12 DECEMBER 2023

BELARUS’ COLLABORATION WITH
RUSSIA IN THE SYSTEMATIC
DEPORTATION OF UKRAINE’S CHILDREN
A CONFLICT OBSERVATORY REPORT© 2023 Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health, New Haven

This report was produced as part of the Conflict Observatory with the support of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations, United States Department of State. This report does not necessarily represent the views of the United States
Government. Learn more at https://conflictobservatory.org.

The Faculty Director of the Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) at Yale School of Public Health is Dr. Kaveh Khoshnood.
Report production was overseen by Nathaniel Raymond, Executive Director of the HRL, and produced by the Lab’s
research team led by Caitlin Howarth. All analysis was conducted by the Humanitarian Research Lab.

Citation | Khoshnood, Kaveh, Nathaniel A. Raymond and Caitlin N. Howarth et al., “Belarus› Collaboration with Russia
in the Systematic Deportation of Ukraine’s Children” 16 November 2023. Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of
Public Health: New Haven.

CONTENTS
I. Executive Summary...........................................................................................................................................1
Key Findings..............................................................................................................................................................2
Methodology............................................................................................................................................................4
II. Background and Timeline of Key Events...........................................................................................5
III. Detailed Findings............................................................................................................................................8
IV. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 25
V. Corrections ...................................................................................................................................................... 26
VI. Endnotes .......................................................................................................................................................... 27

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian
Research Lab (Yale HRL) has found that at least 2,442
children from Ukraine between the ages of six and 17
have been taken to Belarus between the start of Russia’s
full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 and 30
October 2023.1 Russia and Belarus are jointly targetingchildren for removal from Ukraine, coordinating theirtransport from occupied Ukraine to Russia and onward
to Belarus, and subjecting children to re-education,
including military training. Belarus’ direct involvementin Russia’s forced deportation of children represents acollaboration between the two regimes on deportation
activities conducted by Russia. Russia’s campaign ofchild deportation and transfer has been previously
reported by Yale HRL.2 These activities are a joint effort
between Belarus and Russia through the Union State.
This research demonstrates Belarus’ complicity inand support for Russia’s systematic campaign of childdeportation, which was the subject of arrest warrants
issued by the International Criminal Court for alleged
war crimes in March 2023.3 While this report is not alegal analysis of Belarus and Russia’s activities, Yale HRL
does conclude that these activities by Belarus and Russia
contravene accepted protections for children during
armed conflict enshrined in instruments of international
humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights
law (IHRL) to which both nations are parties. The statedreasons for the deportation of these children does notcomply with Article 49 of Geneva Convention IV, whichstates: “Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well
as deportations of protected persons from occupied
territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or tothat of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited,regardless of their motive.”4
While a component of Russia’s larger campaign offorced deportation, Belarus’ role as documented inthis report is unique for two reasons. First, according
to Belarus, the children’s time in Belarus is temporary.
Yale HRL has not discovered evidence of permanenttransfer (including adoption or fostering) for children
transported from Ukraine to Belarus following Russia’s
full-scale invasion in early 2022. Second, Belarus’ current
involvement appears to rely on multiple non-state actors
for execution in addition to both states.
It is unclear if the parents and legal guardians of thechildren transported from Ukraine to Belarus provided
consent that could be considered free and meaningful.
Evidence reviewed by Yale HRL clearly indicates that free
and meaningful consent was not provided in all cases.

The targeting and movement of vulnerable children
from Ukraine under similar conditions and by the sameand related actors has been alleged to be deportation.5
In addition to the well-documented recent trend ofdeportations of children from Ukraine, this reportdemonstrates additional reasons why consent cannot
be considered to have been freely and meaningfully
given.

This research demonstrates
Belarus’ complicity in andsupport for Russia’s systemic
campaign of child deportation.
Many of the children targeted for deportation to
Belarus are members of highly vulnerable populations
for which achieving full, free, and meaningful consent
is more difficult, including children who are orphans,children with disabilities, children from low-income
families, children with military parents, and “adopted
children.” This is most clearly demonstrated by Russia’s
occupation officials preparing powers of attorney for atleast 30 purported orphans to be deported to Belarus.
Russia’s officials have also waived requirements for
documentation needed for children to cross from
Russia-occupied Ukraine into parts of Russia. Finally,
the context of occupation in which the identificationof children takes place is highly coercive, with frequent
incidents of extrajudicial detention and disappearance.6
Some of the children documented in this report wereidentified and recruited for deportation to Belarusby the Investigative Committee, a domestic criminal
investigative agency of Russia’s federal government,
which may make any consent subject to coercion
and therefore unfree. These actions, along with the
documented trend of deportation of children from
Ukraine to Russia, indicates that the activities captured inthis report require urgent review to ensure that consent
was properly obtained. International investigations into
the terms of consent, including any medical proceduresor treatments conducted after deportation, are required
to determine whether consent was both meaningfully
given and consistent with any treatment and activities
that occurred.

1Key Findings
1) At least 2,442 children from Ukraine have beentransported to 13 facilities in Belarus:
Yale HRL has found that at least 2,442 children from
Ukraine between the ages of six and 17 have beentransported to 13 facilities in Belarus following Russia’s
full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.
Children were transported from at least 17 cities
across Ukraine in waves that continue through thedate of publication. Over 2,050 children from Ukraine
were transported to the Dubrava facility in Belarus
between September 2022 and May 2023.7 The otherapproximately 392 children have been accommodated
across the remaining 12 facilities. Children have been
moved from Ukrainian cities and towns across Donetsk,
Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, including:
Khartsyzsk, Makiivka, Yenakiieve, Chystiakove, Horlivka,
Shakhtarske, Donetsk, Mariupol, Volnovakha, Ilovaisk,
Berdianske, Yasinovataya, Snizhne, Kirovsk, Debaltseve,
Lysychansk, and Vasilevsky.8

2) Russia’s systematic effort to identify, collect,transport, and re-educate Ukraine’s children has
been facilitated by Belarus:
Russia’s federal government and Belarus’ regime havebeen working together to coordinate and fund the
movement of children from Russia-occupied Ukraine
through Russia to Belarus. The movement of children
from Russia-occupied Ukraine to Belarus is ultimately
coordinated between Russia’s President Vladimir
Putin and Belarus’ authoritarian leader Alyaksandr
Lukashenka through the Union State, a supranational
entity constituted of Russia and Belarus.9 This program
has been facilitated by both Russia’s and Belarus’
security services: Russia’s Investigative Committee—afederal state agency reporting to President Vladimir
Putin and responsible for criminal investigations—has
played a significant role in identifying children in Ukraine
for movement to Belarus, while Belarus’ “Internal Troopsof Belarus” have subjected children from Ukraine tomilitary training.10

3) Lukashenka has directly overseen Belarus’
efforts in coordination with Russia:
The movement of children from Ukraine to Belarus, aswell as their re-education and military training, has been
jointly directed and co-funded by Belarus’ authoritarianleader Alyaksandr Lukashenka in direct coordination
with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin [Figure 3].11
Lukashenka approved the use of both state and non-stateorganizations based in Belarus to help transport children
from Ukraine to Belarus, financed their transportation

through the joint Russia-Belarus Union State budget,and worked with various pro-regime actors to facilitate
the transportation of children from Ukraine to Belarus.12
In 2022, the Lukashenka regime also passed legislation
mandating pro-regime education, to which children
from Ukraine were subjected.13 Lukashenka, as well as
members of the Union State and pro-regime actors,
have also visited the children transported from Ukraine
to Belarus on various occasions.14

4) Russia’s Investigative Committee, Russia’s
Ministries of Education of the former socalled Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) andDonetsk People’s Republic (DPR), and regimealigned organizations from both countries,
have facilitated the movement of children fromoccupied Ukraine to Belarus:
Russia’s Investigative Committee and the Ministry of
Education of the former so-called LPR and DPR haveidentified and targeted children from Russia-occupied
Ukraine to be sent to various facilities in Belarus, at least
one of which subjected children from Ukraine to militarytraining.15 The Ministry of Education of the former
so-called LPR also prepared power of attorney for 30
purported orphans to be transported from Ukraine to
Belarus.*16 Additionally, Yale HRL has identified various
pro-Russia and pro-Belarus regime organizations
facilitating the movement of children from Ukraine to
Belarus and exposing them to re-education. Yale HRL
has identified that Belarusian public figure Alyaksei
Talai (and his eponymous foundation); Belarus’ stateowned potash producer OJSC Belaruskali; and Olga
Volkova, the purported director of the Donetsk-based
non-governmental organization named “Dolphins,” haveplayed key roles in transporting children from Ukraine
to Belarus.17 Additionally, Yale HRL has established thatthe Belarusian Republican Youth Union and the Belarus
branches of the pro-Russia regime ultranationalist
militant motorcycle clubs Night Wolves and Night
Valkyries have been involved in the re-education ofchildren from Ukraine.18* * N.B. The use of “so-called”, generally used in this report inreference to “patriotic education” “humanitarian” “rehabilitation”
programs, is to denote that this is the way these programs
and activities are described by Russia, Belarus, and related
actors and are not descriptions used by Yale HRL. “Purported”
is primarily used in reference to language from actors in thissystem about the status of individuals, often related to children
designated as orphans but for whom other data to assess thisstatus may not be available. These terms are used to denotethat Yale HRL may not accept the claims that are made.

25) Children from occupied Ukraine have beentransported to Belarus through Russia:

7) The number of children remaining in Belarus is
unknown:

Yale HRL concludes that children have been transported
from Russia-occupied Ukraine to Rostov-on-Don in
Russia, and then taken by train from Rostov-on-Don to
Belarus.19 The Rostov-to-Minsk rail route matches theroute described in a 21 March 2023 letter from Dmitry
Mezentsev, Secretary of State of the Union State—
to Oleg Valentinovich Belozerov, General Director of
Russian Railways OJSC—which details plans to move
2,000 children from Ukraine to Belarus in 2023.20 Basedon available information to date, including alternate
analysis of available transportation routes fromthe children’s origin points, Yale HRL has found noinformation indicating that children from Ukraine havebeen transported from Russia-occupied territory of
Ukraine to Belarus without first passing through Russia
itself.

Key figures involved in the transportation of children
from occupied Ukraine to Belarus claim without evidence
that all children have been returned to Ukraine.26
However, the transport of Ukraine’s children to Belarus
for “rehabilitation” has been ongoing since 2016 withsignificant increase since the 2022 full-scale invasion.27
For each group of children identified in this report,
Yale HRL was unable to identify clear, consistent, andcorroborative data that confirm 1) that specific groupsof children had remained in the identified facilities inBelarus, or 2) that the identified children had returned to
Russia-occupied Ukraine from Belarus.

6) More than half of the facilities housing children
from Ukraine have been involved in re-education,
military training, or unknown medical activities:
Yale HRL has identified that at least nine groups ofchildren from Ukraine have been subjected to pro-regime
re-education in at least eight of the 13 locations identified
in this report.21 Yale HRL defines re-education as thepromotion of cultural, historical, societal, and patriotic
messages or ideas that serve the political interests of
the regimes of Belarus and Russia.22 Additionally, at least
six groups of children from Ukraine were subjected tomilitary training in Belarus, including by Belarus’ internal
security services the “Internal Troops of Belarus.”23 Reeducation efforts have been orchestrated by a networkof Russia’s and Belarus’ officials and organizations,
including pro-regime civil society organizations,ultranationalist militant extremist groups, state-owned
industrial companies, local organizations in Belarus, andregime-aligned politicians.24 Multiple groups of children
from Ukraine, totaling more than 67 children, have beentransported to hospitals in Belarus between March2022 and April 2023 for alleged medical treatment andwhat is referred to as “rehabilitation” by officials in the
Lukashenka regime.25

3

Methodology
The investigative methodology for this report relies
primarily on open source research. This process includes
aggregating and cross-verifying multiple sources
to identify and validate estimates of the number ofchildren that have been deported to Belarus, geolocate
the facilities to which children from Ukraine weredeported, and identify both the activities that occurredat these facilities and the chain of command involved.
Analysis of commercially available very high resolution(VHR) satellite imagery was performed in limited cases
to verify information established through open source
research.
The claims in this report were verified according tostandards established by the Berkeley Protocol on Digital
Open Source Investigations.28 Sources were assessed forexpertise, clear proximity to events, political, economic,
or other ulterior motivations, and history of postingauthentic content. An assessment of bias did not meanthat the information provided was not valid, but it did
require additional analysis and scrutiny. The presenceof multiple types of sources attesting to the same fact
or image lent credibility to assertions made. All open
source materials in Ukrainian, Russian, or Belarusianwere translated and verified by language experts.

Facility Identification and Geolocation
Facilities were geolocated based on the names,
addresses, and photographs identified in open source
material, often published by individuals facilitatingtransportation. VHR satellite imagery was used to verify
and corroborate details about facilities with relevant
visible components. At least two analysts were required
to concur on a facility’s location to consider it to begeolocated. Once a facility’s location was geolocated,
information about the activities that occurred at thesesites and the experiences of children was also collected,
analyzed, and verified.

Network of Entities Involved
Many of the individuals and organizations involvedin the movement of children from Ukraine to Belarus
publicly acknowledged and even advertised theirinvolvement through official channels.29 Theseassertions, when they occur, were treated as prima facie
evidence of the involvement of these individuals andorganizations. Where such information was unavailable,
multiple independent sources were utilized to verify the
involvement of an individual or organization named inthis report. Individuals and entities who appeared to becoerced into participation were not identified.
The network of entities involved in this systematic
program includes regime officials of Belarus and Russia,
as well as ministries and official agencies of Belarus andRussia. What is unique about the particular activities
described in this report is the integral involvement of acomplex network of regime-aligned private individuals,
state-run enterprises, civil society groups, and nationalist
extremist groups from both countries, including a
motorcycle club and a swimming organization.

Limitations
This report’s sources are limited to remote sensing
and open source data. As a result, some data are notincorporated because it was not public or not yet
known to the researchers at the time of writing. The
activities described in this report were often framed
and presented in open source data that contained
significant misinformation and disinformation that itself
had to be analyzed. Yale HRL relied on well-establishedprocedures for identifying mis- and disinformation andmitigating its impact on research. These procedures
require linguistic and area experts to interpret
misleading information, conduct forensic analysis ofany visual material suspected to be manipulated, andevaluate multiple independent sources to verify claims.
Processes for identifying and mitigating these typesof content—regardless of whether it was intentionallyor unintentionally generated—have been standardized
within Yale HRL’s investigative workflow.

