DISASTER DURING A PANDEMIC

THE TEAM
Sangita Das, Resilience Innovation Knowledge Academy
Rajib Shaw, Keio University
Sakiko Kanbara, University of Kochi
Miwa Abe, Kumamoto University
Takeshi Komino, CWS Japan

Published by:
CWS Japan
Room 25, 2-3-18 Nishiwaseda,
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0051 Japan
http://www.cwsjapan.org
Tel: +81-(0)3-6457-6840

January 2021

The contents of this publication may be copied,distributed and displayed alike and withattribution only for non-commercial purposes.
Please refer to this publication as follows: Das S., Shaw R., Kanbara S., Abe M.,
Komino T. (January 2021); “Disaster During a Pandemic—Lessons from SouthJapan Flood in July 2020”, CWS Japan, 40 pages, Tokyo, JapanTABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations.............................................................................4

INTRODUCTION

5FOCUS 1: EVACUATION

12FOCUS 2: SHELTER MANAGEMENT

20

FOCUS 3: VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT

25

FOCUS 4: EARLY RECOVERY30

WAY FORWARD

36

PERSONS CONSULTEDDOCUMENTS CONSULTED

37
38

History of Floods in Kumamoto............................................................9Halted Dam Project Could Reduce the Effects of Flooding................ 10
Timeline of the First Few Hours............................................................11
Confusion Everywhere: To Go or Not To Go?...................................... 13
Dispersed Evacuation: How Well Did It Work?.................................... 15
The Fire Departmente Office Itself was Underwater............................17
Importance of Good Evacuation Plan and Periodic Drills................... 18
Hazard Maps are Under-Utilized......................................................... 19(A) Food Distribution............................................................................21(B) Clothes and Everyday Items..........................................................21(C) Cleanliness and Hygiene...............................................................21(D) Physical and Mental Care............................................................. 22(E) Internet Connectivity...................................................................... 23
Consideration for People at Other Emergency Shelters......................24
Some Cases of Infection......................................................................26
Silver Linings........................................................................................26
Special Skill Volunteers........................................................................26
The Importance of Coordination..........................................................27
The Kuma Recovery Project................................................................ 28
Beyond the Cleaning Work..................................................................29
Recovery Plan of Hitoyoshi City...........................................................31
Recovery Plan of Kuma Village............................................................32
Temporary Housing..............................................................................34
Minna no Ie: A Home for All.................................................................35

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSAMDA		DMAT		
FDMA		GEJE		
JMA		
JVOAD
KVOAD
MHLW		
MLIT		
NGO		
NHK		
NPO		
SFDRR
YMCA		YWCA		The Association of Medical Doctors of Asia
Disaster Medical Association TeamFire and Disaster Management Agency
Great East Japan Earthquake
Japan Meteorological Agency
Japan Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
Kumamoto Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Non-Government Organization
Nippon Hoso Kyokai or Japan Broadcasting Corporation
Non-Profit Organization
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
Young Men’s Christian Association
Young Women’s Christian Association

4

INTRODUCTION
On July 4th, 2020, the southern prefectures of Japan,
particularly Kumamoto and Kagoshima, experienced
record-breaking heavy rain, which caused devastating
floods and landslides in many areas of these prefectures.
The disaster, which was officially named as “Reiwa 2-Nen
7-Gatsu Gou” (meaning heavy rain of July 2020), killed 83
people, 65 of whom were in Kumamoto prefecture1. Thereis a possibility that the number will increase with time
because of disaster-related deaths2. Beyond these mostdevastating losses of life, the latest data notes 15,335
buildings destroyed by this disaster.

KUMAMOTO
PREFECTURE
KAGOSHIMA
PREFECTURE
From Fire and Disaster Management Agency data, available online (in Japanese).
“Disaster related death” is death from indirect causes linked to disasters, such as illnesses exacerbatedby difficult conditions in evacuation shelters, the heavy stress from the radically changed living
environment, suicides among evacuees and so on.

12

5

Right: damage in the city of Aso in Kumamoto
prefecture following the 2016 earthquake.
Below: flood damage in July 2020.

This report focuses on theaffected areas of Kumamoto
prefecture, which was most
severely damaged by thisdisaster. The Kuma river ofthis prefecture has a historyof repeated floods, most ofwhich affected the areas thatwere affected this year.
Moreover, Kumamoto was theprefecture that was hit by adamaging 7.0 magnitude
earthquake in 2016, which caused
widespread damage in and aroundKumamoto city. Because of these pastdisasters, some of which happened within thelast decade, there are many aspects in which
Kumamoto is more prepared to manage a disaster than theneighboring prefectures. However, there is a number of otheraspects where a lot more can be done.

The flood of July 2020, unfortunately,
happened at a time when the wholecountry, as well as most other countriesof the world, was fighting a pandemic.
Japan has been relatively successful
in keeping the spread of the Covid-19
virus somewhat in control compared toother developed countries, which could
be related to its culture (such as
non-touch greeting and sanitation
practice since childhood), food
habits and advance healthcare
system3. However, Japan has been
managing the response to COVID-19
under a separate structure from theone used for dealing with natural
disasters, instead of adopting a
multi-hazard approach recommended
in the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction (SFDRR, widely known
as “the Sendai Framework”)4. The stateof emergency that went into effect inApril was declared on the basis not of
the Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act
that covers natural disasters but of theSpecial Measures Act to Counter New

Types of Influenza. As will be
discussed in this report, the pandemic
has affected both the preparationand the response of the July 2020
flood, highlighting the importance of amulti-hazard approach as called forby the Sendai Framework.
The strict regulations because of thepandemic have affected the researchof this report as well, since it wasdifficult to access the field from otherparts of the country without an
exclusive permit. This research was
mostly done through published data
and documents, interview of theaffected people and leaders oforganizations, and short visits to thefield with special permission. The
authors hope that the findings of thisresearch, supported by CWS Japan,
will bring to light the complex impacts
and management implications ofcascading disasters, and thus project
the importance of a multi-hazard
approach.

Covid-19 cases in Kumamoto prefecture between February and November, 2020.
The highest numbers were in late July. Source: website of Kumamoto prefecture.
Tashiro A., Shaw R., “COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Japan: What is Behind the Initial
Flattening of the Curve”; Sustainability, June 2020.
4
Mikio Ishiwatari, “Multi-hazard Approach to Compound/Cascading Disasters: Putting Experiencein Developing Disaster Risk Reduction to Use in Pandemics”; JIIA, December 2020.
3

7

A damaged whitewater rafting facility along the Kuma river.
The Kuma is one of three major rivers in Japan and has ahistory of flooding.

