O C TO B E R 2 0 1 4Mediating Transition in Yemen:
Achievements and Lessons

STEVEN A. ZYCKCover Photo: March for Taiz in Sana’a,
Yemen, May 30, 2011. © Raja Althaibani.

ABOUT THE AUTHORSTEVEN A. ZYCK is Research Fellow with the Humanitarian

Disclaimer: The views expressed in thispaper represent those of the author
and not necessarily those of IPI. IPI
welcomes consideration of a wide
range of perspectives in the pursuit ofa well-informed debate on criticalpolicies and issues in international
affairs.

Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute andEditor of Stability: International Journal of Security &Development.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank Marie O’Reilly and Andrea

IPI Publications
Adam Lupel, Director of Publications
and Senior Fellow
Marie O’Reilly, Associate Editor

Ó Súilleabháin for conducting an extensive interview with
Jamal Benomar in New York. The author is grateful to all of
the international and Yemeni experts and stakeholders who
provided information and analysis for this paper.

Marisa McCrone, Assistant Production
Editor

IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for theirgenerous support that makes publications like this one

Suggested Citation:
Steven A. Zyck, “Mediating Transition in
Yemen: Achievements and Lessons,”
New York: International Peace Institute,
October 2014.
© by International Peace Institute, 2014
All Rights Reserved
www.ipinst.org

possible.

CONTENTS

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Historical Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The UN Role in Yemen’s Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
CREATING SPACE FOR DIALOGUE AND
A TRANSITION PLAN
PREPARING FOR THE NATIONAL DIALOGUECONFERENCESUPPORTING THE NATIONAL DIALOGUECONFERENCE

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9BEST PRACTICESLESSONS LEARNED

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

1Introduction
Yemen remains the only site of an Arab Spring
uprising that has ended in a negotiated agreement
and a structured, internationally supported transition process. As Jamal Benomar, the United
Nations Special Adviser to the Secretary-Generalon Yemen, stated, “Yemen was definitely heading
towards a Syria-type scenario” before international
actors, including the United Nations (UN), helped
to shepherd a complex transition process, which
continues at the time of writing.1 Benomar, withsupport from a wide array of stakeholders, helped
avert an escalating conflict in Yemen by stepping in
to offer the good offices of the UN secretarygeneral without waiting for the UN Security
Council or the embattled Yemeni regime todemand UN action. Benomar’s interventions—
including bringing Yemen’s major political parties
together amid the uprising—helped ensure that thecountry did not devolve into civil war when
President Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down after
thirty-three years in power. That is, the UN openeda space for dialogue where none had previously
been considered possible.2
Later, the UN closely participated in designingand implementing a plan for Yemen’s transition
that involved an inclusive National Dialogue
Conference (NDC), among other steps. Benomar
personally and successfully championed, withsupport from civil society, embassies, and others,
the inclusion of women, youth, and southerners in
the NDC. However, as the UN turned frommanaging a crisis to shepherding a large andcomplex transition, opportunities appear to havebeen missed. The UN, hoping to emphasize the
Yemeni-led nature of the NDC, maintained alimited role and a small team relative to the size andcomplexity of the NDC. UN personnel, particularly
those from the Mediation Support Unit (MSU)
within the UN Department of Political Affairs(DPA), provided crucial technical support to the
NDC but were unable to keep track of—let alone
support—the myriad deliberations unfolding
within and around the conference.
Many note that, despite Benomar’s credibility
among many factions, the UN did not respondadequately to ongoing and escalating conflicts in
Yemen’s North and South. Yet it would not be fair
to fully credit or fault the UN or the secretarygeneral’s special adviser for either progress or
problems. Indeed, Yemen’s formal transition
process was initiated by the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), led by the interim government of
Yemen, and heavily influenced by a number ofother countries and institutions, particularly theUnited States and Saudi Arabia.3 The transition in
Yemen is a rather rare example of collaboration
among global, regional, and national actors rather
than being attributable solely to the UN.
Ultimately, despite some missed opportunities,
this study highlights the potential of the UN to proactively employ the good offices of the secretarygeneral to open an impartial space for dialogue anddesign inclusive transition processes.4 These
conclusions are based on the literature concerning
Yemen’s transition and, most importantly, oninterviews with several individuals closely familiar
with the UN role in Yemen, including Benomar
himself.5 However, it is important to acknowledge
that the details of sensitive diplomatic processes are
generally not intended for revelation, and thisstudy cannot comprise a comprehensive record of
the UN’s multifaceted and still-evolving contribution to Yemen’s transition.

* The content of this paper is based on research, including interviews with relevant stakeholders, in March and April 2014. It is not intended to capture developments in Yemen beyond that point in time. Given the sensitive nature of the transition process and diplomatic engagement, the names and affiliations of interviewees, other than Jamal Benomar, are not specified directly or indirectly in this paper. All interviews as part of this project took place on the basis of nonattribution.
1 United Nations Department of Political Affairs, “Yemen: The Middle East’s Only Negotiated Transition,” New York, 2012.
2 Chatham House, “Transcript: Friends of Yemen: Aid and Accountability,” Yemen Forum, London, March 6, 2013.
3 Charles Schmitz, “Yemen’s National Dialogue,” Middle East Institute Policy Papers Series 2014-1, Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, February 2014.
4 For further discussion of the UN’s application of the secretary-general’s good offices, see Anna Magnusson and Morten B. Pedersen, “A Good Office? Twenty
Years of UN Mediation in Myanmar,” New York: International Peace Institute, 2012.
5 The interview with Jamal Benomar was conducted in New York by Marie O’Reilly and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin of the International Peace Institute; it was recorded
and subsequently shared with the author.

2

Steven A. Zyck

Historical Context

Yemen now consider their “revolution” to be anengineered rather than bottom-up process.

Yemen is a complex and dynamic environment
marked by several ongoing conflicts, entrenchedtribal issues, intersecting political and economic
interests, shifting alliances, and strong regional andinternational involvement.6 Even before the ArabSpring, Yemen was facing a range of interconnected humanitarian, political, and security
challenges. The country remains by far the poorest
in the region and has the second lowest level offood security in the world. Amid these social andeconomic challenges, the regime of former
president Saleh maintained power for thirty-three
years—ten of those as the head of North Yemen—by purchasing loyalty from key power-holders andmanipulating tribal and political divisions.7 Such a
strategy enabled short-term stability but also meantthat the state achieved more in the way ofobedience than loyalty or legitimacy.

