ing threats of physical assault or banishment. Local

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authorities in Krong Pac District publicly berated andThroughout 2018, the government arrested andhumiliated Montagnards for their affiliation with theconvicted members of religious organizations for prounrecognized Evangelical Church of Christ. Meanwhile,
testing limits on their freedom. In February 2018, local
an estimated 2,000 Protestant Hmong and Montagnard
authorities in An Giang Province tried and convicted
households—approximately 10,000 individuals—in thesix independent Hoa Hao Buddhists—Bui Van Trung,Central Highlands continued to be stateless because
his wife Le Thi Hen, his daughter Bui Thi Bich Tuyen,
local authorities refused to issue ID cards, household
his son Bui Van Tham, Nguyen Hoang Nam, and Le Thi
registration, and birth certificates, in many instances inHong Hanh—to between three and five years in prison
retaliation for refusing to renounce their faith.
for staging a public protest against religious repression“Red Flag” militant groups continued to harassin April 2017. In April 2018, the government sentenced
dissidents during the reporting period, particularly
Nguyen Bac Truyen—a Hoa Hao Buddhist who ran the
Catholics in Nghe An Province. Unlike plain-clothes
independent civil society organization the Vietnamese
thugs, Red Flag groups are organized and do not pretend Political & Religious Prisoners Friendship Association
to be a spontaneous mob; they often work closely with—and provided legal advice to rights victims—to 11 years
and sometimes at the direction of—local authorities.
in prison. Four Falun Gong practitioners were senMoreover, the government has shown little willingness
tenced to three years’ imprisonment for “stealing fromto prosecute or discipline those involved in the attacks.
a police station” because they sought to retrieve items
For example, when Father Nguyen Duc Nhan of Ke
police had confiscated.
Gai Parish asked provincial authorities to investigate
According to the NOW! Campaign, almost one
members of a Red Flag group who attacked individuals
quarter of prisoners of conscience were Hmong,
involved in a land dispute, the police instead summoned Montagnard, or Khmer Krom. In March 2018, Gia
his parishioners for questioning.
Lai Province police, in coordination with the Central
Government agents
Highlands Security
reportedly harassed,
Department, arrested 25
interrogated, or restricted
Montagnards for allegedly
Government agents reportedly
the freedom of religious
proselytizing Dega
harassed, interrogated, or restricted theleaders and activists
Protestantism—which
freedom of religious leaders andbecause of their assocombines aspirations
activists because of their association
ciation with foreign
for independence with
with foreign diplomatic personnel.
diplomatic personnel.
evangelical Christianity—
Several of the incidents
under the direction of
involving Sub-Dignitary
Montagnards living overHua Phi occurred shortly before he was scheduled toseas. The arrests included former prisoner of conscience
meet with diplomats from the United States, Europe,
Siu Blo, who was forced to publicly renounce his religion
and Australia.
and confess his alleged wrongdoings.
USCIRF also received reports about poor prison
Arrests and Imprisonments
conditions for detained religious leaders and activists,
According to the NOW! Campaign—a coalition ofas well as their access to religious services and facilities.
human rights organizations working for the unconPastor Nguyen Trung Ton, president of the Brotherhood
ditional release of all Vietnamese prisoners offor Democracy, was sentenced in April 2018 to 12 years
conscience—as of December 31, 2018, there were 244
in prison for allegedly undertaking “activities aiming toprisoners of conscience serving sentences in Vietnam,
overthrow the people’s administration” and reportedly
as well as 20 detained activists still awaiting trial,
denied hospital treatment for various medical condiincluding many who “promoted or protected the righttions and kept in solitary confinement. In November
to freedom of religion or belief and others who simply
2018, authorities reportedly transferred both Bui Van
professed or practiced their faith.”
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developers had built ancestor temples and otherstructures on land owned by the Thien An Benedictine monastery in Hue. In early November, the local
government said it would investigate the monastery’s
claims. In November 2018, local authorities in Danang
seized land from seven households in Con Dau Parish
on behalf of Sun Group, a private real estate corporation.
Rights groups were concerned that the local government
would seize the remaining 80 households in the parish.
Also in November, the state-run Trang An Elementary School began construction on land owned by the
Hanoi Archdiocese, despite protests by church leaders. According to church records, the government has
confiscated 95 hospitals, schools, and other facilities run
by the Hanoi Archdiocese since 1954. Local authorities
in some of these cases reportedly granted developers
illegal or inaccurate ownership papers. In January 2019,
after the reporting period, authorities in Ho Chi Minh
City demolished at least 112 residential houses on landclaimed by the Catholic Church.
Land grabbing and destruction of property havealso affected other religious communities in Vietnam.
By the end of 2018, the UBCV had only 12 temples. In
November 2018, the People’s Committee of Son Tra
District demolished Ang Cu—a UBCV-affiliated temple—and evicted the Venerable Thich Thien Phuc inorder to build a road. In Tra Vinh Province, Khmer Krom
Land Grabbing and Destruction of Property Buddhists reported concerns with the government’s
Expropriation and destruction of religious property at
ongoing confiscation and demolition of structures
times may have little to do with religious freedom, as
and land used by followers. Of the more than 300 Cao
when authorities expropriate land for economic develDai temples in Vietnam, all but approximately 15 haveopment projects. However, such actions do disrupt
been seized by the government-sponsored 1997 Sect
or interfere with reliduring the previous two
gious practices and can
decades. In November,increasingly threaten how
authorities in Long An. . . local authorities in Danang
religious communities
Province allegedly set
seized land from seven households
observe their faith. Often
fire to a storeroom on ain Con Dau Parish . . .
these incidents are precipfarm owned by Sub-digitated by local authorities
nitary Hua Phi, whichrather than the national
he believed was an act ofgovernment. In some instances, human rights groups
retaliation for meeting with U.S. diplomats in Ho Chi
allege that the primary purpose of seizing property was
Minh City. Between April 20 and June 30, the 1997 Sect
to intimidate adherents of independent religious groups.
demolished at least 15 graves at Cuc Lac Thai Binh CemIncidents of land grabbing and destruction of
etery belonging to independent Cao Dai followers whose
property significantly affect Vietnam’s Catholic comfamilies refused to join the 1997 Sect. The government
munities. Throughout 2018, there were reports thathas long harassed followers of Duong Van Minh, a small

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in Tien Giang Province after the two prisoners complained about the use of forced labor in the prison. Do
Thi Hong—a leader of the Buddhist An Dan Dai Dai sect
who was sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment in 2013 on
the charge of “plotting to overthrow the government”—
is reportedly in poor health. The Venerable Thach Thuol,a Khmer Krom Buddhist monk, has been imprisoned
since 2013 for peacefully exercising his right to teach
Khmer in his temple school. Several Montagnard andHmong religious freedom activists—including Nhi,
Nuh, Kpa Binh, Sui Wiu, Siu Koch, Roh, Ro Mah Klit, Ro
Lan Ju, and Kpa Sinh—were scheduled to be released
upon completion of their sentences in late 2018, but
USCIRF had not received confirmation of their releaseby the end of the reporting period.
In a positive development, after 19 years undereffective house arrest the Most Venerable Thich Quang
Do—UBCV patriarch—was able to leave Thanh MinhZen Monastery in October 2018 and travel to his homeprovince of Thai Binh. He later returned to Ho Chi Minh
City—to reside at Tu Hieu Pagoda, but at the end of thereporting period continued to face pressure from thegovernment to return to Thai Binh where he would be
isolated from fellow UBCV members. USCIRF has advocated on his behalf as part of the Religious Prisoners ofConscience Project.

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Christian sect, and destroyed or burned funeral sheds
central to the group’s core practices; in 2018, authorities
destroyed at least 36 sheds in Tuyen Quang, Bac Kan,
and Cao Bang provinces. Such destructions also often
involve arrests and physical assaults.

U.S. POLICY
As part of their Comprehensive Partnership, the UnitedStates and Vietnam have a robust defense relationshipand regularly cooperate on maritime security, peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and humanitarian issues. In
March 2018, the USS Carl Vinson visited Danang, becoming the first U.S. aircraft carrier to visit Vietnam since1975. In the past two decades, U.S.-Vietnam bilateral
trade grew by 8,000 percent to $49 billion worth of goods
and services through October 2018. In September, theState Department expressed condolences at the passingof Vietnamese president Tran Dai Quang, calling him astrong supporter of the U.S.-Vietnam relationship.
On May 17, 2018, the State Department hosted the22nd U.S.-Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue, where
U.S. officials raised concerns about religious freedom
generally and individual prisoners of conscience with
Vietnamese government officials. In addition, a State
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Pham Van Troi, Pastor Nguyen Trung Ton, Nguyen Bac
Truyen, Truong Minh Duc, Hoang Duc Binh, and Nguyen
Nam Phong, and called upon the government of Vietnam
to release all prisoners of conscience immediately. On
June 7, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Foreign Relations held a hearing about human rights in
Vietnam, which included testimony about religious freedom conditions. Also in June, the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi
condemned Vietnam’s new Cybersecurity Law, claiming
it would violate Vietnam’s international trade commitments and stifle online dissent.
Due to Vietnam’s systematic, ongoing, and egregious religious freedom violations, the State Department
designated Vietnam as a CPC from 2004 to 2006 andentered into a binding agreement with the government
under IRFA. When the CPC designation was lifted,
USCIRF concurred with the State Department’s assessment that the designation and binding agreement
had brought about modest improvements in religious
freedom. Nevertheless, USCIRF felt it was too soon todetermine if the new policies would be permanent oreffective over the long term. Since the CPC designation
was lifted, the government of Vietnam has continued
to persecute religious individuals and organizations,
at times even regressing from the short-lived progressunder the CPC designation and binding agreement.

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AFGHANISTANTIER 2KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Afghanistan trended
negatively. Afghanistan’s leadership struggled to maintainsecurity in the country, especially for religious minority groups.
The ongoing operation of terrorist groups, such as the IslamicState in Khorasan Province (ISKP), threaten the country’s overall
security but particularly endanger the nation’s Shi’a Muslim
population who have faced increased attacks in recent years.
In fact, 2018 was one of the most fatal in Afghanistan for all
civilians—and particularly religious minorities—due to terrorist
activity, and the government often was unable to protect civilians from attacks. Also, during the reporting period, non-Muslim
groups like Hindus, Christians, and Sikhs remained endangeredminorities—many fled the country and many of their community leaders who remained were killed in a largescale July 2018
terrorist attack. In general, religious minorities in Afghanistan
have endured severe human rights violations since the 1990s
under the Taliban’s rule and subsequently have suffered ongoing attacks by extremist groups. Sikhs and Hindus have been
driven underground without the ability to publicly practice theirreligious traditions for fear of reprisal by terrorist groups or
society at large. While the government has provided assurances
to religious minority communities and made limited attempts
to include them in the policy-making process, socioeconomic

discrimination and lack of security continued to challenge thesurvival of these groups, which include other vulnerable populations, such as women and girls. This trend could worsen if
religious freedom is not made a focal point for talks between
the U.S. government, the Afghan government, and the Taliban.
Based on these concerns, USCIRF again places Afghanistan
on its Tier 2 in 2019, as it has since 2006, for engaging in or
tolerating religious freedom violations that meet at least one of
the elements of the “systematic, ongoing, egregious” standard
for designation as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC,
under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). USCIRF isconcerned about the degree to which the Afghan government
has control, both in general and with respect to religious freedom violations. As such, USCIRF will monitor religious freedom
conditions to determine whether developments worsen andwarrant a change in Afghanistan’s status during the year ahead.
USCIRF also finds that the Taliban continued to commit particularly severe religious freedom violations in 2018 while controllingparts of Afghanistan’s territory, and therefore again recommends in 2019 that the group be designated as an “entity ofparticular concern,” or EPC, under December 2016 amendments
to IRFA. The U.S. Department of State designated the Taliban in
Afghanistan as an EPC, most recently in November 2018.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Press the Afghan government toacknowledge the significant threat to
freedom of religion or belief posed by
the Taliban and raise these concerns
during peace negotiations between
the U.S. government, the Afghan
government, and the Taliban by:such as countering religious extremism
and resolving sectarian conflict into U.S.
Department of State, U.S. Agency forInternational Development (USAID), theMillennium Challenge Corporation, andU.S. Department of Defense strategies
and policies concerning Afghanistan;• Ensure—and, if possible, in coordination with USAID’s Textbook
Printing and Distribution Project—that inflammatory and intolerant
textbook and curricula content is
discontinued and removed fromusage; and• Emphasizing the need to protect vulnerable groups—including womenand girls—whose religious freedoms
and related rights have been endangered in the past due to the Taliban’s
actions and policies; and• Urge the Afghan government to revoke
the 2004 media law prohibiting “un-Islamic” writings and overturn throughappropriate legislation the 2007
decision by the Supreme Court thatthe Baha’i faith is blasphemous andconverts to it are apostates throughcooperation between the embassy,
leading parliamentarians, the Ministryof Law, and the Directorate on Fatwa
and Accounts in the Supreme Court;• Create a civic space for the open
discussion of diverse opinions on
matters of religion and society in the
country; and• Highlighting the interconnectedrole of government officials, security
forces, and former affiliates of the
Taliban in ensuring religious freedom rights throughout the country;• Ensure the integration of religious
freedom concerns with related issues

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• Encourage the Afghan Ministry of
Education and Ministry of Information
and Culture to:• Advocate for the Ministries of Interior,
Defense, and Hajj and Religious
Affairs to work collectively to provide
security for and facilitate cooperative
meetings between faith leaders andscholars from various religions andfrom the various Muslim communities
that exist in Afghanistan.

TIER 2 AFGHANISTANCOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GOVERNMENT
Unitary Presidential Islamic Republic

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
98.99% Muslim (80% Sunni; 10–19% Shi’a Muslim,
including Ismailis)>1% Other (Hindu, Sikh, Baha’i, Christian, Buddhist,and Zoroastrian)

POPULATION
34,940,837
GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSIslamBACKGROUND
Afghanistan is home to a diverse array of ethnic
groups, including Pashtuns (42 percent), Tajiks (27percent), Hazaras (9 percent), Uzbeks (9 percent),
Turkmen (3 percent), and Baloch (2 percent). Historically, the nation was also home to a religiously diverse
population; however, the vast majority of non-Muslims
fled the country after the Taliban took over the government in 1992. The country continues to be used asa center of operations for international terrorist groups
like the Taliban, the ISKP, and al-Qaeda. Further, there
are regional terrorist groups operating within Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan, including
the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-eTaiba, and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.
The United Nations and other nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) declared 2018 as one of the bloodiest years in the Afghan conflict, with 2,798 civilians
killed and at least 5,000 injured due to terrorist activity.
While the overall population is facing increasing threats
to their security, religious minorities in particular
continued to face threats as the nation’s leadership has
not been able to prevent attacks against them. In fact,
the national government of Afghanistan only controls
50 to 60 percent of the overall territory in the country,with extremist groups contesting or outright controlling
the remaining areas. Further complicating matters, the*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook

Afghan government continued to engage in peace talks
with the Taliban during the reporting period, despite thefact that the latter does not acknowledge the government’s role in the peace process.
The constitution recognizes Islam as the official
religion of the state and requires all parliamentarylaws to respect Islamic principles. Non-Muslims areprohibited from holding the highest offices in the land,
including president and vice president. Although chapter 18 of Afghanistan’s Penal Code protects all religions
by criminalizing assault against those publicly practicing any faith and the destruction of any religious places,
there have been few cases enforcing this protection.
Since 2004, a vaguely worded media law criminalized “anti-Islamic content” and assigned enforcement
to a commission of government officials and membersof the media. The constitutional rules for the judiciary
require the use of Hanafi Shari’ah jurisprudence in theabsence of laws or constitutional provisions governing acase. This has impacted the criminalization of blasphemy, which is not listed in Afghanistan’s Penal Codebut is punishable by death for Muslims under Hanafi
jurisprudence. There have been no recorded cases
involving the death penalty for a person accused of blasphemy since 2001.
Article 2 of the constitution, which makes Islamthe state religion, also states that non-Muslims are free
to practice their “religious rites,” but must do so “within

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the bounds of law.” This means that laws can be createdto limit the religious practices of non-Muslims. Moreover, the limited right to worship that is permitted for
non-Muslims differs greatly from the more expansive
right recognized under international human rights standards. This is especially important because Afghanistan’s
constitution explicitly requires respect for internationallaw, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR).

Syria. As a result, many ISIS leaders who fled from Syria
to Afghanistan to establish bases have exported theirintent to exact revenge against all Shi’a Muslims in
the country. This is especially significant because anincreased number of local Taliban fighters have started
to switch their allegiance to the ISKP. In 2018, this culminated in an increasingly lethal series of ISKP attacks
against Shi’a mosques, such as an attack in March 2018that left one dead and eight wounded and another inAugust that resulted in the deaths of 29.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
While the ISKP carried out attacks that targeted all
Treatment of Shi’a Muslims
civilians in general, its attacks targeting the Shi’a Muslim community have been more lethal, with nearly 300
Since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, a few
historically disadvantaged ethnic and religious minority fatalities from almost two dozen attacks in 2018 alone.
Such attacks often have coincided with Shi’a religious
groups have overcome generations of discrimination
festivals like Ashura or Muharram. In response to thisto hold prominent positions in the public and private
threat, the Afghan government has attempted to provide
sectors. This is especially true for the Shi’a Muslim comadditional security and offered weapons to civilians
munity, whose sociopolitical influence has grown overliving near Shi’a mosques.
the last two decades as its members increasingly holdIn 2018, extremist groups, including the ISKP,
leading positions in the government, media, and private
continued
targeting one specific ethnic group in
industry. There are now more than 10,000 Shi’a mosquesparticular: the overwhelmingly Shi’a Hazaras. Somein the country, 400 of which are in the capital city of
Kabul. There are also several prosperous neighborhoods examples include the ISKP’s twin bombings on September 5 of a Shi’a Hazara enclave that resulted in theand enclaves throughout the country that are predomideaths of 20 and injuries to 70, along with an attack
nately inhabited by the Shi’a Muslim community.
on August 15 that resulted in 48 young Shi’a Muslims
Shi’a Muslims’ sociopolitical ascendance has been
being killed and 67
one of the reasons someinjured. These kinds ofextremist groups haveattacks were not limited
continued to target theDue to persistent attacks
in 2018 to major cities like
community, whom theyon these communities, loss of property
Kabul, but increasingly
consider to be apostates.
through land grabs, and socioeconomic
occurred at the provinYet, a superficial division
exclusion, only 3,000 to 7,000 Sikhs
cial level, such as a series
has formed between
and Hindus remain in the country.
of attacks in Ghazni Provextremists allied with theince. Hazara advocates
ISKP and those working
have complained thatfor the Taliban. For examthe
government
has
failedtoprovideproper security
ple, in the aftermath of an attack in November 2018, theto the community and that Hazara political leaders
Taliban’s website explained that its aim was not to target
were granted limited influence over the government’s
any “specific race, ethnicity or sect” but rather to attack
policy-making process.
anyone abetting the government.
On the other hand, extremists affiliated with theIslamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have intentionally
escalated their attacks and increased their public hatespeech dehumanizing Afghanistan’s Shi’a Muslims.
This is, in part, due to the fact that some of Afghanistan’s Shi’a Muslim population fought against ISIS in142

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Treatment of Non-Muslim Communities
Before the fall of the government to the Taliban in 1992,
there were nearly 200,000 Hindu and Sikh citizens in
Afghanistan. Due to persistent attacks on these communities, loss of property through land grabs, andU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

TIER 2 AFGHANISTAN

socioeconomic exclusion, only 3,000 to 7,000 Sikhs andthe Supreme Court of Afghanistan, which proclaimed
Hindus remain in the country. Small numbers have
Baha’is to be a blasphemous group.
represented the communities in the parliament since
Women and Religious Freedom
2016, and the president has employed Sikhs and Hindus
During the reporting period, the status of women’s rights
in government service.
in Afghanistan remained much the same as in 2017.
Yet, several prominent leaders from both comExtremist groups continued to cite their interpretation
munities were killed in a July 2018 ISKP terrorist attackof Islamic principles when attacking the basic rights
in Jalalabad that left 19 dead. The attack took place asof women to hold and inherit property, gain an educaleaders from the community were awaiting a meetingtion or employment, and marry according to their own
with President Ashraf Ghani; one of the victims waswishes. Also, during 2018, governmental and societal
Awtar Singh Khalsa, the only Sikh candidate running
actors continued to enforce religious and social norms inin the October 2018 elections. The attack increased bothways that discriminated against women and restrictedcommunities’ level of fear of further persecution in thetheir right to freedom of religion or belief. For example,
absence of leaders capable of representing their interests.
leaders updated the nation’s Penal Code in February 2018
There were increasing calls from the communibut excluded a section criminalizing violence against
ties to leave the country as they feel the government
women. Honor killings based on allegations of extrais unwilling and unable to provide adequate security.
marital or premarital sex continued to impact AfghanMany have fled to India where they have been given
women due to strict interpretations of Shari’ah.
rights to residence, while the remaining members
Further, while theof the community
government in 2017
complain of limited
created a National Actionaccess to housing and[D]uring 2018, governmental andPlan to Eliminate Early
employment. Some Sikhsocietal actors continued toand Child Marriages
community members
enforce religious and social norms into stem the practice of
have been relegated to
ways that discriminated against womenarranged marriages ofliving inside their temple
and restricted their right tofemale children under the(or gurdwara) due to lackfreedom of religion or belief.
age of 18, there has beenof financial means andlittle progress in enforcsecure housing options.
ing the plan. This lack
Further, in order to avoidof progress could partly be attributed to some political
attacks, the remaining Hindu families—as well as
leaders who often argue that the modernization of
Christians—have abandoned visually distinguishable
women’s rights is anti-Islamic. Nevertheless, women in
temples and churches in favor of plain buildings. With
Afghanistan continued to advocate for their rights andfew crematoria in the country, these communities arehave increasingly sought justice by submitting family
unable to carry out their religious funeral rites. Whendisputes to specialized units created by the Ministry of
ceremonies were carried out in residential areas,
Women’s Affairs in local shura or jirga councils and theconflicts with the neighborhood’s Muslim community
Huquq (Rights) Department in the Ministry of Justice.
increased in 2018.
For nonbelievers in Afghanistan, authorities interElections
pret Shari’ah law to allow for capital punishment. The
Elections remain a point of conflict in Afghanistan.
number of nonbelievers is unknown because admission
During the leadup to the October 2018 parliamenof such a status could lead to death.
tary elections, the ISKP carried out several attacks on
Similarly, for the Baha’i community in Afghanistan,religious minorities—such as Shi’a Muslims—at voter
there are few population data available. The commuregistration or polling centers. For example, an April 22
nity has lived in anonymity since the 2007 declaration
attack in Kabul left 57 people dead and 117 wounded.
by the General Directorate of Fatwas and Accounts of143

TIER 2 AFGHANISTAN

Both the Taliban and the ISKP have carried out similar
attacks in connection to the upcoming 2019 presidential election. Not only have the attacks been violent, but
their collateral damage of delaying the electoral process
also has been criticized by ascendant religious minority
groups like the Hazara Shi’a community.

U.S. POLICY
Mired in a seemingly intractable civil war with international implications, Afghanistan continues to challenge
U.S. policymakers. The year 2018 was one of the mostlethal periods in the conflict since 2014, and evidence
suggests the number and capability of terrorist groups
like the Taliban and the ISKP is rising. Attempts to resolve
the conflict through peace talks with the Taliban havelargely failed, and the ISKP and other extremist groups
are likely to try to stymie future attempts. There are two
military missions operating within Afghanistan: theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Resolute Support mission and the joint U.S.-Afghan mission. In 2017,
both President Donald J. Trump and the NATO Resolute
Support mission committed to provide additional troops
in Afghanistan. Yet, in December 2018, President Trumpordered the U.S. military to withdraw 7,000 U.S. troops

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from Afghanistan during the first few months of 2019.
This will put even greater pressure on the U.S. government and its Afghan civilian allies to settle a peace deal
with the Taliban in order to resolve the conflict.
During several high-level visits in 2018, U.S. government officials emphasized the president’s policy forpeace talks. Highlighting the importance of these talks,
Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo visited Kabul inJuly 2018 and met with President Ghani to discuss thestatus of negotiations with the Taliban. On September 7, 2018, then Secretary of Defense James Mattis
visited Kabul, echoing those sentiments. While eachof these U.S. government officials have discussed theimportance of an Afghan-led peace process, few havepublicly raised the protection of religious minorities
as a substantial issue in negotiations with the Taliban.
In January 2019, after the reporting period, U.S. andTaliban interlocutors discussed a tentative plan thatwould ensure international terrorists—both individuals
and groups—do not use key Afghan territories for theirextremist activities and could lead to a withdrawal of
U.S. troops.
In November 2018, the State Department redesignated the Taliban in Afghanistan as an EPC.

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AZERBAIJANTIER 2KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, although the Azerbaijani government made a number of positive overtures to engage in and discuss mattersof freedom of religion or belief with the United States andthe international community, religious freedom conditions
did not measurably improve. The government continued tocontrol religious activities through the 2009 Law on Freedomof Religion and related amendments of the administrative andcriminal codes, which require religious communities to registerwith the government and criminalize all unregistered religious
activity. In a positive development, four non-Muslim religious
communities received registration from the government. However, throughout the year, local police forces continued toharass, raid, detain, and fine religious communities that did notcomply with registration requirements and various restrictions
on the production, possession, and dissemination of religious
literature, although one community did report a lessening inpolice harassment. During the year, Protestants, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and some Muslim groups were targeted, with somemembers of the Muslim community being forced to endure an
additional layer of scrutiny by authorities who suspect and seek

to limit Iranian-government influence or subversive activity
in the country. In July 2018, the government held “religious
radicals” responsible for an assassination attempt that monthon the mayor of Ganja and the deaths of two police officers.
While it is difficult to ascertain the veracity of what transpired in
Ganja, human rights activists accused the government of using
the events as a pretext to clamp down on political dissent andinflame fears of Islamist terrorism. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) contended that approximately 68 prisoners ofconscience—many of whom are members of the Muslim Unity
Movement (MUM)—remained imprisoned in Azerbaijan on
religious grounds. Throughout 2018, claims of “systemic andendemic” torture persisted, particularly against members of
the MUM.
Based on these conditions, in 2019 USCIRF again places
Azerbaijan on Tier 2 for engaging in or tolerating religious
freedom violations that meet at least one of the elements of
the “systematic, ongoing, egregious” standard for designation
as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Urge the Azerbaijani government to:• Reform the 2009 law on religiousorganizations to bring it into conformity with recommendations by theCouncil of Europe’s Venice Commission and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) in 2012;• Permit all religious communities—
particularly those located outside of
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freely regardless of their registration
status; and• Release prisoners of conscience—
particularly those imprisoned for theirfaith—and ensure detainee accessto family, human rights monitors,
adequate medical care, legal counsel,
and religious accommodations;• Specify freedom of religion or
belief as a grant category and areaof activity for the U.S. Agency forInternational Development and U.S.

Embassy in Azerbaijan, and encourage
the National Endowment for Democracy to make grants for civil society
programs on tolerance and freedomof religion or belief; and• Ensure continued U.S. funding for Radio
Azadliq, the Azerbaijani Service of RadioFree Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL),
and the Azerbaijani Service of the Voiceof America, so that uncensored information about events inside Azerbaijan,
including incidents related to religious
freedom, continues to be disseminated.

TIER 2 AZERBAIJANCOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Republic of Azerbaijan
GOVERNMENT
Presidential Republic

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
96% Muslim (65% Shi’a Muslim and 35% Sunni Muslim)
4% Other (including Baha’is, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, Jews, Protestants, Roman Catholics, Russian
Orthodox, and others)

POPULATION
10,046,516
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSIslam (Shi’a and Sunni), Christianity, and Judaism

BACKGROUND
Azerbaijan’s constitution affirms the equality of all
religions before the law, provides for the freedom of
religion and belief, and prohibits discrimination on
religious grounds. Theoretically, the right to professbelief in a religion individually or together with others,
or to profess no religion, and the right to disseminate
religious ideas are protected. However, the constitution
also prohibits “the spread or propaganda of religions
which humiliate human dignity” and limits religious
activities that disturb public order or are “contrary” topublic morals. Azerbaijan’s 2009 law on religious organizations tightly controls religious activity: it sets complex
registration procedures; limits religious activity to agroup’s registered address; restricts the content, production, import, export, distribution, and sale of religious
texts; and requires state approval of religious education
for religious leaders. Failure to comply with the law may
result in significant fines. In 2014, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) noted that the law gives officials“unlimited discretionary power” to define and prosecute “illegal” religious activity. Under 2015 religion law
amendments, religious groups must file official reports
documenting their activities and limit religious expression—such as displaying banners or slogans—to placesof worship. The State Committee for Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA) is the government agency
responsible for regulating and overseeing religious*Estimates compiled from the U.S. Department of State

activities. The Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB) is theadministrative body that manages the practice of Shi’aand Sunni Islam.
Approximately 96 percent of Azerbaijan’s population identifies as Muslim, the majority of whom—anestimated 65 percent—identify as Shi’a Muslim. The
remaining 35 percent adhere to Sunni Islam. Azerbaijan’s non-Muslim religious minorities make up
approximately four percent of the population, andinclude members of the Armenian Apostolic, Baha’i,Georgian Orthodox, Hare Krishna, Jehovah’s Witness,
Jewish, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Russian Orthodox,
and other faith communities. According to the constitution, the state is secular, with no state religion.
In 2018, the Azerbaijani government continued tograpple with the legacy of Soviet-era laws and policies
that negatively impact human rights in the country. In
addition, Azerbaijan’s proximity between Russia andIran contributed to the government’s ongoing challenges to address legitimate security concerns while
also balancing its commitments to improve its humanrights and religious freedom record. In part due to this,throughout 2018, the government of Azerbaijan continued to suppress political dissent and crack down on civilsociety, with little improvement in the overall humanrights situation. In April 2018, President Ilham Aliyev,
in power since 2003, was reelected to his fourth consecutive term in a snap presidential election that was

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148

boycotted by opposition parties and characterized asvillage of Aliabad outside of Zaqatala have similarly“restrictive” by international observers.
sought registration since 1994 and been denied. They
In 2018, Azerbaijan
have reportedly been
underwent its Universal
informed that they
Periodic Review at thecannot even meet to celeBaptists
inthevillage
United Nations (UN). Sevbrate Christmas together.
of Aliabad . . . have reportedly beeneral countries expressed
In 2018, four non-Muslim
informedthat
they
cannoteven
meet
concerns about religious
religious communito celebrate Christmas together.
freedom conditions inties—the New Apostle,
Azerbaijan—such as
Vineyard Azerbaijan,
mandatory registration
Jehovah’s Witnesses inrequirements; restrictions on nontraditional religious
Baku, and the Seventh-day Adventists in Ganja—werecommunities and the ability, generally, of religious
granted registration.
groups to practice in private and in public; and individuals imprisoned and tortured for their beliefs. In addition, Repression of Independent Muslims
Muslim communities face additional legal restrictions
civil society organizations submitted similar informathat do not apply to non-Muslim religious groups intion and recommendations about religious freedom
Azerbaijan. In order to apply for registration with theconcerns in Azerbaijan.
SCWRA, Muslim communities and applications to build
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
mosques must first be approved by the CMB. The CMB
Government Control through Registrationis also responsible for appointing all imams. Government officials generally attribute the more stringent
The 2009 law requires religious groups to register with
policies regarding Muslims to the need to combat
the government in order to conduct religious activities,
Iranian-government supported religious extremism andthough the government claims that lack of registration
alleged terrorist activity in the country. By the end ofdoes not preclude private worship. Religious groups
2018, Sardar Babayev, an Iranian-educated Shi’a Muslimthat are denied registration or refuse to register on
imam, remained imprisoned for violating a law thattheological grounds are considered “illegal” and may
prohibited individuals with foreign religious education
face police raids, detainment, arrests, or fines. Accordfrom performing religious ceremonies. Although theing to the SCWRA, 877 Muslim religious associations
law was amended in May 2017 just before Babayev’s Julyand 32 non-Muslim religious associations have been
2017 conviction—allowing the CMB to grant exempregistered, with 2,250 mosques, 14 churches, andtions to approved foreign-educated citizens in order forseven synagogues legally functioning throughout thethem to lead religious ceremonies—the Supreme Court
country. Religious minority groups in Azerbaijan,
rejected his appeal in February 2018.
however, including some Baptist and Jehovah’s WitAccording to Forum 18, the state also mandated
ness communities, continue to be unable to registerthat all Muslims follow a Shi’a Muslim calendar, whichwith the SCWRA. Some government officials have
Sunni Muslims reject due to differences in prayer times
acknowledged that the state is not fully equipped toand dates for religious observances such as Ramadan.
deal with smaller religious minorities. In some cases,
In September 2018, leading up to the Shi’a Muslim
instead of denying outright applications for registracommemoration of Ashura, government officials
tion, the SCWRA indefinitely delays the process byreportedly warned participants against engaging infinding “technical flaws” in applications that requireself-flagellation, allowing children to participate inresubmittal, or by failing to take action on a submitted
ceremonies, or permitting any observances to takeapplication. For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses haveplace outside of mosques. According to news outlets,sought registration in the city of Ganja since 2010 andparticipation in the commemorations had decreased
have yet to receive a response on their most recently
from the previous year due to government pressure,submitted application from May 2016. Baptists in the

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TIER 2 AZERBAIJAN

and mosques saw an increased police presence during
After the reporting period, Shiraliyev was reportedly
the holiday. In addition, members of the Muslim Unity
released from prison.
Movement (MUM) continued to serve lengthy prison
Closure of Places of Worshipsentences of between 10 and 20 years on numerous
In 2018, mosques that the government purportedly had
dubious charges, including terrorism. International
closed for repairs remained shut down years after their
human rights organizations continued to reportclosure and with no official timeline for the completion
serious allegations of torture, particularly againstof the renovations or the mosques’ reopening. Critics
MUM members, and reports released by the Council ofof the closures believe it
Europe in 2018 describedis part of a government
a “generalized culture
effort to target Muslimsof violence” in prisons.
Mosquesthatthegovernment
who are considered
In February 2018, MUM
purportedly had closed for repairs“radical.” The Ashur
leader and Shi’a Musremained
shut
down
years
after
Mosque, also known as
lim theologian Taleh
their closure . . . with no official
the Lezgi Mosque, locatedBagirov (also known by
timelinefor.
.
.
[their]reopening.
in the Old City of Baku,
the surname Bagirzade)was closed in July 2016
received an additional
despite protests from thefive-month sentence for
local Muslim community, which expressed concern that
allegedly possessing micro-discs containing the text
the repairs were an excuse and part of an attempt by
and audio recordings of the Qur’an.
the government to disperse the community. At the end
Religious Prisonersof the reporting period, the mosque remained closed.
In 2018, three NGOs—the Center for the Protection ofDuring the year, numerous other “nontraditional” home
Political Prisoners in Azerbaijan, the Working Groupmosques throughout Baku and other regions, including
on a Unified List of Political Prisoners in Azerbaijan,
one that was apparently connected to the Naqshbandi
and the Union for the Freedom of Political Prisoners
Sufi community, continued to face raids and closure byof Azerbaijan—continued to maintain lists of political
SCWRA and police officials.
prisoners. The lists for the second half of 2018 indicate
In April 2018, the new building of the Haji Javad
that of the estimated 130 to 150 political prisoners, a
Mosque in the Yasamal District of Baku was completed.
reported 68 are imprisoned for their religious beliefs.
The original mosque had been destroyed amid protests
While this marked an improvement in the total numin July 2017. Although the opening of the mosque was aber of religious prisoners from the previous year, many
positive development, some have complained that theprisoners were released following the completion of
new mosque is far from the community, as it was relotheir sentences. A few prisoners reportedly received acated to a site approximately four to five kilometers awaypresidential pardon.
from the location of the original mosque.
In December 2018, Telman Shiraliyev, a Shi’aStatus of Non-Muslim Religious Minorities
Muslim man originally sentenced to six years in prison
Jewish groups have long lived in Azerbaijan andfor participating in an October 2012 protest against agenerally have not faced any discrimination or perseban on headscarves in schools, was sentenced to an
cution. The Azerbaijani government publicly stresses
additional six months in prison. Azerbaijani authorities
the absence of anti-Semitism in the country and its
claimed that Shiraliyev hid a knife in his prison cell, an
good relations with Israel, although officials have also
accusation that human rights activists have rejected. In
expressed concerns about anti-Semitism and antia move that has become routine for soon-to-be released
Muslim sentiment. Other “nontraditional” religious
political prisoners in Azerbaijan, the new charge wasintroduced just days before Shiraliyev’s expected release communities, however, often face persecution from
authority figures. In January 2018, local police raided
following the completion of his initial six-year sentence.