HISTORY OF FLOODS IN KUMAMOTO
As mentioned above the Kuma River basin has a history of flooding,the worst of which was in 1965. One of three major rapids in Japan,
the Kuma is a 115-kilometer-long class A river5. Its course begins
in the mountain range in Kyushu, and it runs through Hitoyoshi city,
Kuma village, and Yatsushiro city before discharging into the
Yatsushiro Sea. The river is prone to flooding almost every time there
is heavy rainfall in the region, which, because of its geographic
location, happens very often.
July 1965

The river overflowed along almost its entire length,
flooding almost two-thirds of Hitoyoshi and breaking
part of the Hagiwara levee in Yatsushiro.

July 1982

The same areas were affected along the river aftera record rainfall. Over 5,000 houses were damaged,
and 47 houses were washed away.

Aug. 2004

Heavy rainfall brought by a typhoon caused theriver to overflow, forcing people in Hitoyoshi and thesurrounding areas to evacuate.

Sept. 2005

The river overflowed following heavy rainfall caused
by a typhoon. A total of 119 houses were inundated,and over 750 families had to evacuate.

July 2006

Continuous heavy rainfall raised the water level,
which overflowed and inundated 80 houses. Over
900 families had to evacuate.

June 2008

Heavy rainfall caused the river to swell and overflow,
inundating 33 houses. More than 1,000 families in
Hitoyoshi, Yatsushiro and Ashikita had to evacuate.

June 2011

The water level of river crossed the danger limit
after heavy rainfall, forcing residents of Hitoyoshi andsurrounding areas to evacuate. At least eight houses
were inundated.

Table 1: Major floods along the Kuma river since the 1960s(Source: Website of MLIT’s Yatsushiro River and National Highway Office.)

The term “Class A River” is applied to rivers and waterways deemed to be important to theeconomy of the nation as a whole, as well as those deemed important to the conservation ofnature within Japan (source: Wikipedia).

59

HALTED DAM PROJECT COULD
REDUCE THE IMPACT OF FLOODING
After Kumamoto Prefecture was hit
by heavy floods from the Kuma Riverfor three years in a row from 1963
to 1965, the Construction Ministry, apredecessor of the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism,
announced in 1966 a project toconstruct a dam along the Kawabe
River, the largest arm of the Kuma
River, as a flood control measure. In
2008 the prefecture governor
requested the Land Ministry tosuspend the project and consider
flood protection measures withoutdams, following which the project
was canceled in 2009 by the central
government. The MLIT, prefecture
government, and local governments
have established committees to
examine measures without dams,
but have been unable to find out
any solution because of the costs
and construction period required.
Construction of water control
structures like dams is always adifficult decision. They do protect
settlements from floods, but often at

the cost of other sacrifices. Kuma
River is famous for river rafting, and if
the dam affects the water quality, theentire tourism industry of that area will
suffer. However, an estimation compiledby the land ministry’s Kyushu Regional
Development Bureau after the July
2020 flood showed that the dam, which
would be called the Kawabegawa dam,
could have reduced the total area ofinundation by 60.7% had it been
constructed as planned (see Table 2).
The areas that had an inundation of
three meters or above could have beensaved by nearly 89%, which means theseven lives that were lost in the second
floors of buildings could have beensaved. The prefectural government
announced in mid-November, fourmonths after the flood, that it has
decided to restart the construction of
the controversial dam6, and instead ofa conventional reservoir-style dam, thestate will build a flood retention dam
that is environmentally friendly andstores water only in the event offlooding with open outlets.

Depth ofInundation

Area of
Area ofInundation (ha)Inundation (ha)Without the Dam With the Dam

Percentage of
the Area that
Could be Saved

Below 0.5m

68.5

66

-4.0%

0.5 to 3m

275.9

132.1

-52.1%

Above 3m

224.2

25.2

-88.8%

Total

568.6

223.3

-60.7%

Table 2: Estimates compiled by MLIT showing percentage of area that could besaved if the dam was built as planned.
(Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, October 6, 2020)
Kyodo news via The Japan Times, November 19, 2020, “Kumamoto approves controversial dam
after deadly July flooding”

6

10TIMELINE OF THE FIRST FEW HOURS

21:39
JMA announced a
predicted 200mm rainin Kumamoto prefecturein the following 24 hours(the actual rainfall
was over 400mm)*no special warning
was announced*
JULY 3
17:00

19:00

21:00

17:00
Advisory: elderly
people told to prepare
for evacuation

22:20
landslide warning
issued for Kuma village
22:20
evacuation advisory
issued in Kuma village

5:55
MLIT announcesthat the Kuma
River has
overflowed and2:30
large areas
mudslide damages
have been
Route 219 in Kuma
floodedvillage
5:55
2:30
Senju-enwater level of the
Nursing
Kuma River risingHome isinundated
JULY 4
23:00
1:00
3:00
5:00
3:10
Hitoyoshi monitoring
point on the Kuma
River reaches
overflow warning
level
3:30
water reachedevacuation
advisory level

7:00

4:50
JMA announces
special warningfor heavy rain

4:00
water on the Kuma
River crosses thedanger level

3:30
JMA announced
heavy rainfall of
110mm/hour in andaround Kuma village
3:30
Evacuation orderissued for everyone
in Kuma village
11

FOCUS 1: EVACUATIONAs soon as the heavy rain forecast
was announced by the Japan
Meteorological Agency in theevening on July 3rd, the local news
media started to relay the forecast
asking people to take early action.
This was the first time the new
evacuation guideline was to be
applied, and the possibility ofconfusion among the people could
not be ruled out. As discussed in
CWS Japan’s report “Lessons fromMabi”7, there are various reasons
why people are often reluctant toevacuate, such as inadequate risk
communication, underestimation ofdanger, physical inability, lack of
information about where or how
to go and so on. Because of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the dilemmaand confusion regarding where andhow to evacuate, or whether toevacuate at all, had intensified
manifolds.
The capacity of the designatedevacuation shelters dropped tonearly one-fourth to accommodatesocial distancing among theevacuees, and people were advised
to follow the Dispersed Evacuation
guideline8 to avoid the Three C’s9.
Many people did take early action toevacuate after hearing the warning,but there were also many who could
not move to a safe place before theriver overflowed. Of the 83 deaths
reported so far, 58 died inside abuilding, seven of whom were found in
the second floor, which, unfortunately,is one of the options often advised byexperts for emergency evacuation.