Opposition to President Saleh’s rule grew inintensity after March 18, 2011, when government
snipers killed more than fifty peaceful demonstrators and wounded nearly 200 more.10 Acknowledging the regime had lost key domestic
supporters and the backing of the international
community, the GCC—with the strong involvement of the United States and other Western
powers—developed the broad strokes of a transitional plan, known as the GCC Initiative,11 which it
presented to President Saleh and his party, theGeneral People’s Congress (GPC), in mid-2011.12
This one-page agreement offered the president andhis associates immunity if President Saleh would
step down.13 It required the formation of an interim
government, the transfer of power to the vicepresident, the organization of presidential elections
within sixty days,14 and the formation of acommittee to draft a new constitution (to be
ratified through a national referendum).

The regime’s tenuous balancing act—bolsteredby support from neighboring Saudi Arabia andclose security cooperation with the United States—
began to unravel prior to the Arab Spring.
President Saleh sought to consolidate power, taking
leadership and resources away from allies, as a way
to hand the presidency to his son, Ahmed Ali. In
doing so, the regime lost the goodwill of key
backers such as the powerful al-Ahmar family, who
controlled a vast network of businesses, a key tribal
confederation, and the largest opposition party.8
Hence, the several hundred young activists whobegan demonstrating against the regime in Taizand Sana’a in January 2011 eventually foundthemselves joined by thousands mobilized byformer regime allies and members of Yemen’s“official opposition.”9 For this reason, many in

6
7

Yet President Saleh refused to agree to the GCC
Initiative and remained in power despite being
injured in an attack on the presidential compound inJune 2011 and despite UN Security Council
Resolution 2014 urging his departure.15 He finallyagreed to the GCC Initiative in November 2011 once
it became apparent that his situation was untenable
and once the United States and the European Union
threatened to freeze or confiscate his ill-gotten
fortune if he refused to step down.16 While Saleh’s
rationale for ultimately agreeing to step down
remains unknown, analysts suggest that he valued
his financial position and appeared to have used hislast months in power to ensure he would not lose his
fortune upon stepping down. Hence, the threats ofSteven A. Zyck, Conflict Assessment: Republic of Yemen (Sana’a: United Nations, 2013).
Hugh Naylor, “Social Contracts: Yemen’s Network of Tribes Key in Rebuilding Country,” The National, February 28, 2012, available atwww.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/social-contracts-yemens-network-of-tribes-key-in-rebuilding-country .
8 Ginny Hill, “Yemen Unrest: Saleh’s Rivals Enter Elite Power Struggle,” BBC News, May 27, 2011, available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13560514 .
9 Nada Bakri and J. David Goodman, “Thousands in Yemen Protest against the Government,” The New York Times, January 27, 2011, available atwww.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/world/middleeast/28yemen.html .
10 Adrian Blomfield, “Yemen Protests: Evidence Snipers Shot To Kill,” The Telegraph, March 19, 2011, available atwww.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/8392796/Yemen-protests-Evidence-snipers-shot-to-kill.html .
11 Tim O. Petschulat, “Political Change with Pitfalls: An Interim Report on the Yemeni Transition Process,” Sana’a: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 2012.
12 The GCC Initiative is also the label often applied to the Implementation Mechanism for the GCC Initiative, which is a longer document developed with extensive
UN support to identify a series of steps that Yemen’s transition would follow.
13 “Yemen Transition Agreement 2011,” Al-Bab (blog), available at www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/yemen/yemen_transition_agreement.htm .
14 These elections were, from the beginning, intended to be noncompetitive, serving to validate President Hadi’s tenure in compliance with the existing Yemeni
constitution.
15 UN Security Council Resolution 2014 (October 21, 2011), UN Doc. S/RES/2014, available at www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014(2011) .
16 The total number killed during the entire revolution is unconfirmed though estimates range from 200, according to Amnesty International, to 2,000, according to
Yemen’s Ministry of Human Rights.

MEDIATING TRANSITION IN YEMEN

international financial sanctions proved particularly
effective in this instance.
After President Saleh stepped down, the transition quickly proceeded per the GCC Initiative; thepowers of the presidency were transferred to VicePresident Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who wasformally elected president in February 2012.17 The
interim parliament controversially conferredimmunity on the former president and 500 of his
associates that same month. Preparations for the
National Dialogue were soon underway. While
Yemen’s transition also includes a constitutionwriting process and open presidential elections,many Yemeni and international stakeholders
viewed the NDC as the lynchpin given that it was
intended to restore confidence in the state, propose
a new state structure, and address several othercrucial issues.18 These issues were to be tackled inplenary and through nine working groups on theconflicts in the South and North, transitional
justice,statebuilding,goodgovernance,
military/security issues, socioeconomic development, rights/freedoms, and “special entities.”19
Many felt that the GCC Initiative and, hence, peaceand stability in Yemen, would be undermined if thesix-month NDC was not successful.20
The NDC reflected a Yemeni tradition, exemplified in the civil war in the North in the 1960s, ofresolving major disputes via large and inclusive
discussions among multiple parties. Yet, in otherrespects, it was also relatively unique for Yemen
and the international community—a single,
lengthy conference intended not only to design a
new state structure and tackle issues such as
development, transitional justice, and security
sector reform but also to resolve several ongoing
conflicts. These included a secessionist movement
in southern Yemen led by Al-Hiraak Al-Janoubi(the Southern Movement). Hiraak, which
comprises several factions, felt that the South of
Yemen had been dominated by northern elites
since North and South Yemen united in 1990.21