4II. BACKGROUND AND TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS
Belarus is a Russia-aligned authoritarian client statethat severely restricts civil liberties and has criminalized
opposition groups and independent civil society,according to human rights monitors.30 The activities
that this report documents occur in an environment inwhich the actions of state and non-state organizations
could not reasonably be expected to take place without
either the direct or implicit approval of the Lukashenka
regime.
Russia and Belarus are co-members of what is known
as the “Union State,” a supranational entity createdin the immediate post-Soviet period through a seriesof formal bilateral agreements.31 The Union State isheaded by Lukashenka and Putin and executes decisions
on common defense, economic, and social policies.32
Russia’s forces used Belarus as a staging ground tolaunch its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, including but
not limited to: hosting thousands of Russia’s troops;
providing fuel, air defense, and air traffic control; andsupporting the flow of Russia’s ground forces across its
borders into Ukraine.33 High-level officials in Russia’s
federal government and Belarus’ regime passed
decrees facilitating the movement of children from
Ukraine to Russia and mandating pro-regime education

throughout Belarus both before and after Russia’s fullscale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.34 Theselegislative changes allowed children to be transported
from Ukraine to Russia without parental consent andsupported the re-education of children from Ukraine.
Officials from Russia and Belarus also coordinated with
relevant transportation authorities to deport thousandsof children from Ukraine to Belarus.35
The campaign of transporting children from Ukraine
to Belarus between 2022 and 2023 described in thisreport is not the first time that Lukashenka and Putin
have worked together to take children from Ukraine to
Belarus. Belarus and Russia have an established priorhistory of systematic, coordinated removal of children
from Ukraine to facilities in Belarus that pre-dates
Russia’s most recent invasion of Ukraine, with reports ofsimilar activities dating back to at least 2016.36 Children
at those facilities were placed in a program of what Yale
HRL defines as “re-education”—activities that promote
specific military, cultural, and historical education
narratives determined by the regime.37 “Pro-regime” inthis report refers to individuals, activities, directions, andpolicies aligned with or subordinate to the Lukashenka
and Putin regimes.

TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS
August 2014

Belarus’ authoritarian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka passes legislation
explicitly authorizing Belarus’ border service officials to waive therequirement for Ukrainian citizens to produce valid identification
documentation upon entry and/or exit from Belarus.38

May 2021

Alyaksei Talai, a Belarusian public figure, meets with Lukashenka to proposea “humanitarian mission” to build “connections” with children in Ukraine.39

2022

Russian and Belarusian railways reportedly facilitate the transportation ofchildren between occupied Ukraine and Belarus via Russia, with funding
from the Union State.40

March 2022

The first group of children identified in this report are transported from
Ukraine to Belarus at the behest of Talai; Lukashenka meets with children
from Ukraine who had been transferred to one of the 12 facilities identified
in this report.41

June 2022

A group of children from Ukraine staying at the Volma Sanatorium aretaken to a military unit of the Internal Troops of Belarus, where they are
subjected to firearms demonstrations, a military parade, and shown handto-hand combat.42(months unknown)

5September 2022

The Union State declares its intention to support the so-called“rehabilitation” of children from Donetsk and Luhansk; the Union State’s
Council of Ministers adopt a resolution to send 1,050 children from Ukraine
to Belarus.43

14 Sept. 2022

The Ministry of Education and Science of the former so-called Donetsk
People’s Republic (DPR) identifies and targets children from Republican
Budgetary General Education Institution (RBOU) “School 4 – Cadet Corps”
in Donetsk to be moved to the Dubrava facility in Belarus.44

Sept. to Oct. 2022

1,050 children from Ukraine are transported to the Dubrava facility in
Minsk.45

October 2022

Putin signs a decree granting regional government officials the authority tomake amendments to their border policies for people arriving from Russiaoccupied areas of Ukraine.46

25 Oct. 2022

Dmitry Mezentsev, the Secretary of State of the Union State, and Talai meetchildren from Ukraine at the Dubrava facility.47

December 2022

Russia’s Investigative Committee creates a cadet class entirely of children
from Ukraine at a Luhansk educational complex named after Russian pilotcosmonaut Georgy Beregovoy, representing Russia’s concerted effort tomilitarize Ukraine’s children. Children from this school were subsequently
taken to Belarus, where they were subjected to re-education in August2023.48
A group of children from Russia-occupied Horlivka are taken to see theInternal Troops of Belarus by Talai. Social media images show children
wearing tactical gear and handling firearms.49

March 2023

The Education Department of the Russia-occupied Horlivka cityadministration establishes a “quota” for four children aged between nineand 15 years old to be sent to the Dubrava facility in Belarus.50

9 March 2023

The Governor of Rostov waives documentation requirements—including
valid passports and powers of attorney—for children from Ukraine entering
the Rostov region of Russia, in explicit reference to Putin’s decree issued in
October 2022.51

10 March 2023

Talai “requests assistance” from the Union State to organize thetransportation of 2,000 children from Ukraine to Belarus, including
specifically “children from low-income families and orphans”.52

21 March 2023

Mezentsev writes a letter to the CEO of Russian Railways OJSC stating theintent to transport more than 2,000 children from Ukraine to Belarus in
2023 in coordination with Talai, 1,050 of whom will be transported tofacilities in Belarus via Rostov in the first half of the year and 950 in thesecond half of 2023.53

28 April 2023

Talai meets with Russia’s ambassador to Belarus, Boris Gryzlov, to discuss
the “rehabilitation of schoolchildren from new Russian regions” andinitiatives aimed at “preserving the historical history and truth about theGreat Patriotic War”.54

April - May 2023

More than 1,000 children are transported from Ukraine to the Dubravafacility in Minsk.55

Reported in

The Ministry of Education of the former so-called LPR reportedly prepares
powers of attorney for 30 purported orphans in Ukraine to be transported
to Belarus.56

June 2023

6

3 June 2023

Mezentsev claims that more than 2,000 children from the former so-called
LPR and DPR had been transported to Minsk at the behest of the Union
State.57

June 2023

Russia’s Investigative Committee identifies children in a school in Russiaoccupied Ukraine to be transported to Belarus.58

20 June 2023

An OSCE report finds that at least one child evacuated to Belarus for
medical reasons had their stay extended for non-medical reasons, which
the report’s authors determine to be a violation of Article 78 of Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.59

July 2023

Alyaksei Talai, Dmitry Shevtsov, and pro-Russia regime bloggers visit
children at a school in Russia-occupied Luhansk.60

August 2023

Lukashenka states that he and Putin have been coordinating thetransportation of children from Ukraine using Union State funds. He
specifically states that he and Putin coordinate to finance the removal ofchildren from Russia-occupied territory in Ukraine to Belarus.61
A group of five children from the school in Russia-occupied Luhansk visited
by Russia’s Investigative Committee in December 2022 are transported
to the Zubrenok facility in Belarus for “patriotic education” and are seenwearing military-style uniforms with the “Z” insignia.62

18 Sept. 2023

A group of 48 children from Ukraine arrives in Novopolotsk, Belarus.
Travel was organized by the Alyaksei Talai Foundation and demonstrates
continuous removal of children from Ukraine to Belarus by the foundation.63

30 Oct. 2023

A group of 37 children from Ukraine arrive in Belarus on a trip facilitatedby Talai to reportedly undergo unspecified “medical evaluations” in Brest,
Belarus where they are subjected to re-education.64

7

III. DETAILED FINDINGS
1. At least 2,442 children from Ukraine between
the ages of six and 17, including children fromvulnerable groups, have been transported to 13
facilities in Belarus.
Yale HRL has found that at least 2,442 children from
Ukraine between the ages of six and 17 have beentransported to 13 facilities in Belarus following Russia’s
full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022.65
Children were transported from at least 17 cities across
Ukraine as of October 2023.66 Over 2,050 children
from Ukraine were transported to the Dubrava facility
in Belarus between September 2022 and May 2023.67
The other approximately 392 children have beenaccommodated across the remaining 12 facilities.
Children among especially vulnerable populations havebeen identified for movement to Belarus. Individuals
coordinating the movement of children from occupied
Ukraine to Belarus, as well as various Belarusian media
sources, have stated that children taken from Ukraine
include orphans, children from institutional homes,
children with disabilities, children of military personnel,
children from low-income families,
and “adopted children.”68
The total number of children
transported is likely higher, as Yale HRL
only counted those whose removalfrom Ukraine could be confirmedwith high confidence. The National
Anti-Crisis Management (NAM)
organization, known as a prominent
Belarusian opposition group to
Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime andself-described analytics center that
submitted data to the International
Criminal Court on children’s removalfrom Ukraine to Belarus, states that
2,150 children have been taken to
Belarus as of May 2023.69 Western
media and civil society groups havelargely relied on this number as themost credible estimate to date of
the number of children deported
to Belarus.70 However, this reportdemonstrates Yale HRL’s high-confidence assessmentthat the total number of children from Ukrainetransported to Belarus is likely higher than 2,442.
Children from Ukraine were taken to at least 13 facilities
in six regions in Belarus. Yale HRL was unable togeolocate where three groups of children from Ukraine
had been taken in Belarus but have confirmed they weretransported to facilities located somewhere within the
Minsk, Gomel, and Brest regions of Belarus.71 Because
analysts were not able to establish with high confidence

the exact locations to which they were transported in
the Brest, Gomel, and Minsk regions, respectively, thesethree facilities were not included in the 13 total facilities
identified in this report.

Locations where children have been taken
Yale HRL has identified at least 13 locations in Belarus—
three sanatoriums, five “health camps,” three hospitals,
one hotel, and one dormitory—to which children from
Ukraine have been transported since Russia’s full-scaleinvasion in February 2022.72 The 13 facilities identified
by Yale HRL are listed in the figure below, and illustrate
which facilities have subjected children from Ukraine
to re-education and military training (See Section 6,
Military Training).
These 13 facilities are located throughout the Minsk,
Brest, Vitebsk, Mogilev, Grodno, and Gomel regions ofBelarus. The figure below shows the locations of these
13 facilities as well as the approximate locations of thethree groups of children transported to unconfirmed
locations in Belarus.

Figure 1: Thirteen facilities in Belarus to whichchildren from Ukraine were transported following
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine
Approximately 85% of the children identified inthis report were taken to the DOL Dubrava facility(commonly referred to as “Dubrava”) located in the
Soligorsk district of Minsk Oblast. More than 2,050
children were transported from Ukraine through Russia
to this facility between September 2022 and May 2023.73
This facility is owned by OSJC Belaruskali, a state-owned
8Facility Name (Russian)Гостиница “Беларусь”

Facility Name (English)
Hotel Belarus

Re-education

DOL DubravaДОЛ Дубрава

Documented Activities(often referred to as “Dubrava” inmedia and this report)

Re-education and militarytrainingСанаторий Волма

Volma sanatorium

Re-education and militarytrainingСанаторий Зеленый бор

Green Forest/Zelenyĭ Bor sanatorium

Re-educationСанаторий Золотые пески

Golden Sands sanatorium

Activities unknownСолигорской ЦРБ

Soligorsk Central District Hospital

Activities unknownСтаробинская городская больница

Starobinsk Hospital

Activities unknownЛагерь Березка

Berëzka / Birch camp

Re-education and militarytrainingЛагерь ЗаряZarya camp

Re-education and militarytrainingОбщежитие Завода Полимир

Polymir Factory Dormitory

Activities unknownОздоровительного центра Зубренок

Zubrenok Health Center

Re-education and militarytrainingPеабилитационно-оздоровительный
центр «Колос»Kolos Children’s Rehabilitation and
Health Center

Activities unknownРеспубликанская детская больница
медицинской реабилитации

Republican Children’s Hospital of
Medical Rehabilitation

Activities unknown

Table 1. Facilities where Ukraine’s children have been housed in Belarus after 24 February 2022

potash company (see Section 4, OJSC Belaruskali).74
Children from Ukraine were transported to a variety ofother locations in Belarus, including the “Golden Sands
sanatorium,” “Green Forest/Zelenyĭ Bor sanatorium,”“Volma sanatorium,” “Zarya camp,” “Republican Children’s
Hospital of Medical Rehabilitation, Ostroshitsky Town,”“Soligorsk Central District Hospital,” “Berëzka/Birch
camp,” “Hotel Belarus,” “Starobinsk Hospital,” “Zubrenok
Health Center,” “Kolos Children’s Rehabilitation and
Health Center,” and the “Polymir Factory Dormitory.”75(See Section 6, Medical Activities subsection for more
information on medical treatment and rehabilitation
activities that allegedly occurred at these locations.)
Belarusian media claimed that diplomats from Mongolia,
Palestine, Qatar, and Russia showed support for Belarus’
hosting of children from Ukraine and gave positive
reviews of the conditions in which the children were
held.76 On 4 October 2023, foreign diplomats visited thechildren from Ukraine staying at the Polymir Factory
Dormitory in Novopolotsk to reportedly “assess theconditions for recreation” for the children during theirstay in Belarus.77 Photographs and videos show diplomats
surrounding children from Ukraine in what appears to bea school room and gym.78 Belarusian media stated thatno Western countries who have previously accused
Belarus of “abducting” children were in attendance.79

2. Russia’s systematic effort to identify,transport, and re-educate Ukraine’s children has
been facilitated by Belarus.
Belarus’ regime and Russia’s federal government havebeen working together to coordinate and co-fund the
movement of children from Russia-occupied Ukraine
through Russia to Belarus. The movement of children
from Russia-occupied Ukraine to Belarus is ultimately
coordinated by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin andBelarus’ authoritarian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka
through the Union State.80
Formal and informal policy coordination and logisticalcollaboration with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin andhis government makes Belarus’ campaign of targeting,transport, and re-education effectively a joint endeavor
between Belarus and Russia. Russia and Belarus are comembers of the Union State, a supranational entity
created in the immediate post-Soviet period through aseries of formal agreements. The Union State is jointly
headed by Lukashenka and Putin and executes decisions
on common defense, economic, and social policies.81
Various agencies in Russia’s federal government—
including Russia’s Investigative Committee and theRostov Border Service of the Federal Security Bureau(FSB)—have played key roles in identifying and targeting9marginalized groups of children in Ukraine andfacilitating their movement to Belarus.82

The Role of the Russian Federation
The removal of children from Ukraine to Belarus wasorchestrated at the highest levels of Russia’s federal
government and Belarus’ regime at the behest of
Lukashenka and Putin. The movement of children from
Ukraine through Russia to Belarus was executed with
Russia’s active operational involvement in these removals
at almost every stage.83 Russia’s federal government
played an integral role in the removal of children
from Ukraine; the targeting of children in Ukraine fordeportation to Belarus; the signing of legal documents
granting permission for children purported to be orphans
to be transported to Belarus; and the passing of decrees
waiving documentation requirements for children to be
moved through Rostov-on-Don, a critical railway hub in
Russia bordering the Russia-occupied regions in eastern
Ukraine.84