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the religious services of the Star in the East Pentecostal
The SCWRA reportedly prepares an expert opinion on
Church, which were being conducted in the home of
all religious literature, including printed material anda church member in the city of Ganja. The church mem- electronic media, in order to determine its potential
ber who owned the home was detained by police, who
impact on society and whether it will incite religious
cited the church’s lack of registration and reportedly
hatred or hostility. No official list of banned literature
took down the names and personal information of allor materials exists or is publicly available, but matethose present, including children.
rials from Jehovah’s Witnesses and the followers of
In 2018, Jehovah’s Witnesses continued to face
Said Nursi—a Kurdish Sunni Muslim theologian fromdetention and police harassment. During the year, a
Turkey—have been confiscated in the past. In February
number of Witnesses were2018, the State Comdetained in the course of
mittee banned Muslim
sharing their beliefs pubtheologian Elshad Miri’s
Local authorities have continued
licly and privately. Whilebook, Things Not Found
toraid
Witnesses’
homesinJehovah’s Witnesses are
in Islam, for fear that it
an attempt to catch them holding
no longer being arrested
would “have a negative“illegal”
religious
meetings.
or fined, as was the caseinfluence on religious
in previous years, local
stability.” However, theauthorities have continauthor contended that theued to raid Witnesses’
book was banned due tohomes in an attempt to catch them holding “illegal”
officials’ theological objections.
religious meetings. For example, in January 2018, police
Throughout 2018, authorities continued to raid
raided the Lankaran home of a Witness hosting several
shops across the country for selling unauthorized relifamilies for a social gathering. In February 2018, officials gious literature or selling approved religious literature
in Gakh similarly accused another Witness of holdwithout state permission. In March 2018, the State Coming religious meetings in her home, and threatened tomittee reportedly raided numerous shops in the small
search her home if they received another complaint. In
city of Masalli, seizing literature and fining one shop
July 2018, police interrupted a religious meeting that was owner the equivalent of four months’ average wages
being conducted in a home in Sumgayit.
for selling religious literature without state permission.
Jehovah’s Witnesses were also routinely denied theIn April 2018, a court dismissed a Baku shop owner’s
right to conscientious objection—despite a provisionappeal to overturn a similar fine for selling unauthoin the constitution that allows for alternative service—rized religious literature. Throughout 2018, government
and faced prosecution for evading military service. In
raids, seizures of religious literature, and fines were also
2018, two conscientious objectors, Emil Mehdiyev andcarried out and imposed in the cities of Sheki, Shirvan,
Vahid Abilov, received criminal convictions in July andand Zaqatala.
September, respectively, and each received one-year
U.S. POLICY
suspended prison sentences. During the year, local
The United States and Azerbaijan cooperate primarily on
authorities referred at least three additional cases for
issues of regional stability, including combating terrorprosecution; by the end of the reporting period, these
ism and countering transnational threats, expandingcases were ongoing.
bilateral economic relations, and promoting European
Government Control of Religious Materials
energy security. The United States continues to seek the
The government requires that all religious literature
peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflictand materials receive the prior approval of the SCWRA
through negotiations in the framework of the Organiin order to be produced in or imported into the country.
zation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Similarly, the sale and distribution of religious literature
Minsk Group, which is cochaired by the United States,
can only be carried out at preapproved stores or sites.
France, and Russia. The United States provides assistanceU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
COMMISSIONER JOHNNIE MOORE
In my estimation, Azerbaijan no longer meets thethreshold necessary to be included as a Tier 2 country on this list. For the vast majority of its citizens, it isactually a country increasingly noted precisely for its
religious tolerance. It is a country where Sunni and Shi’aclerics pray together, where Evangelical and Russian
Orthodox Christians serve together, and where a thriving local Jewish community enjoys freedom and total
security in their almost entirely Islamic country. It is a
Muslim majority country which has hosted prominent
Hindu leaders and it is a Shi’a-majority neighbor of Iranwhose commitment to peace led it long ago to forge avibrant and public relationship with the state of Israel.
Where legitimate concerns remain in Azerbaijan, andthere are certain concerns as it relates to law and policy,
I have found the government to be making progress,
impressively responsive to requests from members of
the religious freedom community. Also, considering its
geographic location, the religious freedom community
would be wise to not discount too arbitrarily the government’s concerns about violent religious extremism andnational security. Finally, and most importantly, I joinwith religious leaders throughout the world in callingupon the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia to
continue to pursue peace for the sake of their children,
to work seriously to address the grievances and injustices between them. It’s possible for those swords to beturned into ploughshares, and it’s time.

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TIER 2 AZERBAIJAN

to Azerbaijan to build capacity against security threats,
support economic development, and promote independent institutions and civil society. U.S. companies also
cooperate with Azerbaijan in offshore oil development.
On the occasion of President Aliyev’s reelectionin April 2018, the U.S. Mission to the OSCE made astatement concurring with the OSCE’s findings thatthe presidential election was conducted in a restrictive
political environment, and that it included limits on
fundamental freedoms, a lack of genuine competition,and other irregularities such as ballot box stuffing. In
October 2018, U.S. National Security Advisor John R.
Bolton visited Azerbaijan and met with President Aliyev
and Minister of Foreign Affairs Elmar Mammadyarov todiscuss bilateral relations and regional issues, including
Iran. Publicly available information about the visit indicated that Bolton discussed human rights issues with
President Aliyev.
At Azerbaijan’s 2018 Universal Periodic Review, theUnited States recommended that the country “immediately and unconditionally release all individuals incustody for exercising their fundamental freedoms,
including the rights to freedom of expression, association, assembly and religion.” Also, during the year
the U.S. Embassy in Baku continued to meet regularly
with Azerbaijani government authorities to press themregarding registration requirements and literature
restrictions. Embassy officials also regularly met withrepresentatives of religious communities to monitor thegovernment’s treatment of their religious observance.

151

BAHRAINTIER 2KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Bahrain trended positive in some areas but remained the same in others. Bahrain
continued its significant efforts to promote international religious freedom and interreligious understanding through theannouncement of an Ambassador-at-Large for Peaceful Coexistence and Religious Freedom and the opening of the King
Hamad Global Center for Interfaith Dialogue and Peaceful
Coexistence. Non-Muslim religious communities continued
to be able to practice their faith freely, both publicly andprivately. In addition, the Shi’a Muslim community generally
enjoyed freedom of worship throughout the country. At thesame time, a USCIRF visit to Bahrain in March 2019 found thatthe government continued its discrimination and repressionof the Shi’a Muslim community on the basis of their religious
identity in certain areas. In 2018, the government arrested

some Shi’a Muslim clerics during Ashura religious observances,
allegedly for “inciting hatred.” In the November 2018 local andparliamentary elections, some Shi’a Bahraini candidates wereprevented from participating, and several party leaders werearrested or remained in jail. Some human rights defenders
who advocated for greater religious freedom remained inprison. Furthermore, discrimination against Shi’a Muslims ingovernment employment and some public and social services
also continued, even though Bahrain’s laws affirm principles
of nondiscrimination.
In 2019, USCIRF places Bahrain on its Tier 2 for engaging
in or tolerating religious freedom violations that meet at least
one of the elements of the “systematic, ongoing, egregious”
standard for designation as a “country of particular concern,”
or CPC, under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Urge the Bahraini government to clarify
the terms and enforcement of the 2016
amendment to article 5 of the 2005
Political Society Law, which prohibits
religious figures from “inciting hatred,”and repeal articles 309 and 310 of
Bahrain’s Penal Code that impose fines
and jail time for blasphemy;• Work with the Bahraini government
to continue to implement reforms
consistent with the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI)
report—specifically recommendation
1724a relating to censorship of beliefs

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and recommendation 1722d relating
to holding prisoners incognito—andurge it to conduct and make public anannual progress report;that promote sectarian reconciliation,
support the rule of law, and counterviolent extremism—such as ongoing
community policing initiatives; and• Press the Bahraini government toenforce existing laws, including Royal
Decree 36 of 2012 and Royal Decree
95 of 2018, prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of sectarian affiliation;• Press Bahrain’s government to ensure
freedom of religion and reduce sectarian incitement by passing the bill
pending in the Ministerial Committee
for Social Services, Communicationand Media, providing accountability forpast abuses against the Shi’a Muslim community, and unconditionallyreleasing prisoners of conscience andreligious freedom advocates.

• Continue to train security officials,
prosecutors, and judges to better
address sectarian violence andincitement by enhancing programs

TIER 2 BAHRAIN

COUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Kingdom of Bahrain
GOVERNMENT
Constitutional Monarchy
POPULATION
1,442,659
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHS
Registered religious organizations represent Sunni and Shi’aIslam, as well as Christianity (including Catholic, Evangelical,
Anglican, Seventh-day Adventist, Syrian Orthodox, Malankara Orthodox, and Indian Orthodox churches), Hinduism,
the Baha’i faith, Buddhism, and Judaism

BACKGROUND
According to Bahrain’s constitution, Islam is the religion of the state and Shari’ah is a principal source forlegislation. The constitution provides for freedom of
conscience, the inviolability of places of worship, andfreedom to perform religious rites. Of the country’s
population of approximately 1.4 million, slightly lessthan half are Bahraini citizens, with a small majority
comprising expatriate workers, primarily from Southand Southeast Asia. The majority of Bahraini citizens
are Shi’a Muslims.
In recent years, Bahraini authorities have cited
increased efforts by Iran to expand its influence inthe country as the reason for heightened government
concern about subversive activity by Iranian-backed
Shi’a militants. While Iran’s support for such activities
in Bahrain has been documented widely, the Bahraini
government has sometimes used this pretext to crack
down on some Shi’a opposition leaders, clerics, andactivists without substantiating charges of subversion or
criminal activity.
In 2011, Bahraini citizens protested in public
spaces, including Pearl Roundabout in Manama,calling for political reforms. While the government

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
70% Muslim (60% Shi’a, 35–40% Sunni)
14.5% Christian
9.8% Hindu
2.5% Buddhist
0.6% Jewish
2.6% Other (including Folk Religions, Unaffiliated, Sikhs,
and Baha’is*Estimates compiled from the U.S. State Department and CIA World
Factbook

initially allowed these protests to take place, it eventually cracked down with the assistance of Saudi Arabia,
killing scores of protestors, demolishing dozens of Shi’amosques, and destroying Pearl Roundabout itself. In
June 2011, Bahrain’s king established the BICI to investigate these events. The BICI released its report to the kingin a live televised event in November 2011 along with aset of 26 recommendations. Bahrain’s government committed to implementing these reforms, and announced
full implementation in 2016. However, a June 2016 U.S.
Department of State assessment of this implementation
challenged that conclusion and noted that “more work
remains to be done.”
Since then, the government has continued its
crackdown on political opposition, prosecuting
Bahrainis whose beliefs differ from the government’s
position. In March 2018, Bahrain’s Ministry of Interior
threatened punishment against those who criticized the government online despite a BICI report
recommendation to “consider relaxing censorship”
and “provide opposition groups with an adequate
voice.” Activist Ebrahim Sharif was summoned by
the public prosecutor in December 2018 for a tweet
urging Sudanese president Omar Bashir to leave office

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154

amid protests. Also, in December, Bahrain’s Court of
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
Cassation upheld the conviction and five-year prison
Positive Developments
sentence of human rights defender Nabeel Rajab for
In July 2018, at the State Department Ministerial to
tweeting in opposition to the Saudi military campaign
Advance Religious Freedom, Bahraini foreign minin Yemen, which Bahrain’s government supports,
ister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa announced theand accusing Bahrain’s
creation of an Ambassaprison authorities of
dor-at-Large for Peacefultorture. During USCIRF’s
Coexistence and ReliIn December, Bahrain’s Court
March 2019 visit after
gious Freedom, thoughof Cassation upheld the conviction
the reporting period,
this position had notof human rights defender Nabeel
Bahrain’s government
been filled by the end
Rajab . . . [who] has . . . advocated for
did not grant the USCIRF
of the reporting period.
religious freedom in the country . . .
delegation a request to
As part of its “This Is
visit Rajab in prison; heBahrain” public diplohas in the past advocatedmacy initiative run byfor religious freedom inthe Bahrain Federation of Expatriate Associations
the country as head of the Bahrain Center for Humanunder the patronage of King Hamad bin Isa Al KhalRights. Bahrain also has not yet enacted a draft law
ifa, Bahrain endowed a chair in interfaith dialoguethat would curb incitement to violence, hatred, andand coexistence at Sapienza University in Rome, Italy,
sectarianism; by the end of the reporting period, thein November 2018. It also continued to support thebill had been referred to the Ministerial Committee forKing Hamad Global Center for Interfaith Dialogue
Social Services, Communication and Media, which isand Peaceful Coexistence, which hosts interreligious
expected to be introduced for debate in parliament.
dialogues, conferences, and events related to religious
Article 169 of Bahrain’s Penal Code imposes up
freedom and peaceful coexistence. The Center also
to two years’ imprisonment and a fine for publishingannounced plans to create a Museum of Tolerance in“falsified” or “untrue” reports, and states that laws on
Manama. During 2018, Bahrain’s crown prince also
freedom of expression must be “compatible with values
hosted a delegation from the Syrian Orthodox Churchof a democratic society.” Such broad language, subject
and highlighted the country’s commitment to religious
to varying interpretations, increases the likelihood
tolerance. Throughout the year, Bahrain’s governmentof infringement on freedom of expression, including
engaged proactively and constructively with USCIRF
religious expression. Furthermore, articles 309 and 310
on religious freedom issues, including during a visit toof the Penal Code criminalize insulting a recognized
the kingdom in March 2019 where USCIRF met withreligious community, its rituals, or religious symbols—
civil society leaders, government officials, and His
with a term of imprisonment up to one year or a fine notHighness Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, andexceeding $265 (100 Bahraini dinars). Despite charges
attended the 200th anniversary celebration of Bahand convictions in previous years, there were no known
rain’s Hindu community.
convictions during the reporting period.
In addition, internal accountability institutions
On November 24, 2018, Bahrain held parliamencreated in response to recommendations from the 2011
tary and municipal council elections. While Shi’a
BICI report—including the Special Investigations Unit,
Muslim candidates faced barriers to participating, six
National Institute for Human Rights, Ombudsman’s
women were elected to parliament, as well as Bahrain’s
Office, and High Commission on Prisoners and Detainfirst woman parliament speaker, Fouzia Zainal. Jewees—continued to follow up on complaints of abuse
ish member of parliament Nancy Khedouri was also
and mistreatment to the extent permitted by law. For
appointed vice president of the parliament’s Foreign
example, an Ombudsman’s Office investigation led to
Affairs, Defense, and National Security Committee.
the reopening of a death penalty case that was retried inearly 2019, just after the reporting period.

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allegedly “encouraging acts of terrorism” and “inciting
hatred against the regime”; according to groups thatIn 2018, Bahrain’s government continued its targeting
monitor religious freedom in Bahrain, these charges wereof some Shi’a Muslims in the country. While governunsubstantiated. In November 2018, Bahrain’s Ministry
ment officials discouraged sectarian language in media
of Interior arrested leading Shi’a cleric Sheikh Khalid
outlets, progovernment and private media at times
Fadhil al-Zaki during security raids in Shakhura and Abu
used inflammatory, sectarian rhetoric. Sheikh Isa
Saiba and held him until mid-December 2018.
Qasim, Bahrain’s leading Shi’a cleric, had his citizenAs in previous years, in September 2018 Bahrainiship revoked by administrative order in June 2016; suchsecurity
officials clamped down on peaceful Shi’aorders are usually unappealable, but past removals ofMuslim religious rituals during Ashura observances.
citizenship required a royal decree or an order from
While Bahrain is the only Gulf state to recognize Ashura
the Ministry of Interior, both of which are subject to an
as a public holiday, authorities restricted celebrations
extra layer of appeals. Nevertheless, Sheikh Qasim was
granted a temporary passport in 2018 to travel to London in some areas. More than 15 Shi’a clerics, chanters, andlay assistants reportedly were summoned and interrofor medical treatment following almost two years undergated over their sermons. Bahraini authorities claimed
house arrest. Shortly after the reporting period, upon
13 preachers were arrested in 2018 for violating sermon
completion of his medical treatment in London, Sheikh
laws, seven of whom were Sunni Muslim and six of
Qasim continued on to Iraq and Iran. He remained inwhom were Shi’a Muslim, and that all offenders were
Iran at the time of this report and visited the shrine
suspended from preaching. Bahraini security forcesof the leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Ayatoldestroyed banners and signs advertising Ashura rituals
lah Ruhollah Khomeini. Sheikh Qasim subsequently
claiming that the displaying of banners across streets
released statements from within Iran criticizing theposed a safety hazard. In April 2018, Bahrain’s Ministry
Bahraini government. Bahraini officials have claimedof Interior demolished a temporary building meant to
the latter visit constituted evidence of their longtime
replace the Shi’a Imam al-Askari mosque in Hamad
accusation that Sheikh Qasim supports Iran’s alleged
Town, northern Bahrain, for the second time and withpolitical activities in the kingdom. Bahraini oppositionout prior notice, claiming it was subject to demolition
leaders have differing views on Sheikh Qasim’s apparent
under the Building Regulations Code Law No. 13 of 1977
exile in Iran, some noting that Sheikh Qasim also visitedand the Road Works Law No. 2 of 1996. In August, thea number of Shi’a shrines in both Iraq and Iran.
Ministry of Interior demolished the fence and the founBahrain also continued to arrest and detain Shi’adation marking the outline of the al-Alawiyat mosqueclerics on the basis of their religious identity. Shi’a clericin al-Zinj, which had been destroyed in 2011. Since
Sayyed Adnan al-Sayed Hashim was arrested in Diraz
2011, Bahraini authorities have destroyed more than 38
in January 2018 and held incognito for two weeks. Thismosques and Shi’a religious institutions. The Bahraini
arrest contravened the BICI report’s recommendation notgovernment has stated that the mosques it destroyed did
to detain individuals “without access to the outside world
not comply with safety and zoning laws, and that a small
for more than two or three days.” A Bahraini appeals
number of mosque destructions in a country with 608
court also upheld a verdict against the imam of the Shi’aplaces of Shi’a worship is
al-Kheif mosque, Sheikh
not evidence of a religious
Isa al-Moemen, for “incitfreedom violation.
ing hatred” in a July 2017
Members of Bahrain’s Shi’aMembers of Bahrain’s
sermon. Moemen served
community reportedly still
Shi’aMuslim communitya three-month sentence
cannot serve in the active military.
reportedly still cannot
and was released in May
serve in the active military,
2018. In September 2018,
only in administrative
during Ashura, three Shi’apositions,
and
there
are
no
Shi’a
Muslims in the upperclerics—Sheikh Yassin al-Harami, Sheikh Hani al-Bana’,levels of the Bahraini government security apparatus,and Sheikh Mohammed al-Sahlawi—were arrested for

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Treatment of Shi’a Muslims

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156

including the military and police, with the exception of
spurious national security charges. Ali Salman had
a Shi’a Muslim who holds the rank of brigadier general.
his sentence extended from four years to life in prison
Many Shi’a public sector employees who were dismissed
three weeks before the elections took place. Prior to thefrom their jobs because of participating in the 2011 proelections, Bahraini authorities arrested former Shi’atests were reinstated in lower-level jobs, positions outside
al-Wefaq parliament minister Ali Rashed al-Asheeri forof their specialty, or positions without actual responsia tweet expressing his intent to boycott the November
bilities. The Bahraini government continued to deny any
2018 elections.
discrimination against the Shi’a Muslim community
In 2016, King Al Khalifa amended a 2005 law
in government employment, and has asserted there
banning religious parties from political participation
has been progress to diversify the military and security
to also preclude anyone engaged in politics from giving
apparatus, for example, by recruiting from all segments
religious speeches, sermons, or spiritual guidance.
of society—including the
Bahrain’s government
Shi’a Muslim commucontinued to use thisnity—into its community
amendment to prevent
Bahrain . . . prevent[ed]policing program. ActivShi’a Muslim religious figShi’a Muslim religious figuresists informed USCIRF
ures from running for andfrom running for and holding
during its March 2019
holding political office,political office, while allowing
visit that the government
while allowing Sunni
Sunni religious figures to do so.
refused to track the exclureligious figures to do so.
sion of Shi’a Muslims fromIn the 2018 elections, six
employment in the milicandidates affiliated withtary and government on the grounds that keeping such
the Sunni Salafist Asalah Islamic Society ran for office,records would be a violation of privacy. Several activists
three of whom were elected to parliament. Candidates
noted that while there is no formal hiring discrimination
linked to the Muslim Brotherhood-backed Al Menbar
against Shi’a Muslims, many employers ask questions
Islamic Society also ran, but did not win any seats.
that indirectly reveal an applicant’s religious affiliation.
Treatment of Non-Muslims
Bahraini government officials noted that members of theApproximately half of the expatriate workers in Bahrain
royal family have intervened when cases of discriminaare non-Muslim. The government officially recognizes
tion were brought to their attention.
19 religious entities, including more than a dozen ChrisDiscrimination against Shi’a Muslims in thetian denominations, a tiny Jewish community, Hindus,
November Elections
Sikhs, Buddhists, and Baha’is. Generally speaking, these
The Bahraini government continued its discrimination
communities are able to publicly and privately practiceagainst Shi’a electoral candidates in 2018. No canditheir faiths without interference or limitation. Bahrain
dates were allowed to run from the Shi’a al-Wefaq party,
hosts the Arabian Peninsula’s only intact synagogue
which the government dissolved in 2016 after accusing
and the seat of the Catholic Vicarate of Northern Arabia,
it of providing “a nourishing environment for terrorism,
which includes Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. In
extremism, and violence.” A 2016 amendment by King
March 2019, after the reporting period, USCIRF particAl Khalifa to Law 14 of 2002 banned anyone who had
ipated in a celebration of the 200th anniversary of thereceived a prison sentence of six months or longer from
Hindu community in Bahrain at the Hindu Temple inparticipating in elections, disqualifying hundreds ofManama (the oldest in the Gulf) with Prince Abdullah
Shi’a activists and opposition figures who had previbin Hamad Al Khalifa and Bahrain’s Foreign Minister
ously protested mistreatment. Ahead of the elections,
Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifa. Prince Nasser bin Hamad
Sheikh Ali Salman, the former secretary-general of the
Al Khalifa also hosted USCIRF and dignitaries for abanned al-Wefaq party, and Sheikh Hassan Sultan, a
reception at his reception hall (majles) to commemoratesenior Shi’a cleric, were sentenced to life in prison on
the event.

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U.S. POLICY
U.S.-Bahraini relations are based on shared geopoliticalconcerns, including the regional influence of Iran andsecurity cooperation to combat extremism. Bahrain, alongstanding U.S. ally in the region, has hosted a U.S.
naval presence since 1946 and is home to more than
8,300 members of the U.S. armed services, mostly affiliated with the Fifth Fleet of the United States Navy. In
2002, the United States designated Bahrain as a major
non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally,
allowing the country access to defense research cooperation and purchase of certain otherwise-restricted
U.S. arms. Bahrain and the United States cooperate on
regional security, counterterrorism, and counter-smuggling operations. The United States has also assisted
Bahrain in implementing a version of the Drug Abuse
Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program that targets
extremism. Economically, Bahrain and the UnitedStates also benefit from the 2006 U.S.-Bahrain Free
Trade Agreement, which in recent years has generated
nearly $2 billion annually.
The 2011 BICI report has provided the major framework in recent years for U.S. assessments of progresson human rights reforms in Bahrain. In both 2013 and2016, Congress directed the secretary of state to submit
an assessment of Bahrain’s progress in implementing
the BICI report’s 26 recommendations, including adescription of specific steps taken and an assessmentof compliance with each recommendation. The State
Department produced two such reports, most recently
in 2016. Both found that while the Bahraini government had made some progress, it had not achieved
full implementation of the report’s recommendations, particularly relating to the independence andaccountability of investigative bodies and promotion ofnational reconciliation. The 2016 report noted progress in rebuilding demolished Shi’a mosques and in
implementing tolerance in school curricula. However,it cautioned that “more work needs to be done” for Bahrain to fully implement the recommendations outlinedin the report.
The Trump administration has prioritized a close
defense relationship with Bahrain in order to counter
Iran’s influence in the region and attempts to destabilize
Bahrain. In July 2018, the State Department designatedthe al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB) as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, citing material support provided to thegroup by Iran. In August 2018, the State Department
sanctioned AAB’s leader, Qassim Ali Ahmed, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. In September 2018,
the State Department announced the potential sale ofrocket launchers to Bahrain worth $300 million; the sale
was approved in November.
In July 2018, Bahrain participated in the State
Department’s International Religious Freedom
Ministerial, where it announced the creation of an
Ambassador-at-Large for Peaceful Coexistence andReligious Freedom. Then Secretary of Defense James N.
Mattis visited Bahrain in March 2018 and returned for ameeting later in October 2018. Secretary of State Michael
R. Pompeo visited Bahrain in early 2019 and discussed“religious coexistence and freedom of religion” with
Bahrain’s king, crown prince, and foreign minister.
State Department officials have emphasized freedomof religious expression for Shi’a clerics and prisoners inconversations with Bahraini officials, and continue toadvocate for reforms that take into consideration theneeds of all citizens regardless of religious affiliation.

TIER 2 BAHRAIN

Christians in Bahrain comprise 14.5 percent of the
population and are generally free to practice their faith.
There are several churches representing Catholic, Anglican, Evangelical, Orthodox, and nondenominational
communities, among others. A third Catholic church
under construction, Our Lady of Arabia, will be thelargest Catholic church in the Gulf region upon its completion, scheduled for 2021. However, two letters written
to the Bahraini royal court in 2018 requesting new land
for a Christian cemetery have not been returned. In
addition, since only umbrella Christian organizations
are formally registered with the government, several
congregations that meet under the auspices of theseorganizations have had their assets frozen because they
are not formally registered. Some of these congregations
waited months for these issues to be resolved so thatthey could spend money on salaries and programs.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
COMMISSIONER JOHNNIE MOORE
Respectfully, I do not personally believe that Bahrain
any longer meets the threshold of Tier 2 status when one
compares it to other countries that obviously do meet

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158

that threshold. One needs only to consider the amountand types of progress the kingdom has made in such ashort period of time on the basis of direct engagementwith the religious freedom community and I do believe
the religious freedom community has had a tendency
to underestimate the legitimate security questions the
kingdom has long faced given its location and the sadrole religion has played in regional conflict. Bahrain’s
level of substantive engagement with the religious
freedom community is beyond compare with any othercountry cited on this list. They have gone so far as tochange laws and policy resulting in some of the progress cited in this report, established a regional centerto promote peaceful coexistence, and the king’s own
Bahrain Declaration for Religious Freedom was the firstever such document in the Arab world to clearly endorse“choice” as it relates to determining one’s religion,
written by an Arab monarch, nonetheless. Of course,
there remain certain questions which merit continued
engagement, which this report cites, but I could notbring myself to compare this country to others on Tier 2,
based upon my personal experience.