3

Likewise, in the far northern provinces, the Houthi
movement felt that members of the Zaydi branch of
Shia Islam had been increasingly maligned andmarginalized within Yemen; the group fought andsurvived six rounds of conflict with the Yemeni
military from 2004 to 2010.22 During and since theuprising, the Houthis greatly expanded theterritory under their control, and the movementfound itself increasingly under attack from conservative Sunni Salafist groups and others associatedwith the Islamist Islah party.
Meanwhile, Yemen was facing additional threatsand myriad factions. These included former regime
elements and members of President Saleh’s party,
the GPC, who retained a strong role in Yemen’s
government throughout the uprising and transition. The GPC was increasingly being challenged
by opposition groups, which were collectively
referred to as the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP). The
JMP includes the Islamist Islah party, which has
clashed repeatedly with the GPC, the Southern
Movement, and the Houthis as they haveattempted to gain power and supporters in postSaleh Yemen.
The UN was thus entering a highly complex
environment that posed numerous challenges formediation. The Arab uprisings across the region
appeared to make a strong case for intransigence;
instead of proving the benefits of dialogue andmediation, events in Tunisia and Egypt, in particular, seemed to suggest that groups could get their
way simply by holding fast for extended periods oftime (a message not lost on the Southern
Movement). Furthermore, the UN was not the soleor “official” mediator and did not “own” the transition process. Instead, it had entered Yemen
welcome, but uninvited, and eventually signed
onto a process initiated by the GCC. And all UN
efforts took place alongside many other international and regional stakeholders’ contributions,
including those led by Yemen’s strongest backers,
Saudi Arabia and the United States.

17 “Profile: Yemen’s Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi,” Al Jazeera, February 25, 2012, available at www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/02/2012219133034774204.html .
18 Project on Middle East Political Science, “Arab Uprisings: Yemen’s National Dialogue,” POMEPS Briefings 19, Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, March 21,
2013.
19 Raya Barazanji, “Dialoguing for Reconciliation in Yemen,” Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 16, 2014.
20 The NDC was initially intended to last six months, though it continued for ten months as a result of slow progress on certain issues. See Stephen W. Day, “The‘Non-Conclusion’ of Yemen’s National Dialogue,” Foreign Policy, January 27, 2014.
21 International Crisis Group, “Yemen’s Southern Question: Avoiding a Breakdown,” Brussels and Sana’a, September 25, 2013.
22 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2010).

4

The UN Role in Yemen’s
Transition
The UN played a key role in facilitating dialogue
among the various stakeholders noted above andmany others. Its engagement was led by Benomar
himself and his team, which this paper refers tocollectively as the Office of the Special Adviser, or
OSA. The OSA included a small number of teammembers deployed by the MSU, though it
functioned as a single office rather than necessarily
having a stand-alone MSU contingent. The OSA
generally had seven to ten international staff
members, though the numbers fluctuated.
However, only three of these were generally in
Yemen on a nearly full-time basis, with the rest,
including Benomar himself, flying in and out of
Sana’a as needed. For instance, in his first eighteenmonths as special adviser, Benomar traveled to
Yemen twenty-four times, according to media
reports.23 These trips each lasted at least two weeks,with several lasting three or four weeks. While a
few stakeholders felt that it would have been
beneficial for the OSA to have had a larger continuous presence in Yemen, many diplomats andothers found Benomar’s in-and-out role to beeffective. Yemeni stakeholders were eager to make
rapid progress in time for his arrivals and before hewould depart, particularly when he was bound to
New York to brief the UN Security Council; such a
degree of urgency may not have applied if thespecial adviser were consistently in Yemen.
Benomar and the OSA were involved in Yemen’stransition from the spring of 2011, with their role
broadly divided among the following three phases:
creating space for dialogue and a transition plan,
preparing for the NDC, and shepherding the NDC.
As further examined in latter sections of this paper,
these various phases broadly reflected the key“mediation fundamentals” noted within the UN
Guidance for Effective Mediation,24 which include:(a) preparedness, (b) consent, (c) impartiality, (d)inclusivity, (e) national ownership, (f) internationallaw and normative frameworks, (g) coherence,
coordination, and complementarity of the media-

Steven A. Zyck

tion effort, and (h) quality peace agreements.25
CREATING SPACE FOR DIALOGUE AND
A TRANSITION PLAN
The first and arguably most important contribution of the UN to Yemen’s transition began in April
2011, two months after the Arab Spring spread to
Yemen, with the appointment of Benomar as the
Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Yemen.
Despite having a team of only two or three people,
Benomar quickly stepped into the fray without any
mandate from the UN Security Council or General
Assembly. Shortly after being appointed, Benomar
traveled to Yemen at Secretary-General Ban Kimoon’s request to “find out what was going on”
and informally explore whether it might be beneficial to extend the secretary-general’s good offices inline with the UN Charter. Benomar not only met
with Yemeni leaders and foreign diplomats but also
spent time speaking with Yemenis demonstrating
in squares around Sana’a. When in meetings in
Yemen, the special adviser is reported to haveexhibited an unusual degree of patience, allowing
Yemenis to tell their stories in great detail andexpress their frustrations.
This “soft intervention,” as Benomar characterized it, was significant for a number of reasons.
Firstly, it represented a more liberal use (andinterpretation) of the UN role in establishing good
offices than is presently common, and it was highly
proactive in a UN structure that has grown increasingly wary of overstepping its mandate or drawing
the ire of the permanent five members of the
Security Council (P5). Secondly, in the context of
the Arab Spring, Benomar’s early action was
unique; the UN had been far slower and morecautious to become involved in uprisings in Egypt
and Syria, doing little while situations in thosecountries proceeded to deteriorate. Thirdly, fromthe Yemeni perspective, the early involvement of
the UN created a crucial space for dialogue.
Benomar brought all of Yemen’s major politicalparties together for the first time since the uprisingbegan. In doing so, he helped to open lines of
dialogue and begin tangible planning on how tomove Yemen forward—avoiding chaos or a

23 Farea al-Muslimi, “UN Envoy on Yemen Deserves Spotlight,” Al-Monitor, October 23, 2013, available at www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/yemen-unadviser-benomar-controversy-success.html .
24 United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation, September 2012.
25 However, individuals associated with the OSA generally indicated that they had not drawn upon the Guidance document despite being aware of it.