The Role of the Union State
Lukashenka’s and Putin’s efforts to move children from
Ukraine to Belarus were coordinated via the Union State.
Policies and actions implemented by the Union Stateare voted into law by two votes. The heads of state—
Lukashenka and Putin, or a person authorized by them—each cast one vote.85 Both states must unanimously
vote to execute any actions on behalf of the Union State;
as such, all decisions executed by the Union State area joint effort coordinated by both Russia and Belarus.
The highest levels of Russia’s and Belarus’ regimes
have therefore jointly coordinated the Union State’s
activities to remove—and in some cases re-educate—children from Ukraine.86 Yale HRL cannot definitively
assess which party initiated this collaboration; however,Lukashenka asserts that he proposed that Union State
funds be spent on children from Ukraine.87
The Union State has allocated at least tens of millions ofrubles to move children from Ukraine to Belarus, and has
coordinated with the Alyaksei Talai Foundation, OJSC
Belaruskali, OJSC Russian Railways, and other entities tofacilitate these deportations.88 In September 2022, theUnion State’s Council of Ministers adopted a resolution
to host 1,050 children from Ukraine in Belarus.89 When
the Union State’s Secretary of State Dmitry Mezentsev
announced that this resolution was passed, Russia’s
state-owned media TASS news claimed that this decision“confirms the position of Russian President Vladimir
Putin and President of Belarus Alyaksandr Lukashenka insupport of the continuation of humanitarian assistanceto children living in the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s
republics.”90
At least as early as December 2022, the Union State
spearheaded the project “Helping the Children
from Donbass,” which formalized the Union State’s

commitment to providing so-called humanitarian aid tochildren in Russia-occupied Ukraine.91 Yale HRL has notbeen able to confirm which elements of the deportation
and re-education efforts were implemented under thiseffort.
As of June 2023, Mezentsev claimed, “according to thedecision of the governing bodies of the Union State,”that more than 2,000 children from the former so-called
LPR and DPR visited purported health camps in Minsk.92
In October 2022, Mezentsev visited the Dubrava facility,
which at the time hosted over 300 children from Ukraine
and has hosted more than 2,050 children from Ukraine
thus far. Belarusian media published photographs in
October 2022 of Mezentsev surrounded by children
reportedly from Ukraine.93

The removal of children
from Ukraine to Belarus wasorchestrated at the highest levelsof Russia’s federal government
and Belarus’ regime at the behestof Lukashenka and Putin.
During his visit to the Dubrava facility, Mezentsev
stated that tens of millions of rubles had been allocatedby the Union State to fund the transportation ofchildren from Ukraine to Belarus.94 The Wall Street
Journal later reported OJSC Belaruskali spent millionsof dollars transporting children from Ukraine to theDubrava facility in Belarus.95 At least three of thesetransportation efforts funded by the Union State routed
children through Rostov-on-Don in Russia before they
were sent to Belarus.96 Mezentsev later claimed in June
2023 that the transportation of children from Ukraine to
Belarus was in accordance with decisions made by theUnion State, and that they would continue to do so, “nomatter what anyone says.”97
In March 2023, Mezentsev wrote a letter to Oleg
Belozerov, the CEO of the Russian state-owned enterpriseOJSC Russian Railways, asking for his assistance in thedeportation of 2,000 children from Ukraine to Belarus
under Talai’s foundation in 2023, approximately 1,050
in the first half of 2023 and 950 in the second half of2023. In this letter he reminded Belozerov that OJSC
Russian Railways and Belarusian Railways provided suchassistance in 2022, and that the cost of the operation wascovered by the Union State budget.98 (See Subsection 5
on Transportation below for details on the provenanceof this letter.)10

Laws and policies facilitating deportation of children
from Ukraine to Belarus
A critical element of Belarus’ and Russia’s bilateralcollaboration in the systematic deportation and reeducation of children from Russia-occupied areas of
Ukraine since February 2022 has been changes to laws,
policies, consent practices, and educational mandates
relevant to the overall program of moving Ukraine’s
children to Belarus.99 These changes removed barriers
that could have slowed efforts by Belarus and Russia totransport children from Ukraine to Belarus. The waiverof legal identification and documentation of parental
consent can obfuscate records of the transport ofpeople into Belarus, including children.
Belarus’ regime has been facilitating the movement ofpeople from Ukraine since Russia’s invasion of Crimea
in 2014. In August 2014, Lukashenka passed legislation
explicitly authorizing Belarus’ border service officials towaive the requirement of citizens of Ukraine to produce
valid documentation upon entry to and/or exit from
Belarus.100

occupied areas of Ukraine.101 The decree issued by thegovernor of Rostov allows children to enter Rostov
without a passport. Importantly, the Rostov decree also
states that “A notarized consent form from one of theparents, legal guardians or trustees is not required forminor citizens of the Russian Federation, DPR, LPR, or
minor foreign citizens to cross the administrative borderof the Rostov Region.”102
Together, these provisions expedite the movement ofchildren from Ukraine into Belarus through Russia, as
they eliminate the requirement for children to have valid
passports and consent from parents, guardians, or legal
trustees to cross borders. Less than one month after
the change of rules in Rostov, a group of children from
Ukraine was transported to Belarus through Rostov-onDon.103 Yale HRL has not been able to establish if thesechildren were transported through Rostov versus otherborder regions as a direct result of the decree issued in
March 2023.

In March 2023, the governor of the Rostov region of
Russia issued a decree changing the documentation
requirements for people crossing into the region from

Consent
Yale HRL is unable to identify how consent was
obtained—if at all—for the majority of children
transported from occupied Ukraine to Belarus.
As previously discussed, the Rostov region
waived all documentation requirements—
including passports and assignment of powers
of attorney—for children from Ukraine to enter
Russia via Rostov. The age of majority in Russia
and Belarus is 18, meaning that parents or legal
guardians are the only individuals able to grantconsent on behalf of children under the age of
18.104 Removing the requirement for children tohave signed powers of attorney subsequently
allows children to be moved from Ukraine to
Rostov without the documented permissionof their parents or guardians, which was not
permitted before Russia’s full-scale invasion of
Ukraine in 2022.
Yale HRL has previously reported problematic
instances of consent documentation as partof Russia’s systematic deportation of Ukraine’s
children, including signed powers of attorneyproviding authorization to unnamed, blankentities.105

This report documents a systematic targetingof vulnerable groups of children, including
those purported to be orphans, disabledchildren, children from low-income families,
and children from large families, among
others.106 Yale HRL was unable to identify theconditions under which consent may havebeen obtained, or whether such consent
can be considered meaningful to a degree
consistent with international standards for
obtaining consent from parents or guardians
for the movement of children across borders.
If legal guardians had granted consent for theirchild to be transported to Belarus, it is unclear
whether they had done so freely and without
coercion. If legal guardians and parents
provided meaningful consent for their children
to be transported to Russia and onward to
Belarus, it remains unclear what activities,
medical treatment, and other measures towhich consent was provided, and whether the
events in Belarus were consistent with thoseterms.

11

3. Lukashenka directly oversees Belarus’ efforts
in coordination with Russia.
Lukashenka has mobilized the highest levels of Belarus’
regime and coordinated with various individuals andnon-state organizations in Belarus to contribute to
Russia’s deportation of children from Ukraine.107 In
addition to passing laws coordinating the deportation
and re-education of children from Ukraine, Lukashenka
has personally visited children brought to Belarus by thiseffort and publicized his role.108
Lukashenka facilitated the movement of children fromoccupied Ukraine to Belarus in the months leading up
to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In May 2021,
Lukashenka met with Alyaksei Talai, a prominent figurein the movement of children from Ukraine, who had
recently returned from a trip to Donetsk and Luhansk.109
The purpose of Lukashenka’s meeting with Talai wasreportedly to discuss future plans regarding children
from Ukraine. Talai documented the trip, stating “this is
only the beginning.”110 Talai has been a central figure in
the Lukashenka regime’s program of identifying children
for movement to Belarus, their subsequent deportation,and in some cases, their exposure to so-called “patriotic”
re-education after their arrival at facilities, including
military training (See Section 4, Alyaksei Talai and the
Alyaksei Talai Charity Foundation).
Four months later, in September 2021, Talai—throughhis foundation, the Alyaksei Talai Charity Foundation—transported more than 100 children from Ukraine to the
Zubrenok Health Center in Belarus, which he reports
was at Lukashenka’s invitation.111 Lukashenka would
later suggest to Putin that the Union State fund the
movement of children from Ukraine to Belarus,112 after
which children from Russia-occupied Ukraine weretransported to Belarus.113
Lukashenka also passed legislation on immigration,
coordination of movement, and other issues related to
Ukrainian citizens entering Belarus. A provision of thisdecree—introduced in 2014 and amended in 2022—
simplifies the process by which children from Ukraine
can be integrated into the Belarus’ education system,
paving the way for re-education efforts.114 Lukashenka
also “personally oversees” the national youth policy,
which includes the Belarusian Republican Youth Union,a pro-regime group that has subjected children from
Ukraine to re-education efforts (See Section 6, Reeducation115 (See Section 6, Re-education)
Lukashenka has been personally and publicly involved withthe program of deportation and re-education of children
from Ukraine following Russia’s full-scale invasion: inMarch 2022, children from Ukraine sent to Belarus weretaken to watch a match played by Lukashenka’s hockey
team.116 Video footage shows Lukashenka handingout toys to the children from Ukraine, saying “this is all

for you!” in Russian.117 On at least one other occasion,
products from Lukashenka’s personal farmstead were
distributed to children from Donetsk and Luhansk who
had been taken to the Dubrava facility.118 Lukashenka
also reportedly spoke at an event in December 2022
at which children transported from Ukraine were inattendance.119 Additionally, Lukashenka’s elite armed
forces group, special forces (Spetsnaz) Unit 3214,
subjected children from Ukraine to military training.120
Lukashenka has close ties with Spetsnaz, including Unit
3214, the same unit that subjected children from Ukraine
to weaponry training (see section 4).121
Multiple organizations and media outlets identify
Lukashenka as a primary figure in the removal ofchildren from occupied Ukraine to Belarus.122 Membersof Lukashenka’s government, as well as official Union
State social media channels, have also publicly praised
Lukashenka for his involvement in these efforts.123 Talai
and Olga Volkova, whose involvement is detailed in later
sections, personally thanked Lukashenka in May 2023
for his support in these efforts and claimed that the“visit” of thousands of children from occupied Ukraine
to Belarus was a “great merit to [Lukashenka].”124 In May
2023, a pro-Russia regime collaborationist organization
located in the Russia-occupied Zaporizhzhia region, “We
Are Together with United Russia,” stated that the “trip”
for children from Ukraine to Belarus was orchestrated
under personal agreements between Lukashenka andPutin.125
Lukashenka’s coordination with Putin is evidenced bystatements published on the official website of the
Office of the President of Belarus, which note that Putin
reportedly thanked Lukashenka for undertaking the socalled “assistance” for children from Ukraine.126 He didso after Lukashenka signed a decree authorizing theprovision of “humanitarian assistance at the expenseof the Union State budget to students and educational
institutions of the Donetsk People’s Republic and theLuhansk People’s Republic.”127
On 11 August 2023, Lukashenka stated that, in
collaboration with Putin, the Union State had funded
the transportation of children from occupied Ukraine to
Belarus, claiming, “We have done this and will continue
to do this, regardless of any reproaches.”128

4. Russia’s Investigative Committee, theMinistries of Education of the former so-called
Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s
Republic, and regime-aligned organizations fromboth countries have facilitated the movement ofchildren from occupied Ukraine to Belarus.
Belarus’ program of identification, transportation,and so-called “patriotic” re-education of children
from Ukraine has been facilitated by both the security
services of Belarus and Russia, as well as the Ministries of12

Education in the former so-called DPR and LPR.129 Russia’s
Investigative Committee—a federal state agency
reporting to President Vladimir Putin and responsible forcriminal investigations—has played a significant role intargeting children in Ukraine for movement to Belarus.130
The Internal Troops of Belarus (hereafter, “Internal
Troops”) have subjected children from Ukraine tomilitary training.131 Russia’s Border Service of the Federal
Security Bureau (FSB) for the Rostov Oblast has been
acknowledged by Talai as facilitating transportation ofchildren to Belarus, though the full nature of the FSB’s
support for the program is unknown.132

Internal Troops of Belarus
In at least two instances, children from Ukraine weretaken to visit the 3rd Separate Special-Purpose Brigade(Military Unit No. 3214) of the Internal Troops, amilitarized internal security apparatus within Belarus’
Ministry of Internal Affairs that is under United States
sanctions.133 At these locations, children were subjected
to military training, demonstrations of weaponry, military
parades, and tours of the brigade’s headquarters.134 In
December 2022, Belarus’ Ministry of Internal Affairs
published photographs of young children from Ukraine

undergoing military training with Military Unit No. 3214
of the Internal Troops, in which they can be seen wearing
tactical gear and holding guns (see Section 6, Military
Training subsection).135
The special forces (Spetsnaz) Unit 3214 is a special rapid
response unit with riot control function subordinate
to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.136 Spetsnaz has
direct and close ties to Lukashenka: The Ministry ofInternal Affairs, to which Unit 3214 is subordinate, andthe State Security Committee’s “Al’fa group” jointly
form the basis of the President’s Security Service.137
Lukashenka visited the unit in Uruchie on 28 July 2020,
12 days before the 9 August presidential elections
that year, and identified “preserving the country” and“not allowing destabilization” as the “most importantand primary task” before both the president and law
enforcement.138 On this visit, Lukashenka watchedas Unit 3214 carried out a life-scale demonstration of
suppressing street protests.139 The unit participated in
the violent crackdowns against pro-democracy protests
following the 9 August 2020 elections.140 Before
2020, there is evidence of this unit acting to protect
the specific political interests of Lukashenka himself,
independently of other government organs, and of

Figure 2: Network of main actors and organizations involved in organizing the removal of children from
Ukraine to Belarus
13Lukashenka protecting the leadership of this unit fromother Belarusian law enforcement. In November 2000,
Belarus’ then-prosecutor general Oleg Bozhelko issued
an arrest warrant for the then-commander of Unit 3214,
Dmitry Pavlichenko, on suspicion of having founded a“death squad” that assassinated political opponentsof Lukashenka from 1999 through 2000. Pavlichenko
returned to his post days later, following Lukashenka’s
personal request that he be released from prison.141