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CUBA
TIER 2KEY FINDINGS
During 2018, religious freedom conditions in Cuba trended
the same, although some of the tactics employed by the
Cuban government to repress religious freedom changed.
Cuba continues to be a one-party system with no independent
judicial bodies and where the state tightly controls religious
institutions. After Fidel Castro’s death and Raúl Castro’s resignation as president, the Cuban Communist Party in April 2018
appointed Miguel Díaz-Canel to the presidency without anelection. The change in leadership did not result in increased
religious freedom. A new constitution, which was ratified after
the reporting period, weakened protections for freedom of
religion or belief. The Cuban government engaged in harassment campaigns targeting religious leaders and activists who
advocated for stronger religious freedom protections. Gathering detailed information on religious freedom conditions
in Cuba remains a challenge, but open and flagrant attacks
on religious leaders and property appear to have decreased
since 2017. Because the Cuban government is concerned about
international public opinion, it has changed some of its tactics, including by subtly increasing its harassment of religious
leaders and activists countrywide in ways that are difficult
to track. The new forms of harassment include the issuance,
as a scare tactic, of pre-arrest warrants to religious leaders
and believers and charging them with criminal and civil code

violations to disguise religious repression. The government
continued to use a restrictive system of laws and policies,
surveillance, and harassment to control religious groups. The
Office of Religious Affairs (ORA), an entity within the Cuban
Communist Party, arbitrarily controls all religious activity. The
ORA requires religious organizations to register, which, intheory, allows communities to receive foreign visitors, importreligious materials, meet in approved houses of worship, andapply to travel abroad. However, the ORA can still arbitrarily
interfere in any church matters—whether the church is registered or not. The Cuban government publicized the buildingof a Catholic Church in Sandino, which is the first new religious
building that the government has allowed to be constructed insix decades. While this is overall a positive step, other religious
groups have not been allowed to construct new religious buildings. Almost every Sunday in 2018, the government violently
prevented members of the Ladies in White and other activists
from attending Mass.
Based on these concerns, in 2019 USCIRF again places Cuba
on its Tier 2 for engaging in or tolerating religious freedom
violations that meet at least one of the elements of the “systematic, ongoing, egregious” standard for designation as a“country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International
Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

160• Highlight religious freedom violationsin specific prisoner of conscience
initiatives, such as the U.S. Mission
to the United Nations’ “Jailed for
What?” campaign and the Tom
Lantos Human Rights Commission’s
Defending Freedoms Project;

to consular services for religious leaders in Cuba to obtain visas given gaps
in personnel at the U.S. Embassy;

religious leaders to travel to andinteract with coreligionists in the
United States; and• Press the Cuban government toinclude in the new constitution legal
protections for religious associations
and institutions;• Encourage key countries, particularly• Prioritize adequate coverage of religious freedom issues as well as access• Facilitate multi-entry visas for bothregistered and unregistered CubanU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

those in Latin America, to ensure that
violations of freedom of religion or
belief are part of all multilateral or bilateral discussions with or about Cuba.

TIER 2 CUBACOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Republic of Cuba
GOVERNMENT
Communist StatePOPULATION
11,116,369
GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHS
Religious groups may be granted registration; a reported
number of at least 58 officially registered denominations in
Cuba existed at the end of 2018

BACKGROUNDIn April 2018 the Cuban Communist Party named
Miguel Díaz-Canel the president of Cuba after six
decades of rule by Fidel and Raúl Castro. After thetransfer of power, the Cuban Communist Party
remained the only constitutionally recognized party
and continued to rule with absolute authority. During
the reporting period, the transfer of power did notappear to have resulted in meaningful change for religious groups in Cuba.
President Díaz-Canel launched a process to adopt
a new constitution. From August to November 2018,
the government held “public consultations” to debate
a draft constitution and convened thousands of public
assemblies. Religious leaders and activists reported
being excluded from the constitutional process andpressured to support the new constitution. Following
the consultation period, the Constitutional Commission, chaired by former president Raúl Castro,
produced a final constitution that the National Assembly approved in December 2018.
The new constitution weakens protections for
freedom of religion or belief. While article 15 assertsthat “the State recognizes, respects and guarantees
religious freedom,” the right of freedom of conscience
was removed from that article. And while the new

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
60–70% Roman Catholic**
5% Protestant
25–30% Unaffiliated or Other (includes Jehovah’s Witnesses,
Methodists, Seventh-day Adventists, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Jews, Muslims, Quakers, members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Greek Orthodox,
Russian Orthodox, Buddhists, and Baha’is)*Estimates compiled from the U.S. Department of State and CIA World
Factbook**Self-identified Catholics also include followers of syncretic religions

constitution stipulates that different beliefs and religions enjoy equal treatment and religious institutions
are separate from the state, it does not eliminate orreform the Office of Religious Affairs (ORA). The ORA
is an entity of the Central Committee of the Cuban
Communist Party and maintains direct authority overreligious groups and activities.
During the public consultation period, a cross-denominational group of Christians, initiated by theleaders of the Methodist Church of Cuba and Assemblies of God, put forth a petition appealing for greater
protections of religious freedom. These leaders
expressed alarm regarding the omission of the words“freedom of conscience” and the failure of the draft tocomply with international standards. Catholic bishops also called for more comprehensive protection,
while Protestant church leaders asked for languagethat prohibits the Cuban government from interferingwith the internal life of religious associations. Rather
than respond to this unprecedented call for stronger
freedom of religion protections, the Cuban governmentpressured many religious leaders to cease their opposition and publicly support the new constitution.
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from conducting religious education and providing
humanitarian support, requiring the registration of
publications, limiting the entry of foreign religious
workers, and restricting certain religious texts fromentering the country. In March 2018, the Cuban
government blocked 17,000 copies of the New International Version of the Bible from entering the country
on the basis that only older translations of the Bible
are permitted.
In 2018, the Cuban government continued to closely
monitor internet use and communication. Access to theinternet is hindered by the lack of infrastructure (andthe government’s continued refusal to build the necessary infrastructure), the high and inaccessible costs ofusing the internet, extremely slow internet connections,and the narrow limits placed on where the internet canbe accessed.

Detention and Harassment ofReligious Leaders and Activists

Throughout 2018, the Cuban government engaged inharassment campaigns against religious leaders who
advocate for religious freedom, especially after thelaunch of the public consultations on the constitution in
August 2018. To increase pressure, the government also
targeted family members of religious leaders. As a resultof the intensifying harassment, activists reported that
more religious leaders fled to seek asylum abroad. Most
who have fled are long term religious leaders from bothregistered and nonregistered denominations.
In January 2018, three Catholic priests (Father Castor
José Álvarez Devesa, Father José Conrado Rodríguez, andFather Roque Nelvis Morales Fonseca) published an open
letter to then President Raúl Castro calling for religious
freedom. In a February meeting with USCIRF, Fr. Álvarez
expressed concern about potential backlash for releasing
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018the letter. Nevertheless, he was able to travel to the Vatican
Office of Religious Affairs
to present the letter and return to Cuba later in February.
The Cuban government controls all religious activities
In January 2018, Yoruba priest Alexei Mora Monthrough the ORA, which operates out of the Ministry of
talvo was arrested along with Guillermo del Sol Pérez, an
Justice (MOJ). The government requires religious comindependent journalist who reports on religion. Duringmunities to apply to the MOJ for official registration.
Montalvo’s detention, state security agents tried to coerce
Despite existing criteria for registration, decisions are
him into joining the government-controlled Yoruba
arbitrary and often politically motivated. Registered
Cultural Association of Cuba. His arrest is believed to be
religious associations have to request permission fromdue to his questioning the religious authority of Yoruba
local Cuban Communist Party officials for virtually
Cultural Association of Cuba’s right to publish annual
any activities other than regular worship services,predictions. He was arrested, beaten, and interrogatedincluding holding a public event or procession outside
multiple times in 2018. At the end of the reporting period,
religious buildings, owning a vehicle, and repairing
he was not detained.
a building. As the ORA has final authority over all
In February 2018, authorities arrested and detained
decisions and is accountable only to the Party, it holds
for two days without charge Leonardo Rodríguez
broad, largely unchecked
Alonso, the regional coorpower over religious
dinator for the Patmos
practice in Cuba. The
Institute, an independent
The harassment of religious leaders
ORA also controls thecivil society organization
intensified with the launch of thereligious activities ofthat promotes freedom
constitutional campaign in August.
unregistered religiousof religion or belief. He
organizations, who are
was arrested on his way
particularly vulnerable
home to Villa Clara afteras their operation is considered illegal. Membership or
meeting with human rights activists.
association with an unregistered religious group is a
The harassment of religious leaders intensified
crime, with potential punishments ranging from a finewith the launch of the constitutional campaign into imprisonment.
August. During 2018, state security agents frequently
visited and threatened pastors involved in calls for162

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TIER 2 CUBA

stronger religious freedom protections at the national
international travel. In 2018, the Patmos Instituteand local levels. In addition, several religious leaders
recorded 121 instances in which individuals—including
were arrested due to their engagement in public conseveral religious leaders—were prevented from travelsultations. In September, Pastor Alain Toledano of theing abroad, including to attend meetings on freedom of
Emmanuel Church of the Apostolic Ministry received
religion or belief, including Leonardo Rodríguez Alonsoa warrant for his arrest allegedly related to a noise
and Alexei Mora Montalvo. Dr. Óscar Elías Biscet,complaint received during church services. During his
recipient of the 2007 Presidential Medal of Freedom andarrest, authorities interrogated Pastor Toledano about
former prisoner of conscience, was also blocked fromhis views of the constitution and threatened to proseleaving Cuba. In 2016, USCIRF met with Dr. Biscet andcute him or confiscate church property if he did not offer his wife Elsa Morejón.
his public support for the draft. Pastor Manuel Alberto
Some activists and their family members in detenMorejón Soler was similarly summoned by authorities
tion were denied access to religious materials, practices,and questioned on his views of the constitution sevor visits by religious leaders. For example, Eduardo
eral times. Other activists and religious leaders briefly
Cardet, national coordinator of an organization thatdetained for speaking out against the constitution andadvocates for democracy called the Christian Liberation
its religious provisions include Alexei Mora Montalvo,
Movement and who is currently serving a three-year
Irenaldo Sosa Báez, Guillermo del Sol Pérez, and Gabrielprison sentence, was not allowed to receive visits from
Barrenechea Chávez.
religious leaders and his Bible was confiscated.
To mask religious repression, the Cuban govThreats to Churches
ernment charges religious leaders and community
While there were no new reports of property confiscamembers through criminal and civil code violations.
tion in 2018, officials used Legal Decree 322, which the
While it is difficult to track these cases, one organiCuban government announced in 2015 to purportedly
zation reported that 194 individuals were imprisoned
regulate private properor detained because ofties and zoning laws, totheir religious beliefs
threaten confiscation or
and activities between
To mask religious repression,
demolition of multiple
July 2017 and April 2018.
the
Cuban
government
chargeschurches.
Even when not charged,
religious leaders and community
Religious organizareligious leaders are fremembers
throughcriminal
tions reported that thequently threatened withand civil code violations.
ORA granted authoricriminal proceedings
zation for construction,
through the use of pre-arrenovations, and repairs
rest warrants (actas deon existing religious structures more frequently inadvertencia) that are used to justify arrests and more2018, although the resources needed for such building
severe penalties for future alleged crimes. For examimprovements remain scarce and the government limitsple, a pastor of an unregistered church in Camagüey
access to construction materials. In March 2018, govreported that the police served him with two pre-arrest
ernment officials in Santiago banned members of thewarrants in 2018 as part of a larger pattern of hostility
Apostolic Movement network of churches from buying
and intimidation by state officials. Religious leaders
the materials needed to rebuild their church that wasreport that government security agents routinely
arbitrarily demolished in early 2016. At the end of theattend, monitor, and record religious services. Local
reporting period, the congregation continued to meetgovernment officials and police encourage an environunder a makeshift tent.
ment of harassment against pastors and their churches
The Cuban government permitted the Catholicand interruption in services and religious celebrations.
Church to build its first new church in six decades. The
During 2018, the Cuban government continued
congregation, which had previously been operating as
to restrict Cuban religious leaders and activists from163

TIER 2 CUBA

an illegal house church in Sandino, held its inaugural
mass in January 2019, just after the end of the reporting
period. The Cuban government has permitted construction of two other Catholic churches in Havana andSantiago. While this is a positive step, other religious
groups continue to be denied permission to construct
new religious buildings.

of religion or belief. Activists detained on their way toreligious services, usually Catholic Mass, were frequently beaten and held without charge, sometimes formore than 24 hours. In attempts to keep the religious
and political spheres separate, government officials
routinely pressured religious leaders to expel or shunsuch activists and threatened to close their churches ifthey did not comply.
Other Religious Groups
Almost every Sunday, the government prevented
Non-Christian groups are subject to similar levels of
more than 60 activists from attending religious serrestrictions, including practitioners of the syncretic
vices. Most blocked were members of the Ladies in
tradition of Santería, which draws upon the Yoruba reliWhite—wives and relatives of dissidents imprisoned ingion and is among the most popular traditions in Cuba.
2003—but also increasingly included other activists actThe government intensified its attempts to coopt thising in solidarity. Every week, Ladies in White wear white
tradition throughout 2018,clothing and march toincluding through its
Sunday Mass to increasetargeting of Alexei Moraattention to the imprisAlmost every Sunday,
Montalvo as described
onment of their families
the government prevented
above. The Bnei Anusim
They are often detained
more than 60 activists fromand Messianic Jewish
on their way to Mass or
attending religious services.
communities, which areother religious services
unregistered in Cuba, also
and released hours later.
reported harassment andDetainees report thatinterruptions in religious services during 2018.
arrests are often violent; law enforcement officials andIn 2005, the Cuban government implemented a law
state security agents dressed as civilians beat them,to regulate house churches, which are commonly usedrelease them in remote areas far from their homes, andby Protestant denominations due to government restricsubject them to arbitrary fines. Some Ladies in White
tions on new building construction. According to thewere charged with fabricated petty crimes, such as failState Department, there are an estimated 2,000–10,000
ing to pay penalties and contempt. In 2018, those held
Protestant house churches in Cuba. The law requires
on such charges include Marta Sánchez, Nieves Matall house churches to register and submit to the governamoros, Aimara Nieto, Yolanda Santana, Xiomara Cruz,
ment detailed information on their membership, theDaysi Artiles, and Micaela Roll Gibert.
house church’s inhabitants, and the schedule of serLadies in White leader Berta Soler Fernández is
vices. The law further requires that house churches ofoften targeted for violent arrest by security forces. The
the same denomination must be at least two kilometers
Cuban government also blocked Soler from leaving theapart. Once registration is granted, the law empowers
island to raise awareness about the Ladies in White. The
the authorities to supervise religious meetings, limit the
government prohibited her from traveling to the United
number of services that are held each week, and set theStates to receive the Cato Institute’s Milton Friedman
maximum number of attendees. The law also explicitly
Prize for Advancing Liberty in May and refused to renew
prohibits foreigners from participating in religious serher passport in November.
vices without official permission.

U.S. POLICY

Denial of Religious Freedom for
Democracy and Human Rights Activists
In 2018, the Cuban government denied some prodemocracy and human rights activists their right to freedom164

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U.S.-Cuban relations remained tense in 2018. The
Trump administration policy toward Cuba continued to
be guided by the National Security Presidential Memorandum entitled “Strengthening the Policy of the Unitedits final report with recommendations to support media,
freedom of information, and internet access.
During a November 2018 speech, National Security
Advisor John R. Bolton dubbed Cuba, as well as Venezuela
and Nicaragua, the “Troika of Tyranny.” He accused thethree countries of being “the cause of immense humansuffering, the impetus of enormous regional instability,
and the genesis of a sordid cradle of communism in thewestern hemisphere” and emphasized that the UnitedStates “is taking direct action” against these regimes todefend the rule of law, liberty, and basic human decency.
Following his speech, the State Department added 26
tourist attractions to the Cuba Restricted List, which forbids doing business with dozens of entities that have links
to Cuba’s military, intelligence, and security agencies.
In 2018, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations
launched a campaign called “Jailed for What?” tohighlight the plight of the estimated 130 prisoners ofconscience in Cuba. While Cuban diplomats attempted
to disrupt the October launch event, the commotion
brought more attention to repression in Cuba. In addition, Secretary Pompeo in December published an open
letter urging the Cuban government to provide more
information on the charges against political prisoners, including Eduardo Cardet Concepción, national
coordinator of the Christian Liberation Movement, andMartha Sánchez, a member of the Ladies in White.

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TIER 2 CUBA

States Towards Cuba,” issued in November 2017. This
policy focuses on the need for human rights, democracy,
and free enterprise in Cuba. It further instructed thesecretary of state to provide a report to the president on
the degree to which the Cuban government has fulfilled
the requirements of a transition government, as outlined in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996.
In 2017, the United States pulled most of its embassy
staff from Cuba. In March 2018, staffing numbers werepermanently reduced from around 50 to 18. In June
2018, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo establishedthe interagency Health Incidents Response Task Force toinvestigate the 2017 health attacks on 26 U.S. diplomats
and family members, but the cause and source of theattacks remain unknown. The State Department’s Integrated Country Strategy noted that the staff reduction
has resulted in the suspension of most visa processing
and a decrease in bilateral engagement. A congressional
memorandum concluded that the United States’ ability
to monitor Cuba and defend human rights is being
undermined by the staff reduction.
The State Department convened the Cuba Internet
Task Force in January 2018, which is mandated by thepolicy memo to “examine the technological challenges
and opportunities for expanding internet access in
Cuba.” The Task Force is expected to release in May 2019165

EGYPT
TIER 2KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Egypt generally
trended in a more positive direction related to high-level official discourse and actions. However, persistent challenges atthe community level and a poor, broader human rights situation remained consistent with recent years. President Abdel
Fattah El-Sisi heightened the inclusion of religious tolerance inpublic discourse, including continuing his now-annual traditionof attending Coptic Christmas Eve Mass. He also personallyoversaw the opening of a Coptic Orthodox cathedral and amosque in the new administrative capital in January 2019—after
the reporting period—encouraging the inclusion of churches
in plans for new urban developments and calling for wider
freedom of belief and worship. By March 2019, shortly after
the reporting period, the cabinet-level committee tasked withapproving the registration of churches and church-relatedbuildings under Law 80/2016 approved 783 of the between
5,515 and 5,540 properties slated for registration. The Ministryof Education began issuing a new primary school curriculum forreligious instruction. Officials shared its new curriculum with
USCIRF during its January 2019 country visit in order to demonstrate the removal of intolerant concepts and language fromthe state-mandated curriculum. During USCIRF’s visit, Grand

Sheikh of al-Azhar Ahmed El-Tayeb stated that non-Muslims,
including Baha’is and Jehovah’s Witnesses, should be permitted
public places of worship in Egypt, representing a notable shift inrhetoric. Nevertheless, despite these prominent gestures, systematic and ongoing challenges to religious freedom remainedwidespread at the community level, particularly in rural areas.
Anti-Christian mob violence occurred with impunity and regularity in Upper Egypt; on several occasions, these incidents
came in direct response to efforts by local Christians to legally
register their churches. Meanwhile, Egyptian affiliates of theIslamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and domestic terror groups
continued to target local Christians in addition to government
officials and security forces. Baha’is and Jehovah’s Witnesses
remained unrecognized, and blasphemy laws, which have notbeen repealed, continued to be used in targeting Muslims,
Christians, and nonreligious persons.
Based on these concerns, USCIRF again places Egypt on its
Tier 2 for engaging in or tolerating systematic and ongoing religious freedom violations, thereby meeting at least one of thethree elements of the standard for designation as a “country ofparticular concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious
Freedom Act (IRFA).

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Urge the Egyptian government toaccelerate approvals for churches andchurch-related buildings that haveapplied for renovation, construction,or registration under Law 80/2016;
enforce the law’s provision thatchurches awaiting approval can continue to operate; and initiate a national
discussion into supplanting that law
with one that would uniformly apply
to all houses of worship, regardless ofreligious affiliation;• Allocate a portion of U.S. assistance—
including through Foreign Military
Funding (FMF) and Economic Support
Fund sources, as appropriate—to
programs through the U.S. Agency forInternational Development (USAID)

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to train and equip Egyptian security
forces to protect the places of worshipand other holy sites of religious
minority communities;• Press the Egyptian government andsecurity services to immediately end thepractice of ceding legal authority to customary reconciliation councils to resolve
incidents of anti-Christian mob violence;• Encourage the Egyptian government
to repeal decrees banning Baha’is andJehovah’s Witnesses, remove religion
from official identity documents, andpass laws consistent with article 53of the constitution, such as creating
an independent antidiscriminationbody that includes non-Sunni Muslim
representatives; and• Urge the Egyptian government torepeal or revise article 98(f) of thePenal Code, which criminalizes contempt of religion, or blasphemy, andin the interim provide the rule of law
and due process for those individuals
charged with violating article 98(f).
The U.S. Congress should:• Require the U.S. Department of Stateto provide justification for the releaseof any foreign military financing
withheld to Egypt, including public
disclosure of its assessment and certification of Egypt’s progress toward
improving human rights and religious
freedom conditions.

TIER 2 EGYPTCOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Arab Republic of Egypt
GOVERNMENT
Presidential Republic

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY
90% Muslim (predominantly Sunni)
10% Christian (majority Coptic Orthodox; other Christians
include Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, Maronite, Orthodox,
and Anglican) (2015 estimate)

POPULATION
99,413,317
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED FAITHS
85–90% Sunni Islam, 10–15% Christianity (Orthodox, Catholics, Protestants), <1% Other (Baha’is, Jehovah’s Witnesses,
Shi’a Muslims, Jews)

BACKGROUND
Egypt’s constitution identifies Islam as the state religion
and the principles of Shari’ah as the primary source oflegislation. While article 64 of the constitution statesthat “freedom of belief is absolute,” only Muslims, Christians, and Jews can practice their religion publicly andbuild places of worship. Of the country’s estimated 99
million people, 85 to 90 percent are Sunni Muslims, andnon-Sunni Muslims comprise less than one percent. Ten
to 15 percent are Christians, the vast majority of whom
belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church; others belong
to various other denominations, including Catholic,Protestant, Maronite, Armenian Apostolic, Greek and
Syrian Orthodox, and others. There are at least 2,000
Baha’is, approximately 1,500 Jehovah’s Witnesses, andfewer than 20 Jews.
Egypt has experienced both progress and setbacks
during its political transition since 2013. President
El-Sisi has overseen several key economic reforms
and initiatives that returned the Egyptian economy
to a position of relative—if fragile—stability, garnering praise from partners such as the International
Monetary Fund. The government has, however, paidless attention to other social concerns during thistransitional period, including endemic gender-based
challenges such as the sexual harassment of women*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook and U.S. Department of Statein public spaces and the practice of female genital
mutilation (FGM)—a practice that is formally banned
but persists at an alarming rate. At the same time, theEgyptian military has been unable to decisively end
an insurgency by a North Sinai-based affiliate of ISIS,
despite a campaign since mid-2015 to do so. Attacks by
ISIS or other domestic terror groups on the Egyptian
mainland slowed in 2018 in comparison to prior years,
but they continued to pose a serious danger to security
forces, religious minorities, and the general public.
Furthermore, the government’s initial effort tocombat Islamist violence and ideology has evolved intoa more general and severe crackdown on all perceived
dissent or criticism toward the country’s leadership.
Thousands of sympathizers and members of the Muslim
Brotherhood have faced arrest, trial, and conviction, but
the government has similarly jailed journalists, secularand liberal activists, and other non-Islamist critics. Egyptian independent media continued to be prevented fromexpressing dissenting political views, and presenters oroutlets that defy this expectation are silenced. Crackdown
on public dissent became particularly acute ahead of the
March 2018 presidential election when journalists andpotential candidates alike faced harassment and arrest ina clear effort to remove any perceived barriers to President El-Sisi’s reelection. Hundreds of nongovernmental

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organization (NGO) workers have faced widespread
legal obstacles such as closures and arrests under Law
70/2017, which severely restricts operations and foreign
funding of NGOs. However, the government launched aneffort in late 2018 to conduct a thorough review of the law
following President El-Sisi’s public pledge to address its
well-documented flaws.
In March 2018 and January 2019, just after thereporting period, USCIRF delegations traveled to Egypt toassess religious freedom conditions and met with a rangeof Egyptian government officials, including Minister of
Education Tarek Shawki; Grand Sheikh El-Tayeb; Pope
Tawadros II, head of the Coptic Orthodox Church; andreligious leaders and human rights defenders. During
the latter visit, USCIRF members also joined national
political and religious leaders at the formal opening of theCathedral of the Nativity and al-Fatah al-Alim Mosque,both in the country’s new administrative capital.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
Positive Developments

El-Tayeb also called for tolerance and unity among Muslims, Christians, and Jews while admonishing fellow
Muslims to take responsibility for protecting churches
as well as mosques. In fact, just one day earlier a Muslim
police officer had died and two others were injured
while attempting to defuse a crude bomb planted near achurch in the Nasr City neighborhood of Cairo.
The Egyptian government also took some important
but limited practical steps toward the improvement ofreligious freedom conditions. In 2018, and just after thereporting period, the cabinet committee tasked withapproving the registration of churches and church-related buildings under the Church Building Law of 2016
(Law 80/2016)—the first law of its kind in Egypt—granted
incremental approval to 783 of the 5,515–5,540 relevant
properties that had submitted applications. In September 2018, President El-Sisi appointed Manal Awad as
the governor of Dumyat, representing the first Christian woman to hold that post and only the fourth Coptin Egypt’s modern history to receive a gubernatorial
appointment. Finally, Minister of Education Shawki
told USCIRF that plans to reform the public school
curriculum had made important progress during 2018,
including that new primary school textbooks on religion
no longer contained exclusionary or intolerant language.

Senior Egyptian leadership made positive gestures
toward recognizing the need for greater religious
freedom and representation of religious minorities inpublic life. President El-Sisi publicly commented on thissubject on multiple occasions during 2018. In December,
Construction, Renovation, andhe insisted that new residential development projects
Registration of Churches
include churches and in November, during the World
Despite these positive signs from Egyptian leaderYouth Forum, he stated his belief that all people should
ship, there remain significant challenges to religious
be allowed to believe or not believe as they choose,
freedom throughout the country. The 783 churches
and to have their own places of worship. Grand Sheikh
and church-related buildings that received registraEl-Tayeb, the country’s senior most Sunni Muslim
tion approval during and just after the 2018 reporting
scholar, told USCIRF that all religious communities inperiod represent justEgypt should be allowed
over 14 percent of theto have their own places
5,515–5,540 relevantof worship and the stateGrand
SheikhEl-Tayeb,thecountry’s
properties. Furthermore,should guarantee theirseniormost
Sunni
Muslimscholar,the vast majority of these
protection, even commutold
USCIRFthatall
religious
communities
applications represent
nities such as the Baha’isin
Egypt
should
have
their
own
preexisting properties
and Jehovah’s Witnesses,
placesofworship.
.
.
that were already in use
who are formally banned
for religious purposes
as falling outside accepted
for years or even decades
Abrahamic traditions
in some cases, generally(“heavenly religions”).
inruralcommunities
in
which
there were insufficient
During his public remarks at the January 2019 opening
church facilities—or none at all—to accommodate theof the new Coptic Orthodox cathedral, Grand Sheikh168

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TIER 2 EGYPT

local Coptic population. Neither these approvals, nor the intended target. In November 2018, in the deadliest single
additional facilities that have applied to register, nor theattack of the year, gunmen in the governorate of Minyapresence of preexisting churches address the country’s
attacked two minibuses of Christian pilgrims who had
uneven policies regarding places of worship. Given thatjust left the Monastery of St. Samuel the Confessor, killing
governors approved only eight new churches since theseven people and injuring seven others. The Egyptian
passage of Law 80/2016, including three properties inbranch of ISIS later claimed responsibility for that attack.
new and currently uninhabited urban developments,
Egyptian authorities typically single out thesethat disproportion remains largely overlooked.
large-scale incidents as symptomatic of terrorist
There remain other serious problems with theorganizations that target Christians as well as security
structure and implementation of Law 80/2016. Egypforces and police. During 2018, ISIS and remnants oftian security agencies maintain an unnecessary andother radical Islamist groups continued to pose a serious
outsized role in the registration approval process,threat to Egypt’s large Christian population. However,
although they play no such formal role in the approval ofblaming Egypt’s sectarian issues on radical Islamist
mosques. Furthermore, even as the responsible cabinet
groups belies the reality that societal bigotry and govcommittee cleared 783
ernment negligence also
properties for registration
play roles in incidents
during or just after theof communal violence.
.
.
.
blamingEgypt’ssectarianissuesonreporting period, local
Perceived negligenceradical Islamist groups belies theor provincial authorities
on the part of Egyptian
realitythatsocietalbigotry
andclosed at least eight othersecurity forces continued
government negligence also play roles inchurches during the year.
to be an ongoing grievincidentsofcommunal
violence.
Several of those closuresance of the Christianoccurred as a result of
population: for example,
mob violence directed
at the funeral for victims
toward Christians; rather than uphold the rule of law,of the monastery bus attack in November, eyewitnesses
authorities instead deferred to mob rule by allowing
reported a palpable and audible sense of anger toward
customary reconciliation sessions to determine the outpolice who failed to prevent the attack, despite its
come. Relatedly, several such incidents directly resulted
occurrence at a venue just one kilometer from a nearly
from reports that Christians had applied to register
identical and even deadlier attack on the same road inchurch-related properties or planned to do so, such as2017. In addition, police officers are sometimes directly
the March 2018 closure of the Church of the Virgin in
involved in such violence: for example, a Christianal-Toud, Qena Governorate, and the April 2018 closurebarber in Beni Suef died in police custody in July 2018of the Church of the Virgin and Pope Kirullus in Beni
after reportedly receiving a fatal beating from officers
Menin, Beni Suef Governorate.
when he attempted to report a dispute with a Muslim
fellow resident. In another example, a police sergeantSectarian Attacks and Legal Impunity
tasked with guarding a church in Minya gunned down a
While incidents of violence directly targeting Christians
Coptic father and son at a worksite in front of his post in
resulted in fewer casualties than in previous years, they
December, following a minor dispute. That officer was
persisted in various forms throughout 2018. Nongovernsubsequently found guilty of murder charges in Februmental interlocutors informed USCIRF during a Januaryary 2019, after the reporting period.
2019 country visit that there were at least 25 incidents
The prevalence of violence against Christians inof violence or attempted violence against Christians
Egypt was most clearly on display in incidents of mob
during the reporting period. Such incidents included
violence that occurred in rural towns and villages in
an attempted suicide bombing on a Coptic Orthodox
Upper Egypt; the perpetrators were moved to action bychurch in Qalyubiya in August, which police successthe words of their local imams and their own deeply
fully thwarted before the would-be bomber reached his
rooted prejudices. There were at least eight such mob

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attacks in 2018: in three separate attacks in Augustalone, Muslim rioters attacked Coptic churches, homes,
and businesses in Sultan Basha, Minya; Esna, Luxor;and Dimshaw Hashim, Minya, after reports circulated
that local Christians had attempted to legally register
their places of worship. Although none of these attacks
resulted in outright fatalities, they caused significant
property destruction and terrified local Christians. Furthermore, none of them produced legal consequences
for the perpetrators; instead, by deferring to customaryreconciliation sessions, local authorities made concessions to the rioters by agreeing to close the churches orprayer halls in dispute.

Discrimination and Gender-Based Violenceagainst Coptic Christians

fewer such reports in 2018, particularly in comparison
to earlier reporting periods, they remain a persistentfeature of Coptic vulnerability. It is exceedingly difficult to verify most of these reports; some may represent
cases of intercommunal relationships between young
Muslim men and Christian women whose families
refuse to accept their choices, and others likely point to
individual conversions that took place without any sortof coercion. However, some of these reports are likely
authentic, particularly but not limited to those incidents
involving a Coptic woman or girl who disappeared, or
whose abduction was directly witnessed. Because of thestigma that both religious conversion and the sexualassault implied by forcible abductions carry in Egyptian
society, regardless of the victims’ religious affiliation,
most of these incidents are at best difficult to document
and at worst remain underreported or unreported.