See Issue 4 of CWS Japan’s report “Six Months Since Western Japan Flood: Lessons From Mabi.”
NHK online special page on COVID-19; (in Japanese). Available online.
9
The Three C’s: Closed spaces, Crowded places, Close-contact settings. See Ministry of Health,
Labor and Welfare’s (MHLW) poster available online.
7
8

12

CONFUSION EVERYWHERE:TO GO OR NOT TO GO?

The 5-point warning system used by the Japan Meterological Agency.

When a danger approaches, it becomeschallenging to walk or drive even to themost familiar places of one’s
neighborhood. Without a good
evacuation plan, one can only try to go
to one of the facilities, if there are any
nearby, or a friend or relative’s housein a safer place. All the while, confusion
and mental stress caused by theapproaching danger take a toll. With thedesignated evacuation shelters filled
within hours due to their significantly
reduced capacity, many were completely
lost of options as the heavy rain started.
Many went back to their homes, stayed
put in the upper floor, if there was any, tosave themselves from the worst. Many
did not leave their homes at all because
they saw their neighbors and friends
leave for an emergency center, thencome back after not finding anything.
People with pets, especially, try to avoid
going out, since pets are usually notallowed inside the same space as
people at most evacuation shelters.

The biggest dilemma, however, about
whether to look for an emergency
shelter or to just stay put during the July
2020 flood, was faced by families that
had one or more members who needed
special care (such as elderlies or
persons with disabilities). Evacuation
itself could pose a risk to thosemembers, as the moves could cause
injury or destabilization of long-termcare plans. Besides, the conditions
in evacuation shelters, quite
understandably, fall short of those inclinics and nursing homes by far—
especially in terms of ensuring theprotection against a deadly virus. It wasa tough decision for those who provide
care to those people, and hence they
took their time in making the move.
When it became clear that they were
not safe where they were, people tried
to move to the upper level of thebuilding, which in many cases,
including the case of Senju-en10 Nursing
Home, is not a safe place to evacuate.

The Asahi Shinbun online edition, July 6, 2020, “Male nurse racked by guilt at failure to saveelderly residents”

1013VOICES FROM THE FIELD“The rain was really heavy in the night of July 3rd. Aroundthe time of the sunrise I heard the sound of some sort ofannouncement, but I was sleeping, and the rain was toostrong. I could not figure out what the announcement was
about. At around 5 in the morning when I looked outside,
I was shocked to find the whole area under water. I live
within the compound of a shrine, which is thankfully
located on the high ground. Many people from thesurrounding areas had come for shelter, but we had no
idea about what was going on.
Because of the altitude we cannot catch radio or NHK
transmissions, and there was no information from the local
residents’ association. I called my daughter who lives in thegreater area to seek her advice, and it was then that I got
to know about the flood. She sent detail information about
which areas had been inundated, which roads had beendamaged, by cell phone messages with pictures, fromhundreds of miles away! I was thankful for my daughter’shelp, but this experience made me realize how risky it is to
not have access to local information in times of disaster.”- A Woman in her 60s from Sakamoto town of Yatsushiro city

DISPERSED EVACUATION:
HOW WELL DID IT WORK?
Evacuation shelters of Japan aremostly multipurpose halls of publicschools, which usually accommodatea few hundred people. In case of
the July 2020 flood, as has been
mentioned above, they could only
accommodate one-fourth of theirusual capacity. For example, if a hall
can typically accommodate 200
people, because of social distancing
it will only be able to accommodate
50 people now. Not only that, as manyas 14 designated shelters were
submerged in three prefectures
because of the heavy rain, making
the situation much worse11.There werealso some places like the severely

affected Kuma village, where there
was no designated emergency
shelter. Therefore, the very limited
number of spaces that could actually
be managed within the evacuation
shelters were mainly for people whowant to or have no choice but to seek
shelter there, and it was in a way
expected that most others would opt
not to go to a designated emergency
shelter for fear of getting infected12.
It was advised that people find otheroptions, such as accommodation
facilities like hotels or inns, or friend
and relative’s houses and so on in thesafe zones as an alternative.

FRIEND’S HOUSEEVACUATIONSHELTER

CAR

HOTEL

The Jiji Press via The Japan Times,
July 13, 2020; “14 evacuation shelters become
unusable amid Japan rain disaster”
12
Koyama M., Kanbara S., Minamisawa K., “A
guideline for creation of countermeasures against
flood disaster during a pandemic situation (COVID-19)”,
2nd Edition, March 27, 2020
1115

A Good Example of a
Lesson Applied
When typhoon Hagibis hit in
October last year, the sheltersof Tokyo’s Tama city became
overcrowded, and there werecases where some families
had to look for alternatives in
the middle of the night. The city
authorities took this matter
seriously, and collaborated witha local IT company to develop
an app in August this year, withwhich the residents can check how
crowded the shelters are on themap of their cell phones or computers.

Unfortunately, the evacuation shelters
registered people based on who camefirst. People started pouring in there as thewarnings were announced repeatedly, and they filled
within a matter of hours leaving the rest, including many elderly
residents, with no place to go. Some were denied access, somewere allowed under special consideration, but the rest went backhome finding no other option. In an open hall within a sports facility
called “Sakura Dome” in the higher land of Kuma village, 200
people took shelter for two nights, even though it had no wall orproper floor. The accommodation facilities in Hitoyoshi andYatsushiro city filled very fast by people who could afford them.
Many residents did not have cars or a valid license, and many
hesitated to trouble their friends or relatives without prior plans.
The advisory about Dispersed Evacuation was to save people fromthe COVID-19 pandemic while evacuating, and it is safe to say thatthe plan worked, since there has been no report of outbreak as of
October 20, but because such a large number of people had toevacuate at the same time, it ended up causing more confusion anddilemma to a process that was already quite challenging for many.
Thankfully, the TV channels aired the latest updates on whichshelter was full, which could take some more and so on in real time.
This helped people take informed decision about where toevacuate, at a very critical time.
16THE FIRE DEPARTMENT ITSELFWAS UNDER WATER
When the Kuma river overflowed on
the morning of July 4, the first floor of
Shimokuma Fire Department’s officein Hitoyoshi city went under water.
The office had been receiving calls
for help and rescue since 2 AM frompeople who could not evacuate, orwere stuck in their cars in areas close
to the water. They continued doing
their duty for as long as they safely
could, but after the office went
under water, they were ordered tosave their own lives. The trucks andrescue equipment, including thegenerators to produce electricity inemergency, were all inundated. There
was nothing they could do anymore,

although they kept receiving callsfrom people under water “up to theneck”13. They also received a few callsfrom Senju-en Nursing Home, where
14 lives were lost.
The Chief of the Shimokuma Fire
Department’s office reported that theiroffice is located in the flood-risk zone.
During the worst flooding, it can beunder five meters of water (up to thesecond floor). They did periodic
evacuation drills for this situation,but on July 4 the floods came fasterthan drills had prepared even these
professional rescuers for, forcing themto evacuate to save their own lives.