Russia’s Investigative Committee
Russia’s Investigative Committee has identified
and targeted children in occupied areas of Ukraine
for removal to Belarus. The agency was nominallyestablished in 2010 as an anti-corruption unit andconducts criminal investigations.142 Members of theInvestigative Committee have visited schools, hospitals,
and orphanages in Ukraine since the full-scale invasion
in February 2022.143 The Committee itself claims to havetransported 323 children from Ukraine to Russia since
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.144
Russia’s federal agencies, especially the Investigative
Committee, have coordinated with Belarus to identify
and target children from Russia-occupied Ukraine tobe specifically enrolled in military training in Belarus.145
In December 2022, Russia’s Investigative Committee
created a specialized cadet class in Luhansk specifically forchildren from Ukraine at a Luhansk educational complex
named after pilot-cosmonaut Georgy Beregovoy.146 This
specialized cadet corps class represents a concerted
effort to militarize Ukrainian children, which is further
emphasized with a name that refers to Russia’s national
heroes in Ukraine. It is unknown where and how often
similar Russian cadet corps are being formed in occupied
areas of Ukraine by Russia’s occupation officials. In
June 2023, advisors from the Investigative Committee
recruited students from this school to the Artek facility
in Russia and the Zubrenok Health Center in Belarus.147
In August the Investigative Committee reported thatnine children from this school had been transported
to Artek and five children had been transported to
Zubrenok for “patriotic education,” where they are seenwearing military uniforms with the “Z” insignia.148 On 31
August 2023, the Investigative Committee claimed thatthe “Luhansk cadets became part of the Russian cadet
movement.”149

had a “guaranteed return”; their status remains underinvestigation by Yale HRL.152 Yale HRL was unable toverify the family details of the 30 children purported
to be orphans. Furthermore, Yale HRL was unable toidentify what role the Ministry of Education of theformer so-called LPR played in additional removals, ifany, of children from Ukraine to Belarus.
The Ministry of Education and Science of the former
so-called DPR addressed a letter to the directorof the RBOU “School 4 – Cadet Corps” in Donetsk
requesting the school submit applications for children
from “preferential categories”—including those withdisabilities, orphans, and those from low-income
families—to be sent to the Dubrava facility.153 The letter
listed the documentation required for the children to beeligible and claimed that their school had a “quota” of
32 children from the preferential categories that would
be sent to Dubrava.154 Belarus’ news media claimed thatchildren from this school attended the Dubrava facility
in September 2023.155

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB)
The extent of the FSB’s involvement in the removal ofchildren from Ukraine to Belarus is unclear. However, Yale
HRL has identified data suggesting the FSB was involvedin transporting children from Ukraine to Belarus. On 11
December 2022, during a period when children fromoccupied Ukraine had been transported to Minsk, Talai
thanked various individuals and entities from Russia andBelarus, including Lukashenka, Putin, the Union State,
Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry ofInternal Affairs of Belarus, and the Border Service of the
FSB for their “assistance and support.”156
The FSB has allegedly been involved in previous efforts
to move children from occupied areas of Ukraine to
Russia. In March 2022, Russia’s state FSB Rostov Border
Force shared information pertaining to the simplificationof rules related to cross-border movement of minors
between Ukraine and Rostov Oblast.157 Additionally,
the governor of Rostov removed pre-existing policy andlegal barriers to the rapid and undocumented movement
across the frontier of the oblast bordering Russia in
March 2023, as the next section will explore in depth.158

Key private individuals and non-governmentalorganizations involved in program

Ministries of Education of the former so-called DPR Non-state actors have had a notable role in this system,
and LPR
including in identifying, transporting and re-educating
Russia’s regional Ministries of Education have been
integral in moving children from Ukraine to Belarus.150
According to the Union State and various media outlets
in Russia and Belarus, the Ministry of Education of theformer so-called LPR prepared powers of attorney for
30 purported orphans to be moved from Ukraine to
Belarus through Russia.151 The Union State’s Secretaryof State Mezentsev claimed the purported orphanschildren from Ukraine. Some entities, including Talai
and his foundation, play a significant and public role infacilitating the transportation of children from Ukraine
to facilities across Belarus. These entities align strongly
with pro-regime views and are closely associatedwith state actors. For example, the Night Wolves, anultranationalist militant extremist motorcycle club thathas branches in both Belarus and Russia, is heavily aligned

14with Vladimir Putin. Members of the club welcome Putin
as an honorary member of their group and actively
defend his policies to the point of violence to “suppress
any uprising against Vladimir Putin.”159

Alyaksei Talai and the Alyaksei Talai Charity Foundation
Alyaksei Talai is a prominent Paralympian from Belarus
who, along with his eponymous foundation, plays acentral role in the formation and implementation of
the campaign to transport children from Ukraine to
Belarus.160 Talai and his foundation have helped organize
and facilitate the movement of at least 2,375 children
from Ukraine to at least eight facilities in Belarus andhas coordinated with members of Belarus’ regime tofacilitate the movement of children from Ukraine to
Russia prior to transporting them to Belarus.161 Talai
began coordinating the transport of children from
Ukraine to Belarus through his foundation approximately
five months prior to the full-scale invasion.162 Talai and his
foundation have orchestrated the transport of multiple
groups of children from Ukraine to the Dubrava facility,
and the Alyaksei Talai Charity Foundation has made atleast one fundraising call specifically for the movementof children from Ukraine to Belarus, indicating that they
have also funded these efforts.163
Talai has visited Russia-occupied areas of Ukraine on
several occasions; his earliest reported trip took place in
May 2021, and he has continued to visit Russia-occupied
Ukraine in 2023.164 Talai also targeted at least one groupof children in Zaporizhzhia for movement to Belarus at
the request of Vladimir Rogov, a former representativeof the main council of the Zaporizhzhia Region’s military
civil-administration and now head of the pro-Russia “We
are together with Russia” movement.165 Talai’s efforts
have focused on transporting children from especiallyvulnerable groups; he claimed that he intended to “focus[his] attention precisely on children with disabilities.”166
Talai has personally met at least eight groups ofchildren from Ukraine upon their arrival to Belarus
and has knowingly allowed children to be subjected tomilitary training and re-education programs..167 He hascoordinated with the Belarusian Republican Youth Union,
the Night Valkyries and Night Wolves, and the Internal
Troops of Belarus on re-education and military training
programs.168 His foundation has also collaborated with
the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus, the Minsk City
Executive Committee, and the Internal Troops of Belarus
to organize a trip for children from Donetsk, during
which children were subjected to military training,demonstrations of weaponry, military parades, and toursof an Internal Troops unit’s headquarters.169
Talai has collaborated with officials from Russia, Belarus,
and the Union State to coordinate deportations ofchildren from Ukraine to Belarus. The official Union
State website acknowledges his involvement: “TheAlyaksei Talai Charitable Foundation, with the supportof the President of Belarus, the President of the RussianFederation, as well as the Standing Committee of theUnion State, continues to implement a large-scale
project, under which children from Donbas and theliberated territories come to Belarusian sanatoriums forrehabilitation.”170 Talai claimed in June 2023 that he hadreceived Lukashenka’s “consent and support” to movechildren from Ukraine to Belarus,171 and Lukashenka’s
official website claims that Talai approached Lukashenka
ten times about the effort to move children from Ukraine
to Belarus and now coordinates their “rehabilitation.”172
Russian politician and Secretary of the Union State,
Dmitry Mezentsev, confirmed Talai’s involvement indeportations,173 and the two visited a facility to which
over 300 children had been deported in October 2022.174
Talai also met with Russia’s ambassador to Belarus
in April 2023 to discuss the removal of children from
Ukraine to Belarus under the “initiative of the Alyaksei
Talai Foundation.”175 Additionally, Sergey Afonin—anadviser to the Russian embassy in Belarus who visitedchildren from Ukraine sent to the Dubrava facility—
lauded Talai for his role in coordinating for children from
Ukraine to be sent to the Dubrava facility and invited thechildren to visit Russia and Belarus.176 In January 2023,
the occupation administration of a city in the former
so-called DPR gave Talai an award for his role in the
movement of children from Ukraine to Belarus.177
Talai has advertised his own involvement in transportingchildren from Belarus on social media. He maintains that
all movements of children from Ukraine to Belarus werelegal and that all children transported from Ukraine
have returned home to Ukraine, although both claims
are made without supporting evidence and have notbeen confirmed.178 In response to recent accusationsof his complicity in the removals, Talai asserted thathe “is not afraid of anyone, no international courts, nointernational structures.”179

Belarusian Red Cross Society Secretary General Dmitry Shevtsov
Yale HRL has documented the involvement of theBelarusian Red Cross Society’s Secretary General,
Dmitry Shevtsov, who visited children from Ukraine inboth Belarus and Russia-occupied Ukraine. Shevtsov
has been vocal about his involvement, claiming thathe “participated, is participating and will actively
participate” in the movement of children from Ukraine
to Belarus.180
In December 2022, Alyaksei Talai organized the
movement of a group of 43 children from Lysychansk,
Ukraine, to Novopolotsk, Belarus.181 The group was met
by several members of the Novopolotsk City Executive
Committee, as well as Dmitry Shevtsov.182 On 12 July 2023,
Talai reported on a visit he made to Lysychansk School
No. 27 in Russia-occupied Luhansk with Shevtsov.183
Individuals in pro-Russia military apparel were also15

present, but Yale HRL was unable to determine whether
these individuals were a part of Russia’s military forces.
Shevtsov was seen wearing pro-Russia military apparelwith the “Z” insignia on his sleeve.184 Yale HRL was unable
to assess the contours of the relationship between Talai
and the Secretary General Shevtsov, and why they werevisiting children in Russia-occupied Luhansk.
The activities described above attributed to Dmitry
Shevtsov contravene the stated values of the Red
Cross/Red Crescent movement, which require membersof the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies to act with impartiality, neutrality,
and independence from the agendas of state actors andnon-humanitarian entities.185 Yale HRL has not assessedthat the actions of Dmitry Shevtsov represent the viewsof the Belarusian Red Cross Society.
In response to the activities of the Belarusian Red Cross
Society Secretary General, the International Federationof the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
stated that Shevtsov’s visit and associated activities
implicate the Fundamental Principles of the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and theyreferred this case to the Compliance and Mediation
Committee.186 All National Society members of the IFRC
are held to the standards according to the Fundamental
Principles of the Movement.187 National Society
members are also fully independent organizations, andwhile IFRC’s Governing Board (which is comprised of theleadership of multiple National Societies) can sanction
or exclude National Societies from the Federation, they
have no direct control over National Societies’ personnel
or operations.188 In October 2023, the IFRC Complianceand Mediation Committee (CMC) found that the current
Belarus Red Cross Secretary General breached the Red
Cross Red Crescent Fundamental Principles, misused
the emblem, and breached the IFRC integrity policy.
However, the investigation found that the movementof children from Russia-occupied territories to Belarus
was not led nor funded by the Belarusian Red Cross
Society. The IFRC announced that the Belarusian Red
Cross Society has until 30 November 2023 to dismiss
the Secretary General, Dmitry Shevtsov, or else theInternational Federation will suspend the branch.189 Thisdisciplinary action is in response to Shevtsov’s apparent
violations of the organization’s principles of neutrality
and integrity.190

OJSC Belaruskali
Yale HRL has assessed that the Belarusian state-owned
enterprise OJSC Belaruskali, an entity under sanctions
from the United States Department of Treasury forbeing owned or controlled by the Government ofBelarus, plays a pivotal role in the movement of children
from Ukraine arriving in Belarus.191 Pavel Latushka, a
Belarusian opposition figure who has provided evidenceof the forced relocation of children from Ukraine to theInternational Criminal Court, has claimed that the head of

OJSC Belaruskali, Ivan Halavaty, was directly involved in
the removal of Ukraine’s children to Belarus.192 Halavaty
is also a member of the Council of the Republic, theupper house of the Belarusian Parliament.193 Latushka
also alleged that Halavaty personally ordered that theDubrava facility be prepared to accommodate children
from Ukraine.194 Children were transported from Minsk
to facilities throughout Belarus on buses belonging to
Shakhtyor Soligorsk, a soccer team owned by Halavaty.195
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Dubravafacility, which is owned by OJSC Belaruskali, has held
more than 2,050 children from Ukraine across six
sessions between September 2022 and May 2023.196 As
of October 2022, Halavaty stated that more than 1,000
children had stayed at Dubrava, and that the facility “willcontinue to receive children.”197
Belarus’ and Russia’s state media have reported thatOJSC Belaruskali has organized transportation forchildren from Ukraine both across “the border” (whichborder specifically was not clarified) and within Belarus
and has subjected children to re-education and medical
treatment.198 Yale HRL was unable to determine whether
the children’s guardians had consented to any medical
treatment to which children may have been subjected.
OJSC Belaruskali also subjected children from Ukraine
to re-education at their facility, where members of proregime nationalist and militarist organizations visitedchildren from Ukraine.199

Olga Volkova and the Dolphins
Yale HRL has assessed that the Donetsk-basedorganization called “Dolphins,” an NGO that provides
swimming lessons to individuals with disabilities, hasalso played a key role in the deportation of children
from Ukraine to Belarus.200 The Dolphins organization,
which is led by Olga Volkova according to Russianand Belarusian media outlets, has coordinated the
movement of multiple groups of children from Ukraine
to Belarus and been involved in subjecting children to
re-education and military training.201 Volkova and theDolphins organization play an instrumental role as one
of Talai’s key partners in Russia-occupied Donetsk.202
After a meeting in Donetsk with Volkova in May 2021,
Talai contacted Lukashenka to begin transportingchildren from Ukraine to Belarus.203 Between March 2022
and July 2023, Volkova accompanied at least six groupsof children from Ukraine to Belarus.204 The Dolphins andthe Alyaksei Talai Charity Foundation reportedly havea “longstanding” cooperation, and Volkova has openly
discussed working with Talai, his foundation, and OJSC
Belaruskali.205 In one instance in September 2022, Volkova
and the Dolphins coordinated with the Alyaksei Talai
Charity Foundation and OJSC Belaruskali to transporta group of six- to ten-year-old children from Ukraine
to the Dubrava facility in Belarus.206 While a group ofchildren from Ukraine was reportedly taken to Soligorsk

16

Central District Hospital in September 2022, Belarusiannews media reported that Volkova was staying withthe children “around the clock.”207 The Dolphins andVolkova also collaborated with the Alyaksei Talai Charity
Foundation to organize a military training program forchildren from Ukraine in June 2022.208 Children, including
some with disabilities, were taken to a training base of
the Internal Troops of Belarus, where they were exposed
to firearms and hand to hand combat.209 (See Section 6,
Military Training.)