Apart from more overt examples of direct violence,
Coptic Christians continued to face widespread societal
Blasphemy Law and Limits onpressures such as religious discrimination and outright
Religious Expression
bigotry. Christians continued to be underrepresented
among high-ranking officers in the Egyptian police
Article 98(f) of the Egyptian Penal Code prohibits citiand armed forces as well as among leadership roles
zens from “ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions orin public universities and the judiciary, and they have
inciting sectarian strife.” Egyptian authorities contintraditionally been excluded from the country’s intelliued to use this law against “contempt of religion,” orgence apparatus and foreign service. The appointment
blasphemy, to detain, prosecute, and imprison Muslims,
of a Coptic woman to the governorship of Dumyat in
Christians, atheists, and members of smaller religious
September 2018 was an important step forward, butgroups whose practices deviate from mainstream
she remained the only Christian among 27 governors
Islamic beliefs. At least five resulted in conviction inacross the country.
2018, one of which was
The most recent andoverturned on appeal.
illustrative example ofProsecutors also launched
While
the
formationof
thiscommittee
this reality came in lateinvestigations into at least[to combat sectarianism] represented a
December, when Preseight new cases; in fivegenerally
positive,symbolicmove,
ident El-Sisi appointedof them, the defendants
it failed to include even aa committee to combat
remained in detention
singlerepresentativefromthesectarianism. While
awaiting trial at the end ofcountry’s Christian community.
the formation of thisthe reporting period.
committee represented
This blasphemy law
a generally positive,
also applies to activities
symbolic move, it failed to include even a single reprethat allegedly jeopardize communal harmony or vaguelysentative from the country’s Christian community.
insult religion, primarily Islam. Egypt’s legal system
Gender-based issues also play a culturally sigallows private citizens to bring charges against fellow
nificant role in these discriminatory pressures. Some
Egyptians to the public prosecutor for consideration, andChristians continued to claim ongoing abductions
this framework is especially susceptible to abuses of theof Christian women, often but not always involving
blasphemy law. Furthermore, it is common for prosecucoerced conversion to Islam. Although there weretors to tie blasphemy-related charges to unrelated court

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TIER 2 EGYPT

cases that involve violations of the ambiguous concept
both unique and common ongoing pressures from theof “public order.” For example, in July 2018, a Cairo court
government. The Baha’i community has been formallyconvicted a Lebanese tourist, Mona al-Mazbouh, onbanned for almost 60 years as a result of a decree issued
charges of “spreading false rumors that would harmby then President Gamal Abd al-Nasser. Furthermore,society, attacking religion, and public indecency” forsince Baha’i marriage is not recognized, married
posting a video to social media in which she complained
Baha’is still cannot obtain identity cards, making itof sexual harassment during her time in Egypt. She was
impossible for them to register for school, own a car, or
initially sentenced to eight years in prison for the comconduct daily transactions like banking. Other Baha’is
bined charges, but that sentence was suspended and she
can obtain identity cards only if they list a dash “--” inwas deported to Lebanon in September.
the required religion section since the only available
While the majority of those who are charged with
options are Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Egyptian
blasphemy are Sunni Muslims, most of the individuals
officials told USCIRF during a January 2019 country visit
who are actually convicted and sentenced to prison
that the status of Baha’is is a delicate matter and the govterms on related charges are Christians, atheists, andernment is unlikely to revoke the decree banning theirother religious minorities. In December 2018, a Minyarecognition anytime soon. Jehovah’s Witnesses remain
court found Abdo Adel, a Coptic Christian, guilty ofbanned under a 1960 decree; their meetings have“insulting Islam in the first degree” for a July Facebook
been allowed in private homes in groups of 30 or fewer
post that reportedly compared the Prophet Muhamindividuals, but repeated requests for the expansion
mad to Jesus, and sentenced him to three years inof this number have been denied or ignored. Jehovah’s
prison. In a sign of the societal consequences that often Witnesses are still not allowed to have their own places
surround blasphemy charges, a mob attacked Copof worship or import Bibles or other religious materials.
tic homes in Mr. Adel’s
The Egyptian governvillage after news of his
ment does not recognize
arrest spread, forcing
conversions of MusIn a sign of the societal consequences
local Christians to hidelims to other religions.
that often surroundfor days in fear of opening
Egyptian-born Muslims
blasphemy charges, a mob attacked
their shops or emerging
who have converted to
Coptic homes . . . forcing local
into public view. None
Christianity or other reliChristians to hide for daysof the rioters faced legal
gions still cannot reflectin fear of opening their shops orconsequences following
their change of religious
emerging into public view
the predictable outcome
affiliation on identityof a customary reconcilidocuments, and in many
ation session. Meanwhile,cases, these converts
police have detained and released self-professed athecontinue to face intense social hostility. In past cases
ist Sherif Gaber several times since he was first brought
in which converts have sued for the right to reflect their
up on blasphemy-related charges in 2013, including his
new religious affiliation on ID cards, Egyptian courts
most recent arrest and release in May 2018. According
have ruled that Muslims are forbidden from converting
to Mr. Gaber’s own account, Egyptian authorities havefrom Islam based on principles of Islamic law because
since prevented him from leaving the country, and fear
conversion would constitute an insult to Islam andof long-term imprisonment has forced him into hiding.
threaten public order by enticing other Muslims toconvert. In 2018, there also remained systemic problems
Smaller Religious Communities: Baha’is,for individuals who converted to Islam but then conJehovah’s Witnesses, Converts, Jews
verted back to Christianity to have this change reflected
While Coptic Christians represent the largest nonon identity documents. Despite a July 2011 law making
Sunni Muslim population in Egypt, the country is also
it easier to reflect one’s religion on ID cards—and nothome to other, smaller religious communities who facehaving to declare “formerly Muslim”—it remained171

TIER 2 EGYPT

exceedingly difficult in practice for these individuals
to obtain identity cards. Egypt’s ancient Jewish community has dwindled to near-extinction with fewer
than 20 Egyptian Jews remaining in the country. Whileanti-Semitic sentiment remained persistent in Egyptian
mass media and society at large, senior government
officials made a series of public announcements in 2018that encouraged increased tolerance toward the country’s Jewish heritage. In November, President El-Sisi
remarked at the World Youth Forum that Jews shouldhave the right like Muslims and Christians to build
places of worship in Egypt. The Ministry of Antiquities
subsequently announced in December that the president had allotted $72 million toward the restoration of
Egypt’s Jewish cultural heritage.

U.S. POLICYThe United States has a close and longstanding partnership with Egypt, extending back to the 1979 Camp David
Accords. Through that partnership, the U.S. government
gives $1.3 billion in military aid to Egypt annually, in
addition to lesser amounts of humanitarian and otherforms of financial aid. In 2018, it also continued topartner with Egypt in military exercises, counterterrorism assistance, intelligence sharing, and other forms ofcooperation, even as U.S. leadership also took personal
interest in Egypt’s religious freedom conditions.
In September 2018, on the sidelines of the United
Nations General Assembly, President Donald J. Trumpraised the importance of religious freedom and theplight of Coptic Christians during a meeting with
President El-Sisi. Vice President Michael R. Pence also
engaged with Egyptian officials during the reporting
period, including an official visit to Cairo in January
2018 and a phone call with President El-Sisi in May.
During his January visit, he expressed concern andcondolences over recent attacks on Coptic Christians aswell as on Muslim places of worship, and in November
he explicitly condemned the ISIS bus attack on Coptic
pilgrims, calling such violence “cowardly assaults on themost basic freedoms of the Egyptian people.”
However, in 2018, the U.S. government also repeatedly raised concerns regarding Egypt’s human rights
situation. In March, Congress passed the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2018, which conditioned the
disbursement of up to $300 million in aid to Egypt on

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its progress toward the promotion of democracy andhuman rights, including a commitment to due process
and the protection of religious minorities. In May, theSenate Appropriations Committee held up that $300
million in response to several human rights concerns,
including the damaging effects of Egypt’s restrictive
policies regarding NGOs (Law 70/2017) and the unresolved investigation into the 2016 abduction and killingof Italian graduate student Giulio Regeni. Despite theseongoing concerns, in July 2018 the State Department
ordered the release of $195 million of the remaining
military aid to Egypt.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
COMMISSIONER JOHNNIE MOORE
Egypt is making progress at a rapid pace and deserves
credit for it. Both the substantive actions taken by thepresidential administration and parliament, as well as
President al-Sisi’s important statements and symbolic
actions, have together created an environment of greater
religious freedom, emanating from the world’s mostpopulous Arab country and the theological heart of theIslamic world. There are reasons for optimism.
In my estimation, the two main reasons Egypt
remains on Tier 2 relate to: 1) The Egyptian struggle toexport Cairo’s commitment to peaceful coexistence,
religious freedom, and security for all religious communities to Upper Egypt, especially Minya; and 2) the needto enshrine best-intentioned practices into law and policy for other minority communities such as the Baha’is.
The relationship between Egypt’s central government and its Christian and Jewish communities,
including the vast diaspora of Egyptian Jews, may be atan all-time modern high. However, the government mustfind the capacity, and local leaders must find the will,to create the same type of environment throughout theless educated, less secure, and more sectarian parts ofthe country. Based upon my own engagement with the
Egyptian President and senior leaders in the country,
including the Coptic Orthodox Pope, the government
needs more resources to address those challenges.
If the Egyptian government can—judiciously—
resolve issues in Minya then it will have reduced
significantly criticism that it receives from religious
freedom communities, which will then more clearly
see that the policies and priorities of Cairo have made

TIER 2 EGYPT

it throughout the country. When it comes to otherminority communities such as Baha’is, Jehovah’s Witnesses and others, I have found the communities to becomplementary and supportive of the government, andyet policies carried over from Egypt’s past still make it
difficult for them to legally marry, establish places toworship, and fulfill other religious rites.
This is a solvable problem for the Egyptian government, particularly given that even religious leaders from
Al-Azhar are now in support of such policy changes, as
this report cites. The Egyptian government could, forinstance, simply create an “office for special cases” inorder to facilitate the marriage of Baha’is, facilitate equal
rights for other religious communities, change ID cards,
etc. even before the parliament is able to expand thechurch building law to other religious communities or
enshrine other rights in the law.
If the situation in Minya were different, and if
communities like the Baha’is could overcome theseobstacles to full recognition, I personally believe Egypt
would likely merit removal from Tier 2 altogether.

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INDIATIER 2KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in India continued adownward trend. India has a long history as a secular democracy where religious communities of every faith have thrived.
The constitution guarantees the right to religious freedom, andthe nation’s independent judiciary has often provided essential
protections to religious minority communities through its jurisprudence. Yet, this history of religious freedom has come underattack in recent years with the growth of exclusionary extremist
narratives—including, at times, the government’s allowanceand encouragement of mob violence against religious minorities—that have facilitated an egregious and ongoing campaignof violence, intimidation, and harassment against non-Hindu
and lower-caste Hindu minorities. Both public and private
actors have engaged in this campaign. In 2018, approximately
one-third of state governments increasingly enforced anti-conversion and/or anti-cow slaughter laws discriminatorily against
non-Hindus and Dalits alike. Further, cow protection mobs
engaged in violence predominantly targeting Muslims andDalits, some of whom have been legally involved in the dairy,
leather, or beef trades for generations. Mob violence was also
carried out against Christians under accusations of forced or
induced religious conversion. In cases involving mobs killing
an individual based on false accusations of cow slaughter orforced conversion, police investigations and prosecutions often
were not adequately pursued. Rules on the registration offoreign-funded nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) werediscriminatorily implemented against religious minority groups.
Religious freedom conditions varied dramatically from state
to state, with some states continuing to be relatively open

and free for religious minorities, while others—if taken on
their own—had “systematic, ongoing, egregious” violationsof religious freedom. In 2018, the Supreme Court of India
highlighted the deteriorating conditions for religious freedom
in some states, concluding that certain state governments
were not doing enough to stop violence against religious
minorities and, in some extreme instances, impunity was being
granted to criminals engaged in communal violence. Prime
Minister Narendra Modi seldom made statements decrying
mob violence, and certain members of his political party haveaffiliations with Hindu extremist groups and used inflammatory
language about religious minorities publicly. Victims of largescale attacks in recent years have not been granted justice, andreports of new crimes committed against religious minorities
were not adequately accounted for or prosecuted. India’s
substantial population both complicates and limits the abilityof national and state institutions to address these issues.
Based on these concerns, in 2019 USCIRF again places India
on its Tier 2 for engaging in or tolerating religious freedom
violations that meet at least one of the elements of the “systematic, ongoing, egregious” standard for designation as a“country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International
Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). While the Indian government
repeatedly has denied USCIRF access to India, the Commission
welcomes the opportunity to openly and candidly engage
with the government—including the chance for a USCIRF delegation to visit India—to discuss shared values and interests,
including international standards of freedom of religion or
belief and related human rights.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Press the Indian government to allow a
USCIRF delegation to visit the country
and meet with stakeholders to evaluate conditions for freedom of religion
or belief in India;• Work with the Indian government tocreate a multiyear strategy to ebb theflow of hate crimes targeting religious
minorities, including by:• Pressing state governments to prosecute religious leaders, government
officials, and media personalities
who incite violence against religious
minority groups through public
speeches or articles, as was recommended by the National Minorities
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• Strengthening the training andcapacity of state and central police
to prevent and punish cases of religious violence, while also protecting
victims, witnesses, and houses ofworship and other holy sites;• Encouraging passage of the Protection of Human Rights (Amendment)
Bill, 2018 to establish national andstate human rights commissions andhuman rights courts; and• Assisting the Ministry of Law andJustice to work with state prosecutors to increase the rate ofprosecutions for hate crimes andonline hate speech targeting religious minorities;• Increase the U.S. Embassy’s focus
on religious freedom and related
human rights through continued visits
to regions impacted by religiously
motivated violence and dialogue withreligious communities, local governmental leaders, and police; and• Advocate for the Indian central
government to ensure that theForeign Contribution Regulation Act
is not used discriminatorily to target
international missionary and humanrights groups, and to press states with
anti-conversion and anti-cow slaughter laws to do the same.

TIER 2 INDIA

COUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Republic of India
GOVERNMENT
Federal Parliamentary Republic
POPULATION
1,210,193,422
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSSecular Constitution

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*:
79.80% Hindu
14.2% Muslim
2.3% Christian
1.7% Sikh
0.7% Buddhist
0.4% Jain
0.7% Other (including Zoroastrians, Jews, Baha’is, and tribal
religions)
0.2% Religion Not Stated*Estimates compiled from the 2011 Census of India (15th census)

BACKGROUND
As the world’s largest democracy, India is not only a leader
in South Asia, but also a unique power with a prominent
position in the global economy. Its standing is underpinned by a vibrant and uninterrupted parliamentary
system of democracy, which includes an active and independent judiciary and a federal constitutional system that
limits some powers of the central government and grants
a great deal of policymaking power to the states.
Over the last decade, conditions for religious
minorities in India have deteriorated. A multifaceted
campaign by Hindu nationalist groups like Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sang (RSS), Sangh Parivar, and Vishva
Hindu Parishad (VHP) to alienate non-Hindus or lower-caste Hindus is a significant contributor to the riseof religious violence and persecution. Those targetedby this campaign—including Muslims, Christians,
Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and lower-caste Hindus—facechallenges ranging from acts of violence or intimidation, to the loss of political power, increasing feelingsof disenfranchisement, and limits on access to education, housing, and employment. While there is asystem of affirmative action for education, housing,and employment that is constitutionally mandated toassist historically disenfranchised groups, especiallylower-caste Hindus, some have called its efficacy andfairness of implementation into question.
In 2017, the Indian government’s criminal datacollection agency, the National Crime Records Bureau(NCRB), reported that communal violence increased
significantly during 2016. However, in 2018, minority
rights groups criticized the NCRB’s methodology for
failing to include more categories on mob violence or
lynching. Accordingly, the NCRB delayed its 2018 reportto collect data on nearly 30 new crime categories, which
will include hate crimes, lynching, and crimes based on
fake news.
In 2018, religious minorities remained concernedwith their safety and security. In February 2018, Minister of State at the Ministry of Home Affairs Hansraj Ahir
reported to parliament that 111 people were murderedand 2,384 injured in 822 communal clashes during 2017(as compared to 86 people killed and 2,321 injured in
703 incidents the previous year). Positively, in December
2018, Union Minister for Home Affairs Rajnath Singhsaid that the number of communal attacks dropped 12
percent in 2018 from the high in 2017. Independent hatecrime monitoring services reported that in 2018 there
were more than 90 religious-based hate crimes, causing
30 deaths and far more injuries.

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In addition, institutional challenges impact progress on all issues, including religious freedom. For
example, Indian state and central government agencies
face an immense task that has left the police and courts
overwhelmed by the needs of a growing populationand longstanding gaps in their capacity, training, andfunding. Also, worsening income inequality has left more
Indians suffering from poverty and has exacerbated historical conditions of inequality for certain religious andsocial minorities.

continued to document and report incidents in which
politicians and government officials engaged publicly inincitement to violence against religious minorities.

Role of Hindutva/Hindu Extremist Groups

Various nationalist groups in India have expanded theideology of Hindutva, or “Hinduness,” which has threepillars—common nation, race, and culture—and forms
the basis of an oftentimes exclusionary national narrativewith a singular focus on the rights of Hindus. The views
espoused by individuals belonging to these groups and
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018the activities they undertake vary widely. Nevertheless,Positive Developments
both moderate and extreme forces within the Hindutva
movement point to the rise in the Muslim population
Despite an overall deterioration of religious freedom
from constituting 10 percent of the national population in
conditions in 2018, there were also positive devel1951 to 14 percent in 2011, which in their view necessitates
opments. Some government entities made efforts to“mitigation” against the growing Muslim community.
counter increasing intolerance in the country, which led
While some Hindutva groups want greater influence of
to a 12 percent decline in communal violence comHindu principles in the state’s decision-making process,pared to the previous year, according to Home Minister
more extreme elements have stated they would like
Singh. The judiciary, exemplified by the Supreme Court
to see all non-Hindus expelled, killed, or converted toof India, decided several cases during the year that
Hinduism. Some members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata
protected the rights of religious minorities. In 2017, theParty (BJP) have affiliations with Hindu extremist groups
Supreme Court called on state governments to establish
and have used discriminatory language about religious
mechanisms to prevent mob violence, and in June 2018minorities. For example, in 2018, state-level BJP member
issued a follow-up call to the central and state central
T. Raja Singh was charged by the police for hate speechgovernments to pursue an 11-point plan, including
after stating that “every Hindu should carry weapons likecompensation to hate crime victims, fast-tracking
lathis [clubs] and attack other communities’ members if
prosecutions, assigning senior police officers to deal
they said anything wrong.”with communal issues, and other provisions. The lower
The influence of Hindutva groups goes beyond
courts also made some progress in prosecuting mob
politics
and government. For example, Hindutva
members; for example, in March 2018 a court in thegroups have expanded the scope and size of relieastern state of Jharkhand sentenced 11 men to life
gious schools—which often teach intolerant religious
imprisonment for lynching a Muslim man in June 2017.
ideology in nongovernmental private educational sysIn 2018, the government also invested more of its
tems—to nearly four million students, and have triedbudget in minority development projects. For example,
to distribute books promoting religious intolerance
the central government granted the Ministry of Minority
in public schools. Some
Affairs a 12 percent
groups have student
increase in its budget, andyouth wings, such as
it was reported that all ofSome government entities
the RSS’s Akhil Bharathe new minority developmade efforts to counter increasingtiya Vidyarthi Parishadment projects combined
intolerance in the country . . .
(ABVP), which haveconstituted a 62 percent
used intimidation andincrease for minority
violence in colleges toaffairs. The National Comsilence
theirsecularor
non-Hinduclassmates and shut
mission for Minorities— created as a statutory body indown events that challenge their viewpoints.
1992 and whose members are government nominated—

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Two months later in the same state, 25 Christians werearrested due to accusations of induced conversion after
they conducted a group prayer at the home of a Christian. While nine were released, the remaining membersof the group were charged under Jharkhand’s anti-conversion law and remanded to judicial custody while
their charges were prosecuted; these cases were ongoingat the end of the reporting period.
In 2018, the media dedicated significant coverage to
Anti-Conversion Laws andinflammatory allegations of an organized campaign toForced Conversion
coerce Hindu women to marry Muslim men and convert
The fundamental right to freedom of religion or belief
to Islam. In March 2018, the Supreme Court of India set
includes the right to change one’s faith to anotheraside a 2017 decision by the High Court of Kerala thator to no faith at all. This right includes the ability to
had annulled the marriage of a woman by the name ofmanifest one’s beliefs through expression intended
Hadiya; originally from a Hindu family, Hadiya converted
to persuade another individual to change his or her
to Islam and married a Muslim man in 2016. The Kerala
religious beliefs or affiliation voluntarily. In India, stateHigh Court determined that she had been subject tolevel anti-conversion laws prohibit conversion based onan organized coercion campaign. The Supreme Court
force, allurement, inducement, or fraud; however, somereversed and upheld the marriage after being satisfied
contain such broad definitions that they can be interthat she had freely granted consent. The Hadiya casepreted as prohibiting any kind of conversion, whether
prompted the National Investigation Agency (NIA),
consensual or not. Anti-conversion laws have gone into
India’s national counterterrorism investigative agency,
effect in seven states: Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Chhatto launch an investigation into the existence of a coorditisgarh, Gujarat, Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, nated campaign to force women to convert and marry. In
and Jharkhand. In 2018, USCIRF released a report,
October 2018, the NIA concluded, after numerous investiLimitations on Minorities’ Religious Freedom in Southgations, that there was no evidence of such a campaign.
Asia, which discussed the trend of anti-conversion laws
Some Hindutva groups have sought to convert thosein India. In some states, anyone engaged in conversion
born Hindu who had converted to another faith back tomust register with local government authorities.
Hinduism through “homecoming” conversion ceremonies
In 2018, anti-conversion laws were enforced pre(ghar wapsi). In some cases, these conversion ceremonies
dominantly against Muslims and Christians engaged inreportedly involve force or coercion; however, it is often
proselytization and also limited the freedom of religiondifficult to ascertain whether such conversions take placeor belief of others to discuss, consider, and ultimately
voluntarily or forcibly. There continued to be reports of
convert to other religions.
such ceremonies in 2018,
Also, religious minority
although their number andleaders and adherents
nature were impossible[Some] state level
faced intimidation andto confirm. For example,
anti-conversion laws . . . contain sucharrest under the guise ofin April 2018, a Hindutva
broad definitions that they can be
anti-conversion laws. For
group was alleged to haveinterpreted as prohibiting any
example, in May 2018,
physically assaulted a Dalit
kind of conversion,authorities arrested 11
man in Uttar Pradesh whowhether consensual or not.
people for conducting a
had recently converted
group prayer in a home infrom Hinduism to Islam
Jharkhand, and four othand, according to reports,
ers were arrested nearby after locals complained about
forced him to undertake ghar wapsi to convert back to Hinthe group conducting a Christian marriage ceremony.
duism. Video accounts of the incident, although somewhat

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In general, both the federal and state governments
have done little to condemn the use of inflammatory
language, even if it incites violence. And state action torename numerous cities—such as Faizabad and Allahabad from the names that had been given during theMughal period—has been perceived as an effort to eraseor downplay the influence of non-Hindus in Indian history and as an attack on Muslims within India today.

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unclear, show a group of men removing the skull cap fromthe man’s head and shaving off his beard. In October 2018,
also in Uttar Pradesh, a family who had been Muslim forgenerations was reportedly forced to convert to Hinduism;
13 individuals from the family were involved.

Cow Slaughter Laws and Vigilante Groups

and nonstate actors, particularly when their actions
result in hate crimes. The ruling—which also instructedstate governments to monitor mob incidents—came inresponse to petitions to the court regarding vigilantism
against Muslims for cattle slaughter, dairy farming, andbeef consumption.

Hate Crimes and Incitement to Violence
Under article 48 of India’s constitution, the slaughter
against Religious Minorities
of cows is prohibited. Accordingly, 21 out of 29 states
Hate crimes and incitement to violence directed atin India prohibit cow slaughter in various forms, withreligious minority communities remained a prevalentprison sentences ranging from six months to 14 years.
threat in 2018. As one example of the communal violence
Since 2005, the Supreme Court of India has accepted thetowards Muslims, in April 2018, during an annual Hindu
constitutionality of cow slaughter laws. In 2018, several
festival in West Bengal, Hindutva extremists taunted
state governments toughened their laws to increase theMuslims and used anti-Muslim rhetoric. At least fourpunishment for cow slaughter. While prohibitions on
people died during the ensuing communal clashes. The
cow slaughter have a long history in India, “cow protecpolice reportedly opened investigations into possibletion” mobs are a new phenomenon, and such groups
links to members of the BJP, although the case remained
have perpetrated more than 100 attacks since May 2015,
ongoing at the end of the reporting period.
resulting in 44 deaths and approximately 300 injured.
In addition, Christians have reported threats to
In 2018 alone, cow protection lynch mobs killed at least
their safety over the past
13 people and injured
year, as well as increased
57 in 31 incidents. Not
discrimination andonly do these mobs take[Cow
protection]
mobs
take
the
unfair treatment directly
the law into their own
law into their own hands byrelated to their religious
hands by publicly beating
publicly
beatingormurdering
identity. For example,
or murdering individindividuals suspected of cow slaughter—various research groups
uals suspected of cow
usuallywith
impunity.
.
.
affiliated with Chrisslaughter—usually withtian churches found an
impunity—but they also
increase in hate speechharass and intimidate
and hate crimes against Christians across the country,
individuals engaged in the dairy industry without conespecially in northeastern states, where the Christiannections to cow slaughter.
community has grown in recent decades. Throughout
In July 2018, a dairy farmer named Rakbar Khan
August and September 2018, authorities arrested sevwas beaten to death in Rajasthan. While the details oferal Christian pastors in Uttar Pradesh, some during
his death continue to be corroborated, it appears thatchurch services and prayer meetings, while mobs
the police were complicit or directly involved, alongattacked and threatened others. Some of the pastors
with a local mob. In December 2018, in another incident
arrested were accused of alleged conversions. In one
in Uttar Pradesh, a mob shot and killed police officer
set of simultaneous attacks in October 2018, Hindutva
Subodh Kumar Singh and another victim after findextremists issued threats against four churches in theing cow carcasses. In response, Uttar Pradesh’s Chiefstate of Tamil Nadu. Church worshipers were subject
Minister Yogi Adityanath stated that the mob attack was
to public hate speech, attacks on their church strucan accident and generally denied the existence of lynchtures, and threats issued to the church’s leadership. In
mob killings in his state.
December 2018, a mob attacked a small community
In a July 2018 ruling on mob violence and cow
church in Maharashtra’s Kolhapur district, leaving
vigilantism, the Supreme Court of India instructed themany injured just before Christmas.
government to enact legislation to address extrajudicial

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Continued Impunity for Large-Scale
Communal Violence

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NGO Registration

Several international groups—some with missionary
Numerous instances of large-scale communal violenceand human rights portfolios—have been prohibited
across India remain unresolved years later, withoutfrom operating in India since the Foreign Contribution
proper accountability or recompense. Investigations
Regulation Act (FCRA) of 1976 was updated in 2010.
and prosecutions of those involved in large-scale
Under the revision to the law, the government can shutcommunal violence have too often been ineffective or
down any internationally funded NGO engaged in “anyabsent. Further, victims
activities detrimental tohave complained thatthe national interest.”
the government has not
The government has
Investigations and prosecutions ofprovided adequate assisalso used this provision
those involved in large-scaletance to rebuild destroyed
to shut down thousands
communal violence have too often
neighborhoods, homes,of international NGOs
been ineffective or absent.
and places of worship.
since 2014; some reports
The government has
estimate that 20,000
also not taken sufficientNGOs have been denied
steps to prevent such large-scale communal violence
licenses to operate or continue operations. The processfrom recurring. The Supreme Court of India andby which NGOs have to apply for certification lacks
fact-finding commissions, among other institutions,transparency, and NGOs who have been denied operhave noted common characteristics and causes ofational licenses often cannot obtain explanations forsuch violence, including incitement to violence against
the denial. The NGOs were often targeted for politicalreligious minorities by politicians or religious leaders.
reasons, however, non-Hindu religious organizations
Yet failing to address those common characteristics andwere also targeted. In November 2018, the Indian govcauses or to hold perpetrators accountable have contribernment demanded that 1,775 organizations provide
uted to a culture of impunity for such violence.
further explanation for their failure to submit use of
The case of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, Uttar
foreign funds over the last six years; these organizations included many non-Hindu religious groups, some Pradesh, exemplifies the enduring nature of theseconflicts. In 1992, after Hindutva groups destroyed the
Hindu trusts managing major temples, and secularBabri Mosque, nearly 2,000 people lost their lives after
human rights groups. USCIRF’s 2018 report on limmonths of rioting. In 2018, this tension continued asitations to religious freedom in South Asia and a 2018
politicians and others renewed calls for a Hindu temple
Congressional Research Service report described theto be built on the mosque ruins; the Supreme Court of
FCRA’s impact.
India in 2018 heard several pleas regarding the site.
Some among the Hindu population—including some Hindutva extremists—perceive Christian
Assam and Citizenshipmissionaries converting Dalits to be particularly
In 1951, the National Register of Citizens (NRC) was
threatening, as there are nearly 200 million Dalits ininstituted in Assam. The NRC was a way to keep track ofIndia. Many observers assert that it was this fear of
all registered Indian citizens, as Assam is a border state
mass conversion that led to the 2017 shutdown of Comwith significant security concerns and an ever-changing
passion International, a U.S.-based Christian charity,
migrant population. In 2015, a process began to update
which provided services to nearly 150,000 Indian
the NRC, for the first time since 1951. Anyone bornchildren. Compassion International remained closed
after March 24, 1971, had to provide documentation ofat the end of the reporting period; it hopes to reopen
Indian citizenship. In July 2018, the Indian government
operations in India in the future, though this may
released a draft update to the NRC, which excluded
prove difficult considering the way the FCRA has been
approximately four million people from the register due
applied against Christian groups.
to their alleged inability to provide such documentation.

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Since that time, individuals excluded from the draft list
have lodged hundreds of thousands of objections. The
final NRC list is expected to be released in July 2019; thefear and/or expectation is that anyone not on that list
will be rendered stateless and considered a foreigner.
Widespread concerns have been raised that the
NRC update is an intentional effort to discriminate and/or has the effect of discriminating against Muslims, andthat the discretion given to local authorities in the verification process and in identifying perceived foreigners
to be excluded from the draft list will be abused. For
some, the exclusion of the four million people from thedraft NRC affirmed those concerns. A June 2018 joint
letter by four United Nations (UN) special rapporteurs—
including the special rapporteur on freedom of religion
or belief—explained that the citizenship registry “hasgenerated increased anxiety and concerns among theBengali Muslim minority in Assam, who have long been
discriminated against due to their perceived status asforeigners, despite possessing the necessary documents
to prove their citizenship.” The UN experts reiterated
their concerns in a December 2018 statement, which
noted that while the exact exclusions were unknown at
the time, they appeared to target “ethnic, religious andlinguistic minorities.” The State Department highlighted the fraught nature of the National Register of
Citizens in Assam in its 2018 Human Rights Report for
India, released after the reporting period.
Concerns about the targeting of Muslims throughthe citizenship process were separately exacerbatedby the introduction and passage of the CitizenshipAmendment Bill in the Lok Sabha (“lower house”)
of Parliament, which would provide citizenship tomigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan
as long as they were not Muslim. In February 2019, after
the reporting period, the bill was dropped in the Raj
Sabha (“upper house”) of Parliament amid protests.

Women and Religious Freedom
In 2018, women and girls in India continued to be thetargets of intracommunal honor killings, intercommunal violence, and sexual violence along religious lines.
In a 2018 incident known as the Kathua rape case, aneight year old girl named Asifa Bano was abducted,
gang-raped, and murdered as a message and threat toher Muslim nomadic community in Kashmir. The priest

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of a private temple, his son, and a special police officer
were charged in the abduction, gang rape, and murder;
several other police officers were charged with covering
up the crimes. While many decried the young girl’s rapeand murder, several others organized in support of themen charged, including members of the BJP.
The year 2018 marked a renewed focus on anddiscussion of restrictions placed on women’s ability toworship at certain religious sites. In September 2018, theSupreme Court of India ordered that Sabarimala temple
in Kerala be opened to adult women, striking down alongstanding ban on women between the ages of 10 and
50 from taking the special pilgrimage to the temple. In
response, women attempting to enter the temple were
physically attacked and others who publicly stated thatthey would try to enter the temple received hate messages including death threats both online and in-person.
Nearly five million women reportedly initiated a counter-protest movement in January 2019, after the reporting
period, by forming a 385-mile human chain near thetemple to protest in favor of equal access for all.

U.S. POLICY
India and the United States have strengthened ties over thelast several decades, with India now described as a focal
partner in the Indo-Pacific region. For several decades, theUnited States and India have pursued a strategic relationship based on shared values of democracy and the rule oflaw and shared interests relating to energy, security, trade,and counterterrorism. The U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue
was launched in 2009 through which the countries havediscussed a wide range of bilateral, regional, and global
issues such as economic development, business and trade,
education, technology, counterterrorism, and the environment. Human rights and religious freedom, however, havenot been emphasized.
In 2017, when Prime Minister Modi visited theUnited States, he and President Donald J. Trump agreed
to create a 2+2 Dialogue to further deepen security andeconomic cooperation between the two countries. At
the inaugural meeting of the 2+2 Dialogue in September 2018, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo andthen Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis conducteda joint visit to India to negotiate terms for the multi-issue agreement. During a visit to India in June 2018,
then Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley noted how theINDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
CHAIR TENZIN DORJEE
While India must address issues related to religious
freedom, I respectfully dissent on the views that India’s
religious freedom conditions continued on a downward
trend, the government allowed and encouraged mob
violence against religious minorities, and some states
are involved in “systematic, ongoing, and egregious
violations of religious freedom.” India is an open society
with a robust democratic and judiciary system.
India is a great civilization, and since ancient times
she has been a country of multifaith, multilingual,and multicultural. I lived in India for over 30 years as a
Tibetan refugee and mostly witnessed the best of Indiaand sometimes worst due to intractable interreligious
conflicts. Unfortunately, religious divides and power
struggles not only led to the partition of India andPakistan but often contribute to the egregious violations of religious freedom and tragedies. Despite theseissues, India exists as a multifaith and secular country.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama praises India greatly for
religious diversity and harmony and secular values suchas respect and compassion, and has committed himself
to revive and promote them for global harmony among
all faiths and nonfaiths.