“Water up to the neck, 191 SOS calls, Fire Department under water, phones constantly ringing:
The case of Hitoyoshi Shimokuma” (in Japanese)

13

17

IMPORTANCE OF A GOOD EVACUATION
PLAN & PERIODIC DRILLS
The importance of a good
evacuation plan and periodic drills
cannot be overstated. Especiallyfamilies that have disabled or elderly
members, and facilities that provide
care for such people, must have aplan in place for all kinds ofemergencies. It has been repeatedly
seen in the recent years that those
who do these drills have been able topull it through the worst of disasters
without any fatality. During typhoon
Hagibis in October 2019, as a power
outage rendered elevators inoperable
at a nursing home in Saitama
prefecture, 24 caregivers who hadrigorously planned and drilled wereable to move all 120 residents tothe second floor in the middle of thenight. The following day, all of theresidents—most in their 80s and 90s
and many suffering from dementia—
were rescued by local firefighters,
prefectural police officers and national
Self-Defense Forces troops.

they noticed the rising water of theriver, it was too late for the six workers
to carry all 60 residents, most of whom
could not move by themselves, to theupper floors. Senju-en is situated neara small river that branches off fromthe Kuma River. The area falls in thehigh-risk zone, and in the event of
a flood, water levels were expected
to rise up to 20 meters, or about fivefloors. Which means, if the water roseto the worst level, neither the residents
nor the caregivers could be saved
even if they moved to the upper floors.

What is most concerning is thatcases like Senju-en are not rare at allin Japan. According to the Ministryof Land, Infrastructure, Transport andTourism, as many as 67,000 nursing
homes and clinics across the country
for people who require special careare located near rivers and are at riskof flooding14. All of these facilities are
obliged to prepare an emergency
evacuation plan and conduct
The caregivers of Senju-en Nursing
emergency drills, but according toHome, where 14 residents died,
MLIT, only 35.6 percent of facilities
also conducted periodic drills, as
nationwide had such plans in place
reported later by its director Ms. Aki
as of March 2019. In the southern
Goto, but around midnight on July 3rd, prefectures of Japan, the percentage
they were more worried about mud
was even lower at 24.2 percent,slide from the hills on the other side of with the ratio in five of the seven
the facility. A very unfortunate case of prefectures lower than the nation’spoor risk communication. By the time
average.
The Japan Times, July 24, 2020, “Japan’s nursing care facilities face challenge of safely
evacuating during disasters”

14

18

HAZARD MAPS ARE UNDER-UTILIZED
About 80% of theJuly 2020 flooding of the Kuma river:casualties happened Area of inundation in and around Hitoyoshi cityin areas that werealready marked
as high risk in thehazard maps or theflood risk maps15.
This has been a very
critical matter, and acommon occurrence,in all the recent
water-related
disasters. The hazard
maps are still a workin progress,
This map was made at 1 PM on July 4,
especially in Southbased on images and other information
posted on social media from the affected
Japan, where only
areas in real time, and may not fully
23.1 percent ofreflect the real depth and areas of inundation.
municipalities haveand damage. There are about 5000
finished making the maps as ofbuildings along the Kuma river, from
November 2019, with Kumamoto
16
the upstream to the downstream, andbeing the second lowest at 9.5% ,most of them are located in Kuma
but almost all the areas that werevillage and Hitoyoshi town, where theaffected by the July 2020 flood weredamages were the most severe. In
marked as high risk. It has become
other words, the damages could beclear yet again that the flood risk
maps are not being carefully checked significantly reduced if the residents
by the residents and the communities. had better understanding of the risk.
To leave the judgement of whether
These maps are usually issued on
to build in those areas or not on thepaper, and are often very difficult toowner or the developer is clearly notunderstand for the common people.
enough. With the intensity of water-reThere have been talks about making
them more comprehensive and easily lated disasters increasing with time
available, although no significant step because of the climate change, it has
become essential to make strong polhas been taken yet. Understanding
icies against building in the areas thatdisaster risk is the first Priority forare clearly marked as flood-risk zones
Action in Sendai Framework forin the Hazard Maps.
Disaster Risk Reduction and isessential for prevention of fatalities
NHK News Web, September 28, 2020, “What we saw from the death of 83 persons” (in Japanese)
The Japan Times; November 22, 2019; “Less than a quarter of Kyushu Municipalities haveup-to-date flood risk maps”

15
16

19

FOCUS 2: SHELTER MANAGEMENT
An evacuation shelter is not merely asafe building to provide shelter for
people at risk of being affected by adisaster—it is also a place that provides
the evacuees with all kinds of help andsupport till they are able to manage on
their own. Management of evacuation
shelters, where several hundred
people might be taking shelter during
an emergency, requires a team ofpeople with varied experience andexpertise. Under normal conditions
the management team follows a set of
guidelines issued by the government.
Because of the pandemic, a new setof guidelines has been issued, thatcovers various aspects of managing
an emergency shelter, including how
to open it at the wake of a disaster andwhat to prepare, details on what to dowith people who show symptoms ofthe disease, how to maintain thecleanliness and sanitation, how tomanage and report about relief goods,
what to be careful about while
distributing food, and what to do withpeople who come with pets. However,each disaster is different, so is eachshelter, and not everything can be
instructed through a common guideline.
A good amount of instant decisionmaking, therefore, is always left on thepeople who manage the shelters—atask that can be extremely stressful
during the first few weeks after adisaster. The government officers
dispatched to the shelters to look overthe management, as well as local
volunteers with previous shelter
management experience, whothemselves may be affected by thedisaster, are often over-worked. There
have been cases of serious stressrelated illnesses, and even suicides in
the past among the officers who wereon emergency duty after disasters. The
complexity, severity and longevity of the
COVID19 pandemic has brought thisissue back to light.
As discussed in the previous chapter,evacuation shelters could only
accomodate a quarter of their usual
capacity during the July 2020 flood
because of social distancing. This
reduced the number of evacuees but
did not necessarily make theresponsibility of management any
easier. This chapter examines various
aspects of evacuation shelter
management after this disaster andtries to understand the lessons thatwere learned.