Belarusian Republican Youth Union
The Belarusian Republican Youth Union, an
ultranationalist organization aimed at promoting“civic and patriotic education,” has played a key role in
the re-education and indoctrination of children from
Ukraine.210 The Belarusian Republican Youth Union is
supported by Lukashenka, who “personally oversees”
national youth policy and claims that a unified youth
union should be one of the primary pillars of Belarus’society.211 The organization was involved in the reeducation and indoctrination of at least two groupsof children who had been deported from Ukraine to
Belarus.212 The organization was also reportedly involvedin coordinating train travel for children transported
from Ukraine to Belarus.213 The Belarusian Republican
Youth Union met children arriving at the train stationin Minsk on at least two separate occasions, in April
and September 2023, and children from Ukraine were
photographed holding the organization’s flag in bothinstances.214 The Belarusian Republican Youth Unionalso facilitated re-education programs for children from
Ukraine (see Section 6, Re-education). Additionally,
the First Secretary of the Central Committee of theBelarusian Republican Youth Union, Alexander Lukyanov,a well-known promoter of Lukashenka’s program of“patriotic” re-education, reportedly spoke at the closing
ceremony of the Dubrava facility’s first shift, which
included children from Ukraine, and distributed packetsof stationery purchased by the Belarusian Republican
Youth Union.215 In July 2023, Alexander Saxonov, arepresentative of the Belarusian Republican Youth
Union’s Mogilev branch, visited the Zarya facility, whereat least 12 children from Ukraine had been moved for a
purported educational program.216 Saxonov reportedly
discussed the Belarusian Republican Youth Union’s
activities and proposed creating “opportunities” forthe creative development of the children.217 Yale HRL
was not able to determine what opportunities werediscussed.

Night Wolves & Night Valkyries
Members of the Belarusian branches of Russia-based
nationalist organizations, including the all-maleultranationalist militant group the Night Wolves andtheir female counterpart, the Night Valkyries, havefacilitated programs for children deported from Ukraine
to Belarus.

The Night Wolves is an extremist group that actively
supports Russia’s state propaganda, denies Ukraine’s
right to statehood, and supports calls to “de-nazify”
Ukraine.218 The group is led by Alexander Zaldastanov,a vocal supporter of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine,and has been a designated sanctioned entity by the US
Department of Treasury since 2014.219 The Night Wolves
has been closely tied to Russia’s special services.220
In 2022, the group helped recruit separatist fighters
in Donetsk and Luhansk and dispatched a volunteer
contingent that identifies as “Night Wolves,” to fight on
the front lines of Donetsk.221 This volunteer contingent
received public support and combat equipment fromthe Russian state entity Roscosmos, a state corporationin Russia specializing in aerospace research.222 Membersof the Night Wolves were involved in the “Crimean selfdefense forces” as early as February 2014, which staged
resistance against the government of Ukraine.223
The Night Wolves and Night Valkyries have been
involved in various programs in Belarus to which children
moved from Ukraine were subjected. In April 2023,
the Night Wolves and Night Valkyries met children
transported from Ukraine at the Minsk train station in
Belarus.224 Upon meeting, children arriving from Ukraine
were photographed holding flags of Belarus and theformer so-called DPR.225 The Night Wolves and Night
Valkyries of Belarus have met children from Ukraine
arriving in Belarus on at least three prior occasions, in
September, October, and December 2022.226 The Night
Valkyries of Belarus also accompanied children from
Ukraine to a Belarusian Orthodox church in September
2022 on a trip orchestrated by Talai and Volkova.227 In
October 2022, the Night Wolves and Night Valkyries ofBelarus posted photos on their social media accounts
with children from Ukraine sitting on Night Wolves’and Night Valkyries members’ motorcycles and wearing
helmets.228 The Night Valkyries have publicly supported
the Alyaksei Talai Charity Foundation, sharing theFoundation’s calls for donations for children from
Ukraine through his foundation on the Night Valkyries’social media accounts on 22 November 2022.229

5. Children from occupied Ukraine have beentransported to Belarus through Russia.
Yale HRL assesses that it is highly likely that the majorityof children from Ukraine transported to Belarus traveledlargely by rail via the city of Rostov-on-Don in Russia’s
Rostov oblast.230 This finding is significant because itshows Russia’s integral operational involvement andpolitical participation at both the local and national levelin the logistics of transporting children from Russiaoccupied areas in eastern Ukraine, through Russia, toBelarus.
Yale HRL has confirmed that at least three groupsof children have specifically been transported from
Russia-occupied Ukraine to facilities in Belarus through17Rostov-on-Don. These transports occurred between
September 2022 and September 2023. Children camefrom the Zaporizhzhia region; Mariupol, Volnovakha,
Ilovaisk, Berdyansk, Makiivka, and the city of Donetsk in
the Donetsk region; and Lysychansk and Severodonetsk
in the Luhansk region. They were transported to two
locations in Belarus: the Dubrava facility in Soligorsk and
the Polymir Factory Dormitory in Novopolotsk.231
A from March 2023 signed by Dmitry Mezentsev
confirmed that children would be transported from
Ukraine through Rostov-on-Don to Belarus in 2023, andclaimed that Russia and Belarus, in cooperation withvarious organizations in Russia and Belarus, coordinatedthe movement of children from Ukraine to Belarus in
2022 and planned to move thousands of additionalchildren from Ukraine to Belarus in 2023.232 The letter,reportedly obtained by a Belarusian hacker organization,
was released by the Belarusian Investigative Centre, acollective of investigative journalists who investigate
corruption within Belarus’ regime.233 Yale HRL was
unable to verify the authenticity of the letter firsthand.
This letter, which was addressed to Oleg Belozerov, theCEO of OJSC Russian Railways, claimed that Belarusian
Railways and OJSC Russian Railways coordinated totransport children from Ukraine to Belarus in 2022, which
was financed from the budget of the Union State. Thisfinding is corroborated by Mezentsev’s October 2022
statement that the Union State spent millions of rubles
to transport children from Ukraine through Rostov-onDon to Belarus.234

18Figure 3: Letter from Dimitry Mezentsev to Oleg Belozerov, CEO of Russian Railways. The letter was released by the Belarusian Investigative Centre, a collective of investigative journalists who investigate corruption within Belarus’ regime.
Yale HRL was unable to verify the authenticity of the letter firsthand.235

Translation by Yale HRL:
Dear Oleg Valentinovich!
In pursuance of the decisions of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin and
the President of the Republic of Belarus A.G.
Lukashenka, the Postoyanni Komitet [Standing Committee] of the Union State systematically provides humanitarian assistance tochildren living in the affected areas of theDonetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk
People’s Republic.
On March 10 this year, Aleksey Talai, the legendary Paralympian, who heads the charitable foundation, appealed to the Postoyanni
Komitet of the Union State with a request
for co-action in organizing the travel of children (1,050 people in the first half [of 2023]
and 950 people in the second half of 2023)
from low-income families and orphans living
in difficult conditions on the territory of the
DPR and LPR for rehabilitation in the Republic of Belarus. The first group’s arrival (1050people) should be organized in three shifts in
April - May this year - along the railway route
Rostov-on-Don - Minsk and back.
In 2022, such assistance had already been
provided, practical cooperation of the Belarusian Railway and Russian Railway OJSC was
carried out to organize travel and meals forchildren. In accordance with the Decree of
the Council of Ministers of the Union State,
the event was carried out at the expense of
the budget of the Union State.
Dear Oleg Valentinovich, I ask you to consider the possibility of organizing the transportation of children from Donbass to brotherly
Belarus for rehabilitation. Such support foryoung citizens of the Russian Federation willbe especially significant.
(Handwritten note – with [inc.] sincere wishes, yours, [signature])
D. Mezentsev

19Additionally, the letter details the organizations involvedin the transportation of children from Ukraine to
Belarus. For example, on 10 March 2023, Talai requested
assistance for the transport of “children (…) from lowincome families and orphans living in difficult conditions
on the territory of the DPR and LPR for rehabilitationin the Republic of Belarus.”236 The letter also claims
that Talai and the Union State intended to send 2,000
children from Ukraine to Belarus in 2023—1,050 people
were to be transported to a facility in Minsk across three“camp” sessions between April-May 2023—and refers
to children from Ukraine as “citizens of the RussianFederation.”237
The proposed movement of children from Ukraine
detailed in the letter was executed within weeks. One
month after Mezentsev signed this letter, children from
Ukraine were transported through Rostov-on-Don to
the Dubrava facility in Minsk, after which two moregroups of children from Ukraine were transported to thesame facility.238 In total, more than 1,000 children from
Ukraine were transported to the Dubrava facility acrossthree sessions between April and May 2023.

Yale HRL has identified routes by which children weretransported from Ukraine through Rostov-on-Don to
Belarus. Yale HRL used satellite imagery to assess that
there are multiple rail lines and bus stations in operationin Donetsk that have routes into Rostov-on-Don in Russia
which were active between March 2023 and July 2023.
While satellite imagery was not available for the specificdates that children were allegedly transported from
Ukraine to Belarus, rail car traffic is visible and facilities
appear operational during the timeframe documented
in this report. These observable indicators suggest thisarea’s railway infrastructure could support the transportof children during this time between Donetsk andRostov-on-Don.
Additionally, according to a decree issued on 10 March2023 by the Governor of Rostov, populations movingfrom Donetsk to Rostov-on-Don are required to passthrough one of six checkpoints on the border of Donetsk
and Rostov.239 According to the Ministry of Educationand Science of the former so-called DPR, children
transported by the Ministry to facilities “outside of theregion” are taken by bus to the Uspenskaya checkpoint
as of June 2023.240 The Uspenskaya checkpoint is one of
the six checkpoints through which
residents can move from Donetsk
to the Rostov region. Satellite
imagery of the checkpoint area was
not available for the month in whichchildren from Ukraine were taken
through this checkpoint and on to
Belarus.

Furthermore, it is not currently
possible to travel via ground or
air
between
Russia-occupied
Ukraine and Belarus withoutcrossing through Russia or thefrontlines of the war. Yale HRL has
not identified a route available forthe transportation of children to
Belarus exclusively through Russiaoccupied territory of Ukraine
into Belarus. These findings,
compounded by the verified
documentation of at least threegroups of children taken throughRostov-on-Don and the letter
detailed above, has led Yale HRL
to assess that most children werehighly likely transported to Belarus
through Russia.241 Children appear
to be transported first from Ukraine
by bus to Rostov-on-Don in western
Russia, followed by a train journey
Figure 4: Map depicting the confirmed trajectory of at from Rostov to Belarus, after which they are transported
least three groups of children taken from Ukraine to by bus to their final destination.242 Their journeys require
Belarus via Rostov-on-Don in Russia
up to three days of travel before arrival at the train
station in Minsk, Belarus.243
20Belarus and Russia have recently invested resources toexpand the transportation infrastructure likely used forthe deportation of children from Ukraine to Belarus. In
June 2023, a commercial bus route by the Belarus-basedorganization “Bus Express LLC” was established fromDonetsk to Minsk.244 Additionally, bus routes between
Mariupol, Donetsk and Rostov-on-Don were recently
opened by a Russian state-owned enterprise called “Bus
Stations of Donbass.”245 Plans to integrate Donetsk’s
railway system into the Russian Railways Systemcommenced in January 2023, according to the Deputy
Prime Minister of the former so-called DPR, a Russiaappointed occupation official.246 Yale HRL has been
unable to confirm whether children from Ukraine havebeen transported through Rostov-on-Don to Belarus
using these specific bus and railway networks.
Children from Ukraine were transported from Minsk
to facilities throughout Belarus on buses belonging
to Shakhtyor Soligorsk, a soccer team owned by Ivan
Halavaty, head of OJSC Belaruskali.247 In September 2023,
children transported from Russia-occupied Ukraine to
Belarus stopped at the Gomel train station in Belarus on
their way to the Minsk station..248 In an article post about
this movement of children from Ukraine, Belarusian
media states that this stop was “tradition.”249 Yale HRL
was unable to verify whether all children taken from
Ukraine to Belarus were routed to arrive in Minsk, nor
whether several groups of children who were taken to
Minsk first stopped at the Gomel station.
Russia and Belarus continue to transport children from
Ukraine to Belarus with the help of various pro-Russia
and pro-regime organizations as of the publication ofthis report. Additionally, according to the letter from
Mezentsev previously identified in this report, the Union
State intends to transport more than 950 children from
Ukraine to Belarus in the latter half of 2023.250

6. More than half of the facilities have been
involved in re-education or purported medical
activities.

Re-Education
Yale HRL defines re-education as the promotion ofcultural, historical, societal, and patriotic messages orideas that serve the political interests of Belarus’ regime.
Among the 13 facilities identified in this report, at least
eight facilities subjected children to re-education.251 At
least nine groups of children from Ukraine have passed
through re-education programs at the eight facilities
confirmed by this report to be engaged in these activities.
Because this number relies primarily on self-reporting by
officials and program facilitators, the true number may
be higher. Yale HRL has confirmed that at least one groupof the children staying at the Dubrava facility, to whichmore than 2,050 children were transported between
September 2022 and May 2023, were subjected to reeducation. Various ultranationalist extremist groups andpro-regime organizations coordinated or participated in
exposing children transported from Ukraine to the reeducation efforts detailed below.
Re-education activities promote a narrow version ofhistory, culture, and world events aligned with the politicalprerogatives of the regimes in Belarus and Russia, and insome instances, include military training. Re-educationin this report includes—but is not limited to—lectures onhistory and geopolitics, visits to museums and historicalsights, and speeches given by government figures andmembers of extremist organizations. Many of the 50
children in this group are reported to have disabilities;some appear in wheelchairs in photos.
In 2022, Lukashenka “ordered historians to devise asingle, unified ‘correct interpretation of history’ to betaught in Belarus, and enacted legislation criminalizing
any deviation from the approved historical narrative.”252
Lukashenka expressly directed this so-called “patriotic
education” in January 2022 and it was formally
implemented in September 2022.253 An amendment to
Article 15 of Belarus’ constitution, made via a referendum
held three days after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine,notes, “the State shall ensure the preservation of thehistorical truth and the memory of the heroic deed of
the Belarusian people during the Great Patriotic War.”254
In April 2023, Talai and Russia’s ambassador to Belarus
met to discuss the removal of children from Ukraine
to Belarus under the “initiative of the Alyaksei Talai
Foundation.”255 During the meeting, Talai allegedly
presented several initiatives aimed at “preserving
the historical memory and the truth” about Belarus’
historical interpretation of World War II.256 Talai’s proBelarus and pro-Russia regime views were further
elucidated by a statement he made during an interview
in March 2023, during which he claimed that “[Ukraine]should be demilitarized, denazified, and sane, loyal, goodforces should come to power there.”257
Between December 2022 and January 2023, Talaiorganized for children from Luhansk to be sent to
Novopolotsk over the New Year holiday.258 Upon theirarrival in Belarus, children attended schools in theregion.259 Parents and teachers in Belarus reportedly“wished to ‘host’” the children for the New Year holidays
while they were in Belarus.260 It is unclear what thisentailed, and whether children were transported fromthe Novopolotsk facility to additional locations whilefamilies “hosted” children from Ukraine for New Years.
A second group of children from Ukraine attended
local schools in Belarus in September 2023. Belarusian
media and Talai advertised that a group of 48 children
were brought over to Belarus from Lysychansk andSeverodonetsk via Rostov-on-Don on 18 September
2023.261 These children have been said to be staying
at the Polymir Factory Dormitory for three weeks andattending Middle School No. 7 in Novopolotsk.262
21