I mostly grew up and lived in two Indian states,
Karnataka and Himachal Pradesh. As a Tibetan
refugee—the most vulnerable minority among all
minorities there—experienced full religious freedom
in India. Inside Tibet, communist China has systematically, egregiously, and continuously destroyed Tibetan
religion, language, culture, and environment. However, Tibetan language, religion, and culture thrive
in India due to the full support of India and Indianpeople. In many scholarly publications, I discussed
it extensively and as a Tibetan American, I often visit
India and observe abundant religious freedom andinterreligious harmony there.
As I commented last year, overall, I believe religious
harmony exists in India. Last year, in Budhupur, Bihar, aMuslim village donated land and money to build a Hindu
temple for their Hindu families, and in a Punjab village, a Hindu temple donated land nearby, and Hindus
and Sikhs helped build a mosque for Muslims of theircommunity. Notably, in Hyderabad last year, the Hindu
head priest CS Rangarajan carried a Dalit youth Aditya
Parasri on his shoulders into the Chilkur Balaji Temple’s
inner sanctum, and a huge crowd cheered. Relatedly,in Nathowal village near Ludhiana Hindu and Sikhcommunities helped repair an old mosque in the village,
and Muslim and Hindu communities helped work at
Sikh Gurudwara Temple. People in this village reported
to the Times of India that they celebrated together annual
multifaith festivals such as Diwali, Dusshera, Rakhi, Eid,and Gurupurab. These stories speak for India’s multifaith civilization, religious freedom, and interreligious
harmony. I strongly appeal to the Indian leadership andpeople of India to continuously respect religious freedom
and strive to promote India as a vibrant country of andfor the multifaith people.

TIER 2 INDIA

United States and India both respect religious freedom.
Similarly, when asked about how human rights andreligious freedom may impact the 2+2 Dialogue between
the U.S. and India, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Southand Central Asia Alice Wells asserted that India respects
religious freedom inside its borders.
In 2018, the U.S. Embassy and Consulates
continued to engage in discussions with religious
representatives and other stakeholders about religious
persecution and intolerance and to promote interfaithdialogue. In December 2018, Senior Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South/Central
Asia Knox Thames visited India and met with religious
communities and discussed interfaith relations.
Since 2001, USCIRF has attempted to visit India
in order to assess religious freedom conditions on the
ground. However, on three different occasions—in
2001, 2009, and 2016—the government of India refused
to grant visas for a USCIRF delegation despite requests
being supported by the State Department.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
COMMISSIONER ANURIMA BHARGAVA
India is a rich, multi-faith, vibrant democracy thatwarrants close and constructive engagement with theCommission. For more than a decade, however, theCommission has not been granted the opportunity tointeract nor visit India in any official capacity. As a new
Commissioner, I look forward to open and productive
dialogue and stronger engagement of the Commission
with India in the year to come.

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INDONESIATIER 2KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, the overall religious freedom conditions in Indonesia trended negative. Although the number of religious
freedom violations committed by state actors decreased
in 2018, the Indonesian government continued to enforce
several laws and policies that imposed significant obstacles
to religious freedom, such as draconian blasphemy laws andan arduous approval process for the construction of newhouses of worship. The national government frequently does
not intervene when provincial and local governments enact
unconstitutional regulations or policies that exacerbate religious divisions. For example, in late 2018, the government
released a mobile phone application that provides citizens
the ability to report on “deviant” religious practices, creating
panic among Indonesia’s religious minorities and underscoring the risks of acceding to pressure from hardliners and otherintolerant groups. Moreover, there has been little effort torein in hardliners and other intolerant groups that commit actsof discrimination and violence against members of certain
faiths. There were increased signs of radicalization in 2018,
particularly in Indonesia’s education system. Candidates in
the 2018 regional elections appealed to religious sectarianism, raising fears about the politicization of religion aheadof the April 2019 general elections. Violations of religious
freedom tended to have the greatest impact on Ahmadiyya
and Shi’a Muslims, Christians, believers outside the six officially recognized faiths, and nonbelievers. In October 2018,a USCIRF delegation visited Indonesia to assess religious
freedom conditions.
In 2019, USCIRF again places Indonesia on its Tier 2, where
it has been since 2004, for engaging in or tolerating religious
freedom violations that meet at least one of the elements of
the “systematic, ongoing, egregious” standard for designation
as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Direct the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta
and the U.S. Consulates in Indonesia
to urge the Indonesian government
at the central, provincial, and local
levels to repeal or amend laws that
violate religious freedom, including
but not limited to: the blasphemy law
and related measures; a regulation on
houses of worship; a decree banning
Ahmadiyya members from spreading

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their faith; and requirements to namereligious affiliation on ID cards;• Prioritize funding for programs that
improve the capacity of civil society
and the media to collect, investigate,
and clarify provocative information
relating to religion that appears online
or in text messages;• Focus U.S. government funding forderadicalization efforts in Indonesia

on teachers, students, and school
administrators, particularly in Islamicboarding schools; and• Ensure that U.S.-funded programs forIndonesian police and counterterrorism
officials incorporate training on addressing sectarian conflict, religion-related
vigilantism, hate speech, and terrorism
through practices consistent with international human rights standards.

TIER 2 INDONESIACOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Republic of Indonesia
GOVERNMENT
Presidential Republic
POPULATION
262,787,403
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSIslam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism,
Confucianism

BACKGROUND
Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country, has a long tradition of religious pluralism.
According to article 29 of its constitution, “The Stateguarantees the independence of each resident toembrace religion and worship according to theirrespective religions and beliefs.” The government haspromoted an ideology known as Pancasila, which comprises five principles: monotheism, civilized humanity,
national unity, deliberative democracy, and social justice(“monotheism” broadly defined as any religion with asupreme deity, a prophet or holy figure, a scripture, andestablished rituals). However, the government officiallyrecognizes only six religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism.
Indonesia has a long history of interreligious conflict,from the Darul Islam insurgency in the 1950s that soughtto establish an Islamic state to fighting between Christianand Muslim militias in Maluku during the early 2000s
that killed more than 5,000 people and displaced 700,000.
Even in the absence of armed conflict, hardliners andother intolerant groups have used religious appeals to
provoke riots against certain religious minorities, sometimes causing physical injuries, destruction of property,
and even fatalities. As such, many Indonesians havetended to prioritize interfaith harmony over religious
freedom. The government claims many of the policies

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
87.2% Muslim
7% Protestant
2.9% Catholic
1.7% Hindu
0.9% Other (includes Buddhist and Confucian)
0.4% Unspecified*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook

that violate religious freedom, such as the criminalization of blasphemy and approval process for new housesof worship, are necessary to prevent conflict, but theselaws and regulations often have the unintended effect ofexacerbating interreligious tensions.
Although the country’s largest Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah,remain committed to religious pluralism and theprinciples of Pancasila, since the country’s transition
to democracy in 1998 hardliners and other intolerantgroups—such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) andthe Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI), the country’s
top Muslim clerical body—have called for increasinglyconservative interpretations of Islam. This social undercurrent has been buttressed in part by Saudi investment
and influence in Indonesia for decades, which, according to Indonesian academics and think tank experts,
has brought a different, more austere form of Islam tothe country. The current president, Joko Widodo (alsoknown as “Jokowi”), generally has tried to distance thegovernment from hardliners, an improvement over his
predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014).
According to KontraS, a local nongovernmentalorganization, the number of incidents of religious
freedom violations in 2018 committed by state actors,
including the police, decreased compared to previous
years. While this trend is encouraging, the governmentU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

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184

continued to enforce several laws and policies thatendorsed Jokowi’s opponent, former general Prabowo
impose significant obstacles to religious minorities
Subianto. In September, both presidential candidates
practicing their faith. Moreover, the national governpledged to avoid exploiting religious divisions while
ment frequently does not intervene when provincial andcampaigning. However, on October 25, some of the same
local governments enact unconstitutional regulations or groups that mobilized against Ahok in 2016 and 2017
policies that exacerbate religious divisions. By consuccessfully pressured NU to cancel a rally in Yogyakarta
trast, there has been a marked increase in hate speech,
after a member of its youth wing burned the flag of Hizb
intimidation, and violence against religious minorities
ut-Tahrir, an Islamist group banned by the Indonesiancommitted by nonstate actors, such as vigilante groups
government. The protests were seen by some analysts
and hardliner social movements. According to theas an indirect attack against Jokowi because of Amin’s
Wahid Foundation, a local nongovernmental orgaaffiliation with NU.
nization, police are now taking such violations more
In October 2018, a USCIRF delegation traveled
seriously, but some local authorities still struggle toto Indonesia to meet with government officials, civil
define hate speech and remain impartial.
society leaders, and religious representatives in Jakarta,
There is increasing concern about political opporSurabaya, and Medan.
tunists exploiting religious tensions for electoral gain,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
especially after intolerant groups successfully used aBlasphemy
blasphemy accusation to derail the reelection of Jakarta
governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (also known as
Article 156(a) of Indonesia’s Criminal Code prohibits“Ahok”) in April 2017. In the June 2018 regional elecexpression or acts “at enmity with, abusing, or staining ations, gubernatorial candidates in West Kalimantan
religion adhered to in Indonesia,” subject to a maximum
and North Sumatra provinces won by using religious
penalty of up to five years’ imprisonment. The counappeals, and voting split largely along religious lines.
try has another blasphemy law issued by presidential
Religious tensions in West Kalimantan did not erupt
decree (Law N. 1/PNPS/1965), which prohibits “deviant
into serious violence in part because a group of civilinterpretation” of religious teachings.
society organizations and journalists worked to collect,
After Indonesia’s transition to democracy, theinvestigate, and clarify provocative information relating
number of prosecutions and convictions for blasphemy
to religion that appeared online or in text messaging.
increased dramatically. During its October 2018 visit,
In August, President Widodo chose Ma’ruf Amin,
USCIRF learned that 125 people were convicted forchair of the MUI and former chief advisor to NU, as
blasphemy under President Yudhoyono’s 10-year tenure;
his vice-presidential candidate, a move widely seen
the number of new convictions decreased to 23 underas an attempt to strengthen his Islamic credentials
the first four years of President Widodo’s presidency. The
ahead of the April 2019 general elections. As part of the
blasphemy law is frequently—but not exclusively—used to
MUI, Amin signed intolerant fatwas (religious edicts),
target religious minorities alleged to have insulted Islam.
including against Ahmadiyya Muslims in 2005, andIn 2018, six individuals were convicted of blasphemy
testified against Ahok inand sentenced to prison,his politically charged
including Meiliana (whoblasphemy trial. Howuses only one name), an
In 2018, six individuals were
ever, since becoming a
ethnic Chinese Buddhist
convicted of blasphemy andvice-presidential candiwoman from Tanjung
sentenced to prison . . .
date, he has called for a
Balai, for a comment she
more moderate form of
made about the volume
Islam, condemned disof the loudspeaker on acrimination against religious minorities, and expressed
nearby mosque. On November 16, political opponents
regret over his testimony against Ahok. Meanwhile, FPI
reported Grace Natalie, a Protestant and founder of theleader Rizieq Shihab, currently exiled in Saudi Arabia,
Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), to the police after she

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been closed or prevented from being built in Indonesia
since 2006. Far fewer state-sponsored closures of housesof worship have occurred under President Widodo, but
local authorities still sometimes accede to the demandsof hardliners. For example, on September 27, 2018,
police sealed three churches in West Kenali village inJambi Province that allegedly lacked the necessary permits after complaints from the local community.

TIER 2 INDONESIA

criticized laws prohibiting “immoral acts” like gamblingand drinking. At the end of the reporting period, she
had not yet been formally charged with blasphemy. On
January 24, 2019, after the reporting period, former Jakarta
governor Ahok was released early from a prison sentenceconnected to his May 2017 conviction for blasphemy.
On July 23, 2018, the Constitutional Court rejected
a petition challenging the constitutionality of the
blasphemy law, declaring that the government could
limit religious freedom in order to preserve public order(the third time the court has reaffirmed the law). The
legislature is currently considering a Religious Rights
Protection Bill, which would expand the legal definitionof blasphemy to include acts like conversion between
faiths and “tainting” holy books. It is not expected to act
on the bill until after the April 2019 elections.

Religious Sermons and WorshipConcerns about extremist rhetoric in houses of worshipgrew in 2018. In November, Indonesia’s national intelligence agency announced the results of an investigation
into extremism in mosques, finding that as many as 500
mosques, including 41 connected to government institutions and state-owned enterprises, exposed worshippers
to extremist ideologies. In May, the Ministry of Religious
Houses of Worship
Affairs published a list—certified by the MUI—of the
The 2006 Joint Regulation on Houses of Worshipnames of Islamic preachers “qualified” to give religious
requires individuals seeking to establish a house of
instruction. The government justified the list as necesworship to submit the names of at least 90 congregation
sary to counter radicalism, but Muslim groups argued
members, as well as signatures from at least 60 local
that instead the government should blacklist extremists
households of a different faith, and then obtain recomrather than endorse individual instructors. As of midmendations from both the local government’s religious
2018, the list contained more than 500 preachers.
affairs office and the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB),
Some local governments have attempted to regulate
a council composed of local religious leaders. The regureligious sermons for political gain. On October 15, thelation provides local governments the authority to close
Cianjur Regency government in West Java instructedor tear down houses of worship built prior to 2006.
local mosques that their Friday sermons should critiThe 2006 regulation was intended to reduce tencize the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex
sions surrounding houses(LGBTI) community.
of worship, but in practiceDuring its October 2018it has politicized theirvisit, USCIRF learned that
The 2006 regulation was intended
construction. Hardlinsome local governments—
to reduce tensions surrounding
ers and other intolerant
including Palembang,houses of worship, but in practice itgroups will often allege
capital of South Sumatra
has politicized their construction.
faulty or missing permits
Province, and Banten
as justification to proProvince—have issued
test houses of worshipdecrees requiring Muslim
and demand their closure. During its October 2018civil servants to attend prayer services.
visit, USCIRF learned that hardliners from outside the
Educationcommunity will try to pressure local residents to oppose
In late 2018, the government began drafting a bill toconstruction of new houses of worship by certain reliregulate how schools and religious institutions teachgious groups. Some smaller congregations cannot meet
religion. In November, Vice President Jusuf Kalla called
the signature threshold, so they are effectively prohibupon universities to do more to counter radicalism andited from erecting any houses of worship. According tocreate a “curriculum of sermons” for campus mosques.
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186

These moves are partly in response to concerns about
In 2008, Islamic hardliners persuaded the govradicalization in the education sector. According to aernment to issue a joint ministerial decree that banssurvey released in October 2018 by Syarif Hidayatullah
Indonesia’s 400,000 Ahmadiyya from spreading their
State Islamic University, nearly six in 10 Muslim teachers
faith, under a penalty of up to five years in prison. Somein both state and Islamic schools expressed intolerant
local and provincial governments, such as East Java,
attitudes toward otherhave gone even further
religions. Some of theand banned all Ahmadi
more conservative
activities. Since 2008,
In November, Bakor Pakem . . . launched a
Islamic schools do not
local authorities havemobile phone application called
permit students to interact
closed or violent pro“Smart Pakem” that allows members to thewith Christians or Jews.
testors have vandalized
public to report on blasphemy . . .
However, some religious
more than 100 Ahmadischools, especially thoseyya mosques. Intolerant
affiliated with minority
groups have also attacked
faiths, worried the proposed law would make it harder to
Ahmadiyya followers and their property. On May 19,
obtain permission for peaceful educational activities like
2018, a mob in the village of Grepek Tanak Eat, East
Sunday school and Bible classes.
Lombok Regency, torched at least eight houses, forcing
seven Ahmadiyya families to leave their homes.
Religion on ID Cards
In 2018, public harassment of Indonesia’s one
The Indonesian government requires all citizens to list
to three million Shi’a Muslims continued. For years,
their religious affiliation on ID cards. This has made it
authorities in certain localities, such as the city ofmore difficult for individuals who do not follow one ofMakassar, have prohibited them from commemoratthe country’s six officially recognized faiths to obtaining Ashura in public. In 2012, 56 Shi’a Muslim houses
licenses and permits, access education and government
in Sampang Regency, Madura, were burned down,jobs, and complete financial transactions. During its
forcing hundreds of survivors to flee to Surabaya;
October 2018 visit, USCIRF spoke with members of otherduring USCIRF’s October 2018 visit to Surabaya, thefaiths, such as Ahmadis and Sikhs, and learned that theyCommission learned that 346 Shi’a Muslims—or 83
have to either falsely identify as one of the six recognizedhouseholds—remain internally displaced. Moreover,faiths or leave the religion field on their ID card blank,
USCIRF heard that these displaced persons do not have
which not all local officials permit. In November 2017,
access to a mosque qualified to conduct Shi’a Muslim
the Constitutional Court declared that forcing followreligious rituals and cannot bury their dead in accord
ers of indigenous faiths to identify as Muslim, Catholic,with their customs.
Protestant, Buddhist, Hindu, or Confucian was unconstiFormed in 2012, the Gerakan Fajar Nusantaratutional. The MUI lobbied the Ministry of Home Affairs
movement, known as Gafatar, follows a syncretic blend
to list the phrase “Belief in one and only god” on the ID
of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. The group had
cards of followers of indigenous faiths rather than allow
attempted to form a commune in Kalimantan, but inthem to list their religion. As of late 2018, the Ministry
January 2016 mob attacks forced 8,000 members to flee.
decided that the legislature would have to review andIn 2017, three of Gafatar’s leaders were convicted ofamend the Indonesian Population Administration Law
blasphemy. Throughout 2018, members continued tobefore it could include indigenous faiths on ID cards.
face persecution and pressure from the government andfamily members to recant their beliefs.
“Deviant” Groups
In November, Bakor Pakem, a body charged with
The quasi-governmental Indonesian Council of Ulema
religious oversight within the office of the Attorney
has issued fatwas declaring certain religious groups,
General, launched a mobile phone application called
including Ahmadiyya Muslims, Shi’a Muslims, and“Smart Pakem” that allows members of the public to
Gafatar, to be “deviant” and heretical to Islam.
report on blasphemy, as well as on “misguided” religious

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organization. Human rights groups expressed concernsthat the law’s vague wording could allow the government
to crack down on any group seen as a threat, including
peaceful activists. In June, the South Jakarta District
Court banned JAD under the new law.

Shari’ah Law

U.S. POLICY

As part of a peace agreement ending a separatist insurgency in 2005, the Acehnese provincial government has
the authority to enact Shari’ah law. During its October
2018 visit, USCIRF learned that Aceh resumed publiccaning in July 2018, despite a previous pledge to carryout canings only inside prisons.
Although Aceh is the only region of Indonesia
officially permitted to adopt Shari’ah law, as of early 2018
more than 100 Indonesian municipalities had implemented nearly 450 local Shari’ah regulations, often to
appease local hardliners. Some of these laws disadvantage
and discriminate against religious minorities by limiting
their freedom to conduct certain activities openly.

In August 2018, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo
visited Indonesia, where he met with Minister for Foreign
Affairs Retno Marsudi and reaffirmed the U.S.-Indonesia
Strategic Partnership. As part of their defense relationship, the United States and Indonesia regularly engaged
on matters such as counterterrorism and maritime
security, as well as mutual interests in the South China
Sea. After an earthquake and tsunami struck Central
Sulawesi on September 28, President Donald J. Trump
called Indonesian President Widodo to express his
condolences to the victims and provided almost $12
million in assistance for relief efforts. A State Department
spokesperson expressed condolences on behalf of theUnited States for the victims of a tsunami that struck
West Java and southern Sumatra on December 22. At
the November 2018 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
forum, Vice President Michael R. Pence and President
Widodo agreed to promote shared principles, values, andnorms as part of the United States’ commitment to a free
and open Indo-Pacific based on Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality.
The United States strongly condemned the May 13
church bombings in Surabaya. USAID Mission Director
Erin E. McKee offered to provide the Indonesian government with assistance in its investigation. The U.S. State
Department had in 2017 designated JAD as a “Specially
Designated Global Terrorist” (SDGT). Four days after theattacks, Vice President Pence met with Kyai Haji Yahya
Cholil Staquf, supreme leader of NU, at the White House
to express his condolences.
In late 2018, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) launched USAID/Indonesia
Harmoni: Towards Inclusion and Resilience Activity,
a four-year, $20 million project designed to engage key
Indonesian government, civil society, and education
stakeholders to mitigate the risk of recruitment into violent extremist organizations and reintegrate reformed
extremists into society.

Terrorism
On February 12, 2018, a man stabbed a Catholic priest andthree others during Sunday mass at St. Lidwina Church
in Yogyakarta. He also slashed statues of Jesus and theVirgin Mary. Counterterrorism officials suspected his
actions were inspired by radical groups, which during theprevious week had called for knife attacks in Indonesia.
On May 13, three churches in Surabaya—Immaculate Saint Mary Catholic Church, Indonesia Christian
Church, and Surabaya Central Pentecost Church—wereattacked by suicide bombers affiliated with Jamaah
Ansharut Daulah (JAD), a group with ties to the IslamicState of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The bombs killed 15 people
and injured 57. During a visit to one of the churches in
October 2018, USCIRF met with church leaders and heard
about the brave sacrifice several church members madeto save both lives and property. Moreover, USCIRF heard
about the thousands of Muslims who gathered after thebombings to protect churches throughout Surabaya.
Indonesian officials suggested the bombings were a
response to the imprisonment of JAD leader Aman Abdurrahman. The following week, the legislature amended
the Terrorism Law to authorize law enforcement topreemptively arrest suspects for up to three weeks andto prosecute individuals who recruit for or join a terrorist

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TIER 2 INDONESIA

beliefs from a list that includes Ahmadiyya Muslims,
Shi’a Muslims, and Gafatar. The independent National
Commission on Human Rights criticized the app andsaid it possibly contravenes the Constitutional Court’s
2017 decision on indigenous faiths.

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IRAQ
TIER 2KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, there continued to be significant challenges to religious freedom conditions in Iraq, trending toward modest but
fragile improvement. The Iraqi government continued to show
a lack of willingness or ability to provide proper security forvulnerable religious and ethnic minorities. It also eschewed
due process for Sunni Muslims and family members accusedof supporting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), while it
maintained and enforced restrictions on religious freedom, suchas anti-blasphemy laws and official intolerance of some religious
communities. Meanwhile, although domestic and international
leaders have touted the defeat of ISIS since late 2017, the group
continues to operate throughout the country as a diffuse, cellbased insurgency, rather than as a territory-controlling state witha centrally organized military. Its transformation has allowed it
to increase its rate of small-scale operations and to maintain an
estimated membership of up to 15,000 fighters in Iraq alone. In
addition, religious and ethnic minorities whom ISIS had particularly singled out for genocide, such as Yazidis and Christians,
continued to face dire uncertainty as to whether conditions
would allow them to return to their communities of origin. This
uncertainty was especially pronounced in areas that had beenliberated from ISIS control and/or that fall within certain sectionsof northern Iraq whose control has long remained in dispute
between the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi
Federal Government (IFG), such as Sinjar, the Nineveh Plains, andKirkuk. As a result, displaced religious minorities’ rate of return
was far less than that of Sunni and Shi’a Muslim communities
who had fled their homes following the rise of ISIS in 2014. For
some communities, such as the more than 200,000 Yazidis who
were displaced from the vicinity of Sinjar, few of their internallydisplaced persons (IDPs) returned in 2018 as most remained incamps awaiting reconstruction and the restoration of security intheir places of origin. In March 2018, a USCIRF delegation visited
both IFG- and KRG-administered territories to assess religious
freedom conditions.
Based on these concerns, in 2019 USCIRF again places thegovernment of Iraq on its Tier 2 for engaging in or tolerating religious freedom violations that meet at least one of theelements of the “systematic, ongoing, egregious” standard
for designation as a “country of political concern,” or CPC,
under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). Also,
USCIRF finds that because ISIS no longer “exercise[d] significant political power and territorial control” within Iraq during
the reporting period, it does not meet the statutory requirement that would merit its designation as an “entity of particularconcern,” or EPC, for particularly severe religious freedom
violations as defined by December 2016 amendments to IRFA.
However, USCIRF still finds that ISIS meets the statutory definition with respect to its territorial control and activities in Syria
and therefore recommends its designation as an EPC.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Expedite the dispersal of U.S.
assistance for the rehabilitation andstabilization of areas liberated from ISIS
control, in order to facilitate the returnof displaced and vulnerable communities and others whose religious andethnic divisions ISIS exploited, in partpursuant to the Iraq and Syria Genocide Relief and Accountability Act of2018 (P.L. 115-300);• Encourage both the IFG and the KRG
to peacefully resolve outstanding
budget, oil, and territorial disputes,
such as longstanding delays over
implementation of article 140 of
the Iraqi constitution, which have
impeded their ability to fully address

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the ISIS threat and allow displacedcommunities—including religious andethnic minorities—to return to theirplaces of origin;• Encourage both the IFG and the KRG
to prevent the expropriation of homes
and properties of religious and ethnic
minorities by dominant communities,
while supporting legal and otherforms of assistance to both governments to establish a viable framework
for resolving longstanding, intercommunal property disputes; and• Stipulate in all military or security
assistance to the IFG and the KRG
the full integration of security forces
to better reflect the country’s

religious and ethnic diversity, andprovide training for recipient units on
international human rights standards
and how to treat civilians, particularly
religious minorities.
The U.S. Congress should:• Support legislation that would
specifically target for sanctions Iranian-controlled factions of the Popular
Mobilization Forces (PMF), particularly Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Harakat
Hizbollah al-Nujaba, which havecarried out sectarian violence in both
Iraq and Syria and have complicatedefforts to restore government-led
security and stability throughout Iraq.

TIER 2 IRAQCOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Republic of Iraq

POPULATION
40,194,216

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
95–98% Muslim(64–69% Shi’a, 29–34% Sunni)
1% Christian<1% Other (includes Yazidis, Sabean-Mandaeans,
Baha’is, Zoroastrians, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, andadherents of folk religions)

GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSIslam, Christianity, Sabean-Mandaeanism, the Baha’i faith,
Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, and folk religion*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook and the U.S.
Department of State

GOVERNMENT
Federal Parliamentary Republic

BACKGROUND

Events elsewhere in the country also complicatedefforts
to fully eradicate the ISIS threat. Several overIraq continued to face serious challenges throughout thelapping factions continued to vie for dominance in2018 reporting period. ISIS remained on the defensive
disputed areas of northern Iraq: Kurdish Peshmerga
and ostensibly abandoned efforts to recapture direct
forces; Iran-backed PMF; Kurdish People’s Protection
control over Iraqi territory in the short term. However, itsUnits (YPG) from neighboring Syria; and Iraqi Security
operatives—likely still numbering 20,000–30,000, distribForces (ISF). In the southern district of Basra, wideuted across Iraq and Syria—returned to pre-2014 tactics
spread protests in July and September 2018 againstof employing small-scale attacks as part of an apparent
corruption, poor government services, and Iranianlong-term strategy to preserve the group’s operational
capabilities by avoiding large-scale military confrontations influence led the government to deploy a significant
contingent of the ISF there and attempt to assert authorwith Iraqi, Kurdish, or international forces. According toity over local PMF factions. This civil unrest threatenedgroups that closely track and document conflict data, thisto devolve into a wider intra-Shi’a conflict and served to
strategy allowed ISIS to carry out an average of at least 75
distract the military fromattacks in Iraq each month
focusing its efforts to boththroughout 2018 while
fully dismantle ISIS andmaintaining a visible if
In short, ISIS has temporarily
restore security in thediminished presence,
retreated to the shadows but remains anorth. However, the worst
particularly in disputed
grave and imminent threat,of that unrest had largely
or ungoverned areas
particularly to vulnerable minority
subsided by the end of thewhere security presence iscommunities in northern Iraq . . .
reporting period.
minimal. In short, ISIS has
Meanwhile, althoughtemporarily retreated toovert tensions temporarthe shadows but remains
ily
subsided
over
the
IFG
seizureof Kirkuk and othera grave and imminent threat, particularly to vulnerable
areas following the KRG’s referendum on independence
minority communities in northern Iraq that have alreadyin 2017, the Iraqi government held elections in May 2018,
been a primary target of the group’s particular brand ofand the KRG held its own in October, leading to new
violent intolerance since its emergence in 2014.