20

FOOD DISTRIBUTION
The distribution of food wascontracted to one local company
since there was no other within thearea that could supply such a large
number of packed food each day
for an indefinite time. Unlike otherdisasters, restaurant owners fromwithin or outside the prefecture were
not allowed to open soup kitchens to
distribute warm food to prevent thevirus. For a short stay this may notseem like a big problem, but in aperspective of several months, thisaffects the nutrition level of theevacuees, making them vulnerable
to chronic diseases. There is also a
long-term psychological impact of nothaving any variation of food that isoften overlooked. The situation started
changing slowly towards the end of
September, when other companies
were included in the contract.

CLOTHES & EVERYDAY ITEMSThe designated shelters receive hugeamounts of relief goods from all overthe country, including clothes andeveryday items. Sometimes people
send used items, which may, in turn,pose a threat of infection for theevacuees. Used items, in general,
are usually separated anddisposed of by the managing body,and only fresh, necessary items areoffered to the evacuees. This has
been a widely talked about issueduring the 2018 Western Japan
flood17. This year the goods are being
checked with consideration about the
pandemic as well.

CLEANLINESS & HYGIENEIn terms of cleanliness and hygiene,
however, the evacuation shelters are
doing far better compared to otherdisasters—thanks both to the new
guidelines and increased awarenessand action on the evacuees’ parts.
After the Western Japan flood two
years ago, many evacuees andvolunteers reported of untidy
environment within the shelters, whereentrances were often filled with shoes
covered in mud and dirt, which could
easily be borne inside by anyone
coming in. This time only thedesignated people are allowed inside,
after a temperature check andsanitizing of hands. The separate
17

areas for people who need special
care are off limits for everyone except
the caregivers, and they follow a strictlevel of sanitizing process before
entering the area. As of mid-October,
there has been no report of an
outbreak—COVID-19 or otherwise—at
the evacuation shelters.

NHK online; July 11, 2018, “Hold on before you send that relief!” (in Japanese)

21

PHYSICAL & MENTAL CARE
The medical care for the first 48
hours is usually given by medical
associations such as Disaster Medical
Association Team. Kumamoto DMAT,
which is based at the Japanese Red
Cross Kumamoto Hospital, has nine
doctors, 10 nurses and sevencoordinators in its emergency team.
These specialized teams often haveto brave bad weather conditions toreach out to the people who needvarious types of emergency treatment.
Their duties do not end with the initial
phase, which may last from 48 to 96
hours. They visit the shelters from time
to time to provide medical support
after the initial phase as well. There
are several other medical associations
that provide healthcare at the shelters
by joining the Health Department.
The Association of Medical Doctorsof Asia, for example, was present with
its team of one doctor, two nurses andone coordinator at the Dai-ichi JuniorHigh School in Hitoyoshi city, where,
as of July 10, 116 people werestaying.
Because of the restriction on people
from outside the prefecture due tothe pandemic, many other medical
professionals, such as disaster
nurses, who could offer help invarious ways, were not able to visit
inside the shelters. The members ofthese additional teams reach out
to the evacuees and can detect acase of stress or fatigue related
illness simply by looking at a personor exchanging greetings. People
often evacuate without taking their
medicines and healthcare items,
and their condition often deteriorates
irreversibly at the shelters by thetime the necessary medicines arrive.
Left undetected and untreated,these cases may end up in
disaster-related deaths, which are
not small in number even if only thereported cases are considered18.
The shelter management does
provide health-related support,with instructions from the Health
Department, but without the presenceof a healthcare professional in theteam they do that only after aproblem is reported—by when it isusually quite late. The health-carevolunteers, on the other hand, reachout to people, talk to them or givethem a massage, for example, andcan detect a problem before aperson recognizes it himself or
herself. Their visit and services arealso important for the mental healthof the evacuees, as discussed in
CWS Japan’s report “Towards Mabi’s
Recovery: Lessons One Year On.”19

Disaster related deaths from typhoon Hagibis of 2019, for example, went up to as many as 21
a year after the disaster. Source: NHK World news, October 12, 2020, “One year since Typhoon
Hagibis struck Japan”.
19
See 3.1.2 Health (pg. 8) of CWS Japan report “Towards Mabi’s Recovery: Lessons One Year On”
18

22

INTERNET CONNECTIVITY
Evacuation shelters are required
to have telephones and internet
connectivity, because the shelter
management has to keep in constant
touch with various departments ofthe city office and other stakeholders.
There may also be situations where
the management may need to sendor receive urgent information using
the internet. The importance ofinternet connectivity is even more
for the evacuees, who depend on
online sources to receive thesupport to rebuild their lives. All theinformation and applications—starting from temporary shelters toreconstruction subsidies—areavailable online. Since the evacuation
shelters are usually multipurpose
halls of public schools, they are notsupposed to have internet
connectivity under normal conditions.
According to the guideline, theshelter management needs to ensurethat before it is opened, usually byborrowing the internet equipmentfrom the school office. Cell phone
providers often provide wirelessconnection and charging station at
the shelters, although only for theirrespective customers.

2020. Especially at gathering
places, where important information
is exchanged among the affected
people, an internet connection isalmost indispensable. It is usually
the local committee or disastersupport from large companies thatprovide internet in these places, but
unfortunately this time no one seems
to be ready to take the responsibility.
This will definitely affect the recovery
process at individual level, especiallyin case of older adults, who needsupport to even operate their devices.
When this report was written, somevolunteer organizations were bringing
in wireless routers to the gathering
places, but they were not sure whomthey could ask for the cost. It is worth
mentioning here that the government
In case of the July 2020 flood,
however, since people were dispersed App designed for COVID-19 contact
tracing will not function without goodover a large area in non-designatedinternet connection at all gathering
shelters, most places do not haveplaces.
internet equipment as of October23

CONSIDERATION FOR PEOPLE AT
OTHER EMERGENCY SHELTERS
It is essential to provide all kinds ofsupport to the evacuees including
the ones discussed above, but whatneeds to be kept in mind is that many
affected people are living in all kindsof difficult conditions, including cars
and partially damaged houses, since
July. The new government guideline
talks about considering ways to help
these people (for example, page 18
section 7(3) about food distribution),but there is no further guideline.
According to some volunteer
organizations, people who stayed in

non-designated emergency shelters
after the July 2020 flood, including
those who stayed at home and in thecars, were three or four times morethan those who stayed inside theevacuation shelters. Therefore,
focusing all the support within theevacuation shelters is not enough.
It is very difficult for many people togo there seeking food, clothes andhealthcare every day. Attention mustbe paid, and efforts must be made toreach out to these people before it is
too late.
24