MEDIATING TRANSITION IN YEMEN

factional conflict—once Saleh ultimately stepped
down. Lastly, without direct Security Council
involvement,26 Benomar was able to emphasize his
and the UN’s independence among Yemeni leaders
and the Yemeni public. He was ultimately able tostate and demonstrate that he was not a “fig leaf”
for foreign powers but was instead entering Yemen
as an honest broker concerned more for Yemen’s
future than for American or Saudi security interests
or French energy investments. Such an achievement is particularly notable given that, particularlyin the Middle East, the UN is often greeted with astrong degree of mistrust.
While playing a crucial role, Benomar and his
team were not directly involved in the design of the
GCC Initiative, which Benomar has repeatedly andpublicly criticized for offering broad immunity (inviolation of international law, according to some)to Saleh and his associates.27 Likewise, the UN was
only marginally involved in Saleh’s crucial decision
to sign the GCC Initiative. Instead, diplomats andanalysts indicate that Saudi and Americanpressure, the loss of Saleh’s key domestic allies, and,perhaps most importantly, credible threats ofinternational financial sanctions proved decisive inpressing the Yemeni president to step down in late
2011.
However, in the months while the GCC andothers were pushing Saleh to step down, Benomar
and his team continued to work with major
Yemeni parties in designing the Implementation
Mechanism that was to put meat on the bare-bones
GCC Initiative. This process involved pro- andanti-regime elements, both of which personally(and separately) invited Benomar to mediate their
discussions. Indeed, this sort of tangible transition
planning—which had not taken place in Tunisia or
Egypt amid the Arab Spring—largely emerged as aresult of Benomar’s soft advocacy. The special

5

adviser had spent several months trying toconvince key Yemeni stakeholders that a
structured agreement was necessary given that
Yemen had a history of rudimentary peaceagreements that were vague and that easilycollapsed (e.g., the 1990 unification agreement
between North and South Yemen or the numerous
ceasefires agreed between the Houthis and the
Yemeni military).
As negotiations around the transition plan
began, Benomar noted that the pro- and antiregime sides put forward separate proposals thatwere directly contradictory and that did not show
clear areas for compromising. Recognizing animpasse, the two Yemeni sides asked Benomar to
put forward an alternative proposal. Anticipatingsuch a moment, the OSA had been working on atransition plan since June or July 2011. This OSAplan, which was reportedly very detailed, ultimately
served as the jumping-off point for negotiations
among Yemeni stakeholders; for instance, this was
the first document to propose the organization of
the NDC (discussed later). Ultimately, however,the content of these negotiations is not a matter ofpublic record, and it is not possible to tell how
much the final Implementation Mechanism
resembled the plan that the OSA initially put
forward. However, stakeholders involved in thesenegotiations did note that Benomar pushed for thetransition to be inclusive (particularly of womenand youth), to demonstrate general adherence tothe existing Yemeni constitution, and, mostimportantly, to include a clear role for the GPC.28
This final element helped reassure the GPC thatthey would not be stripped of power (à la Iraqi deBaathification) and, thus, helped convince key
figures in the GPC to also push for Saleh to stepdown.

26 Benomar’s initial visit to Yemen took place without the UN Security Council being aware; however, Security Council member states quickly heard of his mission
to Yemen and asked for a briefing upon his return. Following the briefing, the council asked Benomar to remain engaged in Yemen, thus giving his later efforts asort of soft approval or authorization from the council.
27 “Yemenis Protest against Immunity for Saleh,” Al Jazeera, January 22, 2012, available at www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/01/201212210178891840.html .
28 For a key discussion of the normative and instrumental roles of inclusivity in peace processes, see John Packer, “Challenges and Opportunities of Inclusivity in
Peace Processes,” Discussion Paper No. 7, Brussels: Civil Society Dialogue Network, 2013.

6

Steven A. Zyck

Managing International Pressures
While the OSA was able to maintain its impartiality throughout Yemen’s transition, it had to strategicallygrapple with pressure from a number of UN member states. At times, these proved beneficial and relatively
consensual. For instance, in October 2011 Benomar and the British government pushed for a UN Security
Council resolution calling for a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Yemen. Despite anticipating resistance, the Security Council ultimately agreed and issued Resolution 2014 by consensus. The international
agreement behind this resolution reportedly strengthened Benomar’s legitimacy and also showed
President Saleh that the international community was united behind the GCC Initiative.
Later, however, the OSA faced more challenging diplomatic pressures. For instance, Benomar at one
stage gave President Saleh a preview of his upcoming and very negative briefing to the Security Council on
the situation in Yemen. Saleh asked Benomar to delay his council presentation to allow him to make moretangible progress. While two members of the P5 reportedly opposed any delay, Benomar was able to workwith the then-chair of the council to postpone his briefing before others could stop him in a demonstrationof diplomatic and bureaucratic maneuvering.
In another instance, Benomar reportedly faced harsh criticism and pressure after he declined to visit aparticular Western embassy immediately after meeting with key Yemeni leaders. The special adviser feltthat it would be inappropriate—and compromise his perceived impartiality—for him to go directly fromthe president’s office to a Western embassy. To avoid looking as if he were reporting directly to any foreigncountry, Benomar offered to meet with that country’s ambassador the following day.
Likewise, the OSA declined to share copies of the Implementation Mechanism for Yemen’s transition
with foreign diplomats, including the P5, while it was still being negotiated. According to Benomar, the P5
and Saudi Arabia received the Implementation Mechanism only once it had been finalized. These sorts ofactions, and those listed above, reportedly caused diplomatic rows and opened the OSA to criticism fromparticular governments. However, Benomar and others noted that, given his seniority, experience, andthick skin, the special adviser was able to weather these minor controversies relatively unscathed. A morejunior or less independent mediator may have given in or been forced out amid similar pressures.