One facility subjected a group of children to history
education through the Republican Campaign Dreams
are Born—Dreams Come True, a pro-regime program
implemented by Belarus’ Ministry of Education that aims
to instill “fundamental values...that reflect the essenceof Belarusian statehood.”263 This campaign promotes
the “continuation of work on the formation in childrenof a responsible attitude to a reasonable combinationof work and rest, the need to increase labor activity as acondition for social and personal success.”264 According
to the Campaign’s official website, it is a pro-regime
nationalist program whose goals are to “[instill] in theyounger generation fundamental values, ideas, beliefs
that reflect the essence of Belarusian statehood” andto help children develop “a respectful attitude towards
state symbols (coat of arms, flag, anthem) [and] stateauthorities of the country.”265 Yale HRL verified thatchildren from Ukraine were in attendance at the time thefacility subjected children to the Republican Campaign
Dreams are Born—Dreams Come True program andassesses that children from Ukraine were likely exposedto these re-education programs during their time at thefacility. The Belarusian Red Cross Society also publicized
their involvement with this facility, though Yale HRL
has not assessed whether they were involved in any reeducation activities.266
Another group of children from Ukraine were met
at the Minsk station by members of the Belarusian
Republican Youth Union and photographed holding theorganizational flag, an event which was subsequently
shared on the organization’s social media.267 Additionally,prior to meeting a group of children from Donetsk
and Belarus, First Secretary of the Central Committeeof the ultranationalist Belarusian Republican Youth
Union Alexander Lukyanov declared that preserving
the system of former so-called “patriotic education”
instills a “sense of responsibility for the future of theircountry” in children.268 This “patriotic education” refers
to the pro-regime curricula of propaganda mandatedby Lukashenka in 2022.269 The Belarusian Republican
Youth Union, with Lukyanov, Alyaksandr Shpakovsky,
the current Minister-Counselor of the Belarusian
Embassy in the Russian Federation, and the militarypatriotic group “Rodnik,” all visited a group of children
at Dubrava to lecture them about “friendship andmutual assistance.”270 The Rodnik organization, basedin Soligorsk, also visited a group of children at Dubravafacility, gave combat demonstrations, and allowed
children to handle firearms.271
The Night Wolves and Night Valkyries, both extremistgroups, have also been involved in various programs towhich children from Ukraine were subjected. In April
2023, the Night Wolves and Night Valkyries met children
transported from Ukraine at the Minsk train station in
Belarus.272 Upon meeting the members, children arrivingfrom Ukraine were photographed holding flags ofBelarus and the former so-called DPR.273

Military Training
Yale HRL has identified at least six instances of militarytraining that have occurred at facilities in Belarus holding
children from Ukraine. At least two groups of children
deported from Ukraine were brought to bases of theInternal Troops of Belarus.274 The unit was involved in
the violent suppression of pro-democracy protests in
Belarus in 2020 and has been placed under sanctions
by the United States, Canada, and Switzerland, among
other countries.275 Members of the Internal Troops
subjected children to military training that included
handling firearms, wearing body armor, and viewing
military parades, lectures, and combat demonstrations.
In December 2022, one group of children from Donetsk
was brought to a base of the Internal Troops 3rd
Separate Special-Purpose Brigade (Military Unit No.
3214), a prominent unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairsof Belarus and a designated entity since June 2021.276
Children from Ukraine were given a tour of the base, amilitary parade, and a weapons exhibition. The children
were taken to a military base after being taken to Belarus
at the behest of Alyaksei Talai and his eponymous
foundation.277 One additional group of children visited
this unit, but no additional information about the natureof the military training they received is available.278
Another group of children from Donetsk visited abase of an unidentified unit of the Internal Troopsof Belarus in June 2022, where they were also given
combat demonstrations and posed for pictures holding
firearms.279 Many of the 50 children in this group arereported to have disabilities; some appear in photos
in wheelchairs.280 No explicit measures to ensure
appropriate standards of safe handling of firearms appear
evident in the available pictures.281 The firearms (as seenin Figure 5) appear to pointed at both small children andadults while being held by children. Belarusian media
claims that some of the children were accompanied bytheir parents, but Yale HRL has not been able to establish
the identity of the adults pictured with the children.282
This facility’s program was organized by the Alyaksei
Talai Charity Foundation, the Dolphins organization, andthe purported director of the Dolphins, Volkova.283
Children at other facilities were subjected to militarystyle training as well. Representatives of Belarus’ fire andpolice units visited one group of children at the Berëzka
facility.284 Children attending the facility at the time
were photographed posing with firearms and wearing
body armor.285

Medical Activities
At least 67 children from Ukraine, in at least five groups,
were transported to three different hospitals in Belarus
between March 2022 and April 2023 for alleged medical
treatment and what is referred to as “rehabilitation” by
officials in the Lukashenka regime.286 Three groups of22

children from Ukraine were subjected
to “exercise therapy classes and grouppsychological correction, massage andhalotherapy, water and electrotherapy.”289
Children from this group reportedly had
neurological and congenital diseases aswell as autism.290 In another instance, atleast two groups of children originally
set to be transported to Dubrava weretaken to two hospitals in the Minsk
region; these children were placed in theskin and venereological dispensary of the
Soligorsk Central District Hospital andin an unknown ward of the Starobinsk
Hospital.291 Reporting from late 2021
suggests that the Soligorsk Central
District Hospital accepted only COVID-19
patients since late 2020, but it is unclear
if it was still used in that manner when
the children from Ukraine arrived.292 Yale
HRL was unable to identify the medical
treatment received but observed possible
puncture marks on children’s arms inphotos, which may be consistent withintravenous (IV) treatment.293 A news
outlet from Russia reported that somechildren “will be discharged,” but Yale HRL
was unable to validate this claim or confirm
whether the children ever left the hospital,
went to Dubrava, or are currently inanother location.294 It is unknown if parents
gave consent to have their children sent tothese medical facilities, whether parents
had provided consent for their children to
receive medical treatment, or whether theparents were informed of this change inlocation.

Figure 5: First photo shows a young child handling what appears to be an unidentified firearm alongside military personnel. The second photo shows a child handling a Shayka
shotgun in front of a group of military personnel and reportedly disabled children.284 In both images, children handling
weapons demonstrate an absence of basic safe handlingprocedures, pointing weapons towards other people.
children were transported to the Republican Children’s
Hospital for Medical Rehabilitation, Ostroshitsky Town
for “injuries and traumas” or “disabilities” including
cerebral palsy, autism, and complex brain diseases.287
Media aligned with Belarus’ regime claim that somechildren transported to hospitals in Belarus wereaccompanied by their parents; Yale HRL was unable toverify this claim.288
In many instances, Yale HRL was unable to confirm
what type of medical treatments or procedures were
performed at these facilities. In one instance, however,
the Children’s Republican Hospital for Medical
Rehabilitation, Ostroshitsky Town, reported that

Yale HRL was unable to verify how many children
described in this report—if any—were held in Belarus
after supposedly receiving medical treatment. An OSCE
report published in June 2023 claimed that at least one
child evacuated to Belarus for medical reasons had theirstay extended for non-medical reasons; according to the
OSCE report, this constitutes a violation of Article 78 of
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.295

7. The number of children taken from occupied
Ukraine and currently located in Belarus is
unknown.
Yale HRL cannot, through analysis of available open
source information, adequately assess at this time how
many children have been returned to Ukraine from
Belarus, nor can Yale HRL assess how many children
transported from Ukraine to the 13 locations identified
in this report remain in Belarus. Key figures involved in
the removal of children from Ukraine to Belarus haveclaimed that all children have been returned to Russia23

occupied Ukraine.296 For example, a letter to the CEO ofOJSC Russian Railways from the Union State Secretary
Mezentsev dated March 2023 requests the company’s
assistance in transporting children from Rostov-onDon to Minsk “and back.”297 Yale HRL has not yet beenable to independently confirm whether all return trips
have occurred. Talai himself asserted in June 2023 that
all children have been returned to Ukraine, claiming hepossesses photographic and video data of their return.298
Yale HRL has not yet been able to identify what data
Talai is referring to in his statements, and it is presently
unknown if this data exists. In a video posted by Belarus
state media in July 2023, Talai and the Secretary Generalof the Belarusian Red Cross Dmitry Shevtsov reportedly
visited children at their school in Lysychansk, Luhansk.299
According to the video, this group of children had
previously gone to Novopolotsk, Belarus in December
2022 and then returned. Yale HRL is unable to confirm
this claim.
Yale HRL analysts identified and monitored the online
presence of individuals and organizations involvedin the movement of children from Ukraine to Belarus
for any information related to children’s movements,
including but not limited to transportation to secondary
facilities, other locations, or return journeys to thechildren’s points of origin in Russia-occupied Ukraine.
Yale HRL conducted forensic analysis of images andvideos purporting to report on children who returned
to occupied Ukraine from Belarus, verifying theirauthenticity, accuracy, and additional components
based on principles established by the Berkeley Protocol
on Digital Open Source Investigations. Video and image
metadata availability was limited or unavailable in mostcases, leading to inconclusive results. Additionally,
analysts identified Ukrainian institutions attended bychildren who had been taken to Belarus and performed
searches for information on school websites andassociated media accounts pertaining to whether thechildren that had been taken to Belarus had returned to
Ukraine. Yale HRL searched for any public statementsfrom parents confirming the return of their children
from Belarus in various Ukrainian news outlets andattempted to identify user-generated media by parents
and guardians confirming the return of their children.
Yale HRL also attempted to identify children taken to
Belarus via media purporting to show returned groupsof children, comparing photos of the children in Belarus
to photos of children who had allegedly returned to
Russia-occupied Ukraine. For each group of children
identified in this report, Yale HRL was unable to identify
clear, consistent, and corroborative data that confirm
1) that specific groups of children had remained in theidentified facilities in Belarus, or 2) that the identified
children had returned to Russia-occupied Ukraine from
Belarus.

Yale HRL identified multiple Belarusian and Russian
sources claiming that children had returned to Ukraine
after being taken to Belarus. In contrast to the significant
amount of information corroborating children’s journeys
from Ukraine to Belarus across multiple sources, there
was not substantial information on children’s purported
returns from Belarus to occupied Ukraine. Sources
claiming that children had returned from Belarus tooccupied Ukraine did not detail how many children
were returning, their transportation route, where inoccupied Ukraine they were returned to, or to whom
the children were released upon their alleged arrivals.
Additionally, few sources provided photographic orvideo documentation of children’s purported returns, incontrast to data available about transports to Belarus.
In two instances, Belarus state-affiliated media sources
claimed that two separate groups of children werereturning home and included photographs of children on
the platform of a Belarusian train station, with one outlet
stating that children were “returning to the front line.”300
However, Yale HRL was unable to verify that children
had boarded these respective trains, and if so, where thetrain was routed to or whether the children had returned
to Ukraine. Later, in July 2023, Talai posted a video ofhimself and the Secretary General of the Belarusian Red
Cross Society, Dmitry Shevtsov, visiting schoolchildren in
Russia-occupied Luhansk who had reportedly returned
to Ukraine after being taken to Belarus in December
2022.301 Using the methodology detailed above, Yale
HRL was unable to confirm that the group of children
who had been taken to Belarus in December 2022 was
the same group of children depicted in Talai’s video.
Using available open source information, Yale HRL is
unable to corroborate claims that children have returned
from Belarus to Russia-occupied Ukraine or adequately
assess how many children transported from Ukraine
to the facilities identified in this report may remain in
Belarus.

24

IV. CONCLUSION
This report documents Belarus and Russia’s joint effort
to target children from Ukraine for removal and reeducation in Belarus. It builds on research published by
Yale HRL in February 2023 describing Russia’s programof deporting children from occupied areas of Ukraine
to facilities in Russia where they were subjected tore-education. This report expands on the scope ofthat reporting, showing the central involvement ofpolitical, security, civil society, and business figures inBelarus involved in the systematic deportation and reeducation of thousands of children from Ukraine.. It also
demonstrates the collaborative relationship in which
Russia targets vulnerable children, including children
from low-income families, orphans, and children living ininstitutional settings for deportation to Belarus, where
they are subjected to re-education. The true numberof children deported to Belarus is likely higher than the2,442 documented here.

disappearance of perceived opponents, and forcing
Ukrainian civilians in occupied territory to acquire
Russian passports. As with the program for deporting
Ukraine’s children to Russia, this system of deportation
and re-education in Belarus is designed to instill a belief
in political and historical narratives that align with thegoals of the regimes of Russia and Belarus. Based on theavailable data through open source materials, Yale HRL
cannot confirm the current status of the 2,442 children
who have been taken to Belarus, nor can Yale HRL
confirm that they have returned to Ukraine.

This program of deportation and re-education isdemonstrative of Russia’s broader effort to assimilate
occupied regions of Ukraine, and highlights Russia’scontinued close relationship and coordination with
Belarus throughout the conflict. This program ofdeportation mirrors other instances that Yale HRL
has documented of efforts to pacify and assimilate
the areas of Ukraine which Russia has sought tooccupy in contravention of international law, including
through mass deportation of civilians, detention and25

V. CORRECTIONSThis edition contains corrections to the report issued on
16 November 2022. The following summary encapsulates
the corrections made to this edition:•

A small number of citations (endnotes 58, 69, 70,
72, 74, 75, 81, 82, 91, 96, 230, 275, 288) have been
unredacted in the interest of ongoing research into
these areas of interest. Any credible accountability
entity, journalist, or research entity with ahumanitarian objective may connect with the Yale
Humanitarian Research Lab at hrl@yale.edu toobtain the full, unredacted citation list.

•

Updates have been made to endnotes 112-301; thealignment of sources to text is now correct. In somecases, in-line source references have been replacedwith endnotes. Researchers should make reference
to the updated and revised edition.

•

Minor changes have been made to correct misaligned text between pages and help the reader’seye. Full justification is used to visually distinguish
this edition from the previous.