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190

leadership and parliamentary representation for bothcomplex tensions that continue to pervade Iraqi society,authorities. At the end of 2018, many positions in bothgovernment institutions, and security forces. The Sunni
governments remained unfilled as internal power-sharMuslim population still does not trust the Shi’a Muslim
ing negotiations proceeded slowly, further complicating
majority government to protect its community or incorthe restoration of security, the process of post-ISIS
porate its voice effectively in government; the reverse
reconstruction, and the ability of leadership to pursue
also holds true for the Shi’a Muslim population and its
long-term solutions to Iraq’s most intractable problems
approach to Sunni Muslims, whom many Shi’a Muslims
in regard to religious freedom conditions and othersuspect or accuse of having offered direct or tacit supcritical areas.
port for ISIS during its brief time in power.
Despite these challenges, there was incremental
In addition, religious minorities, including the
progress in efforts to address the critical humanitarYazidi and Christian communities, are skeptical of theian needs of Iraq’s threatened and most vulnerable
Iraqi government’s willingness and capability to protect
communities. In May, United Nations (UN) Secretary
them from both Shi’a and Sunni violent armed groups,
General António Guterres appointed Karim Asad Ahmad including ISIS and sectarian elements of the PMF—the
Khanas Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative
latter of which the Iraqi government remains unable
Team tasked with implementing UN Security Council
or unwilling to place under the command structure of
Resolution 2379. That 2017 resolution authorized an
the ISF. Although the government of Iraq has made aninvestigative team to hold ISIS accountable by collecting,increasing show of support for minority rights sincepreserving, and storing in Iraq evidence of acts by the
2017—especially within Nineveh Province—and thegroup that may be war crimes, crimes against humanity,
KRG has continued to offer a relatively secure refuge foror genocide. The team later announced that it planned todisplaced minority communities, many of them remain
begin its work on the ground in Iraq in early 2019.
wary of the notion that religious freedom and human
All of the above, however, is best understood in therights are priorities for Iraqi leadership.
wider context of Iraq’s more than 15 years of sectarian
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
tensions and violence, which have adversely affected
Long-Term Displacement of
human rights and religious freedom conditions. This
Religious Minorities
longstanding sectarian climate facilitated the rise of
ISIS in northern and central Iraq in 2014, and the same
Even before the rise of ISIS in 2014, Iraq’s smallest religious
conditions still persisted in 2018 despite that group’s
communities—including Catholics, Orthodox Christians,
defeat as an occupying force in the prior year. Former
Protestants, Yazidis, and Sabean-Mandaeans—werepresident Saddam Hussein’s favoritism of the Sunnialready significantly diminished, and their numbers have
population and former
continued to decline in theprime minister Nouri
subsequent four years. Iraq
al-Maliki’s favoritism ofis in particular danger ofEven before the rise of ISIS in 2014,
the Shi’a Muslim populosing its ancient ChrisIraq’s smallest religious communities—
lation created divisions
tian community, whose
including Catholics, Orthodox Christians,
and significant distrust
numbers have dramatiProtestants, Yazidis, and Sabeanbetween the country’s
cally diminished during
Mandaeans—were already significantly
two largest religious comthe last 15 years. According
diminished, and their numbers havemunities. These tensions
to Christian leaders, there
continued to decline . . .
have only worsened overare now fewer than 250,000
time: although former
Christians in Iraq, down
prime minister Haider
from a pre-2003 estimate
al-Abadi demonstrated some willingness to reverse hisof 1.4 million. Although international Christian religious
predecessor’s overtly sectarian policies, during his four
leaders and institutions have encouraged Iraqi Christians
years in office he had little success in addressing theseto remain in the country, many have continued to flee

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TIER 2 IRAQ

their heartland in Iraq’s war-ravaged northwest. Meanthe northwestern region as they retreated in 2016 andwhile, Yazidi leaders claim their community numbers
2017, destroying wells, orchards, and infrastructure.
around 400,000–500,000, including more than 3,000
There is thus precious little livelihood left to faciliwhom ISIS abducted in 2014 and whose whereabouts
tate the return of many farming communities suchremain unknown, while the Kaka’i community numbers
as Yazidi-majority villages in that area. Meanwhile,
no more than 300,000. The Sabean-Mandaean commuhundreds of freed Yazidi women now face impossiblenity likely numbers between 1,000 and 2,000, and there
choices because they bore children as a result of sexual
are fewer than 2,000 Baha’is.
assault by ISIS personnel while in captivity. They face
Yazidis, whose adherents in the Sinjar region of
ostracism from home communities whose traditional
Nineveh Province bore the brunt of ISIS’ genocidal
leadership insist they could return home, but theiractions beginning in mid-2014, remain almost entirely
children—born to genocidal, non-Yazidi fathers anddisplaced from theirpotentially numbering
ancestral homes, within the hundreds—would
most lingering in IDP
have no place among
Meanwhile, hundreds of freed
camps in the Duhok
them. Furthermore,
Yazidi
women
now
face
impossible
choicesregion and others still
years of government
because they bore children as afinding refuge in ramcorruption and neglect
resultofsexualassault
byISIS
personnel
shackle tents atop Mountof Iraq’s water resources
while in captivity.
Sinjar. By the end of thehave displaced many
reporting period, their
Sabean-Mandaeans—
towns and villages in thewhose rites depend on
Sinjar region remained
access to clean, flowing
essentially untouched by restoration or rebuilding, as thewater—from their traditional heartland in southern
contest for military control between rival forces of the
Iraq to other, less polluted parts of the country, or out
PMF, Syrian YPG, Peshmerga, and ISF prevented mostof Iraq entirely.
efforts at restabilization, such as the reconstruction ofViolations by ISIS
homes, infrastructure, businesses, and places of worship.
Despite former prime minister al-Abadi’s declaration in
A limited number of Assyrian and Chaldean ChrisDecember 2017 that Iraq had completely liberated all oftians returned to their homes in the Nineveh Plains,
its territory from ISIS, in conjunction with the U.S.-ledsuch as in Qaraqosh where Assyrians celebrated Easter
Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, in 2018 ISIS remnants
for the first time since 2014. Most did not yet return,who fled into hiding continued to carry out small-scale
however, as a lack of restored infrastructure, danger
armed operations, assassinations, and improvised
from ISIS booby traps and unexploded ordnance, andexplosive device (IED) attacks throughout many parts ofpersistent fears of an ISIS resurgence prevented many
the country. Their targets have included Iraqi military
Christian IDPs from returning to Mosul or villages in its
and police forces, both on the battlefield and in theirsocial and economic orbit. Government and commuhomes; prominent members of tribes and villages whonity representatives repeatedly echoed these security
defied ISIS during its occupation; PMF checkpoints
concerns during USCIRF’s March 2018 visit.
and patrols; civilian bystanders in urban districts ofWhile the above issues are the most dramatic of
the challenges facing Iraq’s myriad religious and ethnic northern Iraq, such as marketplaces and restaurants;
and others. While these attacks have focused on striking
minorities, a series of other, secondary obstacles havemilitary targets and carrying out vendettas against
contributed to the degradation of this once-vibrantprominent Sunni and Shi’a Muslim community memsocietal landscape. Some of these challenges directlybers, they signify the present and ongoing threat that
represent the lingering shadow of ISIS’ campaign of
ISIS has the resources, capability, and motivation toviolence: for example, ISIS fighters obliterated theregroup and again carry out its campaigns of genocide
agricultural resources of many rural communities in191

TIER 2 IRAQ

and violent intolerance toward its perceived enemies
among the nation’s Shi’a Muslims, Yazidis, Christians,
and others.
The country continues to grapple with the violent
legacy of ISIS in a variety of other ways. More than 3,100of the approximately 6,400 Yazidis whom ISIS captured
in 2014 remained in captivity, likely within the group’s
few remaining pockets of territorial control in Syria. At
the same time, government and humanitarian efforts
continued to uncover the mass graves of ISIS victims,
including Yazidis, Shi’a Muslim civilians, and IMF
soldiers. As of November 2018, the United Nations had
identified 202 such burial sites, including at least 95 in
Nineveh Province and the remainder spread across theregions of Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Anbar that ISIS
once controlled. Those mass graves reportedly containthe remains of up to 12,000 victims, some of them ingraves holding as few as eight and others in large pitsthat are estimated to hold thousands.

disentangle for each individual defendant. Even so, theIraqi government made little apparent effort in 2018 todemonstrate a commitment to transitional justice thatwould bolster the rule of law while creating a frameworkof reconciliation capable of breaking the cycle of sectarian violence. Local leaders, activists, and international
analysts alike have repeatedly expressed that the Iraqi
government must address Sunni grievances in order toprevent either an ISIS resurgence or the reemergence ofother forms of sectarian violence.

Other Iraqi Government Issues

The Iraqi government held nationwide elections in
May 2018, resulting in a largely peaceful if protracted
transition of power to a new administration in early
October, headed by Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi
and President Barham Salih. Both leaders were widely
seen as relatively conciliatory choices, further inching
the country away from the overly sectarian policies
of Nouri al-Maliki, who held the premiership from
Violations by the Iraqi Government
2006 and 2014, and the centrist government of Haidar
As in the prior year, following the recapture of Mosul
al-Abadi, whose time in office was largely consumed byfrom ISIS, suspicion of Sunni Muslims on the part of thethe threat of ISIS. In a potential sign that the government
Iraqi government and ISF remained deeply entrenched.
had taken note of increased international scrutiny on
The Iraqi government has
the status of its religious
denied families suspected
and ethnic minorities,of any possible ties to ISIS
the Cabinet approved in
Local leaders, activists, andthe right to return home
December 2018 a new law
international analysts alike haveand has placed somethat declared December
repeatedly expressed that the Iraqi
of them in “ISIS family
25 a national holiday ingovernment must address Sunni
camps.” International
honor of Iraqi Christians’grievances in order to prevent either anobservers continued tocelebration of Christmas
ISIS resurgence or the reemergence offind evidence of extrajuDay. Also, the Federal
other forms of sectarian violence.
dicial executions of Sunni
Supreme Court ruled in
Muslims in and around
January 2018 that Yazidi
Mosul well into 2018,
representation in parliamonths after the fall of the city to Iraqi and international
ment should be increased from one seat to five, in orderforces in late 2017. Meanwhile, reports emerged fromto proportionally reflect that community’s population.
various sources throughout 2018 on the rapid pace andHowever, parliament failed to implement this rulingdisdain for due process and evidence that Iraqi criminal
ahead of the 2018 elections. Such representation was
courts have demonstrated while convicting thousands ofamong the most persistent concerns that religious andSunni Muslims on charges of directly joining or supportethnic minority leaders expressed to USCIRF during its
ing ISIS, at an estimated 98 percent rate of conviction.
March 2018 visit.
The social, religious, and ideological dynamics that
Despite these tentative areas of progress regarding
led to the rise of ISIS were complex and varied, andthe country’s transition of power, systemic challenges
likely beyond the capacity of Iraqi courts to equitably
to Iraq’s religious freedom conditions remain. The

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government has largely ignored claims by Assyrian andattention to Law No. 105, which has banned Baha’is from
Chaldean Christians of the illegal expropriation of theiroperating in the country since its passage by the earlylands in the wake of their temporary displacement by
Ba’athist government in 1970.
ISIS, even as reports emerged of the illegal seizure andIssues in the KRG
attempted re-registration of more than 300 Christian
KRG-controlled areas have been a crucial refuge forproperties in Nineveh Province. Property is a complimany of northern Iraq’s religious and ethnic minoricated issue in the Iraqi context, with many disputes
ties, most recently during the ISIS crisis but extending
stretching back decades to efforts by the Ba’athist govback into the era of post-2003 sectarian violence asernment of former president Saddam Hussein to forcibly
well, and KRG officials
transform demographics
have exerted substantial
in the traditionally Kurdeffort to promote theirish-majority north into
KRG-controlled areas have been aterritories as havens ofan ethnic Arab majority.
crucial refuge for many of northern Iraq’s
religious and ethnic tolHowever, the IDP crisis
religious and ethnic minorities . . . anderance. Many membersthat erupted surrounding
KRG officials have exerted substantialof minority communiISIS-controlled territoeffort to promote their territories asties fled to and settled
ries from 2014 to 2017 led
havens of religious and ethnic tolerance.
in those areas following
to an additional layer of
ISIS’ rise, where theircontestation, as Christianvoices—which had notfamilies sought to return
been given the attention they deserved by Iraq’s central
home but found that some of their properties had been
government—had more weight, particularly in local
claimed by Sunni Arabs or Kurds.
governance and KRG decision making. There wasFurthermore, the Iraqi government continued toincreasing space for religious freedom in the KRG priorprevent other communities or individuals from freely
to 2017 clashes between Baghdad and the KRG followexpressing or practicing their beliefs. The 2015 National
ing the ill-fated referendum on Kurdish independence,
Identity Card Law remains problematic for Iraq’s
and that space does not appear to have shown signs ofminorities: Article 26 forces children with one Muscontraction in the intervening months.
lim parent to identify as Muslim. It reinforces existing
Nevertheless, there are legitimate and ongoing
restrictions that Muslims cannot change their religious
challenges for religious minority communities living in
identification on their identity cards after conversion
KRG territory. One of the most serious challenges, echoto any other religion. Christian leaders have said thating similar issues that have emerged in areas under IFG
in some cases, families that are formally registered ascontrol, is that of land disputes. In the Iraqi context,
Muslim but practice Christianity have fled to avoid
religious and ethnic identity is often closely tied to comregistering their children as Muslims or to have their
munal or sacred space, such as a village that has beenchildren remain undocumented. The law remains inhome to a cluster of Chaldean Christian or Shi’a Muslim
place, despite periodic promises by successive Iraqi
Shabak families for countless generations, or a shrine
administrations since 2015 to revisit it. Meanwhile, theat which Yazidi worshippers might gather for holy days.
government has pursued legal action against reported
In these circumstances, especially prevalent in northatheists, including its issuance in April 2018 of a court
ern Iraq, control over such land and the ways in which
order for the arrest of four such individuals on charges
governing authorities address disagreements over itsof “promoting the idea of the non-existence of God.” Inownership can directly impact a community’s sense
December, Deputy Justice Minister Hussein al-Zuhairi
of social and religious inclusion or marginalization.
reiterated during a dialogue with the UN Committee on
Christian communities in particular have reported seithe Elimination of Racial Discrimination the governzures of Christian land and homes in Dohuk Province,
ment’s longstanding insistence that the Baha’i faith isoften but not always involving properties that they had
not a legitimate religion. In doing so, he drew renewed

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temporarily fled during the height of the ISIS crisis. As
in IFG-controlled territory, it is highly likely that theseissues also reflect decades of corruption, nationwide
disputes over ethnic identity and land registration, andother complications that predate the KRG’s present
autonomy in northern Iraq.

U.S. POLICYThe United States enacted several key measures
regarding the crisis facing Iraq’s religious and ethnic
minorities. First, in January 2018 the U.S. Agency forInternational Development (USAID) announced that
$55 million of the $75 million it had already pledged tohelp restabilize Iraq through the UN Development Program (UNDP) would specifically go toward supporting
those communities. In October, the U.S. Department ofState announced an additional $178 million for the same
purposes. Finally, Congress passed H.R. 390 in November, also known as the Iraq and Syria Genocide Reliefand Accountability Act of 2018, which President Donald
J. Trump signed into law the following month. This act
declared that ISIS “is responsible for genocide, crimes
against humanity, and other atrocity crimes against
religious and ethnic minority groups in Iraq and Syria,
including Christians, Yazidis, and Shi’a Muslims, among
other religious and ethnic groups.” It further directed
U.S. policy to assist in meeting the “humanitarian,194

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stabilization, and recovery needs” of those communities as well as to support the efforts of governments andnongovernmental organizations to hold ISIS members
accountable for the above. These measures represented
serious U.S. policy and financial commitments toaddressing Iraq’s dire religious and ethnic catastrophesof the prior several years.
Aid groups and religious leaders in Iraq had earlier
expressed growing concerns that relatively few of thepromised funds and initiatives had actually reachedIraqi communities in need. However, Vice President
Michael R. Pence in particular took an increasing
interest in pushing forward initiatives aimed at supporting persecuted ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq
directly by increasing U.S. foreign assistance, including
in coordination with local and faith-based organizations.
In July 2018, Vice President Pence announced at the
Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom a new U.S. initiative to help the victims of the atrocities committed by
ISIS, leading to the launch of USAID’s Genocide Recovery
and Persecution Response (GRPR) program in July anddoubling its total assistance to more than $239 million
to support persecuted ethnic and religious minorities in
Iraq. In addition, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo
deployed Max Primorac to the U.S. Consulate Generalin Erbil in October to oversee these programs as Special
Representative for Minority Assistance.

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KAZAKHSTANTIER 2KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, despite some positive developments, the government of Kazakhstan continued to commit religious freedom
violations. During the year, there was a substantial decrease in
the number of administrative prosecutions for religious activity: from 279 cases in 2017 to 165 in 2018. Offenses ranged
from attending worship meetings and engaging in missionary
activity to minor administrative infractions. Of these cases, 139
resulted in punishments—including fines, prison terms, andvarious restrictions on freedom—as opposed to 259 in 2017.
In October 2018, for the sixth time since 2003, Kazakhstan
hosted its Congress of the Leaders of World and Traditional
Religions, which promoted Kazakhstan’s image as a beacon of religious pluralism and a historical center of religious
diversity. On January 29, 2019, after the reporting period, thegovernment unexpectedly abandoned a series of proposed
amendments to the country’s already restrictive 2011 religion
law. Many observers had feared these amendments would
initiate an even harsher crackdown on religious freedom in
Kazakhstan. The decision to abandon the amendments cameafter nearly a year and a half of parliamentary debate. These

positive trends coincided with the continuation of repressive
government policies toward religious belief and practice: forexample, the government continued to routinely subject thegeneral population to official scrutiny of their religious belief
and practice. Dozens of individuals have been arrested and/or fined, or received sentences that restricted their freedoms
and—in at least five cases—led to lengthy prison terms forthe peaceful expression of religious beliefs. The Kazakhstani
government also continued to politicize religion; it frequently
charged its opponents with religious extremism and, in somecases, fabricated elaborate terrorism cases against them. The
government continued to be particularly suspicious of proselytism, connections to religious movements or institutions
abroad, and criticism of or dissent from official policy.
Based on these concerns, in 2019 USCIRF again places
Kazakhstan on its Tier 2 for engaging in or tolerating religious
freedom violations that meet at least one of the elements of
the “systematic, ongoing, egregious” standard for designation
as a “country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Prioritize religious freedom andrelated human rights into the
U.S.-Kazakhstan Strategic Partnership Dialogue and other bilateralinteractions, and specifically urge thegovernment of Kazakhstan to:• Repeal or amend its religious registration laws, which are frequently
used to harass and prosecute
religious minorities;196

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• Cease the detention and sentencing
of individuals for their peaceful religious expression and practice; and• Provide an alternative to military
service for conscientious objectors;• Encourage the Kazakhstani government to open the Congress of the
Leaders of the World and Traditional
Religions to representatives of all
faiths; and• Ensure continued U.S. funding forRadio Azattyq, the Kazakh service of Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty (RFE/RL), so that uncensored
information about events inside
Kazakhstan, including those related
to religious freedom, can be disseminated widely.

TIER 2 K AZAKHSTANCOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Republic of Kazakhstan“traditional religions,” especially Hanafi Islam and Russian
Orthodox Christianity.

GOVERNMENT
Presidential Republic

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
70% Muslim (Sunni Hanafi)
26% Christian (including Orthodox, Protestants, Catholics,
and Jehovah’s Witnesses)
3% Other (including Jews, Buddhists, Baha’is, andHare Krishnas)
1% Non-Hanafi Muslim (including Shi’a and Sufi Muslims)

POPULATION
18,744,548
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSTechnically a secular state with complete religious freedom.
In practice, the government gives preference to so-called

BACKGROUND
Kazakhstan is territorially the largest state in Central
Asia, with 18 million citizens, second only to Uzbekistan
in terms of population. About two-thirds of the population are ethnic Kazakhs, a Turkic people, while therest are ethnic Slavs and other Turkic peoples including
Uzbeks and Uighurs (also spelled Uyghur). Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country that has a large
ethnic-Russian population (23.7 percent), most of whom
live in the north along the Russian border. The country
was ruled by Nursultan Nazarbayev between 1990—
when it was still part of the Soviet Union—and March 19,
2019, when Nazarbayev resigned amid growing popular
unrest over the government’s neglect of ordinary citizens. Nazarbayev actively opposed the dissolution of theSoviet Union, and maintained his position for almost
30 years by carefully balancing Kazakhstan’s autonomy
with Russian, Chinese, and American interests, andby exploiting perceived security threats to expand thepower of the state at the expense of civil society.
In the 21st century, the threat from Russia has been
overshadowed by the specter of Islamist extremism.
Kazakhstan has suffered several terrorist attacks, whichhave frequently served as a pretext for the extension of
authoritarian rule. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) election observers have found*Estimates compiled from the U.S. Department of State

that no election in the country has been free and fair,including the most recent April 2015 election in which
the president purportedly received almost 98 percentof the vote. New elections are scheduled for June 9,
2019, until which time the former speaker of the Senate,
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, will serve as interim president. Despite his resignation, Nazarbayev will maintainsignificant power in his unelected roles as “Leader of
the Nation,” head of the National Security Council, andhead of Kazakhstan’s ruling political party, Nur Otan.
For decades, Nazarbayev sought to cultivate
Kazakhstan’s image as a model of religious pluralism.
Since 2003, the country periodically hosted an official Congress of the Leaders of World and Traditional
Religions, joined by prominent religious and politicalleaders, including the general secretaries of the United
Nations (UN) and OSCE. In October 2018, Kazakhstan
hosted the Sixth Congress, devoted to “Overcoming
Extremism and Terrorism,” which was attended by
80 delegates from 46 countries. Representatives fromreligious groups that the government of Kazakhstan
considered “extremist” were notably absent—such as
the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Church of Scientology, theUnion of Evangelical Baptists, and Tablighi Jamaat.
Before its 2011 religion law was enacted, Kazakhstan
had been one of the least repressive post-Soviet Central
Asian states with regard to freedom of religion or belief.

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198

The religion law, however, set stringent registration
education. In addition, another requirement that all
requirements with high membership thresholds, andworship only take place in specially designated religious
banned or restricted unregistered religious activities,
institutions would have imposed unfair burdens on
including those relating to education, distributing
communities either lacking a separate space or simply
literature, and training clergy. Other vague criminal
exercising their freedom to worship in private.
and administrative statutes enable the state to punRELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018ish most unauthorized religious or political activity.
Positive Developments
Religious groups are subject to police and secret police
surveillance. As a result of the law’s registration requireOn January 29, 2019, after the reporting period, thements, the total number of registered religious groups
government of Kazakhstan abandoned its proposed
fell sharply after 2011, especially the number of “nonamendments to the country’s already restrictive 2011
traditional” religious groups, which declined from 48
religion law. The decision to abandon the amendments
to 16. Although the religion law considers all religions
came after nearly a year and a half of parliamentary
to be equal, its preamble “recognizes the historicaldebate and followed their approval on September 27 byrole of Hanafi Islam andthe Senate, which thenOrthodox Christianity.”
handed the amendments
According to government
back to the lower house. . . the government ofstatistics, Kazakhstan had
for final passage. During
Kazakhstan abandoned its proposed
3,732 registered religious
2018, there was a subamendments to the country’s
entities at the end of thestantial decrease in thealready restrictive 2011 religion law.
reporting period—often,
number of administrative
but not always, reflected
prosecutions for reliin a physical house of worgious activity, from 279
ship: 2,599 Muslim entities, 340 Orthodox, 86 Catholic,cases in 2017 to 165 in 2018. Of these cases, 139 resulted
594 Protestant, seven Jewish, two Buddhist, six Baha’i,in punishments—including fines, prison terms, and
two Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and one
various restrictions on freedom—as opposed to 259
Unification. The government restricted many religious
in 2017. During the summer, the Ministry of Religion
minority communities from registering as legal entities
and Civil Society was renamed the Ministry of Socialand funded “anti-sect centers” that function as quaDevelopment and references to religion were removed
si-nongovernmental organizations, publicly promoting
from its official designations. Some Muslims reported
intolerance against Jehovah’s Witnesses, evangelicalexperiencing an improvement in their treatment during
Christians, and Salafi Muslims, among others.
2018 when compared to the previous year. One self-deThroughout 2018, Kazakhstan wavered between ascribed Salafi Muslim claimed that in the past, he andrenewed offensive against religion and a more conciliatory his friends were routinely stopped and questioned byposture. The number of cases targeting religious activthe police about their religious beliefs, but in 2018 this
ity noticeably diminished, even as the Senate debatedpractice had largely stopped.
a series of amendments that would, if approved, draGovernment Targeting of Tablighi Jamaat
matically expand the government’s ability to prosecute
religion. Among other things, the proposed amendments
Although Kazakhstan is a majority Muslim country, thewould have further restricted who may legally proselygovernment is avowedly secular and views religion as
tize—already broadly defined under Kazakhstani law
a potential threat to be controlled. The state maintains
to encompass all manner of religious discussion—and
influence over, and preference for, the ‘traditional’ Hanafi
under what circumstances. A requirement for the explicit
Sunni school, while Islamic practice that deviates fromapproval of both parents for children to take part in relithe mainstream is viewed with suspicion. In 2018, as ingious activities would have posed another major hurdle
the past, Muslims in Kazakhstan were by far the mostto religious groups organizing large events or children’s
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TIER 2 K AZAKHSTAN

cases brought against individuals for hosting, holding, orProsecution for Islamic Literature
participating in religious meetings involved Muslims. In
and Instruction
particular, the government continued to target memDuring the year, the Kazakhstani government roubers of the Muslim missionary organization, Tablighitinely prosecuted citizens for possessing or distributing
Jamaat. Tablighi Jamaat was banned as “extremist” inreligious literature. Between February 2009 and May
2013, despite an extensive study undertaken by the secret2018, the government banned 815 items for alleged
police and the Religious Affairs Committee between 2010
association with “extremism.” The government also
and 2012, which found the movement is neither extremist
censors all religious texts, bans religious materials in
nor terrorist. Tablighi Jamaat is avowedly pacifist andprison, and restricts where religious materials may beapolitical. Nevertheless, the international scope and missold. On September 19, 2018, a 65-year-old man was
sionary emphasis of Tablighi Jamaat routinely attracts the fined the equivalent of three weeks’ average wages forire of the Kazakhstani govselling Islamic pamphlets
ernment, which remains
about how to pray andsuspicious of religious
read the Qur’an. The
The government censors allgroups with foreign ties orpolice had begun invesreligious texts, bans religiousthat actively proselytize.
tigating him for “inciting
materials in prison, and restricts where
On April 6, 2018, areligious discord” in June,religious materials may be sold.
court sentenced Kazbut the investigation was
bek Laubayev, Marat
later dropped “due to the
Konyrbayev, and Taskali
absence of a crime.” He
Naurzgaliyev to three years in prison for membership
was then charged with illegally distributing religious
in Tablighi Jamaat. Three other men arrested withliterature. In addition to the fine, the judge ordered allthem were fined and placed under restricted freedom,
85 copies of the pamphlets to be destroyed, not because
which could include house arrest, the inability to holdthey were illegal, but because the defendant “did notcertain jobs, or prohibition of travel to another cityneed them.” On August 6, a couple was fined the equivwithout official permission. According to Forum 18, aalent of three months’ average wages for missionary
senior police official admitted that none of the six men
activity and the illegal production and distribution of
had committed or called for violence. On July 9, sevenreligious literature. The two had collected traditional
more members of Tablighi Jamaat were sentenced to
Muslim prayers into booklets, which they taught to local
restricted freedom for between one and three years.
children with the permission of their parents.
Four of them were additionally punished with 120 hours
Several Kazakhstani citizens have been handedof community service. In August, all seven were added
harsh sentences for posting online lectures by Musto a list of individuals “connected with the financing of
lim theology student Kuanysh Bashpayev, in which
terrorism or extremism,” maintained by the Financehe criticized the state-controlled Muslim Board. In
Ministry. Those on the list have their bank accounts
2017, Bashpayev was jailed for extremism as a result
frozen and their families are only able to withdraw
of these lectures and has spent more than a year insmall amounts if given special permission by the state.
solitary confinement, where he remained at the end
Anyone helping those on the list, or their families, placeof the reporting period. His incarceration continued
themselves in legal jeopardy of financing terrorism.
despite an assessment of his lectures commissioned
On January 9, 2019, after the reporting period, Abilaiby the national security services, in which two of three
Bokbasarov became the 73rd Muslim imprisoned in
independent experts found the lectures did not incite
Kazakhstan for membership in Tablighi Jamaat. He was
religious hatred or call for the violent overthrow of thesentenced to three years in prison and, upon his release,state. On October 19, 2018, Galymzhan Abilkairov waswill be forbidden from engaging in religious activity for
sentenced to seven years and seven months in prison for
an additional five years. He was added to the Financeposting the lectures online. On November 16, another
Ministry’s list on February 15.
Kazakhstani citizen, Dadash Mazhanov, was sentenced

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to seven years and eight months in a labor camp for thesame offense.

Headscarves Banned in Schools
At the beginning of the 2018 school year, the government started a renewed campaign against the wearingof headscarves by female students. In one school wherestudents had previously worn headscarves without incident, more than 200 girls were barred entry for refusing
to remove them. Psychologists and theologians sent tothe school’s village by local authorities convinced all but
10 of the girls to remove their scarves. Authorities subsequently fined the parents of seven of the girls. In another
district, the parents of 13 girls were fined $380 eachfor sending their daughters to school in headscarves.
Dozens of girls are reportedly unable to attend school
because they refuse to comply with the newly restricted
clothing policy. During the year, the government maintained its right to enforce a secular dress code in publicschools as a legacy of the “important historical achievement of the Kazakh people.” Officials explained thatthe recalcitrant girls are a product of “nontraditional”
religious groups and that the ban on headscarves isnecessary to fight religious extremism in affected areasof the country.

embezzling five billion dollars. Tungishbayev was
charged with propagating terrorism, an offense punishable by up to 12 years in prison; he remained in
pretrial detention at the end of the reporting period. On
December 21, Kenzhebek Abishev, Almat Zhumaghulov, and Oralbek Omyrov, also members of the DVK,
were convicted of propagating religious extremism andterrorism. The case against Abishev, Zhumaghulov,
and Omyrov was based on a video recording of three
armed masked men, who claimed to represent the DVK
and called for Islamic jihad. According to independent
observers, the course of the trial revealed the video tobe highly suspect, with compelling evidence that it was
fabricated by the security services. Nevertheless, thejudge found the men guilty, effectively linking the DVK
to Islamist terrorism.

Government Complicity in Chinese
Persecution of Kazakh and Other Muslims

Over the last two decades, the government of Kazakhstan has on several occasions deported ethnic Uighur
Muslims to China, violating its obligations under the1951 UN Refugee Convention, its 1967 Protocol, and theinternational legal principle of nonrefoulement. In recent
years, the Chinese government has actively detained
Kazakh and other Muslims within its borders. According
Arbitrary Accusations of Islamist Extremism to the State Department, since 2017 the Chinese governKazakhstani human rights groups, like the Kazakhstan
ment has detained 800,000 to possibly more than two
International Bureau for Human Rights, and indepenmillion Uighur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims indent Kazakhstani journalists have provided compellinginternment camps. The existence of information about
evidence that the govthese camps owes muchernment of Kazakhstan
to the work of Kazakh
uses charges of religious
activists like Serikzhan
Kazakhstani human rights
extremism and terrorism
Bilash, an ethnic Kazakhgroups . . . and independent
to persecute its politicaloriginally from the
Kazakhstani journalists have provided
enemies. In June 2018,
Xinjiang Uighur Autonocompelling evidence thatthe government extramous Region of northwest
the government of Kazakhstan
dited blogger and activist
China who has advocateduses charges of religious extremism
Muratbek Tungishbayev
for his compatriots inand terrorism tofrom Kyrgyzstan. Tungthe camps. While somepersecute its political enemies.
ishbayev was a member
Kazakh Muslims detainedof the banned oppositionin China were released
movement Democratic
in 2018 and forced to
Choice for Kazakhstan (DVK), which was founded byremain in the country, approximately 2,000 reportedly
Mukhtar Ablyazov, a former banker and prominent
received permission to emigrate to Kazakhstan. One
critic of Nazarbayev’s government wanted for allegedly
ethnic Kazakh on whose behalf Bilash advocated was200

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Sayragul Sauytbay, a female Chinese citizen who fled
Being an officially registered church is not a guarone of the camps in April 2018 after being forced toantee against harassment by authorities. On February
teach there. Kazakhstani authorities arrested Sauytbay
25, 2018, police raided the New Life Protestant Church in
in May when she crossed the border, but in August athe city of Kyzylorda, responding to a report that a childcourt declined to deport her to China. At the end of thewas present. They demanded to see the church’s regisreporting period, hertration, surrounded thestatus remained uncerbuilding with yellow tape,tain after Kazakhstan
filmed everyone presBeing an officially registered
twice denied her asylum
ent, and refused to allow
church is not a guarantee against
requests. Relatedly, on
anyone to leave. Officers
harassment by authorities.
March 10, after the reportdemanded that all chiling period, Bilash was
dren present identify theirdetained by law enforceparents. Each member
ment in the southern city of Almaty and remanded to
was forced to write a statement explaining why they
the capital, Astana. The following day, he was accused
came to church, when they had started coming, whetherof “inciting ethnic hatred” for his advocacy on behalf
anyone had forced them to do so, and whether theyof ethnic Kazakhs like Sauytbay. Such instances haveread any religious literature. About 20 members were
contributed to popular outrage and ongoing protests
taken to the police station and questioned for several
over the Kazakhstani government’s systematic neglect ofhours. Religious literature, including the pastor’s Bible,
ordinary citizens.
was seized despite having already received approval by
official censors. The pastor was taken to a drug testing
Harassment of Protestant Christians
center and forced to take an alcohol test before being
Christians in Kazakhstan are frequently penalized forquestioned at the police station. He was detained for six
distributing religious texts without a license, discussing
hours, twice the duration permitted by law, and accused
religion without the required “missionary” registraof “inciting discord,” a charge that carries up to 10 years
tion, and holding unregistered worship meetings.
in prison. The charges were later dropped.
Churches belonging to the Baptist Council of Churches
On March 30, an official from a regional religious
exercise civil disobedience by refusing to comply withaffairs department in western Kazakhstan sent a letter
registration laws in any of the post-Soviet states whereto the leaders of local Christian groups, all of which were
they exist. Of the eight administrative charges brought
officially registered. The letter demanded the names,
against Christians in 2018 for hosting, holding, or partic- ages, places of study, and state identification numbers of
ipating in religious meetings, seven of the accused were
all underage members. The data was allegedly needed
Baptist Council churches.
for an ongoing official study and “monitoring,” and only
In late 2018, police raided a Baptist Council of
Christian groups were selected.
Churches congregation in Almaty; police filmed all thoseJehovah’s Witnesses
present and confiscated religious literature for “expert
Jehovah’s Witnesses reported an improved atmosphere
analysis.” The pastor, Eduard Neifeld, was charged within 2018. The group remained legal in Kazakhstan andviolating the religion law by holding an unapproved
congregations were able to register. Like other relimeeting and distributing religious materials that havegious groups that engage in proselytization, Jehovah’s
not received a “positive assessment from a religious
Witnesses have been prosecuted for unauthorizedstudies expert analysis.” On January 28, 2019, after the
missionary activity in the past. In January 2017, Teymur
reporting period, Pastor Neifeld was fined the equivalent
Akhmedov was arrested for discussing his faith withof $667, or roughly two months’ average wages. Over theundercover police informers, who secretly recorded
next several weeks, two more Baptist Council churches
him. On May 2, 2017, he was sentenced to five years inwere raided by the police and issued similar fines for
prison, despite being diagnosed with colon cancer while
their unregistered meetings.