PREPARING FOR THE NATIONAL
DIALOGUE CONFERENCE
As the Implementation Mechanism moved
forward, the UN supported the preparatory work
surrounding the NDC. This included an initialperiod of preparations from April to August 2012,
during which time Benomar and his team worked
with President Hadi’s office and other Yemeni
stakeholders to build trust and to ensure that all
major factions would be willing to be involved in
the NDC. At this point, the UN primarily provided
technical support on issues such as the restructuring of the Yemeni military, confidence-building
gestures with the Southern Movement (the socalled 20 points29), and the formation of a formal
Technical Committee to chart a course for the

NDC. While providing support on a number ofissues—and encouraging Yemeni leaders to make
rapid progress in building trust with the South andother groups—Benomar and his team particularly
worked with stakeholders to promote the inclusionof women, youth, and civil society figures in theTechnical Committee.
Ultimately, the Technical Committee, which
operated from September 2012 to March 2013,
included twenty-five individuals from acrossYemen’s largest political parties.30 The committee
addressed a wide variety of issues, including
foundational issues such as the number of participants in the NDC, the share of seats to be reservedfor each faction or party, the involvement of
women and youth, and the actual agenda. The OSA

29 As later discussed, the OSA actively pushed the interim government and president’s office to act on the 20 points, but Yemeni government officials generally
resisted these pressures and made very little progress on the 20 points.
30 Christina Murray, “Yemen's National Dialogue Conference,” October 2013, available at www.academia.edu/5925389/Yemens_National_Dialogue_Conference .

MEDIATING TRANSITION IN YEMEN

provided technical inputs into these discussions
based on other countries’ experiences with transition and comparable dialogue processes. This sortof support, which was particularly provided by asmall number of MSU-affiliated experts, waswidely lauded by UN, non-UN, and Yemeni
stakeholders.
In addition, Benomar and his team also helped tobreak logjams as they emerged in and out of theTechnical Committee. When members of theTechnical Committee would reach an impasse, thespecial adviser reportedly put forward middleground solutions—for instance, on how many seats
each group would have in the NDC—that theparties were willing to tolerate but could notthemselves propose. In addition, Benomar reportedly used his frequent briefings to the UN Security
Council to press parties to reach a compromise,informing members of the Technical Committee—
who were top officials from major politicalfactions—that he needed firm decisions from themto demonstrate tangible progress to the council.
These sorts of micro-mediations were bolsteredby Benomar’s popularity within Yemen and therespect he commanded from key factions in the
country, who were keen to curry the special
adviser’s favor and publicly align themselves withhim. Benomar’s popularity emerged partly fromthe perception that his arrival marked a new degreeof international respect for Yemen, which has often
chafed at being manipulated by regional orWestern powers. In addition, many Yemenis foundthe presence of a nominally Muslim mediator to beparticularly appropriate, and Benomar, who isfrom Morocco, was reportedly referred to as
Brother Benomar, in a sign of religious affinity, byYemenis. Some Yemeni stakeholders felt that beingfrom an Arab country equipped the special adviser
with great patience, which he frequently
demonstrated as Yemeni officials and factions
often prolifically reiterated their grievances,
frustrations, and positions to him. Such personal
traits also endeared him to the Yemeni media,
which Benomar courted and which generally
tended to treat him and his work with a somewhat
uncommon degree of reverence.

7

This popularity also allowed Benomar and the
OSA to help ensure that the NDC was inclusive.
The special adviser made it a personal mission toensure that the NDC included a significant numberof women and youth, a goal shared by several
international organizations and foreign embassies.
Ultimately the NDC included 30 percent womenand 20 percent youth, most of whom were at least
partly affiliated with particular parties or factions,among its 565 participants.31 To overcome many
Yemeni stakeholders’ misgivings about theinclusion of women, in particular, Benomar reportedly drew upon UN norms and standards—
frequently stating that he could not remain
involved with the process, and that the NDC would
not have international backing, if it did not include
a significant number of women. In doing so,
Benomar and others involved in this process notethat the OSA gradually worked to help Yemeni
stakeholders understand that it remained impartial
but was not necessarily neutral (i.e., it supported
the need for change and would not sacrifice
women’s participation and human rights).
The special adviser also emphasized the inclusionof Southern Movement and southern participants
given that the secession of the South posed atangible and existential threat to the future of
Yemen in its current form. Ultimately, half of allseats in the NDC were reserved for individuals
originating in southern Yemen (including a
number of individuals from the South who had
lived much of their lives in the North or who were
not associated with Hiraak).32 A further eighty seats
were allotted to official representatives of theSouthern Movement. However, Hiraak members
who agreed to participate in the NDC represented
only one element within the Southern Movement
and were not viewed as representative of the Southas a whole.
While some analysts have claimed that Benomar
and his team failed to secure more broad-basedsouthern (or Hiraaki) participation, this is an area
where context is crucial. The tenor of the southernsecessionist movement had grown so strong during
the transition, partly as a result of Yemeni security
forces’ shootings of southern protestors, that many

31 Erica Gaston, “Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue,” Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, February 7, 2014.
32 Tik Root and Peter Salisbury, “Jamal Benomar and the Fine Art of Making Peace in Yemen,” Atlantic Council, June 17, 2014, available atwww.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/jamal-benomar-and-the-fine-art-of-making-peace-in-yemen . See also Murray, “Yemen's National Dialogue
Conference.”

8

southern factions were fundamentally opposed to
the NDC and the broader transition, which they
viewed as a northern-led process. Furthermore,
President Hadi repeatedly declined to make goodon trust-building measures (the “20 points”)
necessary to attain greater Hiraaki participation in
the NDC despite repeated appeals from Benomar
for him to do so. Indeed, this situation highlights
the fact that, aside from the bully pulpit, the special
adviser wielded little in the way of carrots or sticks
to influence Yemeni stakeholders. Lastly, Benomar
was reportedly blocked by the UN Department of
Safety and Security from traveling to southern
Yemen on at least one occasion, thus blunting his
ability to make large personal gestures to build
trust with the southern people and Hiraaki leaders.
While many analysts have rightly criticized thelimited southern buy-in to the NDC, it may not beappropriate to attribute this outcome to Benomar
and his office.
SUPPORTING THE NATIONAL
DIALOGUE CONFERENCE
Having spent a great deal of effort on NDC
preparations, Benomar and the OSA were
ultimately to play a relatively modest role in theconference itself. In addition to providing day-today support to the NDC secretariat and seminars
for NDC participants on a range of issues, OSA andits team of experts attended some plenary sessions
and issue-specific working groups. One constitutional expert and an MSU-deployed legal specialist
were considered by many to be crucial sources of
information and practical solutions during the
NDC; for instance, they would, when requested,
present examples of approaches adopted in othercountries (or in other transition processes) tobetter inform NDC discussions. Yet these experts
were few in number—fewer than half a dozen at
any time—compared with the size of the NDC,
where even the nine working groups eachcontained more than fifty participants. Each OSA
specialist was generally assigned to at least two or
three NDC working groups, which made it difficult
for them to keep track of the discussions andunderstand whether the participants were making
progress. The process of monitoring the working
groups—and engaging comfortably with NDC
participants—was made more difficult by the factthat very few OSA personnel working on the transition spoke Arabic. High-quality interpreters were