FOCUS 3:
VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT
The restriction on people coming infrom outside the prefecture becauseof the pandemic caused a serious
shortage of volunteers during the firstsix weeks after the disaster. There
was a four-day long weekend about
three weeks after the flood, and it
was expected that a good numberof spontaneous volunteers would
register, but the actual number was
far less. The first responders weremainly organizations that were alreadyactive inside the prefecture, mostof whom formed after the 2016
Kumamoto earthquake. Organizations
like Kumamoto Young Women’s
Christian Association started theiractivities right after the disaster,and played the important role ofconnecting organizations from outside
the prefecture, including CWS Japan,
to the affected people. Largeorganizations that have thecapacity to handle volunteer
management joined much later,
towards the third week of August.
Volunteers willing to help needed toclear certain conditions that
confirmed that they neither carried thevirus nor came in close contact withit, and were asked to follow a series ofpreparatory health routine, suchas checking temperature at regularintervals. Moreover, they were
expected to follow the guidelines
published by JVOAD20 at all times,

and were given a simple orientation
after their registration was confirmed.
Each volunteer had to maintain arecord of their activities and locations
and share it every day via Google
Doc.

JVOAD guideline for volunteers available online.

25

20

SILVER LININGSSOME CASES OF INFECTION

Due to all these restrictions,
there has been a volunteer
shortage since the beginning.
This affected the initial cleaning
severely. Most of the damagedbuildings, roads and bridges
had to be kept as they were forweeks. Many residents still do
not know where to begin thecleaning and renovation of their
damaged homes. However, as
the days went by, it turned outthat this situation has somepositive sides, too:In spite of the strict precautions, there
were some cases where infected people
didn’t know about the disease until they
had worked in the area for several days.
A city employee from Kagawa
Prefecture in western Japan who wasdispatched to Kumamoto for disaster
relief efforts was found to be infected
on July 13, a week after the flood. The
same week, a Jiji Press photographer
sent to cover the disaster in Yatsushiroand Hitoyoshi was also found to have
Covid-19. According to a report fromthe Kumamoto government, both of theinfected persons had been following theguidelines, and no further cases werereported from people who had come incontact with them. Regardless, thesetwo cases made authorities rethinkallowing help and support from outside
the prefecture.

•

It was relatively easy to
manage the volunteers
because there were so few.

•

Because of the strict healthrules, there were noreported cases of sickness
or heat stroke among thevolunteers, which is often
common during summer
disasters. The volunteers
are taking good care of theirhealth. When they come tohelp, they come fed andrested.

•With so few volunteers,some needs were unmet.
As a result, evacuees
started doing many things
by themselves. This canlead to a paradigm shift in
how we perceive the needfor volunteers, and can also
result in better and stronger
community resilience.

SPECIAL SKILL VOLUNTEERS
Although there were restrictions about
non-skill volunteers (who usually are
the largest in number), special-skill
volunteers like masons, carpenters,
heavy equipment operators and lawyers
who specialize in house insurance
were allowed to come and start theiractivities from an early stage. As
mentioned above, organizations
specializing in shelter management
like Young Men’s Christian Association
and Peace Boat Disaster Relief, camein towards the third week of August.
Lawyers, in particular, were quite fast to
respond and become active this timecompared to most previous disasters.

THE IMPORTANCE OF COORDINATION
Kumamoto Voluntary Organizations
Active in Disaster has been playing aninvaluable role of coordinating the
response of all organizations bycreating a common platform where
each can share their own and canlearn about the others’ latest updates.
KVOAD has been holding regularmeetings, first every evening, theneventually each Tuesday and Thursday
at 6 p.m., where not only NGOs andNPOs, but also governmentorganizations, research bodies andthe mass media have been taking part.
They call these meetings “Hinokuni
Kaigi”, which literally means“meeting for the country of fire”(i.e., earthquakes and volcanos).
KVOAD was founded after the 2016
earthquake in Kumamoto, after its
Director Mr. Tsutomu Higuchi realized
the need for a form of intermediatory

support organization while working on
environmental improvements for 118
evacuation shelters around Japan.
The meetings are held at Kumamoto
Prefecture’s Social Welfare Association
office, but this year because of thepandemic the meetings have been
taking place online. The online
meetings, it turned out, had several
positive sides too, other thanprotection from the spreading of thevirus. The organizations can not only
meet needs with support more quickly,
they can also share information withmembers all over Japan in real timeand receive advice immediately.
People can even join while they areon the move in the disaster area
using their smartphones. Meeting
notes are kept in real time (inJapanese), date-stamped, and posted
to the organization’s website.

27

THE KUMA RECOVERY PROJECT
To solve the problem of severe
shortage of volunteers at least to
some extent, a group of localorganizations, including Hinokuni
Kaigi, have started a project called“The Kuma Recovery Project”21.
The model principally involves threeparties: (1) areas where volunteers
are needed (for cleaning work), (2)potential volunteers, who are mainly
people who lost their business or jobs
to the disaster, (3) contributors andfund-providers.
In this project the potential volunteers
who satisfy the criteria can apply
through the website for a particulardate and place. When their work isdone, they are given a small amountof daily allowance from the fundcreated by the contributors. Bus rides
are provided between major areas
for their transport. Updates of therecovery work done under this project
are posted regularly in the website.
This project is a very good example of
Adaptive Governance Mechanism22.
Experts suggest that time has come to
examine at each disaster-prone area
the minimum manpower required forthe cleaning and reconstruction work,
both from inside and outside theprefecture. Local businesses andprivate companies also need toactively contribute in the “manpowerbank”, the way they have done for the
Kuma Recovery Project.

Website of the Kuma recovery project (in Japanese).
“Adaptive governance is an emergent form of environmental governance that is increasingly called
upon by scholars and practitioners to coordinate resource management regimes in the face of thecomplexity and uncertainty associated with rapid environmental change” Chaffin B., Gosnell H.,
Cosens B., “A decade of adaptive governance scholarship: synthesis and future directions”;
Ecology and Society, Vol.19, no.3, article 56. Available online.