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in custody. In October 2017, and again in January 2018,
the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention called
for Akhmedov’s immediate release so that he could be
effectively treated at a hospital. On April 4, 2018, he wasreleased from prison after receiving a full presidential
pardon from Nazarbayev.

had one of the world’s largest reserves of nuclear weapons, including 1,410 strategic nuclear warheads placedon its territory and an undisclosed number of tactical
nuclear weapons. By 1994, it had exchanged all of themfor improved relations with the West. Key bilateral issues
with the United States include regional security—suchas efforts to stabilize Afghanistan—and nuclear nonOther Religious Minorites
proliferation. In 2018, Kazakhstan and the United States
The Russian Orthodox Church maintained goodsigned their fourth five-year plan to strengthen military
relations with the government of Kazakhstan andcooperation via capacity-building programs. U.S. Agency
has a strong presence, especially among the Russian
for International Development (USAID) programs inminority in the north. Prominent Orthodox clerics
Kazakhstan help support civil society, increase accessvocally support Nazarbayev, and the president gives an
to information, strengthen citizen initiative groups, proannual televised address on Orthodox Christmas thatmote an independent judiciary, and encourage humanreferences the uniquerights protection. USAID
multiconfessional nature
also assists in civil societyof Kazakhstan’s historicalpartnerships with the. . . the chairman of thedevelopment. Speaking
Kazakhstani government.
Kazakhstani Senate claimed that theon the recent indepenOn January 16, 2018,
parishes of the Orthodox Church indence (autocephaly)
President Donald J.
Kazakhstan were united and had
granted to the Ukrainian
Trump hosted then Presno need for autonomy.
Orthodox Church, theident Nazarbayev at thechairman of the KazakhWhite House, where thestani Senate claimed thattwo discussed improving
the parishes of the Orthodox Church in Kazakhstan
trade and economic ties between the two countries. On
were united and had no need for autonomy.
January 17, Vice President Michael R. Pence met with
In addition, the government of Kazakhstan mainNazarbayev and stressed the importance of respecting
tained good relations with the Vatican, and Catholics
civil liberties, “especially meeting commitments toare the only religious group exempt from registration.
protect religious freedoms.” Deputy Secretary of State
Nazarbayev marked the beginning of the Sixth Congress John J. Sullivan reiterated this message in July 2018of the Leaders of World and Traditional Religions bywhen he met with Kazakhstan Foreign Minister Kairatpresenting an award to the Vatican for its “contribution
Abdrakhmanov in Washington, DC, and discussed
to interreligious dialogue.” Other religious minorities inreligious freedom.
Kazakhstan were likewise represented at the Congress,
In 2018, U.S. Embassy officials met with represenreflecting the status they tend to enjoy in the country.
tatives of the Kazakhstani government to urge respect
Notable attendees included Vice-President of the Worldfor religious freedom, raise concerns about the negative
Congress of Buddhists Choyzhilzhavyn Dambazhav,
impact of the government’s legal prosecution of religion,
Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi of Israel David Lau, Chief Sepand emphasize the role of freedom of religion in counhardic Rabbi of Israel Yitzhak Yosef, and Iranian Shi’atering violent extremism.
cleric Mohsen Araki.

U.S. POLICY
After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the UnitedStates was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan’s
independence, and is now the largest direct foreign
investor in Kazakhstan. At independence, Kazakhstan202

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LAOS
TIER 2KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Laos trended the sameas in 2017. It continued to be difficult to obtain and confirm
details about religious freedom violations due to heavy government censorship and restrictions on freedom of information.
Lao officials seek to control all perceived challenges to stateauthority and often characterize religious and ethnic minorities
as potential agitators. The Lao constitution ostensibly protects
its peoples’ inherent right to religious freedom. However,as exemplified by Decree 315, corresponding rules and regulations pertaining to religious observance are excessively
cumbersome, vaguely worded, and open to interpretation.
This emboldened some local authorities to implement thespirit of the decree as they understand it rather than according
to the decree. In 2018, communication between national andprovincial government institutions remained limited, and locallevel officials were often unaware of or unwilling to implement
or enforce national laws and policies pertaining to religious
freedom. As such, religious freedom conditions throughout
the country varied widely by district, village, and province. In
some parts of the country, religious freedom conditions weregenerally good, while in others—typically more rural and isolated areas—they remained quite poor. Some Lao authorities

remained deeply suspicious of Christians, sometimes resulting
in social exclusion, harassment, and arbitrary detention by law
enforcement officials. Throughout 2018, USCIRF continued toreceive reports of harassment and persecution of Christians
in Savannakhet, a province known for its religious intolerance.
The Lao government has a long history of sentencing individuals to indefinite prison terms for expressing open criticism of
the government or shedding light on its human rights abuses,
including religious freedom violations, and the possibility of
government retaliation prompted many people to self-censor.
Furthermore, the Lao government maintained its policy of promoting Buddhism through various state institutions, including
public school curricula, and at times incorporated Buddhist
rituals or ceremonies in official state functions. Religious tensions were also manifest at the village level, indicating a degreeof generalized social prejudice toward religious minorities.
In 2019, USCIRF again places Laos on its Tier 2, where it has
been since 2009, for engaging in or tolerating religious freedom violations that meet at least one of the elements of the“systematic, ongoing, egregious” standard for designation as a“country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International
Religious Freedom Act (IRFA).

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Urge the Lao government to:• Amend Decree 315 in order toclarify administrative procedures
and enforcement mechanisms, and,in the meantime, hold accountable central, provincial, and local
government and law enforcement
officials acting in contravention of
Laos’ laws, the Lao constitution, andinternational standards; and• Permit all religious communities—
particularly those located in rural204

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and isolated areas—to operate
freely regardless of their recognition
status; and• Support programs that increase
understanding and awareness of Laogovernment policies and practices
relating to religious freedom—including government restrictions
and social hostilities—among
national and local-level officials, law
enforcement, and religious leaders
representing all beliefs.

The U.S. Congress should:• Send regular congressional delegations to Laos and hold hearings
focused on religious freedom andrelated human rights to collect anddisseminate information about overall
conditions and specific violations.

TIER 2 LAOSCOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Lao People’s Democratic Republic

POPULATION
7,234,171

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*:
64.7% Buddhist
1.7% Christian
31.4% No Religion
2.1% Other/Not Stated(“No Religion” or “Other” include Folk Religions, Animism,
the Baha’i faith, Confucianism, and Taoism)

GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHS
Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and the Baha’i faith*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook

GOVERNMENT
Communist StateBACKGROUND
Laos is an authoritarian, single-party communist statewith a dismal human rights record. In July 2018, theUnited Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) emphasized the country’s
highly repressive environment and the government’s
refusal to respect the Lao people’s basic civil andpolitical rights, and criticized authorities for systemic
human rights abuses—including enforced disappearances, the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities,
and endemic restrictions on the freedoms of expression
and peaceful assembly. The OHCHR specifically noted“reports of persecution and discrimination against
Christians, including arbitrary arrests.” Lao authorities
seek to control all perceived challenges to state authority
and regulate individuals or groups they regard as being
critical of the government. Furthermore, government
officials tend to be highly suspicious of certain ethnic
and religious groups, particularly Christians, and often
characterize them as potential agitators.
The Lao government is decentralized. As a consequence, religious freedom conditions throughout thecountry can vary widely by district, village, and province. Laos has a long tradition of highly independent
provincial governance. As such, national leaders often
are reluctant to pressure provincial authorities to fall inline with federal policies, and communication between
their respective jurisdictions can be lacking. Local
officials are often unaware of or unwilling to implement
or enforce national laws. In some parts of the country,
religious freedom conditions are generally good, whilein others they are quite poor.
In addition to the arbitrary arrest of Christians
noted above, the Lao government has a long historyof sentencing individuals to indefinite prison terms
for expressing open criticism of the government or
shedding light on its human rights abuses. Throughout
2018, the wife of Lao civil society leader Sombath Somphone—along with family and supporters—continued
to seek information regarding his disappearance morethan six years ago. However, by the end of the reporting
period, Lao government officials had not been forthcoming about their investigation. During a July 2018
OHCHR session in Geneva, Lao delegate Bounkeut
Sangsomsak evaded questions regarding Somphone’s
disappearance, accused him of having possessed up to
two million dollars in undeclared assets, and attacked
his wife for steadfastly campaigning on Somphone’s
behalf. The OHCHR subsequently issued a reportdetailing more than a dozen enforced disappearancesin Laos and the government’s persistent failures toadequately investigate.

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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
State Administration of Religious Activity

tion by local authorities. For example, in August 2018,
authorities in Nakai District, Khammouane Province,arrested a man for performing worship services in his
The Lao constitution guarantees the “right and freedom
home without paying weekly fees to local officials andto believe or not to believe in religion” and ensures all
for refusing to renounce his faith. Because village elders
citizens equal treatment before the law, regardless ofsometimes disapprove of Christian religious activities,
their ethnic or religious affiliations. The constitution
local authorities often feel
also details various relijustified in committing
gious regulations, whichthese abuses under theare implemented through[Decree 315] describes the
misguided notion of predecrees. Decree 315 is thelegal space in which religious organizations
serving communal peacelatest iteration in a series
are required to operate and mandates aand stability.
of policies and regulations
complex, multilayered approval process for
The Lao government
pertaining to religious
nearly all religious activities.
oversees religious affairs
practice and observance.
through two primary
It describes the legal
administrative bodies:
space in which religious
the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and the Lao Front
organizations are required to operate and mandates afor National Construction (LFNC). MOHA regulates
complex, multilayered approval process for nearly all
virtually all aspects of religious life. MOHA approval isreligious activities. The language is vague and open
required to assemble for religious purposes, construct
to multiple interpretations, often emboldening local
new houses of worship or modify existing facilities, andauthorities to implement the spirit of the decree as they
establish new congregations in districts or villages that
understand it rather than according to the law.
previously had none. In addition, MOHA offices have
The Lao government officially acknowledges four
authority to restrict religious activities they perceive
religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and the Baha’ito be at odds with local customs or national policies.
faith. Within Christianity, the government recognizes
MOHA may also shut down any religious activity it
three denominations—the Lao Evangelical Church
deems to threaten national stability, peace and order,(LEC), the Catholic Church, and the Seventh-day Adventhe environment, or unity between religious and ethnic
tist Church. Lao authorities typically urge Christians
groups. Furthermore, all religious groups holdingof other denominations to register with the LEC, which
religious services—or even secular community events—
serves as an umbrella organization for all other Chrismust register with MOHA, submit annual plans for all
tian groups. Animist beliefs, characterized by the notion
scheduled activities outside the scope of routine operathat all living and inanimate things possess a spirit andtions, and provide information on individuals internallyconsciousness, are also widespread throughout muchelected or appointed to positions of influence or authorof Lao society and often blend with the practices ofity. These regulations pose obstacles to routine religious
religious groups.
observance and often preclude collaboration between
Some Christians find the government-prescribedfaith communities operating in separate administrative
religious labels too narrow or at odds with their own
jurisdictions, a necessity in many remote, rural areas
personal doctrine or beliefs. As a result, some choose
where clergy are scarce. For example, in 2018, clergy
not to join a recognized religious institution and insteadand members of the Catholic diocese in Luang Prabang
attend services at unofficial house churches. While
Province had difficulty traveling; authorities required
technically illegal, house churches are fairly common
priests and parishioners to request permission firstthroughout much of the country, and in some areas they
before visiting other villages and assigned a soldier toare more or less tolerated by local authorities. In other—accompany them, allegedly for their protection.
predominantly rural—areas, Christians worshipping in
The LFNC works broadly with both religious
unregistered house churches face social exclusion fromorganizations and local officials to inform and educate
their community, harassment, and occasional deten-

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TIER 2 LAOS

stakeholders on national religious policies. The LFNC’s
were arrested and held for several days for conducting
stated purpose is to alleviate ethnic and religious tenwhat local authorities interpreted as unlawful religious
sions and clarify existing
services in Keovilai
regulations by meeting
Village, and another fivewith and facilitatingwere detained in Non. . . authorities in Nakanong Village
dialogue between proSoung Village for comarrested seven Christians after
vincial authorities, local
municating with a pastor
deeming their Christmas church service
religious leaders, clergy,
from a neighboring village
to be illegal.
and members of faithabout the prospect ofcommunities. In the past,working together without
the LFNC has sometimes
obtaining the required
used these engagements to promote intolerant views
approval in advance.
toward certain religious groups and institutions. In
Although Christians represent only a small
December 2018, LFNC and other officials in Khamminority of the population, many local religious leadersmouane Province reportedly told a Christian man
assert they are now the fastest-growing religious comhe was not permitted to hold meetings or organize
munity in Laos. Some Lao authorities harbor an acuteceremonies, and more ominously, that he would have
distrust of Christians, often conflating individual believno recourse if anything happened to him because
ers with what they perceive as European and American
Christianity was not an officially recognized religion,
imperialism. For example, local officials and even fellow
which is untrue.
community members have threatened Christian families to renounce their faith or face eviction from their
Violations against Christians
villages or the confiscation of their land titles if they do
Throughout 2018, it remained difficult to obtain andnot. In November 2018, a regional governor in northern
confirm information regarding religious freedom
Laos stated he would not tolerate Christianity in the area
violations in Laos. The Lao government continued tobecause it was a “foreign religion.” He issued an ultimacontrol virtually all domestic media outlets, prompttum to 20 Christian families: leave the village within one
ing many people to self-censor. Religious believers,
month or go to jail. At least five families renounced theircivil society advocates, and some ethnic minority
faith to avoid imprisonment.
groups continued to regulate their own statements andPromotion of Buddhism
public behavior in order to avoid scrutiny and possible
retaliation for exposing information or abuses that may Throughout 2018, the Lao government continued to promote Buddhism through various state institutions, anddiscredit the government.
at times incorporated Buddhist rituals or ceremonies in
In 2018, local officials in some provinces, particofficial state functions. Authorities usually framed theseularly Savannakhet Province, continued to mistreat
efforts as an attempt to instill pride in Lao customs andethnic and religious minorities. In November 2018,
reinforce national identity by regarding Buddhism notauthorities in Vilabouly District arrested four Chrissolely as a religion, but also as an integral component
tians, including a 78-year-old grandmother, for holdingof the country’s cultural heritage. The Lao government
worship services without a permit; all four were held foralso reportedly urged highly influential Buddhista week before being released. In December 2018, authorleaders to include progovernment messaging in theirities in Nakanong Village arrested seven Christians after
religious sermons.
deeming their Christmas church service to be illegal.
The Lao government continued to promote BudLocal authorities also demolished the church’s stage, cut
dhist practices throughout the public school system.
its power line, destroyed its sound system, and seized
Although education officials insisted the Buddhist
personal property from the congregation. The detainees
curriculum is taught in a secular manner and thatwere freed several days later in early January 2019, after
non-Buddhist parents have the right to remove their
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children from these lessons if it makes them uncomfortable, in the past some students have reportedly
been required to pray in Buddhist temples as a precondition for grade advancement. However, this practiceappears to be limited and may reflect the individual
prejudice of some Buddhist teachers rather than official government policy.

U.S. POLICYThe United States and Laos continue to cooperate
on many levels under a Comprehensive Partnership announced in 2016. Throughout 2018, the two
governments worked jointly to facilitate economic
development and global health security, promote education and strengthen people-to-people ties, partneron counternarcotics activities, and address various
Communal Religious Tensions
Vietnam War legacy issues including the clearing of
In 2018, some Christians living in multifaith comunexploded ordnance and accounting for missing
munities reportedly chose not to attend village-level
American personnel. The U.S. government also conBuddhist or animist ceremonies because they statedtinues to assist the Lao government in developing legal
even passive engagement conflicts with their own
and regulatory tools to facilitate greater participation inreligious beliefs. The
regional and international
apprehension of sometrade agreements and to
Christians to participate
better integrate the Lao
Animists have also reportedly
in ceremonial offerings
economy with the Associinterfered in Christian burial rituals,
to the village guardian
ation of Southeast Asianas some believe that burying
spirit has in some areas
Nations (ASEAN).
rather than cremating the deadagitated local animists
In February 2018,
will result in disharmony andbecause they fear thetwo of the largest, highconflict with village spirits.
spirit may collectively
est-ranking congressional
punish the village. Thisdelegations to visit Laos
has at times sparked
met with counterparts inlocalized tensions in rural villages and led to somethe Lao government to discuss ways to strengthen ties
Christians being asked to leave their homes. In Februbetween the U.S. Congress and the Lao National Assemary, the chief of Nasathoung Village in Khammouane
bly. Additionally, in April 2018, Representative Jackie
Province threatened at least nine Christian families
Speier of California met with Lao government officials
with incarceration if they did not leave the village orin Vientiane to discuss ways to enhance cooperation
renounce their faith. Animists have also reportedly
on defense issues, public security, and law enforcement
interfered in Christian burial rituals, as some believe
under the Comprehensive Partnership. In addition tothat burying rather than cremating the dead will result
her official engagements, Speier visited two Buddhist
in disharmony and conflict with village spirits.
temples to learn about local silk weaving traditions andto give alms, gestures that served to highlight social andTreatment of Muslims and Baha’iscultural ties between the two countries.
There are only two active mosques in Laos, both locatedOngoing cultural engagement—along with thein the capital, Vientiane, and the Muslim community
sustained military relationship between the two coundoes not report much difficulty practicing their faithtries—have helped build trust that, over time, hasopenly. Leaders of the Muslim Association, a small
strengthened the United States’ position to raise humangroup that manages Muslim community affairs andrights and religious freedom issues with Laos. In May 2018,
government outreach, reportedly meet and maintaina high-level military delegation from the U.S. Indo-Pacificgood relationships with MOHA and LFNC officials.
Command met with Lao government officials to discuss
Likewise, Baha’i leaders in Vientiane, Savannakhet, andthe bilateral defense relationship, emphasize the United
Luang Prabang seldom report interference in or restricStates’ commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, and contion of their religious activities.
sider ways to enhance the Comprehensive Partnership byexpanding military-to-military ties. In September, the U.S.

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TIER 2 LAOS

military hosted members of the Lao Ministry of National
Defense at Camp Smith, Hawaii, for the 13th Lao-UnitedStates Bilateral Defense Dialogue. Participants identified
and discussed various opportunities for enhanced bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

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MALAYSIATIER 2KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, religious freedom conditions in Malaysia trended thesame as in 2017, despite some optimism about the potential
for overall human rights improvements following a historicchange of government in the 2018 general elections. Malaysia
has a highly pluralistic society, but some public attitudes andgovernment policies on race, ethnicity, and religion have attimes contributed to societal intolerance. In general, the Sunni
Muslim majority must adhere to a strict, state-approved interpretation of Islam and have little freedom to practice according
to their conscience. Federal and state-level government authorities continued to forbid so-called “deviant” religious minority
groups—including Shi’a Muslims, Ahmadiyya Muslims, Baha’is,
and the Al-Arqam sect—from assembling or worshiping inpublic. In addition, deeper, institutionalized barriers to religious freedom remained firmly intact. Ethnic Malays—who are
constitutionally defined as Muslim—comprise more than half
the country’s population and have benefitted from affirmative
action policies. These special privileges are allocated strictly on
the basis of ethnicity, and by extension, adherence to Islam. Furthermore, Malaysia’s dual-track legal system includes both civiland Shari’ah courts. When their respective jurisdictions intersect, civil courts usually ceded to religious courts, which means

non-Muslims were sometimes subjected to Shari’ah court rulings. In 2018, Sunni Muslims remained free to proselytize, andthe proselytization of Islam to non-Muslims was reportedly
widespread in Malaysia’s public school system. Individuals who
identify with minority faiths were barred from proselytizing
Sunni Muslims and faced possible criminal charges such as caning or imprisonment for attempting to do so. Throughout 2018,
non-Sunni Muslims continued to suffer from varying degrees
of discrimination, including baseless accusations of extremism
and unprovoked acts of vandalism directed at their places ofworship. While non-Muslims had little difficulty converting toIslam, Muslims who wished to convert to another religion continued to face persistent legal and administrative difficulties andgenerally struggled to secure official government recognitionof their faith.
Based on these concerns, in 2019 USCIRF again places
Malaysia on its Tier 2, where it has been since 2014, for engaging in or tolerating religious freedom violations that meet atleast one of the elements of the “systematic, ongoing, egregious” standard for designation as a “country of particularconcern,” or CPC, under the International Religious Freedom
Act (IRFA).

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Request that the Malaysian government clarify administrative procedures
and develop tangible mechanisms forindividuals to leave Islam when theychoose to convert to another faith;• Press the Malaysian government toremove the religion field from national
ID cards and allow for marriage
between Muslims and non-Muslims
without conversion;

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• Urge the Malaysian government tofacilitate independent institutions,
including the judiciary, in order toguarantee that everyone residing in
Malaysia, regardless of religion or
ethnicity, enjoys equal representation
before the law and freedom of religion
or belief; and• Urge the Malaysian government toacknowledge all peaceful religious
activity as legitimate and cease thearrest, detention, or forced “rehabilitation” of religious minorities, particularly
members of Shi’a Muslim, Ahmadiyya
Muslim, Baha’i, and Al-Arqam groups,
among others, and to release unconditionally those detained or imprisoned
for related charges.

TIER 2 MALAYSIACOUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Malaysia
GOVERNMENT
Federal Constitutional Monarchy
POPULATION
31,809,660
GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSIslam (official state religion); other religious groups may be
granted registration, excluding those deemed “deviant”

BACKGROUND
Malaysia has a highly pluralistic society with an expansive range of ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic
diversity. Nevertheless, some longstanding public
attitudes and government policies pertaining to race,
ethnicity, and religion that discriminate against minority
communities have, at times, contributed to periodic
intolerance between and within well-established socialgroupings. For example, federal and state-level religious
authorities have banned a number of so-called “deviant” minority religious groups including Shi’a Muslims,
Ahmadiyya Muslims, Baha’is, and the Al-Arqam sect.
Also, some individuals have previously objected to public displays of religious iconography outside Hindu andBuddhist temples. The government, along with statelevel Shari’ah courts, have authority to send converts
from Sunni Islam and members of deviant groups to“rehabilitation centers,” which function as extrajudicial detention facilities. Non-Sunni Muslims can also
be prosecuted for apostasy, which can result in fines or
prison sentences. In some states, the criminal penalty
for apostasy includes caning or even death, although inpractice the latter has never been enforced.
In the May 2018 general elections, the Pakatan
Harapan coalition (PH) won a simple majority in Malaysia’s lower house of parliament. This outcome ended
more than 60 years of Barisan Nasional (BN) rule and

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
61.3% Muslim
19.8% Buddhist
9.2% Christian
6.3% Hindu
1.3% Confucian, Taoist, and other traditional Chinese religions
0.4% Other
0.8% None*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook

marked the first post-independence regime change in
Malaysia’s history. Former BN coalition leader Mahathir bin Mohamad was sworn in as prime minister on
May 10 (he previously served as prime minister underthe BN government from 1981 to 2003). Despite theoptimism resulting from his election and the changeof government, Mahathir’s long political career has notbeen without controversy, some of which was revived
in 2018. For example, Mahathir has been accused ofmaking a number of anti-Semitic remarks regarding
the global Jewish community and the state of Israel. In
August 2018, he claimed anti-Semitism is “a term thatis invented to prevent people from criticizing Jews fordoing wrong things,” and went on to assert his right toopenly criticize anyone.
The Malaysian constitution states that “every
person has the right to profess and practice his religion.”
However, the constitution also specifies Islam as the“religion of the federation” and grants state and federal
government officials the authority to forbid proselytizing to Muslims. While the constitution makes no
distinction between Sunni and Shi’a Islam, in practice,
Shi’a Muslims experience various forms of discrimination. Malaysian authorities surveil and harass Shi’aMuslims, ban literature that promotes non-Sunni
Islamic beliefs, prohibit public worship or assembly, andthreaten arrests for observing Shi’a Muslim holidays.

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212

Only Sunni Muslims are free to proselytize unim2018, when Prime Minister Mahathir made a commitpeded. Members of all other faiths can only proselytize
ment at the 73rd United Nations (UN) General Assembly
followers of other minority communities. The act or
to ratify all unresolved UN conventions. Some Malays
mere accusation of proselytizing Muslims can result
feared this would negatively affect their privileged status
in criminal charges, such as caning or imprisonment.
and, by extension, the supremacy of Islam in Malaysian
Foreigners are not exempt from this law, and, in Novemsociety. In November 2018, between 55,000 and 100,000
ber 2018, four Finnish nationals were detained and later
demonstrators rallied in Kuala Lumpur against ratificadeported for distributing Christian materials in public.
tion of the International Convention on the Elimination
Some Sunni Muslims continue to feel alienatedof All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). Theor judged when their own practice or interpretation
Malaysian government ultimately reversed course andof Islam does not align with official government-apchose not to ratify the convention, demonstrating theproved teachings. Malaysia’s constitution grants statechallenge Malaysian leaders have in addressing policies
and federal governments power to regulate the content
that touch on issues of race, ethnicity, and religion.
of Muslim religious services. In practice this amounts
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
to a strict, state-backed version of Islam with no room
Discrimination against Religious Minorities
for personal interpretation. Most Sunni mosques andimams receive government funding and pre-approved
In recent years—prior to the 2018 general elections—talking points for religious sermons from the federal
religious minorities and even Sunni Muslims have voiced
Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM).
concern about deteriorating religious freedom conditions
Government-sanctioned themes sometimes feature
throughout Malaysia. The historic change in government
pointed critiques of Shi’a Muslim religious doctrine.
ushered in a new wave of optimism, in part underpinned
The constitutional construct stipulating all ethnic
by the PH coalition’s campaign promises to improve reliMalays are Muslim has been used to advance social
gious harmony and overall human rights conditions. For
policies—many of which amount to legally mandated
example, the PH coalition proposed to repeal the vaguely
religious discrimination—aimed at giving ethnic
worded Sedition Act, which in the past the government
Malays preferential treatment in order to offset historihas used to suppress political and religious dissent. Yet
cal economic disparity.
at the end of the reportThe benefits for Malays
ing period, the Sedition
include, but are not limited
Act remained in effect.
The constitutional construct stipulating
to: set quotas for university
Encouragingly, in August
all ethnic Malays are Muslim
admissions, academic
2018 the new governmenthas been used to advance social policies—
scholarships, and civil seralso took steps to repeal
many of which amount tovice jobs; and real estate
legally mandated religious discrimination . . . Malaysia’s controversubsidies for land andsial Anti Fake News Act
property purchases.
(AFNA), which came into
While these policies
effect ahead of the general
are somewhat controversial, Malays have been reluctant
elections and instituted jail terms for the dissemination of
to give up their preferential status. The end result is a
so-called “fake news.” But the effort was thwarted whenmostly unspoken social contract in which non-Malays
in September the opposition-controlled Senate blockedenjoy the benefits of Malaysian citizenship, but mustthe repeal. This law, too, remained in effect at the end ofalso accept second-class status in Malaysian society. In
the reporting period.
October 2018, Prime Minister Mahathir publicly asserted
In short, many of the PH coalition’s campaign prothese policies were still necessary to bridge the economic posals with respect to human rights have yet to bear fruit,
gap between Malays and non-Malays and would remain
and in 2018, religious freedom conditions in Malaysia
in place for the foreseeable future. The salience of theseremained largely unchanged. While most Malaysian citiaffirmative action policies was exemplified in September
zens were free to worship, non-Sunni Muslims continued

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TIER 2 MALAYSIA

to experience varying degrees of discrimination. In Janbetween temple factions and went on to arrest 83 Musuary 2018, Mohd Asri Zainul Abidin, the mufti of Perlis,
lim men for their involvement. Details later emerged
declared that Shi’a Muslims posed a threat to nationalthat these men were likely hired to foment unrest
security, though there is no evidence to suggest that any
and that the resulting chaos stemmed primarily from
Malaysian Shi’a Muslims have been linked to extremist
an ongoing property dispute. The incident inflamedgroups or implicated in domestic terror attacks.
lingering religious tensions and prompted the governIn the past, vandals have targeted non-Muslim
ment to propose legislation to mandate registration
houses of worship, and this practice continued in 2018.
of all existing houses of worship and require local
Shortly after midnight on January 1, during a late-night
government approval prior to the construction of new
worship service to celebrate the new year, assailants
religious facilities.
detonated an explosive device in front of the LutherIn December 2018, Malaysian Education Minister
Centre, a Lutheran church in Petaling Jaya. Three
Dr. Maszlee Malik stirred controversy by urging Muslim
church-goers were injured in the attack. One week later, religious educators from peninsular Malaysia to preacha disgruntled civil servant threw two burning water filIslam in Sabah and Sarawak—East Malaysian statesters at the Kota Bahru Methodist Church and smashedwith significant Christian populations. After much
windows at the nearby Arulmigu Siva Subramaniyar
confusion over the true meaning of his remarks, Dr.
Hindu temple; the man
Maszlee later clarified
was later arrested. The
this statement was madechurch’s pastor claimed
in reference to a shortage. . . assailants detonated an
it was the second attackof Muslim teachers for the
explosive device in front
to happen that week, andlocal Muslim commuof the Luther Centre,
Reverend Hermen Shasnity, but many Christiansa Lutheran church in Petaling Jaya.
tri, general secretary of
believed he was urging
Three church-goers were
the Council of Churches
Muslim teachers to coninjured in the attack.
of Malaysia (CCM),
vert Christians to Islam.
described the attack as
His comments were“motivated by extremists
particularly sensitive
who are out to stoke the flames of religious intolerance
because proselytization of non-Muslims is reportedly
in the country.”widespread throughout Malaysia’s public school system.
In January 2018, Malaysia’s highest court ruled thatIn 2018, Malaysia maintained its dual-track legal
both parents’ consent is required to convert a minor
system with both civil and Shari’ah courts; non-Musfrom one religion to another. The ruling was unexpected lims have no legal standing in the latter. Shari’ah courts
because the government had previously withdrawn
have jurisdiction over Muslims in matters of family
a measure that would have prohibited the unilaterallaw and religious observance, but when the two legal
conversion of children after giving in to pressure fromsystems intersect, civil courts typically cede to Shari’ah
conservative Muslim groups. This ruling was largely
courts. At times this leads to non-Muslims being
inspired by the M. Indira Gandhi case, a Hindu woman
directly impacted by Shari’ah rulings because they lack
whose former husband converted to Islam, then conthe ability to defend themselves or appeal the court’s
verted their three children without her knowledge.
decision. As in previous years, Muslims who wished to
Malaysia’s Federal Court ultimately decided the unilatconvert to another religion were first required to secure
eral conversion of their children was invalid and thatapproval from Shari’ah courts to declare themselves
Ms. Gandhi should be awarded custody.
as apostates. This approval was seldom granted andIn November 2018, rioting occurred outside SeafShari’ah courts have been known to impose penalties
ield Sri Maha Mariamman, a Hindu temple in Selangor, on those who request it, at times even forcibly detaining
killing at least one person and injuring another dozen.
them at so-called “rehabilitation” camps for attempting
Authorities initially described the incident as a rivalry
to leave Islam.

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214

Evangelical pastor Raymond Koh’s high-profile disappearance—missing since February 2017 when he was
abducted in broad daylight—remained unsolved at theend of the reporting period. Malaysia’s government-appointed human rights commission, known locally by its
acronym SUHAKAM, launched an independent investigation but was forced to cease the inquiry in early 2018
when authorities pressed charges against a man believed
to be responsible for Koh’s disappearance. Police later
stated the man was not directly connected to the crime.
SUHAKAM subsequently resumed the investigation andlater concluded its inquiry in December 2018 but did not
uncover any conclusive evidence regarding Pastor Koh’s
whereabouts or the details surrounding his abduction
before the end of the reporting period. Similar investigations into the disappearances of Shi’a Muslim social
activist Amri Che Mat, Pastor Joshua Hilmy, and his wife
Ruth Hilmy also made little progress in 2018.

southern Thailand. State-level authorities in Kelantan
fined the man for getting married outside Malaysia,
skirting local regulations. The child was abruptly
returned to Thailand and placed under the care of a
local social welfare department, but it remains unclear
if the marriage was ever annulled. The incident sparked
widespread condemnation and led to assertions that the
new government was failing to protect children’s rights
under the guise of religious freedom.
In a similar case, in September, a 44-year-old man
married a 15-year-old girl in Kota Bahru. The girl’sparents approved of the wedding and obtained thenecessary permission from a local Shari’ah court. The
case generated significant international attention andspurred further government scrutiny. However, Deputy
Prime Minister Wan Azizah Wan Ismail admitted there
was little the Malaysian government could do because
the marriage was approved by a Shari’ah court.
In October 2018, Prime Minister Mahathir issued
Hudood Punishments
a directive instructing all state authorities to raise theSome states have pursued efforts to enforce an Islamic
minimum marriage age for Muslims to 18. This gesturepenal code, known as hudood (also spelled hudud), forwas largely symbolic. According to the constitution,
a number of criminal offenses including apostasy, slanIslamic law falls under the jurisdiction of state-level
der, adultery, and alcohol consumption. The prescribedmuftis, and the federal government cannot enforce apunishments include flogging or caning and, whilelegal minimum marriage age for Muslims. The Selangor
never implemented, amputation, stoning, crucifixion,
sultan correspondingly raised the legal Muslim marand death. In 2018, the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party
riage age to 18 in his state, although younger couples(PAS) continued to push
can still apply for marfor hudood penalties
riage if they meet very
for various criminal
strict guidelines. Shari’ah
The law also stipulates that aoffenses in the staunchly
courts can still approve
Muslim’s
spousemustbeMuslimas
well,conservative northernchild marriages throughor convert to Islam for thestates. By the end of theout the rest of Malaysia,
marriagetobelegally
recognized.
reporting period, the new
but by the end of thegovernment had not yetreporting period fivedemonstrated willingness
other state governments
to take up hudood measures at the federal level, which
had agreed, at least in principle, that the minimum age
would likely require a constitutional amendment.
should be raised to 18.