Steven A. Zyck

only periodically available, and the OSA reportedly
relied from time to time on ad hoc assistance withinterpretation, which varied widely in quality.
From the early days of the NDC, several
diplomatic stakeholders in Sana’a expressedsurprise that OSA personnel were present in the
NDC only sporadically and were not actively
involved in “firefighting,” i.e., helping to settle
disputes where they emerged among or within
particular factions. Many asked whether UN
personnel should have played a stronger, but
subtle, role in terms of helping mediate disagreements among participants or at least helping theworking groups to craft clear agendas and timelines
to ensure that they were likely to stay on track.
Without clear external facilitation, some working
groups reportedly engaged in circular discussions
and proved somewhat directionless.
The OSA’s lack of engagement reportedly
stemmed from a combination of factors. These
include the special adviser’s desire to maintain a
Yemeni-led process but also a range of other morepractical factors. Firstly, the OSA team in Sana’a
had little clear instruction or strategic guidance on
what role they were to play in the NDC; no written
or unwritten strategy or standard operatingprocedures had been established within Benomar’s
team. Without this guidance, and with Benomar
being frequently hard to reach, it was often difficult
to obtain his inputs or go-ahead. Secondly, as
already mentioned, the size of the OSA team was
small compared to the massive scope of the conference; and a majority of the special adviser’s teamtraveled with Benomar or were only sporadically in
Sana’a. For instance, MSU specialists working with
the OSA frequently had to juggle several crisis
situations around the world and were able todedicate only a portion of their time to Yemen.
Thirdly, and as previously noted, the lack of Arabic
linguists on the team—and the inconsistentavailability of interpreters—posed a key challenge;some indicate that Benomar’s team had requested
additional Arabic-speaking political officers fromthe UN, but that such individuals were short in
supply and often unwilling to temporarily relocate
to Yemen.
Furthermore, Benomar’s office was, aside fromindividual exceptions, not able to draw upon the
broader resources of UN humanitarian anddevelopment agencies in Yemen, which had several

MEDIATING TRANSITION IN YEMEN

hundred staff members, most of them Arabic
speakers and many with backgrounds related topeacebuilding, governance, socioeconomic development, transitional justice, land reform, andother NDC-relevant topics. Animosity emerged
early between the UN special adviser and senior
UN development figures in Yemen and ultimately
prevented the OSA from drawing fully upon otherUN agencies in the country.33 Many note that, hadthese frictions not existed, Benomar and his team
could have involved UN governance and development specialists in at least monitoring the NDC
working groups, providing more robust andfrequent technical inputs, and providing additional
capacity building for NDC members.34
The special adviser and his team also played a keyrole outside of the formal confines of the NDC.
This includes, for instance, support from Benomar
to the so-called “eight-plus-eight” discussions,which formed amid, but partly separate from, thecore NDC working groups once it became apparent
that Yemen’s future state structure would not be
resolved within the NDC.35 Benomar was reportedly asked to take a leading role in mediating
between the eight northerners and eightsoutherners in the sixteen-person body, also
known as the Regions Defining Committee. This
reportedly included intense negotiations, andBenomar was credited by some with helping participants approach and conceptualize their positions
and interests in a new way that helped make thedeliberations more fruitful. At the same time, thespecial adviser reportedly also used his leverage andpopularity to push through compromises andconvince groups to abandon immovable positions.
Ultimately the eight-plus-eight committee was able
to put forward a plan for a six-part federal state
that, despite controversy, is considered viable(though many questions regarding revenue
sharing, the powers allotted to states and thecentral government, and other divisive issues have
yet to be addressed).
While Benomar was particularly involved in

9resolving the conflict within the eight-plus-eight
committee, he reportedly did not always engage so
proactively to other matters. Several stakeholders
pointed to the conflict in northern Yemen,36 which
intensified markedly among the Houthis, Salafistgroups, and others during and since the NDC.
Benomar had personally built up a strong degree ofcredibility with the Houthis before the NDC but
had reportedly proven relatively unwilling toleverage this relationship and become significantly
involved in the conflict brewing in northern
Yemen. Yet many in Sana’a felt that the special
adviser’s involvement could have helped to quell
the violence more effectively and could haveyielded a more durable ceasefire between the
Houthis and their opponents. According to several
stakeholders, the UN appeared to limit its focus to
the NDC and other steps involved in the GCC
Initiative’s Implementation Mechanism while notnecessarily addressing other issues and challenges
facing the country.

Analysis
The narrative above, while identifying somechallenges, is altogether a promising one withsignificant implications for the UN. Despite notreferencing the UN Guidance for Effective
Mediation,37 the OSA’s work reflected many of its
core messages and principles. Benomar and his
team earned the consent of the major stakeholder
groups involved in the transition, and the special
adviser himself was generally seen as impartial
despite having good relations with multiple groups(aside, perhaps, from those closely associated withthe ousted president in the later stages of the transition). The UN also took great pains to ensure theprocess was inclusive and was always led by
Yemenis and national institutions. The inclusion of
women and the special adviser’s critical stance visà-vis immunity for the former president and his
associates also reflected deference to internationallaw and normative frameworks. Indeed, the special
adviser repeatedly informed Yemeni stakeholders

33 Interviewees frequently noted the reasons for this animosity but indicated that, for institutional reasons, they did not wish to discuss these on the record.
34 For a discussion of the contribution of UN humanitarian and development agencies to mediation missions, see Charles T. Call, “UN Mediation and the Politics ofTransition after Constitutional Crises,” New York: International Peace Institute, February 2012.
35 Erica Gaston, “Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue.”
36 Nasser Arrabyee, “National Dimensions of the Saada Conflict,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 26, 2013. See also Peter
Salisbury, “Yemen's 'Hidden Wars' Threaten Peace Process,” Al Jazeera, December 3, 2013, available at www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/12/yemenhidden-wars-threaten-peace-process-2013123898288137.html .
37 United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation, September 2012.