26

VI. ENDNOTES
1. All statements in this key finding represent an aggregate total based on Yale HRL’s analytic synthesis of findings.
2. Khoshnood, Kaveh, Nathaniel A. Raymond and Caitlin N. Howarth et al., “Russia’s Systematic Program for
the Re-education and Adoption of Ukraine’s Children,” February 14, 2023, Humanitarian Research Lab at
Yale School of Public Health: New Haven, https://hub.conflictobservatory.org/portal/sharing/rest/content/
items/97f919ccfe524d31a241b53ca44076b8/data.
3. International Criminal Court, “Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin
and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova,” March 17, 2023, https://perma.cc/3BYX-RPF5, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/
situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and.
4. International Humanitarian Law Databases, “Article 49 - Deportations, transfers, evacuations,” ICRC, https://ihl-databases.
icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-49?activeTab=default, https://perma.cc/BQ9S-W2Z6.
5. Khoshnood, Kaveh, Nathaniel A. Raymond and Caitlin N. Howarth et al., “Russia’s Systematic Program for
the Re-education and Adoption of Ukraine’s Children,” February 14, 2023, Humanitarian Research Lab at
Yale School of Public Health: New Haven, https://hub.conflictobservatory.org/portal/sharing/rest/content/
items/97f919ccfe524d31a241b53ca44076b8/data ; International Criminal Court, “Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issuearrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova,” March 17, 2023, https://perma.cc/3BYX-RPF5, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimirvladimirovich-putin-and.
6. Khoshnood, Kaveh, Nathaniel A. Raymond and Caitlin N. Howarth et al, “Extrajudicial Detentions and Enforced
Disappearences in Kherson Oblast,” 18 November 2022, Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health:
New Haven, https://perma.cc/MW6K-GSSW, https://hub.conflictobservatory.org/portal/sharing/rest/content/
items/90f22f80754042c597f85529c42e8f6b/data.
7. All statements in this key finding represent an aggregate total based on Yale HRL’s analytic synthesis of findings
8. Sources B001, B002, B003, B004, B005, and B001 have been withheld for protection concerns. ; Информационноаналитический портал Союзного государства, “Союзное государство в зеркале СМИ за 10 мая,” soyuz.by,https://archive.ph/llIFR, https://soyuz.by/obzor-smi/soyuznoe-gosudarstvo-v-zerkale-smi-za-10-maya-1. ; SputnikБеларусь, “Алексей Талай создает российско-белорусский фонд для помощи Донбассу,” June 5, 2023, https://archive.ph/WAN0t, https://sputnik.by/20230506/aleksey-talay-sozdaet-rossiysko-belorusskiy-fond-dlya-pomoschidonbassu-1075267833.html.
9. TACC, “Мезенцев: Помощь Детям Донбасса Стала Мероприятием Союзного Государства,” September 23, 2023,
https://perma.cc/Z4C6-QRN5, https://tass.ru/obschestvo/15853367. ; Source B012 has been withheld for protection
concerns.
10. Sources B006, B008, B009 have been withheld for protection concerns.
11. Sources B010, B011 have been withheld for protection concerns. ; Прэзідэнта Рэспублікі Беларусь, “Уручэнне
Генеральскіх Пагонаў Вышэйшаму Афіцэрскаму Складу,” accessed September 15, 2023,https://archive.ph/Y2gCu,
https://president.gov.by/special/be/events/vruchenie-generalskih-pogon-vysshemu-oficerskomu-sostavu.; Президент
Республики Беларусь, “Заседание Высшего Государственного Совета Союзного Государства,” accessed August
9, 2023, https://archive.ph/Zj3lx, https://president.gov.by/ru/events/zasedanie-vysshego-gosudarstvennogo-sovetasoyuznogo-gosudarstva.;
12. БЕЛТА, “‘Мы получили поддержку и согласие Президента’, Талай об организации помощи детям из Донбасса,”June 17, 2023, https://archive.ph/TihSJ, https://www.belta.by/society/view/my-poluchili-podderzhku-i-soglasieprezidenta-talaj-ob-organizatsii-pomoschi-detjam-iz-donbassa-572397-2023/.; Sources B012, B013 have been
withheld for protection concerns. ; Прэзідэнта Рэспублікі Беларусь, “Уручэнне Генеральскіх Пагонаў Вышэйшаму
Афіцэрскаму Складу,” accessed September 15, 2023,https://archive.ph/Y2gCu, https://president.gov.by/special/be/
events/vruchenie-generalskih-pogon-vysshemu-oficerskomu-sostavu.
13. Freedom House, “Belarus: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report,” accessed August 8, 2023, https://archive.ph/Kmb46, https://freedomhouse.org/country/belarus/freedom-world/2023.
14. Sources B014, B015, B016, B017 have been withheld for protection concerns.
15. Sources B009, B018, B456 have been withheld for protection concerns. ; @6-Б класс МБОУ г.Горловки “Школа 42,” VK,
March 13, 2023, https://perma.cc/9SMP-N3J3,https://vk.com/wall-199308208_1252.F41.
16. Source B019 has been withheld for protection reasons.

2717. Sources B020, B021, B022, B023, B024, B025 have been withheld for protection reasons.
18. Sources B026, B027, B028, B033, B034 have been withheld for protection reasons.
19. Sources B037, B038, B039, B040 have been withheld for protection reasons.
20. Source B041 has been withheld for protection reasons.
21. Sources B042, B043, B044, B045, B046, B047, B048, B049, B028, B078, B468 have been withheld for protection reasons.;@berezka_belagruda, Telegram, edited August 14, 2022, https://archive.ph/fy2KO, https://t.me/berezka_belagruda/3200.
22. Khoshnood, Kaveh, Nathaniel A. Raymond and Caitlin N. Howarth et al., “Russia’s Systematic Program for
the Re-education and Adoption of Ukraine’s Children,” February 14, 2023, Humanitarian Research Lab at
Yale School of Public Health: New Haven, https://hub.conflictobservatory.org/portal/sharing/rest/content/
items/97f919ccfe524d31a241b53ca44076b8/data.
23. Sources B049, B050, B422, B444, B054, B078, B457 have been withheld for protection reasons.
24. Sources B051, B052, B053, B054, B056 have been withheld for protection reasons.
25. All statements in this key finding represent an aggregate total based on Yale HRL’s analytic synthesis of findings.; Source
B041 has been withheld for protection reasons.; TACC, “Мезенцев: Помощь Детям Донбасса Стала Мероприятием
Союзного Государства,” September 23, 2022, https://perma.cc/Z4C6-QRN5, https://tass.ru/obschestvo/15853367.
26. Sources B057, B058, B059, B060, B448 have been withheld for protection reasons.
27. Министерство иностранных дел Республики Беларусь, “Ответ Пресс-Секретаря МИД А.Глаза На Вопрос «БелТА»в Связи с Саммитом Совета Европы 16-17 Мая 2023 г,” Accessed August 8, 2023, https://archive.ph/gNB9f, https://www.mfa.gov.by/print/press/news_mfa/f678b080ea20c637.html ; “TACC, “Мезенцев: Помощь Детям Донбасса
Стала Мероприятием Союзного Государства,” Accessed August 9, 2023, https://perma.cc/Z4C6-QRN5, https://tass.
ru/obschestvo/15853367. ; Kiborg News, “Білорусь краде українських дітей,” June 5, 2023, https://archive.ph/o3MpZ,
https://kiborg.news/2023/06/05/bilorus-krade-ukrayinskyh-ditej/. ; Kiborg News, “Білорусь краде українських дітей,”June 5, 2023, https://archive.ph/o3MpZ, https://kiborg.news/2023/06/05/bilorus-krade-ukrayinskyh-ditej/. ;28. Freeman, Lindsey, Alexa Koenig, and Eric Stover, “Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations,” Human Rights
Center, January 30, 2022, https://perma.cc/V8EN-QS9V, https://humanrights.berkeley.edu/berkeley-protocol-digital-opensource-investigations.; Source B168 has been withheld for protection reasons.;
29. TACC, “Мезенцев: Помощь Детям Донбасса Стала Мероприятием Союзного Государства,” September 23, 2023,
https://perma.cc/Z4C6-QRN5, https://tass.ru/obschestvo/15853367. ; Прэзідэнта Рэспублікі Беларусь, “Уручэнне
Генеральскіх Пагонаў Вышэйшаму Афіцэрскаму Складу,” accessed September 15, 2023,https://archive.ph/Y2gCu,
https://president.gov.by/special/be/events/vruchenie-generalskih-pogon-vysshemu-oficerskomu-sostavu.
30. Human Rights Watch, “Belarus,” https://archive.ph/mXNU1, https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/belarus.; The
Economist Intelligence Unit, “Belarus,” Accessed August 8, 2023, https://archive.ph/QfK9t, https://country.eiu.com/
belarus.; Freedom House, “Belarus: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report,” Accessed August 8, 2023, https://archive.ph/Kmb46, https://freedomhouse.org/country/belarus/freedom-world/2023.
31. The Clingendael Institute, “Historical and Legal Context of the Union State of Russia and Belarus,” https://archive.ph/tcAms, https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2021/an-ever-closer-union/2-historical-and-legal-context/.
32. Ibid.
33. Sheftalovich, Zoya, “Belarus’ Lukashenko: ‘The Only Mistake We Made’ Was Not Finishing off Ukraine with Russia in
2014,” Politico, June 2, 2023, https://archive.ph/cF0Dc, https://www.politico.eu/article/belarus-alexander-lukashenkomistake-not-invade-ukraine-russia-2014-vladimir-putin/.; Karmanau, Yuras, “Belarusians Wary of Being Drawn into
Russia’s War in Ukraine,” PBS NewsHour, https://archive.ph/g1EWM, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/belarusianswary-of-being-drawn-into-russias-war-in-ukraine. ; Coakley, Amanda,“Lukashenko Is Letting Putin Use Belarus to Attack
Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, February 24, 2022, https://archive.ph/5IKCq, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/24/russiaukraine-war-belarus-chernobyl-lukashenko/.
34. Президента Республики Беларусь, “О Пребывании Граждан Украины в Республике Беларусь № 420 От 30Августа 2014 г,” Accessed August 9, 2023, https://archive.ph/aG76t, https://president.gov.by/ru/documents/ukaz-420ot-30-avgusta-2014-g-9659.; “Президента Республики Беларусь, “Об Изменении Указа Президента Республики
Беларусь (Корректируется Указ № 420 От 30 Августа 2014 г.)Указ № 326 От 14 Сентября 2022 г,” Accessed August 9, 2023, https://archive.ph/wGjKk, https://president.gov.by/
ru/documents/ukaz-no-326-ot-14-sentyabrya-2022-g.; Президент России, “Указ «О мерах, осуществляемых всубъектах Российской Федерации в связи с Указом Президента Российской Федерации от 19 октября 2022 г. №
28

756»,” October 27, 2022, https://archive.ph/lThVI, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69632. ; Venice Commission,“Belarus - Constitution (with Amendments Adopted by Referendum of 27 February 2022).” Accessed August 21, 2023,
https://perma.cc/5XU4-CBQ9, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-REF(2022)034-e.; Freedom
House, “Belarus: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report,” Accessed August 8, 2023, https://archive.ph/Kmb46,
https://freedomhouse.org/country/belarus/freedom-world/2023.
35. Source B061 has been withheld for protection reasons.; Source B062 has been withheld for protection reasons.
Система ГАРАНТ, “Указ Губернатора Ростовской Области От 9 Марта 2023 г. N 20”О Дополнительных Мерах ПоРеализации Указа Президента Российской Федерации От 19 Октября 2022 г. N 757”,” accessed August 21, 2023,
https://archive.ph/uz6g1, http://ivo.garant.ru/#/document/406505903/paragraph/1/doclist/7070:0.
36. Министерство иностранных дел Республики Беларусь, “Ответ Пресс-Секретаря МИД А.Глаза На Вопрос «БелТА»в Связи с Саммитом Совета Европы 16-17 Мая 2023 г,” Accessed August 8, 2023, https://archive.ph/gNB9f, https://www.mfa.gov.by/print/press/news_mfa/f678b080ea20c637.html ;37. Khoshnood, Kaveh, Nathaniel A. Raymond and Caitlin N. Howarth et al., “Russia’s Systematic Program for
the Re-education and Adoption of Ukraine’s Children,” 14 February 2023, Humanitarian Research Lab at
Yale School of Public Health: New Haven, https://hub.conflictobservatory.org/portal/sharing/rest/content/
items/97f919ccfe524d31a241b53ca44076b8/data.
38. Президента Республики Беларусь, “О Пребывании Граждан Украины в Республике Беларусь № 420 От 30Августа 2014 г,” Accessed August 9, 2023, https://archive.ph/aG76t, https://president.gov.by/ru/documents/ukaz-420ot-30-avgusta-2014-g-9659.
39. @alexey_talai, Telegram, https://perma.cc/AD87-FAJG, https://t.me/alexey_talai/73.
40. Source B063 has been withheld for protection reasons.
41. Sources B064, B168 have been withheld for protection reasons.
42. Sources B065, B066 have been withheld for protection reasons.
43. “TACC, “Мезенцев: Помощь Детям Донбасса Стала Мероприятием Союзного Государства,” Accessed August 9,2023, https://perma.cc/Z4C6-QRN5, https://tass.ru/obschestvo/15853367.
44. Source B448 has been withheld for protection reasons.
45. Ibid.
46. Президент России, “Указ «О мерах, осуществляемых в субъектах Российской Федерации в связи с Указом
Президента Российской Федерации от 19 октября 2022 г. № 756»,” October 27, 2022, https://archive.ph/lThVI, http://
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69632.
47. Sources B067, B068 have been withheld for protection reasons.
48. Sources B069, B184 have been withheld for protection reasons.
49. Source B071 has been withheld due to protection reasons.
50. @6-Б класс МБОУ г.Горловки “Школа 42”, VK, https://perma.cc/9SMP-N3J3, https://vk.com/wall-199308208_1252.
51. Система ГАРАНТ, “Указ Губернатора Ростовской Области От 9 Марта 2023 г. N 20”О Дополнительных Мерах ПоРеализации Указа Президента Российской Федерации От 19 Октября 2022 г. N 757”,” Accessed August 21, 2023,
https://archive.ph/uz6g1, http://ivo.garant.ru/#/document/406505903/paragraph/1/doclist/7070:0.
52. Source B072 has been withheld for protection reasons.
53. Ibid.
54. @alexey_talai, Telegram, https://perma.cc/8ZDW-CPV9, https://t.me/alexey_talai/2993.
55. Source B074 has been withheld for protection concerns.
56. Source B075 has been withheld for protection concerns.
57. Ibid.
58. Лента новостей ЛНР, “Сотрудники СК России посетили с рабочей поездкой Донецкую и Луганскую народные
республики,” June 5, 2023, https://archive.ph/0Cfp5, https://lnr-news.ru/incident/2023/06/05/196405.html.
59. OSCE, “Организация По Безопасности и Сотрудничеству в Европе По Демократическим Институтам и Правам
Человека,” June 20, 2023, pg. 48, https://perma.cc/RX7T-HYQ6, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/a/546557.
29