21
22

28

BEYOND CLEANING WORK
It is often thought that the work
volunteers help with after a disaster
only involves cleaning of buildings
and roads. While it is true that thelarge share of the work involves some
sort of cleaning, in reality volunteers
help in many other ways too— suchas shelter management, distribution offood, clothes and other items and soon. There is also paperwork that getsdone thanks to volunteers. Experiencehas shown that the victims of disasters
need more than just daily supplies.
Physical and mental health care isvital too. In fact, this care, which canbe provided directly or indirectly while
doing the cleaning or other types ofwork, often matters the most. The lives
that survived a catastrophe and thehurdle of living in very difficult
situation for days, even weeks, maylose to the harsh mental impact of thetrauma and the feeling of being left
behind. Volunteers like the owner ofthe restaurant “Himawari-Tei” in
Hitoyoshi city, or organizations like
“Minori”—who go from door to door
to distribute food, or just to talk to
people, ask if they need anything—areplaying an extremely important rolethat is often overlooked.
The July 2020 flood showed thatwhile much of the work inside theevacuation shelters could be doneby the evacuees themselves, morehands and eyes are needed to reachout to the people who are dispersed
over the entire affected area, who arestill finding it very difficult to go fromone day to another.

29

FOCUS 4: EARLY RECOVERYAs discussed in the previous
chapters, the travel restriction toprevent the spread of COVID-19
has resulted in serious shortage ofvolunteers, which has eventuallycaused delay in the recovery efforts.
The vast areas that wereinundated needed to be cleaned,
and the damaged buildings needed
to be washed and repaired.
Businesses had to be restored. It is
not possible to take on such a vastscale of work without help from allover the country. River rafting, forexample, around which a large partof the tourism industry is built along
the Kuma river, cannot run unlessthe river is fully cleaned and thedamaged facilities arereconstructed. Without adequate
volunteer help, the owners and thethe local government will have no
choice but to wait for support fromthe central government, which willtake time. The early phase of therecovery is largely focused on
relocating the displaced people fromthe emergency evacuation shelters
to temporary shelters, and since
Kumamoto has rebuilt from a massive
earthquake four years ago, this parthas progressed quite smoothly. The
first six months is also the period
during which the affected towns andvillages publish their recovery plan
based on opinions from the residents.
This chapter summarizes the recovery
plans published so far, and talks about
the temporary houses built for thefamilies that were displaced by thisdisaster.
30

RECOVERY PLAN OF HITOYOSHI CITY

The recovery plan of Hitoyoshi city23, which was published two months after
the disaster, was prepared based on cooperation between the city, theprefecture, reconstruction experts, and above all the residents. The plan gives
an overview of an expected schedule, and how activities will be coordinatedwith the overall planning of the city. It also outlines how the plan will betaken forward with interactions between the city and the residents.
The plan has three main components:
1. Rebuilding of community
2. Revival of the economy
3. Resilient town planning23

The recovery plan of Hitoyoshi city (in Japanese) can be downloaded from the city’s website.

31

RECOVERY PLAN OF KUMA VILLAGE
Kuma village had not yet publisheda recovery plan after the July 2020
flood when this report was written.
With a population of little over 3,800
people, most of whom are over 65
years of age, Kuma village has been
repeatedly affected by floods from theKuma river over the last few decades.
It became urgent to rethink the overall
village planning from the perspectiveof disaster resilience, and a committee
was established in December 2015
to work out a plan. The plan was
published in September 2017, where
the matter of absence of a fullfunctioning evacuation shelter wasaddressed with great importance. The
issue came to the forefront after the
July flood, when people had to move

miles away from the village in searchof a safe evacuation shelter. An open
structure called “Sakura Dome”
located at a sports facility, which had
neither finished floor, nor walls, nor
usable toilets, served as an
emergency evacuation center for the
first few days. Most villagers who losttheir homes had to stay far away fromthe village, and travel back and forthwith great difficulty to take care of
their damaged property. Many havealready given up hope of comingback to the village. It is expectedthat Kuma village will emphasize thismatter again when it publishes its
recovery plan, which will no doubt callfor adequate safe place for its aging
population within its boundaries.
32

VOICES FROM THE FIELD“The first floor of my house was completely damagedby the flood. There were about 20 families living in thearea, but I heard only three will rebuild their homes
here. Many have moved out of the village to live with
their families. I don’t think that many people went to
the evacuation shelters from this village.
I myself took shelter on the upper floor of my housein the beginning, but I decided to go to an evacuation
shelter because it was difficult for me to prepare meals
by myself. However, the road to the evacuation shelter
where I am staying was damaged, and I had to take a
two-hour detour just to reach my home every day toclean up. Now the road has been repaired, but it stilltakes an hour one-way. It is really difficult to make thisone-hour journey every day to clean up at this age.
I have started to give up hopes of rebuilding my homeat the same place… I can’t see any future for myself
here. Even if I get an allocation of a temporary house, itwill only be for up to two years. What will happen after
that? An old fellow like me sees no hope. I’m thinkingof talking to my family and moving to a town with ahospital nearby.”- A 70-year-old farmer from Kuma village

TEMPORARY HOUSING
Arranging temporary housing forthe displaced people where they
can live temporarily till their houses
are repaired and reconstructed, isan important part of the earlyrecovery. According to the websiteof Kumamoto prefecture24, 808 unitsof prefabricated temporary sheltersat 24 group housing in seven villages
and towns were constructed, starting
since after the disaster in July till early
December. The affected people
started moving into these temporary
shelters since as early as late-August.
Compared to the 2016 earthquake
in the same prefecture, when it took
about 6 months for the evacuees tostart moving into the temporary
shelters, the progress of theconstruction was quite fast.

pay any part of the rent during theirtemporary stay.

Since the prefabricated shelters arebuilt in groups, it is easier for thegovernment and non-governmentorganizations to keep track of the
updates and needs of the residents.
With the rental subsidy, they will bescattered over a large part of area,
often quite far from their original placeof residence, and it will be difficult toApart from the prefabricatedkeep track of each of their individual
temporary houses, the affected
needs periodically unless they reachfamilies will be given rental subsidy for out. This was a serious problem in
empty houses and apartments. The
Mabi town of Okayama prefecture
application process has started,
after the 2018 Western Japan flood,according to a circulation in thewhen almost 80% of the affected
prefecture’s website on October 14,
people moved into these empty
and the deadline for application ishouses and apartments with rental
December 15th. Any affected family
subsidy25. Separately, plans are
who satisfies the given criteria will be
under way for a new group housing
able to apply. Those who have already for people who need special care,rented a house or apartment andwhere trained caregivers who lost
moved in will also be able to apply, if
their jobs because of the disasterthey satisfy the same criteria. These
will look after the residents. The
families will only have to pay for theconstruction is expected to start aswater and energy supplies, and notsoon as a suitable land is found.