Child Marriage

ID Cards

Malaysian civil law permits Muslims to marry at 16
years old while the minimum age to marry for non-Muslims is 18. The law also stipulates that a Muslim’s spousemust be Muslim as well, or convert to Islam for the marriage to be legally recognized. In July 2018, a 41-year-old
Malaysian man married an 11-year-old Muslim girl in

All Malaysian citizens over the age of 12 are requiredby law to carry a national ID card, known locally asa “MyKad.” Along with standard fields for personal
information, these ID cards also have a required fieldindicating the person’s religion. Muslims’ cards state
their religion in print; this information is not physicallyU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

TIER 2 MALAYSIA

displayed for believers of any other faith, but is instead
for a meeting at the Pentagon. They reportedly discussed
encrypted in the card’s smartchip and can only bea wide range of security issues and reaffirmed the imporaccessed electronically. Malaysians who have successtance of the two countries’ defense relationship. They
fully converted to another religion have at times reported
agreed to work closely together on maritime security,difficulty changing this field to reflect their current
counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and disasbeliefs. Followers of minority faiths are sometimes
ter relief, and examined ways to strengthen the existing
incorrectly registeredpartnership based on
as Muslim due to forced
shared values and mutual
conversions, marriage
interests. A few days later,
Followersofminority
faithsarearrangements, or even
Prime Minister Mahathirsometimes incorrectly registered as
clerical errors. Whatever
visited the United States
Muslimdue
toforcedconversions,the circumstances, being
for the first time sincemarriage arrangements,
incorrectly identified as
returning to power.
orevenclericalerrors.
Muslim on the ID cardThroughout 2018, thebars an individual from
U.S. Embassy in Kuala
marrying a non-Muslim,
Lumpur routinely urged
subjects them to Shari’ah
Malaysian government
court rulings, requires that their children attend Islamic
officials to speak out against religious intolerance
schools, and in most instances prohibits conversion toand continued to engage with various faith groups toanother faith. Inaccurate registration becomes an inherlearn more about the challenges they face attemptited problem for the person’s children and grandchildren.
ing to practice their religion. As in previous years, inNovember 2018, the embassy celebrated International
U.S. POLICY
Day for Tolerance, with the ambassador, a Malaysian
The U.S.-Malaysia bilateral relationship is framed by
official, and interfaith religious leaders touring houses
a Comprehensive Partnership that includes a numberof worship “to promote religious freedom, inclusion,of key components: trade, investment, security, enviand tolerance.”ronmental cooperation, and educational and cultural
One key issue that continued in 2018 to permeate
relations. In May 2018, the White House issued a statethe otherwise deepening bilateral relationship was thement from President Donald J. Trump congratulating
U.S. Department of Justice’s ongoing investigation into
Mahathir for his swearing in as Malaysia’s seventh prime
1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB, a Malaysian
minister. President Trump emphasized the United
investment fund) regarding possible money launderStates’ longstanding and robust people-to-people ties,
ing through the United States. Following former Primemutual democratic values, and shared economic interMinister Najib Razak’s 2018 electoral defeat, Malaysian
ests with Malaysia.
authorities raided his residential properties and confisIn August 2018, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo
cated assets worth a combined value of approximately
spent two days in Malaysia and met with Prime Minister$270 million. The Justice Department supported these
Mahathir during a five-day official visit to Southeast Asia.
measures and conveyed both confidence and enthuIn September, then Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis
siasm that the new Malaysian government would be
hosted Malaysian Defense Minister Mohamad bin Sabu
cooperative as the investigation progresses.

215

TURKEY
TIER 2KEY FINDINGSIn 2018, the state of religious freedom in Turkey remained
deeply troubling, raising serious concerns that the country’s
current trajectory will lead to the further deterioration of conditions in the year ahead. The lack of any meaningful progresson the part of the Turkish government to address longstanding
religious freedom issues was continued cause for concern.
Many serious limitations on the freedom of religion or belief
continued, threatening the continued vitality and survival ofminority religious communities in the country; in addition,
increased demonization and a smear campaign by government
entities and progovernment media contributed to a growing
climate of fear among religious minority communities. The
Turkish government continued to interfere in the internalaffairs of religious communities, disallowing patriarchal elections for the Armenian Apostolic Church and maintaining
its requirement that Greek Orthodox metropolitans obtain
Turkish citizenship in order to participate in the church’s Holy
Synod. Followers of U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gülen continued to be dismissed from public service, detained, andarrested in the tens of thousands for alleged complicity in theJuly 2016 failed coup attempt, or involvement in terrorist activity. The Turkish government has indiscriminately designatedthose affiliated with Gülen as part of a terrorist organization.
Government officials also continued to engage in anti-Semitism in the form of public statements and comments madeon social media platforms, while progovernment newspapers
and media outlets propagated hate speech directed against

both Christians and Jews. While the state proposed a budget
increase of 36 percent for the government body charged
with overseeing the exercise of Sunni Islam, other religious
groups, including Alevis—whom the government views as aculture rather than a religion—do not receive equal funding.
However, due to Turkey’s strict interpretation of secularism, noreligious community—including Sunni Muslims—can obtainfull legal status. Other longstanding religious freedom concerns remain, such as the return of expropriated religious
properties and state-mandated religious education for primary and secondary students. Finally, the unjust detainment
and trial of Protestant pastor Andrew Brunson, an ordeal thatlasted for more than two years and gave way to a rise in hatespeech against Christians, concluded in October 2018 with his
conviction and immediate release, after significant pressure
from the U.S. government. A USCIRF delegation attended
Pastor Brunson’s hearings in Aliağa, Turkey, in May, July, andOctober 2018.
Based on these conditions, in 2019 USCIRF again places
Turkey on Tier 2 for engaging in or tolerating religious freedom violations that meet at least one of the elements of the“systematic, ongoing, egregious” standard for designation as a“country of particular concern,” or CPC, under the International
Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). However, USCIRF will continue
to monitor religious freedom conditions to determine whether
developments worsen and warrant a change in the country’s
status during the year ahead.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT• Urge the Turkish government to fullycomply with the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) rulings on
freedom of religion or belief, including
by removing the field for religious
affiliation on national ID cards’ microchips and recognizing Alevi cemevleri
as legal places of worship and Alevi
dedeleri as religious leaders;• Press the Turkish government tostreamline measures that would
permit non-Sunni Muslim faith com-

216

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munities to apply for government
funding to support the construction,
maintenance, and upkeep of theirhouses of worship;• Urge the Turkish government toensure the education curriculum
remains inclusive of all of Turkey’s
religious groups, and allow students
to be exempted from religious courses
without disclosing their religious andphilosophical convictions, as mandated by the ECtHR;• Press the Turkish government to fulfill
private and public commitments that
the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary
be reopened, and to permit the
Armenian Apostolic Church to holdelections for the position of patriarchwithout state interference; and• Press the Turkish government to publicly rebuke government officials whomake anti-Semitic statements or otherderogatory statements about religious
communities in Turkey.

TIER 2 TURKEY

COUNTRY FACTS
FULL NAME
Republic of Turkey

POPULATION
81,257,239

RELIGIOUS DEMOGRAPHY*
99.8% Muslim (mostly Sunni, although an estimated 10 million to 25 million are Alevi)
0.2% other, including Armenian Apostolic, Baha’i, Bulgarian
Orthodox, Chaldean Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Jehovah’s
Witness, Jewish, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Syriac Catholic,and Syriac Orthodox

GOVERNMENT-RECOGNIZED RELIGIONS/FAITHSIslam, Armenian Apostolic, Greek Orthodox, and Judaism (thelatter three being the Lausanne Treaty-recognized minorities)*Estimates compiled from the CIA World Factbook

GOVERNMENT
Presidential Republic

BACKGROUND
The state of human rights and civil liberties in Turkey
continued to decline in the wake of the government
response to the failed coup attempt of July 2016. In the
two years since the coup attempt, the Turkish government has dismissed more than 150,000 public servants,
detained and arrested tens of thousands in connection
to the coup attempt or alleged links to terrorism, andjailed 68 journalists in connection with their work—
the highest number of journalists arrested by any
country in 2018, according to the Committee to Protect
Journalists. The government has also closed down
more than 150 media outlets, and the country has seen
the majority of independent media increasingly comeunder the control of progovernment entities. In June
2018, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was reelected
in snap presidential and parliamentary elections that
accompanied the introduction of expanded executive
powers under a new presidential system approved byreferendum in April 2017.
The government also continued to detain former
chairman of the opposition Peoples’ Democratic Party(HDP) Selahattin Demirtaş, despite a ruling from the
ECtHR in November 2018 that his pretrial detainment
was unjustified and that he should be released. In July
2018, 18 religious leaders and representatives from Turkey’s Christian and Jewish communities released a joint

declaration denying they live under pressure, raisingsuspicions that the statement may have been coordinated with, or initiated by, the Turkish government.
Approximately 99.8 percent of Turkey’s population is Muslim, the majority of whom identify as
Sunni Muslim. By some estimates, between 10 million
and 25 million are Alevi, which the Turkish government considers to be Muslim, although some Alevis
self-identify as part of a unique non-Muslim culture.
Turkey’s non-Muslim religious minorities compriseless than 0.2 percent of the overall population, andinclude members of the Armenian Apostolic, Baha’i,
Bulgarian Orthodox, Chaldean Catholic, Greek
Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witness, Jewish, Protestant,
Roman Catholic, Syriac Catholic, and Syriac Orthodox communities.
The 1982 Turkish constitution provides for the
freedom of belief and worship and the private dissemination of religious ideas, and prohibits discrimination
on religious grounds. Nevertheless, the government
interprets secularism to require state control overreligious communities, including their practices andhouses of worship. No religion enjoys full legal status.
The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) maintains control over the practice of Islam in Turkey; allother religions are under the auspices of the General
Directorate of Foundations (Vakıflar).

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TIER 2 TURKEYRELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONDITIONS 2018
Education
Despite the implementation in 2018 of a new education
curriculum in Turkey’s public schools, the “Religious
Culture and Moral Knowledge Course” remains arequirement for primary and secondary school students.
Traditionally, non-Muslim students from the Lausanne
Treaty communities—Armenian Apostolic, Greek
Orthodox, and Jewish—have been allowed exemption
from the course due to its focus on Islam. Atheists also
have received exemptions within the last year. However,members of some faiths, including Alevis, are routinely
denied exemption, despite an ECtHR ruling in 2014 thatthe course should not be compulsory and that students
should not be required to disclose their religious identity. Students and their parents seeking exemption often
undergo a lengthy petitioning process, or pursue theirclaims in court—even if the ruling is favorable, however,
it is not always implemented by the school.

State Interference in Internal
Religious Affairs

in March 2017, the Istanbul governor’s office intervened,calling the elections “legally impossible” and claiming
they might “cause splits in the community.” In February 2018, the Istanbul governor’s office stated in a
letter to the Armenian Patriarchate that the necessary
conditions for an election had not been met, yet again
preventing the process from moving forward.

National Identity Cards
Concerns remain that microchips on national identification cards may contain information regarding theholder’s religious identity, which could lead to discrimination in the workplace and other places where themicrochip can be read. The government’s February
2018 opening of population registers that allow accessto genealogical records raised similar concerns abouta government effort to code minorities such as Armenians, Greeks, and Jews. While the opening of the
population registers was welcomed by some as a positive
step in acknowledging Turkey’s ethnic and religious
diversity, others fear the information could be used forthe purpose of discrimination or defamation.

In 2018, the Turkish government continued to interAlevis
fere in the internal affairs of religious communities,
Alevis constitute the largest religious minority in Turparticularly regarding the right of those communities
key. However, the government has long classified Alevis
to elect their own leaders. Due to government requireas Muslim and subsequently failed to recognize themments stipulating that members of the Holy Synod
as a religious community distinct from majority Sunni
must be Turkish citizens, the Ecumenical Patriarchate
Muslims. Despite a February 2015 ruling issued by theis restricted in its ability to nominate members for the
ECtHR, the government has yet to take steps to exempt
Holy Synod, which, in turn, elects the community’s
Alevi students from attending compulsory religious
patriarch. While Turkey has approved foreign metropolclasses that are baseditans for dual citizenship,
primarily on the Sunnithe requirement presents
understanding of Islam.
an unnecessary burden
Alevis constitute the largest
Alevi leaders have also
for the Greek Orthodox
religious minority in Turkey . . . [but]taken issue with a newcommunity and has been
the government has . . . failed tocurriculum that charperceived as a means torecognize them as a religious community
acterizes Alevi places ofcontrol the outcome of
distinct from majority Sunni Muslims.
worship simply as a place
future elections.
where “rituals and cusThe Armenian
toms are practiced.”
Apostolic Church—whose
In November 2018, the Supreme Court of Appeals
spiritual leader Mesrob Mutafyan died in March 2019,
announced a decision in favor of the Alevis’ longstandafter the reporting period—has been unable to holding struggle to achieve official recognition for theirelections for the position of patriarch due to an Interior“gathering houses” or cemevleri as places of worship.
Ministry decision that precluded elections beginning in
In April 2015, the ECtHR had ruled that Turkey violated
2010. When the community began an electoral process218

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demonized in connection with the case of Pastor Brunson. At least 20 foreign Protestant families reportedly
were deported or forced to leave Turkey through thedenial of visa renewals.
Pastor Brunson, a U.S. citizen who lived in Izmir,
Turkey, for 23 years and led a small Protestant congregation, spent more than two years in prison after Turkishauthorities unjustly detained him in October 2016.
Authorities initially accused Pastor Brunson of being amember of a terrorist organization, until he was indicted
in March 2018 for “committing crimes on behalf of a terAnti-Semitism
rorist organization without membership” and “procuring
Anti-Semitism continued in progovernment print andconfidential government information for the purpose ofsocial media. According to a report on hate speech bypolitical or military espionage.” The indictment accusedthe Hrant Dink Foundation, a local nongovernmental
Pastor Brunson of providing aid to both the Kurdistanorganization, there wereWorkers’ Party (PKK) and
427 instances of hate
the Fethullahist Terrorist
speech from January
Organization (FETÖ), and
The indictment . . . alleged thatthrough April 2018 that
alleged that he sought[Pastor Brunson] sought the
specifically targeted
the fragmentation of thefragmentation of the country . . . throughJews. News articles andcountry and formation
the Christianization ofheadlines frequentlyof an independent state
Turkey’s ethnic Kurdish population.
made reference to Jews
of Kurdistan throughwhen referring to the state
the Christianization ofof Israel and mentioned
Turkey’s ethnic Kurdish
Jews in negative media coverage related to the state of
population. Information in the indictment was provided
Turkish-Israeli relations.
primarily by a secret witness. While President Erdoğan
Turkish politicians also have continued to makeroutinely rebuffed U.S. requests for the release and returnanti-Semitic comments. In August 2018, ruling Justiceof Pastor Brunson, claiming that the decision would
and Development Party (AKP) founding member andultimately lie with the Turkish judicial system, he noneformer parliamentarian Burhan Kuzu tweeted that Jewtheless contradicted himself in September 2017 when heish families “managed the world” by printing banknotes
suggested that he would be willing to hand over Pastor
and alleged that U.S. presidents Abraham Lincoln andBrunson in return for the extradition of Gülen.
John F. Kennedy were “killed by Zionists.” Although such
Prior to Pastor Brunson’s release, USCIRF advorhetoric is particularly prevalent in the ruling party, it
cated on his behalf as part of the Commission’s Religious
has also surfaced among the opposition. In August 2018,
Prisoners of Conscience Project. In October 2017,
Republican People’s Party (CHP) presidential candidate
USCIRF visited Pastor Brunson while he was imprisoned
Muharrem İnce was accused of making anti-Semiticin Kırıklar Prison—the first nonfamily, nonconsularcomments when he criticized President Erdoğan fordelegation to meet with him—and attended three of his
having received a Jewish courage award, which was presubsequent court hearings in May, July, and October 2018.
sented to him in honor of a Turkish diplomat who saved a
On October 12, 2018, a Turkish court convicted
number of Jewish families from the Holocaust.
Pastor Brunson of providing aid to a terrorist organization and sentenced him to three years, one month,Protestants
and 15 days, which the judge counted as time served.
The Protestant community continued to be the target ofThat same day, he was subsequently released fromhate speech, with evangelical Christians in particularhouse arrest and allowed to return to the United States.

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TIER 2 TURKEY

Alevis’ rights by failing to recognize their places of worship and accord them legal status and its corresponding
advantages, such as an exemption from the paymentof electricity bills. In the decision, the court ruled that
cemevleri are places of worship and that the government
is obligated to pay for their electricity bills as it does formosques and some other places of worship. At the end of
the reporting period, the verdict had not yet been finalized, and it was unclear whether the ruling would bringabout a country-wide change in the status of cemevleri.

219

TIER 2 TURKEY

Although Pastor Brunson’s release was a much-welcomed positive development, it should be noted thatit only came about following immense pressure fromthe highest levels of the U.S. government on Turkey
to release him. That the Turkish court still found him
guilty of supporting a terrorist organization only servesto perpetuate the grave injustice done against him.
In January 2019, after the reporting period, the
ECtHR announced a decision in favor of the Foundation of Seventh-day Adventists, ruling that Turkey had
violated the right to assembly of church members by notallowing the foundation to register. Turkey had prohibited the foundation from registering on the grounds
that a foundation cannot be formed only to serve themembers of a particular community.

thousands of individuals. The government continued
to allege that Gülen and his followers were behind theplot to overthrow the government, although only asmall minority has been charged with participation in
the coup attempt. The government labeled Gülen andhis followers a terrorist organization in May 2016, andrefers to them as the Fethullahist Terrorist Organization (FETÖ).

Religious Minority Properties

Religious minorities continued to seek the returnof properties expropriated by the government. The
Armenian Patriarchate has been seeking the return of
the Sanasaryan Han in Istanbul—a property previously
used for the education of Armenian children—that
the government seized in 1935. The Greek Orthodox
Other Christian Minorities
Foundation on Bozcaada Island has also yet to receive
Jehovah’s Witnesses continued to be denied the rightthe title deeds for 11 properties, despite a September
to conscientious objection to military service and face2014 decision rendered by the Council of Foundations toprosecution, fines, and imprisonment for the exercise oftransfer the deeds.
their beliefs. In 2018, 66 Jehovah’s Witnesses faced prosThe Greek Orthodox Theological School of Halki,ecution. Because of longstanding government pressure
also known as Halki Seminary, has been closed andexerted on employers, many Jehovah’s Witnesses also
unable to educate or train clergy since 1971. The Turkish
lose their jobs for refusing to enlist in the military.
government closed the seminary in accordance withIn April 2018, the Church of Jesus Christ of Lattera constitutional decision that banned the operation of
day Saints reassigned its volunteers in Turkey to otherprivate institutions of higher learning, a decision that
regions due to a “prolonged period of heightened
served to effectively force the closure of religious andpolitical tensions” in the country. Throughout 2018,
theological schools in the country. Although the Turkthe Church and its members were smeared in progovish government and officials have at times expressed
ernment media outlets following accusations made insupport for reopening the seminary, no concrete steps
the indictment against Pastor Brunson that members
have been taken. In April 2018, Greek Orthodox Patriwere operating in the country as agents under thearch Dimitri Bartholomew met with President Erdoğanguise of missionaries.
to discuss the reopening of Halki Seminary. Turkish
media reported that President Erdoğan would take theSunni Muslims
request to reopen the seminary into consideration andFollowers of U.S.-based cleric Gülen have facedthat Patriarch Bartholomew was optimistic the semiincreased persecution bynary could reopen for thethe government. In theacademic year by Septwo years since the failed
tember 2018; at the end. . . the Turkish government hascoup attempt in 2016,of the reporting period, it
embarked on a purge of those affiliatedthe Turkish government
remained closed.
with Gülen, resulting in the dismissal,
has embarked on a purge
In January 2018,detainment, and arrest ofof those affiliated with
President
Erdoğan andtens of thousands of individuals.
Gülen, resulting in the
Bulgarian Prime Minister
dismissal, detainment,
Boyko Borisov attended
and arrest of tens of
the opening ceremony of220

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TIER 2 TURKEY

the Bulgarian Orthodox St. Stephen Church in Istanbul,
ber 2018, the Constitutional Court of Turkey rejected onfollowing the completion of its seven-year restoration.
technical grounds a request filed by a private associaThe restoration was funded jointly by both the Turkish
tion to open the museum for worship, stating that anand Bulgarian governments and, pursuant to a “princiassociation cannot submit an application as an individple of reciprocity,” was accompanied by the Bulgarianual. The court did not examine the request. In Marchgovernment similarly allowing for the restoration of a2018, President Erdoğan recited a Muslim prayer in themosque in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. In May 2018, the governHagia Sophia on the occasion of an art festival opening,ment returned the deeds to 50 properties, including that
resulting in protests against the Turkish government’sof the Mor Gabriel Monastery, to the Syriac Orthodox“religious use” of the museum. On March 27, 2019, after
Church in Mardin following a protracted legal disputethe reporting period, President Erdoğan announced
brought about by municipal land reforms beginningthat the Hagia Sophia would be converted to a mosque,in 2008. According to Deputy Prime Minister Hakan
repeating similar previous pronouncements over theÇavuşoğlu, the seizure and transfer of the Syriac Orthoyears that were never followed by action.
dox properties to the Treasury, and then to the Diyanet,
Women and Religious Freedom
was a “misunderstanding,” although religious officials
In January 2018, a religious glossary on the Diyanet’s
perceived the move as a purposeful attack on the Syriac
official website suggested that girls as young as age nine
Orthodox Church. In July 2018, the Council of Foundations took positive steps to allocate a number of religious and boys as young as age 12 could be married in accordance with Islamic law (Turkey’s legal age for marriage
properties to their respective foundations at no cost,is 18, with exceptions at age 17 with parental consent).
including the Sacre Coeur Church to the Syriac CathoAfter public outcry, the Diyanet removed the glossary
lic Church and the Mar Yuhanna Church in Hatay to aentries and denied having
Greek Orthodox foundaendorsed child marriage,
tion. Finally, in January
issuing a statement that
2019, local authorities in. . . local authorities in Istanbul
the Diyanet had always
Istanbul issued a perissued a permit allowing the
supported a minimum
mit allowing the Syriac
Syriac Orthodox Church to build what
age of 17 for girls andOrthodox Church to build
has been characterized as the
18 for boys to marry.
what has been characfirst newly constructed church in the
A January 2018 media
terized as the first newly
history of the Turkish republic.
report stated that in early
constructed church in2017, 115 underage girls
the history of the Turkishreceived pregnancy-rerepublic. While this was a
lated treatment in an Istanbul hospital. According tolong-awaited positive development, it came after years
hospital records, 38 of the girls became pregnant beforeof efforts on the part of the Syriac Orthodox Church tothe age of 15.
secure permission to construct a new church. Moreover, it follows a multi-year dispute after authorities
U.S. POLICY
announced that the new church would be built on land
Turkey is a strategic partner of the United States, athat previously served as a cemetery for the Roman
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Catholic Church.
(NATO), and host to a U.S. airbase in İncirlik. NevHagia Sophia
erthless, during the year, relations between the two
The historic Hagia Sophia, a Greek Orthodox basilica
countries became increasingly strained, in large partthat was converted into a mosque in the 15th century,
due to the continued detention of U.S. citizens Pastor
has held legal status as a museum since 1935. However,Brunson and Serkan Gölge, a National Aeronautics andsome Muslims continued to call for it to be converted
Space Administration (NASA) scientist charged withback into a mosque and opened for prayer. In Septeminvolvement in the coup attempt, as well as that of three221

TIER 2 TURKEY222

Turkish nationals who worked at U.S. Consulates. President Donald J. Trump, Vice President Michael R. Pence,
Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, and numerous
members of Congress repeatedly called for Pastor
Brunson’s release. In August 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Turkish Minister ofJustice Abdulhamit Gül and Turkish Minister of theInterior Süleyman Soylu for their complicity in Pastor
Brunson’s detainment. That same month, President
Trump announced the doubling of tariff rates on steel
and aluminum imports from Turkey, which led to asignificant loss in the value of the Turkish lira and sent
shockwaves through the Turkish economy. Since Pastor
Brunson’s release in October 2018, relations have seensome improvement. In November 2018, the sanctions
on Minister Gül and Minister Soylu were lifted.
In addition to the detainments mentioned above,concerns persist about Turkey’s intention to purchase
Russia’s S-400 missile system—which is incompatible

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with NATO systems—prompting Congress in August
2018 to temporarily halt the sale of F-35 jets to Turkey.
The Turkish government also opposes U.S. support for
Kurdish groups combating the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) in Syria, particularly the People’s Protection
Units (YPG), which Turkey claims is a terrorist organization affiliated with the PKK. The United States has
designated the PKK as a terrorist organization since1997, but has not done so for the YPG. Additionally,
Turkish officials continue to press for the extradition of
Gülen and others in connection with allegations of their
responsibility for the failed coup attempt.
Since 2011, the United States has provided funding
for refugees in Turkey through the United Nations (UN)refugee agency, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Turkey is hosting at least 3.6 million
registered Syrian refugees from various religious faiths
who fled to Turkey to escape persecution by the Basharal-Assad regime and ISIS.

APPENDIX 1 USCIRF COMMISSIONERSTENZIN DORJEE,CHAIR
Reappointed by: Hon. Nancy Pelosi (D),then House Minority Leader, for a term
expiring in May 2020. Associate Professor
at the Department of Human Communication Studies, California State University,
Fullerton (CSUF).

KRISTINA ARRIAGA,
VICE CHAIR

GAYLE MANCHIN,
VICE CHAIR

Reappointed by: Hon. Paul Ryan (R), thenSpeaker of the House, for a term expiringin May 2020. Former advisor to the UnitedStates delegation to the United Nations
Human Rights Commission and an appointee to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.

Appointed by: Hon. Charles Schumer (D),Senate Minority Leader, for a term expiringin May 2020. Educator, former First Ladyof West Virginia and past president of theState Board of Education.

ANURIMA BHARGAVA,COMMISSIONER

NADINE MAENZA,
COMMISSIONER

Appointed by: Hon. Nancy Pelosi (D), thenHouse Minority Leader, for a term expiring in May 2020. Civil rights lawyer andfounder and president of Anthem of Us.

Appointed by: President Donald J. Trump,for a term expiring in May 2020. Executive
Director of Patriot Voices and former Chairman of Hardwired Global, an organization
working to stop religious oppression
around the world.

GARY L. BAUER,COMMISSIONERJOHNNIE MOORE,COMMISSIONER

Appointed by: President Donald J. Trump,for a term expiring in May 2019. Presidentof American Values, a public policy thinktank, and Washington Director of Christians
United for Israel Action Fund.

Appointed by: President Donald J. Trump,for a term expiring in May 2020. Founderand CEO of the KAIROS Company, a public
relations consultancy, and former Chief ofStaff and Vice President of Faith Content
for the United Artists Media Group.

ANDY KHAWAJA,COMMISSIONERTONY PERKINS,COMMISSIONER

Appointed by: Hon. Charles Schumer (D),Senate Minority Leader, for a term expiringin May 2020. Founder and CEO of Allied
Wallet, an online payment service provider
headquartered in Los Angeles.

Appointed by: Hon. Mitch McConnell (R),
Senate Majority Leader, for a term expiringin May 2020. President of the Family
Research Council (FRC), a religious public
policy organization.

U S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

223

224

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APPENDIX 2
RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE
THROUGH THE RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE PROJECT, USCIRF SEEKS TO RAISE
AWARENESS OF THOSE IMPRISONED FOR THEIR RELIGION OR BELIEF, REDUCE THEIR NUMBERS,AND HIGHLIGHT THE COUNTRY CONDITIONS THAT LED TO THEIR IMPRISONMENT.

PANCHEN LAMAGULMIRA IMIN

DENNIS CHRISTENSEN

IVAN MATSITSKY

CHINA

CHINA

RUSSIARUSSIAUSCIRF Advocates:
Chair Tenzin Dorjee andCommissioner Nadine Maenza

USCIRF Advocate:
Chair Tenzin Dorjee

USCIRF Advocate:
Vice Chair Kristina Arriaga

USCIRF Advocate:
Vice Chair Kristina Arriaga

HAMID BIN HAYDARAROBERT LEVINSONDAVID LIN

YEMEN

IRAN

CHINA

USCIRF Advocate:Commissioner Andy Khawaja

USCIRF Advocate:Commissioner Andy Khawaja

USCIRF Advocates:
Vice Chair Kristina Arriaga andCommissioner Tony Perkins

GOLROKH IRAEEMOHAMMAD TAHERIRAIF BADAWIYOUCEF NADARKHANI

IRAN

IRAN

SAUDI ARABIAIRAN

USCIRF Advocate:
Vice Chair Gayle Manchin

USCIRF Advocate:
Vice Chair Gayle Manchin

USCIRF Advocate:Commissioner Nadine Maenza

USCIRF Advocate:Commissioner Nadine Maenza

HU SHIGEN

PATRIARCH ANTONIOSCHINAERITREAUSCIRF Advocate:Commissioner Gary Bauer

USCIRF Advocate:Commissioner Johnnie MooreU S C I R F | A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 19

225

APPENDIX 2
RELIGIOUS PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCERELEASEDABDUL SHAKOORTHICH QUANG DO

ANDREW BRUNSONFARIBA KAMALABADIPAKISTAN

VIETNAM

TURKEY

IRAN(Released March 2019)(Released October 2018,
Currently Under Surveillance)(Released October 2018)(Released November 2017)

USCIRF Advocates:
Commissioner Kristina Arriaga
and then Commissioner
Sandra Jolley

USCIRF Advocate:Commissioner Kristina Arriaga

USCIRF Advocates:
Commissioner Johnnie
Moore; then Commissioner
Daniel MarkUSCIRF Advocate:Commissioner Kristina Arriaga

BAGIR KAZIKHANOVMAHVASH SABETRUSSIA

IRAN

MARYAM NAGHASHZARGARAN(Released October 2017)(Released September 2017)

IRAN

USCIRF Advocate: Then
Commissioner John Ruskay

USCIRF Advocate:Commissioner Kristina Arriaga

USCIRF Advocate:
Then Commissioner Clifford D. May

PASTOR NGUYEN CONG CHINH AND
TRAN THI HONGZAW ZAW LATT AND PWINT PHYU LATTVIETNAM(Released May 2017)(Released July 2017)
USCIRF Advocate: Then Commissioner Jackie Wolcott

226(Released August 2017)

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BURMA
USCIRF Advocate: Then Commissioner Daniel Mark

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0 1 9

C O U

N T R

I E

S

■ TIER 1 COUNTRIES OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
Burma
Central African Republic
China
Eritrea

Iran
Nigeria
North Korea
Pakistan

RussiaSaudi Arabia
Sudan
Syria

Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Vietnam

Cuba
Egypt
India

Indonesia
Iraq
Kazakhstan

Laos
Malaysia
Turkey■ TIER 2 COUNTRIES
AfghanistanAzerbaijan
Bahrain

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
732 North Capitol Street, NW, Suite A714
Washington, DC 20401
Telephone: (202) 523–3240 Fax: (202) 523–5020
www.uscirf.gov