10

that international norms required the strong
inclusion of women in the NDC, leveraging thesenorms and frameworks to strengthen his negotiating position.
The main deviation from the Guidance and its
principles appeared to involve preparedness. Whileindividuals associated with the OSA built up a great
deal of contextual awareness, new arrivals to theteam often found few materials to help them
prepare to engage. As previously noted, no strategy
or mission-specific guidelines existed, and recordsof past meetings were rarely maintained. Nor was
the OSA guided by any structured analysis of thevarious stakeholder groups involved in the transition and their underlying interests. Even regular
media monitoring was reportedly not undertaken.
The OSA reportedly declined to produce thesematerials for a number of reasons. As in many
diplomatic processes, Benomar was at times
concerned about sensitive documents being
intentionally or accidentally leaked. However,many note that the special adviser’s style, including
a penchant for micro-management, had at times
served to discourage initiative among those aroundhim.
This section now turns to a broader question:
what best practices and lessons learned can betaken away from the UN’s mediation or facilitationof Yemen’s transition?
BEST PRACTICES• Early, exploratory engagement can be crucial
and should be drawn upon with increasing
frequency.
The UN special adviser’s proactive engagementin Yemen proved crucial in helping to build
relations among all parties. Benomar and a small
number of colleagues in the early days wererelatively free from specific UN Security Council
pressures and were able to engage in a more
exploratory manner, focusing on analyzing thesituation and building relations with key
stakeholders rather than achieving any shortterm outcomes. Many stakeholders felt that thisproactive form of engagement and liberalapplication of the secretary-general’s good offices
should be viewed as a model meriting replication

Steven A. Zyck

in future contexts that appear to be falling deeper
into crisis. However, it is important to note that
this form of engagement in Yemen is often seen
as part and parcel of Benomar’s personal style,which was seen to be well matched to the Yemenicontext, and to his level of seniority, whichallowed him to strategically ignore pressuresfrom particular UN member states keen on
influencing his work.
• A unified UN Security Council can be a powerful ally for mediators and can strategically
employ resolutions.
Many analyses have recently compared UN
involvement in Yemen, Syria, and Libya. In thelatter two countries, the council was deeply
divided, a fact that many feel enabled continued
escalation. While such a finding likely passes forcommon sense, the case of Yemen demonstrates
the power of the Security Council when it is inagreement or willing to find common ground.
For instance, Security Council Resolutions 2014
and 2140, which were coordinated closely with
Benomar’s office, were useful in helping toconvince Saleh to step down and in discouraging
him and his allies from attempting to spoil
Yemen’s transition.38 Furthermore, since
Benomar was likely to receive a fair and open
hearing at the council, the special adviser wasable to use his briefings to push Saleh and others
to make concessions. Such leverage would nothave existed if the council had not trusted
Benomar’s briefings or if members of the P5 had
publicly challenged them.
• The NDC, while problematic at times, demonstrates the potential of large, transformative
events amid transitions.
The National Dialogue had a number of flaws,
but it did provide a historic opportunity forstakeholders to assemble and tackle a wide rangeof challenges. Many felt that it partly validates
such events, which received a tarnished reputation after they yielded partial or problematic
outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq. While it is notpossible to say that National Dialogue processes
are inherently a good practice, it is clear that they
can be useful in launching a slow process of

38 However, UN Security Council Resolution 2140 also raised concerns that the UN was inappropriately taking sides or collaborating with those eager to see the former
president further marginalized; this perception appears to have had implications for Benomar’s perceived neutrality in certain circles. See Nasser Arrabyee, “Howthe U.N. Could Help Yemeni Dialogue,” Yemen Times, March 27, 2014.

MEDIATING TRANSITION IN YEMEN

negotiation among key stakeholders, building
trust among several parties, and turning many
stakeholders’ attention away from the battlefield
and toward a major political undertaking.39 In
this respect, it may comprise a useful first step
toward national elections by modeling peacefulpolitical contestation.
LESSONS LEARNED• Reconsider the scope of National Dialogue
processes, moving particular issues to separate
venues.
The NDC addressed an unreasonably broad setof issues, thus making it difficult for the participants to fully understand and engage with thevarious issues at hand. Furthermore, including
highly sensitive issues related to the structure of
the Yemeni state and Southern Movement in a
relatively public and highly visible venue such as
the NDC undermined the prospects for progress.
That is, parties found it difficult to discuss such
issues in the NDC, and it is telling that the state
structure issue was ultimately decided in aclosed-door, sixteen-person forum. That said,
dialogue processes would be likely to lose their
credibility if they wholly ignored the largest andmost divisive political issues of the day; hence,
there is a careful balance to be struck whensetting the agenda for such processes.
• Recalibrate technical support to dialogues andtransitions, focusing much more on mediationand communication skills among participants.
The OSA in Yemen provided regular support to
the NDC and ran a number of workshops for
NDC participants. Yet many felt that, instead oftechnical information on individual issues, theyrequired more in-depth capacity building toallow them to define their agendas, develop
negotiating strategies, mediate day-to-day
disputes, and communicate effectively. The sortsof rapid seminars focused on technical issues
related to governance, security sector reform,
and other somewhat academic topics that the UN
provided were deemed to be valuable thoughvaried widely in quality and relevance; however,many stakeholders noted that NDC participants
instead needed a broader form of skill building.