24
25

Source: Official website of Kumamoto prefecture’s emergency response.
See Issue 8: Temporary Shelter of CWS Japan’s report “Lessons from Mabi”.

34

MINNA NO IE: A HOME FOR ALL“Minna no Ie”26 or “A Home for All”
is a project initiated by a team ofarchitects and designers, who callthemselves the “Art-Police”27. The
team is led by Pritzker prize winnerarchitect Toyo Ito. This project designs
and builds wooden structures to be
used as community spaces for theaffected people within the temporarygroup housing areas. The project
started in 2011 after the Great East
Japan Earthquake by building thesecommunity spaces at the temporary
housing sites of Sendai city in Miyagi
prefecture. When Kumamoto wasaffected by a flood the following year,
the team built 2 similar structures

26
27

See the website of Kumamoto Prefecture for details.
See the website of Kumamoto Prefecture for details.

for people to gather together andshare ideas for the recovery process.
After the 2016 Kumamoto earthquake
they built 95 of these structures at 73
temporary housing sites. This year
the Art-Police team has built 20“Minna no Ie” at various temporary
housing sites in Kumamoto, and allof them were complete by the
beginning of December. The Minnano Ie structures are always built by
local masons and carpenters withthe best local materials. As has been
seen after all recent disasters, thesecommunity spaces play a very
important role in the recovery of theaffected communities.

35

WAY FORWARD
As highlighted in the World Economic
Forum’s 2020 Global Risk Report28,
the world has been undergoingincreasingly complex risk landscapesover the recent years. Cascading
disasters are becoming common,and it is no more enough to havepolicies that only address one typeof disaster at a time. Moreover, thegrowing climate change haspresented new problems andaggravated the existing ones inall parts of the world. Living anddecision making amid the new
uncertainties of climate change havealmost become the “new normal.”Cascading disasters like the SouthJapan flood of July 2020 during
the COVID-19 pandemic,
unfortunately, are no longer an event
one may only see once in a lifetime.
As such, the government guideline

28that was published in June, justbefore the flood, and then revised in
September, will remain as a valuablereference document for future complex
disasters. Much of the management,
including protecting the affected
people from the virus—both before
and after the flood—could be done
largely because of the guideline.
However, because of the added rules
and restrictions, new issues andchallenges, as cited throughout thisreport, have arisen. The lessons fromthe South Japan flood of 2020 showthat the challenges of these complex
risks can only be addressed througha multi-hazard approach. Therefore,
time has come to build up international
cooperation to enhance capabilities
against multi-hazards across different
sectors.

See Figure 1: The Evolving Risks Landscape, 2007-2020

36

PEOPLE CONSULTED
The authors would like to express their sincerest thanks to thefollowing people for their time and assistance:
Dr. Mikio Ishiwatari
Japan International Cooperation Agency,
				The University of Tokyo
Mr. Tsutomu Higuchi
Kumamoto Voluntary Organizations
				Active in Disaster
Mr. Katsumi Jimbo		
Young Men’s Christian Association,
				Kumamoto
Mr. Makoto Kakiki		Disaster volunteer

Mr. Kosuke Sasaki		Intern, Peace Winds Japan

Ms. Yukiko Maki		CWS Japan

37

DOCUMENTS CONSULTED
1. Fire and Disaster Management Agency data.
2. The Japan Times online edition, March 23, 2019, “‘Indirect’ deaths fromdisasters”; available online.
3. Tashiro A., Shaw R., “COVID-19 Pandemic Response in Japan: What is
Behind the Initial Flattening of the Curve”; Sustainability, June 2020.
4. Mikio Ishiwatari, “Multi-hazard Approach to Compound/Cascading
Disasters: Putting Experience in Developing Disaster Risk Reduction to
Use in Pandemics”; JIIA, December 2020. Available online.
5. Wikipedia: “Class A River”; available online.
6. Website of MLIT’s Yatsushiro River and National Highway Office.
Available online.
7. Kyodo news via The Japan Times, November 19, 2020, “Kumamoto
approves controversial dam after deadly July flooding”. Available
online.
8. Das S. (2019): “Six Months Since Western Japan Flood: Lessons From
Mabi”, 28 pages, CWS Japan, Tokyo. Available online.
9. NHK online special page on COVID-19, available online.
10. Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare’s online poster about the Three C’s;
available online.
11. The Asahi Shinbun online edition, July 6, 2020, “Male nurse racked
by guilt at failure to save elderly residents”; available online.
12. The Jiji Press via The Japan Times, July 13, 2020; “14 evacuation
shelters become unusable amid Japan rain disaster”; available online.
13. Koyama M., Kanbara S., Minamisawa K., “A guideline for creation ofcountermeasures against flood disaster during a pandemic situation(COVID-19)”, 2nd Edition, March 27, 2020. Available online.

38

DOCUMENTS CONSULTED
14. “Water up to the neck, 191 SOS calls, Fire Department under water,
phones constantly ringing: The case of Hitoyoshi Shimokuma” Available
online (in Japanese).
15. The Japan Times online, July 24, 2020, “Japan’s nursing care facilities
face challenge of safely evacuating during disasters”. Available online.
16. NHK News Web, September 28, 2020, “What we saw from the death of
83 persons”. Available online.
17. The Japan Times online; November 22, 2019; “Less than a quarter ofKyushu Municipalities have up-to-date flood risk maps”. Available
online.
18. Report on shelter management drill of Mashiki town; PDF available
online (in Japanese).
19. NHK online; July 11, 2018, “Hold on before you send that relief!”
Available online.
20. NHK World news, October 12, 2020, “One year since Typhoon Hagibis
struck Japan”. Available online.
21. Alexander J., Das S., Ishiwatari M., Kanbara S., Izumi T., Komino T.,
Sakurai A., Shaw R. (2019): “Towards Mabi’s Recovery—Lessons One
Year On”, CWS Japan, 25 pages, Tokyo, Japan. Available online.
22. JVOAD, “Disaster Response Guidelines for volunteers and non-profit
organizations during the COVID-19 pandemic”, June 1, 2020.
Available online.
23. Website of the Kuma recovery project, available online (in Japanese).
24. Chaffin B., Gosnell H., Cosens B., “A decade of adaptive governancescholarship: synthesis and future directions”; Ecology and Society,Vol.19, no.3, article 56. Available online.
25. The recovery plan of Hitoyoshi city (in Japanese); can be downloaded
from the city’s website.
26. Kumamoto prefecture’s website on July 2020 flood.

39

CWS Japan
Room 25, 2-3-18 Nishiwaseda,
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0051 Japan