pdf.
60. Source B077 has been withheld for protection concerns.
61. Президент Республики Беларусь, “Посещение Национального Аэропорта Минск и Минского Завода
Гражданской Авиации №407,” Accessed August 23, 2023, https://archive.ph/7MdLQ, https://president.gov.by/ru/
events/poseshchenie-nacionalnogo-aeroporta-minsk-i-minskogo-zavoda-grazhdanskoy-aviacii-no407.
62. Sources B078, B079 have been withheld for protection reasons.
63. Sources B080, B081, B082, B083, B084 have been withheld for protection reasons.
64. Sources B468, B469 have been withheld for protection reasons.
65. All statements in this key finding represent an aggregate total based on Yale HRL’s analytic synthesis of findings.
66. Sources B085, B086, B087, B088, B089, B011 have been withheld for protection reasons. Информационноаналитический портал Союзного государства, “Союзное государство в зеркале СМИ за 10 мая,” soyuz.by, https://archive.ph/llIFR, https://soyuz.by/obzor-smi/soyuznoe-gosudarstvo-v-zerkale-smi-za-10-maya-1. Sputnik Беларусь,“Алексей Талай создает российско-белорусский фонд для помощи Донбассу,” https://archive.ph/WAN0t, https://
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67. Sources B090, B091 have been withheld for protection reasons.
68. Note: “Adopted children” is the wording used by Belarus’s state-funded media when reporting the demographicsof these groups of children. Yale HRL has not yet found any additional clarification regarding the nature of these“adopted children.” ; Sources B092, B093, B094 have been withheld for protection reasons.
69. NAM, “Ukraine Investigating Role of Belarus in Transfers of Children, Prosecutor Says,” accessed September 26, 2023,
https://archive.li/u11yM, https://www.belarus-nau.org/en/post/ukraine-investigating-role-of-belarus-in-transfers-ofchildren-prosecutor-says. ; NAM, “Lukashenko personally approved the forced relocation of Ukrainian children, says
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70. Deutsch, Anthony, and Stephanie van den Berg, “Ukraine Investigating Role of Belarus in Transfers of Children, Prosecutor
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Verity Bowman, and Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Exclusive: Belarus Abducts Thousands of Ukrainian Children,” The Telegraph, July17, 2023, https://archive.ph/OKXMV, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/07/17/russia-abducting-ukrainianchildren-via-belarus/.
71. Sources B098, B099, B100, B101 have been withheld for protection reasons. ; Белтелерадиокомпания, “Ребята ИзДонбасса Сыграли в Хоккей На Льду ‘Олимпик-Арены,’” Accessed October 4, 2023, https://archive.ph/dh5hh, https://www.tvr.by/news/obshchestvo/rebyata_iz_donbassa_sygrali_v_khokkey_na_ldu_olimpik_areny/.
72. Sources B103, B104, B105, B106, B107, B108, B109, B110, B111, B112, B446, B447 have been withheld for protection
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73. Sources B113, B114 have been withheld for protection reasons
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76. Sources B381, B382, B383, B384 have been withheld for protection reasons.
77. Sources B379, B380 have been withheld for protection reasons
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79. Source B385 has been withheld for protection reasons.
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https://belrus.ru/info/status_vyisshego_gosudarstvennogo_soveta_soyu/.; Информационно-аналитический портал
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garant.ru/#/document/406505903/paragraph/1/doclist/7070:0.; TACC, “Мезенцев: Помощь Детям Донбасса Стала
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85. ПАРЛАМЕНТСКОЕ СОБРАНИЕ СОЮЗА БЕЛАРУСИ И РОССИИ, “Статус Высшего Государственного Совета
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gosudarstvennogo_soveta_soyu/. ; Информационно-аналитический портал Союзного государства, “Высший
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86. Ibid.
87. Прэзідэнта Рэспублікі Беларусь, “Уручэнне Генеральскіх Пагонаў Вышэйшаму Афіцэрскаму Складу,” Accessed
September 15, 2023, https://archive.ph/Y2gCu, https://president.gov.by/special/be/events/vruchenie-generalskih-pogon-

31

vysshemu-oficerskomu-sostavu.
88. Sources B149, B150, B151, B152 have been withheld for protection reasons
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90. Ibid.
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92. Source B154 has been withheld for protection reasons.
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98. Source B160 has been withheld for protection reasons.
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kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69632. ; Президента Республики Беларусь, О Пребывании Граждан Украиныв Республике Беларусь № 420 От 30 Августа 2014 г,” Accessed August 9, 2023, https://archive.ph/aG76t, https://president.gov.by/ru/documents/ukaz-420-ot-30-avgusta-2014-g-9659.; “Президента Республики Беларусь, “ОбИзменении Указа Президента Республики Беларусь (Корректируется Указ № 420 От 30 Августа 2014 г.)Указ № 326 От 14 Сентября 2022 г,” Accessed August 9, 2023, https://archive.ph/wGjKk, https://president.gov.by/ru/
documents/ukaz-no-326-ot-14-sentyabrya-2022-g. ; Venice Commission, “Belarus - Constitution (with Amendments
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102. ФЕДЕРАЛЬНАЯ СЛУЖБА БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ (ФСБ России) ПОГРАНИЧНОЕ
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for the Re-education and Adoption of Ukraine’s Children,” 14 February 2023, Humanitarian Research Lab at
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32

items/97f919ccfe524d31a241b53ca44076b8/data.
106. Sources B162, B163 have been withheld for protection reasons.
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108. Source B168 has been withheld for protection reasons.
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110. Ibid.
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112. Прэзідэнта Рэспублікі Беларусь, “Уручэнне Генеральскіх Пагонаў Вышэйшаму Афіцэрскаму Складу,” Accessed
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113. Прэзідэнта Рэспублікі Беларусь, “Уручэнне Генеральскіх Пагонаў Вышэйшаму Афіцэрскаму Складу,” Accessed
September 15, 2023, https://archive.ph/Y2gCu, https://president.gov.by/special/be/events/vruchenie-generalskih-pogonvysshemu-oficerskomu-sostavu; TACC, “Мезенцев: Помощь Детям Донбасса Стала Мероприятием Союзного
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B119 has been withheld for protection reasons. ; Source B137 has been withheld for protection reasons.
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ru/documents/ukaz-no-326-ot-14-sentyabrya-2022-g.; Президента Республики Беларусь, О Пребывании Граждан
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Belarus, “BRSM Youth Union,” Accessed August 9, 2023, https://archive.ph/cGk4m, https://president.gov.by/en/belarus/
society/public-associations/brsm-youth-union.
116. Belarus.by, “Прием По Случаю 20-Летия Хоккейной Команды Президента Беларуси Состоялся Во Дворце
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117. Source B171 has been withheld for protection reasons.
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https://oshmiany.gov.by/ru/republic-ru/view/aleksandr-lukashenko-my-zhelaem-tolko-odnogo-videt-ulybki-detej-i-znatchto-oni-zhivut-v-mire-i-22648-2022.
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been withheld for protection reasons.
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250. Source B373 has been withheld for protection reasons.
251. All statements in this paragraph represent an aggregate total based on Yale HRL’s analytic synthesis of findings.
252. Freedom House, “Belarus: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report,” Accessed August 8, 2023, https://archive.ph/Kmb46, https://freedomhouse.org/country/belarus/freedom-world/2023.
253. Ibid.
254. Venice Commission, “Belarus - Constitution (with Amendments Adopted by Referendum of 27 February 2022).”
Accessed August 21, 2023, https://perma.cc/5XU4-CBQ9, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-

39

REF(2022)034-e.
255. @alexey_talai, Telegram, https://perma.cc/8ZDW-CPV9, https://t.me/alexey_talai/2993.
256. Ibid.
257. Телеканал Беларусь 1, “Алексей Талай: ‘Всех Знаю, Всех Помню и За Каждого Молюсь!,’” March 3, 2023, https://perma.cc/CZJ8-3PLK, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z7B0ymOnxb8.
258. Source B374 has been withheld for protection reasons.
259. Source B375 has been withheld for protection reasons.
260. Source B376 has been withheld for protection reasons.
261. Source B377 has been withheld for protection reasons; Belarus24.by, “Дети Из Донбасса Прибыли в Беларусь НаОздоровление,” September 19, 2023, https://perma.cc/3GY3-7CLF, https://belarus24.by/news/society/deti-iz-donbassapribyli-v-belarus-na-ozdorovlenie190920231000/.
262. Source B378 has been withheld for protection reasons.
263. Министерство образования Республики Беларусь Главное управление по образованию Брестского
облисполкома. “Республиканская Акция «Мечты Рождаются – Мечты Сбываются!».” Accessed August 9, 2023,
https://archive.ph/KEKkF http://goo.baranovichi.edu.by/ru/main.aspx?guid=96521; @obrazovanie_Lida, Telegram,
https://perma.cc/5RFW-3FDA, https://t.me/obrazovanie_Lida/37894.
264. Министерство образования Республики Беларусь Главное управление по образованию Брестского
облисполкома. “Республиканская Акция «Мечты Рождаются – Мечты Сбываются!».” Accessed August 9, 2023,
https://archive.ph/KEKkF http://goo.baranovichi.edu.by/ru/main.aspx?guid=96521.
265. Министерство образования Республики Беларусь Главное управление по образованию Брестского
облисполкома. “Республиканская Акция «Мечты Рождаются – Мечты Сбываются!».” Accessed August 9, 2023,
https://archive.ph/KEKkF http://goo.baranovichi.edu.by/ru/main.aspx?guid=96521.
266. Source B400 has been withheld for protection reasons.
267. Source B386 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B387 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source
B388 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B389 has been withheld for protection reasons.
268. Source B390 has been withheld for protection reasons.
269. Freedom House, “Belarus: Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report,” Accessed August 8, 2023, https://archive.ph/Kmb46, https://freedomhouse.org/country/belarus/freedom-world/2023.
270. Source B391 has been withheld for protection reasons; Sputnik.by, “Политолог Шпаковский назначен советникомпосланником посольства Беларуси в РФ”, Accessed October 4, 2023, https://perma.cc/NX7R-UPAW, https://sputnik.
by/20230901/politolog-shpakovskiy-naznachen-sovetnikom-poslannikom-posolstva-belarusi-v-rf-1079092953.html.
271. Source B392 has been withheld for protection reasons.
272. Source B393 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B395 has been withheld for protection reasons.
273. Source B399 has been withheld for protection reasons.
274.Source B404 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B405 has been withheld for protection reasons; Official
Internet Portal of the President of the Republic of Belarus. “Visit to Military Unit No. 3214 of the Internal Troops of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs in Uruchie,” July 28, 2020. https://president.gov.by/en/events/visit-to-military-unit-no-3214-ofthe-internal-troops-of-the-ministry-of-internal-affairs-in-uruchie.
275. Source B406 has been withheld for protection reasons; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury and International
Partners Condemn Ongoing Human Rights Abuses and Erosion of Democracy in Belarus,” June 21, 2021, https://perma.
cc/2JUH-H78N, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0237; OpenSanctions, “Internal Troops of the Ministryof Internal Affairs of the Republic of Belarus,” June 10, 2022, https://perma.cc/6CAJ-8CPW, https://www.opensanctions.
org/entities/NK-bhQnSMi87Ewv6fRk7Q6Z8n/.
276. The unit is led by Vladimir Zhiznevsky, who is under European Union sanctions and was considered for US sanctionsin 2020 (”Notes: Commission of acts of violence against peaceful protesters, torture of detainees, inhumane detainment
conditions, persecution of political opposition and journalists.); Congressional Record, September 15, 2020, Vol. 166
edition, sec. No. 159, https://perma.cc/4XJQ-MQB7, https://www.congress.gov/116/crec/2020/09/15/CREC-2020-0915-pt1-PgH4385-4.pdf; Source B409 has been withheld for protection reasons.
40277. Source B410 has been withheld for protection reasons.
278. Source B444 has been withheld for protection reasons.
279. Source B412 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B413 has been withheld for protection reasons.
280. Source B414 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B415 has been withheld for protection reasons.
281. Source B416 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B417 has been withheld for protection reasons.
282. Source B418 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B419 has been withheld for protection reasons.
283. Source B420 has been withheld for protection reasons.
284. Source B422 has been withheld for protection reasons.
285. Ibid.
286. This statement represents an aggregate total based on Yale HRL’s analytic synthesis of findings.
287. Source B424 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B425 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source
B426 has been withheld for protection reasons.
288. Российская газета, “В Гомеле и Минске встретили детей из ДНР и ЛНР, прибывших на оздоровление вбелорусские санатории,” Accessed August 8, 2023, https://perma.cc/VG9Y-J89E, https://rg.ru/2022/12/15/potomuchto-odna-semia.html.
289. Source B428 has been withheld for protection reasons.
290. Ibid.
291. Source B430 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B431 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source
B432 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B433 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B434 has
been withheld for protection reasons.
292. Шахцёр Солигорск, “26 точек подачи кислорода: инфекционное отделение солигорской больницы готово
принять первых пациентов с COVID-19,” November 27, 2020, https://perma.cc/WY5Z-TWPX, https://shahter.by/soligorsk/52-tochki-podachi-kisloroda-infektsionnoe-otdelenie-soligorskoj-bolnitsy-gotovo-prinyat-pervyh-patsientov-scovid-19/.
293. @Стройтрест № 3, VK, October 02, 2022, archive.ph/66m9l, https://vk.com/prikaz270str3?w=wall-155214329_4197.
294. Source B435 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B436 has been withheld for protection reasons.
295. OSCE, “Организация По Безопасности и Сотрудничеству в Европе По Демократическим Институтам и Правам
Человека,” June 20, 2023, pg. 48, https://perma.cc/RX7T-HYQ6, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/a/546557.
pdf.
296. Source B436 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B437 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source
B438 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B439 has been withheld for protection reasons.
297. Source B440 has been withheld for protection reasons.
298. Source B445 has been withheld for protection reasons.
299. Source B441 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B451 has been withheld for protection reasons.
300. Source B263 has been withheld for protection reasons; Source B470 has been withheld for protection reasons.
301. Source B451 has been withheld for protection reasons.
Accountability mechanisms, humanitarians, and credentialed researchers and journalists
can contact hrl@yale.edu for the full, unredacted source list.

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