11

Basic planning, negotiation, and communication
skills were deemed particularly crucial in
overcoming asymmetries among groups in the
NDC. For instance, some groups wererepresented at the NDC by internationallytrained experts, while other delegates wererelatively poorly educated; this means that theyoften faced difficulties negotiating given differences in preparation and communication/negotiation styles.
• Strong mediators should have an empowered
and competent manager as second-in-command.
The UN special adviser was frequently so indemand, whether in New York or Sana’a, that hewas not necessarily able to fill the role of day-today team manager. Hence, a senior manager orchief of staff role should be incorporated into the
OSA and into similar missions in the future. This
manager should have a diplomatic backgroundand be attuned to the senior UN mediator’s
agenda and style and be implicitly trusted byhim; the senior diplomat (e.g., Benomar in thisinstance) should be closely involved in selecting
this individual. Most importantly, the manager
or chief of staff should be empowered to oversee
routine team management, manage resources,
document progress, and make non-criticaldecisions without the direct involvement of thespecial adviser.
• The skills required for mediation may bedifferent from the skills required for large andcomplex dialogue processes.
Mediators must have a certain skill set that often
involves an ability to build relationships andengage with stakeholders in relatively small
group settings. In contrast, dialogue processes
such as Yemen’s 565-person NDC require amanager (or an “orchestra conductor,” as one
individual termed it) who is comfortable dealing
with information and process management, thedevelopment of technical coordination
mechanisms, and communications strategies.
Hence, the UN, specifically DPA and the MSU,
may wish to build capacity not only formediation but also for dialogue facilitation andmanagement. In practice, these “conductors”

39 For a broader discussion of national dialogue processes, including in Yemen, see Katia Papagianni, “National Dialogue Processes in Political Transitions,” Discussion
Paper No. 3, Brussels: Civil Society Dialogue Network, 2014.

12

Steven A. Zyck

would not replace senior mediators once a
conflict is resolved; instead, they could serve as
empowered deputies capable of leveraging themediator’s credibility and channeling it into
postmediation dialogue processes.
• Consider developing guidance and training for
UN mediators and facilitators that enable themto quickly access and draw on cross-context
comparisons.
As noted earlier, those familiar with the transition and the OSA indicated that many membersof the special adviser’s team were broadly awareof the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, butthat it was not actively drawn on given its breadthand relatively normative perspective. That said,
many involved in Yemen’s transition felt that
guidance materials were sorely needed.
According to some, these materials—andaccompanying
trainings—shouldequip
mediators and facilitators to draw on crosscontext comparisons. Many NDC participants
and Yemeni stakeholders were eager to hear
examples from other transition processes, andthe most valued and respected members of the
OSA were generally those capable of drawing
upon these. While such a broad knowledge baseis often rooted in a lengthy career and first-handexperience, many cross-context comparisons canbe documented and taught to individuals participating in transition and dialogue processes suchas those unfolding in Yemen.

Conclusion
The UN mediation of Yemen’s transition was
ultimately crucial in helping to head off a broader
conflict and build broad consensus regarding thepost-Saleh transition process. The proactive andlow-key use of the secretary-general’s good offices
represent a promising practice that merits further
replication under appropriate conditions in the
future. That said, it will be important to avoid
generalizing too broadly from the Yemeni case.
Benomar’s ability to proactively engage in Yemen
reflected a number of very specific conditions. The
uprising in Yemen was being watched closely by
several global powers, not least the US and Saudi

governments, but no nation or member of the P5
had necessarily taken on responsibility for
responding to it; hence, there was scope for lowkey UN involvement. Likewise, Yemenis wereaccustomed to dialogue, negotiation, andmediation, which have a long history in Yemen.
Key factions and figures were generally open to
middle-ground solutions rather than an all-ornothing mentality; this pragmatism was seen
during the Saleh regime, when several politicalparties, tribes, and others often balanced public
opposition to the state with behind-the-scenes
cooperation.
Beyond the OSA’s success in averting a largerscale conflict in Yemen, Benomar and his team had
several other successes. They proved naysayers
wrong by helping to ensure that the NDC andYemen’s transition was far more inclusive in termsof women, youth, and civil society. In the end, theNDC ended with a promising, but daunting, set of
1,800 recommendations and—through a somewhat
parallel process—a broad roadmap for the future
Yemeni state.40 While challenges arose, these did
not necessarily undermine the foundational
success of UN engagement.
Now Yemen continues with its transition. And
despite the NDC, the number of challenges facing
the country has multiplied. As previously noted,
conflict in northern Yemen intensified during the
National Dialogue and largely went unaddressedby the OSA. The announcement of a six-partfederal structure was followed by a new round offighting in the South in the Al-Dhale governorate.
Yemen is, simply, less stable now than when the
NDC began, and it is not necessarily clear that UN
diplomatic engagement in Yemen was responsive
to changing circumstances on the ground acrossYemen.
With a constitution-drafting process underway, areferendum to approve a draft constitution, andcoming elections all within the next year, many
anticipate that Yemen will only become less stable.
The open dialogue established among key parties
and factions in Yemen will become increasingly
important, and the need for Benomar and his officewill only grow. Many analysts and officials are, in

40 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, “Outcomes of Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference: A Step Toward Conflict Resolution and State Building?”
Assessment Report, Doha, February 2014.

MEDIATING TRANSITION IN YEMEN

particular, hopeful that the OSA will be able tosoften the requirement that Yemen’s draft constitution be approved by a national referendum. While
the GCC Initiative established the need for areferendum, many note that Yemen’s politicalsystem would be thrown into disarray if, as many
expect, the draft constitution were to be rejected nomatter what it contains.
Work remains to be done, but the UN has
established itself—despite an initial lack of carrots
and sticks—to be an indispensable key player in
Yemen’s transition. An expanded UN team will bebeneficial in allowing the OSA to fulfill its mandate,13

as will improved management arrangements
within the OSA. Even so, Benomar and his teamwill have an opportunity not only to draw on theirinternal resources but also on the broad networks
and key figures that they were able to develop andrefine through the NDC. These include key NDC
delegates as well as Yemeni civil society groups,
international NGOs, UN humanitarian anddevelopment agencies, and others who are keen to
support Yemen’s transition—and who would be
wise to do so in an increasingly harmonizedmanner.

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